2 History and 1 Philosophy paper

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SOURCES — “CLEAN HANDS”: THE GERMAN ARMY ON THE EASTERN FRONT Hitler considered the German armed forces to be the most important tool for achieving his foreign policy objectives. However, the Wehrmacht [German armed forces] was not, strictly speaking, a Nazi institution. Its senior leadership had been trained and employed by the Imperial and Weimar governments long before Hitler’s rise to power. Hitler himself rejected the formal Nazification of the armed forces when he purged the SA [Nazi Party militia] in 1934. Following the Second World War, it was generally accepted in Germany and in the West that the Wehrmacht had remained apolitical: the German army had fought an honourable war distinct from the criminality of the Nazi Party and the SS, which took responsibility for the exploitation of occupied Europe and the execution of the Holocaust. The Wehrmacht exited the war supposedly with “clean hands.” Your task is to evaluate the accuracy of this prevailing wisdom using the collection of documents below. Most of the sources concern the activities of the German army on the eastern front in 1941 and 1942. The Germans launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941. The eastern front immediately became the focal point of the Second World War, not only because of the numbers of men employed in operations, but because the Soviet Union was the primary target of Hitler’s ideology. Hitler’s anti-communism and anti-Semitism, combined with his concept of Lebensraum [living space], gave Nazi policies in the east a particularly sinister character. With Operation Barbarossa, the Holocaust escalated from the ghettoization of Jews to their mass murder by the Einsatzgruppen, paving the way for the establishment of extermination camps in 1942. During the war, more than 15 million Soviet civilians died as the result of Nazi starvation policies or repression measures. To what extent was the Wehrmacht involved in these criminal policies? How much did German commanders, officers, and soldiers know about them and the activities of the SS? Did the regular army participate in war crimes? In part, you will be taking the role of the prosecution or defence in a legal case. In fact, many of the documents below were used as evidence in the Nuremberg Trials of war criminals held during the aftermath of the Second World War. But, you should also think about the sources as a historian, seeking to explain the factors behind your findings and to account for gray areas in the evidence. Why did the German high command, officers, and soldiers behave the way they did? Did they all behave the same way? If not, were there factors that help explain the differences? Use these questions to guide you in developing your own thesis, but feel free to be creative. The following documents include a range of source types: memoirs; official reports, correspondence, and directives; propaganda; private letters; even bugged conversations. A small amount of background information has been provided before each source. Addition technical information is available in the appendices that follow the documents. For historiographic background on the German army’s role in the east, start with the list of further reading below. Beyond that, you may choose to refer to other secondary sources for further clarification. One of the exciting parts of analyzing primary sources is the detective work involved in tracking down a name, place, or event that is not familiar to you! Further Reading (Historiography) Madievski, Samson. "The War of Extermination: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht in 1941 to 1944." Rethinking History 7, no. 2 (2003): 243–54. Shepherd, Ben. "The Clean Wehrmacht, the War of Extermination, and Beyond." Historical Journal 52, no. 1 (2009): 455–73.

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Table of Contents Documents

1. The Memoirs of General Heinz Guderian, 1952 2. Halder’s Notes of Hitler’s Address to German Generals, 30 March 1941 3. The Barbarossa Decree, 13 May 1941 4. The Commissar Decree, 6 June 1941 5. General Jodl’s Order, 7 October 1941 6. Memorandum on Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories, 10 October 1941 7. Von Manstein Order to Eleventh Army, 20 November 1941 8. Directives on Behaviour towards the Ukrainian Population, 7 December 1941 9. Mitteilungen für die Truppe, June 1940 10. Mitteilungen für die Truppe, July 1941 11. Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps, April 1942 12. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Wife, 28 June 1941 13. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Father, 4 August 1941 14. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Mother, 15 October 1941 15. A German NCO Writes Home, July 1942 16. A German NCO Writes Home, August 1942 17. General Rudolf Schmundt’s Directive, 31 October 1942 18. A Conversation between Two German POWs, August 1944 19. Letter from Alfred Rosenberg to Wilhelm Keitel, 28 February 1942 20. Affidavit of SS Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, 5 November 1945 21. A Conversation between German POWs, 28 December 1944 22. Testimony of Lieutenant Erwin Bingel, August 1945 23. Major von Gersdorff’s Report, 9 December 1941

Appendix

A. The German Army Chain of Command B. List of Terms and Abbreviations C. The German-Occupied East (map)

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Document 1. The Memoirs of General Heinz Guderian, 19521 General Heinz Guderian was one of the German army’s most prominent theorists of mechanized warfare. After participating in the invasions of Poland and France, he commanded a Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa. Following the failure to capture Moscow in December 1941, Hitler relieved Guderian of his command. Guderian was not involved in the plot of German generals to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. In the aftermath of the attempted coup, he was appointed chief of staff of the OKH. He surrendered to the Americans in 1945 and was never charged for war crimes. The following excerpts are taken from Guderian’s memoirs, published in 1952. On Criminal Orders:

Finally, an allusion must be made to an event which was to leave a deep stain on Germany's reputation.

Shortly before the opening of hostilities the OKW sent an order direct to all corps and divisions concerning the treatment that was to be given to the civilian population and to prisoners of war in Russia. It specified that in the event of excesses being committed against civilians or prisoners, the responsible soldier was not automatically to be tried and punished according to military law; disciplinary action was only to be taken at the discretion of the man's immediate unit commander. This order was obviously likely to have the most unfortunate effect on the preservation of discipline. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army had apparently realised this himself, for an appendix to the order, signed by Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, stated that the order would only be carried out if there was no danger of discipline suffering thereby. Since both I and my corps commanders were immediately convinced that discipline must suffer if the order were published, I forbade its forwarding to the divisions and ordered that it be returned to Berlin. This order, which was to play an important part in the post-war trials of German generals by our former enemies, was consequently never carried out in my Panzer Group. At the time I dutifully informed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group that I was not publishing or obeying this order.

The equally notorious, so-called 'Commissar Order' never even reached my Panzer Group. No doubt Army Group Centre had already decided not to forward it. Therefore the 'Commissar Order' was never carried out by my troops either.

Looking back, one can only deeply regret that neither the OKW nor the OKH blocked these two orders in the first place. Many brave and innocent soldiers would have thus been saved bitter suffering, and the good name of Germany would have been spared a great shame. Regardless of whether the Russians had signed the Hague Agreement or not, whether or not they had approved the Geneva Convention, German soldiers must accept their international obligations and must behave according to the dictates of a Christian conscience. Even without harsh orders the effects of war on the population of an enemy country are cruel enough, and the Russian civilians were as innocent of causing this war as were our own. [...] 1 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (1952; repr., London: Penguin, 2000), 152, 440–41, 446–48, 462–65.

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On Adolf Hitler: He was, in the summer of 1940, unsure how he might lead his country back to peace. He

did not know how to deal with the English. His armed forces were ready. They could not remain mobilised and inactive for an indefinite length of time. He felt an itch to act. What was to happen? The old ideological enemy, against whom he had struggled throughout his career and which, by opposing it, had brought him the mass of his supporters' votes, stood intact on the eastern frontier. He was tempted to make use of the time allowed him by the temporary lull on the Western Front in order to complete the reckoning with the Soviets. He was clearly aware of the threat that the Soviet Union and the communist urge to world hegemony offered both to Europe and to the whole of Western civilisation: He knew that in this matter he was in agreement with the majority of his fellow-countrymen and, indeed, with many good Europeans in other lands. The question of whether these ideas of his could in fact be militarily executed was, of course, quite another matter.

To begin with perhaps he only toyed with these ideas, but as time went on he began to take them more and more seriously. His unusually vivid powers of imagination led him to under- estimate the known strength of the Soviet Union. He maintained that mechanisation on land and in the air offered fresh chances of success, so that comparison with the campaigns of Charles XII of Sweden or Napoleon was no longer relevant. He maintained that he could rely with certainty upon the collapse of the Soviet system as soon as his first blows reached their mark. He believed the Russian populace would embrace his National-Socialist ideology. But as soon as the campaign began almost everything was done to prevent any such thing from taking place. By ill-treating the native populations in the occupied Russian territories that were administered by high Party functionaries, and by reason of his decision to dissolve the Russian state and to incorporate considerable areas into Germany, Hitler succeeded in uniting all Russians under the banner of Stalin. They were now fighting for Holy Mother Russia and against a foreign invader.

In part responsible for this blunder was his habit of under-estimating other races and nations. This had become evident before the war, within Germany, in his significantly short- sighted and irresponsibly harsh treatment of the Jews. It now assumed an even more sinister aspect. If any single fact played a predominant part in the collapse of National-Socialism and of Germany it was the folly of this racial policy.

Hitler wished to unite Europe. His failure to understand the characteristic differences of the various nations, combined with his methods of centralised control, doomed this intention from the start.

