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Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure: Note Author(s): Roger D. Blair and Arnold A. Heggestad Source: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 88-93 Published by: Ohio State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1991474 Accessed: 21-03-2015 20:16 UTC

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NOTES, COMMENTS, REPLIES

Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure

A Note by Roger D. Blair and Arnold A. Heggestad

1. Introduction A large number of regulations designed to maintain soundness are imposed

on commercial banks. In this paper, we analyze one important form of these regulations, the restriction of risk exposure in bank asset portfolios. We dem- onstrate that althoughS in principle, portfolio regulation may reduce the prob- ability of bank failure, its current implementation may produce perverse results. That is, bank portfolio regulation, by restricting high-risk, high-return assets, may actually increase the probability of bank failure. We then propose a more efficient method of portfolio regulation, which eliminates the possibility of the regulation leading to greater rather than less total risk exposure.

2. Bank Portfolios and the Probability of Failure At the beginning of each period, the bank has a variety of assets available

for inclusion in its portfolio. We shall assume that the net return from each asset is distributed according to some known (subjective) probability distribu- tion. Since profits are derived from these risky assets, profits are random as well. We assume that the firm's strategy is to maximize the expected utility of its uncertain profits.1 We expect each bank to have a utility function that exhibits risk aversion although the degree of risk aversion need not be identical for each bank. Thus, we assume that each bank chooses its asset portfolio to maximize the expected utility of its uncertain profits and that this choice will be characterized by risk aversion.2

* The authors have received helpful suggestions and kind encouragement from Haim Levy, Fred Arditti, Harry MarkowitzS William Dewald, and the referees. Of course, we retain the usual responsi- bility for what follows. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida.

1 For a detailed derivation of the theory of the financial intermediary under uncertainty, see [6]. 2 If capital markets were perfect and default risk were zero, the bank would be forced to operate

in a risk-neutral fashion, i.e., to maximize the expected value of profits. Restrictions on bank charters however, clearly minimize the threat of takeovers and suggest that risk aversion is not an unreason- able assumption about bank behavior (see [4, 7]).

ROGER D. BLAIR is associate professor °r economics and ARNOLD A. HEGGESTAD is associate professor offinance, University Or Florida.

0022-2879/78/0278-0088$00.50/0 (A) 1978 Ohio State University Press JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING, vol. 10, no. 1 (February 1978)

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NOTES, COMMENTS, AND REPLIES : 89

Given all possible assets and their distribution, an efficient frontier in mean- standard deviation space can be derived. Portfolios on the efficient frontier offer minimum standard deviation a for any given level of expected return 1I. We proceed on the assumption that no risk-free asset for banks exists, since the net return on all assets is influenced by interest rate fluctuations, even though default risk may approach zero.

The frontier will appear as the envelope EF1 in Figure 1.3 The risk-averse bank's preferences may be summarized by an upward-sloping indifference map in mean-standard deviation space as well.4 The portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of profits will be determined by the point of tangency between the efficiency frontier and the highest attainable indifference curve (point D in Fig. 1).

/// B F

//

7T- / F2

a z

Fig. 1. Impact of Regulation on Risk Exposure

According to official pronouncements (e.g. [2]), the bank regulators are not concerned with riskiness per se but with the probability of bank failure. We shall define failure to occur if, in any period, the bank's losses exceed its total

3 Under a set of severe restrictions, in the absence of a risk-free asset, the unregulated frontier would be linear between the origin and the highest tangency point on the efficiency frontier [6]. The regulated frontier would also be linear and would coincide at the origin but would lie below the unregulated frontier, since banks are unable to diversify away residual risk and cannot hold the "market" portfolio.

4 Despite the widespread use of indifference maps in mean-variance space, one should not ignore some of the difficulties and implicit restrictions (see [3, 5, 12]). In contrast, Levy and Markowitz have an important empirical paper forthcoming that suggests that mean-variance analysis works admirably in practice.

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90 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING

capital. The Chebyshev inequality then allows us to approximate the prob- ability of failure, given the portfolio characteristics and the bank's capital position. In particular, the least upper bound on the probability of failure iS5

Pr[7r < oc] < 52l(rI _ 2)2 (l)

which is the square of the reciprocal of the slope of the ray from 2 to D in Figure 1. Thus, for a given specification of disaster (failure), its probability is smaller, the steeper the ray to the portfolio selected.6

3. Bank Portfolio Regulation Portfolio regulation can clearly be used to increase bank soundness. It is

applied, however, in a misguided fashion. It takes the form of precluding the bank from holding any quantity of certain securities, e.g., common stocks and low-grade bonds, and limiting the role that any single asset can play in the bank's portfolio. The bank thus faces a new frontier computed from the assets available to it. This frontier obviously cannot lie above the unregulated frontier. If any of the restricted assets had been included in the unconstrained frontier, the new frontier would be shifted down and would coincide only at the safest asset, if that asset were allowed.7 The net effect of regulation will be a shifting down and perhaps a twisting of the efficiency frontier because of the regulatory bias against high-risk, high-return assets. In Figure 1, if the original efficiency frontier were EF1, then the regulated frontier may be represented by EF2. One can see that expected profits are lower for any level of risk.

We can examine some of the consequences of this form of regulation. First, and most important, it is distinctly possible that the probability of bank failure will have increased. Given the avowed purpose of regulation, this is a bit dis- concerting. To see this, consider the regulated frontier EF2 in Figure 1. Expected utility maximization leads to the selection of a portfolio consistent with, say, point Z. For a given capital level, the upper bound on the probability of failure is the inverse of the slope of the ray from 2 to Z. If the bank had selected any point on EF1 between A and B absent the regulation, then the regulation has unambiguously increased the probability of failure. This follows since a ray from 2 to any point between A and B will have a steeper slope (lower probability

5 The Chebyshev inequality states that

Pr[|( )| > k] S l/k2

Pr[ fI < ( fI-k)] S l /k2 .

If a = 7r-ka, k = [(7r-a)/a]. Substitution for k above yields the expression in equation (1) in the text.

6 This is proved in [10]. For further elaborations on the implications see [1, 9, 11]. 7 For an analysis of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as they apply to the efficiency frontier, cf. [8].

In particular, Appendix A sets out the conditions under which an asset will be excluded without any regulatory influence.

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() / / 1I

NOTES, COMMENTS, AND REPLIES : 91

of failure). Clearly, the bank is worse off since it must necessarily be on a lower indifference curve, i.e., have a lower expected utility. Moreover, it is worth noting that regulation does not even necessarily reduce the variance of the portfolio. These unfortunate results stem from a failure to appreciate the pres- ence and significance of covariances between assets. By focusing solely on the relatively high variance and ignoring the pooling effect of diversification, the regulator appears to be misled regarding the desirability of high-risk, high- return assets.

4. Optimal Portfolio Regulation The optimal regulatory procedure should be clear. The regulator can decide

upon an acceptable (positive) probability of failure.8 This constraint is de- scribed by the ray from 2 in Figure 2. Presumably, all points on or above the ray are acceptable portfolios from the regulator's perspective. Subject to this constraint, the bank then can select any portfolio that maximizes expected utility. Three cases can be distinguished. First, the efficiency frontier may be EF1. In that case, the bank must select a portfolio along sections AB of EF1. If, in fact, the constraint is binding, the bank will select the portfolio at A or

.FI

F2

7T -

.F3

/

/

// / a

'

//

Fig. 2. Proposed Regulatory Framework

8 This probability could be constant for all banks or could be adjusted to allow for the expected social costs from the failure of each bank or each class of banks.

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92 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING

the one at B. This case poses no real problems for the regulator. Second, by sheer chance, the efficiency frontier may be EF2. Given EF2, the maximum probability of failure acceptable to the regulator is equal to the frontier's least upper bound on the probability of failure. The only portfolio that satisfies the constraint is the one at C.9 Finally, the efficiency frontier may be EF3. In that case, the bank cannot satisfy the soundness constraint. There are two options for the bank. It can appeal to the regulator to relax the constraint; if such an appeal is successful, the ray from 2 will rotate downward until one of the two cases above results, and if the appeal is unsuccessful, the bank must expand its capital. This will shift the ray down by changing the disaster level. Bank capital must be increased until the ray shifts far enough so that one of the first two cases holds. An example is the dashed ray from '.

5. Summary and Concluding Remarks In summary, this paper has demonstrated that the present form of portfolio

regulation is, at a minimum, inefficient. The same goals could be achieved by placing restrictions on total portfolio return and variance, without the neces- sary profit sacrifices by the industry. Removing these restrictions would allow a relaxation of other provisions designed to increase profitability such as entry limitations and restrictions on price competition. This would certainly be of some benefit to consumers of banking services. In addition, the form that portfolio regulation takes has an even more significant impact than a simple reduction in industry profits. By forcing banks to inefficient frontiers, the regu- lations are very likely increasing the probability that losses will exceed capital- the exact opposite of their intended impact.10 The optimal form of regulation is clear. Given the acceptable probability of each bank's failure and given its capital position, the regulators should set the limits on the bank's frontier where the probability of failure falls within some acceptable range and then allow the bank freedom of choice within this broad constraint.

Basically, there is only one important objection to our proposed regulatory procedure: it is not practical. This follows from the difficulty and expense involved in calculating the efficiency frontier. First, assuming that this objection is valid, the fact remains that the "practical" procedure employed by the regula- tors cannot be defended. It is likely to increase the probability of bank failure; thus, the practical approach is not a suitable substitute. Second, it may be possible to finance the program through the greater profits that banks could earn by having unrestricted efficiency frontiers. Finally, although precise

9 Of course, it is impractical to attempt to find a point like C for each efficiency frontier. If the regulator attempts to prescribe the portfolio with the smallest probability of failure, the trans- action costs of maintaining the constrant would be prohibitive. Since the efficiency frontier is not unique intertemporally, the bank would be revising its portfolio constantly. For the regulator, the policing costs of such a policy would be prohibitive.

10 Without knowledge of the specific utility functions and the frontiers before and after regulation, we cannot say for certain that the risk exposure will increase. An NSF project is currently underway that will estimate the effect of portfolio restrictions on efficient frontiers.

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NOTES, COMMENTS, AND REPLIES : 93

location of the efficiency frontier depends upon accurate knowledge of the probability distributions, it may be possible to estimate a confidence interval that would constitute a practical alternative. The frontier would then be a band rather than a line, but would be the same in other respects.

LITERATURE CITED

1. Baumol, William J. "An Expected Gain-Confidence Limit Criterion for Portfolio Selection." Management Science (October 1963), 174-82.

2. Burns, Arthur F. "Maintaining the Soundness of Our Banking System." Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review (November 1974), 263-67.

3. Borch, Karl. "A Note on Uncertainty and Indifference Curves." Review of Economic Studies (January 1969), 1-4.

4. Edwards, Franklin, and Arnold A. Heggestad. "Uncertainty, Market Structure and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis and Managerial Motives in Bank- ing." Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1973), 455-73.

5. Feldstein, Martin S. "Mean-Variance Analysis in the Theory of Liquidity Preference and Portfolio Selection." Review of Economic Studies (January 1969), 5-12.

6. Hart, Oliver D., and Dwight M. Jaffee. "On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries." Review of Economic Studies (January 1974), 129-41.

7. Levy, Haim, and Marshall Sarnat. "Diversification, Portfolio Analysis, and the Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers." Journal of Finance (September 1970), 795-802.

8. Markowitz, Harry. Portfolio Selection: Efticient Diversification of Investments. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

9. Pyle, David H., and Stephen J. Turnovsky. "Safety First and Expected Utility Maxi- mization in Mean-Standard Deviation Portfolio Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics (February 1970), 75-81.

10. Roy, A. D. "Safety First and the Holding of Assets." Econometrica (July 1952), 431 -49.

11. Telser, Lester. "Safety-First and Hedging." Review of Economic Studies, 23(1955-56), 1-16.

12. Tobin, James. "Comment on Borch and Feldstein." Review of Economic Studies (January 1969), 13-14.

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  • Article Contents
    • p. [88]
    • p. 89
    • p. 90
    • p. 91
    • p. 92
    • p. 93
  • Issue Table of Contents
    • Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 1-137
      • Front Matter
      • Macroeconomic Dynamics and Growth in a Monetary Economy: A Synthesis [pp. 1-26]
      • Repeal of Silver Monetization in the Late Nineteenth Century [pp. 27-45]
      • Money, Equity Values, and Income: Tests for Exogeneity [pp. 46-64]
      • The Efficiency and Profitability of Minority Controlled Savings and Loan Associations [pp. 65-74]
      • Mortgage Rationing and Residential Investment: Some Results from a Brainard-Tobin Model [pp. 75-87]
      • Notes, Comments, Replies
        • Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure: Note [pp. 88-93]
        • Direct Wealth Effects in Macroeconomic Models: The Saving vs. the Definitional Approach: Note [pp. 94-98]
        • Inflation and the Issue of Unidirectional Causality: Note [pp. 99-101]
        • The Role of the Federal Funds Market: Note [pp. 102-104]
        • A Reinterpretation of Velocity Trends in The United States, 1900-1920: Comment [pp. 105-111]
        • Money and Money Substitutes: Comment [pp. 112-114]
        • Money and Money Substitutes: Reply [pp. 115-116]
        • A Monetary Approach to Afghanistan's Flexible Exchange Rates: Comment [pp. 117-118]
      • Book Reviews
        • Review: untitled [pp. 119-123]
        • Review: untitled [pp. 124-129]
        • Review: untitled [pp. 129-131]
        • Review: untitled [pp. 132-137]
      • Back Matter

1-s2.0-0378426683900055-main.pdf

Journal of Banking and Finance 7 (1983) 467480. North-Holland

LIQUIDITY, CREDIT CREATION AND INTERNATIONAL BANKING

An Econometric Investigation*

George MCKENZIE and Stephen THOMAS

University of Southampton, Southampton SO9 5NH, UK

For the past 18 months the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee of the British House of Commons has been taking evidence from expert witnesses and interested parties concerning International Monetary Arrangements. An important concern of their work has been the inter- relationship between current problems in international bank lending and macroeconomic policies. Our presentation will review the opinions expressed in the Committee’s Reports in the light of the econometric evidence we have obtained in our formal paper prepared for this conference. Basically we feel that the current problems facing the international banking system are in no small part due to the increased systematic risk introduced into thk system by the macroeconomic policies followed by the industrial countries over the past decade, rather than simply to reckless and imprudent bank management. Further, our econometric evidence suggests that Eurocurrency flows may have a substantial effect on domestic liquidity, in contrast to the accepted view that such flows are unimportant. An underlying major theme of our paper concerns the importance of using modern econometric methods to shed light on current important problems of international financial interdependence.

1. Introduction

In the Spring of 1980 the central bank governors of the major industrial countries met in Basle at the Bank for International Settlements to discuss the implications of international banking. Three major issues were identified:

(i) The effects of international banking activities on the stability of exchange rates.

(ii) The effects on overall liquidity and credit creation. (iii) The viability of international banking per se in terms of the quality of

the asset and liability positions of the financial institutions involved.

In the press communique issued after the conference, and in the subsequent attitudes of most of the central banks, it has been apparent that

*This work has been financed in part by a Fulbright grant for research on economic policy co-ordination among industrial countries. We would like to thank Trevor Breusch, Joachim Gabler, Karl Heinz Todter, Helmut Mayer, Walter Wasserfallen and Grayham Mizon for their helpful comments. We alone are responsible for any errors or omissions.

0378%4266/83/$3.00 0 1983, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)

468 G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, itzter~ut~a~ul banking

the third issue just noted was of prime concern. This has manifested itself largely in the form of co-ordinated international procedures aimed at prudential supervision of banks. With respect to the first two concerns, it was felt that private financial institutions have played an important, stabilising role in recycling the OPEC balance of payments’ surpluses, and hence that any instability in the exchange markets or difficulties in the application of macroeconomic policies as a result of international banking are of secondary importance.

The prime objective of this paper is to argue that both monetary authorities and economists should take a more balanced attitude towards the issues noted above. In particular, it is necessary to recognize two fundamental points:

(1) the macroeconomic environment and especially the policies followed by national monetary authorities have had a significant effect on the quality of international bank portfolios,

(2) international bank operations, especially through the Eurocurrency system, increase the availability of near-monies and hence are potentially in a position to offset the effect of monetary policies.

2. International banks as NMFIs

Although the economic implications of financial innovations are well- known, they do not appear to have been properly appreciated in the context of international banking. As long ago as the 1930’s Henry Simons in his classic paper, ‘Rules versus authorities in monetary policy’, argued that effective monetary control was likely to be thwarted by the development of near-monies during periods of monetary restraint. A similar viewpoint was taken in the Radcliffe Report (1959) on the operation of the British financial system, and in the work of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960), in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. Indeed, the presentation of Gurley and Shaw is the most formal and clearcut and hence it is upon their analysis that our own work is based.

Although there may well exist an important element of substitutability between various forms of financial items, there are important differences in the transformation process whereby someone’s liability is turned into someone else’s asset. Three classes of financial items can be identi~ed:

(i) Primary securities. In this instance the lender or surplus economic unit extends funds directly to the borrower or deficit economic unit. Although the transactions may take place through a broker, the properties of the asset and liability thereby created are virtually identical. Further, the existence of a secondary market in primary securities provides deficit economic units with a degree of liquidity and,

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking 469

depending on national securities’ legislation, provides the borrower with the opportunity of repurchasing some or all of his outstanding debt.

(ii) Financial items created by monetary financial institutions. Given a stable

pattern of deposits and withdrawals, and a low ratio of defaults to total liabilities, monetary financial intermediaries are in a position to transform highly liquid liabilities used for transactions’ purposes into

assets possessing entirely different properties. The latter may be of relatively long maturity, fairly risky, and, of course, yielding a return which is an important source of profits to the institution concerned. In other words, a financial intermediary is more than a broker.

(iii) Financial items created by non-monetary financial institutions (NMFl’s). In terms of their operations such institutions are very similar to their monetary counterparts in that they act as an intermediary between borrower and lender. The crucial difference

between monetary and non-monetary intermediaries is that the liabilities of the latter are not used for the purpose of carrying out transactions. This may be due to convention or banking regulations. Examples of

such institutions are building societies, savings and loan associations, pension funds, mutual funds, and as we shall argue, international banking operations in the Eurocurrency system.

This distinction between monetary and non-monetary financial intermediaries has two important consequences. Firstly, it means that although current account deposits and the liabilities of NMFI’s may appear

to be largely substitutable in the eyes of holders, they cannot be entirely so since the former is used for transactions’ purposes, whereas the latter is not. Indeed, it is this property which renders the application of the so-called coefficients of deposit and credit expansion largely irrelevant for NMFI’s since once a loan is made and the proceeds spent, it is highly unlikely that a significant proportion will end up back with the NMFI. Rather, the funds will be deposited with the commercial banking system.

Secondly, NMFI’s must themselves use the commercial banks for the pursuit of their own activities, namely transferring funds from lender to borrower, and for the purpose of holding reserves. Thus when funds are transferred from a commercial bank to a NMFI, they never in fact leave the banking system. The same is true when the NMFI onlends to a borrower who in turn spends the loan proceeds, since the ownership of a bank deposit is simply transferred between economic units. However, in the process additional assets and liabilities have been created via the NMFI, which implies that the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the portfolios and spending patterns of individual economic units must change in order for the new pattern of activity to be sustained.

It should be noted at this point that the above considerations cast some

470 G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

doubt on what Tobin (1963) and others have thought to be the main distinction between monetary and non-monetary financial intermediaries, namely the relatively high minimum reserve ratios on the former and low or non-existent reserve requirements on the latter. This situation no doubt has an impact on the size and profitability of NMFI’s, but differences in

minimum reserve ratios are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of NMFI’s. The fact that they provide assets and liabilities with even marginally different properties than those of commercial banks is suflicient to enable them to exist even if reserve ratios were identical for the two classes of financial institutions.

The liabilities of a NMFI are not generally accepted as a means of payment and indeed these intermediaries must use the commercial banking system for transferring funds or holding reserves. International banks involved in Eurocurrency lending satisfy these conditions in that their liabilities, say Eurodollar deposits, are not means of payment, and their reserves are held in the clearing system of the country in whose currency the deposits are denominated, usually the United States.

There are, broadly speaking, three types of operators on both sides of the balance sheet of Eurocurrency operations:

0) non-banks, (ii) central banks, (iii) commercial banks.

In this paper we are primarily concerned with the impact of operations undertaken by the first group, though this does not mean that the extent or implications of deposits and loans by the second and third groups is unimportant. On the contrary, table 1 shows that deposits by central banks have been extensive and indeed they produce an effect on global liquidity not unlike an expansionary open-market operation. Further, much of the process of international financial intermediation takes the form of inter-bank lending, both within the Eurocurrency system and with banks outside it. This can involve the short-term placement of funds to enable deficit and surplus

Table 1

Eurocurrency market size: $ billion, end-of-period.”

1975 1982

Gross 485 2055 Liabilities to non-banks 90 485 Liabilities to central banks 65 90 Liabilities to other banks 330 1480

“Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York.

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking 471

financial institutions to clear their overnight positions, and also the search process which enables banks which have accepted relatively short-term

placements to find other banks which are in a better position to create higher yielding loans. Indeed, from table 1 we see that interbank liabilities accounted for around two-thirds of gross liabilities at the end of 1981. However, in this paper we shall concentrate upon the decisions of non-bank depositors.

3. The macroeconomic implications of international banking

We now turn to a detailed examination of the macroeconomic implications of non-bank depositing in the Eurocurrency system. As we shall see, the impact of this, or indeed any other, form of depositing depends upon the degree of substitutability between the three categories of financial items, Eurocurrency deposits, commercial bank deposits, and primary securities.

There are two ways in which these structural characteristics affect the relationship between the productive and financial sectors. Firstly, given a particular level of the monetary base, the process of financial innovation which generates a new form of financial intermediation such as the Eurocurrency system can lead to a change in the pattern of payments and an increase in the velocity of circulation of that given monetary base. Secondly, given that the financial innovation has taken place, changes in the monetary base undertaken by the authorities may now have only a diminished effect on aggregate spending. We shall now deal with these two points in turn.

3.1. The innovation effect

We first consider the possible implications of the Eurocurrency system as a financial innovation by presenting an analysis similar to that of Gurley and Shaw (1955, p. 529), though in a rather different context. In fig. 1, the demand for narrowly defined money is given by LL and its supply is fixed at OM. The total financial assets of spending units is given by BB, which increases as the value of the fixed stock of bonds rises with falling interest rates. At any given interest rate, the horizontal distance between LL and BB is the demand for bonds, while the horizontal distance between MM and BB

is the supply of bonds. We have an equilibrium interest rate at i” because at that rate there is equality between the supply and demand for both money and bonds. At i” the total demand for financial assets is OP, of which OM represents the demand for narrowly defined money and MP the demand for primary securities or bonds.

Now let us suppose that there is a financial innovation in the form of the Eurocurrency system. There are three possible scenarios as to the macroeconomic implications:

J.B.F.- B

412 G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

0 M T P S

Fmancial Assets

Fig. 1

Case 1. At one extreme, Eurocurrency deposits and money could be perfect substitutes. Suppose that at i” the demand for these new assets is NQ, so that the demand for money shifts to L’L’. But NQ also measures the excess supply of money at interest rate i” and the demand for bonds by the Eurobanks. The rate of interest now falls to i’ since there is an excess supply of money and excess demand for bonds. The total demand for ‘liquidity’ is now 07: of which OM remains the demand for narrowly defined money and MT the demand for Eurocurrency deposits. The spending units’ final holdings of bonds has fallen from MP to TS, but of course this is not sufficient to offset the effects of the financial innovation. Thus the total demand for linancial

assets has increased by PS.

The nature of the intermediation process can be illustrated by the example in table 2. Here we depict the sterling and foreign currency accounts of a U.K. bank. The distance MT in fig. 1 is assumed to represent the &lo0 transfer of funds in table 2. Following the establishment of foreign currency accounts, individual I decides that his portfolio position is better served if he draws down his sterling account and exchanges the funds for $200 which are

held in a Eurodollar deposit. The receiving bank now possesses excess loanable funds which are onlent to individual II to purchase goods from a British resident who in turn redeposits the funds in the U.K. banking system. The net result is no change in the structure of assets and liabilities of the

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

Table 2

473

The balance sheet of a U.K. bank.

Sterling accounts Foreign currency accounts

Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities

Deposit of I -flOO

Deposit of III fElo0

Loan to II Deposit of I +$200 +S200

Scenario

I exchanges f for $ and opens a Eurodollar account. II exchanges S for f and purchases goods and services from III. Both I and II are U.K. residents, and the exchange rate is $2.

sterling accounts (equivalent to OM in fig. 1). However, additional financial assets have been created through intermediation carried out in the Eurocurrency system, which obviously has led to an increase in economic activity and an increase in the velocity at which the narrowly defined money stock is being circulated. Of course, secondary adjustments will be induced which are not -depicted here and which can only be analysed within a more general, complex model; however, the basic conclusion remains unchanged.

Case II. We now turn our attention to the other polar case where the financial items created are perfect substitutes for primary securities. This will leave the demand for narrowly defined money unchanged at LL. At the rate of interest i”, the public’s demand for Eurodeposits, QN’, instead of bonds, is replaced by the new institutional demand for bonds of the same magnitude. Thus the rate of interest is not affected. The distance MP may now be redefined as the demand for other assets consisting of primary securities and Eurocurrency deposits, which in turn are to be onlent for the purchase of primary securities. In this case, the financial innovation has relatively little impact with Eurocurrency deposits merely substituting for other financial items.

Case III. It is unlikely that either of these two extreme cases could provide a reasonable description of the effects of any financial innovation. Rather, there is bound to be some degree of substitutability or complementarity between financial items.

Several commentators have conjectured that international banking activities have relatively little impact upon macroeconomic activity. Indeed,

474 G. McKenzie und S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

Dufey and Giddy (I978), Pearce and Hogan (1982), and Llewelyn (1981), take the view that control or elimination of the Eurocurrency system would simply cause financial activity to be restricted to other, already existing,

channels. However, in the light of the analysis presented above, we must view this conjecture with some scepticism. For the effectiveness of monetary policy to remain stable, the NMFI financial items created by an innovation must be

substitutable with primary securities and unrelated to commercial bank deposits. [Also see McKenzie and Thomas (1983).]

3.2. The transmission effects

The temptation among many economists has been to conclude that monetary policy must be carried out with increased vigour in order to compensate for the higher velocity of circulation arising from the existence of near-monies. The search for suitable broad monetary aggregates by the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England are examples of this tendency. However, this approach represents a considerable oversimpli~cation? as can be appreciated by considering the transmission effect associated with monetary policy in a world where near-monies are prevalent.

In conventional macroeconomic models, whether Keynesian or monetarist in construction, there are usually only two classes of asset: money and primary securities. Thus, for example, any decrease in the monetary base produces an excess demand for loanable funds which can only be eliminated by an increase in interest rates. In the presence of non-monetary financial intermediation the process of adjustment is more complicated. Potential borrowers have an alternative source to traditional domestic currency loans, and thus given the excess demand for loanable funds initially induced by the monetary authorities, potential borrowers may seek to borrow funds from the Eurocurrency system, In order to obtain the necessary funds, banks operating in this sphere will raise Eurodollar deposit rates in order to attract the required funds, Thus suppose we consider an example analogous to the one discussed in the last section: a British resident transfers funds to a Eurodollar deposit which is onlent to someone who purchases goods from another British resident. The level of deposits remains the same as it was following the restrictive monetary policy, but additional assets and liabilities have been created through the Eurocurrency system. This will enable a good part of the excess demand for funds to be satisfied with a smaller increase in interest rates than would otherwise have occurred [see the Radcliffe Report (1959, par. 392)]. This presumes that sterling bank deposits and Eurocurrency deposits are highly substitutable. On the other hand, if Eurocurrency deposits were highly substitutable for primary securities then we would expect that the former would simply substitute for the latter as

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking 415

interest rates rose and that the restrictive monetary policy would not be

offset.

4. Empirical evidence for the United Kingdom

The magnitudes of the innovation and substitution effects just described depend crucially upon the structure of the financial sector and, in particular, upon the degree of substitutability between Eurocurrency and domestic currency deposits. In this section we examine the evidence as it pertains to the available data for the monetary sector of the United Kingdom. The procedures which we shall utilize are orthodox in two respects:

(1) We examine interest rate effects derived from a single equation model. This is the approach adopted in many money demand studies and is not uncommon in the literature investigating the ‘nearness’ of near-monies [see Feige and Pearce (1977)]. It does possess a number of drawbacks in the sense that (a) it does not take into account that the explanatory variables may themselves be endogenous within a broader macroeconomic model, and (b) it neglects the possibility that the ‘single-equation’ may be part of a more complex portfolio choice framework.

(2) In estimating the relevant interest rate effects we utilize the general to specific modelling methodology recently developed in papers by Mizon (1977), and Hendry and Mizon (1978). This approach takes as its starting point a very general model encompassing as many competing hypotheses as are of interest and capable of being investigated given the available data.’

(3) The estimated parameters are then examined according to two criteria:

(a) economic plausibility in terms of the reasonableness of the signs and magnitudes of the parameter values,

(b) data coherence in terms of goodness of tit, forecasting ability, evidence of systematic omissions and significance of parameters.

The explanatory variables chosen are as follows:

re = the three-month Eurodollar rate, r cb

= the three-month commercial bill rate (to represent the return on primary securities),

rd = the seven-day deposit rate, fp =the three-month forward premium on sterling, GDP=the level of Real Gross Domestic Product in 1975 prices (to represent

the level of real activity in the economy), and the quarterly rate of inflation for period t=log(P,/P, 1) (based on the implicit deflator for GDP, Pr).

‘A full description of the procedures utilized are contained in McKenzie and Thomas (1983, pp. 231-237).

476 G. McKenzie ond S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

These variables are available from the Monthly Digest of Statistics or Financial Statistics published regularly by the Central Statistical Office in the U.K. The holdings of foreign currency by British residents is provided in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. This variable, together with the interest rates, refer to the levels of the variables at the end of the relevant quarter. We deflate the interest rates by the price level, P, to yield real returns plus one as follows:

the renl Eurodollar rate,2 for time t

1 +rr;=(Pt ,JP,) x(rF/lOO+ l),

the real commercial bill rate

1 +rr,““=(P,_,/P,) x (rfb/lOO+ l),

the real deposit rate

1 +rrf=(Pt-l/P,) x($/100+ l),

the real covered interest rate is

The use of the covered rate indicates that deposits in dollars will have to be converted into sterling in three-months’ time for comparison with the return on a sterling deposit and thus the separate effect of the real Eurodollar rate may be considered to reflect any speculative intentions present. Note that the division by 100 and addition to unity are simply intended to facilitate the taking of logarithms in our model.

We can see from fig. 2 that real foreign currency deposits follows a strong upward trend, rising in fact from &299 million in 1964, quarter 3, to over &3700 million in 1978 at 1975 prices. Compared with this twelve fold growth, real sterling time deposits rose from &9579 million in 1964, to &25000 million at it’s peak in 1973. The holdings of foreign currency deposits rose particularly rapidly between 1971 and 1974, and in fact levelled off in 1977. The relaxation of exchange control regulations in 1979 does not appear to invalidate our modelling exercise since, in the first place, it is widely believed that the authorities had little practical influence on foreign currency holdings

‘That is, a .fl deposit becomes f(1 fr’j100) at the end of the quarter. If the price level changes from P, I to P, over the quarter, the initial fl will buy (P, , .‘P,) x f( 1 +r’,‘lOO) worth of goods at (I - I) prices.

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking 411

prior to 1979; certainly, examination of fig. 2 would seem to support this.

Further, our selected regression equation turns out to be a stable representation of the data both before and after exchange controls were lifted and thus supports the hypothesis that such controls had little practical effect.

- = Actual ---Ez Fitted

1964(iii) 1971(k) 1974(iii) 1978(ii) I980( iv)

Fig. 2. Actual and fitted values of eq. (1).

418 G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

The data period we are considering is from the third quarter, 1964, to the fourth quarter, 1979, with a further four quarters for post-sample parameter stability tests, taking us through to the end of 1980. Starting from a general model with first and fourth-order lags in all variables, together with additional lags of order live and six in the dependent variable, we obtain eq. (1) as a final specification using the criteria mentioned above, which is explained in more detail in McKenzie and Thomas (1983, pp. 231-237).

DW(1) and DW(4) are Durbin-Watson statistics of order one and four respectively. Z,(4) and Z,(8) are Box-Pierce statistics distributed x2 with degrees of freedom given in brackets on the null hypothesis that the residual correlogram is random up to the order given in brackets. Z,(4) is dist~buted x2 with four degrees of freedom on the null hypothesis that the parameters are stable over the four quarter forecast period. DUM2 is a (0,l) dummy representing the devaluation of sterling in 1967, while DUM3 is a similar dummy capturing the effect of the 1971 Smithsonian exchange rate realignment. Both of these phenomena are considered to be special features of the data and outside the scope of the model.

Note that A, is the difference operator of order j [OLS estimates, 1964(iii)- 1979(iv) t-values in parentheses],

Iog(~~~)~ =0.72 log(FOR), _ l -0.23 A 1 log(FOR),_ 5 (10.23) (2.41)

+ 4.554, log (1 + YICb)t - 2.50 log (1 + rrCb)c (3.35) (1.05)

- 2.83 log (1 + rrdjt -2.56d,log(l+rrdf,_, (1.89) (2.98)

+ 4.00 log (1 + IT”)~ -2.894, log (1 + r’~“)~ (3.49) (3.06)

+-1.55d,log(li-vr”‘),_,-O.X7d,log(GDP), (2.75) (1.53)

~1.921og(GDP)~-18.56+0.06Q1~0.12Q2~0.06Q3 (3.54) (3.52) (0.90) (3.67) (1.96)

-I-0.29DUM2-0.25 DUM3, (3.97) (3.24) (1)

ri2 =0.9937, DW(1) = 1.92, DW(4)=2.07,

Z,(4) = 1.54, Z,(8) = 7.54, Z,(4) = 5.45.

G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking 479

The long-run, no growth, solution to eq. (1) is (2):

log (FOR), = - 8.96 log (1 + rrCb)t - 10.16 log (1 + rrd)f

(1.04) (1.98)

+ 14.34 log (1 + rrCT)* + 6.89 log (GDP), + seasons + dummies. (3.81) (16.66)

(2)

Eq. (1) is basically a reparameterisation of our general model with variables

having t-values greater than unity being retained for the new model. Note that this is equivalent to choosing the maximum R2 as a criterion for model selection. The Eurodollar and inflation rates both disappear entirely, while

the term A, log(FOR), _ 5 is suggested by the nearly ‘equal and opposite’ coefficients for log(FOR), _ 5 and log(FOR), _6 in the general model. This restriction on the coefficients is supported by the data, since log(FOR), -6 is not significant when entered separately. The other differenced variables enter in those particular forms as sensible economic variables as agents respond to changes in the levels of the variables, as well as to the levels themselves. The long-run solution, given by (2) suggests that the covered real Eurodollar rate and real GDP are the important determinants of the holdings of Eurocurrency deposits in the U.K. In addition the sterling deposit rate now has a significant negative coefficient suggestive, if anything, of gross substitutability between foreign currency and sterling deposits held by British residents in the U.K. We can see from fig. 2, where actual and predicted values for eq. (1) are plotted against time, that the equations are good representations of the data. The sign on the primary security rate is also consistent with these being substitutes for Eurodollars, though this is less well determined than for sterling deposits. The large numerical values for the coefficients would seem to indicate highly responsive reactions by depositors in these financial markets, which is indeed what we would expect given information availability and alertness of the operators.

