Global cities and global labor markets weaken former political jurisdictions and governance institutions, challenging and creating new political landscapes. To a certain extent, new political assemblages transgress the old international system of nation states. However, the nation state continues to significantly determine conditions of life and work for male and female workers alike.

CHAPTER 10

Gender, Global Labor Markets, Commodity Chains, and Mobilities: Globalizing Production and Reproduction

LABOR markets are becoming more globally integrated, with some women drawn into the circuits of global capital, while others remain outside them (Browne & Misra 2003; Pearson 2007; Floro & Meurs 2009). Women enter into the paid labor force in greater numbers worldwide as economic globalization processes, like off-shoring, outsourcing, subcontracting, informalization, and migration (UNIFEM 2009: 58), restructure local and global labor markets. This chapter analyzes the processes and structures of economic globalization, off-shoring capitalist production and reorganizing reproduction. Different from internationalization of production, economic globalization interconnects work processes and workers through commodity chains and intensifies these linkages across geographic spaces.

This chapter begins with an examination of globalizing trends. Both labor and capital are on the move, but they encounter different constraints that limit, and forces that drive, their respective mobilities. Using a feminist lens focuses attention on how and when capital feminizes jobs, relocating labor-intensive production in global spaces. These labor-intensive economic activities and low-waged work in global production increasingly take place off-shore in special enclaves, in intimate spaces of households, or through relationships of interactive service encounters. New economic zones designate an extra-territorial space to lure capital. In these zones, capital operates in extra-territorial global spaces where national governments suspend labor laws and other regulations. Social and political considerations along with profit maximization motivate hiring and locational decisions contributing to economic globalization.

Economic globalization not only reconfigures the location of work and workers – that is, who performs particular jobs and in what spaces of production and reproduction – but also is associated with feminizing service work and the feminization of work biographies and migration. As this chapter shows, this process differs from the internationalization of migration during earlier phases of capitalist development. Internationalization involved male labor toiling in extractive industries in their home countries or migrating to the North where they worked in the fields, on construction sites, and in factories. In the current era of globalization, gender influences both the structures of meaning at work and the types of labor extracted in transnational service production. One of the newest trends – discussed in this chapter – transnationalization and commodification of feminized services, extracts emotional and affective labor principally from women workers, many of whom migrate from poorer regions to wealthier ones. At the other end of the spectrum, finance capital and the management of global capitalism fuel the globalization of migration among elites who themselves require services for living in global cities, discussed more fully in the next chapter. Globalization of migration, thereby, intensifies the demand for increasing reproductive services, from dual-earner families in developed countries, from wealthy families in developing countries, and from an elite relocating to global cities. As a result, feminization of migration and a global transfer system of gendered care and emotional labor link micro-level interactions with macro-level economic processes.

Another prominent feature of economic globalization increases non-standard employment in nearly every country. The rhetoric of globalization emphasizes economic reasons to explain why firms have shed regular workers and hired employees on non-standard employment contracts in order to save on personnel costs and to evade obligations for job security among their workforce. This reasoning does not adequately situate and identify political sources and social forces giving rise to the variation in vulnerable employment across different groups in different spaces and places. Though women generally are more likely to end up in non-standard employment, an empirical investigation in latter sections underscores the clear trend of increasing informalization for workers, both female and male, everywhere. The final section of this chapter asks whether informalization is an opportunistic by-product of global capitalism, or intrinsic to its logic. In either case, informalization shifts the burden and costs of reproduction onto individuals and intensifies feminized service work, both paid and unpaid.

Globalizing capital, globalizing labor

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, women make up a large share of the workforce in low-waged labor-intensive manufacturing (Collins 2003; Caraway 2007) and increasingly occupy jobs in new tertiary outsourced services (Hochschild 2003; Gottfried 2009b), such as call centers (Poster & Wilson 2008) and care work located both in developed (Holtgrewe 2007) and in developing countries (UNIFEM 2009). Preference for women is evident in hiring practices among firms dedicated to assembling goods in labor-intensive production processes or to computer-enabled operations, such as secretarial work performed off-shore; other services include individuals and small enterprises specializing in care, health, and custodial services. However, gendered employment patterns vary in ways not easily predictable from analyses of economic variables alone.

To understand the process of economic globalization, it is necessary to distinguish between hiring women on the one hand, and feminizing jobs on the other: the former refers to the more commonly used measure of gender composition indicating the *quantity of labor* performed by women workers (Acker 2004: 35), while the latter refers to the gender ideology socially constructing the *quality of labor* based on the "trope of femininity." According to Acker (2004), the "trope of femininity" has survived because it resonates with the new restructuring of globally integrated labor markets and jobs, for both men and women. Salzinger (2004: 45) developed this idea further in terms of the trope of "productive femininity," which plays on the double meaning of "productive." On the one hand, "productive femininity" signifies the way that the structures of meanings construct and produce gendered subjects. On the other hand, "productive femininity" contributes to the engendering of workers. By distinguishing between hiring women (numerical composition of the labor force) and feminizing jobs (quality of labor), it is possible to view the gendering processes and practices that are altering patriarchal social divisions between men and women within countries and transnationally due to economic globalization.

Economic globalization intensifies interactions and interconnections between people, places and production processes. However, not all types of work and production can be transplanted or relocated. Some types of work processes are more mobile than others. Extractive industries, construction and interactive services, such as female-typed care work, sex work, and restaurants, laundries, and cleaning services, involve a product or process that takes shape in site-specific locations. On the other hand, assembly of textiles and electronics, food processing, and digitized tasks that do not require face-to-face contact (Paus 2007: 5), such as IT-enabled services ranging from back-office processes (e.g. data entry), to call centers, to on-line delivery of professional services (accounting, financial services), are all more amenable to transnational relocation. As a result, work and production processes are globalized in different ways. On the one hand, global capital transplanting labor-intensive production processes in search of lower costs may touch down in places where cheap labor abounds. Knowledge-intensive work, especially finance and other high-end business services, may locate where a density of these activities exist, in either old or newer global cities to take advantage of an existing critical mass of networks and skilled workers. On the other hand, site-specific employers, including those offering face-to-face interactive services, may meet demand by hiring low-waged migrant labor. In these cases, employers may draw on a global labor pool. Whether transplantable or site-specific, employers might resort to using informalized employment arrangements, subcontracting with labor market intermediaries, and hiring migrant labor to realize a saving on wage rates and the payment of benefits. Economic globalization, therefore, involves the movement of capital and of labor, but not in the same manner.