The Russian war soon showed the limitations of Germany's strength. But Hitler did not conclude from this that he must either break off the undertaking or at least choose more modest objectives; on the contrary, he plunged into the unlimited. He was determined, by means of reckless violence, to force defeat upon the Russians. With incomprehensible blindness he was simultaneously courting war with the United States. It is true that Roosevelt's order to his ships that they might open fire on Germany's naval vessels had produced a state of affairs that was close to war. But between that and actual, open warfare there might have lain a very long road had Hitler's overweening arrogance not closed it.

This frightening gesture on his part coincided with our first decisive defeat on the battlefields before Moscow. Hitler's strategy, lacking in consistency, and subject to continual vacillation in its execution, had crashed. From now on ruthlessly harsh treatment of his own troops was to make up for a failure of capability on the part of the controlling mind. For a time this proved successful. But in the long run it was not enough simply to remind his soldiers of the

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sacrifices made by Frederick the Great's grenadiers on the orders of that powerful king and commander. It was not enough that he should identify himself with the German people and thus, because he was prepared for privation, that he should simply ignore the population's basic requirements. [...] On Himmler and the SS:

The most impenetrable of all Hitler's disciples was the National Leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler. An inconspicuous man with all the marks of racial inferiority, the impression he made was one of simplicity. He went out of his way to be polite. In contrast to that of Goering his private life might be described as positively Spartan in its austerity.

His imagination was all the more vivid, and even fantastic. He seemed like a man from some other planet. His racial doctrine was fallacious and led him to commit terrible crimes. His attempt to educate the German people in National-Socialism resulted only in concentration camps. As late as 1943, long after Stalingrad, he still believed that Russia should be colonised by Germans as far as the Urals, On one occasion, when I said to him that it was already impossible to find volunteer colonists for the east, he insisted that the land as far as the Urals must be Germanised by compulsory colonisation if necessary and by planting the land with German peasants conscripted for that purpose.

As for the consequences of Himmler's racial theories, I have, from personal observation and experience, nothing to say. Hitler and Himmler succeeded in keeping this part of their programme strictly secret.

Himmler's 'methods of education,' as practised in the concentration camps, have meanwhile become sufficiently well known. During his lifetime the general public knew only a little about this. The atrocities carried out in those camps were made known to most people, as to myself, only after the collapse. The way the concentration camp methods were kept secret can only be described as masterly.

After 20th July2 Himmler became filled with military ambition: this led him to have himself appointed commander of the Training Army and even commander of an army group. In military matters Himmler proved an immediate and total failure. His appreciation of our enemies was positively childish. His decisions when in command of Army Group Vistula, in 1945, were dictated by fear. Despite this he retained Hitler's confidence almost up to the end.

Himmler's most notable creation was the SS. After the collapse this organisation was accused and condemned in root and branch. And that was unjust.

The SS originated as Hitler’s bodyguard. A desire to supervise not only the uninitiated mass of the populace but also the Party organisation led to its increase in strength. After the concentration camps were set up Himmler made the SS responsible for their control. This marks the point at which the SS was subdivided into two main groups: the Waffen-SS, or Armed SS, a primarily military organisation, and the Allgemeine-SS, or General SS. The man entrusted with the Waffen-SS was the former army general, Hausser, formerly chief of staff of my old division at Stettin. General Hausser was a first-class officer, a brave and clever soldier and a man outstandingly upright and honourable character. [...]

I can therefore assert that to my knowledge the SS divisions were always remarkable for a high standard of discipline, of esprit de corps, and of conduct in the face of the enemy. They 2 On 20 July 1944, a group of German army officers tried to assassinate Hitler and stage a coup in Berlin. The attempt failed. In its aftermath, Hitler purged the officer corps of the Wehrmacht and granted more military authority to Himmler’s SS.

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fought shoulder to shoulder with the panzer divisions of the Army, and the longer the war went on the less distinguishable they became from the Army.

There can, of course, be no doubt that Himmler had quite other ends in view when he arranged for the expansion of the Waffen-SS. Both Hitler and he distrusted the Army, for their intentions were dark and there always existed the danger for them that if the Army recognised them in time it might resist. [...]

A far different judgment must be passed on the Allgemeine-SS. Here, too, there were doubtless idealists to be found, who originally believed that they had joined an order with special responsibilities and therefore entitled to special privileges. There were also many men of good character and spirit, men drawn from the most varied professions and careers, who had simply been appointed members of the SS by Himmler without any questions being asked. But as time went on the picture changed; the SS took over numerous police functions of a most dubious sort. Then units of the Allgemeine-SS were also armed. The number of foreign formations was here also constantly on the increase; these were markedly worse than the units of the Waffen-SS, as, for example, was shown by the behaviour of the Kaminski and Dirlewanger Brigades in the crushing of the Warsaw uprising.

I never had anything to do with the SD and its Einsatzkommandos (Operational commandos) and am therefore not able to give any first-hand information concerning them. On the Officer Corps and Nazism:

When National-Socialism, with its new, nationalistic slogans, appeared upon the scene the younger elements of the Officer Corps were soon inflamed by the patriotic theories propounded by Hitler and his followers. The completely inadequate state of the country's armaments had lain like a leaden weight on the Officer Corps for many long years. It is no wonder that the first steps towards rearmament inclined them to, favour the man who promised to breathe fresh life into the armed forces after fifteen years' stagnation. The National-Socialist Party further increased its popularity in military circles since to begin with Hitler showed himself to be well disposed towards the Army and refrained from interfering in its private affairs. The previous gap in the Army's political life was now filled, and interest was aroused in political questions, though hardly in the manner that the democrats seem to have expected. Be that as it may, once the National-Socialists had seized power, the leaders of the armed forces could hardly remain aloof from National-Socialist politics, even had they wished to do so. The General Staff [OKH] certainly played no leading role in this new development; if anything, the contrary was true. The prime example of the sceptical attitude of the General Staff was that of General Beck. He had a number of adherents at the centre, but no influence over the Army as a whole and even less in the other services. Beck and his successor Halder, might try to put the brake on the swing towards National-Socialism at the hub of military authority; their effect on policy in general was nil and it simply followed its course without the support of, and in opposition to, the General Staff. Once again—as before the First World War—Germany found itself in a political situation from which there seemed to be no way out and which made the war look difficult if not hopeless, before ever it began. Once again the soldiers, led by the generals and the General Staff Corps officers, had to find a way out of an impasse for which they were not responsible.

All the reproaches that have been levelled against the leaders of the armed forces by their countrymen and by the international courts have failed to take into consideration one very simple fact: that policy is not laid down by soldiers but by politicians. This has always been the case and is so today. When war starts the soldiers can only act according to the political and military

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situation as it then exists. Unfortunately it is not the habit of politicians to appear in conspicuous places when the bullets begin to fly. They prefer to remain in some safe retreat and to let the soldiers carry out' the continuation of policy by other means.' [...]

At this point I should like to say a few words about the OKW. Field-Marshal Keitel was basically a decent individual who did his best to perform the task allotted him. He soon fell under the sway of Hitler's personality and, as time went on, became less and less able to shake off the hypnosis of which he was a victim. He preserved his Lower Saxon loyalty until the day of his death. Hitler knew that he could place unlimited confidence in the man; for that reason he allowed him to retain his position even when he no longer had any illusion about his talents as a strategist. The Field-Marshal exerted no influence on the course of operations. His chief activities were in the administrative field, which had previously been the domain of the War Ministry. It was Keitel's misfortune that he lacked the strength necessary to resist Hitler's orders when such orders ran contrary to international law and to accepted morality. It was only this weakness on his part that permitted the issuing to the troops of the so-called 'Commissar Order' and other notorious decrees. He paid for this with his life at Nuremberg. His family were not permitted to mourn at his grave.

Colonel-General Jodl, the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, had in fact controlled the operations of the combined armed forces ever since the Norwegian Campaign of April, 1940. He like Keitel, was a decent man; originally he too had fallen under Hitler's spell, but he had never been so hypnotised as was Keitel and therefore never became so uncritical. After his quarrel with Hitler during the Stalingrad period he withdrew completely into his work, most of which he did with his own hands and without the customary office and clerical assistance. He was silent and resigned on the question of reforming the military and political command, and adopted the same attitude towards the reorganisation and unified leadership of the General Staff. Only in the last few weeks of the war did he rise to fresh heights. He was to share Keitel's bitter fate.

If these two officers had assumed a different point of view in their dealings with Hitler they could have prevented much evil from taking place. Hitler only tended to give in when confronted by a unified opposition. But such unity in military matters scarcely ever existed, and this enabled him to make the OKH increasingly powerless and to ignore any objections that it might raise.

For all that—they were my comrades. Document 2. Halder’s Notes of Hitler’s Address to German Generals, 30 March 19413 On 30 March 1941 Hitler addressed his military leadership about the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union and the character he expected it to take. General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army [OKH], recorded the following notes from the meeting. 11.00 Meeting of generals at Führer’s office. Address lasting almost 2½ hours. [...] Our tasks concerning Russia. Crush armed forces, break up state.

3 Reproduced in Jürgen Förster and Evan Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa,” War in History 11, no. 1 (2004): 70–78.