5. Concluding comments

In this paper we have outlined an analytical framework for studying the macroeconomic implications of international banking and shown that the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies depends crucially on the degree of substitutability between Eurocurrency deposits, ordinary commercial bank deposits, and primary securities. If the degree of substitutability between Eurocurrency assets and liabilities is high with respect to their domestic counterparts, but low with respect to primary securities, then the total stock of assets and liabilities is greater than otherwise.

480 G. McKenzie and S. Thomas, Liquidity, credit creation, international banking

Our empirical results for the U.K., 1964-1979, suggest that Eurocurrency bank activity is substitutable for domestic bank activity. These empirical investigations are continuing, though our recent results so far are not inconsistent with the conclusion that international banking activities do generate an increase in total financial activity. They enable available funds to be utilised more efficiently than otherwise, but, in the process, they make the task of monetary control that much more difficult.

References

Dufey, G. and J. Giddy, 1978, The internatio~~al money market (Prentice-Hall, New York). Feige, E.L. and D.K. Pearce, 1977, The substitutability of money and near-monies: A survey of

the time-series evidence, Journal of Economic Literature XV, 439-469. Ciurley, J.G. and E.S. Shaw, 1955, Financial aspects of economic development, American

Economic Review XIV, 51%$38. Gurley, J.G. and ES. Shaw, 1960, Money in a theory of finance (Brookings, Washington, DC). Hendry, D.F. and GE. Mizon, 1978, Serial correlation as a convenient simpl~~~ation, not a

nuisance: A comment on a study of the demand for money by the Bank of England, The Economic Journal 88,549-563.

Llewelyn, D.T., 1981, International financial integration (Wiley, New York). McKenzie, G., 1981, Regulating the Euramarkets, Journal of Banking and Finance 5, 109-134. McKenzie, G. and S. Thomas, 1983, Memoranda presented to the House of Commons’ Treasury

and Civil Service Select Committee on International Monetary Arrangements, Appendix to volume III, 207-213, Appendix to volume IV, 222-239 and 2.55263.

Minsky, H.F., 1964, Financial crisis, financial systems and the performance of the economy, in: Commission on money and credit, private capital markets (Englewood Cliffs, NJ) 1733380.

Mizon, G.E., 1977, Model selection procedures, in: M.J. Artis and A.R. Nobay, eds., Studies in modern economic analysis, ch. 4 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).

Pearce, IF. and W.P. Hogan, 1982, The incredible Euro-Dollar (George, Allen and Unwin, London).

Radcliffe Report, 1959, Committee on the working of the monetary system, Cmnd. 827 (HMSO, London).

Simons, H.C.. 1936, Rules versus authorities in monetary policy, The Journal of Political Economy 44, I-30.

Tobin, J., 1963, Commercial banks as creators of “money”, in: D. Carson, ed., Banking and monetary studies (Richard D. Irwin, Homewood. II).

Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1983, International monetary arrangements: International lending by banks, Vol. 1, Report, March.

1-s2.0-S0313592614000320-main.pdf

Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Economic Analysis and Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eap

Full length article

Predicting the US bank failure: A discriminant analysis Raymond A.K. Cox a,∗, Grace W.-Y. Wang b

a School of Business and Economics, Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, British Columbia, Canada V2C 0C8 b Department of Maritime Administration, Texas A&M University at Galveston, 200 Seawolf Parkway, P.O. Box 1675, Galveston, TX 77553-1675, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 3 May 2013 Received in revised form 29 May 2014 Accepted 4 June 2014 Available online 20 June 2014

Keywords: Bank failures Warning systems Discriminant analysis

a b s t r a c t

Using discriminant analysis, we trace the US bank failures during the period from 2007 to 2010 to poor investment decisions and large exposure to systemic risk channels. Specifically, we find that the proportion of illiquid loans in their books and the exposure to the interbank fundingmarkets are themain predictors of bank failures. There are indicators that distinguish surviving banks from their failed peers, and these indicators serve as the earlywarning signals that predict banking failures. This study provides regulators and bank management forecast signals of financial exigency.

© 2014 Economic Society of Australia, Queensland. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The impetus of the recent global financial and economic turmoil, originating in the United States, was the failure of a few key financial institutions. We observed a surge in the number of bank failures from 3 in 2007, 25 in 2008, 140 in 2009, and 157 in the year of 2010. The estimated costs of increasing bank failures through purchase and assumption by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)was $0.21 billion, $19.86 billion, to $37.35 billion in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively.1

Corresponding to the huge social losses in the US in the late financial crises, a great deal of research was undertaken to explain challenges and policy remedies in banking operation, financial engineering, and banking finance. What were the causes responsible for the increasing number of bank failures? We address this issue by identifying the risk factors through lending, trading, and market liquidity that exposed banks to idiosyncratic risk and systemic financial crisis.

In the corporate finance literature, extensive research has used accounting information to predict impending bank failures (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Randall, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Cebula, 2010; Li et al., 2011). This paper is not aimed to present a comprehensive review of the work done in bankruptcy prediction. Instead, this study contributes to the literature by updating the prediction model with various risk factors that have been unnoticed before the US financial crisis during 2007–2009. Our priority is to identify what types of risky banks failed with what kind of lending and investing.

Risk of banks’ lending activities has been researched by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who provide a micro-foundation to study the optimal deposit contracts, asset allocation, and bank-run equilibrium. This method is applied by Cooper and Ross (1998), Ennis and Keister (2006, 2007, 2009a,b, 2010), Peck and Shell (2010), and Uhlig (2010). Banks face the trade-off between liquidity and profitability. Illiquid assets and long-term investment increases profitability but exposes banks to illiquidity after intrinsic and extrinsic shocks.

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R.A.K. Cox), [email protected] (G.W.-Y. Wang).

1 The estimated loss is the difference between the amount disbursed from the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) to cover obligations to insured depositors and the amount estimated to be ultimately recovered from the liquidation of the receivership estate.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2014.06.002 0313-5926/© 2014 Economic Society of Australia, Queensland. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211 203

Besides the risks originating from lending activities, banks engaged in intermediation suffered fromnew forms of banking problems that can be observed from shifting of bank’s profit activities from lending to securities underwriting, short-term trading, and off-balance-sheet activities (Duffie, 2010). There is an implicit recourse in the special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to their sponsoring banks, and therefore the defaults of SPVs incurred losses and bad debt on the sponsoring banks (Gorton and Souleles, 2007; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2009).When the economy is doingwell, short-term assets that must roll over frequently are relatively cheap to issue (Acharya et al., 2010) resulting in a sizable proportion of banks using nondeposit short-term funds at a cost of enhanced bank fragility.When the economy takes an unexpected sharp turn, highly leveraged banks must liquidate assets at a price much lower than the fundamental value to meet the required haircut. The liquidation wipes out the banks’ capital and causes bank failures (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2009). In addition, easy access to the capital markets and short-term money market instruments including business through financial engineering and innovations, especially loan sales and purchases with recourse, exposed banks to unforeseen credit risks and moral hazard. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) and Wagner (2007) empirically found banks having access to loan sales have a larger percentage of risky assets which resulted in instability and externalities associated with bank failures.

Furthermore, market liquidity and funding liquidity are crucial in explaining bank failures. Restricted debt capacity (Acharya et al., 2010) and overhanging illiquid assets seized up sellers’ term credits in the distressed economy and further caused market illiquidity (Diamond and Rajan, 2009a,b). The funding liquidity intertwined with the market liquidity increased the severity of the financial crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Once the funding channel is blocked, banks stocked with illiquid toxic assets failed (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Moreover, large banks experienced greater fire sale discounts that led to market instability (Acharya et al., 2010). Herding of individual bank investments increased the risk that many banks may fail together and, as a result, increased the chance of forbearance during systemic crises and exacerbated the moral hazard problem (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Acharya et al., 2010; Ennis and Keister, 2010).

In the literature of early warning systems, proxies for the CAMELS approach are employed in studies such as González- Hermosillo (1999), Cihak and Schaeck (2010), Foos et al. (2010), and Barrell et al. (2010). CAMELS methods represent variables that examine the financial characteristics of capital adequacy, asset quality, management earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risks of banks. Cole and White (2012) found that causes of bank failures in 2009 were similar to those from the 1985–1992 crises. They detected no evidence for that the residential mortgage-backed securities contributed to those banks failed. In terms of bankruptcy prediction, a comprehensive review is done by Kumar and Ravi (2007).

Employing discriminant analysis to examine the US bank failures during the financial crisis of 2008–2010we find several characteristics associated with those bankrupted banks. The demised banks proportionately had a higher amount of real estate loans, lower loan growth rates, greater financial leverage measured by equity capital to assets, larger asset size, inferior return of assets (in the loss range), heightened loan loss allowances, and more nonperforming loans, chargeoffs and foreclosure properties. That is, the cause of bank failures stemmed from inadequate equity capitalization and excessive investment in real estate loans with unwarranted collateral valuations. This resulted in loan losses dragging down profits and further reducing the equity cushion.

2. Linear discriminant analysis and quadratic discriminant analysis

Altman (1968) provides an application of the multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) and points out the advantage of this methodology. Not only reducing the space dimensionality, MDA also derives a linear combination of the characteristics which best discriminates the qualitative dependent variable, in this case, bankrupt or non-bankrupt firms.

The MDA technique has the advantage of considering an entire profile of characteristics common to the relevant firms, as well as the interaction of those properties. . . . The discriminant function transforms individual variables values to a single discriminant score which is then used to classify the object. . . . Perhaps the primary advantage of MDA in dealing with classification problems is the potential of analyzing the entire variable profile of the object simultaneously rather than sequentially examining its individual characteristics (Altman, 1968).

Fisher (1936) finds the linear combination of the variables thatmaximizes the difference between groups andminimizes the differencewithin groups through eigenvalues and eigenvectors analysis. Observations in the linear discriminant analysis (LDA) are assumed to be multivariate normal distribution with similar covariance structure but different means for each group. Quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) provides generalized discriminant analysis that allows different covariance matrices. Further refinement of the MDA techniques are provided by Cornfields (1967), Altman (1968), Snapinn and Knoke (1985), Lam and Moy (2002) and Smaoui et al. (2009). The discriminant analysis method was utilized by Cox and Prasad (1988) to find the characteristics of acquisitions of the failedUSbanks by other banks aswell as Canbas et al. (2005) predicting the financial structure of Turkish bank failures. Kumar and Ravi (2007) present a review of various bankruptcy prediction (in banks) techniques.

X =  xij

 is the data matrix in discriminant functions Y = [yi] with the compounding constants matrix 3 =

 λj

 .

i = 1, . . . , n represents individual banks, and j = 1, . . . , p indicates variables.y1 ... yn

 =

x11 · · · x1p ...

. . . ...

xn1 · · · xnp

 λ1

... λp

 (1)

204 R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211

yi is a singlemeasurement defined as a linear function containing p discriminant variables. Each of the discriminant function is orthogonal to the others, meaning that the first discriminant function is not correlated with the value on the second function and so on. Suppose individuals can be partitioned into q groups,

n =

q k=1

nk. (2)

For any given set of coefficients, λ, the mean of y for each group can be calculated as ȳ1, . . . , ȳq, so as the corresponding standard deviations s1 . . . , sq. The LDA with three or more groups is to maximize the ratio

z =

q i=1

(yi − ȳ)2

s2 (y) (3)

where ȳ is the mean of the means in q groups, ȳ1, . . . , ȳq and s2 (y) is a pooled variance. In a dichotomy, there is one discriminant function needed. The matrix of Eq. (1) can be reduced to y = λ1x1 + λ2x2 +

· · · + λpxp. Given that n1 observations are known to be classified as failed group and n2 individuals belong to the survived group, discriminant function will maximize the ratio of the difference between themeans to the standard deviations within

the groups. The pooled standard deviation is s (y) =

 n1s21 (y) + n2s22 (y)

 / (n1 + n2). Thus, we identify the linear function

of discriminant variables whose values are as close as possible within groups but as far as possible between groups. To solve the maximization problem, the first-order-conditions can be derived from differentiating z with respect to each of the p variables. Let the difference between the two groups equal D = λ1 d1 + λ2d2 + · · · + λpdp. We solve the system with p simultaneous equations as follows.s11 · · · s1p

... . . .

... sn1 · · · snp

 λ1

... λp

 =

d1 ... dp

 λi =

p j=1

djs−1 ij .

(4)

2.1. Leave-one-out estimation

Among the statistical techniques of bankruptcy prediction, the methods of linear, multivariate, and quadratic discriminant analysis are commonly discussed and reviewed by the literature. There is no single DA that always outperformed others. Both estimators from Fisher’s LDA and Smith’s resubstitution QDA have the optimistic biases when the sample size is small (Hills 1996; Das Gupta 1974). One possible way to fix the biases is the leave-one-out estimators in classification. The leave-one-out classification is similar to the out-of-sample method in time series econometrics. The former presents the estimates by holding out each observation one at a time and estimates the held out sample while the latter separates the sample as in-sample data set and the out-of-same data set to examine whether the proposed leading indicators are potentially useful in predicting the target variable. The process is repeated many times so that each observation in the sample is used once as validation to see whether the testing data is overfitting or not. In this paper, we forecast the likelihood of bank failures. The leave-one-out classification provides a realistic prediction, using observations that are not used to build the discriminant function. Another concern regarding DA is the assumption of the multivariate normal distribution for the observations. It is common that the MDA is replaced by logistic or logit regression that involves fewer violation such as normally distribution and equal within group variance matrices. However, MDA is adopted due to the statistic ability to reduce the chance of type 2 errors.

3. Data and hypotheses

Data on the variables that comprise the models come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). From the Bank Data & Statistic under Industry Analysis, completed and produced by the FDIC from financial statements, quarterly figures for all changes in the database for the period 2003–2008 are collected to be used as independent variables in the regression models as well as to contrast the operations between failed and surviving banks. Information is gathered from the FDIC onwhich banks failed and survivedduring 2005–2010 for the dependent variables in themodels. During 2008–2010 there were 322 failed banks. Survivorship bias exists insofar as failed banks are removed from the database in the year after they cease to exist.

The analysis is based on 19 financial variables including broader categories of types of loan made, asset, liability and equity composition, bank size, and income statement measures in four different models.

R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211 205

Table 1 Variable definition and expected signs.

Variables Definitions Expected signs

realloan Real estate loans to total assets The subprime mortgage crisis was triggered by the foreclosure of mortgage loans, and therefore banks with relatively large holdings of real estate loans are likely to be associated with a higher likelihood of failure. Therefore, we expect this to be positively related to bank failures.

cons_devlp Construction and land development loans to real estate loans

As these are risky assets sensitive to the business cycle we anticipate this to be positively related to a bank’s failure.

comm_real Commercial real estate loans to real estate loans These assets are income producing properties focusing on financing commercial real estate developers. They are sensitive to economic downturns and hence are positively associated with bank failures.

mul_family Multifamily residential real estate loans to real estate loans People continue to have a need for housing in meltdowns and recession. Thus, this variable should not be correlated to bank failures.

sig_family 1–4 family residential loans to real estate loans Similar to mul_family there should be no relationship to a bank’s failure.

ciloan Commercial and industrial loans to total assets Like comm._real there is no predicted connection with the demise of banks.

idloan Loans to individuals to total assets Since these loans include credit cards whose risk can be micromanaged with the credit limits and short maturity coupled with high income from interest and fees, this is expected to be negatively related to bank failures.

deploan Loans to depository institutions to total assets Given these are assets to high quality institutions this is expected to be negatively related to bank failures.

loangrowth Growth of total loans and leases High loan growth rates typically indicate higher credit risk. However, once the economy has entered into a crisis weaker banks susceptible to failure will abandon loan growth. Thus, this variable is hypothesized as being negatively correlated with banking failures.

lossallow Loan loss allowance to total loans This variable reflects the expected bad debt expense and thereby is positively connected to bank failures.

chargeoff Net chargeoffs to average loans This is the recognized bad debt experience and like lossallow is positively connected to bank failures.

pastdue Nonperforming loans to total assets Similar to chargeoff, this will follow suit.

foreclosure Real estate acquired of other real estate owned to total assets

This is the process to repossess the security (houses) pledge for loans and therefore is positively connected to a bank’s failure.

capital Equity capital to total assets The higher this ratio the greater financial strength and ability to weather the storm in dire times. Hence, this factor is negatively related to bank failures.

size Log of total assets Big banks are more vulnerable than small ones during the crisis because big banks had grown in size as a result of taking extra risk. Thus, a positive relationship is hypothesized.

roa Return on assets Since high ROA indicates high profitability, banks with high ROA are distant from default. Therefore, we expect a negative sign on ROA.

MBS Mortgage-bank securities to total assets As stated in the literature, before this crisis MBS were viewed as gilt-edge assets. On the other hand, MBS is of long duration exposing the holder to interest rate risk and heavy losses if rates increase. However, typically in a financial crisis, regulators combat the calamity by injecting liquidity and decreasing interest rates. Alternatively, as the subprime mortgage market dried out, MBSs were affected tremendously, which then affected other markets for securitized products. Moreover, MBSs have negative convexity, meaning that they become more unfavorable as the rates fall. Even so, the relation of this factor to bank failures is expected to be negative.

debt_sec Total short term debt security to total assets As these include government securities owned we anticipate a negative correlation to bank failures.

loansale Net gains on sales of loans to total non-interest income Banks that are selling their loans are in need of liquidity which is connected with poor operating performance. Thus, this variable is expected to be positively related to bank failures.

3.1. Hypotheses

Four hypotheses grouped into 4models are identified and examined based on themain functions of financial institutions: (1)whether bank’s traditional banking and lending such as real estate loans, individual loans, loans to depository institutions, loan growth contribute to bank failures; (2)whether the real estate loans in construction and land development, commercial

206 R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211

Table 2 Descriptive statistics and univariate t-test for mean differences.

Variable Surviving banks Failed banks Difference (t-stat) Variable Surviving banks Failed banks Difference (t-stat)

realloan 47.33 64.13 −16.80 chargeoff 0.11 0.36 −0.25 (19.84) (14.98) (−14.07)*** (0.40) (0.72) (−4.38)***

cons_devlp 15.08 39.45 −24.37 pastdue 1.72 5.72 −4.00 (15.28) (23.11) (−13.40)*** (1.80) (5.57) (−9.15)***

comm_real 30.58 28.53 2.05 foreclose 0.18 0.75 −0.56 (18.27) (16.47) (1.57) (0.51) (1.19) (−6.04)***

mul_family 2.83 4.97 −2.14 capital 12.73 9.75 2.99 (5.93) (7.97) (−3.41)*** (9.68) (4.35) (8.35)***

sig_family 40.81 24.34 16.47 size 11.91 12.88 −0.96 (23.76) (22.94) (9.07)*** (1.38) (1.61) (−7.58)***

Ciloan 9.35 8.84 0.512 roa 0.51 −1.84 2.35 (7.65) (7.53) (0.86) (5.97) (5.39) (5.49)***

Idloan 4.67 1.64 3.03 MBS 6.33 5.14 1.18 (6.74) (2.07) (16.96)*** (9.27) (6.15) (2.40)**

deploan 0.071 0.012 0.059 debt_sec 19.71 12.20 7.51 (1.19) (0.11) (3.54)*** (14.92) (10.36) (9.07)***

loangrowth 9.33 3.75 5.58 loansale 0.16 1.75 −1.59 (165.27) (15.94) (2.49)** (61.10) (5.11) (−2.00)**

lossallow 1.29 1.85 −0.56 (1.48) (1.33) (−5.28)***

Note: We obtained the results by using the cross-sectional data of 2007:Q4. Failure dummy variable defined as banks that failed in 2008–2009. We use a failure dummy to separate columns 2, 6 to 3, 6 and test the mean difference tests reported on column 4, 8. We reported the mean of explanatory variables for surviving and failed banks in the first two columns. The standard deviations are in the parenthesis. We also present the difference in mean and the t-statistic in the third column which tests the mean difference of both sample banks. All variables are described in Table 1. ** Significant at the 5% level in the two-way test. *** Significant at the 1% level in the two-way test.

real estate loans, multifamily residential and 1–4 family real estate loans are useful in enhancing the understanding of bank failures; (3) whether the non-performance assets, past dues, chargeoffs, and foreclosure reflect the overall performance and survival of banks; (4) whether the access to short-term financing andmarket discipline can prevent bank failures effectively. Our a priori hypotheses for these individual variables are listed in Table 1.

Initially, we applied the univariate t-test on mean differences between the surviving and failed bank groups. The methodology is first comprised of comparing the two samples of surviving and failed banks in 2008 and 2009 respectively for each of the 19 variables using a univariate t-test to discuss differences inmeans at 2 times: Quarter 4 of 2007 and Quarter 4 of 2008. The former time period includes the beginning of the recession that started in December 2007 according to the National Bureau of Economic Research whereas the latter time period is the quarter when the financial meltdown was in high gear. The null hypothesis that the two groups have the samemean is rejected at the 1% significant level for most of the variables listed. We exclude those variables that are unable to distinguish banks into surviving and failed groups.

The next approach is to perform discriminant analysis to examine the differences between groups and further classify unknown observations into groups. The observations of banks in two groups are sampled. The choice of discriminating variables is based on various risk channels that exposed banks to possible failures. The goal of this study is to see whether risk channels defined by discriminating variables adequately separate failed banks from banks that survived to enable the regulator to base predictions of bank failures on these variables. With the predictive linear and quadratic discriminant analysis, we quantitatively discriminate between failed banks and non-failed banks.

There are 4 regression equations representing 4 hypothesizedmodels to explain the financial characteristics of banks that failed. The factors comprising each of the four models are considered the causes of bank failures in the period 2008–2009. The 4 prototypes 1, 2, 3, and 4 delineate risk models of lending, detailed lending, liquidity and lending, and lending and market trading, respectively.

Based on the explanatory power of the bank characteristics among the relatively large number of explanatory variables considered, 8 of the 27 variables are dropped out from the discriminant analysis. The variables used in the discriminant analysis are as follows. The discriminant variables and discriminant function Z addressing 4 hypotheses are as follows: Model 1:

Z1 = β1realloan + β2idloan + β3deploan + β4loangrowth + β5capital + β5size + β6roa.

Model 2:

Z2 = β1cons_devlp + β2comm_real + β3comm_real + β4mul_family + β5sig_family + β6ciloan + β7capital + β8size + β9roa.

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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and univariate t-test for mean differences.

Variable Surviving banks Failed banks Difference (t-stat) Variable Surviving banks Failed banks Difference (t-stat)

realloan 48.45 63.57 −15.13 chargeoff 0.23 1.15 −0.92 (19.59) (13.78) (−18.06)*** (0.57) (1.32) (−11.86)***

cons_devlp 13.04 31.95 −18.91 pastdue 2.37 9.82 −7.45 (12.59) (17.82) (−17.91)*** (2.41) (6.40) (−19.80)***

comm_real 31.82 33.13 −1.31 foreclose 0.37 2.03 −1.66 (18.50) (16.04) (−1.36) (0.76) (2.75) (−10.27)***

mul_family 3.03 5.27 −2.23 capital 11.85 6.83 5.02 (5.93) (7.76) (−4.85)*** (7.87) (3.09) (24.91)***

sig_family 41.18 27.04 14.14 size 11.98 12.65 −0.67 (23.07) (20.62) (11.41)*** (1.37) (1.36) (−8.30)***

Ciloan 9.20 9.08 0.13 roa −0.22 −7.65 7.43 (7.58) (7.42) (0.29) (5.13) (8.81) (14.31)***

Idloan 4.39 1.66 2.73 MBS 7.85 5.90 1.95 (6.60) (2.22) (18.18)*** (10.42) (6.65) (4.80)***

deploan 0.06 0.03 0.03 debt_sec 19.55 10.60 8.94 (1.30) (0.30) (1.19) (14.96) (8.47) (17.06)***

loangrowth 3.46 −1.70 5.16 loansale 0.71 1.45 −0.74 (20.33) (7.30) (10.61)*** (11.59) (14.27) (−0.87)

lossallow 1.40 2.91 −1.51 (0.86) (2.09) (−12.32)***

Note: We obtained the results by using the cross-sectional data of 2008:Q4. Failure dummy variable defined as banks that failed in 2009–2010. We use a failure dummy to separate columns 2, 6 to 3, 6 and test the mean difference tests reported on column 4, 8. We reported the mean of explanatory variables for surviving and failed banks in the first two columns. The standard deviations are in the parenthesis. We also present the difference in mean and the t-statistic in the third column which tests the mean difference of both sample banks. All variables are described in Table 1. *** Significant at the 1% level in the two-way test.

Model 3:

Z3 = β1realloan + β2loangrowth + β3loangrowth + β4capital + β5size + β6roa + β6lossallow + β6pastdue + β6chargeoff + β6foreclose.

Model 4:

Z4 = β1realloan + β2capital + β3size + β4roa + β5lossallow + β6pastdue + β7loan_ast + β8MBS + β9debt_sec + β10loansale + β11insureddep.

4. Results

Tables 2 and 3 provide both the descriptive statistics and results for the univariate t-test on mean differences between the surviving and failed bank groups. For both time periods, Quarter 4 of 2007 in Table 2 and Quarter 4 of 2008 in Table 3, there are numerous statistically significant variables. As hypothesized, failed banks held a much higher concentration of risky loans in real estate and construction and a lower concentration in less risky loans to individuals primarily credit cards. This effect stemmed, in part, from the real estate bubble contributing to the US subprime loan crisis. However, we did not a priori anticipate any significant differences in lending portfolios comprised of multifamily and 1–4 family residential real estate whereas the results of these 2 variables show a higher and lower proportion respectively for failed banks. Mortgage- backed securities (MBSs) were not significantly different between surviving and failed banks although the latter had less of these assets. This empirical result is partially attributed to the two snapshots contained in Tables 2 and 3, which are taken in 2007 Q4 and 2008 Q4 respectively. By 2007 Q4, troublesome mortgage loans and MBSs written on pools of such loans would already have been defaulted, leaving relatively strong ones only in the sample. Those high-quality MBSs were even pledgeable as collateral for repurchase (repo) financing, and that contributed to why we see healthy banks holding more of them in Tables 2 and 3. Loans to depository institutions, as expected, is significantly greater for surviving banks but only for 2007. The sign of the coefficient for 2008 is correct as predicted.

Further empirical evidence of lending risk comes from the quality of loans as denoted by the statistically significant variables of the loan loss allowance, chargeoffs, nonperforming loans (past due) and foreclosures. As theorized, the loan portfolio of failed banks was materially lower quality than surviving banks. The ability of banks to withstand losses from their lending activities would be reflected in their equity accounts. Failed banks have much less of a cushion to absorb loan losses as indicated by their capital and Tier 1 amounts.

Surprisingly, on an average the greater the size of a bank the more likely it was to fail in 2007 and 2008. Typically, larger banks have more sophisticated operations and diversified portfolios making them resistant to failure. Nonetheless, these attributes were not able to overcome the risky activities and deteriorating market conditions of this period.

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Table 4 Discriminant analysis results with rolling windows.

Panel A. Linear discriminant analysis

Independent 2007 2006 2005 2008 2007 2006 Dependent 2008–2009 2008–2009 2008–2009 2009–2010 2009–2010 2009–2010

Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients

realloan 0.3101 0.6983 0.7875 0.1828 0.4299 0.6409 capital −0.0664 0.0671 0.2075 −0.2442 −0.0675 0.0344 size 0.2949 0.5017 0.3408 0.0650 0.2003 0.2720 roa −0.1987 −0.1476 −0.0447 −0.3153 −0.1475 −0.1283 loan_ast −0.3227 −0.2760 −0.0445 −0.3497 −0.1826 −0.1602 lossallow 0.0995 0.0656 0.0486 0.2145 0.1174 0.0987 pastdue 0.8667 0.3580 0.0587 0.7164 0.6983 0.2615 MBS 0.0177 −0.0847 −0.0330 0.0390 0.0322 −0.0203 debt_sec −0.1110 −0.0967 0.0869 −0.1931 −0.1181 −0.1464 pi_grow 0.0325 0.0396 0.2515 −0.0964 −0.0871 −0.0030 hpindex_sa 0.1143 0.3509 0.3482 −0.0266 0.2930 0.5453

Model stat.

Can Corr 0.3071 0.1664 0.1454 0.5063 0.2830 0.2032 Eigenvalue 0.1041 0.02846 0.0216 0.3447 0.0871 0.0431 Likelihood ratio 0.9057 0.9723 0.9789 0.7436 0.9199 0.9587 F-Value 76.748 20.962 16.267 253.83 64.169 31.725 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

A1. Classification: percentage correct

Non-fail 91.22% 73.54% 70.69% 94.92% 84.53% 72.97% Failure 60.12% 72.61% 74.05% 73.88% 68.04% 73.19%

A2. Leave-one-out classification (LOO)

Non-fail 91.18% 73.49% 70.69% 94.87% 84.48% 72.89% Failure 57.67% 70.06% 70.25% 73.88% 68.04% 72.10%

Panel B. Quadratic discriminant analysis results

Independent 2007 2006 2005 2008 2007 2006 Dependent 2008–2009 2008–2009 2008–2009 2009–2010 2009–2010 2009–2010

B1. Classification: percentage correct

Non-fail 68.80% 57.50% 44.34% 89.77% 54.46% 50.68% Failure 79.75% 84.08% 86.71% 83.16% 85.91% 83.70%

B2. Leave-one-out classification (LOO)

Non-fail 68.67% 57.45% 44.25% 89.74% 54.42% 50.64% Failure 77.91% 78.34% 79.75% 82.13% 83.85% 80.80%

Note: Table 4 reports the results of the rolling window Linear Discriminant Analysis and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis. The first three columns have the dependent variables for the failure during 2008–2009, while the last three columns focus on the failures happened in 2009–2010. The independent variables that used to explain failure are in a rolling window up to three years prior to the failures. It includes resubstitution classification in Panels A1 and B1 and the leave-one-out classification in Panels A2 and B2.

The profitability of failed banks, as one would expect, was lower and always negative observing the return on assets coupled with less of the low risk non-income (fees) stream variables. In addition, their liquidity as measured by cash was much lower.

In concurrence with the hypotheses failed banks had significantly smaller ratios representing securities, mortgage- backed securities, and short-term government securities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in the popular press, as to contributing factors towards bank insolvency themortgage-backed securities factor was associatedwith healthier surviving banks.

Other activities and investments positively correlated with failed banks included the sale of loans, hot money (brokered deposits) and interbank deposits. The latter variable was forecasted to have a negative relation to banks that failed. This result supports the opinion that failed banks were not effective in monitoring the credit risk of other banks suggesting a systemic failure.

The results of the rolling window LDA and QDAmodels are shown in Table 4. The first three columns have the dependent variables for the failure during 2008–2009, while the last three columns focus on the failures happened in 2009–2010. The independent variables that used to explain failure are in a rollingwindowup to three years prior to the failures. The estimate coefficients are reported, followed by the classification (A1, B1) and leave-one-out classification (A2, B2). The diagonal elements in the classification table (Table 4, Panel A1, A2, B1, B2) summarize the percentage and the number of observations which are correctly classified. The off-diagonal elements present the misclassification, including type 1 and type 2 errors.

R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211 209

Table 5 LDA classification: 1999Q3–2009Q3.

A. Resubstitution classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Can. Cor. 0.1616 0.2456 0.2171 0.2166 Eigenvalue 0.02681 0.06421 0.04946 0.04921 F-value 1170.1 2787.3 1647.1 1341.2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 81.84 18.16 81.84 18.16 81.39 18.61 79.72 20.28 1 37.34 62.66 37.34 62.66 48.65 51.35 44.90 55.10

B. Leave-one-out classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 81.84 18.16 81.84 18.16 81.38 18.59 79.71 20.27 1 37.36 62.64 37.36 62.64 48.67 51.23 44.96 55.04

Note: Table 5 reports the results of Linear Discriminant Analysis. It includes resubstitution classification in Panel A and the leave-one-out classification in Panel B. The leave-one-out classification is similar to the out-of-sample method in time series econometrics. The former presents the estimates by holding out each observation one at a time and estimates the held out sample while the latter separates the sample as in-sample data set and the out-of-same data set to examine whether the proposed leading indicators are potentially useful in predicting the target variable. In this paper, we forecast the likelihood of bank failures. The diagonal elements in the resubstitution classification table summarize the percentage and the number of observations which are correctly classified. The off-diagonal elements present the misclassification, including type 1 and type 2 errors.

Without further explanation,we report the classification table fromnowon. The coefficient tables for allmodels are available based on request.

Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) performs better in predicting the survival of banks. Overall percentage of accuracy in predicting the survival banks among regulation classification and leave one out classification ranges from 70.69% to 94.92%. Another interesting finding is when compared to LDA, Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) performs better in predicting bank failures. A range of 77.91%–86.71% of bank failures can be predicted correctly using QDA. But only 57.67%–74.05% can be identified when we apply LDA under the same setting of rolling window.

The diagonal elements in the resubstitution classification table (Table 5, Panel A) summarize the percentage and the number of observations which are correctly classified. The off-diagonal elements present the misclassification, including type 1 and type 2 errors. For example in Model 1, 81.84% of surviving banks can be correctly classified, and failed banks are classified accurately around 62.66%, using the historical data from 1999 Quarter 3 to 2009 Quarter 3. The results indicate prediction accuracy and correct classification if applied to unknown observations. However, observations that are used to build the model are being classified in the classification table.

The leave-one-out classification (Table 5, Panel B) presents the estimates by holding out each observation one at a time and estimates the held out sample. Hence, it provides a realistic prediction, using observations that are not used to build the discriminant function. The chance of correctly classifying surviving and failed banks is similar, 81.84% for survived banks and 62.64% for failed banks, when compared to the resubstitution classification table. When comparing the results, we find that the results are similar with those two estimations.

Based on the risk channels defined in the literature, an F-test is used to examine whether the discriminant models as a whole is significant. The F-test shows significance for Models 1–4 as identified in Section 4.

As wemove toModels 2 and 3, we observe limited increase in prediction accuracy for bank’s survivability, so as the bank failures. Models 2 and 3 present a similar pattern asModel 1. Models 1–3 aremore capable in classifying the surviving banks than failed banks. When moving fromModel 1 to Model 4, the probability of correctly identifying survived banks decreases to 79.72% from 81.84%. At the same time, the percentage for predicting bank failures drops to 55.10% from 62.66%. Thus, Model 4 is inferior when compared to the other models studied. Note, as a robustness check we apply probit regression analysis using the same 4 models. Qualitatively the results are similar.

The sample set of the study may impact the prediction and classification results. Given the original classification of bank failures is restricted from 2007 Q1 to 2010 Q4, we include the financial ratios and variables prior to the bank failures from 2003 Q1 to 2007 Q4. By doing so, we eliminate the unreasonable and unusual movements during the crisis period. Given the sample set, we notice that the prediction and classification for failed banks improve drastically (see Table 6). The accurate classifications for failed banks are 75.77%, 64.62%, 69.66%, and 72.76% for Models 1–4 respectively, which are higher than the outcomes if we extend our sample from 1999 Q3 to 2009 Q3.

If quadratic discriminant analysis is applied, the outcomes in predicting bank failures outperform the LDAmodels except Model 3, using the sample of 1999 Q3–2009 Q3 (Table 7). However, the prediction accuracy for failed banks varies from the greatest 75.93% to the lowest 23.39% depending on themodel.When the sample of 2003 Q1–2007 Q4 is considered (Table 8)

210 R.A.K. Cox, G.W.-Y. Wang / Economic Analysis and Policy 44 (2014) 202–211

Table 6 LDA classification: 2003 Q1–2007 Q4.