Global Capital, Local Labor: Feminization of Global Production

Global capital extends its reach by off-shoring and subcontracting labor-intensive production, hiring local workers, and integrating women into commodity chains in a new spatial division of labor.[1] The concept of commodity chains fosters a research agenda for analyzing the structure of transnational corporations' global reach. The metaphor of chain emphasizes connectivity between production processes, networked firms, and people who are otherwise spatially dispersed. Initial research analyzed the logic of global capital moving abroad in search of cheap local labor on what became a global assembly-line. In this narrative, capital seeks out labor in low-waged regions of the world to locate labor-intensive production facilities at the lower end of value-added commodity chains. The place for (re)location of production varies with the type of work and the labor process. Some countries, especially in regions with underdeveloped industrial infrastructures like Africa, are further left behind in a race to the bottom. Labor-intensive manufacturing of garments and electronics employs a female work force in the more developed countries of the Global South (e.g. Mexico, Philippines, and China). Other globalized production like call centers, providing routine and customized services, employs an educated workforce with English-language proficiency, and is located either on the edge of cities in the Global North or in

former British colonies such as India, Jamaica, and other Caribbean countries – as more countries are incorporated into a global system of production.[2] The process remains uneven, in both the kinds of investments made and the nature of labor employed. As a result, the feminization of global production unevenly incorporates women into the global capitalist labor market.

Global Capital and Relocation of Work

Global capital touches down locally not merely in a race to the bottom, as it seeks to maximize profits, but also bases decisions on factors other than the lowest wages. Collins (2003: 151) positions the relationship between social, economic, and political institutions along a continuum by asking the questions: "how different kinds of firms embed themselves differently in local institutions, how their operations are shaped by local culture, and how law and specific forms of economic organization condition different degrees of connection to workers and foster or inhibit the development of strong workplace communities." She analyzes how place matters to the relationship between local labor and global capital, and finds that firms make labor recruitment decisions based not only on the "price" of labor, skill sets, and knowledge available, but also on the social and political arenas in which they operate. This includes the degree of enforcement of the rule of law and regulations, and the existence of favorable laws and terms of engagement (152). Importantly, low wages of workers are underwritten by individual and "community-based livelihood strategies" that enable social reproduction at no or low cost to companies in the Global South (152). For this reason, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, prone to famine, receive less foreign direct investment, even though wages would be among the lowest in the world. Unpaid reproductive labor, both individual and community-based, is an unacknowledged yet important consideration for global capital looking to (re)locate production.

Studies of the apparel industry trace the threads of global production (Bonacich et al. 1994) pieced together from different locations, still prominently in global cities yet increasingly found in newer assembly sites. US-based multinational companies use different strategies for globalizing production. One strategy involves the creation of "the new sweatshops" in US cities with large female immigrant populations (Ross 2004). The US ranks second after China and ahead of Mexico among the top three clothing producers measured by employment – though the clothing industry in the US is small relative to other industries in the overall economy (47) and has shrunk in absolute size in recent decades. Women make up the vast majority of apparel workers – though no reliable statistics are available on their number in the US. Given the existence of "invisible home sewing machine operators," estimating an accurate number of apparel workers, and gauging their employment conditions, require extrapolation from qualitative studies (33). Citing a 1997 Department of Labor (DOL) survey of the New York City garment industry, Ross found only 75,000 workers, a sharp decline from the 340,000 recorded in 1950. Though difficult to calculate, Ross estimates that the "sweatshop" population in New York City ranges from 40% to 63% of total employment in the industry. The once thriving apparel business organized in the heyday of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union has declined in the US, and has moved to lower-waged countries.[3] It is not so much that overall employment in apparel has taken a nosedive, but rather that US parent companies outsource and subcontract with firms in other countries (Collins 2003).

Social and political considerations are part of a firm's location calculation. Collins analyzes locational and hiring decisions by comparing two apparel firms at either end of the fashion spectrum, one at the low end (Tultex) and the other at the higher end (Liz Claiborne), to determine whether product differences entail low- and high-road industrial pathways. Founded in the 1930s, Tultex began as a family business in the cradle of the textile industry of southern Virginia, later expanding into a vertically integrated firm mass-producing knitwear in eight factories across the US. The company shifted production to plants in Jamaica and Mexico in the 1990s when faced with the intensification of global competition, especially from rapidly industrializing China. From its inception in the 1970s, "[Liz Claiborne] produces clothes without factories, externalizing risk to manufacturers and supplier networks throughout the world" (Videla 2010: 3). Despite different origins and organizational models, both firms subcontracted with apparel firms located in the interior city of Aquascalientes in central Mexico – 312 miles northwest of Mexico City. The subcontractors, whether producing higher-quality fashion for Liz Claiborne or T-shirts and hoodies for Tultex, took the low road of Taylorist production methods by recruiting rural women with little factory experience and paying them low wages. The rationale for locating in central Mexico, rather than either on the border of Texas where Maquila factories produced output for many US multinational corporations or in Mexico City, becomes more apparent if we consider social and political factors. Aquascalientes is in close proximity to Mexico City for transportation purposes, but is sufficiently far away from the site of many labor disputes and political mobilizations – a common occurrence in the main Zocalo Square. At the same time, the rural community, though poor, collectivizes the costs of reproduction

through the provision of food from either subsistence agriculture or local farmers. In this setting, corporations can pay lower wages than would be commanded in Mexico City and Juarez, and also employ a relatively docile workforce at the outset. These two firms' location and hiring decisions contribute to feminization of production in these global factories.