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Future political image of Russia. Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates: Baltic states, Ukraine, White Russia. The new states must be socialist states, but without intellectual classes of their own. Formation of a new intellectual class must be prevented. A primitive socialist intelligentsia is all that is needed here. Problem of Russia’s vastness: enormous expanse requires concentration on decisive points. Massed planes and tanks must be brought forward to bear on decisive points. The Russian will break down under the massive impact of tanks and air force. [...] Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with asocial criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a fight of annihilation. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but thirty years later we shall again have to fight the Communist enemy. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy. [*Colonial tasks!]4 Fight against Russia. Extermination of the Bolshevik commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia. The fight must be directed against the poison of disintegration. This is no job for military courts. The individual troop commander must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this fight. The troops must fight back with methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This need not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his men. Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples. [*This fight will be very different from the fight in west. In the east, a stitch in time saves nine.] Document 3. The Barbarossa Decree, 13 May 19415 The following directive was authored and signed by General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Wehrmacht [OKW]. It was issued as a “Führer Decree” on behalf of Hitler.

TOP SECRET

Decree on the jurisdiction of martial law and on special measures of the troops [written in ink] The exercise of martial law serves primarily to maintain military discipline. The wide extent of operational space in the East, the form of combat that this offers, and the peculiarity of the enemy, present tasks to the courts martial [...] that, with their limited personnel, they can only solve if military law restricts itself for the time being to its central task. That is only possible if the troops themselves defend themselves against every threat from the enemy civilian population without mercy. 4 Asterisks signify marginal entries. 5 Two different translations of the decree are available as “Fuehrer Decree, 13 May 1941,” accessed 13 February 2014, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR5.htm, and “Barbarossa Decree of 13 May 1941,” accessed 13 February 2014, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/ggiles/barbaros.html.

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Accordingly, the following is decreed for the territory "Barbarossa" (theater of operation, rear army area and area of the political administration):

I.

Treatment of criminal acts by enemy civilians 1. Criminal acts of enemy civilians are withdrawn until further notice from the jurisdiction of courts-martial and summary courts. 2. Guerrillas are to be dispatched without mercy by the troops either in combat or while trying to escape.

3. Furthermore, all other attacks by enemy civilians against the Wehrmacht, its members and retinue are to be repelled on the spot by the most extreme measures up to the destruction of the attacker.

4. Where measures of this kind were missed or were initially not possible, the suspicious elements are to be immediately brought before an officer. He will decide whether they are to be shot. Collective drastic action will be taken immediately against communities from which treacherous or insidious attacks against the Wehrmacht are launched, on the orders of an officer with at least the rank of battalion commander upwards, if the circumstances do not permit a speedy apprehension of individual culprits.

5. It is expressly forbidden to detain suspected culprits, in order to hand them over to the courts when jurisdiction over native inhabitants is restored to these. [...]

II.

Treatment of criminal acts by members of the Wehrmacht or its retinue against native civilians

1. For acts which members of the Wehrmacht or its retinue commit against enemy civilians, there is no compulsion to prosecute, even when the act represents at the same time a military crime or offense.

2. In judging such deeds it is to be considered in any proceedings that the collapse in the year 1918, the later period of suffering of the German people, and the battle against National Socialism with the movement’s countless sacrifices of blood are incontestably to be attributed to Bolshevik influence, and that no German has forgotten that.

3. The chairman of the court must therefore examine whether a disciplinary reprimand is appropriate or whether it is necessary to institute judicial proceedings. The chairman only orders court-martial proceedings for acts against native inhabitants, when the maintenance of discipline

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or the protection of the troops demands it. That applies, for example, in the case of serious acts that result from the loss of sexual restraint, are derived from a criminal disposition, or are a sign that the troops are threatening to run wild. Criminal acts, by which lodgings or supplies or other plunder are senselessly destroyed to the detriment of our own troops, are not on the whole to be judged more leniently. The order of the inquiry proceedings requires in every individual case the signature of the judge. Extreme care must be exercised when judging the authenticity of the statements of enemy civilians.

III.

Responsibility of the troop commanders

The troop commanders are, within the sphere of their competence, personally responsible for the following: 1. that all officers of the units subordinated to them are very thoroughly and promptly instructed about the fundamentals of I, 2. that their legal advisors be promptly informed about these instructions and about the verbal statements with which the political intentions of the leadership had been explained to the commanders-in-chief, 3. that only such sentences will be confirmed which are in accord with the political intentions of the leadership. [...]

[signed] KEITEL Document 4. The Commissar Decree, 6 June 19416 Two weeks before the invasion of the Soviet Union, the following decree was issued to German commanders destined for the eastern front. Keitel’s deputy, Walter Warlimont, signed the order on his behalf. Commissars were Communist Party officials assigned to Red Army units to ensure the loyalty of officers and to monitor and control morale among Soviet troops.

TOP SECRET

By hand of officer only! Further to the Fuhrer decree of 14 May regarding the exercise of military jurisdiction in the area of "Barbarossa" ... , the attached document, "General Instructions on the Treatment of Political Commissars," is circulated herewith. You are requested to limit its distribution to the

6 “The Commissar Decree, 6 June 1941,” in The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, eds. Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle (London: Routledge, 2002), 277–79.

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Commanders of Armies and Air Force and to arrange for its further oral communication to lower commands.

Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW)

[signed] Warlimont

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TREATMENT OF POLITICAL COMMISSARS

In the struggle against Bolshevism, we must not assume that the enemy's conduct will be based on principles of humanity or of international law. In particular, hate-inspired, cruel, and inhuman treatment of prisoners can be expected on the part of all ranks of political commissars, who are the real leaders of resistance.

The attention of all units must be drawn to the following:

1. To show consideration to these elements during this struggle or to act in accordance with international rules of war is wrong and endangers both our own security and the rapid pacification of conquered territory.

2. Political Commissars have initiated barbaric, Asiatic methods of warfare. Consequently they will be dealt with immediately and with maximum severity. As a matter of principle they will be shot at once whether captured during operations or otherwise showing resistance.

The following regulations will apply: I. THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1. Political commissars who oppose our forces will be treated in accordance with the decree on "The Exercise of Military Law in the Area of Barbarossa." This applies to every kind and rank of Commissar even if only suspected of resistance or sabotage or incitement to resist. In this connection see "General Instructions on the Conduct of Troops in Russia."

2. Political commissars serving with enemy forces are recognizable by their distinctive insignia — a red star interwoven with a hammer and sickle on the sleeve band (see details in "Armed Forces of the USSR" ... ). On capture they will be immediately separated from other prisoners on the field of battle. This is essential to prevent them from influencing in any way the other prisoners. Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated.

3. Political commissars who are neither guilty nor suspected of being guilty of hostile actions will be initially exempt from the above measures. Only as our forces penetrate further into the country will it be possible to decide whether remaining officials should be allowed to stay where they are or whether they should be handed over to the Sonderkommandos [special units], who should where possible carry out the investigation themselves. In reaching a verdict of "guilty or not guilty," greater attention will be paid to the character and bearing of the commissar in question than to his offence, for which corroborative evidence may not be forthcoming.

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4. Under I. and 2. a short report (on a report form) on the case will be forwarded (a) by divisional units to divisional headquarters (Intelligence Section) (b) by units directly subordinate to a Corps, Army Group, or Armored Group to the Intelligence Section at Corps or higher headquarters.

5. None of the above measure must be allowed to interfere with operations. Systematic screening and cleansing operations by combat units will therefore not take place.

II. IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE Commissars who are apprehended in the rear areas for acting in a suspicious manner will be handed over to the Einsatzgruppen or Einsatzkommandos of the SD. III. MODIFICATION OF GENERAL AND REGIMENTAL COURTS MARTIAL General and regimental courts martial will not be responsible for carrying out the measures in Sections I and II. Document 5. General Jodl’s Order, 7 October 19417 Alfred Jodl was another of Keitel’s deputies at the OKW. He sent the following message to the Army High Command [OKH] when it appeared likely that Leningrad and Moscow would soon fall into German hands. Neither city ever did.

MOST SECRET Supreme Command of Armed Forces

Führer’s Hq., 7 Oct. 41 To Army Supreme Command (Ops. Section)

The Fuhrer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or later of Moscow is not to be accepted even if offered by the enemy.

The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world. Just as in Kiev, our troops were subject to extreme danger through explosions with time-fuses, the same must be expected to a still greater degree in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet radio itself has broadcast that the foundations of Leningrad were mined and the city would be defended to the last man.

Extreme danger of epidemics is to be expected. Therefore no German soldier is to enter these cities. Anyone who tries to leave the city

through our lines is to be forced to return under fire. The exodus of the population through the smaller, unguarded gaps towards the interior of

Russia to be allowed. Before all other cities are taken, they are to be softened up by artillery fire and airraids and their population forced to flee.

7 “General Jodl’s order, 7 October 1941,” in Stackelberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 285.

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We cannot take the responsibility of endangering our soldiers' lives by fire in order to save Russian cities, nor that of feeding the population of these cities at the expense of the German homeland [...]

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces By Order

[signed:] Jodl Document 6. Memorandum on Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories, 10 October 19418 Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau commanded the German Sixth Army as part of Army Group South in 1941. He issued the following secret memo to his unit commanders.