A. Resubstitution classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Can. Cor. 0.1685 0.2487 0.1725 0.1792 Eigenvalue 0.02921 0.06595 0.03066 0.33171 F-value 639.49 1392.9 576.61 510.7 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 66.64 33.36 80.60 19.40 67.43 32.57 67.96 32.04 1 24.21 75.79 35.33 64.67 30.27 69.73 27.22 72.78

B. Leave-one-out classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 66.63 33.34 80.60 19.40 67.42 32.54 67.95 32.02 1 24.21 75.77 35.38 64.62 30.30 69.66 27.24 72.76

Note: Given the original classification of bank failures is restricted from 2007 Q1 to 2010 Q4, Table 6 presents the resubstitution classification in Panel A and the leave-one-out classification in Panel B using the financial ratios and variables prior to the bank failures from 2003 Q1 to 2007 Q4.

Table 7 QDA classification: 1999 Q3–2009 Q3.

A. Resubstitution classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 91.26 8.72 85.65 14.35 94.41 5.56 59.82 40.16 1 61.61 38.38 42.93 57.07 76.57 23.41 23.95 76.05

B. Leave-one-out classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 91.26 8.72 85.65 14.35 94.41 5.56 59.82 40.16 1 61.69 38.30 42.96 57.04 76.59 23.39 24.07 75.93

Note: Table 7 applying Quadratic Discriminant Analysis reports resubstitution classification in Panel A and the leave-one-out classification in Panel B. The diagonal elements in the resubstitution classification table summarize the percentage and the number of observations which are correctly classified. The off-diagonal elements present the misclassification, including type 1 and type 2 errors.

Table 8 QDA classification: 2003 Q1–2007 Q4.

A. Resubstitution classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 65.24 34.74 79.30 20.70 88.71 11.26 33.06 66.92 1 22.67 77.31 31.48 68.52 63.81 36.15 11.52 88.48

B. Leave-one-out classification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Classified Classified Classified Classified

True fail 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 65.24 34.74 79.29 20.71 88.71 11.26 33.06 66.92 1 22.73 77.25 31.57 68.43 63.92 36.05 11.67 88.33

Note: Given the original classification of bank failures is restricted from 2007 Q1 to 2010 Q4, Table 8 presents the resubstitution classification in Panel A and the leave-one-out classification in Panel B using the financial ratios and variables prior to the bank failures from 2003 Q1 to 2007 Q4.

the forecast precision for failed banks ranges from 36.05% to 88.33%. The variation or reliability of the correct classification may outweigh the benefit from relaxing the assumptions of estimation when moving from the LDA to the QDA.

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5. Conclusion

This paper studies the US bank failure during the financial crisis of 2008–2010. We employed discriminant analysis (LDA and QDA) and a univariate t-test of mean differences for financial variables between failed and surviving banks. Four models were evaluated for their ability to correctly classify which banks survived and failed and therefore be possibly used by regulators and bank managers as an early warning system of financial ruin. The model best able to predict failure and survival included the variables of real estate loans, growth rate of loans, equity capital to assets, size of bank, return on assets, loan loss allowance, nonperforming loans, net chargeoffs and foreclosures. That is, during this period the cause of failed banks was their high proportion of real estate loans and other uncollectible owned debt. Furthermore, the poor investment (loan) decision of the failed banks greatly contributed to income losses and was exacerbated by a low equity capital base ill equipped to absorb the write-offs and losses. Future research should explore how to further improve the accuracy of bank failure forecasting.

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  • Predicting the US bank failure: A discriminant analysis
    • Introduction
    • Linear discriminant analysis and quadratic discriminant analysis
      • Leave-one-out estimation
    • Data and hypotheses
      • Hypotheses
    • Results
    • Conclusion
    • References

1-s2.0-S0378426613002100-main.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

0378-4266/$ - see front matter � 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.027

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 45 24 87 77. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (I. Distinguin), caroline.roule-

[email protected] (C. Roulet), [email protected] (A. Tarazi).

1 Berger and Bouwman (2009) point out this endogeneity issue. Consequen interpret their results as correlations between capital and liquidity creatio than causal relationships. Their study focuses on the determinants of creation. Capital is one of their independent variables, and they address end using instrumental variable regressions.

Isabelle Distinguin a, Caroline Roulet b,⇑, Amine Tarazi a

a Université de Limoges, LAPE, 5 Rue Félix Eboué, 87031 Limoges Cedex, France b OECD, 2 Rue André Pascal, 75116 Paris Cedex, France

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 29 July 2011 Accepted 13 April 2013 Available online 10 May 2013

JEL classification: G21 G28

Keywords: Bank regulatory capital Liquidity Bank regulation

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investiga- tion supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.

� 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Liquidity transformation is traditionally considered the preem- inent function of banks, but also the primary source of their vulner- ability and a justification for their protection through a public safety net in the form of deposit insurance (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Indeed, an important role of banks in the econ- omy is to provide liquidity by funding long-term, illiquid assets with short-term, liquid liabilities. Thus, banks hold illiquid assets and provide cash to the rest of the economy. Therefore, they face risk if some liabilities invested in illiquid assets are claimed at short notice. The subprime crisis well illustrates how quickly and severely illiquidity can crystallize. In particular, it shows how some sources of funding can evaporate, compounding concerns about the valuation of assets and capital adequacy rules (BIS, 2009).

The existing theoretical and empirical literature considers the causal link that goes from bank capital to liquidity creation. The theoretical literature provides two opposing views on this relationship. As discussed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), under the first view, bank capital tends to impede liquidity creation

through two distinct effects: the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’ and the ‘‘crowding-out of deposits’’. According to the ‘‘financial fra- gility structure’’, higher capital is associated with less monitoring which leads to less liquidity creation (Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001), while higher capital ratios could crowd out deposits and thereby reduce liquidity creation (Gorton and Winton, 2000). Under the second view, higher capital enhances the ability of banks to cre- ate liquidity because it allows them to absorb greater risk (Bhat- tacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden 2004).

While theory suggests a causal relationship from capital to liquidity creation, in practice, the issue is more complex and both might be jointly determined.1 Indeed, the more banks create liquid- ity, the more they are exposed to the risk of being unable to meet unexpected withdrawals from customers. Thus, banks may need to strengthen their solvency to access external funding more easily or, in extreme cases, to face unexpected losses from selling some as- sets at fire-sale prices (Matz and Neu, 2007).

Banks must comply with capital standards through minimum requirements for risk weighted capital ratios. However, most banks

tly, they n rather liquidity ogeneity

3 In their empirical study on the determinants of liquidity creation, Berger and Bouwman (2009) indicate that their results differ for large banks but not for small banks when they account for off-balance sheet positions. More precisely, for large banks, capital and liquidity creation are positively correlated when they use measures

3296 I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

hold an amount of capital that exceeds the minimum imposed by regulation. From this perspective, various studies investigate why banks buildup such capital buffers (Lindquist, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Ayuso et al., 2004). However, this literature does not consider the role of liquidity in analyzing bank regulatory capital buffer.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between bank regulatory capital ratios and liquidity. We study the contribu- tion of liquidity in explaining bank regulatory capital ratios beyond the determinants considered in the literature. Specifically, we question whether banks maintain or strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity. In this context, we hypothesize that banks might strengthen their solvency stan- dards to offset their liquidity constraint and improve their ability to raise external funds. In addition, banks might raise their capital standards to better assume the losses from selling illiquid assets to repay the liabilities claimed on demand. If the hypothesis is re- jected—that is, if banks do not adjust and improve their capital standards when facing higher illiquidity—liquidity requirements concomitant to capital standards might be needed to temper the overall riskiness of banks. From this perspective, we also contrib- ute to the debate on liquidity regulation implemented in the Basel III regulatory framework.2

We extend the current literature in several directions. First, we add to the strand of the existing empirical literature on bank capital buffer, in that liquidity has not yet been considered a deter- minant of capital buffer. Second, to be consistent with recent empirical findings showing that bank capital and liquidity might be jointly determined, we estimate a simultaneous equations model. Third, we consider both a liquidity creation indicator in the steps of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and a liquidity indicator in line with the definition of the Basel Committee on Banking Reg- ulation and Supervision (i.e., the net stable funding ratio). The net stable funding ratio shows to what extent a bank is able to meet its liquidity requirements without borrowing money or selling its assets at a loss. This measure accounts for the imbalances of both sides of bank balance sheets and enables regulators to better assess the ability of banks to meet unexpected customer withdrawals from their liquid assets. The main difference between the liquidity creation indicator and the liquidity indicator as defined in the Basel III accords stems from the liability side of the balance sheets. The liquidity creation indicator considers some liabilities as liquid because they can be quickly withdrawn without penalty. However, a large share of these liquid liabilities is considered as stable in the Basel III liquidity indicator because they are expected to ‘‘stay’’ within the institution. From these two approaches to measure bank liquidity, we investigate how bank managers deal with the stability of their funding in the definition of bank liquidity. We measure the liquidity created by banks or their exposure to liquid- ity risk only from on-balance sheet positions because a detailed breakdown of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases for European banks. This could alter our results for large banks because they are generally more involved in off-balance sheet activities, and specifically in sophisticated instruments, than

2 Two regulatory standards for liquidity have been introduced (BIS, 2009). The ‘‘net stable funding ratio’’ identifies the amount of long-term, stable sources of funding an institution uses relative to the liquidity profiles of its assets and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance-sheet commitments and obligations. The standard requires a minimum amount of funding that is expected to be stable over a one year-time horizon based on liquidity factors assigned to assets and off-balance-sheet commitments. The Basel Committee has also introduced the ‘‘liquidity coverage ratio’’ to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity profile of institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high-quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month.

small banks.3 Finally, we also add to the literature by assessing the accuracy of improving the regulatory framework by adding liquidity requirements to capital standards.

Our investigation requires market data and a detailed break- down of bank balance sheets to compute liquidity indicators. This information is more frequently and extensively reported for listed banks in standard databases. Our sample is therefore limited to pub- licly traded US and European commercial banks4 during the pre-cri- sis 2000–2006. We omit the crisis years 2007 and 2008 that are likely to disturb our analysis. The main results show that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as de- fined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering a different definition of stable liabilities specific to US banks based on the concept of core deposits, the results show that small banks actu- ally increase their regulatory capital ratios when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. The findings support the need to implement mini- mum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee. Nevertheless, the results also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on bank liquidity creation and on the determinants of bank capital buffer. Section 3 presents the dataset and the empirical strategy, while Section 4 describes the variables considered in the analysis. Results and robustness checks are pre- sented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents concluding remarks.

2. Related literature

Our research is related to two strands of literature: the theories linking bank capital and liquidity creation and studies focusing on the determinants of bank capital buffer. Several theory papers deal with the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. In their work, Berger and Bouwman (2009) note that two hypoth- eses largely frame the discussion on this relationship: the ‘‘finan- cial fragility/crowding-out’’ hypothesis and the ‘‘risk absorption’’ hypothesis.

Roughly described,5 the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’ effect is the outcome of the following process. The bank collects funds from depositors and lends them to borrowers. By monitoring borrowers, the bank obtains private information that gives it an advantage in assessing the profitability of its borrowers. However, this informa- tional advantage creates an agency problem, and the bank might extort rents from its depositors by requiring a greater share of the loan income. If depositors refuse to pay the higher cost, the bank withholds monitoring or loan-collecting efforts. Because depositors know that the bank might abuse their trust, they become reluctant to put their money in the bank. Consequently, the bank must win depositors’ confidence by adopting a fragile financial structure with

that include off-balance sheet activities, while the relationship is insignificant when those activities are excluded. For small banks, capital and liquidity creation are negatively correlated using measures with or without off-balance sheet activities.

4 Some of these banks perform non-commercial banking activities (e.g., JP Morgan Chase owns one of the largest hedge funds in the United States). We carry out robustness checks by running estimations on a sub-sample limited to ‘‘true commercial banks’’. We exclude a bank if it is very small (total assets below $25 million) or if it has consumer loans exceeding 50% of total assets. Besides, we verify that our sample does not include a bank with no loans outstanding, zero deposits or zero or negative equity capital. For further details, see Section 6. In all cases, the main conclusions are consistent with those obtained with our full sample of banks.

5 See Berger and Bouwman (2009) for a longer discussion on the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’ and the ‘‘crowding-out of deposits’’ effects.

6 The sample includes banks from the 27 EU member countries, Norway and Switzerland. However, the required data are available only for banks located in the 20 following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3297

a large share of liquid deposits. A contract with depositors mitigates the bank’s hold-up problem because depositors can run on the bank if the bank threatens to withhold efforts. Consequently, financial fragility favors liquidity creation in that it allows the bank to collect more deposits and grant more loans. In contrast, higher capital tends to mitigate the financial fragility and enhances the bargaining power of the bank, which hampers the credibility of its commitment to depositors. Thus, higher capital tends to decrease liquidity creation. In addition, Gorton and Winton (2000) show that a higher capital ratio can reduce liquidity creation through another effect: the ‘‘crowding-out of deposits’’. They maintain that deposits are more effective liquidity hedges for agents than investments in bank equi- ty. Indeed, deposits are totally or partially insured and withdrawable at par value. In contrast, bank capital is not exigible and has a sto- chastic value that depends on the state of bank fundamentals and the liquidity of the stock exchange. Consequently, higher capital ra- tios shift investors’ funds from relatively liquid deposits to relatively illiquid bank capital. Thus, the higher is the bank’s capital ratio, the lower is its liquidity creation.

Under the second hypothesis, higher capital enhances the ability of banks to create liquidity. Here, liquidity creation in- creases the bank’s exposure to risk, as its losses increase with the level of illiquid assets to satisfy the liquidity demands of customers (Allen and Gale, 2004). Bank capital allows the bank to absorb greater risk (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden 2004). Thus, the higher is the bank’s capital ratio, the higher is its liquidity creation.

Berger and Bouwman (2009) empirically test these recent the- ories of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation. Using a sample of US commercial banks from 1993 to 2003, they find that the relationship is positive for large banks when liquidity creation includes off-balance sheet activities and not significant when liquidity creation only accounts for on-balance sheet activi- ties. The relationship is significantly negative for small banks con- sidering both liquidity creation measures.

Besides, the liquidity creation indicator developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) has been used in several other studies to investigate different issues. Fungacova et al. (2010) examine how the introduction of deposit insurance influences the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. They test the two competing hypotheses highlighted by Berger and Bouwman (2009) using a sample of Russian banks from 1999 to 2007. They find that the implementation of deposit insurance has a limited impact on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation and does not change the negative sign of the relationship. Angora and Roulet (2011) use the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation and the Basel III net stable funding (BIS, 2009) measures on a sample of US and European publicly traded commercial banks during the 2000–2008 period. They show that European banks and large US banks create higher levels of liquidity and are more exposed to maturity transformation risk than small US banks. Typically, the results show that banks’ size explains the differences in liquidity creation and in maturity transformation risk. Horvath et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between capital and liquidity creation by performing Granger-causality tests for a sample of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. They show that capital and liquidity creation negatively Granger-cause each other and highlight a trade-off between higher financial stability provided by stronger capital requirements and the benefits stem- ming from higher liquidity creation. Besides, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2012) investigate the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. They use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the 1998–2010 period. They consider the liquidity creation indicator of Berger and Bouwman (2009) as a proxy of liquidity risk. Overall, they find that both liquidity and credit risks contribute to bank de-

fault. They also show that the simultaneous occurrence of both risk factors increases bank default risk. Finally, Berger et al. (2012) study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support on bank risk taking and liquidity creation using a unique dataset over the 1999–2009 period They find that both types of actions are generally associated with statistically-significant reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation in the short and long run.

Turning to the empirical literature on the determinants of bank capital buffer, the studies mainly focus on the relationship between a given determinant and bank capital buffer by controlling for other potential determinants. From this perspective, Lindquist (2004) uses Norwegian banks to study the impact of the riskiness of bank assets on capital buffer. Regulatory capital requirements are only based on credit, market and operational risks and do not cover all types of risk. Furthermore, sophisticated risk valuation models might underestimate risk. Therefore, banks might hold capital in excess of the minimum required by regulators so they can face unexpected losses from their risky assets. However, Lindquist (2004) does not find any significant link. Jokipii and Milne (2011) also focus on the relationship between risk and bank capital buffer, but they examine the relationship between capital buffer and port- folio risk adjustments. Using US bank holding companies and com- mercial banks over the 1986–2006 period, they find a positive two- way relationship. Several studies investigate how the business cy- cle might influence bank capital buffer, as much debate on Basel capital standards has centered on its potential ‘‘pro-cyclicality’’. Ayuso et al. (2004) and Stolz and Wedow (2011) consider Spanish and German banks, respectively. Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) focus on banks from 29 OECD coun- tries and from 25 European countries, respectively. Their results globally highlight a significant negative co-movement with the cy- cle. Banks tend to decrease (increase) their capital buffer during up- turns (downturns). Other studies consider the impact of market discipline in the determination of bank capital buffer. They empir- ically test whether market discipline provides enough incentives for banks to strengthen their capital buffer to mitigate their default risk. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) study the causes of the bank capital buildup of the 1990s for large US banks. They find that among the relevant factors, market discipline explains the bulk of this buildup. Alfon et al. (2004) and Nier and Baumann (2006), using a sample of UK banks and a large cross-country panel data set from 32 countries, respectively, show that moral hazard is effec- tive and that market discipline encourages banks to strengthen their capital buffer. Fonseca and González (2010) consider cross country data from 70 countries and investigate whether the influ- ence of market discipline on capital buffer varies across countries with heterogeneous frameworks for regulation, supervision and institutions. They find that, even if market discipline has a positive impact on bank capital buffer, the relationship depends on several structural factors. Indeed, restrictions on bank activities, effective supervision and bad institutional environment tend to weaken market discipline and reduce incentives for banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum required by regulators.

3. Sample and empirical method

3.1. Presentation of the sample

Our sample includes US and European6 publicly traded commer- cial banks over the 2000–2006 period. We deliberately omit the crisis

Table 1 Distribution of US and European publicly traded commercial banks. Source: Bloom- berg, European Central Bank, Bank of England, National Bank of Switzerland, Sveriges Riskbank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Central Bank of Iceland, FDIC and Finance Norway. To deal with the issue of sample representativeness, we compare aggregate total assets of banks included in the final sample (i.e., US and European publicly traded commercial banks) with aggregate total assets of the whole banking system. From 2000 to 2006, we compute the ratio of aggregate total assets of banks included in the final sample to aggregate total assets of the whole banking system. This table reports the average value of this ratio country by country.

Banks available in Bloomberg

Banks included in our final sample

Total assets of banks in final sample/total assets of the banking system (%)

United States 645 574 66.4 Europe 225 207 60.4 Austria 8 8 57.3 Belgium 4 3 80.3 Cyprus 4 4 69.7 Denmark 44 38 60.6 Finland 2 2 71.2 France 22 22 62.1 Germany 15 14 40.1 Greece 12 12 80.6 Iceland 2 2 66.3 Ireland 3 3 31.3 Italy 24 22 59.6 Liechtenstein 2 2 50.1 Malta 4 4 32.5 Netherlands 2 2 47.6 Norway 23 20 70.3 Portugal 6 6 55.3 Spain 15 15 64.4 Sweden 4 4 72.6 Switzerland 22 18 74.8 United

Kingdom 7 6 61.5

8 Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 billion. Considering US banks, the sample includes 357 banks with total assets below US$1 billion of a total of 574 US banks. This accounts for 62.2% of the total number of US banks in our sample. Considering European banks, the sample includes only 37 banks with total assets below US$1 billion of a total of 207 European banks. These banks represent only 17.8% of the total number of European banks in our

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years 2007 and 2008 that are likely to disturb our analysis. We con- sider US and European banks because the required data are available on standard databases to ensure an accurate representativeness of the sample of banks in each country. Furthermore, we include only listed banks because the setting requires market data (i.e., market value of assets, dividends) and a detailed breakdown of bank balance sheets to compute liquidity indicators. In standard databases, this informa- tion is more frequently and extensively reported for listed banks.

Annual consolidated financial statements were extracted from Bloomberg. We also consider data from the World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervisory Database (Barth et al., 2007) to com- pute an indicator of regulatory oversight of bank capital.

From 2000 to 2006, we identify 870 listed commercial banks (645 in the United States and 225 in Europe). To enable the liquid- ity indicator computation, we restrict the sample to banks for which the breakdown for loans by category and the breakdown for deposits by maturity were available in Bloomberg or in annual reports. We also delete a bank if its total regulatory capital ratio is lower than the regulatory minimum requirement.7 Such a bank is likely to behave very differently from banks that are in compliance because it is under close regulatory scrutiny and it might face constraints on its activities. Our final sample consists of 781 com- mercial banks (574 in the United States and 207 in Europe). Table 1 presents the distribution of banks by country and the representa- tiveness of the sample. We compare aggregate total assets of banks included in the final sample with aggregate total assets of the whole banking system. Over the 2000–2006 period, the final sample

7 We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8% for the ratio of Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it can be considered equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008). Regarding the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets, the minimum requirement is at 4% in all countries.

accounts, on average, for 66.4% of the total assets of US commercial banks as reported by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 60.4% of the total assets of European commercial banks as reported by central banks.

Table 2 presents some general descriptive statistics of the final sample including US and European banks. By using several key accounting ratios, the data highlight that banks are on average focused on traditional intermediation activities. However, there is a high heterogeneity across banks according to their size. The data show that small banks8 both in Europe and in the United States are on average more focused on traditional intermediation activities than large banks. The average share of loans in total assets is 65.4% on the whole sample of banks, and respectively 63.5% for large US banks, 63.2% for large European banks, 67.6% for small US banks and 67.9% for small European banks. The average ratio of total deposits to total assets is 70.7% on the whole sample but it conceals large differences between banks. For large banks, the average ratio of total deposits to total assets is 73.9% in the US and 47.6% in Europe. The average ratio of total deposits to total assets of small US banks is 90.7% and 69.1% for small European banks. In addition, average inter- est income accounts for nearly three-quarters of total income (72%). However, there is a high heterogeneity across banks, as shown by the high standard deviation and extreme values of each ratio. Considering the ratios of total loans to total assets and total deposits to total assets, minimum values are respectively equal to 4.8% and 4.1%. We check that these very low minima are not outliers but prevail for several large European banks. We therefore keep these observations in the panel. Regarding the quality of bank assets, the average share of loan loss provisions in total loans is 0.4%. Consider- ing profitability, the average return on assets is equal to 0.9%. Last, in terms of capitalization, the average risk weighted capital ratio is at 13.4%, and the average ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets is 8.4%.

3.2. The model and regression framework

In this paper, we investigate the contribution of liquidity in explaining bank regulatory capital buffer beyond the determinants considered in the existing literature. Regulatory capital buffer is de- fined as the amount of capital a bank holds in excess of the minimum required to meet regulatory standards. In most of the countries of the sample, regulators set the minimum requirement at 8%. Thus, total regulatory capital buffer is the difference between the total regulatory capital ratio (i.e., the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets) and a constant (8%). To simplify, we use the total regulatory capital ratio instead of total regulatory capital buffer.9 Previous studies show that bank capital might also be a determinant of bank liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Thus to deal with endogeneity, we consider a simultaneous equations model. In the first equation (i.e., the regulatory capital equation), we regress the regulatory capital ratio on a set of factors identified in the previous literature, to which we add liquidity vari- ables using several proxies. In the second equation (i.e., the liquidity equation), we regress the liquidity variable on a set of independent

sample. 9 In Section 6, we perform robustness checks considering bank regulatory capital

buffers instead of bank regulatory capital ratios. We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8%, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008). Our results are consistent with those obtained considering the bank regulatory capital ratio.

Table 2 Summary descriptive statistics of the sample of US and European listed commercial banks, on average, from 2000 to 2006. Source: Bloomberg (2000–2006). All variables are expressed in percentage, except Total assets. Total assets in US$ billion; Total loans/total assets: (commercial loans + consumer loans + other loans)/total assets; Total deposits/total assets: (demand deposits + saving deposits + time deposits + other time deposits)/total assets; Loan loss provisions/total loans: loan loss provisions/(commercial loans + consumer loans + other loans); Tier 1 capital/total assets: Tier 1 capital/total assets; Tier 1 and 2 capital/RWA: (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital)/total risk weighted assets; ROA: net income/total assets; Total interest income/total income: (interest income from loans + resale agreements + interbank investments + other interest income or losses)/total income. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. T-statistics test for null hypothesis of identical means for large and small European (respectively, US banks).

Total assets in US$ billion

Total loans/ total assets

Total deposits/ total assets

Loan loss provisions/total loans

Tier 1 capital/ total assets

Tier 1 and 2 capital/RWA

ROA Total interest income/ total income

All banks Mean 42.5 65.4 70.7 0.4 8.4 13.4 0.9 72.0 Median 1.0 67.2 76.1 0.3 7.9 12.6 1.0 75.6 Max 2176.5 95.1 93.9 6.7 35.2 34.0 6.9 100.0 Min 0.02 4.8 4.1 �1.2 2.1 8.0 �13.3 4.7 Std. dev. 180.0 14.2 17.0 0.5 3.3 3.3 0.9 15.6

Large US banks Mean 34.9 63.5 73.9 0.4 8.0 13.2 1.1 72.8 Median 2.8 65.5 75.4 0.3 7.5 12.5 1.2 74.9 Max 1962.5 93.2 92.1 4.7 28.5 30.1 5.7 99.5 Min 1.00 4.8 28.0 �0.6 0.1 5.1 �13.3 16.6 Std. dev. 157.3 12.5 9.8 0.4 2.6 2.8 0.8 13.1

Small US banks Mean 0.5 67.6 90.7 0.3 9.3 14.2 0.9 79.9 Median 0.4 68.8 92.1 0.3 8.7 13.2 1.0 81.5 Max 1.0 93.0 100.0 5.9 59.9 36.0 6.9 98.9 Min 0.0 6.9 52.7 �0.7 2.5 8.2 �13.3 20.6 Std. dev. 0.2 11.4 7.1 0.4 3.8 3.6 0.9 10.3 Test statistic

& %level �10.12*** 10.27*** 22.30*** �1.23*** 14.07*** 7.84*** �9.64*** 18.15***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Large European banks Mean 145.2 63.2 47.6 0.5 6.6 11.5 0.7 56.4 Median 14.6 65.4 48.1 0.4 6.0 11.3 0.7 58.4 Max 2176.5 95.1 93.6 6.7 26.0 25.9 3.8 97.1 Min 1.01 6.4 4.1 �0.7 0.9 5.1 �5.5 4.7 Std. dev. 315.4 19.3 17.7 0.6 3.2 1.9 0.6 15.5

Small European banks Mean 0.4 67.9 69.1 0.8 11.5 14.6 1.3 67.6 Median 0.4 67.8 70.3 0.6 11.9 13.7 1.2 70.4 Max 1.0 93.0 89.9 4.4 23.1 30.2 4.1 98.4 Min 0.0 6.3 26.5 �1.2 4.2 9.2 �4.4 9.5 Std. dev. 0.3 16.0 10.8 0.8 4.0 3.6 0.9 14.4 Test statistic

& %level �7.52*** 3.74*** 19.07*** 5.99*** 20.87*** 17.33*** 11.28*** 10.71***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, for bilateral test. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level, for bilateral test. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level, for bilateral test.

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3299

variables identified in previous literature. The empirical model is specified by the following simultaneous equations system (noted as system (1); subscripts i and t denoting bank and period, respectively):

K RWAit ¼ ait þ bLi;t þ XK

k¼1

ckDKki;t�1 þ XJ

j¼1

c0jDKji;t þ eit

Li;t ¼ dit þuK RWAit þ XM

m¼1

kmDLmi;t�1 þ XN

n¼1

k0nDLni;t þ nit

8>>>>>< >>>>>:

ð1Þ

Previous empirical studies on capital buffer and liquidity respec- tively highlight potential endogeneity issues with some explanatory variables and specifically with most of the bank level indicators. To address such issues10 and following Lindquist (2004), in both the reg- ulatory capital and the liquidity equations, we replace all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the exist- ing literature by their one-year lagged value.11 K_RWA and L corre-

10 Hausman tests are run for endogeneity by considering each equation of the system individually. The tests confirm the presence of endogeneity both in the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations.

11 We check that the one year lagged values of the presumably endogenous variables are not weak instruments. However, more lags of these variables are not introduced in the regressions as they are weak instruments.

spond respectively to the regulatory capital ratio and to the liquidity proxy. DKj and DLn are respectively the jth and the nth exog- enous determinants of the regulatory capital ratio and liquidity. DKk

and DLm are respectively the kth and the mth presumably endoge- nous determinants of the regulatory capital ratio and liquidity.

We estimate system (1) considering the generalized method of moments (GMM). Considering this estimation method has two advantages. It is robust to the distribution of errors and it is considered more efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression because it accounts for the heteroskedasticity of errors (Hall, 2005). After testing for cross-section and time fixed versus random effects, we include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions.

4. Definition of variables

4.1. Regulatory capital ratios

The total regulatory capital ratio is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). For deeper insights, we consider an alternative measure of the regulatory capital ratio. This is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). Tier 1 capital consists of better quality capital and banks

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might be managing the different components of regulatory capital differently.

Since bank capital and liquidity creation might be jointly determined, the regulatory capital ratio (K_RWA) is the dependent variable in the regulatory capital equation of system (1) and an explanatory variable in the liquidity equation of this system.12 As discussed above, the theoretical literature provides two opposite views of the impact of capital on liquidity creation. The ‘‘financial fragility hypothesis’’ (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; 2001) and the ‘‘de- posit crowding-out hypothesis’’ (Gorton and Winton, 2000) predict that higher capital will decrease bank liquidity creation. However, the ‘‘risk absorption hypothesis’’ postulates that higher capital will increase bank liquidity creation. Thus, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous in the liquidity equation.

4.2. Measures of liquidity

In the banking literature, most empirical studies that consider liquidity indicators use ratios computed from accounting data (i.e., consistent with liquidity indicators of the CAMELS rating approach). However, as argued by Poorman and Blake (2005), using such liquidity ratios could be inaccurate under certain conditions. For example, a large regional bank such as the South- east Bank of Miami, with a ratio of liquid assets to total assets above 30%, bankrupted in September 1991 because of its inability to repay some liabilities claimed on demand with its liquid assets.13 In addition, given the development of bank market activities, the cash value of assets that could be monetized and the availability of market funding are essential to assess bank liquidity. To deal with such issues, some empirical studies use synthetic liquidity indicators that include, in addition to the information pro- vided by accounting data on the liquidity profile of banks, informa- tion about the cash value of assets that could be monetized and about the availability of market funding to determine the liquidity of bank assets and liabilities (Deep and Schaefer, 2004; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; BIS, 2009). Using this literature emphasizing the use of such synthetic indicators and considering the Basel III interna- tional framework for liquidity assessment in banking, we use the following two proxies: a liquidity creation indicator (LC) and the inverse14 of the Basel III net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR).15 We

LC¼0:5� illiquid assetsþ0�semiliquid assets�0:5� liquid assetsþ0:5� Total

12 K_RWA is either the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets (T12_RWA) or the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (T1_RWA).

13 The Southeast Bank of Miami had experienced significant problems as a result of concentrated lending in commercial real estate and weak underwriting and credit administration practices. As of August 31, 1991, real estate loans at Southeast Bank of Miami totaled US$3.5 billion, or 45% of the bank’s total loan portfolio, and nonperforming assets equaled 10% of loans. Southeast Bank of Miami reported a loss of US$116.6 million for the first quarter and US$139 million for the second quarter of 1991. The announcement of these huge losses caused more depositors to withdraw their funds, and the bank’s liquidity problems grew worse. Finally, the bank was closed on September 19, 1991, when it was unable to repay a loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

14 We use the inverse of the Basel III net stable funding ratio. A higher value indicates higher illiquidity.

15 The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision also introduced the ‘‘liquidity coverage ratio’’. This ratio is intended to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity profile of banks by ensuring that they have sufficient high-quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. This paper focuses on a one-year horizon and we do not compute such a ratio which requires the use of monthly data.

measure the liquidity created by banks or their exposure to liquidity risk only from on-balance sheet positions because a detailed break- down of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases for European banks. However, bank liquidity might be affected by on- and off-balance sheets positions. Indeed, banks can also create liquidity off the balance sheet through loan commitments to cus- tomers and similar claims to liquid funds. In addition, the potential contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations can generate lack of liquidity and thus increase bank illiquidity. In Berger and Bouwman (2009), liquidity creation is computed with a method similar to ours by using on-bal- ance sheet information only but also by adding off-balance sheet items. Berger and Bouwman (2009) document that large and small banks create liquidity in very different ways considering alternately a narrow liquidity creation indicator limited to on-balance sheet positions and a broader indicator that also includes off-balance sheet positions. They show that for US banks, as of 2003, unused loan com- mitments amount to 48% of the total liquidity created by large banks while they only account for 19% of the liquidity created by small banks. Regarding the impact of bank capital on liquidity creation, their results differ when they account for off-balance sheet positions for large banks. Indeed, the authors find a positive and significant relationship between capital and liquidity creation for large banks only when they consider their broader liquidity creation measure that includes off-balance sheet activities. For small banks, the rela- tionship between capital and liquidity creation is significant and negative with both definitions of the liquidity creation indicator.

Our first liquidity measure is the narrow liquidity creation indi- cator (LC) defined by Berger and Bouwman (2009) which only considers on-balance sheet positions. To compute this indicator, first, all assets and liabilities are classified as liquid, semiliquid or illiquid according to their maturity and their category. The authors assume that some assets are easier to sell than others (e.g., securi- tizable loans, trading assets). In addition, they assume that some liabilities can be more quickly withdrawn without penalty. Second, each asset and liability item is weighted accordingly. Table 3 shows the weights applied to bank balance sheets based on Berger and Bouwman (2009).

Liquidity creation (LC) is then calculated as follows:

liquid liabilitiesþ0�semiliquid liabilities�0:5� illiquid liabilities assets

All else being equal, a bank creates one dollar of liquidity by investing one dollar of liquid liabilities (e.g., transaction deposits) into one dollar of illiquid assets (e.g., business loans). Similarly, a bank destroys one dollar of liquidity by investing one dollar of illiq- uid liabilities or equity into one dollar of liquid assets (e.g., short- term government securities). Higher values of liquidity creation indicate higher bank illiquidity, as the bank invests more liquid lia- bilities into illiquid assets. In such a case, the bank is more exposed to maturity transformation risk if customers claim their funds on demand while illiquid assets are saleable at fire sale prices.

Our second liquidity proxy is based on the regulatory standards proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (BIS, 2009). Following the subprime crisis, in recogni- tion of the need for banks to improve their liquidity management, the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision developed an international framework for liquidity assessment in banking (BIS, 2009). Among the several guidelines, the Basel III accords include the implementation of the ‘‘net stable funding

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ratio’’. This ratio is intended to promote resiliency over long-term time horizons by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis. This liquidity measure is the ratio of the available amount of stable funding to the required amount of stable funding. The available amount of stable funding is the total amount of an institution’s (1) capital, (2) liabilities with effective maturities of one year or greater, and (3) portion of ‘‘stable’’ demand deposits (i.e., funds with maturities of less than one year that would be expected to ‘‘stay’’ within the institution) and of term deposits with maturities of less than one year that would be expected to ‘‘stay’’ within the institution. The required amount of stable funding is the amount of a particular asset that could not be monetized through sale or used as collateral in a secured borrowing on an extended basis during a liquidity event lasting one year. To calcu- late the ‘‘net stable funding ratio’’, a specific required stable funding factor is assigned to each particular type of asset and a specific available stable funding factor is assigned to each particular type

I NSFR¼ Required amount of stable funding Available amount of stable funding

¼0�ðcashþ interbank assetsþshort-term marketable assetsÞþ0:5�ðlong-term marketable assetsþcustomer acceptancesÞþ0:85�consumer loansþ1�ðcommercial loansþother loansþother assetsþ fixed assetsÞ 0:7�ðdemand depositsþsaving depositsÞþ0�ðshort-term market debtþother short-term liabilitiesÞþ1�ðlong-term liabilitiesþequityÞ

of liability. In Table 4, we briefly summarize the composition of asset and liability categories and related stable funding factors. The higher the required amount of stable funding compared with the available amount of stable funding, the more illiquid a bank is considered. Because the regulation on bank liquidity is not yet implemented, this ratio is only an indicator of bank illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords and does not establish a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity charac- teristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year time horizon.