Feminization and Industrialization

The process of feminization occurs in places with different histories of industrialization. To understand this process, *Assembling Women* compares an impressive number of countries in South America, East Asia, and South Asia to explore the question: why don't employers always prefer women over men in order to reap large labor savings by hiring cheaper women workers? Caraway (2007) asks: if low wages are the paramount consideration, then why don't women workers dominate in all economic sectors? The answer requires examination of the historical process of feminization occurring in waves of industrialization. Prior to the new orientation toward globalization, internationalization was embodied by a different model of economic activities and investment. During the 1960s, countries of the Global South adopted export-oriented industrialization, often at the behest of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and of governments through policy manipulation.

Export-oriented industrialization stimulated the growth of labor-intensive production, and, in this initial phase, employers hired both male and female workers. With the shift to more capital-intensive industries, employment growth slows down, and masculinization of the labor force often follows (Videla 2010: 2). Hiring strategies, once established, often prevail over new staffing arrangements. In this way, older firms dominated by a male workforce may retain that gender mix. This "stickiness" keeps companies from overhauling their personnel, despite the possible cost savings likely to result if they hired women to replace men (2). Newer plants are more likely to feminize the workforce, taking advantage of lower wages paid to the women now drawn into it. Once a firm or a sector feminizes jobs, then other companies often follow suit. In other words, a "spillover" describes the learning process through which corporations emulate the gendered practices of other neighboring employers. The final phase, called "snowballing," gathers up more women when increasing demand for the product leads employers to hire additional workers. And, "importantly, the growth in already feminized sectors deepens gendered beliefs and practices" (2). Once in place, feminized jobs are constructed through gendered discourses about proper work for both men and women.

The global reach of transnational corporations intensifies interconnections and linkages in global commodity chains in several ways: by transplanting production or subcontracting work in low-waged regions; by collectivizing costs of social reproduction; and by locating plants or doing business in special zones, but not necessarily in the most impoverished countries. While women are drawn into labor-intensive production, the results are uneven across firms and countries. At the lower end of the value chain, global production takes place in, and creates new, socio-political spaces.

Global spaces of production: Export Processing Zones and commodity chains

Companies transplant production clustered together in newly emergent global spaces called Export Processing Zones (EPZs). These EPZs have facilitated off-shoring and subcontracting of manufacturing at the low end of value-added global commodity chains. Some of the work off-shored is either subcontracted to local firms or performed by subsidiaries of multinational firms in these zones. Regardless of ownership, the factories operating in these zones typically produce for export rather than for domestic consumption. What makes these spaces global is that they function as extra-territorial sites of production. EPZs also are global spaces in another sense. They suspend national regulations and impose militarized discipline on the workforce. While labor standards and enforcement may be weak in the country as a whole, exemptions from labor and environmental regulation (with or without minimal occupational safety and health standards) lower the cost of doing business further for those locating to these relatively new global spaces of production.

Many developing countries have designated Export Processing Zones (EPZs) as special socio-spatial enclaves dedicated to export-oriented, labor-intensive production processes often employing a low-waged female workforce living in dormitories or in nearby housing. The appeal of these zones is evident in the dramatic growth of EPZs from their inception: from being barely in existence prior to 1975, to numbering almost 1,000 in nearly 40 countries just twelve years later. By 2006, over 3,000 EPZs had taken root in more than 120 countries. Women are the preferred labor force in these zones, accounting for approximately 90% of all employees in Nicaragua, about 80% in Bangladesh, 75% in Honduras, Philippines, and Sri Lanka, and over 50% in Korea, Mexico, and Kenya, among other countries (UNIFEM 2009: 61). Feminization of the workforce is clearly apparent not only in the number of women working in these zones, but as a result of these feminized jobs reserved for women.

In an exemplary case study, "The global trotting sneaker" (Enloe 2006) traces the global commodity chain of iconic sneaker production, starting with research and design by the parent companies in the US, and moving to stitching of shoe parts by subcontracting firms in Asia, and finally to the purchasing of the fashion item in metropolises around the world. Though the globe-trotting sneaker is based on data reported from the 1980s, the logic can be applied to the process of economic globalization more recently. By subdividing work into small component parts, multinational corporations with household names like Nike subcontract shoe assembly to local companies paying piece rates with no or few benefits for workers. An astonishing 45–50 people may work on a single pair of shoes. South and East Asian women earn a fraction of the hourly wage paid to their counterparts in the US. Only a small proportion of the cost of production, however, pays workers' wages (see table 10.1). The transfer of athletic footwear assembly to South Korea, for example, occurred during the 1980s when the military dictatorship of President Park suppressed workers' organizing and could guarantee a supply of cheap labor in literally militarized economic zones. Also importantly, access to an international airport kept transportation costs relatively low. Global spaces of labor-intensive production settle in countries guaranteeing the conditions for a low-waged feminized workforce.

Table 10.1 The globe-trotting sneaker

A: Hourly wages in athletic footwear (1980s)

Country	Wage range ($)
China	0.10–0.14
Indonesia	0.16–0.20
Thailand	0.65–0.74
South Korea	2.02–2.27
United States	7.38–7.94

B: Allocation of costs of a $70.00 pair of Nike Pegasus sneakers (labor-intensive)

Item	Cost ($)
Materials	9.18
Labor	1.66
Administration and overhead	2.82
Subcontractor's profit	1.19
Nike profit	22.95
Retail mark-up	32.20

Source: derived from Enloe (2006).

