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Intellectual Property Cite as: N. Elizabeth Mills, Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design: An Overview of Existing Law and A Look Toward Proposed Legislative Changes, 5 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 24 (2009), available at <http://lctjournal.washington.edu/vol5/a24mills.html>
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGN: AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LAW AND A LOOK TOWARD PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
N. Elizabeth Mills1 ©N. Elizabeth Mills
ABSTRACT
Intellectual property distinguishes a protected work’s aesthetic
value from its functionality. In so doing, intellectual property law
prevents fashion designers from asserting their rights over entire
garments. Apparel industry leaders have repeatedly proposed
legislation that would overcome this limitation, and the latest in
a succession of draft bills is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. In
critiquing the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, this Article surveys
fashion designers’ existing federal intellectual property rights,
particularly trade dress. In the most recent Supreme Court
exposition of the elements of a trade dress action, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., the Court clarifies some
elements of the law, but leaves the threshold for establishing
secondary meaning unresolved. After Samara, federal district
courts have applied trade dress protection to fashion designers
without compromising policy objectives against broad intellectual
property rights. This Article concludes that trade dress,
specifically the secondary meaning element of trade dress, is an
underdeveloped area of law with potential to satisfy designers’
need for stronger intellectual property rights where other
legislative attempts have failed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Past and Present Fashion Design Protection: Copyright, Design Patents and Trademarks Proposed Legislation’s Solution to the Shortcomings in Design Protection Obtaining Fashion Design Protection through Trade Dress Conclusion
Practice Pointers
INTRODUCTION
<1>Under the rubric of copyright, patent and trademark, no
single intellectual property right protects a clothing design’s
aesthetic and functional aspects.2 Rather than acquiring rights
to an entire garment, image, or “look,” designers must
compartmentalize a piece of fashion into its functional3 and
aesthetic components,4 and then obtain separate protections
for each.5 However, fashion is not readily susceptible to such
compartmentalization. The aesthetic worth of a pair of pants, for
example, is inseparable from its utility as clothing.6 Accordingly,
fashion designers have sought protection via the Design Piracy
Prohibition Act (DPPA), which would amend Chapter 13 of the
Copyright Act, to include fashion designs among the Copyright
Act’s protected “useful articles.”7 Critiquing the need for sui
generis8 legislation, this Article surveys the intellectual property
rights currently applicable to fashion and identifies their
limitations. The Article then evaluates trade dress as coming the
closest to resolving designers’ compartmentalization problem,9
and concludes that judicial expansion of trade dress would offer
moderate security from design piracy, without the adverse
economic and policy consequences of expansive sui generis
legislation.10
PAST AND PRESENT FASHION DESIGN PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT, DESIGN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
<2>Fashion designers typically rely on copyright, design patent
and trade dress to protect their nonfunctional works. In detail,
the Copyright Act extends intellectual property rights to “works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”11
The statute expands the U.S. Supreme Court’s Mazer v. Stein
holding,12 and has been revised to extend protection to certain
named industries.13 Despite legislative expansion of the
Copyright Act to benefit specific industries, copyright fails to
overcome the apparel industry’s compartmentalization problem,
whereby designers must distinguish between the useful and
aesthetic aspects of their works and assert separate rights to
each.14
<3>The threshold issue for whether a fashion warrants copyright
protection is which elements of the work are copyrightable.15
As was noted, a copyrightable work must be both original and
fixed in tangible form.16 However, copyright does not extend to
useful design components, even where such components are
original and fixed in tangible form. A typical illustration of this
limitation is that neither the pocket of a jacket, nor the overall
jacket design, is copyrightable. As such, copyright has limited
application to fashion designers.
<4>Apart from copyright, design patents also fail to meet
fashion designers’ need for holistic protection over an entire
garment. In general, design patents, which arise under the
Patent Act,17 do not extend to designs “essential to the use” of
a protected work;18 rather, federal protection extends only to
works that are primarily ornamental. For example, a work that
is primarily ornamental would be the embroidery on a
compartment, as opposed to the compartment’s overall
configuration.19 Thus, design patents, like copyright, do not
protect tailoring because the aesthetic and useful value of
tailoring are legally indistinguishable.