Table 3 Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the liquidity creation indicator.

Assets Liquidity level Weights

Cash and near cash items Liquid �0.5 Interbank assets Semiliquid 0 Short-term marketable assets Liquid �0.5 Commercial loans Illiquid 0.5 Consumer loans Semiliquid 0 Other loans Semiliquid 0 Long-term marketable assets Semiliquid 0 Fixed assets Illiquid 0.5 Other assets Illiquid 0.5 Customer acceptances Semiliquid 0

Liabilities Demand deposits Liquid 0.5 Saving deposits Liquid 0.5 Time deposits Semiliquid 0 Other term deposits Semiliquid 0 Short-term borrowings Liquid 0.5 Other short-term liabilities Liquid 0.5 Long-term borrowings Semiliquid 0 Other long-term liabilities Semiliquid 0 Subordinated debentures Illiquid �0.5 Preferred equity Illiquid �0.5 Minority interests Illiquid �0.5 Shareholder common capital Illiquid �0.5 Retained earnings Illiquid �0.5

For consistency with our first liquidity measure, we consider for this second liquidity measure the inverse of the regulatory ratio (BIS, 2009). Higher values of both measures will indicate higher illiquidity. The inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) is the ratio of the required amount of stable funding to the available amount of stable funding. In Table A.1 (Appendix A), we show the breakdown of bank balance sheets as provided by Bloomberg and its weighting with respect to the Basel III framework to calculate the inverse of the net stable funding ratio. On the asset side, we define the type and maturity of assets consistent with the definition of BIS (2009) to apply the corresponding weights. On the liability side, we consider only the maturity of liabilities to apply the corresponding weights. Because the data only provide the break- down of deposits according to their maturity and not according to the type of depositors, we consider the intermediate weight of 0.716 for stable demand deposits and saving deposits (including all deposits with a maturity of less than one year). We calculate the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) as follows:

As mentioned above, higher values of the two liquidity indica- tors indicate higher bank illiquidity. Higher levels of liquidity cre- ation (LC) mean that banks invest more liquid liabilities in illiquid assets. In addition, a higher inverse net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) implies that the amount of assets that cannot be mone- tized is deviating from the available amount of stable funding. In this context, a bank faces risk if some liquid liabilities (i.e., unstable funding) invested in illiquid assets (i.e., assets that could not be monetized or that can be sold at loss) are claimed on demand. In our approach, we hypothesize that the rational behavior of banks is to hold more capital to assume the losses incurred by higher illiquidity. Consequently, we expect a positive sign for the coefficients of the variables LC and I_NSFR in the determination of regulatory capital ratios.

4.3. Variables affecting regulatory capital buffer and liquidity from previous literature

Following the existing literature, we consider a large set of bank-level indicators and macroeconomic variables that are likely to affect bank regulatory capital ratios and liquidity respectively.

4.3.1. Regulatory capital equation We include profitability in the regulatory capital equation. Be-

cause raising additional capital is costly, capital accumulation can more easily rely on funds generated internally (through higher retained earnings, weaker dividend payments and stock repurchase) in line with the ‘‘pecking order theory of finance’’ (Flannery and Rangan, 2008). Thus, we expect a positive relation-

16 The Basel Committee considers three different weights (i.e., 0.5 or 0.7 or 0.85) for demand and saving deposits (i.e., all deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year) according to the type of depositors. Here, it is the intermediate weight of 0.7 that is used. In Section 6, we perform robustness checks by considering other weights.

Table 4 Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the inverse of the net stable funding ratio. Source: BIS (2009). The inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) is the ratio of the required amount of stable funding to the available amount of stable funding. It is based on the net stable funding ratio as defined in the Basel III accords. For further details about the weighting of bank balance sheet items to compute this ratio, see Appendix A.

Assets Corresponding definition of BIS Weights

Required amount of stable funding Cash and near cash items Cash 0 Interbank assets Nonrenewable loans to financials with remaining maturity < 1 yr 0 Marketable securities and other short-

term investments Short-term unsecured actively traded instruments (with remaining maturity < 1 yr) 0

Commercial loans All other assets 1 Consumer loans Loans to retail clients (with remaining maturity < 1 yr) 0.85 Other loans All other assets 1 Long-term investments Unemcumbered listed equity or nonfinancial senior unsecured corporate bonds rated at least A- (with remaining

maturity > 1 yr) 0.5

Fixed assets All other assets 1 Other assets All other assets 1 Customer acceptances Unemcumbered listed equity or nonfinancial senior unsecured corporate bonds rated at least A- (with remaining

maturity > 1 yr) 0.5

Liabilities Corresponding definition of BIS Weights

Available amount of stable funding Demand deposits Deposits of retail and small business customers (nonmaturity or residual maturity < 1 yr) 0.7 Saving deposits 0.7 Time deposits Other liabilities with an effective maturity > 1 yr 1 Other term deposits Other liabilities with an effective maturity > 1 yr 1 Short-term borrowings All other liabilities or equity not included above 0 Other short-term liabilities All other liabilities or equity not included above 0 Long-term borrowings Other liabilities with an effective maturity > 1 yr 1 Other long-term liabilities Other liabilities with an effective maturity > 1 yr 1 Subordinated debentures Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments, other preferred shares and capital instruments in excess of Tier 2 allowable

amount having an effective maturity > 1 yr 1

Preferred equity 1 Minority interests 1 Shareholder common capital 1 Retained earnings 1

17 This variable is only included in the equation with the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets as the dependent variable. It is not included when the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets because a portion of subordinated debt is eligible for Tier 2 capital. For robustness, we also introduce it when the dependent variable includes both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Our findings are unaltered. Results are shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C.

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ship between bank profitability and regulatory capital ratios. We consider the return on equity as a proxy of bank profitability (ROE).

Because capital accumulation will also depend on dividend pol- icy and following Gropp and Heider (2010), we use the dividend payout ratio in the framework. We conjecture a negative relation- ship between the dividend payout ratio and regulatory capital ratios. The dividend payout ratio, as defined in the Bloomberg database, is the ratio of total common dividends to the difference between net income and minority interests plus preferred dividends (DIV_PYRT).

We include the riskiness of bank assets in the regulatory capital equation. We consider the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP_TLO) as a proxy of asset risk. Note that the expected sign for the relationship between this variable and regulatory capital ratios is not clear-cut. Because bank capital can be viewed as a security buffer to assume losses from risky and poor quality assets, banks willing to take higher risk might hold more capital (Berger et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Nier and Baumann, 2006). However, an increase in this ex post measure of risk could lower the regulatory capital ratio, given that capital is accumulated to face unexpected losses (Ayuso et al., 2004; Fonseca and González, 2010). On the whole, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous.

Nier and Baumann (2006) indicate that the funding structure of the bank is likely to affect capital buffer. Because uninsured debt- holders are likely to face large losses in case of bank failure, they are particularly sensitive to the riskiness of the bank and to its de- fault probability. From this perspective, uninsured debtholders will feel unsafe when the bank is operating with a capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum requirement and will increase their monitoring effort. Following the literature, subordinated debthold- ers are expected to have the strongest incentives to monitor and discipline banks. To avoid higher funding cost, banks that are more

reliant on subordinated debt will hold higher levels of capital. Therefore, we use the ratio of subordinated debts to total debts (MKT_DISC) to capture such a behavior. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of regula- tory capital ratios.17

Because a bank with a higher charter value can more easily raise capital on the market, it will presumably need to hold less capital. Alternatively, as argued by Gropp and Heider (2010), bank reputa- tion and charter value should also be protected with a large amount of capital. We use the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets (MKT_BK_VAL) as a proxy of bank charter value. Thus, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable in the regulatory capital equation is ambiguous.

We also include bank size in the regulatory capital equation. Large banks benefit from economies of scale in screening and monitoring borrowers and from greater diversification. In addition, because of their ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ position, large banks might hold less capital in excess of regulatory requirements. Hence, a negative relationship is expected between bank size and regulatory capital ratios. We use the natural logarithm of total assets (LN_TA) as a proxy of bank size. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of regulatory capital ratios.

We further consider an indicator of regulatory oversight of bank capital (CAP_REG) in the regulatory capital equation (Laeven and Le- vine, 2008; Shehzad et al., 2010). Because banking regulation is likely to vary across countries, this variable controls for possible

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country effects. This index is computed from the World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervisory Database (Barth et al., 2007). Higher values of the bank capital regulation index18 reflect stronger regula- tory oversight. We expect that under strong regulation, banks are encouraged to maintain high levels of capital and increase their reg- ulatory capital ratios. Thus, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of regulatory capital ratios.

We include the influence of the business cycle in the determina- tion of regulatory capital ratios. According to previous studies (Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Lindquist, 2004), capital buffer and economic activity tend to be negatively related. Banks tend to decrease their capital buffer during economic booms and increase it during economic downturns. However, Berger et al. (1995) argue that banks with external growth strategies might increase their capital buffer during economic booms to exploit acquisition opportunities. We consider the annual growth rate of real GDP (GDP_GWT) as a proxy of the economic environment. The expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous in the determination of regulatory capital ratios.

4.3.2. Liquidity equation Berger and Bouwman (2009) shed light on the importance of

bank market power in the ability to create liquidity. Market power can affect the availability of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) and the distribution of the loan portfolio (Berger et al., 2005). Greater market power might enable banks to enhance their transformation activities by granting more loans and attracting more funds (i.e., deposits or market funding). Thus, market power is expected to positively affect liquidity creation and hence bank illiquidity. We consider the ratio of total assets of bank i located in country j to the total assets of the banking system in country j (MKT_POW) a proxy of bank market power. We expect a positive sign for the coef- ficient of this variable in the determination of bank illiquidity.19

Rauch et al. (2009a, 2009b) indicate the importance of mone- tary policy in the explanation of bank liquidity. When the central bank’s policy rate is relatively low, credit supply increases, which positively affects bank illiquidity. In this study, we consider each country’s central bank policy rate (CB) a proxy of monetary policy. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of bank illiquidity.

We also consider the impact of liquidity pressures on the inter- bank market. We use the spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rate of the central bank (IBK1M_CB) as a proxy

18 This index is the total number of affirmative answers to the following questions: (1) Is the minimum capital ratio requirement in line with the Basel guidelines? (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? (3) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of credit risk? (4) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of operational risk? (5) Is there a simple leverage ratio required? (6) Are market values of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? (7) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (8) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? (9) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with International Accounting Standards? For each country in the sample, the possible changes in the answers to these questions over the 2000–2006 period were considered. Thus, for a given country, the value of the index might vary over time.

19 Bank size might also be a determinant of bank liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Rauch et al., 2009a, 2009b). Large banks could create more liquidity than smaller banks because they have easier access to the lender of last resort and because they would be the first to benefit from the safety net. Therefore a positive relationship could be expected between bank size and illiquidity. We do not introduce this variable in the liquidity equation because it is highly correlated with our proxy of bank market power (MKT_POW). In Section 6, we perform three robustness checks. First, we orthogonalize our proxy of bank market power with our proxy of bank size. We introduce our proxy of bank size and the residual component of our proxy of bank market power. Second, we orthogonalize our proxy of bank size with our proxy of bank market power. We introduce our proxy of bank market power and the residual component of our proxy of bank size. Third, we replace our proxy of bank market power by our proxy of bank size. Our main results remain identical.

of the liquidity pressures on the interbank market. Higher values of the spread reflect higher pressures on the interbank market, which make it more difficult for banks to access these sources of liquidity and, all else being equal, will therefore increase their liquidity risk (i.e., they might be unable to raise external funds). Consequently, we expect that higher values of the spread might negatively affect liquidity creation and bank illiquidity.

The macroeconomic environment is also likely to affect bank activities and investment decisions (Chen et al., 2010; Pana et al., 2010). For example, the demand for differentiated financial prod- ucts is higher during economic booms and might improve banks’ ability to expand their loan and securities portfolios at a higher rate. Similarly, economic downturns are exacerbated by the reduc- tion in bank credit supply. We hence conjecture that banks might increase their maturity transformation activities and thus their illi- quidity during economic booms. We use the annual growth rate of real GDP (GDP_GWT) as a proxy of the economic environment. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of bank illiquidity.

Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables.

5. Results

To test the impact of liquidity on bank regulatory capital beyond the determinants identified in the previous literature, we estimate a simultaneous equations system (system (1)). In the regulatory cap- ital equation, we regress the bank regulatory capital ratio on a set of determinants from previous literature and on a proxy of liquidity. We use alternately two definitions of the regulatory capital ratio: the Tier 1 and 2 capital to risk weighted assets (T12_RWA) and the Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). The aim is to examine whether the results remain the same when considering the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio rather than the Tier 1 and 2 reg- ulatory capital ratio as banks might be managing the various com- ponents of regulatory capital differently. In the liquidity equation, we regress the proxy of liquidity on a set of determinants outlined in the previous literature. As proxies of liquidity, we use two indi- cators defined previously: the liquidity creation indicator (LC, in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)) and the inverse of the net stable funding ra- tio (I_NSFR, in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)). Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appen- dix B show the correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables in both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations. In addition, in both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equa- tions, the presumably endogenous bank-level indicators are re- placed by their one-year lagged value.20

5.1. The relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios

Table 6 shows the regression results. The illiquidity variables LC and I_NSFR have a significant and

negative impact only on T12_RWA as the dependent variable. Banks tend to decrease their Tier 1 and 2 capital ratio when they face higher illiquidity. In contrast, they do not adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio. These results show that banks do not strengthen their sol- vency standards when they face higher illiquidity. The unexpected negative signs for our liquidity proxies might be explained as fol- lows. Bank managers might consider certain liquid liabilities as

20 Previous empirical studies on capital buffer and liquidity highlight potential endogeneity with bank-level indicators. After testing for endogeneity (Hausman test), which confirms the presence of endogeneity and consistently with these studies, in both the regulatory capital and liquidity equations, we replace all bank-level explanatory variables by their one-year lagged value because they are presumably endogenous. Regarding our two variables of interest (i.e. capital and liquidity), which are not lagged, we address endogeneity by estimating a simultaneous GMM equation system.

Table 5 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables for US and European listed commercial banks, on average from 2000 to 2006. Source: Bloomberg (2000–2006), World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervisory Database. All variables are expressed in percentage, except LN_TA, MKT_BK_VAL and CAP_REG. LC: liquidity creation/total assets; I_NSFR: required amount of stable funding/available amount of stable funding; ROE: net income/total equity; LLP_TLO loan loss provisions/total loans; MKT_DISC: subordi- nated debt/total debt; DIV_PYRT: common dividend/(net income – minority interests – preferred dividends); MKT_BK_VAL: market value of assets/book value of assets; LN_TA: natural logarithm of total assets; GDP_GWT: annual growth rate of real GDP; CAP_REG: index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; T12_RWA: Tier 1 and 2 capital/ total risk weighted assets; T1_RWA: Tier 1 capital/total risk weighted assets; MKT_POW: total assets of bank i in country j/total assets of the banking system in country j; CB: central bank policy rate; IBK1M_CB: spread of 1 month interbank rate and central bank policy rate.

Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. dev. Obs.

LC 31.1 31.4 72.9 �25.3 12.7 4926 I_NSFR 90.2 89.3 312.4 20.5 21.2 4926 ROE 11.7 12.1 47.9 �88.1 7.6 4943 LLP_TLO 0.4 0.3 6.7 �1.2 0.5 4873 MKT_DISC 0.7 0.0 18.5 0.0 1.4 4926 DIV_PYRT 31.1 31.7 100.0 0.0 22.4 4770 MKT_BK_VAL 1.8 1.7 7.7 0.0 0.8 4776 LN_TA 7.6 7.0 14.6 2.8 2.1 4926 GDP_GWT 2.6 2.7 9.5 �1.6 1.1 5467 CAP_REG 5.8 6.0 8.0 2.0 0.9 5467 T12_RWA 13.5 12.7 36.0 5.1 3.4 4637 T1_RWA 11.8 11.1 35.2 3.3 3.7 4637 MKT_POW 1.7 0.0 74.5 0.0 6.3 4926 CB 3.1 2.3 15.3 0.3 1.9 5467 IBK1M_CB 0.1 0.1 3.5 �0.4 0.2 5467

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stable and thus might be substituting stable liabilities to capital when facing higher illiquidity.

Regarding the other determinants of regulatory capital ratios and of liquidity, most of the findings are consistent with those ob- tained in previous studies. The most relevant factors to explain

CFR¼Required amount of stable funding Core depositsþStable funding

¼0�ðcashþ interbank assetsþshort-term marketable assetsÞþ0:5�ðlong-term marketable assetsþcustomer acceptancesÞþ0:85�consumer loansþ1�ðcommercial loansþother loansþother assetsþ fixed assetsÞ 1�core depositsþ0�ðshort-term market debtþother short-term liabilitiesÞþ1�ðlong-term liabilitiesþequityÞ

21 Berger and Bouwman (2012) show that during normal times, monetary policy does not seem to have a significant effect on total liquidity creation by medium and large banks and that, for small banks, even if a loosening of monetary policy is associated with an increase in liquidity creation, this effect is economically small.

22 The average share of core deposits to total deposits over the 2000–2006 period is 79% for the US banks included in the sample. However, there is a high heterogeneity: the standard deviation of this ratio is 13.5%.

bank regulatory capital ratios are profitability (ROE), the riskiness of bank assets (LLP_TLO) and the dividend payout ratio (DIV_PYRT). Thus, as hypothesized by Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010), more profitable banks or banks that distribute lower dividends tend to hold higher capital buffers, because they benefit from a better ability to accumulate capital from funds generated internally. In addition, consistent with Nier and Baumann (2006), banks increase their capital ratios when they face higher credit risk.

Focusing on the determinants of liquidity, regulatory capital ra- tios (T12_RWA and T1_RWA) and the spread between the one- month interbank rate and the policy rate of the central bank (IBK1M_CB) are the most relevant factors. Consistently with the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’ (Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001) and the ‘‘crowding-out of deposits’’ (Gorton and Winton, 2000) theories, higher regulatory capital ratios are associated with lower liquidity creation and illiquidity. According to the ‘‘financial fragil- ity structure’’ theory, this result might indicate that banks benefit from their informational advantage, which creates an agency prob- lem. Banks are likely to extort rents from depositors. Consequently,

banks must win depositors’ confidence by adopting a fragile financial structure with a large share of liquid deposits. Financial fragility favors liquidity creation because it allows banks to col- lect more deposits and grant more loans. In addition, from the ‘‘crowding-out of deposits’’ theory, higher capital ratios shift investors’ funds from relatively liquid deposits to relatively illiq- uid bank capital. Thus, the higher are banks’ capital ratios, the lower is their liquidity creation. In addition, perhaps surprisingly, the current findings highlight that an increase in the spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rate of the central bank is associated with higher illiquidity. Consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2012), our results also indicate that monetary policy (CB) is not a relevant factor to explain bank liquidity.21

In summary, the results show that banks do not strengthen their solvency standards when they face higher illiquidity. They do not adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio and they actually decrease their Tier 1 and 2 capital ratio when they face higher illiquidity. Nevertheless, the definition of our liquidity measures can be adjusted in the US case. Indeed, Harvey and Spong (2001) and Saunders and Cornett (2006) emphasize the importance of core deposits for US banks. Core deposits are defined as the sum of de- mand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits lower than US$100,000. These deposits are to a great extent derived from a bank’s regular customer base and are therefore typically the most stable and least costly source of funding for banks (Harvey and Spong, 2001). Thus, it might be relevant to adopt an alternative definition for stable deposits by considering core deposits for US banks. Consequently, we compute an alternative liquidity proxy by modifying the denominator of the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR). More precisely, we consider the sum of core deposits and other stable funding as a proxy of the available amount of stable funding.22 This liquidity proxy is defined as the CFR variable. It is computed as follows for US banks:

5.2. The impact of liquidity on regulatory capital ratios separately for European and US banks: the importance of core deposits for US banks

To delve deeper into the relationship between liquidity and reg- ulatory capital ratios, we run regressions separately for European and US banks by also considering the CFR variable for US banks. Tables 7 and 8 show the regression results. The CFR variable is included in systems (1.c) and (1.c0) in Table 8. In system (1.c), the K_RWA variable is the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). In systems (1.c0), the K_RWA variable is the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA).

Table 6 Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.a0 1.b0

Regulatory capital equation LC �0.03** – �0.003 –

(�2.25) (�0.24) I_NSFR – �0.02** – �0.003

(�2.07) (�0.37) ROE 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02*

(1.20) (1.35) (1.99) (1.77) LLP_TLO 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.45***

(4.04) (4.34) (4.24) (4.40) MKT_DISC – – 0.04 0.05*

(1.53) (1.69) DIV_PYRT �0.01*** �0.01*** �0.01*** �0.01***

(�2.45) (�2.84) (�3.86) (�3.98) MKT_BK_VAL �0.001 �0.001 0.005 0.004

(�0.78) (�1.13) (0.68) (0.57) LN_TA 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002 0.002

(2.94) (1.94) (1.29) (1.20) GDP_GWT �0.02 �0.03 �0.04 �0.02

(�0.48) (�0.67) (�0.87) (�0.55) CAP_REG �0.01 �0.01 0.01 0.003

(�0.15) (�0.19) (0.16) (0.06)

Liquidity equation K_RWA �1.90*** �3.45*** �0.91* �2.46***

(�2.78) (�3.16) (�1.73) (-2.85) MKT_POW �0.08 �0.18 �0.25 -0.61

(�0.39) (�0.36) (�1.15) (�1.12) GDP_GWT 0.69*** 0.15 0.81*** 0.35

(3.31) (0.33) (4.14) (0.82) CB �0.63 1.04 �0.58 1.60

(�0.41) (0.38) (�0.33) (0.55) IBK1M_CB 1.86*** 2.98*** 2.02*** 3.13***

(14.38) (11.40) (19.23) (13.30)

Total obs. 3644 3644 3644 3644

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of US and European publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a) and (1.b)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0) and (1.b0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)) or the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

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Regarding European banks, while the coefficient of I_NSFR is sig- nificantly negative only when the total regulatory capital ratio is the dependent variable, the coefficient of LC is significantly negative for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios as the dependent variables. These results emphasize that, instead of strengthening their solvency standards, European banks reduce their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity.

Focusing on US banks, for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios, all the coefficients of the proxies of liquidity are significantly negative. These results show that, similarly to European banks, US banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face high- er illiquidity even when considering a measure of bank liquidity that focuses more closely on core deposits.

23 Berger and Bouwman (2009) also argue that the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’, the ‘‘deposit crowding-out’’ and the ‘‘risk absorption’’ effects might affect differently the causal link that goes from bank capital to liquidity creation depending on bank size. They expect that both the ‘‘financial fragility structure’’ and ‘‘deposit crowding-out’’ effects are likely to be relatively strong for small banks. Indeed small banks deal more with entrepreneurial-type small businesses, where the close monitoring highlighted in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) is important. In addition, small banks tend to be more funded by deposits, so that capital may ‘‘crowd out’’ deposits as in Gorton and Winton (2000). This effect is likely to be relatively weak for large banks that can more easily access market funding.

24 See Section 3.1.

5.3. The impact of bank size and access to external funding on the relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios

By running separate regressions for US and European banks, the results show that, regardless of their institutional environment, banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity. However, depending on their size, the ability of banks to access external funding is presumably different. Large

banks might benefit from a reputational advantage, possibly providing them a broader access to financial markets. This is likely to affect the causal link that goes from bank illiquidity to capital.23

Furthermore, large and small banks might have different scope of activities and contrasting business models.

Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 billion. In Table 2,24 the data show that small banks both in Europe and in the United States are on average more focused on traditional intermediation activities than large banks. Small banks hold significantly more average shares of loans and deposits in total assets than large banks. Therefore, we run regres-

Table 7 Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios for European banks.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.a0 1.b0

Regulatory capital equation LC �0.15*** – �0.09** –

(�2.69) (�2.04) I_NSFR – �0.05** – �0.02

(�2.31) (�1.19) ROE 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.01

(0.81) (0.25) (1.01) (0.85) LLP_TLO 0.18 0.13 0.26 0.37**

(0.83) (0.63) (1.35) (2.17) MKT_DISC – – 0.01 0.01

(0.27) (0.34) DIV_PYRT 0.002 0.003 �0.003 �0.003

(0.74) (0.86) (�1.02) (�1.33) MKT_BK_VAL 0.001 0.001 �0.002 �0.003

(0.24) (0.59) (�1.46) (�1.41) LN_TA �0.01 �0.01 �0.002 �0.001

(�1.29) (�1.25) (�0.45) (�0.20) GDP_GWT 0.21*** 0.10 0.24*** 0.17***

(2.70) (1.47) (3.58) (2.91) CAP_REG 0.002 0.000 �0.001 �0.004

(0.13) (0.02) (�0.08) (�0.26)

Liquidity equation K_RWA 0.21 �3.13 �2.70*** �9.35***

(0.16) (�1.10) (�2.87) (�4.32) MKT_POW �0.24* �0.69* �0.14 �0.77*

(�1.64) (�1.78) (�0.82) (�1.82) GDP_GWT 1.21*** 1.48** 1.45*** 2.28***

(4.24) (2.20) (4.79) (3.09) CB �0.75 3.77 0.57 4.37*

(�0.44) (1.00) (0.43) (1.72) IBK1M_CB 1.60*** 3.39*** 1.26*** 3.02***

(4.60) (4.25) (4.04) (4.19)

Total obs. 858 858 858 858

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of European publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a) and (1.b)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0) and (1.b0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)) or the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include cross- section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank- level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

28 Regarding the causal link that goes from bank capital to liquidity creation, our

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sions separately for large and small banks, still separating European and US banks (Table 9).25

In addition, following the subprime crisis, most regulatory authorities emphasize the importance of ‘‘systemically important financial institutions’’. The Federal Reserve qualifies a bank as ‘‘significant’’ if it holds US$50 billion or more in total consolidated assets (FED, 2011).26 Using this criterion, we run regressions sepa- rately for European and US banks on two sub-samples of banks: the very large (i.e., ‘‘significant’’) banks (total assets above US$50 bil- lion) and the other large banks (total assets below US$50 billion and above US$1 billion). Table 10 shows the regression results.27

Regarding European banks, for both large and small banks, banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity (Table 9). However, because the sample of

25 Only the results obtained for the variables of interest are reported in Table 9. Detailed results are available upon request.

26 The term ‘significant is used in the credit exposure reporting provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which apply to bank holding companies and foreign banks that are treated as a bank holding company and that have US$50 billion or more in assets (FED, 2011).

27 Only the results obtained for the variables of interest are reported in Table 10. Detailed results are available upon request.

European banks includes a relatively low number of small banks (i.e., only 37 banks), the results for small European banks might not be as reliable as those for large banks. For large US banks (Table 9), for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios, all the liquidity variables have a significantly negative effect on bank regulatory capital ratios.28 By contrast, for small US banks, the LC and I_NSFR variables are not significant to explain bank regulatory capital ratios. Besides, whereas the coefficient of CFR, a measure of liquidity that fo- cuses more closely on core deposits, is significantly negative for large US banks, it is significantly positive for small US banks with both def- initions of regulatory capital. Thus, small banks increase their regula-

results, which are available upon request, show that this relationship is insignificant for large banks. This finding is consistent with the results of Berger and Bouwman (2009) based on a liquidity creation indicator ignoring off-balance sheet activities. However, they find a positive and significant relationship between capital and liquidity creation for large banks when they consider a liquidity creation measure that includes off-balance sheet activities. In contrast with Berger and Bouwman (2009), we do not find a significant and negative relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation for small banks. Our sample only includes listed banks and ignores a large number of small privately owned banks. The results are therefore not directly comparable but suggest that publicly traded banks which are more closely monitored by market participants behave differently than privately owned ones.

Table 8 Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios for US banks.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Regulatory capital equation LC �0.07*** – – �0.06*** – –

(�3.75) (�3.23) I_NSFR – �0.06*** – – �0.06*** –

(�3.92) (�3.49) CFR – – �0.05*** – – �0.06***

(�3.53) (�3.85) ROE 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02 0.02

(1.71) (1.24) (1.11) (1.87) (1.40) (1.28) LLP_TLO 0.35*** 0.25** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.18 0.28**

(3.13) (2.17) (2.80) (2.49) (1.52) (2.29) MKT_DISC – – – 0.02 0.04 0.06

(0.48) (0.83) (1.35) DIV_PYRT �0.02*** �0.02*** �0.02*** �0.02*** �0.02*** �0.02***

(�4.60) (�4.65) (�4.32) (�4.47) (�4.45) (�4.03) MKT_BK_VAL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001*

(0.85) (1.32) (0.65) (2.23) (2.70) (1.75) LN_TA 0.004* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.004* 0.01*** 0.01***

(1.76) (2.69) (3.14) (1.87) (2.82) (3.16) GDP_GWT 0.03 �0.01 �0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10

(0.12) (�0.03) (�0.22) (0.31) (0.25) (0.46)

Liquidity equation K_RWA 0.54 1.04 1.49* 0.72 1.25** 1.35**

(1.02) (1.45) (1.88) (1.45) (1.88) (1.92) MKT_POW �1.53* �1.19 �1.63 �1.72* -1.66 �2.78

(�1.73) (�0.88) (�0.76) (�1.83) (�1.21) (�1.43) GDP_GWT 2.15*** 1.67 2.46** 2.12*** 1.55 2.34**

(2.64) (1.50) (2.30) (2.54) (1.37) (2.23) CB �21.56 �8.02 �28.80 �22.03 �8.48 �24.52

(�1.16) (�0.32) (�1.00) (�1.18) (�0.34) (�0.86) IBK1M_CB 0.71* 1.38*** 1.11** 0.70* 1.37*** 1.15**

(1.87) (2.66) (2.14) (1.84) (2.64) (2.26)

Total obs. 2786 2786 2781 2786 2786 2781

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

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tory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity, as measured by the CFR variable. These findings suggest that when small banks face higher illiquidity, they increase their regulatory capital ratios, presumably to secure access to external sources of liquidity if necessary.

Regarding our findings for very large banks, our sample in- cludes 20 very large financial institutions and 197 other large banks in the United States (i.e., 3% and 34% of the sample of US banks, respectively) and 56 very large financial institutions and 114 other large banks in Europe (i.e., 27% and 55% of the sample of European, respectively). For both US and European very large banks (Table 10), there is no significant positive link between regulatory capital ratios and illiquidity. However, be- cause the sample includes a relatively low number of very large banks, the results might not be as reliable as those for other large banks. When we consider USand European other large banks, for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios, all the liquidity variables have a significantly negative effect on bank regulatory capital ratios.

On the whole, only small US banks increase their regulatory capital ratios when facing higher illiquidity considering a mea-

sure of bank illiquidity that focuses more closely on core depos- its. These findings suggest that bank managers might be rationally targeting a liquidity ratio different from the one pro- posed by Basel III to adjust their regulatory capital ratios. Pre- sumably, large banking institutions might underestimate liquidity risk because of their too-big-to-fail position. If bank executives believe they can systematically have priority access to liquidity for safety net and systemic risk considerations, such institutions will not adjust their regulatory capital ratios accordingly. However, large institutions might also be managing liquidity differently, with more sophisticated off-balance sheet instruments. Because a detailed breakdown of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases, we solely consider the liquidity profile of banks stemming from their on-balance sheet positions. Therefore, our liquidity measures will either underesti- mate or overestimate a bank’s actual exposure to liquidity risk depending on the extent of its net off-balance sheet commit- ments (i.e., short or long net positions). This could alter our results for large banks because they are generally more involved in off-balance sheet activities, and specifically in sophisticated instru- ments, than small banks. If the actual exposure of large banks to

Table 9 Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios separately for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.01 – – �0.05 – – 0.01 – – 0.001 – –

(0.27) (�0.49) (0.25) (0.03) I_NSFR – �0.02 – – �0.004 – – �0.02 – – 0.01 –

(�1.03) (�0.06) (�1.08) (0.39) Total Obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.09*** – – �0.05 – – �0.05*** – – �0.04 – –

(�4.98) (�0.96) (�2.78) (�0.83) I_NSFR – �0.07*** – – 0.01 – – �0.04*** – – 0.01 –

(�5.50) (0.13) (�2.67) (0.15) CFR – – �0.06*** – – 0.08** – – �0.04*** – – 0.07*

(�4.96) (2.08) (�2.91) (1.86)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table 10 Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios separately for European and US banks considering very large versus other large banks.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Very Large banks Other Large banks Very Large banks Other Large banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC �0.02 – – �0.08* – – �0.02 – – �0.03* – –

(�1.09) (�1.64) (�1.09) (�1.84) I_NSFR – �0.01 – – �0.09** – – �0.01 – – �0.03* –

(�1.44) (�1.92) (�1.29) (�1.64) Total Obs. 265 265 – 404 404 – 265 265 – 404 404 –

Panel B: US banks LC 0.05 – – �0.10*** – – �0.10 – – �0.06*** – –

(0.25) (�5.74) (�0.37) (�3.36) I_NSFR – 0.01 – – �0.08*** – – 0.20 – – �0.05*** –

(0.04) (�5.97) (0.57) (�3.29) CFR – – 0.03 – – �0.08*** – – 0.08 – – �0.05***

(0.93) (�5.65) (1.12) (�3.07)

Total obs. 114 114 114 1075 1075 1070 114 114 114 1075 1075 1070

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank very large if its total assets exceed US$50 billion (FED, 2011). Total assets of the other large banks vary between US$50 billion and US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

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liquidity risk is higher than the one captured through their on-balance sheet operations, the results would still be consistent. However, if their actual exposure is lower because they are using off-balance sheet instruments to hedge part of their

liquidity risk, the results for large banks will merely indicate that such institutions manage their liquidity differently and not necessarily that they are taking advantage of their too-big-to-fail position.

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3309

6. Robustness checks

We perform several robustness checks, still considering European and US banks separately according to their size. We run regressions separately for two groups: large and small banks. Appendix C presents regression results.29

6.1. Including banks with regulatory capital ratios below minimum requirements

We further check the robustness of our results by including the banks with regulatory capital ratios below the minimum require- ments. For European banks, the number of observations remains unchanged for the group of small banks but 13 observations are added for the group of large banks. For US banks, two observations are added for the sub-sample of large banks and four observations for the sub-sample small banks. In all cases, the results are consis- tent with those previously obtained.30

6.2. Considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer

We further investigate the robustness of our results by consid- ering bank regulatory capital buffer instead of bank regulatory cap- ital ratios. We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8%, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008).31 In addition, in Germany, regulatory minimum requirement is set to 12.5% for newly established banks in the first two years of business. However, such banks are not included in the sample of German banks. We perform this robustness check only for Europeans banks considering the Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital ratio. Indeed, as the minimum requirement for this regulatory capital ratio is set to 8% in the United States, considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer or the Tier 1 and 2 risk weighted cap- ital ratio leads to the same results. Similarly, as the minimum requirement for the Tier 1 risk weighted capital ratio is set to 4% in all countries, considering Tier 1 regulatory capital buffer or the Tier 1 risk weighted capital ratio leads to the same results. Regres- sion results considering only European banks are shown in Table C.2. The results are consistent with those previously obtained with the Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital ratio.