The gender pattern emerges in sharp relief in China's development of Special Economic Zones for labor-intensive manufacturing of textiles, shoes, toys and electronics, destined for export to markets in the US and elsewhere. Within these designated zones, the Chinese state began a "controlled" experiment for foreign direct investment in capitalist production. In 1980, women were recruited to work in these labor-intensive industries (Wichterich 2009: 3). During the 1990s the Chinese government initiated a second phase, focusing on more capital- and technology-intensive industrialization. Over the next decade, the government shifted to more knowledge-based industries at the higher end of the global value chain in coastal manufacturing hubs. This shift led to a decrease in the proportion of female workers in manufacturing, dropping from more than 80% to less than 70% of the total manufacturing workforce (5). The existence of global commodity chains, whereby men and women work in different sectors, results in wage disparities. By one account, those recognized as skilled labor (typically men) saw their wages increase in 2003 to 5,000 Yuan per month (approximately $790) while female migrant workers earned only 10% of those wages working in the Special Economic Zones (Dale 2005 cited in Wichterich 2009: 6). In the case of China, the state both directed and dictated the gender composition of the labor force in these zones.

National governments' trade liberalization, transnational agreements, and state-led economic development projects set the background conditions enabling the creation of EPZs as global spaces for the feminization of global production. The political framework eases the movement of capital around the world. Trade and investment liberalization encourages countries to keep women's relative wages low in order to maintain the countries' competitive advantage for foreign investment (Floro & Meurs 2009: 14). Transnational trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), facilitate the mobility of transnational corporations by lowering tariff barriers. Such agreements, predicated on the principle of "free" trade rather than "fair" trade, either exclude or provide inadequate support for fair labor practices and environmental standards. Thus, companies are "free" to transplant to or subcontract in these spaces where labor regulations are suspended. In addition, subcontracting arrangements with local companies allow parent companies with household names to evade legal and "moral" responsibility for working conditions back home (Enloe 2006: 459). Some companies publicize efforts on behalf of human rights and emphasize the fact that they offer the Third World women making their products a better income than would otherwise be available to them. This is reminiscent of Walmart justifying low wages by arguing that they provide low-cost goods to working families in the US. Yet companies disavow social responsibility for human rights abuses in those same factories. The multiple layers of commodity chains disperse and fragment the labor force, making it hard to hold one employer – particularly the parent company, ultimately – responsible for bad working conditions (Beneria 2001: 39–40).

EPZs represent relatively new socio-political spaces for global production. Companies doing business in these zones often feminize the workforce, taking advantage of lower wages paid to women now drawn into the paid workforce. Once firms or sectors mark jobs as feminized, other companies emulate hiring patterns. Among these firms, labor takes on a gender-specific quality.

Global labor, local employers: gender and migration

The movement of capital across national boundaries is only one side of the process of economic globalization. Labor also joins migratory trails. The lure of Northern prosperity has been called the "globalization of migration" (Castles & Miller, cited in Hochschild 2003: 18). This globalization of migration involves an increasing number of people on the move in search of employment or for the performance of their jobs. Migration tends to be global in that now the distance traveled has increased, no longer just within countries or crossing one border. Economic compulsion is the primary driver of migration from the Global South to the North. However, the mix of choice and compulsion propel different mobilities of men and women from one region to another in the world economy. While low-waged women migrate to the North in search of work, higher-waged men and some women migrate out to manage global production. In particular, transnationalization and commodification of care and other services fuel a feminization of migration. Globalization of migration is not only a story of individual heroism or grit, but also about the changing structures of gender, class, race, and international relationships.

Feminization of Migration: From Global South to North

Economic pressures in home countries and the promise of better pay in places of destination compel more women to migrate to cities, whether in the Global North or South. Many skilled women who leave increasingly poor countries can earn more money as nannies and maids than as nurses, teachers, or clerical workers if they remain in their own country (Hochschild 2003: 18). The changing gender composition of migration (quantitative measure of who migrates) and the changing quality of the labor extracted from migrants (qualitative capacity of labor power) inform the feminization of migration. Feminization of migration is evident in the relative and absolute numbers of women crossing borders to make the journey from their homes to faraway destinations, joining migratory streams in larger absolute numbers than during the past four decades.

More women, both as job-seekers and as family members, embark on migratory sojourns. The female share of migration already hovered at a relatively high level of 47% in 1960, inching upward throughout the 1960s, and then falling a few percentage points from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, during the worldwide economic crisis. By the close of the economic downturn in the late-1980s, female migration returned to its former level at 47% of the total, ratcheting upward to 49% in 2005 (UNIFEM 2009: 59). Although the increase remains relatively modest as a percentage change, this growth rate translates into 100 million women migrating from their homes to new destinations (58–9). Variation in the gender composition of migration depends on the country of origin and destination, and these have changed since the end of World War II. Few Algerian and Moroccan women migrated to France immediately following the War; women accounted for less than 3% of total immigrants from these countries in 1946. By 1990, there was a dramatic change, with women accounting for more than 40% of the total (Hochschild 2003: 5). From some countries, the number of women migrating reached parity (as among Filipinos) or exceeded the number of men (women accounted for 84% of Sri Lankan migrants to the Middle East) by the turn of the twenty-first century (6).

Women have always migrated, either by force through enslavement or military conflict, because of economic circumstances, or by choice. What makes the phenomenon new is not only the sheer number of women migrating and the distances they traverse, but also the feminized nature of the labor extracted. Feminization of migration derives from and drives commodification of care and transnationalization of other feminized services. The feminization of migration becomes more visible when studying waged care work and other services in more developed countries, performed by migrants in private households.

Feminized services: gender, race, and migration

Tracking the migration trail of "pioneering" women can highlight the contradictory effects on, and complexity of, gender and class relations in and between both home and host countries (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parrenas 2008). In other words, theorizing the intersection of gender, class, race, and nation is unavoidable when studying nannies, maids, and home-health-care workers who toil invisibly in the intimate sphere of someone else's household (Hochschild 2003). Like their counterparts among racial minorities, whose experience of domination was documented for an earlier period in the US (Rollins 1985; Glenn 1992; Romero 1992), many women migrating from the Global South perform domestic and care work cast-off by affluent women in the Global North. Women in rich countries, many entering the workforce, are turning over care work to female migrant workers paid low wages with few or no benefits and whose lack of citizenship status deprives them of many social protections and legal rights.