<5>Apart from the Copyright Act and the Patent Act, the
Lanham Act, which governs federal trademark rights, offers
fashion designers comparatively more protection in the form of
trade dress.20 Trade dress refers to the “total image, design,
and appearance of a product,” including “size, shape, color,
color combinations, texture or graphics.”21 The Lanham Act
authorizes claims for trade dress infringement, false designation
of origin, false advertising and dilution,22 with remedies of
damages, preliminary injunctions, attorneys’ fees and corrective
advertising costs.23
<6>Requisite to an infringement action, the claimant must
establish the following: (1) the trade dress’s non-functionality24
and “source-identifying role,” either through inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning;25 and (2) a likelihood of
consumers confusing the defendant’s product or service with the
claimant’s.26 In general, courts deny trade dress for designs
that resemble mechanisms, as opposed to ornaments, because
mechanistic designs do not meet the non-functionality
requirement of trade dress protection.27 Whereas the
requirement of consumer confusion reflects the Lanham Act’s
origin in consumer advocacy,28 the non-functionality
requirement lacks a clear policy basis and has been subject to
debate.29
<7>Apart from non-functionality, trade dress protection hinges
on the designer’s use of the trade dress. Specifically, trade
dress claims require a showing of inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning derived from mark use.30 A designer may
not establish secondary meaning instantaneously, or even after
a single runway show, but must instead cultivate the trade dress
until consumers come to associate it with the designer. This rule
is inconsistent with the industry practice of abandoning new
designs well before they become ubiquitous.31 Absent instant
trade dress protection, designers face uncertainty over whether
a work may warrant protection.32
<8>Revisiting the undeveloped state of trade dress law, the
Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.
observed that courts should “classify ambiguous trade dress as
product design.”33 To protect such a trade dress, claimants
must establish its secondary meaning, not mere inherent
distinctiveness. Although the Samara Court held that an
unregistered color lacked inherent distinctiveness sufficient to
support a trade dress infringement action, the Court ruled that
even colors may warrant trade dress protection if they have
acquired secondary meaning.34 While the Samara opinion
advises courts against broadly extending trade dress protection,
the holding does not preclude applying trade dress protection to
fashion design.35 Because the Supreme Court has not
addressed how trade dress applies to fashion design since
Samara,36 other federal courts have extended trade dress
protections on a case-by-case basis, leaving inconsistent case
law ripe for legislative intervention.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION’S SOLUTION TO THE SHORTCOMINGS IN DESIGN PROTECTION
<9>Due to competitor opposition and ideological arguments
against sui generis legislation, the fashion design industry has
sought such legislative intervention with limited success.37
Congress has addressed design protection bills in each
convening session from the 96th session to the 102nd, and
again in the second session of the 109th Congress.38 The
Fashion Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA)39 would allow
three years of copyright protection to fashion designers’ useful
articles.40 The DPPA would protect clothing, handbags, and
eyewear against both primary and secondary infringement, and
offer damages of $250,000 per violation or five dollars per
counterfeited article, whichever is greater.41
<10>The DPPA has assumed many forms throughout the years,
but first arose in the 1930s.42 Critics attributed the DPPA
predecessors’ failure to overly broad language, disproportionate
benefit to elite designers, and the risk of making fashion
inaccessible to middle and lower-income consumers. Despite this
history of failure, proponents tout the current DPPA as a
breakthrough in helping prevent design piracy, and granting
U.S. designers protections on par with those of Europe.43
Proponents argue that existing intellectual property rights fall
short of those afforded other industries, and the United States
risks a loss of fashion design talent to markets with more
expansive intellectual property rights.
<11>Designers’ aim for legislative subsidies in the Copyright Act
also has historical precedent among other industries.
Semiconductor mask works gained protection under the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,44 and boat hull
designs also received specifically tailored safeguards as “useful
article[s]” under the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act.45 Both
acts’ legislative histories suggest Congress contemplated
including additional industries in the sui generis amendments to
Title 17.46 However, unlike these other two industries, fashion
has not established its works constitute “useful article[s],” and
Congress likely will not amend the Copyright Act to limit an
already prospering industry’s exposure to competition.