6.3. ‘‘True commercial banks’’

Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we also run our estima- tions on a sub-sample limited to ‘‘true commercial banks’’. We impose the following restrictions. We exclude a bank if it is very small (with total assets below US$25 million) and if it has con- sumer loans exceeding 50% of total assets. Berger and Bouwman (2009) also delete a bank if it (1) has no loans outstanding; (2) has zero deposits; (3) has zero or negative equity capital. However, we have no such banks in our sample. Furthermore, they consider two other criteria and delete a bank if it has unused commitments exceeding four times of total assets and if it resembles a thrift (res- idential real estate loans exceeding 50% of total assets). Due to data limitation we do not consider these two additional criteria. For

29 In all the tables, we only report the results obtained for the variables of interest. Detailed results are available upon request.

30 Results are available upon request. 31 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Stability Authority considers two capital

ratios: the trigger ratio and the higher target ratio. The trigger ratio corresponds to the regulatory minimum risk weighted capital ratio. The higher target ratio is set above the trigger ratio, resulting in higher levels of capital required by the regulators for individual banks. Jokipii and Milne (2008) consider a 9% requirement for UK banks. To deal with this issue and following Jokipii and Milne (2008), the regulatory minimum risk weighted capital ratio is set at 9% in this study for UK banks.

European banks, we delete 81 observations for large banks and 38 observations for small banks For US banks, we delete 58 obser- vations for large banks and 161 observations for small banks. In all cases, the main conclusions are consistent with those previously obtained on our full sample of banks (Table C.3).

6.4. Introducing bank size in the liquidity equation

Large banks could create more liquidity than small banks because they have easier access to the lender of last resort and because they would be the first to benefit from the safety net. Therefore a positive relationship could be expected between bank size and illiquidity. As an additional robustness check, we intro- duce a proxy of bank size in the liquidity equation. The natural log- arithm of total assets (LN_TA) is considered as a proxy of bank size. As this variable is highly correlated with our proxy of bank market power (MKT_POW), we perform three robustness checks. First, we orthogonalise our proxy of bank market power with our proxy of bank size. We introduce our proxy of bank size and the residual component of our proxy of bank market power (Table C.4). Second, we orthogonalise our proxy of bank size with our proxy of bank market power. We introduce our proxy of bank market power and the residual component of our proxy of bank size (Table C.5). Third, we include our proxy of bank size in the two equations and we delete our proxy of market power in the liquidity equation (Table C.6). In all cases, our results are consistent with those previously obtained.

6.5. A measure of liquidity creation adjusted for equity

The regression specification is inspired by the theories of bank liquidity creation. These theories argue that banks create liquidity when illiquid assets are transformed into liquid liabilities but not when they are transformed into illiquid claims such as equity. The theories also emphasize that equity might affect a bank’s ability to create liquidity. A potential concern about the regression specification is that current bank equity is included in both the liquidity creation indicator and the regulatory capital ratios. To address this issue, following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we compute an alternative liquidity creation measure by excluding equity LC_EE. This measure does not penalize banks for funding part of their activities with equity capital. As a result, the measured amount of liquidity creation is higher for all banks, and this in- crease is larger for banks holding more capital (Table C.7). On the whole, our main conclusions are consistent with those previously obtained with the LC variable.

6.6. Alternative weights for stable deposits in the inverse of the net stable funding ratio

To determine the robustness of the results for the I_NSFR vari- able, we change the weight of 0.7 for demand and saving deposits. We alternately consider three other weights to determine whether the results can be affected by the extent of deposits considered stable. The first weight, 0.5 (I_NSFR_D05), is the minimum weight set by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision for stable demand and saving deposits. The second, 0.85 (I_NSFR_D085), is the maximum weight set by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision for stable demand and saving deposits. The third, 1, is the extreme case considering all demand and saving deposits as stable. Explicit deposit insurance systems and implicit government guarantee of deposits mitigate the risk of run on deposits and strengthen their stability (I_NSFR_D1). Again, our main conclusions are consistent with those previously obtained with the I_NSFR variable (Table C.8).

3310 I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

6.7. Alternative liquidity proxies

We further examine the robustness of our results by consider- ing other definitions for liquidity proxies. First, we use an alterna- tive specification of the liquidity creation indicator by computing the ratio of illiquid assets to illiquid liabilities (IA_IL) as defined by Berger and Bouwman (2009). Second, we use a liquidity proxy based on the ‘‘liquidity transformation gap’’ (also called LT Gap) as Deep and Schaefer (2004) suggest. The LT Gap is the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets held by a bank, scaled by its total assets. In their work, they deem all the assets and the liabilities that mature within one year liquid. Using this definition of illiquid assets and liabilities of Deep and Schaefer (2004), we compute the ‘‘liquidity transformation ratio’’ (also called ‘‘LT Ratio’’, LTR) as the ratio of illiquid assets (i.e., total loans, long term marketable assets, other assets and net fixed assets) to illiquid liabilities (i.e., time deposits, long term market funding and equi- ty). Finally, we use an alternative specification of the CFR variable based on the ‘‘financing gap’’ of Saunders and Cornett (2006). The ‘‘financing gap’’ is the difference between average loans and core deposits. Using this indicator, the core deposit ratio (CDR) is the ratio of total loans to total core deposits. As for the CFR variable, the core deposit ratio variable is only calculated for US banks, as core deposits can only be identified for US banks (Table C.9). On the whole, the results confirm the conclusions previously obtained.

34 Market debts correspond to short and long term borrowings, and subordinated

6.8. Alternative definitions of small US banks

Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 billion. This definition of small banks conforms in the US to the usual notion of ‘‘community banks’’ that primarily create liquidity by transforming locally generated depos- its into local loans on the balance sheet. However, all the banks considered in our study are listed on a stock exchange. Such insti- tutions are very different and have unequal access to financial mar- kets. Thus, as a robustness check, we consider other criteria to define small US banks.32

First, following FDIC (2012), we consider that while community banks are traditionally defined strictly in terms of their size, a more nuanced model should be chosen depending on the amount of loans and core deposits. Banks with total assets below US$1 billion should not be automatically included if they lack high loan levels and core funding. Thus, we include only banks with total assets be- low US$1 billion that have a ratio of total loans to total assets that exceeds 33% and a ratio of total core deposits to total assets that exceeds 50%33 (see FDIC (2012)). Our results are consistent with those previously obtained (Table C.10). Indeed, both the LC and I_NSFR variables are not significant to explain bank regulatory capital ratios whereas the CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory capital ratios. Besides, the level of significance of the CFR variable is higher and the associated coefficient is twice the one obtained for banks with total assets below US$1 billion.

Second, because our aim is to focus on banks with a restricted access to financial markets, we consider only the ‘‘very small banks’’ which are expected to have the most restricted access to financial markets. Following FDIC (2009), a bank is considered very small if its total assets is lower than US$500 million. Our results are

32 We do not apply these criteria in the European case because listed banks in Europe are on average larger. Thus, there is only 37 European banks in our sample with total assets below US$1 billion. Besides, the notion of ‘‘community bank’’ is specific to the US.

33 These criteria are applied to large banks in FDIC (2012) to broaden the sample of community banks. In our case, we apply these criteria to small banks to ensure that they have a business model corresponding to community banks.

consistent with those previously obtained (Table C.11). We still find that the CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory capital ratios. In addition, the I_NSFR variable has also a significantly positive effect on the regulatory capital ratios.

Third, we consider other criteria to define banks with limited access to financial markets. We only include in our sample of small US banks, banks with total assets below US$ 1 billion which do not issue subordinated debt (null subordinated debt) and whose reli- ance on market funding is relatively low (ratio of market debts34

to total debt lower than the median calculated on the whole sample of US banks (11.7%)) (Table C.12). We still find that the CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory capital ratios. The level of significance of the CFR variable is higher and the associ- ated coefficient is twice the one obtained for banks with total assets below US$1 billion. Besides, the I_NSFR variable has also a signifi- cantly positive effect on the regulatory capital ratios. Thus, small US banks (with total assets below US$1 billion) with a limited reli- ance on financial markets improve their solvency more strongly than other small banks when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords.

7. Concluding remarks

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between bank regulatory capital buffer and liquidity. Building on previous studies indicating that capital and liquidity are presumably jointly determined, we consider a simultaneous equations model to inves- tigate the impact of bank liquidity measured from on- balance sheet positions on regulatory capital buffer beyond the determinants considered in the existing literature. Specifically, we question whether banks maintain or strengthen their regulatory capital buffer when they face lower liquidity because regulatory requirements regarding liquidity have not yet been implemented.

The main results show that banks decrease their regulatory cap- ital when they create more liquidity (i.e., when they fund larger portions of illiquid assets with liquid liabilities) or when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords. Nevertheless, the definition of stable funding might be adjusted in the US case. By using an alternative indicator of liquidity that focuses more clo- sely on core deposits for US banks, the results show that small US banks do actually strengthen their solvency standards when they face higher illiquidity.

These findings support the need to implement minimum liquid- ity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision, but they also cast doubt on the accuracy of the current framework. Adding liquidity ratios to capital ratios might be more relevant for large banking institutions than for small banks. Presumably, large bank- ing institutions might underestimate liquidity risk because of their too-big-to-fail position. However, large institutions might also be managing liquidity differently, with more sophisticated off-bal- ance sheet instruments.

Moreover, the definition and measurement of liquidity must be further clarified under a global regulatory framework. Regulators need to determine what type of liquid liabilities should be consid- ered stable for a deeper regulatory definition of the notion of core

debt. Short-term borrowings include bank overdrafts, short-term debts and borrow- ings, repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos, short-term portion of long- term borrowings, current obligations under capital (finance) leases trust receipts, bills payable, bankers acceptances, and current portion of hire purchase creditors. Long- term borrowings include all interest-bearing financial obligations that are not current, convertible, redeemable, retractable debentures, bonds, loans, mortgage debts, sinking funds, long-term bank overdrafts and capital (finance) lease obligations. They exclude short-term portion of long term debt, pension obligations, deferred tax liabilities and preferred equity.

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3311

or stable deposits. These findings also raise questions regarding the implementation of uniform liquidity requirements to all types of banks if large banking institutions either behave differently be- cause of their too-big-to-fail position or are able to manage their liquidity differently.

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to an anonymous reviewer, Vinod S. Changarath, Robert DeYoung, Joseph J. French, Zuzana Fungaco- va, Caterina Giannetti, Iikka Korhonen, Jean-Pierre Lardy, Laetitia Lepetit, Zhelei Li, Phil Molyneux, Sridhar Sundaram, Clas Wihlborg and delegates at IFABS, Rome, 2011; IBEFA/WEAI, San Diego, 2011; AFSE, Paris, 2011; AFBC, Sydney, 2011; APBRC, Kuala Lumpur, 2012; 51th SWFA, New Orleans, 2012; AFFI,

Table B.1 Correlations among the main explanatory variables in the regulatory capital equation for

LC I_NSFR ROA LLP_TLO MKT_DISC

LC 1 I_NSFR 0.67 1

0.00 ROE 0.08 0.07 1

0.00 0.00 LLP_TLO 0.02 0.02 �0.20 1

0.16 0.10 0.00 MKT_DISC 0.08 0.14 0.11 �0.03 1

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 DIV_PYRT �0.20 �0.06 0.04 �0.03 �0.12

0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 MKT_BK_VAL 0.12 �0.06 0.48 �0.13 0.06

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 LN_TA 0.07 0.28 0.21 0.07 0.10

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GDP_GWT 0.03 �0.02 0.15 �0.18 0.02

0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.10 CAP_REG �0.02 0.00 �0.02 �0.14 �0.05

0.09 0.90 0.26 0.00 0.00

All variables are expressed in percentage, except LN_TA, MKT_BK_VAL and CAP_REG. LC: amount of stable funding; ROE: net income/total equity; LLP_TLO loan loss provisions/tot income �minority interests � preferred dividends); MKT_BK_VAL: market value of asset growth rate of real GDP; CAP_REG: index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. Figures coefficients of correlation equal to 0.

Table A.1 Summary of the balance sheets weighting used to calculate net stable funding ratio as de

Available funding source

Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments Other preferred shares and capital instruments in excess of Tier 2 allowable amount Other liabilities with an effective maturity of 1 year or greater Less stable deposits of retail and small business customers (nonmaturity or residual Less stable deposits of retail and small business customers that are not covered by effe

and foreign currency deposits (nonmaturity or residual maturity < 1 yr) Wholesale funding provided by nonfinancial corporate customers (nonmaturity or re All other liabilities and equity not included above Required funding source Cash Short-term unsecured actively traded instruments (< 1 yr) Securities with exactly offsetting reverse repo Securities with remaining maturity < 1 yr Nonrenewable loans to financials with remaining maturity < 1 yr Debt issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, BIS, IMF, EC, non-central gov Unencumbered nonfinancial senior unsecured corporate bonds (or covered bonds) ra Unencumbered listed equity securities or nonfinancial senior unsecured corporate bo Gold Loans to nonfinancial corporate clients having a maturity < 1 yr Loans to retail clients having a maturity < 1 yr All other assets

Strasbourg, 2012; 3rd World Finance Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 2012; 7th Annual Seminar on Risk, Financial Stability and Banking, Sao Paulo, 2012; FMA Annual Meeting, Atlanta, 2012; AEA Annual Meeting, San Diego, 2013 for constructive comments on earlier versions of the paper. All errors, of course, rest with the authors.

Appendix A. Table A.1.

Appendix B. Tables B.1 and B.2.

US and European listed commercial banks from 2000 to 2006.

DIV_PYRT MKT_BK_VAL LN_TA GDP_GWT CAP_REG

1

0.06 1 0.00 0.22 0.21 1 0.00 0.00 �0.01 0.22 �0.03 1 0.32 0.00 0.07 �0.04 �0.04 �0.15 0.10 1 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00

liquidity creation/total assets; I_NSFR: required amount of stable funding/available al loans; MKT_DISC: subordinated debt/total debt; DIV_PYRT: common dividend/(net s/book value of assets; LN_TA: natural logarithm of total assets; GDP_GWT: annual in italics indicate-values of the T-statistics that test for null hypothesis of Pearson’s

fined in the Basel III accords. Source: BIS (2009)

Availability factor

1 having an effective maturity of one year or greater

maturity < 1 yr) 0.85 ctive deposit insurance, high-value deposits, internet deposits 0.7

sidual maturity < 1 yr) 0.5 0 Required factor 0

ernment, multilateral development banks 0.05 ted at least AA, maturity P 1 yr 0.2 nds (or covered bonds) rated at least A-, maturity P 1 yr 0.5

0.85 1

Table C.1 Including a proxy of market discipline in the capital equation with Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital ratio for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.02 – – �0.04 – –

(0.46) (�0.37) I_NSFR – �0.02 – – 0.02 –

(�0.78) (0.69) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.09*** – – �0.07 – –

(�4.46) (�1.33) I_NSFR – �0.06*** – – �0.01 –

(�4.54) (�0.13) CFR – – �0.05*** – – 0.06*

(�4.17) (1.56)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.2 Considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer for European banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.01 – – �0.05 – –

(0.26) (�0.49) I_NSFR – �0.02 – – �0.004 –

(�1.03) (0.06) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 –

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of European publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The BUFFER variable is the Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer by deleting the negative values of the variable. We define capital buffer as the amount of capital that a bank holds in excess of the minimum required to meet regulatory standards. This variable is computed as the difference between the total risk weighted capital ratio (i.e. the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets) and the regulatory minimum requirements. We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8% for the ratio of Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)) or the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄⁄⁄ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Table B.2 Correlations among the main explanatory variables in the liquidity equation for US and European listed commercial banks from 2000 to 2006.

T12_RWA T1_RWA MKT_POW GDP_GWT CB IBK1M_CB

T12_RWA 1 T1_RWA 0.91 1

0.00 MKT_POW �0.13 �0.22 1

0.00 0.00 GDP_GWT 0.02 0.04 0.03 1

0.14 0.01 0.12 CB �0.06 �0.05 0.07 0.31 1

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 IBK1M_CB �0.02 �0.04 0.16 0.12 0.13 1

0.21 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00

All variables are expressed in percentage. T12_RWA: Tier 1 and 2 capital/total risk weighted assets; T1_RWA: Tier 1 capital/total risk weighted assets; MKT_POW: total assets of bank i in country j/total assets of the banking system in country j; GDP_GWT: annual growth rate of real GDP; CB: central bank policy rate; IBK1M_CB: spread of 1 month interbank rate and central bank policy rate. Figures in italics indicate -values of the T-statistics that test for null hypothesis of Pearson’s coefficients of correlation equal to 0.

3312 I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3313

Appendix C. Tables C.1–C.12.

Table C.3 The case of ‘‘true commercial banks’’ for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.14 – – 0.20 – – 0.14 – – 0.004 – –

(1.18) (1.05) (1.25) (0.03) I_NSFR – �0.03 – – 0.31 – – �0.03 – – 0.16 –

(�0.92) (1.50) (�0.77) (1.44) Total obs. 588 588 – 151 151 – 588 588 – 151 151 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.10*** – – �0.02 – – �0.05** – – �0.01 – –

(�5.11) (�0.41) (�2.30) (�0.25) I_NSFR – �0.07*** – – 0.03 – – �0.03** – – 0.03 –

(�5.54) (0.93) (�2.13) (0.94) CFR – – �0.06*** – – 0.08** – – �0.03*** – – 0.08**

(�5.07) (2.28) (�2.53) (2.17)

Total obs. 1131 1131 1126 1436 1436 1436 1131 1131 1126 1436 1436 1436

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. Consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2009), to ensure that our sample only contains ‘‘true commercial banks’’, we impose the following additional restrictions. We exclude a bank if it is very small (with total assets below US$25 million) and if it has consumer loans exceeding 50% of total assets. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.4 Introducing bank size in the liquidity equation for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.01 – – �0.02 – – 0.02 – – 0.01 – –

(0.25) (�0.17) (0.53) (0.25) I_NSFR – �0.01 – – �0.003 – – �0.01 – – 0.01 –

(�0.45) (�0.04) (�0.34) (0.26) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.10*** – – �0.04 – – �0.06*** – – �0.04 – –

(�5.07) (�0.85) (�2.82) (�0.75) I_NSFR – �0.07*** – – 0.003 – – �0.04*** – – 0.004 –

(�5.43) (0.09) (�2.65) (0.11) CFR – – �0.06*** – – 0.08** – – �0.03*** – – 0.08**

(�4.89) (2.01) (�2.72) (1.89)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We orthogonalize MKT_POW with LN_TA (MKT_POW_O) and we introduce LN_TA as additional explanatory variable in the liquidity equation. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.6 Replacing MKT_POW by LN_TA in the liquidity equation for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC �0.01 – – �0.77** – – �0.01 – – �0.35 – –

(�0.27) (�2.03) (�0.15) (�1.09) I_NSFR – �0.001 – – �0.16 – – 0.003 – – �0.05 –

(�0.03) (�0.87) (0.12) (�0.38) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.10*** – – �0.04 – – �0.05*** – – �0.04 – –

(�5.08) (�0.89) (�2.38) (�0.80) I_NSFR – �0.07*** – – 0.004 – – �0.04*** – – 0.004 –

(�5.45) (0.10) (�2.51) (0.09) CFR – – �0.06*** – – 0.09** – – �0.03*** – – 0.08**

(�4.80) (2.19) (�2.43) (1.92)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.5 Orthogonalising LN_TA with MKT_POW in the liquidity equation for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks LC 0.01 – – �0.02 – – 0.02 – – 0.01 – –

(0.25) (�0.17) (0.53) (0.25) I_NSFR – �0.01 – – �0.003 – – �0.01 – – 0.01 –

(�0.45) (�0.04) (�0.34) (0.26) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks LC �0.10*** – – �0.04 – – �0.06*** – – �0.04 – –

(�5.07) (�0.85) (�2.82) (�0.75) I_NSFR – �0.07*** – – 0.003 – – �0.04*** – – 0.004 –

(�5.43) (0.09) (�2.65) (0.11) CFR – – �0.06*** – – 0.08** – – �0.03*** – – 0.08**

(�4.89) (2.01) (�2.72) (1.89)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for US, we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We orthogonalize LN_TA with MKT_POW and we introduce LN_TA_O as additional explanatory variable in the liquidity equation. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.7 Using a measure of liquidity creation adjusted for equity for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.a 1.a0 1.a0

Panel A: European banks LC_EE 0.002 �0.06 �0.001 �0.01

(0.04) (�0.76) (�0.03) (�0.09) Total obs. 669 189 669 189

3314 I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

Table C.8 Using alternative weights for stable deposits in the inverse of the net stable funding ratio for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks I_NSFR_D05 �0.02 – – �0.002 – – �0.02 – – 0.01 – –

(�1.01) (�0.09) (�1.05) (0.31) I_NSFR_D085 – �0.03 – – 0.004 – – �0.03 – – 0.02 –

(�1.02) (0.09) (�1.06) (0.45) I_NSFR_D1 – – �0.03 – – 0.01 – – �0.03 – – 0.02

(�1.00) (0.13) (�1.03) (0.48) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks I_NSFR_D05 �0.08*** – – �0.01 – – �0.04*** – – �0.002 – –

(�5.47) (�0.20) (�2.76) (�0.05) I_NSFR_D085 – �0.07*** – – 0.01 – – �0.04*** – – 0.01 –

(�5.49) (0.27) (�2.62) (0.23) I_NSFR_D1 – – �0.07*** – – 0.01 – – �0.04*** – – 0.01

(�5.47) (0.38) (�2.58) (0.29)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is an alternative specification of the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) by changing the weight of 0.7 for demand and saving deposits. Three other weights are used: 0.5 (I_NSFR_D05 in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)), 0.85 (I_NSFR_D085 in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)), and 1 (I_NSFR_D1) in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.7 (continued)

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.a 1.a0 1.a0

Panel B: US banks LC_EE �0.08*** 0.01 �0.05*** 0.01

(�5.06) (0.14) (�2.75) (0.23)

Total obs. 1189 1597 1189 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). The liquidity variable is an indicator of liquidity creation calculated by excluding equity (LC_EE). A higher value of this liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.9 Using alternative liquidity proxies for European and US banks according to their size.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

Panel A: European banks IA_IL �0.004 – – �0.01 – – �0.002 – – �0.004 – –

(�0.55) (�0.83) (�0.37) (�0.55) LTR – �0.005 – – �0.001 – – �0.004 – – 0.001 –

(�0.59) (�0.10) (�0.46) (0.26) Total obs. 669 669 – 189 189 – 669 669 – 189 189 –

Panel B: US banks IA_IL �0.10*** – – �0.10*** – – �0.06*** – – �0.09*** – –

(�2.90) (�6.04) (�2.42) (�4.94)

(continued on next page)

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3315

Table C.10 The case of small US ‘‘community banks’’.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

LC �0.01 – – �0.02 – – (�0.13) (�0.43)

I_NSFR – 0.05 – – 0.04 – (1.52) (1.05)

CFR – – 0.17*** – – 0.15***

(3.41) (2.89)

Total obs. 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a US bank as a ‘‘community bank’’ if its total assets are lower than US$1 billion, its ratio of total loans to total assets exceeds 33% and its ratio of total core deposits to total assets exceeds 50%. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross- section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.9 (continued)

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

LTR – 0.14** – – �0.02 – – 0.08 – – �0.01 – (2.07) (�0.79) (1.59) (�0.44)

CDR – – �0.01*** – – 0.05*** – – �0.01*** – – 0.04***

(�4.76) (3.11) (�3.04) (2.63)

Total obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). Alternative definitions of the liquidity variable are used in the regressions. IA_IL is an alternative definition of the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation indicator. It is the ratio of illiquid assets to illiquid liabilities (in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)). LTR is based on the LT gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004) and is the ratio of illiquid assets (i.e., total loans, long-term marketable assets, other assets and net fixed assets) to illiquid liabilities (i.e., time deposits, long-term market funding and equity, in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)). CDR is based on the financing gap of Saunders and Cornett (2006) and is the ratio of total loans to total core deposits (in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

Table C.11 The case of ‘‘very small’’ US banks.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

LC 0.08 – – 0.06 – – (1.53) (1.04)

I_NSFR – 0.12*** – – 0.08* – (3.59) (1.67)

CFR – – 0.10*** – – 0.07**

(3.49) (2.04)

Total obs. 884 884 884 884 884 884

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank very small if its total assets is lower than US$500 million. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. * Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

3316 I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317

Table C.12 The case of small US banks with a restricted access to financial markets.

Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio

1.a 1.b 1.c 1.a0 1.b0 1.c0

LC �0.30*** – – �0.55*** – – (�3.83) (�4.88)

I_NSFR – 0.46*** – – 0.44*** – (4.23) (4.77)

CFR – – 0.14*** – – 0.18***

(2.85) (3.89)

Total obs. 788 788 788 788 788 788

This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of US publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a0), (1.b0) and (1.c0)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a0)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b0)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c0)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include only the small banks with a restricted access to financial markets, i.e., with a null subordinated debt and a ratio of total market debts to total debts lower than the median calculated on the whole sample of US banks (11.7%). We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. ⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ⁄⁄ Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.

I. Distinguin et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3295–3317 3317

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  • Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Related literature
    • 3 Sample and empirical method
      • 3.1 Presentation of the sample
      • 3.2 The model and regression framework
    • 4 Definition of variables
      • 4.1 Regulatory capital ratios
      • 4.2 Measures of liquidity
      • 4.3 Variables affecting regulatory capital buffer and liquidity from previous literature
        • 4.3.1 Regulatory capital equation
        • 4.3.2 Liquidity equation
    • 5 Results
      • 5.1 The relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios
      • 5.2 The impact of liquidity on regulatory capital ratios separately for European and US banks: the importance of core deposits for US banks
      • 5.3 The impact of bank size and access to external funding on the relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios
    • 6 Robustness checks
      • 6.1 Including banks with regulatory capital ratios below minimum requirements
      • 6.2 Considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer
      • 6.3 “True commercial banks”
      • 6.4 Introducing bank size in the liquidity equation
      • 6.5 A measure of liquidity creation adjusted for equity
      • 6.6 Alternative weights for stable deposits in the inverse of the net stable funding ratio
      • 6.7 Alternative liquidity proxies
      • 6.8 Alternative definitions of small US banks
    • 7 Concluding remarks
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A
    • Appendix B
    • Appendix C
    • References

1-s2.0-S0378426613002781-main.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Bank liquidity, the maturity ladder, and regulation

0378-4266/$ - see front matter � 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.008

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 20 5243539; fax: +31 20 5242526. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. de Haan), [email protected] (J.W.

van den End).

Leo de Haan ⇑, Jan Willem van den End De Nederlandsche Bank, Economics and Research Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 17 July 2012 Accepted 5 July 2013 Available online 12 July 2013

JEL classification: G21 G28 G32

Keywords: Banks Liquidity Regulation

We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Cover- age Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquid- ity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1 year.

� 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The crisis that plagues the financial system since 2007 is to some extent a liquidity crisis (Banque de France, 2008), caused by a collapse in confidence in the sustainability of the banks’ high leverage and maturity mismatches. Wholesale funding has almost completely dried up, in particular long-term funding, leading to an increase of the maturity mismatch. Banks responded to this by hoarding high-quality assets as a buffer against the maturity mis- match and rollover risks of short-term interbank borrowing (Ach- arya and Skeie, 2011).

To strengthen banks’ liquidity profiles, Basel III introduces the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The LCR prescribes that banks hold a sufficient level of high-quality assets against the net outflow of liquidity expected in stress conditions during a 30 days period. More specifically, a sufficiently high level of liquid assets should ensure that banks survive an acute stress scenario lasting for 1 month (BCBS, 2009).

Currently, it is foreseen that the LCR proposal will be imple- mented gradually between 2015 and 2019. So far, there is little empirical evidence on how banks have responded or will respond to such a LCR requirement. This raises the question of how the LCR relates to existing national supervisory liquidity rules, if any, and how the LCR relates to banks’ actual liquidity management. The

influence of liquidity regulation on bank behaviour may have wider consequences for the financial sector, financial markets and the real economy. Also from that perspective, insight into the interaction be- tween liquidity regulation and bank behaviour is useful.

This paper contributes to our understanding of how banks will react to the LCR by investigating banks’ actual liquidity management under the quantitative liquidity requirement that has been opera- tional in the Netherlands since 2003, which resembles the Basel III proposal. Under the Dutch liquidity regulation, a bank’s actual liquidity must exceed required liquidity, at horizons of both 1 week and 1 month. Actual liquidity is defined as the stock of liquid assets minus haircuts plus anticipated cash inflows weighted by the degree of liquidity. Required liquidity is defined as the anticipated calls on contingent liquidity lines, anticipated withdrawals of deposits, anticipated drying up of wholesale funding and derivative funding during a period of combined market and idiosyncratic stress. The Dutch liquidity requirement, the so-called Liquidity Balance (LB) rule, conceptually resembles the LCR under Basle III.

We examine banks’ liquidity management under the Dutch LB rule. Our sample contains 62 Dutch banks, taking account of nearly 99% of total assets of the Dutch banking sector, and our sample period is January 2004 to March 2010, after which the Dutch reg- ulatory system was changed.

Our contribution is the first to relate liquid asset holdings by banks to the full maturity ladder of future cash flows. The empiri- cal literature until now has not considered maturity transforma- tion as a determinant of banks’ liquid asset holdings. This seems striking as liquidity transformation, and the liquidity risk resulting

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3931

from it, is the primary reason for banks to hold liquid assets (Good- hart, 2008). To estimate our model, we use unique monthly data on liquid assets and liabilities and scheduled cash flows for maturities ranging from 1 month to beyond 1 year. In addition, we confront the estimated relationship with the relationships implied by Dutch and international liquidity rules, which link required liquid asset holdings to future cash flows for the coming month. Finally, we examine the effects of the crisis and bank characteristics, as well as their interaction, on liquidity management.

The paper is structured as follows. After a short literature re- view, we discuss the liquidity regulation that has been operative since 2003 in the Netherlands and compare the Dutch system with the proposed system under Basel III. Next, we present a model of banks’ liquidity management, according to which banks hold liquid assets as a buffer against maturity mismatch risk. After discussing the data, we estimate this model and subsequently examine how the estimated model relates to both Dutch regulation and regula- tion as proposed under Basel III. Then, we examine whether liquid- ity management was different before and during the crisis. Finally, we test how bank characteristics affect liquidity management, fol- lowed by the conclusion.

2. Literature review

Maturity mismatches are inherent to banks, owing to the trans- formation of liquid liabilities (e.g. deposits) into illiquid assets (e.g. long-term loans). This gives rise to market and funding liquidity risk, as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Market liquidity risk relates to the ability to convert assets into cash at a given price at short notice, while funding liquidity risk refers to the ability to raise cash to fund asset holdings. Rajan and Bird (2003) demon- strate that maturity transformation is inherent to banks and does not depend on implicit safety nets.

Aspachs et al. (2005) analyse the liquidity policy of 57 UK banks over the period 1985Q1 to 2003Q4 and find that the greater the po- tential support from the central bank in case of liquidity crises, the lower the liquidity buffer the banks hold (support is measured as the pseudo-probability of bail-out, based on the Fitch support rat- ing). Their result raises the issue that activation of the lender of last resort (LoLR) function encourages moral hazard. Mink (2011) argues that through facilitating maturity transformation, the lender of last resort gives banks an incentive to lever, diversify, and lower their lending standards. In the recent crisis, many banks, having insuffi- cient liquid assets as first line of defence, have become dependent on LoLR financing. Liquidity regulation aims to address this.

Bonner et al. (2013), using balance sheet data for 7000 banks from 24 OECD countries in 1998–2007, find that the main drivers of the observed variation in liquid reserves are banks’ business model and size, deposit holdings as well as the intensity of disclo- sure requirements.

Liquidity buffers also reduce the probability and severity of sys- temic liquidity stress. They can prevent negative externalities due to asset fire sales, deleveraging, liquidity hoarding and restriction of cred- it, which may arise if banks have liquidity problems. By this, liquidity buffers are complementary to capital buffers, in particular countercy- clical capital buffers as applied in Spain (Saurina, 2009). For that reason the social optimum for bank liquidity buffers usually lies higher than the private optimum (Acharya et al., 2009). However, in an extreme sit- uation characterised by dysfunctional markets and elevated levels of systemic risk, the liquidity requirement can become a binding con- straint that precipitates the undesirable externalities that the regu- lation seeks to mitigate (Van den End and Kruidhof, 2013).

Chadha and Corrado (2012), presenting a DSGE model where banks have an endogenous choice over holdings of liquid assets, show that the presence of incentives to increase liquid assets dur-

ing economic expansions and reduce such holdings during contrac- tions would be beneficial to the economy.

Schertler (2010), using quarterly data for 2000 German banks from 2000-III to 2008-IV, examines banks’ adjustment of securities holdings, loan repayments and long-term lending, respectively, in response to payment obligations in the coming month. She finds that most banks perform ‘asset-side accounting exchanges’ by reducing their new long-term loans when they need more liquid assets. Holl and Schertler’s (2009) model relates (changes in) liquid asset hold- ings of German savings banks to (sight) deposits and other short- term payment obligations, plus a number of controls. Using monthly data from July 2000 to December 2006, they find that German sav- ings banks hold more liquid assets than required by regulation espe- cially when they extend relatively few loans to non-banks.

Murta and Garcia (2010) estimate a model for excess reserve holdings for the aggregate of banks in the euro area, using daily data from April 2004 till December 2008. They use as explanatory variables: the spread (between Euribor and the minimum rate of MRO), the excess reserve holdings of the previous week, and a set of dummy variables capturing end-of-month and end-of-re- serve-maintenance-period effects as well as a crisis dummy. These authors find that precautionary liquidity buffers are motivated by financing costs and they do not find evidence that the crisis af- fected the demand for excess reserves.

It is quite striking that the empirical studies do not consider maturity transformation as a determinant of banks’ liquid asset holdings even though liquidity transformation, and the liquidity risk resulting from it, is the primary reason for banks to hold liquid assets (Goodhart, 2008). Maturity transformation is hard to mea- sure, however. Moreover, data on maturities of banks’ assets and liabilities is scarce. Deep and Schaefer (2004) proxy liquidity trans- formation by the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid as- sets as a percentage of total assets, which they call the liquidity transformation gap. Berger and Bouwman (2009), focusing on the extent to which banks transform illiquid assets into liquid liabili- ties, construct (four) liquidity creation measures, by classifying bank assets and liabilities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid, and weighting these together. Both studies do not use actual maturity data. To the best of our knowledge, the only study employing maturity data is Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), who show the development of the weighted average for the maturity of Italian bank assets and liabilities.

Our contribution is to estimate empirically a model relating li- quid asset holdings by banks to the full maturity ladder of future cash flows, using unique monthly data on maturity buckets ranging from 1 month to beyond 1 year. We confront the estimated empiri- cal relationship with the relationship implied by Dutch and interna- tional liquidity rules. Further, we examine the effects of the crisis and bank characteristics on banks’ liquidity management.

3. Liquidity regulation

3.1. Dutch regulation

In 2003, the Dutch banking regulator introduced a new quanti- tative liquidity supervisory system. According to this regulation, banks should have a so-called Liquidity Balance (LB) greater than or equal to zero at all times. The liquidity balance, LB, is defined as:

LB ¼ Available liquidity� Required liquidity Required liquidity

ð1Þ

where

Available liquidity ¼Weighted stock of liquid assets

þWeighted cash inflow scheduled within the

coming month ð2Þ

3932 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

and

Required liquidity ¼Weighted stock of liquid liabilities

þWeighted cash outflow scheduled within the

coming month ð3Þ

Hence, for the numerator of (1) we can write:

Weighted stock of liquid assets

�Weighted stock of liquid liabilities

þWeighted cash inflow scheduled within the coming month

�Weighted cash outflow scheduled within the coming month

ð4Þ

The adjective ‘weighted’ refers to the fact that the items are weighted according to their liquidity and withdrawal rates. This will be explained below. First, we elucidate the nature of the items themselves. The stock of liquid assets consists of banks’ assets that can be turned into cash on short notice, such as liquid bonds and asset-backed securities. The stock of liquid liabilities consists of banks’ debt that can be called upon immediately, such as demand deposits without a fixed term. Cash inflows are receipts of pay- ments due within 1 month, for example, 1 month reverse repo transactions. Cash outflows scheduled within the coming month are payments that are due within 1 month, for example, 1-month time deposits.