Globalization and the Commodification of Care

The growing demand for a range of paid caring services transforms employment relationships and inequalities on a global terrain. Women's increasing labor market participation in industrial nations and their ability to combine work and family, to some extent, rely on other women's cheap labor. Elite women face different hurdles and opportunities in securing good jobs and can afford different solutions in the face of obstacles such as the time-bind. Some women may pay for services performed by migrant and minority women earning low wages as nannies, maids, and waitresses. Commodification of care involves a global labor transfer system, whereby women migrating from poorer regions of the world replace work once performed largely by mothers and wives in the form of unpaid labor in the home.

The reason that elite women turn to migrant women in part derives from a "care deficit," as more women enter the paid labor force and cannot find adequate care services (Hochschild 2003). Unpaid parental leave and costly privatized childcare accentuate the care deficit in the US. This care deficit is not only the product of public policies, but also the result of men failing to significantly increase their share of domestic labor even when women work full-time: "So, strictly speaking, the presence of immigrant nannies does not enable affluent women to enter the workforce, it enables affluent men to continue avoiding the second shift" (9). In this way, the care deficit helps to drive feminization of migration.

When the care deficit is addressed through the employment of migrant labor, a similar care deficit necessarily is produced in another part of the world through the transfer of commodified sentiments. This global transfer of services associated with and transplanting a wife's traditional role extracts a different kind of labor from that in prior migrations based on agricultural and industrial production

(Hochschild 2003: 20). In the new global era, women's part of the story becomes more prominent than in "male-centered imperialism" in its classic form of openly coercive extraction of natural resources and the production of agricultural output on conquered or colonized lands. Instead, emotional, sexual, nurturance, and physical labor is extracted in this current phase of globalization. In particular, "love is the new gold" (20). The extraction of emotional resources does not typically involve military force, although abusive treatment of care workers has been documented. Among care workers, coercion operates differently, not principally through the barrel of a gun, but rather through economic compulsion (27).

To understand the global transfer of sentiments, Hochschild (2003: 22) argues that love is an "unfairly distributed resource extracted from one place and enjoyed somewhere else." In order to make this argument, she poses the question whether love really can be considered a "resource" which a child has a right to enjoy? And if so, what are the qualities of this immaterial good? According to Hochschild (22), what differentiates love from material commodities is that the former does not constitute a fixed quantity. Instead, love is a renewable resource that creates more of itself. Based on these qualities, love can be seen as a scarce, distributable resource, but cannot be invested as such. Rather, love is displaced in a psychological sense, finding a different object for its expression (23). In this way, love becomes a precious resource not simply extracted from the Global South and implanted in the Global North. Love "owes its very existence to cultural alchemy," occurring in the place that it is imported to (24); loosely analogous to the extraction of raw material, in this case sentiment is "assembled" at the place of work (25). Through cultural alchemy, the nanny extracts love by transferring her affections to the children under her charge, while her own children suffer the loss of her affection. This labor of love produces affection in a display of emotion and care, rather than necessarily expressing genuine affection that is the essence of its commodification.

An analogy to Marx's notion of commodity fetishism allows Hochschild to characterize the experience of a nanny's love as if it obtains a thing-like, unique, and private quality (2003: 26). Hochschild argues that: "We unwittingly separate the love between the nanny and child from the global capitalist order of love to which it very much belongs" (26). Families employing nannies rarely make the connection between the love that their children receive and the love denied to the children left behind. The "magic" of commodity fetishism obscures the exploitative social relationship in which extraction of labor occurs through the global commodity transfer system.[4] The fact that commodity fetishism involves a sentiment, an object of one's affection, does not diminish its exploitative effect. Low wages paid to the nanny and devalued care work are perpetuated through the ideological veil of commodity fetishism that shrouds the fact of the "emotional deprivation of [migrants'] children with the surfeit of affection their First World counterparts enjoy" (22).

Global Labor Transfer System

The concepts of "transnational care chains" and "transnational chains of reproductive labor" created by migrant workers shed light on what propels feminization of migration and its consequences (Hochschild 2003: 18). These chains link families from one region to another region of the world economy in pursuit and performance of reproductive labor. These transnational chains reflect the organization of public and private power relationships between men and women, but also among women divided by class, and often by race, ethnicity, and increasingly by national origins. As Parrenas (2001: 78) describes, "The hierarchy of womanhood – involving race, class, nation, as well as gender – establishes a work transfer system of reproductive labor among women, the international system of caretaking." Both care and remittances are a part of the global labor transfer system.

Who cares for these children left behind depends on local norms and the availability of proximate female relatives. Among the many stories are two about domestic workers from the Philippines. Rowena Bautista hires a local woman to mind her children at her home in the Philippines as she cares for the children of a family in Washington DC (Hochschild 2003). In another case, Jocelyn Santia, a 40-year-old mother, along with her husband who subsequently died, worked as a housekeeper in Milan for 20 years. Jocelyn left grandparents and a brother with the responsibility of raising her four children in Mabini – a city in which 15% of the 42,000 residents live and work abroad (Onishi 2010: A5).

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas (2008) brings together her influential research on Filipina migrants and extends her path-breaking ethnographic analysis to include Filipinas working as domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles and as entertainers in Tokyo. David Eng[5] incisively captures the importance of Parrenas' analysis when he states, "Extracted from home and homeland only to be reinserted into the domestic spaces of the global north, these servants of globalization exemplify an ever-increasing international gendered division of labor, one compelling us to reexamine the neo-liberal coupling of freedom and opportunity with mobility and migration." The "force of domesticity," as well as economic circumstances, compels transnational movements among migrant women into domestic servitude.