OBTAINING FASHION DESIGN PROTECTION THROUGH TRADE DRESS
<12>Among the existing intellectual property rights, trade dress
is perceived as the most appropriate for encompassing an entire
fashion design.47 Trade dress offers practical advantages to
designers because it extends to both registered and
unregistered works and has no originality or fixation
requirement.48 In recent years, trade dress has shown promise
for fashion designers seeking to protect the nonfunctional
aspects of their works. In the representative case Cosmos
Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., a California district court upheld
the claimant jewelry designer’s trade dress right against a
defendant jewelry designer.49 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling.50
<13>The Cosmos defendant had used the claimant’s sand-
blasted gold plumeria pattern on pendants, necklaces, bracelets,
rings, and earrings.51 As a threshold matter, the court
determined that the jewelry design “depict[ing] the plumeria
flower in yellow gold in a specific size and shape with a sand-
blasted matte finish on the petals and high-polished shiny
edges” was nonfunctional.52 Accordingly, the court
distinguished the flower-patterned jewelry’s aesthetic value from
its function as jewelry.53 After the court concluded that the
pattern was within the scope of trade dress protection, the
dispositive factor in the ruling was whether the claimant’s trade
dress had acquired secondary meaning.54
<14>The Court relied on four factors for secondary meaning: (1)
whether consumers “associate” the trade dress with the
claimant designer; (2) the “degree and manner” of the
claimant’s advertising; (3) the “length and manner” of the
claimant’s trade dress use; and (4) the exclusivity of this use.55
Under this analysis, and after a finding of likelihood of consumer
confusion over the origin of the defendant’s infringing dress, the
district court awarded damages, attorney’s fees, and an
injunction against the defendant’s production of competing
jewelry.56
<15>Although the claimant had also raised a claim for copyright
infringement, the court denied this claim on grounds that the
plumeria pattern was ubiquitous in nature and, therefore, did
not meet the originality requirement of copyright protection.57
Thus, trade dress protection may prove viable for fashion
designers whose works fail to meet the originality requirement
of copyright protection.58 As evinced by Cosmos, trade dress
provides enough flexibility for designers to obtain protection
over entire fashions, so long as they consist of designs that
have secondary meaning.
<16>In addition, as Cosmos indicates, courts remain receptive to
trade dress as protection for fashion designs.59 Nevertheless,
Cosmos upholds trade dress rights that are less expansive than
those of the DPPA. For example, existing trade dress law does
not grant designers any proprietary interest in a derivative work
they have not created, whereas the DPPA would protect against
both primary and secondary infringement.60 One additional
caveat to leaving fashion design protection to the courts is the
probability of circuit splits contributing to forum shopping.61
<17>If history is any indication of the outcome of the DPPA
debate, fashion designers’ only recourse lies in appealing to the
courts for innovative applications of existing protections.62 An
alternative of allowing a designer to control an entire garment
or “look,” as the DPPA proposes, would limit not only
competition among designers, but also purchasing power and
choice among consumers. Despite the Cosmos holding’s
potential to expand trade dress protection, the opinion also has
notable limitations. Specifically, Cosmos has yet to be followed,
pertains to jewelry rather than textiles, and does not address
whether the trade dress at issue has the secondary meaning
Samara requires. Nevertheless, Cosmos reignites trade dress as
a potential solution to the inadequacies of intellectual property
protection for fashion designers.
<18>Thus, to raise a trade dress claim, fashion designers must
establish a trade dress’s distinctiveness in one of two ways:
inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning. The Samara and
Cosmos Courts both evaluate the strength of a product design’s
secondary meaning, and much of the continued debate
surrounding trade dress centers on establishing distinctiveness.
Fashion designers who establish this element obtain protection
more consistent with the demands of the industry.
CONCLUSION
<19>Trade dress offers a potential alternative to sui generis
legislation for fashion designers seeking intellectual property
rights tailored to the industry. The best approach for apparel
designers seeking to protect their work from piracy is a
combination of existing intellectual property protections, with
emphasis on trade dress. Congress’s historical reluctance to
extend sui generis protection to designers affirms their need to
leverage the existing intellectual property framework, despite its
potential insufficiency.
PRACTICE POINTERS
File for trade dress registration with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. Registration is
an advantage in infringement disputes, although it is
not a requirement of protection under the Lanham
Act.
Invest in advertising that associates the design with
the designer. Specifically, establish consumer
familiarity with a design before seeking trade dress
protection. Target consumers must recognize the
fashion design as the work of the designer, because
trade dress protection for non-packaging designs
requires secondary meaning in the eyes of
consumers.
Ensure the fashion design is available and visible to
the public for the duration of trade dress protection.
Modifying a trade dress or withdrawing it from the
market may forfeit protection.
Differentiate the functional elements of a fashion
design from its nonfunctional elements; only
nonfunctional elements which are solely eligible for
trade dress protection.
<< Top
Footnotes
1. N. Elizabeth Mills, University of Washington School of
Law, J.D./M.B.A. program Class of 2010. Thank you
to University of Washington School of Law Professor
Jane K. Winn and Fashion Institute of Technology
Professor Guillermo Jimenez. Thank you also to
Alexander Casey and Heather T. Rankie, student
editors, for their direction.
2. Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why
Congress Should Adopt a Modified Version of the
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
305, 309 (2007) (“For decades, designers have
sought shelter for their work in nearly all areas of
intellectual property law, including design patent,
trademark, trade dress, and copyright. However,
none of these fields of law has provided complete
protection for fashion designs.”).
3. Discussion of the Patent Act’s application to fashion
is beyond the scope of this Article, because the
patentable components of fashion design (i.e.,
zippers, buttons, etc.) are minimal. 35 U.S.C. § 101
et seq. (2006).
4. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773
F.2d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (copyright infringement case defining
“separability” of aesthetic and functional elements of
a mannequin design, and asserting copyright
protection does not extend to functional elements).
5. See Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d
150, 156-61 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming rule that
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (2006), generally limits trade dress
protections to nonfunctional components of a design,
such that the plaintiff’s album’s book spine did not
warrant trade dress protection); see also Publ’ns
Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding trade dress protection not available
to overall functional design); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v.
Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d
Cir. 1987) (“[I]f design elements reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic
aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually
separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely,
where design elements can be identified as reflecting
the designer's artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual
separability exists.”).
6. Marshall, supra note 2, at 311 (“Designers looking to
protect the overall appearance of a garment have
run up against obstacles in every area of intellectual
property law.”).
7. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th
Cong. (2007).
8. In this context, sui generis denotes legislation
enacted specifically for a defined class (i.e., fashion
designers). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed.
2004).
9. Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1085-88 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (extending
trade dress protection to include ornate jewelry
design, despite the Supreme Court’s dicta in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205, 211 (2000) and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (cautioning
against broad trade dress protections)), aff’d, No.
07-55333, 2009 WL 766517 (9th Cir. Mar. 24,
2009).
10. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, How
Copyright Law Could Kill the Fashion Industry, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/News/Detail.aspx?
recordid=1188.
11. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
12. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding
statuettes as copyrightable).
13. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(2) (West 2008).
14. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212 n.23 ("Productions of the
industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character
are not subject to copyright registration, even if
artistically made or ornamented.") (internal citation
omitted).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
16. Id.
17. 35 U.S.C §§ 171-73 (2006).
18. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d
1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Power
Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234,
238 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
19. Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 238.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
21. Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Clicks
Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252,
1257 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v.
Po Sun Hon Co., No. 07-55333, 2009 WL 766517
(9th Cir. Mar 24, 2009)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
23. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8 (4th ed.1996).
24. See Glenn Mitchell & Rose Auslander, Trade Dress
Protection: Will a Statutorily Unified Standard Result
in a Functionally Superior Solution?, 88 TRADEMARK
REP. 472, 499 (1998) (noting that the circuits do not
agree on which party has the burden of proof for a
functionality issue); see also Mitchell M. Wong, Note,
The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of
Trade-Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116,
1142 (1998) (discussing the “competition” theory of
functionality).
25. A work acquires secondary meaning when “in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature . . . is to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself.” Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995)
(citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982)).
26. Cosmos Jewelry, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. Also,
non-functionality refers to that aspect of the trade
dress that does not contribute to its purpose, utility,
or value. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc.,
251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165
(1995) (explaining that “[a] product feature is
functional and cannot serve as a trademark if the
product feature is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would
put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-
related disadvantage.”)).
27. Compare Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter
GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying
trade dress protection to a pipette tip, whose design
was functional and essential to the product’s
intended use), and Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp.,
296 F.3d 778, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the
denial of trade dress protection for the overall design
of a mechanism used to sever wheel chair
restraints), and Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v.
SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999)
(denying trade dress protection to an ornate
silverware design, under the aesthetic functionality
doctrine), and Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int'l, Inc., 353 F.
Supp. 2d 218, 227 (D.R.I. 2005) (denying a trade
dress protection for ornate measuring spoons on
similar grounds), with Hartford House, Ltd., v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.
1988) (citing Fuddruckers Inc., v. Doc's B.R. Others,
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that an overall design may warrant trade dress
protection, even if the design includes functional
components)), and Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun
Hon Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2006), aff’d Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co.,
No. 07-55333, 2009 WL 766517 (9th Cir. Mar 24,
2009) (granting trade dress protection to ornate
jewelry design).
28. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2003) (observing that §
1125(a) of the Lanham Act is intended to prevent
consumer confusion, not reward creativity).
29. See Judith Beth Prowda, The Trouble with Trade
Dress Protection of Product Design, 61 ALB. L. REV.
1309, 1354 (1998) (“It is manifest that courts that
have addressed the issue of whether nonfunctional
features can serve as trade dress have reached very
different conclusions as to the relevant legal
standard for such a determination.”).
30. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, at § 8:13.
31. Dep’t of Parks & Recs. for the State of Cal. v.
Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th
Cir. 2006) (stating that “the common law . . .
requires a mark to have been used in commerce
before a protectable ownership interest in the mark
arises.”).
32. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Glow Indus.,
Inc. v. Lopez, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (trademark infringement in the context of
fashion design); Carillon Imps. Ltd. v. Frank Pesce
Group, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1996),
aff'd, 112 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
trade dress offers protection for vodka bottle
design).
33. Samara, 529 U.S. at 215-16 (holding that, in an
action for infringement of an unregistered trade
dress, “a product's design is distinctive, and
therefore protectable, only upon a showing of
secondary meaning.”); see also Megan Williams,
Comment, Fashioning a New Idea: How the Design
Piracy Prohibition Act is a Reasonable Solution to the
Fashion Design Problem, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 303 (2007).
34. Samara, 529 U.S. at 216.
35. See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars,
LP, 423 F.3d 539, 547 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
between trademarks and the broader protection
available under trade dress); see also Publ’ns Int'l,
Ltd., v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir.
1998) (acknowledging that the plaintiff’s cookbook
could warrant overall trade dress protection,
notwithstanding the fact that none of the individual
functional components of the cookbook warranted
trade dress protection); see also Coach Leatherware
Co., Inc. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d
Cir. 1991) (defining trade dress), abrogated by
Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d
815 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
36. Samara, 529 U.S. at 216.
37. Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (recognizing that
design protection bills passed in the House in 1962
and in the Senate in 1963 and 1965 and that
“extensive hearings” have been conducted between
1990 and 1992), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:28908.wais.
38. Id.
39. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th
Cong. (2007).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (opining
that patent law often “fails to give the needed
protection, for designs and patterns usually are
short-lived and with the conditions and time
incidental to obtaining the patent, this protection
comes too late, if at all.”).
43. Diane von Furstenberg, Von Furstenberg: Fashion
Deserves Copyright Protection, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-
furstenberg24aug24,0,1109807.story.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 904 (2006).
45. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended at in 17 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 2008)).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product
Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV.
769, 781 (1991); see also, S. Priya Bharathi,
Comment, There Is More Than One Way to Skin a
Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat
Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1667 (1996) (arguing that trademark, and more
specifically trade dress, poses an alternative for
combating design piracy in the fashion industry);
see also Dorota Niechwiej Clegg, Note, Aesthetic
Functionality Conundrum and Traderight: A Proposal
for a Foster Home to an Orphan of Intellectual
Property Laws, 89 IOWA L. REV. 273, 308-12 (2003)
(proposing that the answer to design piracy is found
in extending a “traderight” for a limited period of
time to creators of a design); see also Karina K.
Terakura, Comment, Insufficiency of Trade Dress
Protection: Lack of Guidance for Trade Dress
Infringement Litigation in the Fashion Design
Industry, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 569, 604 (2000).
48. Trademark Amendment Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999) (amending 15 U.S.C.§
1125(a)(3) to permit protection of unregistered trade
dress, specifically recognizing “civil action[s] for
trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade
dress not registered on the principal register . . .”).
49. Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, Cosmos
Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., No. 07-55333, 2009
WL 766517 (9th Cir. Mar 24, 2009).
50. Cosmos Jewelry, Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., No. 07-
55333, 2009 WL 766517, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24,
2009) (“The district court found Cosmos's trade
dress, ‘plumeria flowers in yellow gold in a specific
size and shape with a sandblasted matte finish on
the petals and high-polished shiny edges,’ to be
distinctive. Our precedents allow for the findings the
district court made.”).
51. Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
52. Id. at 1085.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court lacked discretion to award punitive
damages.
55. Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d,
Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., No. 07-
55333, 2009 WL 766517 (9th Cir. Mar 24, 2009)
(citing Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d
512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989)).
56. Id. at 1087-88.
57. Id. at 1082.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1087-88.
60. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th
Cong. (2007).
61. See Sarah Cone, Comment, Designer Discounter
Infringes Trademark and Goes Unpunished: A Look
at Gucci America, Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc. and the
Lanham Act, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 26 (2005)
(noting that there are “sixty-six jurisdictions capable
of making or changing trademark law, not to
mention several hundred individual district court
judges” capable of creating varied interpretations of
the trademark code).
62. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on
H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat072706.html -
N_2_ (statement of the United States Copyright
Office suggesting designers first pressured Congress
to enact additional copyright protection measures as
early as 1914).
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