SECRET! ARMY H.Q., 10.10.41

Army Command 6., Sec. Ia-A.7 Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the onesided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews. The combating of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerrilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form

8 “Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories,” in The Nazi State and German Society: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Robert G, Moeller (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 117–19.

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of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories [...]

Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfil two tasks:

1. Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed

forces. 2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the

lives of military personnel in Russia.

This is the only way to fulfil our historic task to liberate the German people once forever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

Commander in Chief [signed] von Reichenau

Field Marshal Document 7. Von Manstein Order to Eleventh Army, 20 November 19419 General Erich von Manstein took over command of the Eleventh Army in Ukraine in September 1941. After the war, von Manstein was regarded as one of Germany’s elite field commanders. The following order, signed by von Manstein, was to be distributed to all regiments and battalions in the Eleventh Army.

SECRET Since the 22nd June the German people have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the Bolshevist system. This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet armed forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare. Behind the front, too, the fighting continues. Partisan snipers dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units, and try to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mines and infernal machines. Bolshevists left behind keep the population, freed from Bolshevism, in a state of unrest by means of terror, and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly delivered to starvation. Jewry constitutes the middleman between the enemy in the rear and the remainder of the Red armed forces which is still fighting and the Red leadership. More strongly than in Europe it holds all the key positions in the political leadership and administration, controls commerce and trade, and further forms the nucleus for all unrest and possible uprisings. The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all. Never again must it encroach upon our European living-space.

9 The text of the order is available in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947–49), vol. 20, 640–42.

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The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people. The fight behind the lines is not yet being taken seriously enough. Active co-operation of all soldiers must be demanded in the disarming of the population, the control and arrest of all roving soldiers and civilians and the removal of Bolshevist symbols. Every instance of sabotage must be punished immediately with the severest measures, and all signs thereof must be reported. The food situation at home makes it essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed off the land, and that furthermore the largest possible stocks should be placed at the disposal of the homeland. Particularly in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry. Nevertheless nothing which the homeland has sacrificed itself to contribute may, out of a misguided sense of humanity, be given to prisoners or to the population unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmacht. The soldier must appreciate the necessity for the harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings, which are mostly attributable to Jews. It is the task of leaders at all levels to keep constantly alive the meaning of the present struggle. Support for the Bolshevist fight behind the front by way of thoughtlessness must be prevented. It is to be expected of the non-Bolshevist Ukrainians, Russians and Tartars that they will be converted to the New Order. The non-participation of numerous alleged anti- Soviet elements must give place to a definite decision in favour of active co-operation against Bolshevism. Where it does not exist it must be forced by suitable measures. Voluntary co-operation in the reconstruction of occupied territory is an absolute necessity for the achievement of our economic and political aims. It has as its condition a just treatment of all non- Bolshevist sections of the population, some of whom have for years fought heroically against Bolshevism. The ruling of this country demands from us results, strictness with ourselves and submergence of the individual. The bearing of every soldier is constantly under observation. It can make enemy propaganda ineffective or give it a springboard. If the soldier in the country takes from the peasant the last cow, the breeding sow, the last chicken or the seed, then no restoration of the economy can be achieved. In all measures it is not the momentary success which is decisive. All measures must, therefore, be judged by their effectiveness over a period of time. Respect for religious customs, particularly those of Mohammedan Tartars, must be demanded.

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In pursuance of these concepts there are other measures besides to be carried out by the later administration. The enlightenment of the population by propaganda, encouragement of personal initiative, e.g., by prizes, extensive detailing of the population towards fighting the partisans and expansion of the local auxiliary police must be given more significance. For the achievement of this object the following must be demanded: Active co-operation of soldiers in the fight against the enemy in the rear. No soldier to go about alone at night. All motor vehicles to be equipped with adequate armament. A self-assured but not overbearing attitude from all soldiers. Restraint towards prisoners and the other sex. No waste of food. Severest action to be taken: Against despotism and self-seeking. Against lawlessness and lack of discipline. Against every transgression of the honour of a soldier. Document 8. Directives on Behaviour towards the Ukrainian Population, 7 December 194110 General Ewald von Kleist commanded the First Panzer Army as part of Army Group South. By December 1941, his units had settled into winter quarters in southeastern Ukraine. Von Kleist issued the following directive that month, along with a message from Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories (see Document 19).

Panzer Army 1 HQ, 7.12.41 Subject: Treatment of Ukrainians. The following orders are for your knowledge and study. The contents of the directives can be passed on in writing to regiments, beyond that it is necessary to instruct the troops and officers verbally to the extent necessary. [...]

10 An Italian translation of the order is available as “Trattamento degli ucraini,” 7 December 1941, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Rome), Ministero della Cultura Popolare – Direzione Generale Servizi della Propaganda, b. 196, fasc. “Russia – varie,” sf. “Pieghevole per Fronte Russo, settembre–novembre 1941.” At this time, Italian forces on the eastern front were attached to von Kleist’s Panzer Army.

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Directives on behaviour towards the Ukrainian population. 1. The Führer reserves for himself the future political arrangement of the territories inhabited by

the Ukrainian population. Questions in this regard must not be handled by military offices. To Ukrainian complaints about the placement of individual parts of Ukraine under the administration of the General Governorate and Romania or the like, one should reply by pointing out that Ukraine was rescued with German blood and that therefore Germany will reserve for itself the right to make arrangements for the region according to general and political necessities.

2. In cases of necessity, the collaboration of suitable Ukrainians in the civil administration of towns and districts as trustworthy advisors is permitted. Individual trustworthy Ukrainians can be employed in superior administration offices only as advisors without duties.

3. The final economic aim is the natural development of Ukraine as the breadbasket of Europe. The entire East must become the principle marketplace for West European industry, whose products will be paid for with agricultural goods and raw materials. Agriculture and the production of raw materials must therefore by favoured [...]

4. In accordance with this end goal it is necessary to treat the Ukrainian population gently as long as they willingly collaborate under German administration, especially in agriculture. The widespread efforts of forcing upon a foreign people one’s own customs, manners, and traditions [...] must be stopped.

The Ukrainian press (mail) is permitted to a limited extent under certain control. No objection against the opening of schools.

5. The Ukrainian Autocephalous [Orthodox] Church and some other confessional associations are permitted as long as they are not political. However, it is necessary to prevent places of worship from becoming places of pilgrimage and as such centres of autonomous movement. Ecclesiastical representatives from other states will be expelled from the zones under German administration.

6. The participation of members of the armed forces in national Ukrainian celebrations must be restricted to exceptional cases [...] The arrangement of such celebrations by German offices must in any case be discontinued.

[The following memorandum from Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry was attached to the directive] The Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin, 22.11.41

Urgent

To the Army High Command [OKH]

In recent days the Reich Ministry has repeatedly received questions about the treatment of Ukrainians. These are sometimes accompanied by observations that it would be right to treat Ukrainians as blacks since the region must be exploited as a colony.

Regarding this one must consider the following: The Ukrainians belong to the family of European peoples and are full of Germanic blood. They have completed notable feats, both cultural and scientific. If the people have not fully developed according to their abilities, it is because for the entire course of their history the Ukrainians have been oppressed and plundered

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by foreign peoples. For a long period of time they resisted the assault of the Tatars on Europe, until at last they had to succumb before superior forces. Later, they were oppressed by the Poles and still later by Tsarist Russia which prohibited the Ukrainian language and conducted a policy of Russification. Despite the fertility of the country and its valuable fields of earth, economic exploitation only began in the current century. It has been even worse for Ukrainians under the Bolsheviks who, in exploiting the economic strengths of the country for their own ends, have turned the peasant into a slave through collectivization and expelled those who had made progress through their diligence and skill. The fear of being considered a “kulak” and of being deported was so great that the peasant intentionally wrecked his farm to appear poor.

The impression offering itself to who travels through the country is therefore incorrect. One does not see the true Ukrainian but a man almost completely crushed by Bolshevik terror.

This people considers itself liberated from the intolerable yoke by the German armed forces and has put itself at our disposition, immediately and everywhere. The work of the harvest being attended to despite the lack of machinery and despite very difficult circumstances has provoked general admiration.

That opinion of the population must be preserved in every way. Germany must be faithful to its role that it assumes with the task of liberating Europe

from Bolshevism. Therefore, it would not be entirely inconsequential, but would also be short- sighted to treat men that we have freed from Bolshevism, that we want to incorporate into the New European Order and that furthermore are Aryans, as blacks or slaves. The sympathy of the population would naturally turn into hatred against Germany. [...]

This opinion does not mean that, especially during the course of the war, all the economic potential of the country cannot be rendered useful to our aims. The maximum can be achieved only with a friendly population that wants to work; but never with draconian measures that enslave the people. Document 9. Mitteilungen für die Truppe, June 194011 The Mitteilungen für die Truppe was a news-sheet issued by OKW’s Propaganda Office and distributed to all Wehrmacht units. What the reports of OKW in May 1940 had made known is one single grand poem of German heroism and inspired leadership [...] Any attempt to describe the battles of these three weeks of the Greater German War of Liberation with one word which would equal their greatness, must be admitted to border on the impossible [...] This battle of annihilation was so great that we can only accept with shocked silence and thankful hearts this act of destiny.