The transnational restructuring of reproduction alters class and gender relations, not only in the host country but also at home, through the "huge transfer of caring and emotional resources globally" (Pyle 2006: 289). A care drain is one of the outcomes of this global transfer system, as women who had cared for their own children and elderly family members in their home countries leave to care for children and elderly clients in their host country. Single mothers or "almost" single mothers migrate from countries with high birth rates, and that are strongly pro-natalist (21). Hochschild (2003) asks: what are the repercussions of a care drain in home countries, and for children left behind in the care of others? Even though women from the Global South may achieve a semblance of liberation, the chance to become independent breadwinners and to improve children's material well-being, still they must sacrifice care for their children to engage in their "commute" across the globe.

Migrant labor may leave behind their families, but many transmit money through remittances to the economies of their home countries. Remittances are financial resources sent by workers to support families back home, and constitute badly needed foreign exchange for poor countries, especially those with large debts as a result of loans taken out from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (prevalent during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s). This transfer of large sums of money to their families serves as an important source of "development aid" to their home countries. According to World Bank estimates, in 2004 developing countries received the equivalent of $126 billion in remittances, double the amount of Official Development Assistance, and approximately 75% of total foreign direct investment. The Philippines brought in remittances totaling $17.3 billion in 2009, up from $7.6 billion in 2003, which accounts for more than 10% of its GDP (Onishi 2010: A5). Much has been made of these remittances from the Global North to the Global South.

Remittances subsidize the costs of social reproduction, not only by paying educational fees for children left behind, but also by supporting public infrastructure projects such as roads and municipal buildings. "Toiling far from home for Philippine dreams" reports on a village where one-quarter of the 1,200 residents work in Italy and contributed 20% of the cost to build the public hall (Onishi 2010: A5). Although no data are systematically disaggregated by gender, some anecdotal evidence suggests that women distribute a significant share of their wages in the form of remittances. For example, female Dominicans working in Spain send as much as 78% of all remittances to the Dominican Republic, even though they account for only 61.4% of all migrants. An overwhelming 97% of all Filipino migrants remit at least some money home, and women send on average about 45% of their income (UNIFEM 2009: 58). Clearly, remittances create a transnational system of private and informal support of social reproduction in domestic economies. In doing so, this transnational transfer of funds relieves the pressure on government in the home country to socialize costs of reproduction.

Migration affords women a degree of gender liberation from immediate patriarchal constraints because of their "greater contribution to household income and greater participation in public life" (Parrenas 2001: 1140). Through remittances, women may gain greater leverage over domestic decisions regarding budgeting and domestic chores. However, they replace local patriarchy with structural patriarchal relations globally. Migration is often compelled by economic necessity and deprives children of their parents. Cash is not a substitute for emotional closeness and care between parents and children. Dependency does not only characterize power relationships between nations, "but [is] internalized within [and extended across] families," as the local patriarchal relationship between men and women becomes transnationalized (Hochschild 2003: 18).

Finally, less visible is the way that globalization enables the transfer of ideas in both directions. Feminization of migration facilitates not only the circulation of money through remittances, but also the formation of new social imaginaries and empowerment, as liberatory ideologies are transmitted back to the home country when women visit their families. The economic vulnerability compelling globalization of migration also serves as a means for transmission of ideas about organizing and cultural practices of resistance. One can point to how communicative ties between migrants and their families, and others in diasporas, set apart global mobilities today from internationalization of the past.

Global restructuring unevenly impacts on the work of women and creates divisions of labor between women in different regions of the world economy, generating greater disparities in wealth as the gap between the global rich and poor grows (Hochschild 2003: 17). On the one hand, the lure of higher relative wages propels more women workers from poor countries to migrate to wealthier countries in hope of finding better jobs than those that exist in their countries of origin. Many of these women live in poverty, moving from the "Third World to the Third World within" the industrialized world (Chang 2006). On the other hand, globalization has "created more high-paying professional jobs in the United States, stimulating the demand for low-paying jobs that service the needs of professional workers . . . domestic workers are drawn from various parts of the globe to meet these needs, creating an international division of reproductive labor" (Browne & Misra 2003: 503).

With the global economic crisis in 2008–9, some highly paid women are laying-off domestic workers, as a consequence leading to a reverse-migration flow of women back to the Third World. Still, globalization of migration continues to be predicated on gendered assumptions about who is available for what type of work, and is strongly associated with informalized employment and labor relations. The global transfer system of care propels women on sojourns from their homes. In this feminization of migration, many women workers, including those with nursing or teaching backgrounds, end up in care and other personal services, often without benefits and at low wages. Those employed in personal services, particularly prevalent in private households, forgo a standard employment contract and often enter into informalized working conditions. Employers, individuals and families, can evade paying minimum wages and abiding by national labor standards such as maximum hours worked. The process of informalization leaves workers more vulnerable to the vagaries of the market.

Informalization, economic insecurity, and globalization

Worldwide, labor faces increasing informalization and economic insecurity as a result of globalization processes. Informalization defines the casualized nature of labor relations lacking formal access to social protections and regulations and without the expectation of continuous employment and work schedules. Contrary to traditional development paradigms, informalization prevails in countries of both the Global South (Beneria 2001; Pearson 2007: 9; Floro & Meurs 2009) and North (Gottfried 2008a, b; Vosko et al. 2009). Modernization theories have posited that the informal economy would eventually disappear as the formal economy "absorbed the marginal working population" (Beneria 2001: 33). More generally, modernization theories and non-feminist globalization theories have underestimated the trend because of their neglect of the way gender influences both the composition of and the types of work that are informalized. More specifically, informalization is linked to feminization of jobs and work biographies. As Guy Standing (1999b) suggests, non-standard employment extends "feminized qualities of work to men on a global basis." By feminized qualities, Standing refers to the nature of work biographies characterized by discontinuity and insecurity, rather than to the sex of the individual worker. Thus, informalization ensnares men as well as women and unfolds unevenly across groups differing by gender, race, and class as well as by nation (Beneria 2001; Vosko et al. 2009).