Concerning the weightings applied, the regulator takes into ac- count both market and funding liquidity risks, by applying so- called regulatory weights on assets, liabilities, cash inflows and outflows. Liquid assets and cash inflows are weighted by their liquidity in times of stress. For example, asset-backed securities get a lower weight than high-quality bonds (or, stated differently, get a larger haircut). Thus, the regulator accounts for the risk that in case of financial stress, market liquidity may be so low that cer- tain assets can only be sold immediately at a loss. Liquid liabilities and cash outflows are also weighted to reflect the probability of withdrawal. In this way, the regulator accounts for differences in funding liquidity risk between, for example, retail deposits and wholesale deposits. The weights, dictated by the regulator, have been kept fixed during the sample period. The regulatory weights for all liquid assets, liabilities, and cash flows are given in Appendix A.1 To give some numerical examples: fixed-term savings deposits of households are weighted by a run-off rate of 20% and lower quality corporate bonds get a haircut of 20%. Banks know their liquidity po- sition vis-à-vis the regulatory requirements.

According to (4), LB can be written as a function of liquid assets, liabilities, cash flows and regulatory weights:

LBit ¼ X

j

aj � ASSETijt � X

k

bk � LIABikt þ X

l

cM¼1 l � INFLOWM¼1

ilt

� X

m

dM¼1 m � OUTFLOWM¼1

imt ð5Þ

ASSETijt denotes j liquid asset items and LIABikt k liquid liability items for bank i at time t. Both are stock items without an agreed payment schedule. INFLOWM¼1

ilt denotes l cash inflow items with maturities of 1 month and less and OUTFLOWM¼1

imt m cash outflow items with maturities of 1 month and less (hence, suffix ‘M = 1’). Both are payments scheduled to take place within the coming month. aj; bk; cM¼1

l ; dM¼1 m are the respective regulatory weights,

which are constant over time. The regulator requires the banks to have a liquidity balance

greater than or equal to zero:

LBit P 0 ð6Þ

1 See Van den End and Tabbae (2012) for background information on these weights.

For our purposes, we rewrite the regulatory requirements in terms of the minimum required liquid asset holdings. To achieve this, we combine and rearrange Eqs. (5) and (6) and summarize over all j assets, k liabilities, l cash inflows and m cash outflows, to get the following expression for the minimum required holdings of liquid assets:

AR it ¼ bLB

it Lit þ kLB it IM¼1

it þ lLB it OM¼1

it ð7Þ

where

AR it ¼ X

j

ASSETijt; Lit ¼ X

k

LIABikt; Iit ¼ X

l

INFLOWM¼1 ilt ;

Oit ¼ X

m

OUTFLOWM¼1 imt ;

bLB it ¼

P kbk � LIABiktP

kLIABikt

�P jaj � ASSETijtP

jASSETijt ; kLB

it ¼ P

lc M¼1 l � INFLOWM¼1

iltP l INFLOWM¼1

ilt

,P jaj � ASSETijtP

jASSETijt ;

lLB it ¼

P jd

M¼1 m � OUTFLOWM¼1

imtP mOUTFLOWM¼1

imt

,P jaj � ASSETijtP

jASSETijt

(7) gives the minimum required liquid asset holdings AR it of bank i at

time t, given the size and composition of liquid liabilities, cash in- flows and outflows up to 1 month, and given the regulatory weights. Coefficients bLB

it ; k LB it ;lLB

it are hypothetical, in that they relate liquid liabilities, cash inflows and cash outflows to the stock of li- quid assets under the assumption that banks hold exactly the min- imum required levels of stock liquid assets at all times; no more, no less. In the remainder of this paper we will denote them as ‘regula- tory coefficients’. Note that these regulatory coefficients are ratios of weighted averages of the respective constant regulatory weights aj; bk; cM¼1

l ; dM¼1 m , with the relative shares of the different balance

sheet and cash flow items as weights. As the composition of balance sheet and cash flows may differ between banks and change over time, these regulatory coefficients vary over time t and across banks i as well.

3.2. Basel III

The new Basel III regulation foresees two ratios for monitoring bank liquidity: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Sta- ble Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR is defined as:

LCR ¼ Stock of high-quality liquid assets Netcash outflows scheduled within 1 month

ð8Þ

Using the same notation as for LB, the LCR can be written as:

LCRit ¼ P

jej � ASSETijtP kfk � LIABikt �

P mgM¼1

l � INFLOWM¼1 ilt þ

P mhM¼1

m � OUTFLOWM¼1 imt

ð9Þ

As mentioned in Section 3.1, LIABikt are stock items without an agreed payment schedule, such as demand deposits. By applying anticipated run-off rates fk to such items they are de facto trans- formed into cash outflows. The regulator requires the banks to have an LCR greater than or equal to 1 at all times:

LCRit P 1 ð10Þ

Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) and rearranging, we get the follow- ing expression for the minimum required holdings of liquid assets:

AR it ¼ bLCR

it Lit þ kLCR it IM¼1

it þ lLCR it OM¼1

it ð11Þ

Thus, we now have two regulatory rules, (7) for Dutch regula- tion and (11) for Basel III, which are almost identical except for the coefficients (which are therefore equipped with suffixes ‘LB’ and ‘LCR’, respectively). This is because the regulatory weights

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3933

under the LCR may differ from those under the LB rule. For exam- ple, the composition of the stock of high-quality liquid assets is de- fined more narrowly under the LCR than under the LB (cf. the tables for LB and LCR, respectively, in Appendix A).

The 1 month horizon of the LCR (and the Dutch LB) is too short to cope with a prolonged liquidity crisis. This requires that banks match their maturity profile of assets and liabilities over the matu- rity ladder that goes beyond 1 month. This is taken into account in the NSFR, which establishes a minimum acceptable amount of sta- ble funding based on the liquidity characteristics of a bank’s assets and activities over a 1 year horizon.2 In the remainder of the paper, we focus on LCR and LB.

3.3. Dutch liquidity regulation in the euro area context

The Basel III framework – and its formalisation in European Directives – is a first attempt to create an international harmonised liquidity requirement. The Dutch supervisory liquidity require- ment has been a forerunner. The Dutch regulation dates from 2003, when the then existing system was revised to reflect the internationalization of the banking sector (the scope of the system was broadened to the consolidated group level) and the increased need to analyse short-term cash flows and off-balance-sheet items. The weights in the Dutch regulation that determine the actual and required liquidity of a bank are fixed values and reflect a mix of firm-specific and market wide considerations (DNB, 2003). They are based on best practices and values of haircuts on assets and run-off rates of liabilities typically used by the industry and rating agencies.

Liquidity requirements are intended as self-insurance for banks to liquidity shocks, next to the insurance provided by the interbank market. In the euro area interbank market, bank reserves that are originally provided by the Eurosystem of central banks through main and longer-term refinancing operations are reallocated. Dutch banks in particular have been dependent on this market gi- ven their domestic retail savings gap; in 2008 foreign counterpar- ties accounted for 80% of their interbank borrowing (Liedorp et al., 2010). Since the crisis the euro area interbank market has dried up and liquidity support by the central bank has become more impor- tant. The Eurosystem operates under a common monetary policy framework for regular refinancing operations conducted through open market transactions. Emergency liquidity assistance to illiq- uid but solvent banks is provided by national central banks which have some discretion on the modalities of this financing. While liquidity requirements are set by the supervisor, the central bank has a clear interest that liquidity buffers are a sufficient first line of defence against liquidity shocks to prevent banks to rely on the central bank too early.

4. Stock liquidity, maturity transformation, and the maturity ladder

Maturity transformation is risky, because it implies a maturity mismatch between the assets and the liabilities on the bank’s bal- ance sheet. This is the reason for a bank to hold a buffer stock of liquidity, i.e. high quality assets which can be sold or pledged immediately or at short notice.

In principle, the capacity for maturity transformation is greater when a bank holds a larger stock of liquid assets, since the funding pressure can be met by selling or pledging these assets. As Good- hart (2008, p. 43) states: ‘‘There is a trade-off between stock liquid-

2 For example, see López-Espinosa et al. (2012) whose findings that short-term wholesale funding emerges as the most relevant systemic factor support the Basel Committee’s proposal to introduce a net stable funding ratio.

ity and maturity transformation. What, perhaps, we need is a menu of relationships between stock liquidity and maturity transforma- tion, such as if maturity transformation is measured from 0 (no transformation) to infinite, and stock liquidity is measured as a percentage of assets (. . .)’’.

However, Goodhart (op. cit.) notes that there is an immediate problem: ‘‘this assumes that there is a single accepted scale of measurement, whether cardinal or ordinal, for both maturity transformation and stock liquidity, and this is not so.’’ He mentions that one way to look at maturity transformation is by means of maturity ladders, where one looks at the net cash flow positions of banks over differing horizons. He also sees some problems with this, though. To name one (Goodhart, op. cit.): ‘‘What does one do about retail deposits, demandable on sight but normally the most stable and reliable of all liabilities’’?

Yet, in the real world, banks do link their stock of liquid assets to maturity ladders. According to a survey conducted by the ECB (2002, p. 23–24), ‘‘some banks tie their cash flow limits to their stock of liquid assets, for example by imposing a minimum ratio between the two elements. Volume limits for individual maturity buckets are often interrelated: lower for short-term maturities and higher for long-term maturities.’’ This approach is also one of the several bank liquidity management techniques that are in use as discussed by Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic (2000, p. 167): ‘‘Liquid assets actually held can then be compared to the local currency value of the short-term mismatch in order to assess how much of the latter is in fact covered by a buffer stock of high- quality liquid assets.’’

The bank liquid assets management model of Baltensperger (1980), as expounded by Freixas and Rochet (2008, Section 8.2.1), illustrates the principle of the optimal liquid asset holdings for a bank. In this model, a bank allocates a given amount of deposits L between liquid assets A and illiquid credit C (see Balance sheet I in Fig. 1, panel A). The bank is subject to withdrawal risk of depos- its. The amount of withdrawals at the end of the period is a random variable eO. If deposits partly consist of time deposits with a matu- rity of one period, cash outflow eO may also consist of time deposits not being rolled over.

We can bring credit C to the right hand side of the balance sheet, and denote (L–C) ‘net liabilities’ (Balance sheet II in Fig. 1, panel B). If we assume that loans are scheduled to be repaid at the end of the period, we get the anticipated cash infloweI. Net cash flow is defined as cash inflow minus cash outflow: eZ ¼ eI � eO, which is also random. The bank has an estimated density function of the cash flow f ðeZÞ.

There is a liquidity shortfall if the realization Z of eZ exceeds the beginning-of-period level of liquid assets A. Such a shortfall makes certain costly adjustments necessary for the bank, such as emer- gency borrowing or selling of loans. These costs are assumed to be proportional to the size of the liquidity shortfall rp(Z � A), where rp is the ‘penalty rate’. The penalty rate will presumably also reflect the cost and ease of the liquidity provision from both the central bank and the interbank market.

Then, the expected cost of a liquidity shortfall is R L�C

A rpðZ � AÞ f ðZÞdZ. The rate of return on credit (net of all costs including administration and information costs) rC is assumed to be higher than the interest rate r received on liquid assets. Then, the oppor- tunity cost of holding liquid assets is (rC � r)A.

Differentiating the cost of a liquidity shortfall with respect to li- quid asset holdings A yields �rp

R L�C A f ðZÞdZ < 0. The optimal quan-

tity of liquid asset holdings for a bank will equate the marginal opportunity cost of liquid asset holdings, (rC � r), to their marginal ‘return’, i.e. the marginal reduction of the cost of a liquidity short- fall rp

R L�C A f ðZÞdZ.

This is a general rule that is used widely. For instance, Chadha and Corrado (2012) apply the rule in their macroeconomic DSGE model, where the deviation of reserve requirements from

Fig. 1. Stylized bank balance sheet.

3934 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

steady-state is equal to the ratio of the cost of a liquidity shortfall to the opportunity cost of holding further deposits.

If we assume that loans are scheduled to be repaid at future dates t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t + n, we get a series of anticipated cash in- flows eItþ1;eItþ2; . . . ;eItþn. Against these inflows are outflows resulting from deposit withdrawals eOtþ1; eOtþ2; . . . ; eOtþn. Together these fu- ture incoming and outgoing outflows make a maturity ladder of net cash flows eZtþ1; eZtþ2; . . . ; eZtþn (Balance sheet III in Fig. 1, panel C).

According to Goodhart (2008), banks look at the maturity lad- der of future net cash flows when deciding on the amount of liquid assets to hold in the current period. Hence:

At ¼ f ðeZtþ1; eZtþ2; . . . ; eZtþnÞ ð12Þ

In terms of the liquidity management model presented above, the functional relationship between liquid asset holdings and fu- ture net cash flows f(.) reflects the probabilities and costs of future liquidity shortages relative to the opportunity cost of holding li- quid assets.

Following the above line of reasoning, we postulate the follow- ing benchmark model for the actual liquid asset holdings by banks:

Ait ¼ biLit þ X5

s¼1

dM¼s i ðIM¼s

it � OM¼s it Þ þ ai ð13Þ

where Ait is the stock of liquid assets of bank i at time t, IM¼s it the

scheduled future cash inflow with maturity s, and OM¼s it the sched-

uled future cash outflow with maturity s, for bank i at time t. Hence, ðIM¼s

it � OM¼s it Þ stands for the scheduled future net cash flow with

maturity s. Maturity s in our model has five values for each of the five maturity buckets that are defined in the Dutch liquidity report:

M = 1: 1 month or less M = 2: Between 1 month and 3 months M = 3: Between 3 and 6 months M = 4: Between 6 and 12 months M = 5: Longer than 1 year

For example, ðIM¼1 it � OM¼1

it Þ is the net cash flow scheduled to take place within the coming month. Lit is the stock of liquid lia- bilities (such as demand deposits), the balance sheet item Good- hart (2008) did not know how to deal with. As it is demandable on sight and has no fixed maturity, it cannot be categorized into one of the maturity buckets. bi; d

M¼s i are bank-specific parameters,

incorporating the probabilities and costs of future liquidity short- ages relative to the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets; ai is a bank-specific intercept. Because we expect a bank to be willing to hold more liquid assets the more obligations it has, we assume bi P 0; dM¼s

i 6 0. As liquidity management may differ across banks or bank groups, all parameters have suffix i. Parameters bi; d

M¼s i

reflect the uncertainty with respect to the realization of the scheduled future cash flows. For example, if a bank considers the risk that deposits will be withdrawn and that future net cash outflows will turn out to be greater than anticipated to be rela- tively high, while the cost of liquidity shortages are likely to be substantial, it will probably choose greater values for bi and dM¼s

i (in absolute terms). We also postulate two alternative specifications. In the

first, we split net cash flows up to 1 month (M = 1) into cash in- flows and cash outflows. The reason to do this is that, as we have seen in Section 3, both under Dutch and Basel III liquidity regula- tions, future cash inflows and outflows with maturities within 1 month are treated separately. Hence, we write for the second model:

Ait ¼ biLit þ kiI M¼1 it þ liO

M¼1 it þ

X5

s¼2

dM¼s i ðIM¼s

it � OM¼s it Þ þ ai ð14Þ

where ki 6 0;li P 0. In the third model, we exclude net cash flows with maturities

longer than 1 month and drop the constant ai. In this way, we ob- tain a full analogy with the regulatory specifications (7) and (11), respectively:

Ait ¼ biLit þ kiI M¼1 it þ liO

M¼1 it ð15Þ

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3935

Note that Eq. (15) deals with actual liquid asset holdings, Ait, whereas (7) and (11) are equations for the minimum required liquid asset holdings, AR

it . Hence, the coefficients in (15) do not have suffixes ‘LB’ or ‘LCR’ as they reflect liquidity management, not regulation.

Before we estimate these alternative models, we first discuss the data.

Fig. 2. Stock liquidity and scheduled future cash flows, aggregated over all banks (all series are fractions of total assets).

5. Data

We use monthly consolidated data on liquid assets, liabilities, cash inflows and outflows of Dutch banks over the period January 2004 to March 2010, the last month in which the Dutch regulatory system was left unchanged. This period encompasses both the pre- crisis and the crisis period. Our variables of interest are summa- rized and defined in Appendix B. All balance sheet variables have been scaled by total assets, to remove any trends.

The data source is De Nederlandsche Bank’s (DNB) prudential liquidity report (DNB, 2003). This data source contains end-of- month data on liquid assets, liabilities and cash flows for all Dutch banks (including branches and foreign branches) under supervision, with a detailed breakdown per balance sheet item. These data are unique for two reasons. First, there is information on the maturities of the expected cash inflows and outflows in case there is an under- lying payment schedule. The maturity buckets are as defined in Sec- tion 4: (1) 1 month or less, (2) between 1 month and 3 months, (3) between 3 and 6 months, (4) between 6 and 12 months, and (5) longer than 1 year. Second, there is detailed information on the reg- ulatory weights of all asset, liability and cash flow items.

Not every item is reported by every bank, since some banks do not have exposures in all categories. Also, the data is highly unbal- anced. For that reason, we use data of 62 banks out of a total of 107, for which data is mostly available for the whole sample period. Our sample of 62 banks accounts for 99% of total assets of all banks and consists of four types of banks. First, there is the ‘top-5’ group con- sisting of the five largest Dutch banks: ABN Amro, ING, Fortis, Rabo and SNS.3 These five banks take account of 85% of the Dutch banking sector’s total assets. The second group of 19 ‘other Dutch banks’ comprises a diverse group of medium-sized institutions. The rest of the sample consists of foreign banks: 19 ‘foreign subsidiaries’ form the third group, and 19 ‘foreign branches’ make up the fourth group. Foreign branches can rely on their mother bank for liquidity support and may therefore show very different behaviour. For instance, they may have less need for self-insurance by holding liquid asset buffers, since in stressed markets they can resort to liquidity lines provided by the mother bank (Heijmans, 2012).

Fig. 2 shows, for the aggregate of our sample, liquid assets, lia- bilities and future cash flows. Panel A shows the stocks of liquid as- sets and liabilities. The stock of liquid assets comprises mostly bonds, including asset-backed securities, eligible as collateral at the central bank. The stock of liquid liabilities comprises mostly (retail and wholesale) demand deposits without a fixed term. As it is demandable on sight and has no fixed maturity, it cannot be categorized into one of the maturity buckets. Therefore, we con- sider it to be stock liquidity on the liability side. An option could be to subtract the stock of liquid liabilities from the stock of liquid assets, so that a sort of ‘net stock liquidity position’ is obtained. However, we prefer to consider the stocks of liquidity assets and liabilities separately in our analysis, as this is also done by the reg- ulator who distinguishes between market liquidity and withdrawal risks. Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the cash inflows and cash outflows scheduled for the coming month, as well as their difference: the net cash flows for the coming month. Panel C of Fig. 2 shows the

3 In 2008, Fortis was merged into ABN-Amro and ceased to exist as a separate bank in the Netherlands.

net cash flow positions for maturities longer than 1 month: be- tween 1 and 3 months, 3 and 6 months, 6 and 12 months, and long- er than 1 year, respectively. Net cash flows for maturities until 1 year are mostly negative (however, note that this is for the aggre- gate of our sample of 62 banks), while the maturity bucket beyond 1 year is positive. This asymmetric distribution over short-term and long-term maturity buckets reflects banks’ maturity transfor- mation (funding short-term, lending long-term, implying that repayments, i.e. cash inflows, are received over a longer horizon). Negative mismatches appear to be greatest for maturities until 1 month and between 1 and 3 months.

Fig. 3 shows the Liquidity Balance (LB), aggregated for our sam- ple of Dutch banks. For all banks and bank types, there was a sur- plus during the whole sample period. The surplus of all banks taken together declined from 0.15 in 2004 to 0.06 in 2007 after which it increased until mid-2009, levelling off around the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. The liquidity surplus of the group of other Dutch banks is much higher and more volatile. This also holds for foreign subsidiaries. Foreign branches take a position in the middle (both are subject to the DNB liquidity regulation).

Fig. 4 shows the Dutch regulatory minimum required stock of liquid assets, AR, aggregated for our sample of 62 Dutch banks,

Fig. 3. Liquidity Balance, aggregated by bank type.

Fig. 4. Stock of liquid assets, aggregated over all banks (all series are fractions of total assets).

3936 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

and scaled by total assets. This ratio has been calculated using Eq. (7). We also include actual liquidity holdings into this figure, which is identical to the series depicted in the top panel of Fig. 2. The difference between the minimum required and actual liquidity holdings is also shown in the figure.4 It shows how banks managed to fulfil the regulatory liquidity requirements during the crisis that hit in the fall of 2007. Actual liquidity dropped during the first part of the crisis (August 2007–February 2009), but recov- ered after that. Required liquidity also dropped during the first part of the crisis, but even more quickly than actual liquidity, and more- over stayed at this lower level thereafter. The drop of required liquidity relates to the decline of short-term wholesale and repo funding. As a result, the difference between actual and required liquidity improved during the crisis. The sharp decrease in required stock liquidity was mostly obtained by a cut in wholesale lending and a flight into more liquid assets (De Haan and Van den End, forthcoming).5

Panel A of Table 1 presents the medians and standard deviations of the variables used in models (13)–(15). The median stock of li- quid assets is of similar magnitude for the different bank types: around 0.2–0.3 of total assets. The median stock of liquid liabilities

4 Its shape is similar to but different from that of the liquidity balance as shown in Fig. 3. The difference in shape has two reasons: (1) Scaling: Fig. 3 shows ratios of required liquidity, while Fig. 4 shows ratios of total assets; (2) Regulatory weighting of assets: Fig. 3 is after regulatory weighting, Fig. 4 before regulatory weighting.

5 For the German stock market, Rösch and Kaserer (2013) find evidence also corroborating the flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity hypothesis during times of crisis.

is around 0.4 for all banks except for the group of other Dutch banks (0.3). Standard deviations are relatively large for both liquid assets and liabilities. Median cash inflows and outflows scheduled within the coming month are larger for the top-5 banks than for the ‘other Dutch banks’. Median net cash flows for maturities be- yond 1 month are around zero, except for the maturity beyond 1 year, which is positive especially for the top-5 banks and the cat- egory of ‘other Dutch banks’.

6. Estimation results

In this section we present the estimates of the models pre- sented in Section 4. The empirical specifications of (13) and (14) are obtained by adding time effects st and residuals eit, so that the resulting equations are, respectively:

Ait ¼ bLit þ X5

s¼1

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ þ ai þ st þ eit ð16Þ

Ait ¼ bLit þ kM¼1IM¼1 it þ lM¼1OM¼1

it þ X5

s¼2

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ þ ai þ st þ eit ð17Þ

All variables are scaled by total bank assets, so that they are stationary.6

In Eqs. (16) and (17), all coefficients are assumed to be equal across banks. However, as mentioned in Section 4, liquidity man- agement may differ between banks or bank groups. Therefore, we will proceed in two steps. First, we will estimate the models using the standard assumption of equal coefficients across all banks. Second, we will estimate the models for the different bank groups to be distinguished by bank type and bank characteristics.

Table 2 presents the estimation results for (16) and (17). These models explain the within variation of liquid asset holdings well, according to the within-R2 of around 0.78 and 0.83 for the whole sample. The model fit is better for Dutch banks (especially ‘other Dutch banks’, 0.99) than for foreign banks (especially foreign branches, 0.59). Many coefficients are significant and have the ex- pected signs. The coefficients of liquid liabilities and net cash flows for maturities longer than 1 month turn out to be robust to the inclusion of gross cash inflows and outflows within 1 month (17) instead of net cash flows within 1 month (16). Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we use Eq. (17), because this relates more closely to regulation which also looks at gross cash flows within 1 month.

Overall, the results indicate that banks hold a stock of liquid as- sets as a buffer against the stock of liquid liabilities. When banks have cash inflows in the coming month, they hold fewer liquid as- sets. However, on average, they do not fully reduce their liquid asset holdings when there is an inflow of cash scheduled within the com- ing month. Banks hold more liquid assets if 1-month cash outflows are higher. However, banks look at cash flows further than 1 month ahead. Net cash inflows of several maturities longer than 1 month are significant for various banks types. The top-5 banks seem to manage their stock liquidity with an eye on maturities between 3 and 12 months. Banks in the category of ‘other Dutch banks’ seem to look at maturities between 3 and 6 months and beyond 1 year. For foreign subsidiaries maturities between 1 and 3 and beyond 6 months are significant.7 Hence, only the ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries seem to look further than 1 year ahead. For both bank types the standard deviation of net cash inflows beyond 1 year is relatively high (see Table 1). As these banks face more fluctuating

6 The Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for all panels. Results are available on request.

7 Due to this heterogeneity in bank behavior across different bank types, none of the coefficients for net cash inflows beyond one month are statistically different from zero for the whole sample.

Table 1 Summary statistics.

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Mediana Standard deviation

Mediana Standard deviation

Mediana Standard deviation

Mediana Standard deviation

Mediana Standard deviation

Panel A Stock of liquid 0.249 1.301 0.299 0.145 0.216 2.062 0.258 0.979 0.229 0.529 assets (0.208)*** (0.280) (0.191)** (0.212)*** (0.168)**

Stock of liquid liabilities

0.398 1.534 0.393 0.175 0.295 1.301 0.441 0.992 0.409 2.219

(0.369)*** (0.367) (0.240) (0.430) (0.330)**

Cash inflow 0.167 0.766 0.249 0.146 0.108 1.322 0.240 0.268 0.129 0.273 <1 month (0.148)*** (0.260) (0.086)*** (0.238) (0.133) Cash outflow 0.143 1.120 0.351 0.187 0.065 1.983 0.231 0.251 0.102 0.249 <1 month (0.139) (0.325)*** (0.062) (0.234) (0.096) Net cash inflow 0.000 0.472 �0.061 0.082 0.006 0.822 0.002 0.150 0.000 0.152 <1 month (0.000)** (�0.051)*** (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)***

Net cash inflow 0.006 0.162 �0.035 0.029 0.000 0.171 0.035 0.151 0.010 0.178 1–<3 months (0.005) (�0.050)*** (0.000) (0.050)*** (0.010) Net cash inflow 0.000 0.064 �0.015 0.019 0.000 0.069 0.010 0.071 0.000 0.055 3–<6 months (0.000) (�0.022)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000)***

Net cash inflow 0.000 0.068 �0.010 0.025 0.000 0.071 0.014 0.072 0.000 0.065 6–<12 months (0.000)** (�0.021)*** (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)***

Net cash inflow 0.059 0.205 0.219 0.093 0.126 0.179 0.070 0.280 0.001 0.125 >12 months (0.048)* (0.195)** (0.129) (0.068) (0.002)

Panel B Equity ratio 0.061 0.166 0.032 0.012 0.067 0.204 0.078 0.113 0.032 0.181

(0.060) (0.031) (0.074)*** (0.078) (0.023)*

Z-score 49.438 113.444 118.724 96.136 61.019 164.035 52.032 72.172 20.472 69.870 (37.615)*** (96.060) (44.455)*** (49.394) (12.975)***

Retail deposits 0.000 0.243 0.171 0.093 0.067 0.316 0.002 0.215 0.000 0.148 (0.000) (0.186)*** 0.067) (0.015)** (0.000)

Retail demand deposits

0.000 0.217 0.147 0.084 0.037 0.304 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.138

(0.000) (0.131) (0.041)* (0.000) (0.000) Total number of

obs./banks 4631 62 375 5 1408 19 1425 19 1423 19

(1916) (155) (583) (589) (589)

Note: All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. a Values for the crisis period (from September 2007 onwards) within parentheses.

*** Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 1%. ** Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 5%. * Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 10%.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3937

inflows, they are likely to behave differently. Our findings are consis- tent with a survey finding of ECB (2002), that banks seldom look fur- ther ahead than 1 year for liquidity management purposes,8 which is confirmed by a more recent survey (ECB, 2008).

One might wonder whether the estimation results suffer from an endogeneity problem. The following economic arguments sug- gest that our independent variables are exogenous. The stock of li- quid liabilities consists mostly of retail demand deposits, which are notoriously sluggish and cannot easily be manipulated by the bank in the short run.9 The future cash inflows and outflows scheduled within the coming month are contractually fixed obligations with the bank’s debtors and creditors, respectively, and as such cannot be easily breached by the bank. The same holds for the future net cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month. Hence, our independent vari- ables seem to be exogenous in the bank’s decision process, in con- trast to the dependent variable, the stock of liquid assets, which

8 ECB (2002, p. 24): ‘‘Operational liquidity management typically focuses on periods from one day to between one and three months. (. . .) Strategic liquidity management focuses on periods up to one year (. . .). It is uncommon for banks to look further than one year ahead (. . .).’’

9 As mentioned before, Goodhart (2008) denotes retail deposits as ‘‘the most stable and reliable of all liabilities’’. Retail deposits are relatively stable (Schleifer and Vishny, 2010), also since they are insured by the government (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). Their ‘stickiness’ is also related to switching costs and the transaction services that retail depositors receive from banks (Kim et al., 2003).

consists of the stock of liquid bonds and asset-backed securities that can easily be adjusted by the bank.10

7. How does liquidity management relate to liquidity regulation?

In this section we investigate how banks’ liquidity management relates to bank liquidity regulation, both Dutch and Basel III. We proceed in three steps:

First, we estimate an empirical specification of the regulatory model (15), introduced in Section 4. Unlike models (16) and (17), we do not add fixed bank and time effects because we wish to approximate as closely as possible the regulatory model, lacking such elements. Hence, we specify:

Ait ¼ bLit þ kIM¼1 it þ lOM¼1

it þ eit ð18Þ

The estimation results for (18) are presented in Table 3, under the heading ‘estimated’. These may differ from the corresponding coefficients in Table 2, as model (18) is specified differently from

10 Still, we did a robustness check with respect to the endogeneity problem. We ran an instrumental variables regression, instrumenting the stock of liquid liabilities, the 1-month cash inflow and the 1-month cash outflow by their lagged values plus all other model variables. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates (see Appendix C) remained more or less the same, indicating that the original estimates do not suffer from an endogeneity bias.

Table 2 Estimation results, for equations (16) and (17) (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17)

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.516** 0.436** 0.575*** 0.562*** 0.989*** 0.901*** 0.683*** 0.661*** 0.198*** 0.191***

(0.213) (0.171) (0.115) (0.093) (0.008) (0.083) (0.057) (0.067) (0.032) (0.033) Cash inflow �0.420*** �0.838** �0.912*** 0.128 �0.340*

<1 month (0.157) (0.230) (0.092) (0.481) (0.172) Cash outflow 0.938*** 0.897*** 1.007*** �0.379 0.184 <1 month (0.072) (0.124) (0.008) (0.623) (0.143) Net cash inflow �1.299*** �0.908*** �1.016*** 0.310 �0.199 <1 month (0.143) (0.126) (0.009) (0.606) (0.160) Net cash inflow �0.087 �1.105 �0.163 �0.170 0.255 0.196 �1.876* �1.738* �0.527 �0.408 1–<3 months (0.745) (0.683) (0.201) (0.225) (0.200) (0.196) (1.031) (0.885) (0.343) (0.302) Net cash inflow �0.318 0.167 �0.677** �0.704*** �1.112*** �1.023*** 0.338 0.232 �0.091 �0.114 3–<6 months (0.375) (0.375) (0.187) (0.146) (0.130) (0.137) (0.543) (0.456) (0.112) (0.100) Net cash inflow �0.211 �0.292 �1.048** �1.056** �0.064 �0.054 �0.672** �0.693** �0.135 �0.092 6–<12 months (0.184) (0.180) (0.248) (0.236) (0.123) (0.109) (0.285) (0.292) (0.136) (0.129) Net cash inflow 0.010 �0.137 �0.112 �0.128 �0.623*** �0.602*** �0.312*** �0.288** �0.238 �0.218 >12 months (0.292) (0.190) (0.079) (0.116) (0.067) (0.068) (0.103) (0.116) (0.210) (0.184) R2-within 0.779 0.833 0.830 0.832 0.994 0.994 0.724 0.726 0.590 0.598 Number of obs. 4631 4631 375 375 1408 1408 1425 1425 1423 1423 Number of banks 62 62 5 5 19 19 19 19 19 19

Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses. All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

Table 3 Comparison of estimated coefficients (equation (18)) with means of calculated regulatory coefficients for the Liquidity Balance (LB) and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) – Equations (19) and (20), respectively.

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks

Estimated Eq. (18)

LB Eq. (19)

LCR Eq. (20)

Estimated Eq. (18)

LB Eq. (19)

LCR Eq. (20)

Estimated Eq. (18)

LB Eq. (19)

LCR Eq. (20)

Stock of liquid liabilities

0.633*** 0.236*** 0.904*** 0.477*** 0.316*** 0.471*** 0.871*** 0.236*** 0.604***

(0.071) (0.002) (0.061) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.026) (0.005) (0.035) Cash inflow �0.835*** �0.839*** �2.612*** �0.012 �0.994*** �0.641*** �0.862*** �0.899*** �1.405***

<1 month (0.077) (0.003) (0.285) (0.054) (0.002) (0.013) (0.038) (0.006) (0.117) Cash outflow 1.145*** 0.785*** 3.057*** 0.244*** 0.974*** 0.696*** 1.035*** 0.819*** 1.191***

<1 month (0.027) (0.004) (0.445) (0.037) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.040) Number of obs. 4145 4146 4146 375 375 375 1224 1225 1225 Number of banks 62 62 62 5 5 5 19 19 19

Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Estimated Eq. (18) LB Eq. (19) LCR Eq. (20) Estimated Eq. (18) LB Eq. (19) LCR Eq. (20)

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.851*** 0.196*** 1.241*** 0.316*** 0.296*** 0.980***

(0.077) (0.003) (0.169) (0.055) (0.006) (0.096) Cash inflow �0.902*** �0.831*** �5.246*** �0.225** �0.779*** �1.545***

<1 month (0.088) (0.005) (0.876) (0.105) (0.006) (0.095) Cash outflow 0.757*** 0.749*** 7.046*** 0.435*** 0.734*** 1.104***

<1 month (0.054) (0.006) (1.339) (0.078) (0.007) (0.037) Number of obs. 1375 1375 1375 1171 1171 1171 Number of banks 19 19 19 19 19 19

Note: The estimated coefficients are pooled estimates; robust standard errors within parentheses. LB and LCR coefficients are sample means of coefficients calculated using regulatory weights; standard errors (within parentheses) are the standard deviations of these sample means. *** Denote significance levels of 1%. ** Denote significance levels of 5%. �Denote significance levels of 10%.

3938 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

(16) and (17). Model (18) is an empirical representation of the relationship between the actual stock of liquid assets on the one hand and liquid liabilities and cash flows for the coming month on the other, disregarding cash flows beyond 1 month ahead as does regulation. Models (16) and (17), on the other hand, consider the full range of maturity buckets, both until 1 month and beyond.