Behind the battle of annihilation of May 1940 stands in lone greatness the name of the Führer.

All that has been accomplished since he has taken the fate of our people into his strong hands! [...]

He gave the people back its unity, smashed the parties and destroyed the hydra of the organizations [...] he decontaminated the body of our people from the Jewish subversion,' created a stock-proud, race-conscious Volk, which had overcome the racial death of diminishing births

11 Quoted in Omer Bartov, Hilter’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 122–23.

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and was granted renewed children-prosperity as a carrier of the great future of the Fatherland. He subdued the terrible plight of unemployment and granted to millions of people who had already despaired of the Volk a new belief in the Volksgemeinschaft and happiness in a new Fatherland [...]

His genius, in which the whole strength of Germandom is embodied with ancient powers, has animated the souls of 80,000,000 Germans, has filled them with strength and will, with the storm and stress of a renewed young people; and, himself the first soldier of Germany, he has entered the name of the German soldier into the book of immortality.

All this we were allowed to experience. Our great duty in this year of decision is that we do not accept it as observers, but that we, enchanted, and with all the passion of which we are capable, sacrifice ourselves to this Führer and strive to be worthy of the historical epoch molded by a heaven-storming will. Document 10. Mitteilungen für die Truppe, July 194112 Anyone who has ever looked at the face of a red commissar knows what the Bolsheviks are like. Here there is no need for theoretical expressions. We would insult the animals if we described these mostly Jewish men as beasts. They are the embodiment of the Satanic and insane hatred against the whole of noble humanity. The shape of these commissars reveals to us the rebellion of the Untermenschen against noble blood. The masses, whom they have sent to their deaths by making use of all means at their disposal such as ice-cold terror and insane incitement, would have brought an end to all meaningful life, had this eruption not been dammed at the last moment. Document 11. Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps, April 194213 The Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps was a news-sheet issued by OKW’s Propaganda Office and distributed to all Wehrmacht officers. In the struggle against the capitalism and imperialism of the English and the Americans and against the world-revolutionary theses of the Bolsheviks the weapons of the Wehrmacht alone will not achieve victory ... [which can be gained] only ... when the people ... confronts the political and ideological theses of the enemy with better political concepts .... [S]uch an attitude ... is based on the German people's unshakable sense of loyalty to Führer, Volk and Fatherland, the kind of loyalty which remains absolutely firm in the face of all crises and knows no scepticism .... Not only are the economic and power-political bases of our life critically threatened, but the whole spiritual life of the nation, the ethical basis of our cultural and religious concept of the world, truly everything which is great and holy for German men in life and death, all is threatened at the core if we fail to master the enemy .... Have the officers burnt this so deeply into their men's hearts, that each of them knows and sees fully and clearly against what devilish game in the world he has been called into action? .. We know that the Devil has been set loose against our land ... we are filled with the responsibility to God to defend the land which had been given us, to save His property and to multiply it, and therefore we mobilize not only

12 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 126. 13 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 123–24.

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our weapons ... but also the weapons of the soul. ... The military-spiritual [or ideological] leadership of the soldiers has been added to the officers' duties, because political determination and soldierly feats are a single unity and are indissolubly bound to each other. The more German soldiers are aware of the full extent of the mortal danger which threatens them, the greater will be the conviction and the toughness with which they will confront the dynamics of the Bolshevik revolution with the whole strength of soul and will of National Socialist Germany .... In the war, as the Fuhrer has said ... the nations are being judged in the Godly court of the Almighty. He who survives this trial will be seen as worthy of molding a new life on earth .... What a task! ... The officers of the Fuhrer, and the German soldiers whom they lead, a sworn community of the best men of German blood, carried on by the love, the work and the belief of the German people, are marching to the decision. There beyond hell is burning. May it charge! We shall still win! Document 12. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Wife, 28 June 194114 Karl Fuchs was a tank gunner in the 7th Panzer Division. He participated in Operation Barbarossa and was killed in combat outside of Moscow on 21 November 1941. The following three documents consist of letters written by Fuchs to his family in Germany. My dearest wife, my dear little Horsti,

... Up to now, all of the troops have had to accomplish quite a bit. The same goes for our machines and tanks. But, nevertheless, we're going to show those Bolshevik bums who's who around here! They fight like hired hands—not like soldiers, no matter if they are men, women or children on the front lines. They're all no better than a bunch of scoundrels. By now, half of Europe is mobilized. The entry of Spain and Hungary on our side against this Bolshevik archenemy of the world overjoyed us all. Yes, Europe stands under the leadership of our beloved Fuhrer Adolph Hitler, and he'll reshape it for a better future. The entry of all these volunteer armies into this war will cause the war to be over soon.

The impressions that the battles have left on me will be with me forever. Believe me, dearest, when you see me again, you will face quite a different person, a person who has learned the harsh command: "I will survive!" You can't afford to be soft in war; otherwise you will die. No, you must be tough-indeed, you have to be pitiless and relentless. Don't I sound like a different person to you? Deep down in my heart, I remain a good person and my love for you and our son will never diminish. Never! This love will increase as will my longing for you. I kiss you and remain forever

your Korri Document 13. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Father, 4 August 194115 Dear Father,

... The pitiful hordes on the other side are nothing but felons who are driven by alcohol and the threat of pistols pointed at their heads. There is no troop morale and they are at best cannon fodder. You should read the pamphlets that they drop from the sky with better accuracy than their bombs. "Desert! Join the Bolsheviks! You'll be safe with us!" They are nothing but a

14 “A German Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front,” in Moeller, The Nazi State and German Society, 119–20. 15 “A German Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front,” in Moeller, The Nazi State and German Society, 121.

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bunch of assholes! Excuse the expression, but there simply is no other term for them. Having encountered these Bolshevik hordes and having seen how they live has made a lasting impression on me. Everyone, even the last doubter, knows today that the battle against these subhumans, who've been whipped into a frenzy by the Jews, was not only necessary but came in the nick of time. Our Führer has saved Europe from certain chaos. And so we move on to the final battle and victory. I shake your hand and greet you. Germany, Sieg Heil!

Your loyal son, Karl Document 14. A Letter from Sergeant Karl Fuchs to His Mother, 15 October 194116 My dear Mother,

While a terrible snowstorm is howling outside, my comrades and I are camping in one of these terrible peasant houses. Although it's not much of a home, we managed to clean it up yesterday. Up until now we've always preferred to dig a hole in the ground and maybe pitch a tent. Now, however, it's simply too cold outside. If you could see how these people live here, you would be horrified!

This present abode is in better shape than most. In one corner there is even a structure that looks like a bed. Most Russians don't sleep in beds, but either behind or on top of their stove. I won't describe the other facilities, such as water and sanitation. Suffice it to say that they hardly exist.

Our duty has been to fight and to free the world from this Communist disease. One day, many years hence, the world will thank the Germans and our beloved Fuhrer for our victories here in Russia. Those of us who took part in this liberation battle can look back on those days with pride and infinite joy. That's all for today. I send you my greetings.

Your son, Karl Document 15. A German NCO Writes Home, July 194217 The following excerpts are from a letter written to home by two different but anonymous non- commissioned officers [NCOs] of the Wehrmacht. ... The great task given us in the struggle against Bolshevism lies in the destruction of eternal Jewry. Once one sees what the Jew has done in Russia, one can well understand why the Führer began the struggle against Jewry. What sorrows would have come to our homeland had this beast of a man had the upper hand? ... Recently a comrade of ours was murdered in the night. He was stabbed in the back. That can only have been the Jew, who stands behind these crimes. The revenge taken for that act brought indeed a nice success. The population itself hates the Jews as never before. It realizes now, that he is guilty of everything. 16 “A German Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front,” in Moeller, The Nazi State and German Society, 122. 17 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 162.

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Document 16. A German NCO Writes Home, August 194218 I have received the "Stürmer"19 now for the third time. It makes me happy with all my heart .... You could not have made me happier. ... I recognized the Jewish poison in our people long ago; how far it might have gone with us, this we see only now in this campaign. What the Jewish- regime has done in Russia, we see every day, and even the last doubters are cured here in view of the facts. We must and we will liberate the world from this plague, this is why the German soldier protects the Eastern Front, and we shall not return before we have uprooted all evil and destroyed the center of the Jewish-Bolshevik "world-do-gooders." Document 17. General Rudolf Schmundt’s Directive, 31 October 194220 On 1 October 1942, General Rudolf Schmundt became chief of personnel for OKH, meaning that he played a key role in assignments and promotions within the army. Prior to taking this position, Schmundt had been one of Hitler’s chief adjutants. The following secret directive was issued to senior officers of the German army. Every officer must be fully aware first that the Jewish lobby has challenged the German people's claim to Lebensraum and standing in the eyes of the world, and second has forced our nation to prevail against a world of enemies by spilling the blood of our best young men. Officers must therefore adopt a clear and totally uncompromising stance on the Jewish question. There is no difference between supposedly "decent" Jews and the rest. Nor may any consideration be given to relationships of whatever nature that existed before the threat posed by Jews was common knowledge among the German people. Hence no connection, even of the most casual sort, may exist between an officer and a member of the Jewish race. The present decisive struggle against the international enemy Jewish Bolshevism has clearly revealed the true face of Jewry. Every officer must therefore oppose it on the basis of firm inner conviction and refuse all association with it. Any infraction against this uncompromising stance will make him unviable and result in expulsion from the army. All officers under your command are to be instructed accordingly. Document 18. A Conversation between Two German POWs, August 194421 During the Second World War, British intelligence agents systematically eavesdropped on conversations between German prisoners of war by bugging their cells. The following conversation took place between Lieutenant General Georg Neuffer and Colonel Hans Reimann in August 1944. NEUFFER: That transporting of the Russians to the rear from Vyasma [in autumn 1941] was a ghastly business.