Gender, Informalization, and Vulnerable Employment Worldwide

The numbers tell a story of growth, albeit in an uneven pattern, across economic sectors within countries and across countries as a whole. From 1980 to 1999, informal employment grew as a percentage of non-agricultural employment in every region of the world: Asia saw a 10 percentage-point increase from 53.0 to 63.0, and there was a smaller percentage increase in North Africa (38.8 to 43.4), Sub-Saharan Africa (68.1 to 74.8), and Latin America (52.3 to 56.9) (Charmes, cited in Beneria 2001: 35). Women's share of informal employment ranges from 52.3% in Sub-Saharan Africa, to 45.9% in Latin America and 39.9% in Asia (35), and an estimated two-thirds of women work in the informal economy in the Philippines (Floro and Meurs 2009: 28), and around 94% in India (Vosko 2007: 276). In China's coastal urban centers, informal employment already exceeded formal employment in 2003 (Wichterich 2009: 4); and more recent estimates range from 37% to 60% informal employment out of the total workforce in 2008 (Swider 2010). Despite such extraordinary numbers, we do not have good measures of informal employment and informalization.

UNIFEM established the indicator of "vulnerable employment" to approximate the extent of informalization in a regional comparative perspective. Vulnerable employment is a measure adding together own-account workers and contributing family workers. Own-account workers are self-employed producers or service providers with no employees working for them, contributing family workers are own-account workers who work without pay in an establishment operated by a relative living in the same household (UNIFEM 2009: 54). These own-account workers are among the most vulnerable workers because they must rely on their own income generating activity under highly variable and unpredictable economic conditions and without the institutionalized support of a safety-net. The gender composition of vulnerable employment skews toward women in most regions. In 2008, the magnitude of women's vulnerable employment reached more than 80% in some regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and nearly two-thirds of women in East Asia and the Pacific (see table 10.2). Vulnerable employment encompasses one-third of the male and female workforce in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the Middle East and North Africa, a larger percentage of women (37.7%) than men (26.9%) work in vulnerable employment. Men share a similar fate in the same countries and regions where a large informal economy exists.

To some extent, vulnerable employment is related to underdevelopment. This is supported by the fact that the highest overall rate of

Table 10.2 Percent in vulnerable employment, by region (2008)[a]

	REGION					
	Developed regions	Sub-Saharan Africa	South Asia	Middle East and North Africa	East Asia and the Pacific	Latin America and the Caribbean
Male	9.0	64.3	73.0	26.9	53.1	33.6
Female	7.0	80.6	82.3	37.7	60.7	31.7

[a] Vulnerable employment is the sum of own-account workers and contributing family workers.

Source: based on figure 4.2, ILO Labor Market database (UNIFEM 2009: 54).

vulnerable employment appears in the least developed agrarian-based economies of Sub-Saharan Africa where two-thirds of both men and women work in agriculture (see table 10.3). Indeed, countries undergoing rapid industrialization in South and East Asia, still characterized by high levels of employment in agriculture, also exhibit large populations caught in vulnerable employment. In South Asia, 59.0% of women cultivate fields and 82.3% toil in vulnerable employment. The measure of vulnerable employment is an aggregate statistic for the region, and is not broken down by sector. Thus, we can only infer the relationship between agricultural employment as an indicator of economic development and vulnerable employment. However, the high rates across regions suggest that vulnerable employment is widespread throughout the world economy. It is not that underdevelopment is irrelevant for understanding the growth of informalization, but rather that the notion of vulnerable employment as a residual of backward economies still in the throes of an early stage of development does not explain why non-standard employment has become pronounced in economies of both the Global South and North.

Informalization and Insecurity

For countries with otherwise strong labor regulations, such as many European countries, informalization becomes more pervasive and invasive in those areas of production and reproduction least regulated and unionized. More specifically, the trend toward informaliza-

Table 10.3 Percent in vulnerable agricultural employment, by region (2008)

	REGION					
	Developed regions	Sub-Saharan Africa	South Asia	Middle East and North Africa	East Asia and the Pacific	Latin America and the Caribbean
Male	3.5	63.1	42.3	19.1	39.0	24.9
Female	2.1	67.3	59.0	35.0	42.2	10.5

Source: based on figure 4.5, ILO Labor Market database (UNIFEM 2009: 57)

tion has implications for ways of working, the construction of the standard work biography, and collective-based standards and rights. Weakening reciprocal rights and obligations makes non-standard employment more precarious than permanent full-time employment. The process of informalization threatens the economic security of ever-larger numbers of male and female workers across countries of both Global North and South. Informalization of employment and labor relations adds to insecurity and poverty, especially among own-account, home-based, female workers in developing countries (UNIFEM 2009).

Global capital, whether locally based or globally operated, informalizes labor to reap the benefits of a cheaper more vulnerable workforce. In this sense, informalization is a consequence of globalization, whereby employers opportunistically employ workers in non-standard employment relationships in new and expanding areas of work untouched by past regulatory norms. In another sense, the growth of informalization is a tendency intrinsic to economic globalization. That is, the threat of, or the actual, mobilities of both labor and capital undermine the solidaristic conditions that enabled workers to bargain for the post-war social contract. Most notably, unions that were formed in the international system forged identities and engaged in collective bargaining within the confines of legal arenas staged in nation states. Nonetheless, informalized workers are joining together in new forms of organization, as indicated in chapter 8 on labor organizing, and as discussed more fully in the next chapter on global cities. To explain its growth and patterns, then, we must link informalization to off-shoring, subcontracting, and globalization of migration, as well as to changing political institutions on national and supra-national levels.

Conclusion: gender and economic globalization

> [I]nternational conventions, [social norms], corporations, state policies, and local labor markets, as well as class and racial and patriarchal ideologies, mediate the ways in which women's lives and work are organized. (Videla 2010: 1)

Feminist theories identify causes and consequences of the increasing involvement of women in the waged labor market more generally, and their preponderance in commodified services more specifically. They reveal changing power relations and inequalities associated with the expansion of production of immaterial goods, ideas and services in global commodity chains. Using a feminist lens magnifies the power relationships instantiated in less visible unpaid labor and, increasingly, paid labor performed by migrant workers in the domestic sphere, which links the local to the global. Few places or people are untouched by the global reach of commodity production. Economic globalization, when seen through a feminist lens, highlights new geographies of power formed by the linkages of commodity chains in new spaces of production and reproduction.