Second, we compile ‘regulatory’ coefficients from the regulatory models (7) and (11) introduced in Section 3. We calculate the reg- ulatory coefficients for LB and LCR as follows. Assuming AR

it ¼ Ait , the regulatory coefficients are defined as:

bLB it ¼

Ait � kLB it IM¼1

it � lLB it OM¼1

it

Lit ; kLB

it ¼ Ait � bLB

it Lit � lLB it OM¼1

it

IM¼1 it

;

lLB it ¼

Ait � bLB it Lit � kLB

it IM¼1 it

OM¼1 it

ð19Þ

bLCR it ¼

Ait � kLCR it IM¼1

it � lLCR it OM¼1

it

Lit ; kLCR

it ¼ Ait � bLCR

it Lit � lLCR it OM¼1

it

IM¼1 it

;

lLCR it ¼

Ait � bLCR it Lit � kLCR

it IM¼1 it

OM¼1 it

ð20Þ

Fig. 5. CDS, Euribor spread Dutch banks, and non-standard measures of the ECB (basis points and billions of euros, respectively).

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3939

The sample means of the calculated regulatory coefficients are presented in Table 3 with their standard errors and significance levels, under the headings ‘LB’ and ‘LCR’, respectively.

Third, we compare the estimated coefficients and the calculated regulatory coefficients to gain insight into the way banks’ liquidity management deviates from regulatory minimum standards. To facilitate this comparison, we align the number of observations used in the regressions with the number of observations available for the calculated regulatory coefficients, which is limited due to the occurrence of zero values for the denominators in (19) and (20). This means dropping 10% of the original sample, especially observations in the categories of ‘other Dutch banks’ (13%) and for- eign branches (18%).11

Let us first compare the estimated coefficients with the calcu- lated regulatory coefficients based on LB. The LB coefficient of li- quid liabilities is lower than the estimated one for all banks and all bank types. This means that banks, on average, hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required according to the LB rule, probably for precautionary reasons. This is especially the case for ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries. The pic- ture for the cash flow coefficients is more mixed. The LB coefficient of 1-month cash inflow is quite similar for all banks, ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries. However, in absolute terms, it is greater than its estimated counterpart for the top-5 banks and the foreign branches. The LB coefficient of cash outflows scheduled within 1 month is larger than the estimated counterpart for the top-5 banks and for foreign branches, while it is smaller for ‘other Dutch banks’.

Next, we compare the estimated coefficients with the calculated regulatory coefficients based on LCR. When interpreting these coefficients, three things should be kept in mind. First, as men- tioned in Section 3, the definition of the stock of assets, adopted from the regulatory definitions under LB, is wider than under LCR, since the former includes asset-backed securities, such as RMBS. Second, LCR is not in operation yet. Therefore, the compar- ison with LCR coefficients is hypothetical because banks did not have to meet this rule at the time. The goal of the exercise is to as- sess whether and how actual liquidity management of Dutch banks deviated from the new Basel III liquidity standard. Third, the map- ping of the regulatory weights from LCR on the Dutch regulatory despatches is imperfect. Therefore, the LCR coefficients should be interpreted with caution. We observe that the estimated coeffi- cient of the stock of liquid liabilities is greater than the LCR coeffi- cient for ‘other Dutch banks’. This may be the result of the wider definition of liquid assets in the LB, which recognises asset-backed securities to some extent as liquid assets, while the LCR does not. The estimated and calculated regulatory coefficients are similar in magnitude (around 0.47) for the top-5 banks. For foreign banks, especially foreign branches, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is smaller than the LCR coefficient. Foreign banks are probably less inclined to hold liquid assets, since they usually can count on cash inflows from the parent bank when nec- essary. The LCR coefficients of 1-month cash inflows are larger in absolute terms than their estimated counterparts for all banks and bank types. The same holds for the LCR coefficients of 1-month cash outflows. The magnitudes of the LCR cash flow coefficients for foreign subsidiaries seem out of line, which may be due to the imperfect mapping of LB despatches to LCR rules. For that reason, we abstain from an economic interpretation of these differences.

11 The effect of the smaller sample selection on the estimated coefficients is negligible for ‘other Dutch banks’ but non-negligible for foreign branches. Using the original sample sizes, the coefficients of liquid liabilities, cash inflows and cash outflows were, respectively, 0.858, -0.851 and 1.036 for other Dutch banks and 0.224, -0.049 and 0.352 for foreign branches.

Finally, we compare the calculated regulatory coefficients of the LCR with those of the LB. The LCR coefficient of stock liquid liabil- ities is greater than the LB coefficient. Hence, under the LCR stan- dard, banks have to maintain a greater buffer of liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities. This can be explained by the stricter definition in the LCR of the stock of liquid assets that should cover the expected liquidity outflow. For the top-5 banks, this difference is relatively small, though. The implication for bank lending of the introduction of the LCR is beyond the scope of the present study, which deals with liquidity management and not with credit management. Berben et al. (2010) simulate the poten- tial impact of the LCR on lending by Dutch banks. They assume that banks will substitute loans to some extent for liquid assets, so that lending could fall by around 4% compared with the baseline level.

8. Liquidity management during the crisis

Our sample period can be split into a pre-crisis and a crisis period. The starting date of the crisis is set to August 2007, based on the sud- den rise of CDS and Euribor spreads for Dutch banks in that month (Fig. 5).12 Two months later, in October 2007, the ECB responded to the liquidity crisis with an increase of non-standard liquidity provid- ing measures (notably ‘Long Term Refinancing Operations’).

Table 1 gives median values for the crisis period, showing that the stock of liquid assets and the stock of liabilities were lower in the crisis than before. Cash inflows within 1 month also de- creased significantly during the crisis.

In this section, we examine how the crisis affected banks’ liquidity management in terms of their stock of liquid assets. For this, we re-specify (17) as follows:

Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2LitCt þ kM¼1 1 IM¼1

it þ kM¼1 2 IM¼1

it Ct þ lM¼1 1 OM¼1

it

þ lM¼1 2 OM¼1

it Ct þ X5

s¼2

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ þ cCt þ ai þ st þ eit ð21Þ

where Ct is a dummy variable ‘Crisis’, which has value 1 from Au- gust 2007 to the end of the sample (March 2010) and 0 before.

Table 4 presents the estimation results. Our interest especially concerns the significance and magnitude of the interaction term coefficients, b2; k2;l2.13 For all banks and the top-5 banks the coef- ficient of the stock of liquid liabilities interacted with Crisis, b2, is �0.137 and �0.133, respectively. For foreign branches it is statistically different from zero but small in economic terms (�0.043), while it is not significant for ‘other Dutch banks’ and

12 De Socio (2013) finds that, while credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread during the crisis.

13 Coefficient c is not interesting in itself, for Ct has only been added to facilitate sensible interpretation of the coefficients b2; k2;l2 (Brambor et al., 2006).

Table 4 Estimation results for equation (21), the effect of the crisis (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.493*** 0.654*** 0.910*** 0.653*** 0.223***

(0.177) (0.067) (0.074) (0.077) (0.034) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis �0.137** �0.133*** 0.012 0.181 �0.043***

(0.059) (0.016) (0.040) (0.219) (0.004) Cash inflow �0.475*** �0.904** �0.934*** 0.248 �0.408**

<1 month (0.174) (0.229) (0.089) (0.532) (0.175) Cash inflow �0.077 0.219 0.148 �0.303 0.221*

<1 month x Crisis (0.176) (0.167) (0.110) (0.208) (0.124) Cash outflow 0.947*** 0.956*** 1.016*** �0.447 0.250 <1 month (0.066) (0.118) (0.013) (0.592) (0.156) Cash outflow 0.092 �0.083 �0.093 0.241 �0.043 <1 month x Crisis (0.111) (0.127) (0.076) (0.209) (0.118) Net cash inflow �0.946 �0.255* 0.173 �1.768* �0.467 1–<3 months (0.606) (0.111) (0.148) (0.877) (0.282) Net cash inflow 0.068 �0.661*** �1.009*** 0.197 �0.193*

3–<6 months (0.331) (0.136) (0.113) (0.433) (0.096) Net cash inflow �0.301* �0.834** �0.084 �0.716** �0.124 6–<12 months (0.164) (0.223) (0.084) (0.308) (0.114) Net cash inflow �0.160 �0.130 �0.599*** �0.277** �0.220 >12 months (0.182) (0.094) (0.064) (0.131) (0.156) Crisis 0.233* 0.043 0.159 �0.184 �0.018

(0.133) (0.043) (0.096) (0.136) (0.068) R2 –within 0.843 0.850 0.994 0.727 0.627 Number of obs. 4631 375 1408 1425 1423 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19

Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Crisis is a dummy variable with value 1 in the period August 2007 to end of sample (March 2010) and 0 in the pre-crisis period January 2004 to July 2007. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

Table 5 Factors and factor loadings.

Factor 1: ‘Retail funding’

Factor 2: ‘Capitalization’

Equity ratio �0.126 0.400 Z-score 0.069 0.413 Retail deposits 0.955 0.046 Retail demand deposits 0.955 �0.022 Eigenvalue 1.843 0.333 Cumulative proportion of variance

explained 0.953 1.125

Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Factor loadings have been rotated using orthogonal Varimax. Factor loadings equal to or higher than 0.4 have been printed in bold.

3940 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

foreign affiliates. This means that especially large banks hold less li- quid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities during the crisis than before. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms of cash inflows and outflows with Crisis, k2 and l2, are not significant for most banks, except k2 for foreign branches (but only at the 10% significance level).14

We conclude that the crisis seems to have affected liquidity management of the largest banks, in particular with regard to the stock of liquid liabilities. Banks hold less liquid assets against the stock of liquid liabilities during the crisis than before. This find- ing can be explained as follows. The stock of liquid liabilities con- sists mostly of retail demand deposits. Relative to total assets, their level was stable and even increased somewhat during the crisis (see, for the Netherlands, e.g. De Haan and Van den End, forthcom- ing, and for Europe ECB, 2009).15 This resulted in lower levels of li-

14 We also did the regression including the average CDS premium for the Dutch banking sector instead of the Crisis dummy. The results (available on request) were similar, but less significant.

15 In contrast, liabilities with fixed maturities that are not part of the liability stock, i.e. mostly wholesale debt, were reduced sharply, together with wholesale lending.

quid asset holdings, relative to retail demand deposits. Fig. 2 confirms this interpretation. During the first phase of the crisis (2007–2008), both liquid assets and liquid liabilities decreased, but assets more so than liabilities. In the following phase (2009–2010), both items recovered, but liabilities more than assets. Consequently, the stock of liquid assets decreased relative to the stock of liquid lia- bilities in the crisis.

Another explanation for the fact that banks hold less liquid as- sets during the crisis is that the crisis dummy captures not only a bank liquidity crisis, but also a period in which the ECB provided support through non-standard liquidity measures to alleviate the effects of the crisis. Hence, the coefficients of the crisis dummy not only capture the effects of the crisis but also the effects of the policy response to the crisis, which could have been an incen- tive for banks to hold less liquid buffers. Disentangling both effects would require bank-specific data on spreads and ECB support. Due to lack of such bank-specific data, this is left for future research.

9. Liquidity management and bank characteristics

In this section we examine whether liquidity management de- pends on bank characteristics, other than bank type. To limit the number of variables characterising banks, we apply factor analysis. Factor analysis aims at finding a ‘common factor’, xk, which is an unobservable, hypothetical variable that contributes to the vari- ance of several (at least two) observed variables, yj. The equation of the common factor model is (Mulaik, 1972):

yij ¼ Xq

k¼1

xkjbkj þ eij; ð22Þ

where i denotes the observation. There are q common factors in this equation, which are conveniently assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. bkj is the regression coefficient for predicting observed variable j using the kth common factor. eij are residuals that are

Table 6 Estimation results for equation (24), interaction with retail funding (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.283* 0.506** 0.953*** 0.680*** �0.538 (0.167) (0.124) (0.076) (0.043) (0.543)

Stock of liquid liabilities x Retail funding �0.265* �0.236 �0.063* 0.034 �1.330 (0.145) (0.253) (0.035) (0.160) (1.039)

Cash inflow �0.206 �0.644* �0.976*** 0.105 �0.290 <1 month (0.205) (0.261) (0.083) (0.501) (0.210) Cash inflow 0.259 �0.048 �0.032 0.127 0.261 <1 month x Retail funding (0.227) (0.410) (0.056) (0.173) (0.201) Cash outflow 0.533** 0.764*** 0.991*** �0.349 �0.641 <1 month (0.227) (0.132) (0.047) (0.622) (0.545) Cash outflow �0.669** 0.067 �0.068 �0.034 �1.246 <1 month x Retail funding (0.273) (0.266) (0.070) (0.248) (0.980) Net cash inflow �1.278 �0.185 0.264 �1.747* �0.245 1–<3 months (0.825) (0.103) (0.239) (0.990) (0.271) Net cash inflow 0.083 �0.670** �1.035*** 0.241 �0.165 3–<6 months (0.396) (0.203) (0.129) (0.475) (0.138) Net cash inflow �0.292* �0.676** �0.058 �0.725** 0.053 6–<12 months (0.172) (0.231) (0.161) (0.343) (0.197) Net cash inflow �0.209 �0.271* �0.619*** �0.424*** �0.433 >12 months (0.194) (0.106) (0.084) (0.061) (0.256) Retail funding 0.345*** 0.136 0.059 �0.046 0.568

(0.111) (0.208) (0.051) (0.143) (0.351) R2 –within 0.755 0.764 0.992 0.711 0.606 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19

Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Retail funding is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

Table 7 Estimation results for equation (25), interaction with capitalization (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.561*** 0.556** 0.906*** 0.604*** 0.207**

(0.146) (0.149) (0.029) (0.079) (0.100) Stock of liquid liabilities x Capitalization �0.269** �0.004 �0.248** �0.391*** �0.085

(0.101) (0.115) (0.092) (0.095) (0.052) Cash inflow �0.811*** �0.583*** �0.962*** 0.085 �0.508***

<1 month (0.156) (0.119) (0.039) (0.501) (0.085) Cash inflow 0.562*** �0.488*** 0.344*** 0.715* �0.272 <1 month x Capitalization (0.159) (0.062) (0.100) (0.347) (0.306) Cash outflow 0.969*** 0.741*** 1.048*** �0.202 �0.002 <1 month (0.211) (0.054) (0.021) (0.527) (0.178) Cash outflow �0.018 0.552*** �0.038 0.134 �0.280 <1 month x Capitalization (0.184) (0.107) (0.027) (0.855) (0.224) Net cash inflow �0.705* �0.268* 0.040 �1.603* �0.315 1–<3 months (0.404) (0.106) (0.105) (0.842) (0.215) Net cash inflow �0.195 �0.639*** �0.937*** 0.313 �0.290 3–<6 months (0.242) (0.162) (0.163) (0.477) (0.179) Net cash inflow �0.192 �0.877** �0.041 �0.507** �0.121 6–<12 months (0.130) (0.211) (0.129) (0.213) (0.168) Net cash inflow �0.381*** �0.210 �0.677*** �0.407*** �0.423 >12 months (0.088) (0.139) (0.097) (0.064) (0.253) Capitalization 0.108 �0.089** 0.060 0.080 0.600

(0.090) (0.024) (0.079) (0.140) (0.359) R2 –within 0.831 0.791 0.994 0.719 0.639 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19

Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Capitalization is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3941

uncorrelated both with each other and with the common factors. In matrix notation it reads:

Y ¼ XBþ E: ð23Þ

B is the factor pattern, which lends itself to interpretation of the meanings of the common factors, as will become clear below.

From a larger set of variables we selected four variables (retail deposits, retail demand deposits, equity ratio and Z-score) that are available for all banks in our sample and for the whole sample period. Panel B of Table 1 gives their medians and standard devia- tions. The goal of factor analysis is to cluster variables into factors on the basis of correlations among variables and factors. Variables

Explanatory note: Dotted lines denote 95% confidence bands.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2 Coefficient of liquid liabilities

-1.8

-1.6

-1.4

-1.2

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0 Coefficient of 1-month cash inflow

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 Capitalization

Coefficient of 1-month cash outflow

Fig. 6. Coefficients, by bank capitalization (whole sample).

16 Using sample means for the three interacted right-hand side model variables (liquid liabilities, 1 month cash inflows and outflows), we calculate the liquidity ratio for different values of the equity ratio. The calculations show that when the equity ratio increases by 1 per cent of total assets, the liquidity ratio drops by 0.039 per cent of total assets.

3942 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

that are strongly correlated are formed into a first factor with the condition that this factor is not orthogonal to the second factor, and so on. To improve interpretation of the factor loadings that are obtained from the analysis, an orthogonal rotation is performed to obtain a simple structure so that the rotated factors become uncorrelated. This standard procedure in factor analysis reduces the problem of having too many variables loading on one factor or a variable showing significant loading on more than one factor. An analysis of the ‘eigenvalues’ of the factors and several significance tests help to decide on how many factors to retain. Consequently, applying factor analysis on our four variables, we obtain two ‘com- mon factors’ contributing substantially to the variance of these four variables and having economically interpretable and significant fac- tor loadings. The first factor has high loadings on retail deposits and

retail demand deposits, both scaled by total assets (Table 5). There- fore, we label factor 1 ‘Retail funding’. The second factor has high loadings on the equity ratio and the Z-score, a measure of distance to default. Hence, we label factor 2 ‘Capitalization’.

The conclusion from this factor analysis is that two types of banks can be distinguished: retail funded banks and well capitalized banks. We use this distinction when examining differences in liquid- ity management between bank types. Therefore, we add interaction terms for each of two factor variables, Rit for ‘Retail funding’, and Sit

for ‘Capitalization’, respectively, to model (17). The specification of the two interaction models is as follows:

Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2LitRit þ kM¼1 1 IM¼1

it þ kM¼1 2 IM¼1

it Rit þ lM¼1 1 OM¼1

it

þ lM¼1 2 OM¼1

it Rit þ X5

s¼2

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ þ cRit þ ai þ st þ eit ð24Þ

Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2LitSit þ kM¼1 1 IM¼1

it þ kM¼1 2 IM¼1

it Sit þ lM¼1 1 OM¼1

it

þ lM¼1 2 OM¼1

it Sit þ X5

s¼2

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ þ cSit þ ai þ st þ eit ð25Þ

Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation results for (24) and (25), respectively. The interaction terms with ‘Retail funding’ are not statistically significant at conventional levels (disregarding the puzzling interaction with 1-month cash outflow for the whole sample which is not found in the underlying groups of bank types; Table 6). The interaction with the second factor, ‘Capitalization’, yields more significant results (Table 7). The negative sign of the coefficient of stock liquid liabilities interacted with this factor (for all banks: �0.269) suggests that banks that have more capital keep less liquid assets as a buffer against the stock of liquid liabil- ities. This is found for all bank groups, although for the top-5 and the foreign branches the effect is not significant. On the other hand, better capitalized banks reduce their liquid asset holdings by less against 1-month cash inflows (as implied by the positive sign of the interaction coefficient). Foreign branches and the top-5 banks are an exception again: better capitalized banks reduce their liquid assets by more, instead of less, against 1-month cash inflows (although this is not significant for foreign branches). Finally, the interaction with 1-month cash outflows is only significant and po- sitive for the top-5 banks.

For ease of interpretation, Fig. 6 shows, for the whole sample, the coefficients of liquid liabilities, 1-month cash inflows and 1-month cash outflows by degree of bank capitalization. Moving from left to right on the horizontal axis, i.e. from banks with lower capital towards banks with higher capital, liquid liabilities have a lower positive marginal effect on liquid asset holdings, while 1-month cash inflows have a less negative marginal effect. Capital- ization has no significant influence on the coefficient of the 1-month cash outflows. From this we conclude that banks that have more capital are less inclined to keep liquidity buffers against their liquid liabilities (possibly because better capitalized banks are less vulnerable to demand deposit run-offs), but are less inclined to reduce their buffers when expected inflows increase (possibly indicating more conservative liquidity management). The net effect of capitalization on liquid asset holdings is probably small.16

These results suggest an interaction between capital and liquid- ity buffers. Such an interaction has been recognized in simulation exercises (e.g., MAG, 2010; Barnhill and Schumacher, 2011). There

Table 8 Estimation results for equation (26), interaction with crisis and capitalization (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Stock of liquid liabilities 0.643*** 0.501** 0.929*** 0.542*** 0.258**

(0.072) (0.167) (0.023) (0.076) (0.113) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis �0.299*** 0.007 �0.029 0.214* �0.045

(0.063) (0.176) (0.031) (0.117) (0.070) Stock of liquid liabilities x Capitalization �0.326*** �0.727 �0.181*** �0.298*** �0.118*

(0.046) (0.674) (0.047) (0.086) (0.058) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis x Capitalization 0.214*** 0.849 �0.067 �0.646 0.044

(0.061) (0.742) (0.102) (0.492) (0.052) Cash inflow �0.885*** �0.453** �0.995*** 0.049 �0.630***

<1 month (0.149) (0.177) (0.031) (0.439) (0.163) Cash inflow 0.264** �0.047 0.164* �0.452** 0.235 <1 month x Crisis (0.130) (0.261) (0.091) (0.180) (0.251) Cash inflow 0.617*** 0.184 0.290*** 0.646** �0.320 <1 month x Capitalization (0.152) (0.680) (0.064) (0.247) (0.395) Cash inflow �0.083 �0.478 0.166 0.578 0.201 <1 month x Crisis x Capitalization (0.188) (0.542) (0.142) (0.546) (0.447) Cash outflow 0.990*** 0.686** 1.053*** �0.151 �0.009 <1 month (0.190) (0.125) (0.022) (0.362) (0.249) Cash outflow �0.209 0.040 �0.086 0.227 0.285 <1 month x Crisis (0.131) (0.152) (0.078) (0.182) (0.260) Cash outflow �0.035 0.290 �0.043 �0.289 �0.409 <1 month x Capitalization (0.169) (0.282) (0.027) (0.591) (0.278) Cash outflow 0.303* 0.240 �0.023 0.845 0.321 <1 month x Crisis x Capitalization (0.174) (0.201) (0.137) (0.616) (0.345) Net cash inflow �0.623** �0.282** �0.022 �1.434** �0.337 1–<3 months (0.311) (0.065) (0.065) (0.657) (0.217) Net cash inflow �0.242 �0.561** �0.975*** 0.321 �0.266**

3–<6 months (0.198) (0.148) (0.129) (0.378) (0.107) Net cash inflow �0.215 �0.626* �0.189* �0.502** �0.087 6–<12 months (0.138) (0.113) (0.093) (0.184) (0.161) Net cash inflow �0.388*** �0.210 �0.631*** �0.325*** �0.391 >12 months (0.085) (0.156) (0.089) (0.109) (0.209) Crisis 0.094*** 0.022 0.011 �0.109* �0.144

(0.028) (0.063) (0.014) (0.062) (0.088) Capitalization 0.024 0.174 0.040 0.167 0.708

(0.056) (0.237) (0.052) (0.105) (0.430) Crisis x Capitalization �0.031 �0.354 0.033 �0.013 �0.300

(0.048) (0.249) (0.029) (0.189) (0.247) R2 –within 0.852 0.818 0.995 0.728 0.673 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19

Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Capitalization is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3943

are also studies, initiated by Diamond (1991), suggesting a link be- tween liquidity and solvency. Diamond argues that short-term debt exposes the firm to rollover risk, forcing the firm into liquida- tion even when it is solvent in the long run. Likewise, He and Xiong (2012) argue that short-term debt can lead to a run on the firm and undermine its credit quality, independently of the firm’s solvency position. Gauthier et al. (2010) and Schanz (2011), calibrating a variant of the Morris and Shin (2009) model, also reveal a link be- tween capital and liquidity ratios. Probit models, such as those estimated by Barrell et al. (2009) and Kato et al. (2011), imply some degree of substitutability between capital and liquidity ratios as well.

We finally re-estimate model (17) interacting with both the cri- sis dummy and the indicator of bank capitalization:

Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2LitCt þ b3LitSit þ b4LitCtSit þ kM¼1 1 IM¼1

it þ kM¼1 2 IM¼1

it Ct

þ kM¼1 3 IM¼1

it Sit þ kM¼1 4 IM¼1

it CtSit þ lM¼1 1 OM¼1

it þ lM¼1 2 OM¼1

it Ct

þ lM¼1 3 OM¼1

it Sit þ lM¼1 4 OM¼1

it CtSit þ X5

s¼2

dM¼sðIM¼s it � OM¼s

it Þ

þ c1Ct þ c2Sit þ c3CtSit þ ai þ st þ eit ð26Þ

The estimation results are presented in Table 8. The double interaction terms, with both Crisis and Capitalization, are only statistically significant at conventional levels for the stock of li- quid liabilities for all banks (0.214). For ease of interpretation, Fig. 7 shows, for the whole sample, the coefficients of liquid lia- bilities, 1-month cash inflows and 1-month cash outflows by de- gree of bank capitalization, both before and during the crisis. The picture is similar to Fig. 6: moving from left to right on the hor- izontal axis, i.e. from banks with less capital towards banks with more capital, liquid liabilities have a lower positive marginal ef- fect on liquid asset holdings while 1-month cash inflows have a less negative marginal effect. However, the slopes of these lines differ for the pre-crisis and the crisis period, although only signif- icantly for liquid liabilities. For liquid liabilities, the negative slope is steeper before the crisis than during the crisis. Hence, the negative trade-off between holding liquid assets against lia- bilities and bank capitalization is weaker during the crisis. Possi- bly, the increased volatility of the deposit base in the crisis makes even the more solvent banks more cautious in managing their liquidity. For cash inflows and outflows, the lines are not signifi- cantly different from each other.

Pre-crisis with 95% confidence bands

Crisis with 95% confidence bands

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2 Coefficient of liquid liabilities

-1.8

-1.6

-1.4

-1.2

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4 Coefficient of 1-month cash inflow

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 Capitalization

Coefficient of 1-month cash outflow

Fig. 7. Coefficients, by crisis/pre-crisis period and bank capitalization (whole sample).

3944 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

10. Conclusions

This paper examines liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks, subject to the Dutch liquidity supervisory framework, in operation since 2003. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2010. The Dutch quantitative liquidity requirement, the so-called Liquidity Balance (LB), resembles the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) pro- posed under Basel III.

We find an empirical relationship between the stock of liquid as- sets and maturity transformation, measured by a maturity ladder. Banks keep liquid assets, mostly bonds, as a buffer against both the stock of liquid liabilities without a fixed term (i.e., mostly demand deposits), and against net cash outflows of different

maturities. This relationship is stronger for Dutch banks than for for- eign banks, especially foreign branches. Banks tend to decide how much liquid assets to hold by taking into account their future cash flows, mostly until 1 year ahead. When banks have cash inflows in the coming month, they hold fewer liquid assets. However, on aver- age, they do not fully reduce their liquid asset holdings when there is an inflow of cash within the coming month. This indicates prudent liquidity risk management. Banks hold more liquid assets when the 1-month cash outflows are higher. We find that only smaller Dutch banks (i.e. excluding the top-5) and foreign subsidiaries man- age their liquid assets with an eye on net cash flows beyond 1 year, which is consistent with the earlier survey finding of the ECB (2002) that banks seldom look further ahead than 1 year for liquidity man- agement purposes.

Confronting liquidity management with regulation, we find that banks, on average, hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required according to the Dutch LB rule. This is espe- cially the case for smaller Dutch banks and foreign subsidiaries.

For smaller Dutch banks, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is greater than the LCR coefficient, which may reflect the wider definition of liquid assets in the Dutch liquidity regulation. For the top-5 banks, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is similar in magnitude to the LCR coefficient. For foreign banks, especially foreign branches, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is smaller than the LCR coefficient. Foreign branches are probably less inclined to hold liquid assets as they can usually count on cash inflows from the parent bank.

We find that the crisis period has negatively affected liquid asset holdings against liquid liabilities, especially for the top-5 banks. This reflects the fact that the level of retail demand deposits, which form a major part of the stock of liquid liabilities and which are sluggish, was relatively unaffected during the crisis. Another explanation could be that the extended liquidity support by the central bank might have been an incentive for banks to reduce their liquidity buffers.

Further, we find that more capitalized banks hold less liquid as- sets against their stocks of liquid liabilities. However, this effect of bank capitalization is smaller during the crisis period. These results suggest an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers, espe- cially during non-crisis times, which should be taken into account by regulators.

The liquidity management of banks in relation to the Dutch liquidity requirement, as analysed in this article, provides useful insights into the potential bank behavior under the LCR standard. It may guide regulators in the calibration of the new liquidity rule. First, regulators should be aware that the LCR will likely stimulate banks to hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required. Second, banks base their liquidity holdings on cash flows expected beyond 1 month. This implies that liquidity supervision should also have a longer horizon than just the 1 month horizon of the LCR. And third, the findings underscore that an integrated approach with regard to liquidity and capital regula- tion is advisable, given the interaction between capital and liquid- ity decisions by banks.

Acknowledgements

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not neces- sarily reflect official positions of DNB. We thank an anonymous referee, as well as Paul Baneke, Ryan Banerjee, Clemens Bonner, Ja- kob de Haan, Paul Hilbers, Giulia Iori, Hanne Meihuizen, Steven Ongena, Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski, Stefan Schmitz, Iman van Lelyveld, seminar participants at DNB, participants of the BOK/BIS/ IMF Conference on ‘Macrofinancial Linkages’ (Seoul, 2012) and the BCBS Research Task Force Workshop ‘Bank regulation and liquidity risk in a global financial system’ (Vienna, 2013) for comments and advice. Jack Bekooij and Franka Liedorp kindly provided data.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3945

Appendix A. Dutch LB regulatory weights

GROUP

ASSETS

M

WEEK

MONTH

Banknotes/coins

100

100

Receivables from central banks (including ecb)

1

1

Demand deposits

100

100

1

2

Amounts receivable

M

100

100

1

3

Receivables in respect of

reverse repos

M

100

100

1

4

Receivables in the form of securities or tier 2 eligible assets

M

d*

d*

Collection documents

1

Available on demand

100

100

2

Receivable

M

100

100

Readily marketable debt instruments/ecb eligible assets

Issued by public authorities and central banks

2

1

ECB tier 1 and tier 2 eligible assets

95**

95**

2

2

ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited

85**

85**

2

3

ECB tier 2 eligible assets, not deposited

85

85

2

4

Other readily marketable debt instruments, Zone A

95

95

2

5

Other readily marketable debt instruments, Zone B

70

70

Issued by credit institutions

2

1

ECB tier 1 eligible assets

90**

90**

2

2

ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited

80**

80**

2

3

Other debt instruments qualifying under the CAD (Capital Adequacy Directive)

90

90

2

4

Other liquid debt instruments

70

70

Issued by other institutions

2

1

ECB tier 1 eligible assets

90**

90**

2

2

ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited

80**

80**

2

3

Other debt instruments qualifying under the CAD (Capital Adequacy Directive)

90

90

2

4

Other liquid debt instruments

70

70

Amounts receivable

Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report

3

1

Demand deposits

50

100

3

2

Amounts receivable in respect

of securities transactions

M)

100

100

3

Other amounts receivable

M

100

90

Other credit institutions

3

1

Demand deposits

50

100

3

2

Amounts receivable in respect

of securities transactions

M)

100

100

3

3

Other amounts receivable

M

100

90

Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)

GROUP

ASSETS

M

WEEK

MONTH

Public authorities

3

1

Demand deposits

50

100

3

2

Amounts receivable in respect

of securities transactions

M)

100

100

3

3

Other amounts receivable

M

100

90

Other professional money market players

3

1

Demand deposits

50

100

3

2

Amounts receivable in respect

of securities transactions

M)

100

100

3

3

Other amounts receivable

M

100

90

Other counterparties

1

Demand deposits

0

0

2

Amounts receivable in respect

of securities transactions

M)

100

90

4

3

Other amounts receivable, including premature redemptions

M

50

40

Receivables in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions

Reverse repo transactions (other than with central banks)

5

1

Receivables in respect of bonds

M

100

100

5

2

Receivables in respect of shares

M

100

100

Repo transactions (other than with central banks)

5

1

Receivables in the form of bonds

M

90/d�/��

90/d�/��

5

2

Receivables in the form of shares

M

70

70

Securities lending/borrowing transactions

5

1

Securities stock on account of securities lending/borrrowing transactions

100

100

5

2

Securities receivable on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions

M

100

100

Other securities and gold

6

1

Other liquid shares

70

70

6

2

Unmarketable shares

0

0

2

3

Unmarketable bonds

M

100

100

4

Gold

90

90

Official standby facilities

14

1

Official standby facilities received

100

100

14

Receivables in respect of derivatives

M

***

***

Total

LIABILITIES

Moneys borrowed from central banks

7

1

Overdrafts (payable within one week)

100

100

(continued on next page)

3946 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)

GROUP

ASSETS

M

WEEK

MONTH

7

2

Other amounts owed

M

100

100

Debt instruments issued by the bank itself

8

1

Issued debt securities

M

100

100

8

2

Subordinated liabilities

M

100

100

Deposits and fixed-term loans

Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report

9

1

Amounts owed in respect of securities transactions

M)

100

100

9

2

Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity

M

100

90

Other credit institutions

9

1

Amounts owed in respect of

securities transactions

M)

100

100

9

2

Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity

M

100

90

Other professional money market players

9

1

Amounts owed in respect of securities transactions

M)

100

100

9

2

Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity – plus interest payable

M

100

90

Other counterparties

1

Amounts owed in respect of

securities transactions

M)

100

100

10

2

Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity – plus interest payable

M

50

40

10

3

Fixed-term savings deposits

M

20

20

Liabilities in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions

Repo transactions other than with central banks

11

1

Amounts owed in respect of bonds

M

100

100

11

2

Amounts owed in respect of shares

M

100

100

Reverse repo transactions other than with central banks

11

1

Amounts owed in the form of bonds

M

100

100

11

2

Amounts owed in the form of shares

M

100

100

Securities lending/borrowing transactions

11

1

Negative securities stock on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions

100

100

11

2

Securities to be delivered on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions

M

100

100

Credit balances and other moneys borrowed with an indefinite effective term

Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)

GROUP

ASSETS

M

WEEK

MONTH

Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report

12

1

Current account balances and other demand deposits

50

100

12

Other credit institutions

12

1

Balances on vostro accounts

of banks

50

50

12

2

Other demand deposits

50

100

Other professional money market players

12

1

Demand deposits

50

100

Savings accounts

13

1

Savings accounts without a fixed-term

2.5

10

Other

13

1

Demand deposits and other

liabilities

5

20

13

2

Other amounts due and to be accounted for, including the balance of forward transactions and amounts due in respect of social and provident funds

5

20

Official standby facilities

14

1

Official standby facilities

granted

100

100

Liabilities in respect of derivatives

14

1

Known liabilities in respect of derivatives

M

***

***

14

2

Unknown liabilities in respect of derivatives

***

***

Other contingent liabilities and irrevocable credit facilities

14

1

Unused irrevocable credit facilities, including underwriting of issues

2.5

10

14

2

Bills accepted

M

100

100

14

3

Credit-substitute guarantees

2.5

10

14

4

Non-credit-substitute

guarantees

1.25

5

14

5

Other off-balance-sheet liabilities

1.25

5

Total

The values in columns WEEK and MONTH represent haircuts on assets and run-off rates of liabilities. For the liquidity test for the full month, a distinction is made between non- scheduled items and scheduled items. In contrast to non-scheduled items, sched- uled items are included on the basis of their possible or probable due dates. For the liquidity test for the first week, scheduled items are only included if they are explicitly taken into account in day-to-day liquidity management (treasury oper- ations). In the following table, scheduled items are indicated by the letter M. M = Scheduled item. M)= Settlement due within 1 week or open-ended, including first week or as scheduled. 90/d�/�� = 90% OR: less applicable discount (provided the method is consistently applied). * Less applicable discount. ** Either at stated percentage or at percentages applicable for ecb/escb collateral purposes. *** Calculated amount for the period concerned.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3947

A.1. Basel III LCR regulatory weights

Illustrative template for the liquidity coverage ratio

Item F

actor (to be multiplied against total amount)

T a

otal mount

With factor applied

Stock of high quality liquid assets

Cash 1

00%

Qualifying marketable

securities from sovereigns, central banks, public sector entities, and multi- lateral development banks

1

00%

Qualifying central bank receivables

1

00%

Domestic sovereign or central bank debt in domestic currency

1

00%

In addition, the Committee will gather data on the following instruments to analyse the impact of this standard on the financial sector

Qualifying corporate bonds rated AA or higher

8

0%

Qualifying corporate bonds rated A to AA

6

0%

Qualifying covered bonds rated AA or higher

8

0%

Qualifying covered bonds rated A- to AA-

6

0%

Total value of stock of highly liquid assets Cash outflows

Retail deposits

– Stable deposits M

inimum 7.5%

– Less stable retail

deposits [additional categories to be determined by jurisdiction]

M

inimum 15%

Unsecured wholesale funding

– Stable, small

business customers M

inimum 7.5%

– Less stable, small business customers [additional categories to be determined by jurisdiction]

M

inimum 15%

– Non-financial corporates, no operational relationship

7

5%

Basel III LCR regulatory weights (continued)

Item F

actor (to be multiplied against total amount)

T a

otal mount

With factor applied

– Non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities with operational relationships

2 n o

5% of deposits eeded for perational purposes

– Other legal entity customers and sovereigns, central banks, and PSEs without operational relationships

1

00%

Secured funding

Funding from repo of

illiquid assets and securities lending/ borrowing transactions illiquid assets are lent out

1

00%

Additional requirements

Liabilities related to

derivative collateral calls related to a downgrade of up to 3-notches

1 w c c d

00% of collateral that ould be required to

over the contracts in ase of up to a 3-notch owngrade

Market valuation changes on derivatives transactions

A n [ b

mount should be ationally determined as relevant to specific anks]

Valuation changes on posted noncash or non-high quality sovereign debt collateral securing derivative transactions

2

0%

ABCP, SIVs, Conduits, etc

– Liabilities from

maturing ABCP, SIVs, SPVs, etc

1 a r

00% of maturing mounts and 100% of eturnable assets

Term Asset Backed Securities (including covered bonds)

1 a

00% of maturing mounts

Currently undrawn portion of committed credit and liquidity facilities to

– Retail clients 1

0% of outstanding lines

– Non-financial corporates; credit facilities

1 l

0% of outstanding ines

– Non-financial 1

00% of outstanding

(continued on next page)

3948 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950

Basel III LCR regulatory weights (continued)

Item

Factor (to be multiplied against total amount)

Total amount

With factor applied

corporates; liquidity facilities

lines

– Other legal entity customers

100% of outstanding lines

Other contingent funding liabilities (such as guarantees, letters of credit, revocable credit and liquidity facilities etc.)