18 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 163. 19 Der Stürmer was a Nazi tabloid-newspaper known for its anti-Semitic and anti-communist propaganda. 20 Quoted in Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 132–33. 21 Quoted in Sönke Neitzel and Haral Welzer, Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying; The Secret WWII Transcripts of German POWs, trans. Jefferson Chase (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 95–96.

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REIMANN: It was really gruesome. I was present when they were being transported from Korosten to just outside Lwow. They were driven like cattle from the trucks to the drinking troughs and bludgeoned to keep their ranks. There were troughs at the stations; they rushed to them and drank like beasts; after that they were given just a bit of something to eat. Then they were again driven into the wagons; there were sixty or seventy men in one cattle truck! Each time the train halted ten of them were taken out dead: they had suffocated for lack of oxygen. I was in the train with the camp guard and I heard it from the “Feldwebel” [sergeant], a student, a man with spectacles, an intellectual, whom I asked: “How long has this been going on?” — “Well, I have been doing this for four weeks; I’ll not be able to stand it much longer, I must get away; I don’t stick it any more!” At the stations the prisoners peered out of the narrow openings and shouted in Russian to the Russians standing there: “Bread! And God will bless you,” etc. They three out their old shirts, their last pairs of stockings and shoes from the trucks and children came up and brought them pumpkins to eat. They threw the pumpkins in, and then all you heard was a terrific din like the rearing of wild animals in the trucks. They were probably killing each other. That finished me. I sat back in a corner and pulled my coat up over my ears. I asked the “Feldwebel”: “Haven’t you any food at all?” He answered: “Sir, how should we have anything, nothing has been prepared!” NEUFFER: No, really, all that was incredibly gruesome. Just to see that column of PW [prisoners of war] after the twin battle of Vyasma–Bryansk, when the PW were taken to the rear on foot, far beyond Smolensk. I often travelled along that route—the ditches by the side of the roads were full of shot Russians. Cars had driven in to them; it was really ghastly. Document 19. Letter from Alfred Rosenberg to Wilhelm Keitel, 28 February 194222 Alfred Rosenberg was a prominent Nazi intellectual and ideologue who was born a Baltic German in Estonia. Among his prewar writing that equated Jewry with Bolshevism, Rosenberg also propounded an anti-Christian Germanic neo-paganism. On 17 July 1941, Hitler placed Rosenberg in charge of the newly created Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Technically, his Ministry oversaw the civilian administration of territories in the Baltic, Belorussia, and Ukraine that were not under direct military rule by the army. However, in practice, Rosenberg was unable to control his subordinates [Reichskommissare] and he soon lost out in power struggles with other state agencies and the SS, who implemented their own policies in the occupied east. Here, Rosenberg writes Keitel about the army’s treatment of Soviet prisoners of war and its ramifications for German occupation policy. SUBJECT: PRISONERS OF WAR Since the beginning of its existence, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories has taken the viewpoint that the large number of Soviet prisoners of war constitute highly valuable material for propaganda. The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must be considered differently than the treatment of prisoners of war of other nations for various reasons: 22 “Letter from Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the OKW, 28 February 1942,” in Stackelberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 293–95.

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1. The war in the East has not been concluded, and the treatment of the prisoners of war

must have far-reaching effects on the will to desert of the Red Army soldier who is still fighting.

2. Germany intends to keep a large part of the former Soviet Union occupied, even after the end of the war, and to develop it industrially for our purposes. Therefore we depend on a far-reaching cooperation of the population.

3. Germany is conducting the fight against the Soviet Union because of ideological differences. Bolshevism must be overthrown and something better must be put in its place. Even the prisoners of war themselves must realize that National Socialism is willing and in a position to bring them a better future. They must return later to their homes from Germany with a feeling of admiration and esteem for Germany and German institutions, and thus become propagandists for the cause of Germany and National Socialism.

This attempted goal has not been attained so far. The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 million prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them have starved, or died, because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from typhus. It is understood, of course, that there are difficulties encountered in the feeding of such a large number of prisoners of war. Anyhow, with a certain amount of understanding for goals aimed at by German politics, dying and deterioration could have been avoided to the extent described. For instance, according to information on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union are absolutely willing to put food at the disposal of the prisoners of war. Several understanding camp commanders have successfully chosen this course. However, in the majority of cases, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather let them starve to death. Even on the march to the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to give the prisoners of war food. In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the corpses were left. In numerous camps no shelter for the prisoners of war was provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves. A systematic delousing of the prisoners of war in the camps and of the camps themselves has apparently been missed. Utterances such as these have been heard: "The more of these prisoners die, the better it is for us." The consequence of this treatment now is that typhus is spreading due to the escape and discharge of prisoners and has claimed its victims among the Wehrmacht as well as among the civilian population, even in the old part of Germany.

Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned. These were partly carried out according to viewpoints that ignore all political understanding. For instance, in various camps, all the "Asiatics" were shot, although the inhabitants of the areas, considered belonging to Asia, of Transcaucasia and Turkestan especially, are among those people in the Soviet Union who are most strongly opposed to Russian subjugation and to Bolshevism. The Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories has repeatedly emphasized these abuses. However, in November for instance, a detail appeared in a prisoner of war camp in Nikolajew, wanting to liquidate all Asiatics.

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The treatment of prisoners of war appears to be founded for a great part on serious misconceptions about the people of the Soviet Union. One finds the opinion that the people become more inferior the further one goes east. If the Poles already were given harsh treatment, it is argued, even harsher treatment should be meted out to the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Russians, and finally the "Asiatics."

It was apparently completely ignored, in the treatment of prisoners of war, that Germany found— in contrast to the West (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway)—a people who went through all the terror of Bolshevism, and who now, happy about their liberation, put themselves willingly at the disposal of Germany. A better gift could not come to Germany in this war, which requires every last man. But instead of accepting this gift, the people of the East are being treated more contemptibly and worse than the people of the West, who do not hide their enmity towards Germany ... Document 20. Affidavit of SS Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, 5 November 194523 Otto Ohlendorf was a senior figure in the SS who commanded Einsatzgruppe D in southern Ukraine in 1941 and 1942. Captured by the Americans at the end of the war, Ohlendorf signed the following affidavit in November 1945, outlining the work of his unit. He was later placed on trial for war crimes and executed. I, Otto Ohlendorf, being first duly sworn, declare:

I was chief of the Security Service (SD), Amt III of the Main Office of the chief of the Security Police and the SD (RSHA), from 1939 to 1945. In June 1941 I was designated by Himmler to lead one of the special commitment groups [Einsatzgruppen], which were then being formed, to accompany the German armies in the Russian campaign. I was the chief of the Einsatzgruppe D ... Himmler stated that an important part of our task consisted of the extermination of Jews—women, men, and children—and of communist functionaries. I was informed of the attack on Russia about four weeks in advance.

According to an agreement with the armed forces high command and army high command, the special commitment detachments [Einsatzkommandos] within the army group or the army were assigned to certain army corps and divisions. The army designated the areas in which the special commitment detachments had to operate. All operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the chief of the SIPO [Security Police] and the SD (RSHA) in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the Einsatzgruppen and the chief of the SIPO and the SD.

The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were commanded by personnel of the Gestapo, the SD, or the criminal police. Additional men were detailed from the regular police [Ordnungspolizei] and the Waffen SS. Einsatzgruppe D consisted of approximately 400 to 500 men and had about 170 vehicles at its disposal.

When the German army invaded Russia, I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D in the Southern sector, and in the course of the year, during which I was leader of Einsatzgruppe D, it liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women, and children. The majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were among them some communist functionaries too.

23 “Affidavit of SS Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf,” in Stackelberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 342– 43.

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In the implementation of this extermination program the special commitment groups were subdivided into special commitment detachments, and the Einsatzkommandos into still smaller units, the so-called Special Purpose Detachments [Sonderkommandos] and Unit Detachments [Teilkommandos]. Usually, the smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the Gestapo, or the criminal police. The unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were requested to hand over their valuables to the leaders of the unit, and shortly before the execution to surrender their outer clothing. The men, women, and children were led to a place of execution which in most cases was located next to a more deeply excavated anti-tank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in group D, but ordered that several of the men would shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct, personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit or especially designated persons, however, had to fire the last bullet at those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from conversations with other group leaders that some of them demanded that the victims lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the nape of the neck. I did not approve of these methods.