One side of economic globalization occurs within countries via Export Processing Zones, the designated global spaces where subcontracting of production and off-shoring of jobs takes place. Several studies document the preference for women who are paid low wages in some labor-intensive manufacturing. Preference for women workers, older or younger, depends on the histories of industrialization and the nature of local institutions. A strategy of feminizing the workforce enables companies operating in EPZs to reap the benefit of hiring women in low-waged work in the factories; workers in these zones tend to come from poor rural areas where families cannot provide for their own subsistence. Output produced in the EPZ typically gets transported for final assembly and consumption in developed countries. Underdevelopment, already part of the world economy, breeds distorted development in these extra-territorial global spaces. These zones function to localize work while facilitating the extension of global capitalism.

On the other side of economic globalization is labor's mobility. Globalization of migration not only circulates more people to far-flung places around the world – labor moved in early phases of capitalism – but also involves new integrated processes of production and social reproduction. Differentiating globalization of migration from earlier international migration is the quality as well as the quantity of cross-border economic and political interactions and linkages. More women embark on migratory sojourns. Women migrating from poorer to richer areas provide a cheap source of labor that frees global managers and members of the global male and female elite from taking care of their own domestic tasks, such as cleaning, laundry and child-rearing. This feminization of migration is based on the increasing demand for personal services. Poor countries supply low-waged labor at one end of the commodity chain, which fuels demand for cheaper consumption in the metropoles. The growth of market-based services, especially commodification of care, relieves some women of the responsibility of unpaid household tasks, but shifts the burden onto low-waged workers. A transnational chain of reproductive labor increasingly promotes commodification and informalization of employment relations.

Globalizing labor markets are associated with informalization, characterizing new rights and risk profiles for men and women in different parts of the world (Summerfield 2001: 5–6). The conditions of informalization affect ever larger numbers of workers, especially those in low-waged services and in labor-intensive assembly. Informalization is premised on individualization of employment contracts and privatization of social reproduction, leaving workers without the means of securing their own livelihood and that of their families. Many of these workers risk abuse due to the lack of legal regulation, social protection, and collective representation, and their invisibility in the confines of private spaces of households, commercial buildings, or sweatshops. In this respect, informalization challenges rights and conditions among workers in formerly more protected areas of production in the core, as well as undermining efforts to get formal rights while breaking down cultural practices in home societies on the periphery. Significantly, globalization and individualization disrupt older structures of social support, putting workers and their families at risk, as cultural practices, once supporting social relations and the community, are replaced by new, but often insufficient, means of social reproduction. The importance of social reproduction and care work indicates why it is necessary to apply a feminist lens to the examination of the causes and consequences of informalization extending feminized quality of work to men and women on a global scale.

While expansion of feminized services and export-oriented manufacturing draws more women into the waged labor market globally, whether they stay at "home" or migrate to other places, it has contradictory effects on class and gender inequality. Pearson (2007: 11) cogently argues that "women's increasing role in global production" raises an "unsettling contradiction." Specifically, while women's engagement in paid work does afford them more choices and more control over their lives, much of this work is degrading, underpaid, exploitative, and informalized. Indeed, she suggests that we must rethink the assumption that paid work either automatically "translates into empowerment" (12), autonomy (13–14), or economic security, or is necessarily the main route to achieving gender equality. Gender equality is not simply an issue of equity in the workplace or of comparable wages, but involves a broader project for improving the conditions of work and life. More money will not, in and of itself, empower women. It brings us back to the problematic of the male norm that is based on paid employment without responsibility for social reproduction. Interestingly, women's paid labor may enable them to escape local patriarchy in their home countries, but it is replaced with structural patriarchal relations in the globalized labor market.

Place matters when analyzing globalizing labor markets and how these labor market changes are gendered (Perrons 2007): "In particular, the 'place' of any locality within the global economy gives rise to local employment and household structures, which in turn influence gender relations" (Bruegel 1999: 73). As suggested in this chapter, global production and reproduction are also local activities. The next chapter examines global cities as strategic places where the new economy is reshaping social relations of production and reproduction.

CHAPTER 11

On the Global Economic Grid: Tokyo Tales, London Chronicles, Shanghai Stories

> Thy city, which is so full of envy that already the sack runs over, held me within it in the bright life . . . For the damning fault of gluttony, as thou seest, I lie helpless in the rain; and in my misery I am not alone, for all these are under the same penalty for the same fault. (Canto VI, Dante's *Inferno*, 89)

Dante's *Inferno* vividly imagines the city enticing travelers with its "bright life" caught in an eternal downpour. Like this circle of hell, global cities doom many to extreme misery and deprivation alongside luxury and wealth. As "one strategic type of place" between the global and the national, the city "allows us to recover the concrete, localized [work] processes" (Sassen 2001: 7) sustaining globalization, in order to uncover linkages that tie together the economic fate of men and women. Whereas the global spaces of economic processing zones and other places in developing countries host labor-intensive, often feminized jobs along manufacturing commodity chains, the examination of global cities through a feminist lens provides entry into the ways that local worksites exist within locations of global power relations that are gendered (Acker 2004), and how global processes "enact on local ground" (Freeman 2001: 1008–9). Global cities attract services at both low and high ends for the administration and management of the global economy. These jobs put in sharp relief the stark differences between the unmarked global elite and the strong gender and ethnic marking characteristic of devalued service and care occupations (Clark 1996: 44). In this way, male and female workers gain "presence" or visibility where they were once missing from globalization narratives (Sassen 2004). By focusing on global cities, this chapter further unpacks the concrete work in the global economy.

A tale of two types of global cities in the North and South lends a material setting to Dante's literary lament: "in my misery I am not