In the spring of 1942 we received gas vehicles from the chief of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin. These vehicles were made available by Amt 11 of the RSHA. The man who was responsible for the cars of my Einsatzgruppe was Becher. We had received orders to use the cars for the killing of women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also had these gas vehicles stationed in the neighborhood of the transient camps into which the victims were brought. The victims were told that they would be resettled and had to climb into the vehicles for that purpose. Then the doors were closed and the gas streamed in through the starting of the vehicles. The victims died within 10 to 15 minutes. The cars were then driven to the burial place, where the corpses were taken out and buried ...

[signed] Ohlendorf 5 November 1945

Document 21. A Conversation between German POWs, 28 December 194424 British intelligence officers recorded the following conversation between Lieutenant General Heinrich Kittel and two other German prisoners named Felbert and Schaefer. The events they discuss took place in German-occupied Latvia between July and November 1941. At the time, Kittel was a colonel in a reserve unit of Army Group North. FELBERT: Have you also known places from which the Jews have been removed? KITTEL: Yes. FELBERT: Was that carried out quite systematically? KITTEL: Yes. FELBERT: Women and children—everybody? KITTEL: Everybody. Horrible! FELBERT: Were they loaded onto trains?

24 Quoted in Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 101–106.

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KITTEL: If only they had been loaded onto trains! The things I've experienced! I then sent a man along and said: "I order this to stop. I can't stand it any longer." For instance, in Latvia, near Dvinsk, there were mass executions of Jews carried out by the SS or Security Service [SD]. There were about fifteen Security Service men and perhaps sixty Latvians, who are known to be the most brutal, when I kept on hearing two salvoes followed by small arms fire. I got up and went out and asked: "What's all this shooting?" The orderly said to me: "You ought to go over there, sir, you'll see something." I only went fairly near and that was enough for me. 300 men had been driven out of Dvinsk; they dug a communal grave and then marched home. The next day along they came again—men, women and children—they were counted off and stripped naked; the executioners first laid all the clothes in one pile. Then twenty women had to take up their position— naked—on the edge of the trench, they were shot and fell down into it. FELBERT: How was it done? KITTEL: They faced the trench and then twenty Latvians came up behind and simply fired once through the back of their heads. There was a sort of stop in the trench, so that they stood rather lower than the Latvians, who stood up on the edge and simply shot them through the head, and they fell down forwards into the trench. After that came twenty men and they were killed by a salvo in just the same way. Someone gave the command and the twenty fell into the trench like ninepins. Then came the worst thing of all; I went away and said: "I'm going to do something about this." [...]

I got into my car and went to this Security Service man and said: "Once and for all, I forbid these executions outside, where people can look on. If you shoot people in the wood or somewhere where no-one can see, that's your own affair. But I absolutely forbid another day's shooting there. We draw our drinking water from deep springs; we're getting nothing but corpse water there." It was the Meschefs spa where I was; it lies to the north of Dvinsk.

FELBERT: What did they do to the children? KITTEL (very excited): They seized three-year old children by the hair, held them up and shot them with a pistol and then threw them in. I saw that for myself. One could watch it; the SD had roped the area off and the people were standing watching from about 300 m. off. The Latvians and the German soldiers were just standing there, looking on. FELBERT: What kind of SD people are they, then? KITTEL: Nauseating! I'm convinced that they'll all be shot. FELBERT: Where were they from, from which formation? KITTEL: They were Germans and they were wearing the SD uniform with the black flashes on which is written "Sonder-Dienst." FELBERT: Were all the executioners Latvians? KITTEL: Yes. FELBERT: But a German gave the order, did he? KITTEL: Yes. The Germans directed affairs and the Latvians carried them out. The Latvians searched all the clothes. The SD fellow saw reason and said: "Yes, we will do it somewhere else." They were all Jews who had been brought in from the country districts. Latvians wearing the armband—the Jews were brought in and were then robbed; there was a terrific bitterness against the Jews at Dvinsk, and the people simply gave vent to their rage. FELBERT: Against the Jews?

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[At this point, Schaefer jumps in to answer Felbert’s question] SCHAEFER: Yes, because the Russians had dragged off 60,000 Estonians. But, of course, the flames had been fanned. Tell me, what sort of an impression did these people create? Did you ever see any of them shortly before they were shot? Did they weep? KITTEL: It was terrible. I once saw them being transported but I had no idea they were people who were being driven to their execution. SCHAEFER: Have the people any idea what is in store for them? KITTEL: They know perfectly well; they are apathetic. I'm not sensitive myself but such things just turn my stomach; I always said: "One ceases to be a human being; that's got nothing more to do with warfare." I once had the senior chemist for organic chemistry from IG Farben as my adjutant and because they had nothing better for him to do he had been called up and sent to the front. He's back here again now, though he got there quite accidentally. The man was done for weeks. He sat in the corner the whole time and wept. He said: "When one considers that it may be like that everywhere!" He was an important scientist and a musician with a highly strung nervous system. FELBERT: That shows why Finland deserted us, why Roumania deserted us, why everyone hates us everywhere—not because of that single incident but because of the great number of similar incidents. KITTEL: If one were to destroy all the Jews of the world simultaneously there wouldn't remain a single accuser. FELBERT (very excited and shouting): It's obvious; it's such a scandal; it doesn't need to be a Jew to accuse us—we ourselves must bring the charge; we must accuse the people who have done it. KITTEL: Then one must admit that our State system was wrongly built. FELBERT (shouting): It is, it's obvious that it's wrong, there's no doubt about it. Such a thing is unbelievable. KITTEL: We are the tools... Document 22. Testimony of Lieutenant Erwin Bingel, August 194525 Having been wounded in France in 1940, Lieutenant Erwin Bingel was later assigned to Landesschützen Battalion 783, a unit made up of older or less fit military personnel tasked mainly with guarding prisoners and communications lines in the rear area. In September 1941, his unit was transferred east to the newly-formed Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which was under civil rather than military administration. He was captured and interrogated by the Soviets at the end of the war, providing the following testimony.

On 12.9.1941 we arrived at Vinnitsa where we met the unit which had already taken over the transit camp at the Vinnitsa airport. The guard duties at this camp were the responsibility of the 3rd Company under Hauptmann Becker.

This Company was soon to earn a reputation for the acts of cruelty which it committed in the camps under its control. [...] We had been barely two days in Vinnitsa when we received

25 Excerpted from Erwin Bingel, “The Extermination of Two Ukrainian Jewish Communities: Testimony of a German Officer,” in Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastropher and Resistance III, ed. S. Esh (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1959), 303–320.

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orders to proceed to Uman. We arrived there on September 15. I reported to the Town Commandant’s and received further orders. These were: firstly, to have all railroads in this area guarded permanently; secondly to surround the airport of Uman. To these orders, a Special Order had been added, to the effect that the airport of Uman was to be closed the following day to all traffic, including members of the German Army.

On the appointed day, my Company, strengthened by reinforcements, marched to the airport. There was a certain disquiet prevalent among the troops, as it could be presumed with certainty that something special was bound to happen. From the town, voices of a crowd of people singing Russian melodies could be heard, intimating that large masses of people were on the move and drawing near. The main streets could be seen very clearly and along them huge columns marching six abreast carne by, singing all the time, approaching the confines of the airfield. We soon observed that they included not only men, but also women and children of all ages. Nobody could imagine the possible purpose of bringing this crowd of people there, and the whole affair became still more mysterious when I was given orders to withdraw my guards from the nearest posts. These guards were replaced by Feldgendarmerie-Oberleutnant (Lieutenant of Field Gendarmerie) Georg Baier. [...] I consequently withdrew my men up to a distance of 400 metres, with the exception of those maintaining a few main posts stationed on the Uman-Kiev road. The latter were separated by a distance of only 200 metres from the place where the people had been brought. In the meantime, it became light and it was possible to see everything most exactly. As we could not approach the site, the only alternative we had was to out by attentive observation what was the meaning of this rally.

When the people had crowded into the square in front of the airport, a few trucks drove up from the direction of the town. From these vehicles a troop of field gendarmes alighted, and were immediately led aside. A number of tables was then unloaded from one of the trucks and placed in a line at distances from each other. Meanwhile, a few more trucks with Ukrainian Militiamen commanded by SS officers had arrived. These Militiamen had work tools with them and one of their trucks also carried chloride of lime.

I now have to revert to the preceding day. On that day, long ditches . . . had been dug in the square in front of the airport.

The truck now drove alongside these ditches and the men on it unloaded 6-8 sacks of chloride of lime at intervals of 15-20 metres.

In the meantime, a number of transport planes (Model ‘Junker 52’) had landed at the airport. Out of these stepped several units of SS soldiers who, having fallen in, marched up to the Field Gendarmerie unit, subsequently taking up positions alongside it. As could be discerned from the distance, the two units were obviously being sworn in. I was then informed by my interpreter, who was Jewish—which fact, however, was known only to me personally—that he had learned that the people had been brought together following upon an order which had been posted in the streets of Uman and, which had been given the widest publicity throughout Uman sub-district by the Ukrainian Militia. The order was worded as follows:

Concerning the Jewish population in the town of Uman and its sub-district:

Order For the purpose of preparing an exact census of the Jewish population in the town of Uman, and its sub-district, all Jews, of all ages, must appear on the day appointed hereunder at the respective places of registration. Persons failing to comply with this order will be punished most severely.

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The result of this proclamation was, of course, that all persons concerned appeared as

ordered. This relatively harmless summons, we thought, could be connected in some way or other with the preparations we were observing.

It was because we took the matter so lightly that we were all the more horrified at what we witnessed during the next few hours.

One row of Jews was ordered to move forward and was then allocated to the different tables where they had to undress completely and hand over everything they wore and carried. Some still carried jewellery which they had to put on the table. Then, having taken off all their clothes, they were made to stand in line in front of the ditches, irrespective of their sex. The commandos then marched in behind the line and began to perform the inhuman acts, the horror of which is now known to the whole world,

With automatic pistols and 0.8 pistols these men mowed down the line with such zealous intent that one could have supposed this activity to have been their life-work.

Even Women carrying children a fortnight to three weeks old, sucking at their breasts, were not spared this horrible ordeal. Nor were mothers spared the terrible sight of their children being gripped by their little legs and put to death with one stroke 0f the pistol-butt or club, thereafter to be thrown on the heap of human bodies in the ditch, some of which were not quite dead. Not before these mothers had been exposed to this worst of all tortures did they receive the bullet that released them from this sight.

The people in the first row thus having been killed in the most inhuman manner, those of the second row were now ordered to step forward. The men in this row were ordered to step out and were handed shovels with which to heap chloride of lime upon the still partly-moving bodies in the ditch. Thereafter, they returned to the tables and undressed.

After that they had to set out on the same last walk as their murdered brethren, with one exception—this time the men of the alternative firing squad surpassed each other in cruelty, lest they lag behind their predecessors.

The air resounded with the cries of the children and the tortured. With senses numbed by what had happened, one could not help thinking of wives and children back home who believed they had good reason to be proud of their husbands and fathers, who, they thought, were fighting heroically in the ranks of the German Army on behalf of the Fatherland, whilst the so-called Elite troop, always referred to as unique, perpetrated the most horrible acts of cruelty in the honourable uniform of a nation.

Two of my men who had been standing closest to the scene, left their posts before the appointed time of relief.

Oberfeldwebel (Sergeant-Major) Renner [...] withdrew his men up to our line. This Sergeant-Major and another man were taken to the Lvov field hospital the following day, both having suffered a complete nervous breakdown.

The whole ‘action’ took place between 8 a.m. and 4.30 p.m. At 5 pm. the square lay deserted in deadly desolation and only some dogs, attracted by the scent of blood in the air, were roving the site. The shots were still ringing in our ears. The whole thing might have seemed to me to be a terrifying nightmare but for the sparsely covered ditches which gleamed at us accusingly.

All this was so incomprehensible. How could a nation have the audacity to perpetrate, through its supreme leader and his Elite troop, acts as such as these for which there could be no excuse under any circumstances?

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When we returned to our living quarters, my men rushed at me and asked me to make representations at the Commandant’s office, requesting a justification for what had happened. I acceded to this request by going with the Company Officer to the Town Commandant, demanding an explanation from him. I was given to understand that a special, express order had been issued by Reichsführer SS Himmler, and personally signed by him.

Upon request, I was allowed to see this document. It read: Soldiers of the Waffen-SS! In the forest of Vinnitsa, District of Kiev, six of our best officers were found assassinated, hanging on a tree. The details are as follows: They were found naked, with their legs pointing upwards, their bodies slit open and their intestines showing. As a result of this case, I have decided upon the following measures: As it may be taken for granted that this action was carried out by Jewish partisans, I hereby order that in the District of Kiev 10,000 Jews—irrespective of sex or age—are to die for each of the six officers mentioned above. Even the child in the cradle must be trampled down like a poisonous toad. May each one of you be mindful of his oath and do his duty, whatever may be demanded of you. We are living in an epoch of iron during which it is also necessary to sweep with iron- made brooms.

This was the wording of the Order directly issued to this murder unit to be carried out in the most gruesome and horrible way. [...]

Subsequent to the incident described above, we were again ordered back to Vinnitsa, where our Company was ordered to clean up the airport area. On 19.9.1941 I was compelled to send 20 per cent of my men on leave of absence, since, as a result of their recent experiences, they were quite incapable of performing any duty.

Document 23. Major von Gersdorff’s Report, 9 December 194126 Major Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff was an intelligence officer on the staff of the High Command of Army Group Centre. Here he reports on a recent trip to the front. In all conversations of any length with officers, I was asked about the shootings of Jews, without having made any reference to them myself. I gained the impression that the officer corps is generally opposed, one could almost say, to the shooting of Jews, prisoners, and political commissars. In the case of the commissars it is mainly because killing them increases the strength of the enemy's resistance. The shootings are regarded as bringing dishonor on the German army, and on the officer corps in particular. Officers brought up the question of responsibility for them, in stronger or less strong language depending on the individual's temperament and disposition. I was able to ascertain that the existing facts have become known in full, and that the officers at the front discuss them far more than was to be assumed.

26 Quoted in Wette, The Wehrmacht, 200.

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APPENDIX A. The German Army Chain of Command Understanding the German military hierarchy can help you evaluate the perspective from which each source is written. Together, the OKW and OKH formed Germany’s military leadership, responsible for general policy and strategy. A separate set of field commanders (of armies, etc.) carried out orders and conducted operations in occupied and enemy territory. The following list runs from highest to lowest rank in the chain of command. Orders were filtered and conveyed down this chain. In addition to the commanding officer, each level of command included a varying number of staff officers assigned to different sections, including operations, supply, intelligence, personnel, medical, legal, etc. OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht = High Command of the Armed Forces]

x Tasked with coordinating army, naval, and air forces on all fronts x Based out of Berlin; in direct daily contact with Hitler x Typically commanded by a Field Marshal or General

OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres = High Command of the Army; Army General Staff] x Tasked with coordinating the strategy and operations of Army Groups and Armies x Based out of Berlin; in direct daily contact with Hitler x Typically staffed by a General

Army Group x Because the eastern front was so large, the Germans divided their forces into three

groups (North, Centre, and South) with separate objectives x Responsible for occupying a large rear area (several 100 km deep) x Comprised a million or more men x Typically commanded by a Field Marshal or General

Army / Panzer Group / Panzer Army x Several Armies made up an Army Group x A Panzer Group or Army was made up of largely mechanized forces x Comprised about 200,000 men x Typically commanded by a General

Corps x Several Corps made up an Army x Comprised around 50,000–60,000 men x Typically commanded by a General

Division x Several Divisions made up a Corps x The smallest combined-arms formations capable of independent operations x Comprised around 15,000–18,000 men x Typically commanded by a General

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Regiment x German Divisions were made up of Infantry, Panzer (Armoured), and Artillery Regiments x Typically commanded by a Colonel

Battalion x Most Regiments were divided into three Battalions of about 1,000 men each x Typically commanded by a Colonel or Major

Company x Several companies of about 200 men each made up a Battalion x Typically commanded by a Captain x Further divided into Platoons led by junior officers (Lieutenants) and Squads led by non-

commissioned officers (NCOs = Sergeants, Corporals, etc.) B. List of Terms and Abbreviations Barbarossa The operational codename assigned to the invasion

of the Soviet Union, launched on 22 June 1941 Einsatzgruppen SS death squads that operated behind the front

lines on the eastern front; tasked with maintaining security, they were responsible for the deaths of Jews, commissars, Gypsies, and other civilians; recruited from the SD, Gestapo, and state police

OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres] High Command of the Army; Army General Staff OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] High Command of the Armed Forces Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern State ministry created in July 1941 under Alfred Territories Rosenberg to administer captured Soviet territory Reichskommissariat Territorial unit in occupied countries assigned to civil authorities RHSA [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] Reich Security Head Office; subordinate to Himmler SD [Sicherheitsdienst] Security/intelligence service of the SS; part of RHSA SS [Schutzstaffel] Nazi “protection squad” which under Himmler came to dominate policing and racial policy Waffen-SS Combat formations of the SS Wehrmacht German Armed Forces

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C. The German-Occupied East The map below depicts German occupation at its height in 1942. Captured Soviet territory under German occupation was divided into three administrative units: Reichskommissariat Ostland in the northwest; Reichskommissariat Ukraine in the south; and, areas under military jurisdiction nearer the front lines. These boundaries were constantly in flux, as the Germans conquered and lost territory. Generally speaking, regions well behind the front lines were transferred to civilian control (of the Reichskommissariate) as soon as possible. Nonetheless, army personnel were always present in the Reichskommissariate, either for security, rest, transit, or logistical purposes.