Determined by supervisors, specific to needs at certain banks

Planned outflows related to renewal or extension of new loans (retail or wholesale)

100%

Any other cash outflows (including planned derivative payables)

Total cash outflows

Cash Inflows

Amounts receivable

from retail counterparties

100% of planned inflows from performing assets

Amounts receivable from wholesale counterparties

100% of planned inflows from performing wholesale customers

Receivables in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions backed by illiquid assets and securities lending/ borrowing transactions where illiquid assets are borrowed.

100%

Other cash inflows

Total cash inflows

Net cash outflows

(= Total cash outflows minus Total cash inflows)

Liquidity coverage ratio (= Total value of stock of high quality liquid assets/Net cash outflows)

Source: BCBS (2009).

Appendix B. Definition of variables

Variable

Definition

Cash inflow, different maturities

(Claims with fixed maturities + Claims on behalf of security transactions + Retail loans to households and corporates + Secured wholesale loans + Illiquid bonds + Claims on behalf of derivatives)/Total assets

Cash outflow, different maturities

(Liabilities related to refinancing operations to Central Bank due beyond 1 week + Issued securities + Wholesale fixed term deposits + Retail fixed term deposits + Secured wholesale borrowing + Liabilities on behalf of derivatives)/Total assets

Crisis

Dummy variable with value 1 for August 2007 to end of sample (March 2010), and value 0 before August 2007

ECB

ECB non-standard measures, asset puchases (i.e. outstanding amount of Securities Market Program, SMP) + outstandings of Long Term Refinancing operations (LTRO), in millions of euros

Equity ratio

Tier 1 equity/Total assets

Retail deposits

(Retail demand deposits + Retail fixed

term deposits)/Total assets

Retail demand

deposits

Retail demand deposits/Total assets

Retail funding

Unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis, with high factor loadings on Retail deposits/Total assets and Retail demand deposits/ Total assets. See Section 9.

Capitalization

Unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis, with high factor loadings on Tier 1 equity ratio and Z-score. See Section 9.

Stock of liquid assets

(Cash + Claims demandable on short notice + Liquid debt instruments eligible as ECB collateral + Other liquid debt instruments + Securities + Liquid stocks)/Total assets

Stock of liquid liabilities

(Liabilities related to refinancing operations to Central Bank due within 1 week + Wholesale demand deposits + Retail demand deposits + Off balance sheet liabilities)/Total assets

Z-score

Distance to default, measured as (Return on assets + Tier 1 equity ratio)/ Standard deviation of Return on assets over previous 36 months

Appendix C

Table C1.

Table C1 Estimation results for equation (17): comparison of original results from Table 2 with alternative 2SLS results (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).

Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches

Original (Table 2)

2SLS Original (Table 2)

2SLS Original (Table 2)

2SLS Original (Table 2)

2SLS Original (Table 2)

2SLS

Stock of liquid liabilities

0.436** 0.451*** 0.562*** 0.559*** 0.901*** 0.897*** 0.661*** 0.681*** 0.191*** 0.172***

(0.171) (0.007) (0.093) (0.034) (0.083) (0.020) (0.067) (0.042) (0.033) (0.006) Cash inflow �0.420*** �0.510*** �0.838** �0.950*** �0.912*** �0.901*** 0.128 �0.232 �0.340* �0.563***

<1 month (0.157) (0.129) (0.230) (0.099) (0.092) (0.043) (0.481) (0.404) (0.172) (0.169) Cash outflow 0.938*** 0.984*** 0.897*** 0.956*** 1.007*** 0.999*** �0.379 �0.531* 0.184 0.159 <1 month (0.072) (0.087) (0.124) (0.065) (0.008) (0.034) (0.623) (0.320) (0.143) (0.153) Net cash inflow �1.105 �0.989*** �0.170 �0.120 0.196 0.173** �1.738* �1.326*** �0.408 �0.205*

1–<3 months (0.683) (0.152) (0.225) (0.117) (0.196) (0.085) (0.885) (0.283) (0.302) (0.119) Net cash inflow 0.167 0.149 �0.704*** �0.767*** �1.023*** �1.014*** 0.232 �0.007 �0.114 �0.149 3–<6 months (0.375) (0.133) (0.146) (0.161) (0.137) (0.071) (0.456) (0.291) (0.100) (0.129) Net cash inflow -0.292 �0.299*** �1.056** �1.071*** �0.054 �0.054 �0.693** �0.757*** �0.092 �0.028 6–<12 months (0.180) (0.112) (0.236) (0.134) (0.109) (0.062) (0.292) (0.198) (0.129) (0.121) Net cash inflow �0.137 �0.091 �0.128 �0.092* �0.602*** �0.602*** �0.288** �0.360*** �0.218 �0.215**

>12 months (0.190) (0.062) (0.116) (0.048) (0.068) (0.035) (0.116) (0.100) (0.184) (0.086) R2-within 0.833 0.838 0.832 0.829 0.994 0.994 0.726 0.775 0.598 0.572 Number of obs. 4631 4569 375 370 1408 1389 1425 1406 1423 1404 Number of banks 62 62 5 5 19 19 19 19 19 19

Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. In the 2SLS regression, Stock liquid liabilities, Cash inflow < 1 month and Cash outflow < 1 month have been instru- mented, using their lagged values and all model variables as instruments. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.

L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3949

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  • Bank liquidity, the maturity ladder, and regulation
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Literature review
    • 3 Liquidity regulation
      • 3.1 Dutch regulation
      • 3.2 Basel III
      • 3.3 Dutch liquidity regulation in the euro area context
    • 4 Stock liquidity, maturity transformation, and the maturity ladder
    • 5 Data
    • 6 Estimation results
    • 7 How does liquidity management relate to liquidity regulation?
    • 8 Liquidity management during the crisis
    • 9 Liquidity management and bank characteristics
    • 10 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Dutch LB regulatory weights
      • A.1 Basel III LCR regulatory weights
    • Appendix B Definition of variables
    • Appendix C
    • References

1-s2.0-S0378426614001241-main.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.041 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 41 757 67 46. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Dietrich), [email protected] (K. Hess),

[email protected] (G. Wanzenried).

Andreas Dietrich a,⇑, Kurt Hess b, Gabrielle Wanzenried a

a Institute of Financial Services IFZ, Lucerne University of Applied Sciences, Grafenauweg 10, 6304 Zug, Switzerland b Independent Credit View, Zurich, Switzerland

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 15 July 2013 Accepted 27 March 2014 Available online 4 April 2014

JEL classification: G21 G28 G38

Keywords: Banking regulation Financial stability Net stable funding ratio Liquidity ratio Basel III

a b s t r a c t

New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and driv- ers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We find that a majority of banks have historically not fulfilled NSFR minimum requirements, in particular larger and faster grow- ing institutions as well as banks also active in asset management and investment banking. Many of them have started increasing NSFR with the onset of financial crisis 2008 while this ratio had been sliding in earlier years. Interestingly, potential advantages in funding costs for low NSFR banks do not seem to translate into higher profitability and results of these banks are more volatile.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction (2) The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is designed to ‘‘promote

The recent financial crisis has highlighted shortcomings in the funding and liquidity management at financial institutions, which motivated the creation of new liquidity rules under the Basel III regulatory framework for banks. Principles for liquidity risk man- agement had already existed at national levels before the recent financial crisis, but the new Basel III rules published in late 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a) pro- pose a more comprehensive set of global standards measures to address mismatches in both short-term and long-term liquidity.

(1) The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to maintain an adequate level of ‘‘unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted to cash to meet needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon under severe liquidity stress con- ditions specified by supervisors’’ (BCBS, 2010a, p.3). The standard requires that the value of the ratio should be no less than 100%, i.e. the stock of high-quality liquid assets should at least equal total projected net cash outflows.

longer-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity of an insti- tution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon’’ (BCBS, 2010a, p.22). The ratio is defined as a bank’s available stable funding (ASF) divided by its required stable funding (RSF), which is required to be at least 100 per cent.

The new liquidity rules are expected to affect banks in sig- nificant ways. Their implementation is said to lead to more capital- and liquidity-efficient business models and products (Härle et al., 2010). In particular, the rules relating to NSFR will limit a bank’s ability to do maturity transformation, one of the core functions of banks. Accordingly, complying with the new standards might also have an impact on bank performance, such as reduced profitability and a squeeze on lending margins, as well as systemic effects (Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010).

In this paper, we focus on the net stable funding ratio, which aims at a more sustainable funding of medium- and long-term assets, including off-balance-sheet exposures, thereby reducing the extent of balance sheet maturity imbalances. We expect NSFR to have the most tangible impact on banks as it might force them

14 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

to use alternative funding sources, which in turn could provoke major shifts in their business models.

To gauge potential effects of new NSRF rules in future, we look back and analyze what has driven this ratio in the past and how it has affected performance of banks and the banking industry more generally. Specifically, we consider a sample of 921 Western Euro- pean banks over the period from 1996 to 2010 and study (1) how NSFR has developed over time, (2) which bank-specific, respec- tively outside factors have driven the level of NSFR and, finally, (3) whether and how NSFR has affected banking industry perfor- mance in a broad sense including financial as well as macroeco- nomic outcomes. In summary, it is the purpose of this research to explore potential impacts of the prescribed funding structures under Basel III on the performance of the banking industry in Wes- tern Europe.

We are able to conduct this analysis for NSFR because this ratio can quite reliably be estimated based on historical financial infor- mation published by the above banks, as has been done by other researchers such as Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010). A corre- sponding analysis of LCR does not seem feasible since an estima- tion of this ratio would require detailed information on composition and duration of liquid assets and 30-day liabilities, which would not normally be found in standard bank financial statements.

Given the recent creation of the new liquidity standard, there exist so far just a few mostly descriptive studies on this issue, but no research has, to our knowledge, investigated which specific factors have driven NSFR in the past and in what way NSFR would potentially influence bank and banking system performance. Hence, this paper explores at least four novel aspects:

(1) It is the first research to compile a simulation of historical NSFRs for a large sample of banks over an extended time per- iod including the recent financial crisis. It will thus be better suited to explore the dynamics and the determinants of NSFR.

(2) It is based on a sample of Western European banks which are expected to be more strongly impacted by the Basel III liquid- ity requirements than banking institutions elsewhere, in par- ticular in the US (Härle et al., 2010; Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu, 2010, p.19). This is, among other reasons, because the US banking industry has less proportional weight in its national financial system than European banks and US banking has been subject to liquidity rules for some time.

(3) Our NSFR analyses do not only focus on a few very large banks as in the IMF study of Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010), respectively a set of 15 ‘‘representative’’ banks con- structed from balance sheet data of banks in total of 15 countries (King, 2013). Accounting also for small and med- ium-sized banks helps us better understand the impact of the new liquidity rules on commercial banking more generally.

(4) We use a regression framework in which we analyze the effects of the new liquidity rules on bank performance. We apply the GMM methodology, which also accounts for potential endogeneity problems in our model specifications. Some of the existing studies on that topic have used dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models (e.g. Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010; BCBS, 2010b).1

1 According to Lucas (1976), one of the problems with the dynamic general stochastic equilibrium approach is that these models are very complex and depend on a large set of assumptions, which in turn are based on past correlations between macroeconomic variables. Therefore, the results of the models and their predictions in particular then directly depend on these assumptions. This might no longer be valid due to the introduction of new policies and/or other unforeseen market events.

The main results of our paper are as follows. Overall, the aver- age NSFR amounts to about 97%, but 60% of the banks in our sam- ple do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirement and have an NSFR value below 100%. We find that NSFR generally deterio- rated before the crisis for larger banks and to a lesser extent for medium-sized banks. On the other hand, the group of smallest banks in our sample has significantly improved NSFR since the start of the crisis and had an average NSFR of more than 110%. Finally, there exist significant differences between banks with NSFR P 100% and the ones with NSFR < 100% with respect to bank- and market-specific characteristics considered in our models.

In our regressions we find, among other interesting results, that safer banks, i.e., those with higher capital ratios, do also have a stronger structural liquidity. By contrast, banks with more rapid past growth have lower NSFRs. As expected, the business model does also have a significant impact on NSFR. In particular, tradi- tional banks focusing on the lending / deposit taking business have a higher NSFR than financial institutions with a high proportion of non-interest income, e.g. from asset management or investment banking activities.

As to the impact of NSFR on bank performance, we provide empirical evidence that NSFR does not have any statistically signif- icant influence on individual bank profitability as measured by returns on assets and equity or net interest margin. This result con- trasts with some studies, which expect a negative impact on bank performance (e.g. Härle et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2012). At the same time, low NSFR banks show more volatile results, which would support the case for introducing the new liquidity standards in order to make the banking system more resilient.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on the new liquidity regulations, followed by a description of our data in Section 3. Methodology and model specifications are in Sections 4 and 5 includes our results. We pro- vide a summary and conclusions in Section 6.

2. Related literature

Funding risks in banking as they became apparent with the start of the 2007–2008 financial crisis are no new phenomenon and banks have endured periodic liquidity crises all through history. As documented by Bordo (2008), they are part of a perennial pat- tern regardless of how much individual bank and systemic risk control systems have progressed over time. The root cause seems to lie deep in the banks’ core ‘‘transformation’’ service described by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Due the banks’ role as liquidity providers (Kashyap et al., 2002), most of their funds are tradition- ally associated with comparably short-term deposits from third parties. Such liquid claims allow depositors to intertemporally optimize their consumption preferences, but leave banks exposed to the risk of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).

There is indeed ample empirical evidence that not just high leverage but also the reliance of banks on unsustainable funding structures to finance the expansion of their balance sheets are a key factor in the buildup of systemic risks and the propagation mechanism. Berger and Bouwman (2008, 2009) point to periods of abnormal liquidity creation that have preceded banking crises in the US. For the recent crisis, it was similarly found that the higher the banks’ reliance on non-deposit wholesale funding, the weaker the performance of their stock (Raddatz, 2010), the lower their return on assets (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009) and, very importantly, banks with weaker structural liquidity in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail subsequently (Bologna, 2011; Vazquez and Federico, 2012).

Basel III liquidity regulations (BCBS, 2010a) represent another attempt to rein in the risks of such sudden funding crises. Starting

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 15

with the comprehensive work of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), a strand of research to study potential effects of the new Basel III rules has emerged, mostly however dealing with the impact of capital and leverage regulations. The following liter- ature review thus focuses on the relatively fewer pieces of analysis, many of them authored by policy making bodies and industry con- sultants, which have explored specific effects of the new global minimum liquidity standards.

The impact on lending spreads is an initial aspect discussed by researchers as both low-yielding liquidity and longer-term funding would be costly to banks. It is generally agreed that they will decrease (Härle et al., 2010; King, 2013), at least as a transitory effect (Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010). King (2013), who explores the most cost efficient strategies to meet the new NSFR rule for sample of 15 synthetic banks representing 15 coun- tries, finds a potential reduction of net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, which, for perspective, represents about 40% of the 2009 average margin of these banks. More specific esti- mates are in the McKinsey study of Härle et al. (2010, p. 9) who project higher funding and liquidity costs for loans of up to 40 basis points but additional cost of up to 90 basis points for the funding of off-balance sheet lending products and the fixed income trading book.

One obvious effect of depressed lending margins would be pres- sure on banks’ return on equity which Härle et al. (2010) expect to decline by an average 4% in Europe, respectively 3% in the United States. Whilst the authors attribute most of this decrease to new capital and leverage rules, they foresee a 0.9% decline of returns solely due to new liquidity and funding standards. The results of Bordeleau and Graham (2010), based on a 1997–2009 sample of US and Canadian banks, suggest that profitability is improved for banks that hold some liquid assets, however, there is a point at which holding further liquid assets diminishes a bank’s profitabil- ity. There thus seems to be a tradeoff between short-term profit- ability gains of lower liquidity holdings and longer-term performance benefits of insurance against liquidity shocks. More- over, the authors note that this relationship seems to vary depend- ing on a bank’s business model and the state of the economy.

The aspect of business models, respectively how banks would potentially adapt their strategies to the new regime, has in fact been another focus of researchers. According to Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010), many financial institutions will be forced into such adaptions as they are still well below required NSFR lev- els. Härle et al. (2010) together with many other researchers see the biggest impact on banks with substantial capital markets and trading businesses. To meet the new NSFR target, they will have to increase their base of stable funding, via optimized deposit gath- ering, secured funding instruments and stronger investor coverage to help them place long-term unsecured issuances. A fundamental shift in strategy is also foreseen by Allen et al. (2012) based on their analysis of the UK banking market. They contend that Basel III will compel banks to revert towards the kind of liability-driven asset management that characterized banking in the 1960s, before global financial de-regulation. This strategy could in turn lead a limited availability of credit and thus reduce economic activity.

Margin pressures for banks and expected shifts in their strate- gies are thus thought to have systemic effects mainly through a negative impact on economic growth when lending to the produc- tive sector becomes scarcer. Researchers in fact generally foresee a negative impact on economic output which Angelini et al. (2011) estimate at 0.08% loss for each percentage point increase in NSFR. These negative effects are considered transitory, however, and the authors of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010) reason that as banks become less risky, both the cost and quantity of credit should recover, reversing the initial negative impact on con- sumption and investment. Gambacorta (2011), who estimates

long-run relationship among a set of US macro-variables from 1994 to 2008, likewise shows that tighter capital and liquidity requirements have negative (but rather limited) effects on the level of long-run steady-state output. Studies of BCBS (2010b) and Yan et al. (2011), finally, argue that new regulations will lower proba- bility and severity of future banking crises and associated losses of economic output. On balance, they thus foresee a significant net positive long-term effect on economic activity.

Overall, effects of Basel III funding standards remain a relatively scarcely researched topic and this paper thus attempts to help clos- ing this gap. Most authors appear to focus their attention on capital and leverage rules as it is clear that capitalization determines a bank’s resilience in the long-run. By contrast, our research is moti- vated by the fact that unsustainable funding structures during the recent crisis have proven a more immediate threat to the survival of even well capitalized financial institutions.

3. Data

This section presents the data employed in this research includ- ing a description of (1) sources, (2) methodologies to derive the NSFR data series for the subsequent empirical analysis as well as (3) data filters and sample selection criteria applied. It concludes with bank level data summary statistics and illustrations of selected characteristics of the data analyzed.

To conduct this study, we use data for the bank-specific charac- teristics and the ownership structure from the Fitch-IBCA Bank- scope (BSC) database, which provides annual financial information for banks in 179 countries around the world. Coverage by the Bankscope database is comprehensive in most countries, with the banks included accounting for roughly 90% of the assets of all banks. Macroeconomic factors are taken from various sources including IMF World Economic Outlook, the World Bank and OECD.

The key factor explored in this study is NSFR, which we have introduced in Section 1. This ratio has been defined quite recently (see BCBS, 2010a, p. 25–31) and we thus need raw balance sheet and off-balance sheet data to reproduce NSFR time series for the past. Unfortunately, some data elements required for a precise cal- culation of NSFR have not been reported historically. An example would be a breakdown of customer deposits into a stable and less stable component. However, a good approximation of NSFR seems feasible. Our approach is inspired by Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010, Annex 2, p.37), who derive their NSFR time series in a com- parable way.

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a ratio of available to required stable funding (BCBS, 2010a, p. 25–31). The available sta- ble funding (ASF) is a weighted sum of funding sources according to their stability features. Similarly, the required stable funding (RSF) is a weighted sum of uses of funding sources according to their liquidity. To calculate the required amount of stable funding, specific RSF factors are applied to balance sheet assets and off bal- ance sheet activity. The RSF factor represents the proportion of the exposure that should be backed by stable funding: the more liquid the asset, the lower the RSF factor. Table 1 provides a summary of ASF and RSF factors as applied in this research. It represents a sim- plified version of BCBS (2010a) rules and is, in line with the method applied in Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010, Annex 2, p.37), guided by general availability of past bank financial data.

Our initial raw data sample includes financial data of 8619 Wes- tern European banks for the period from 1996 to 2010. For our econometric analyses, we subsequently narrow it down to achieve a more homogeneous sample of 921 banks from seven Western European countries including Germany, France, Switzerland, Aus- tria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The main motivation for narrowing the sample is twofold. For one, there is good data quality for banks in these markets

Table 1 Funding factors used for calculation of NSFR. Source: Bankscope data item structure.

Available stable funding (ASF) ASF factors (%)

Equity Total equity 100 Pref. shares and hybrid capital accounted for as debt

100

Pref. shares and hybrid capital accounted for as equity

100

Non-controlling interest (minorities)a �100

Liabilities Total customer deposits 90 Deposits from banks 0 Repos and cash collateral 50 Other deposits and short-term borrowings 0 Total long term funding 60 Reserves for pensions and other 100 All other liabilities and equity 0

Required stable funding (RSF) Data item RSF factors

(%) Loans Residential mortgage loans 65

Other mortgage loans 65 Other consumer/retail loans 85 Corporate and commercial loans 85 Other loans 100

Other Loans and advances to banks 0 Total securities 40 Investments in property 100 Insurance assets 100 Other earning assets 100 Cash and due from banks 0 All other non-earning assets 100

Off-balance sheet

Guarantees 5

Acceptances and documentary credits reported off-balance sheet

5

Committed credit lines 5 Other contingent liabilities 5

a Minus factor to eliminate ASF related to non-controlling interests, which were added as component of total equity.

16 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

throughout the sample period. This includes contiguous series of observations, which are crucial for the exploration of dynamic effects. In particular, disclosure of banks in some of the countries

Table 2 Bank selection and NSFR data filer criteria.

Filter criteria

Bank level criteria Bank specializations Only institutions from Bankscope specializati

Bank, Real Estate & Mortgage Bank, Savings B

Countries Only institutions from Germany, France, Swit

Size Total assets (most recent number reported) e OR the institution is among the top 10 in terms

Balance sheet structure On average, at least 30% of assets must be cate

NSFR data criteria Minimum and maximum NSFR NSFR must exceed 25% but must not exceed

(1) peculiar balance sheet structures and/o (2) potential data quality problems in the B

Contiguity of observations There must be at least 6 contiguous annual NS study of lead and lag effects from explanator

Continuity of balance sheet structure NSFR values for a certain institution must exh exceed 20% This is to exclude institutions with

(1) reporting discontinuities and/or (2) effects from merger and acquisition act

The table lists the detailed data filters applied to extract a panel of 921 European banki

does not allow a consistent retrospective calculation of NSFR over the whole sample period. Likewise important, the countries stud- ied here are comparable in terms of banking tradition and culture, the economy and geography as well as the political and regulatory environment. There should thus be less need for system- and coun- try-specific control parameters in our analysis framework. Quite clearly, the constricted sample will not allow us to draw definite conclusions for the whole of Europe or even the global banking sys- tem. It nevertheless allows us explore our research questions for a substantial and in many respects representative swathe of the European financial market.

Further filter criteria applied include size limits, asset structure criteria (lending business of institution must be material) as well as only selected activity specializations as defined by Bankscope. The latter criterion is meant to exclude specialized financial insti- tutions such as investment banks, security firms or finance compa- nies. Once banks are chosen, we apply additional criteria to ensure NSFR data derive as described above (1) are available with a certain consistency and (2) satisfy minimal data quality standards. As a reference, all of the above data filter criteria are shown in Table 2 in the appendix.

The graphs below illustrate some salient properties of banks analyzed in this paper. While most observations are from banks with total assets below USD 5 billion, the group of very large banks with assets above USD 200 billion contribute by far the bulk of combined assets, particularly in the second half of the sample per- iod (see Fig. 1).

In terms of countries, with 73.4% of the number of observations, German financial institutions dominate the sample, which is a reflection of the fragmented nature of this banking market. Aver- age USD assets of German banks represented a mere USD 11 bil- lion, whereas French banks had average assets of USD 62 billion. Even larger are Belgian and Dutch banks in the sample with total average assets far above USD 100 billion. The number of observa- tions per country is presented in Table 3.

Note that our sample is unbalanced. The reason for the missing data is that the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope (BSC) database does not report observations for all the variables in all years. Based on Lit- tle’s test (Little, 1988 and Allison, 2002), we conclude that the assumption of observations missing completely at random (MCAR) holds, and the safe solution is to just use the observed cases, as

on groups Bank Holding & Holding Companies, Commercial Banks, Cooperative ank, Specialized Governmental Credit Institution

zerland, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg

xceeds USD 1 billion

of total assets in its respective country

gorized as loans. This is to exclude institutions without material lending business

250% in any period. This is to exclude banks with r ankscope data base (essential balance sheet data missing in database)

FR observations for an institution to be included in the sample. This facilitates the y data series on NSFR or vice versa ibit a certain stability and standard deviation of NSFR values observed should not

ivities which strongly change the nature of the bank’s business

ng institutions over the 15-years time period considered from 1996 to 2010.

Fig. 1. Number of observations in each bank size category 1996 to 2010.

Table 3 Number of observations and bank assets by country.

Country No banks in % No observations in % Total assets (in USD trillion)a

in %

Austria 52 5.6 601 5.2 11.0 5.7 Belgium 16 1.7 152 1.3 21.0 11.0 France 136 14.7 1301 11.2 49.7 26.0 Germany 625 67.9 8547 73.4 67.2 35.2 Luxembourg 4 0.4 36 0.3 1.1 0.6 Netherlands 21 2.3 157 1.3 34.3 18.0 Switzerland 67 7.3 855 7.3 6.7 3.5

Total 921 100 11,649 100 191.0 100

The table reports on the number of pooled observations and total pooled bank assets in the sample over the full sample period 1996 to 2010. a Latest figure reported.

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 17

these lead to unbiased estimates with correct inference. Further- more, extracting a balanced panel out of the unbalanced panel would lead to a significant loss of observations.

4. Methodology and model specification

As illustrated in Fig. 2, we conduct our analysis in two steps. In step one, we investigate how environmental, market and owner- ship factors as well as bank-specific characteristics affect the level of NSFR. This is followed by step two, where we analyze the impact of all of the above factors jointly with NSFR as additional explana- tory variable on bank performance. We thereby define bank perfor- mance broadly to include dimensions of traditional financial performance but also macro-prudential outcomes such as mea- surements of credit loss performance or volatility of returns (see, e.g. Vander Vennet, 1996; De Haan and Poghosyand, 2012; Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007).

Specifically we explore in step one potential determinants of NSFR employing both a univariate and a multivariate approach. For the univariate method, we classify bank-year observations into two

Fig. 2. Two-step analyses.

categories based upon whether they already fulfill NSFR require- ments (NSFR P 100%) or whether they do not (NSFR < 100%). Once we have classified our sample banks, we calculate descriptive statis- tics for the two groups and test for significant differences across our variables. We then conduct multivariate tests on the data, using GMM technique to estimate models as described under Section 4.1. Section 4.2 provides a discussion of variables considered for the mul- tivariate ‘‘Model 1 specification’’ to explore drivers of NSFR with detailed definitions of the variables shown in Table 4.

For step two we employ an analogous multivariate approach to analyze in what way NSFR in conjunction with bank characteristics and macro variables influences bank performance in a broad sense including profitability measures, funding costs, loan quality and the volatility of the above profitability measures. Section 4.3 pro- vides a discussion of variables considered for this ‘‘Model 2 speci- fication’’, again with detailed definitions of all variables listed in Table 4.

4.1. Multivariate modelling technique

We follow Athanasoglou et al. (2008), García-Herrero et al. (2009) as well as Delis and Kouretas (2011) and use a dynamic lin- ear model as

NSFRit ¼ dNSFRi;t�1 þ XJ

j¼1

bjX j it þ

XM

m¼1

bmXm it þ eit

with jdj < 1

ð1Þ

NSFRi,t is the net stable funding ratio of bank i at time t, with i = 1,. . .,N, t = 1,. . ., T, c is a constant term, Xj

it are the bank-specific and Xm

it the macroeconomic variables as defined in Table 4, and eit

is the disturbance, with mi the unobserved bank-specific effect and uit the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error component regression model, where mi � (IIN(0, r2v) is independent of uit � (IIN(0, r2u).

Table 4 Definition of variables.

Variable Description Type

Capital Ratio Equity over total assets (in %) Firm characteristics Dummy Crisis Dummy variable: Financial crisis years are the years 2007 to 2010 Market/environmental Foreignowned Dummy variable with a foreign owner, if more than 50%; otherwise domestic owned Owner characteristics Funding Costs Interest expenses over averagea total deposits (in %) Performance Gdp Growth The yearly real GDP growth (in %) Market/environmental Growth Netloans Annual growth of net loans (in %) Firm characteristics Loan Loss Ratio Period loan loss provisions over total loans (in %) Performance Net Interest Margin Net interest margin (in %), defined as net interest income divided by total averagea assets Performance Non Interest Share Total non-interest income over total income (in %) Firm characteristics NSFR Ratio is defined as a bank’s available stable funding (ASF) divided by its required stable funding

(RSF) (in %). ASF and RSF are calculated based on funding weights shown in Table 1 Firm characteristics

Overhead/Total Assets Overhead expenses over averagea total assets (in %) Firm characteristics ROA Net profits over averagea total assets (in %) Performance ROE Net profits over averagea total equity (in %) Performance Size (ln assets) Bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of the USD accounting value of the bank’s total assets Firm characteristics Stateowned Dummy variable if more than 50% of the bank is owned by the state Owner characteristics Stdev ROA 3y Standard deviation of ROA calculated over the last three years Performance Yield Curve Difference between a 10 year reference government bond rate and a short-term rate (money market

type instruments) compiled by the OECD. OECD sources these data from national central banks Market/environmental

a Average of beginning and end of year reported value.

18 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

We expect the liquidity structure of a bank to persist over time, as this balance sheet structure cannot be adjusted quickly. There- fore, we specify a dynamic model by including a lagged dependent variable among the regressors. NSFRi,t�1 is the one-period lagged NSFR and d the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. A value of d between 0 and 1 implies persistence of NSFR, but they will eventu- ally return to their normal level.

Given the dynamic nature of our model, least squares estima- tion methods produce biased and inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Therefore, we use techniques for dynamic panel estimation that are able to deal with the biases and inconsistencies of our estimates.

A further challenge for the estimation of NSFR relates to poten- tial endogeneity problems. For example, banks with a higher capi- tal ratio tend to have higher NSFR as equity enters the NSFR calculation as 100% weighted stable funding. However, the causal- ity could also go in the opposite direction, when banks consciously choose a solid NSFR in times of crises, which in turn affects the lev- els of capital held.

Following García-Herrero et al. (2009) as well as Delis and Kouretas (2011), we address these problems by employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data put forward by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As Delis and Kouretas (2011) outline, the Blundell–Bond estimator is well suited to account for the dynamic structure of the model and it has two more additional properties that seem highly relevant for our data. First, it does not break down in the presence of unit roots (see Blinder et al., 2003 for the proof). Sec- ond, it accommodates the possible endogeneity between our dependent variables and some of the explanatory variables in our models by means of appropriate instruments. In particular, the sys- tem GMM estimator uses lagged values of the dependent variable in levels and in differences as instruments, as well as lagged values of other regressors, which could potentially suffer from endogene- ity. The latter problem would lead to a correlation between those endogenous variables and the error term and to inconsistent esti- mates if not properly taken care of.

With respect to the potential endogeneity of our regressors, we have good reasons to believe that at least some of our explanatory variables (in addition to the lagged dependent variable) are endog- enous. We follow Hayashi (2000) and Baum et al. (2003, 2007) in order to determine which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. In concrete terms, we use a modified version of the Durbin–Wu–Hausmann test (Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al.,

2003, 2007) and determine which variables have to be treated as endogenous. For those endogenous variables, which appear in ital- ics in the tables with the regression results, we use their lagged values as instruments, as discussed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The number of lags used are indi- cated in table legend. Note that the system GMM estimator also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and for the persistence of the dependent variable. Overall, this estimator has been found to yield consistent estimations of the parameters (see, e.g., Delis and Kouretas, 2011).

All our results are based on the one-step system GMM estima- tor, using robust standard errors. Even though the two-step esti- mator is asymptotically more efficient, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).

4.2. Model 1 specification

In our Model 1 we analyze which factors affect the level of NSFR. Such drivers include bank characteristics and ownership fac- tors as well as control variables for the crisis and for country-spe- cific macroeconomic conditions. Table 4 provides a detailed definition of all variables employed in this Model 1 specification.

4.2.1. Bank characteristics Bank characteristics include the capital ratio, the growth rate of

loans, bank size as measured by the log of total assets and the busi- ness model as proxied by non-interest income over total income.

In order to check for the relationship between capital and struc- tural liquidity, we use the equity to assets ratio as our capital ratio in line with Basel III leverage rules. Banks with stronger capitaliza- tion can be expected to have a higher NSFR because we presume that safer banks will aim for both stronger capital ratios and a more resilient, sustainable funding structure. Besides that, this relation- ship is also influenced by a technical fact as more equity automat- ically helps to improve NSFR as the ASF-factor of equity is 100%.

For the loan growth variable as a proxy of past credit expansion, we hypothesize that banks with a more aggressive credit expan- sion have a lower NSFR as they might use more short-term money in order to support their funding.

We consider the log of bank assets as proxy to control for pos- sible data distortions due to size heterogeneity within our sample. Small banks are usually more focused on traditional intermedia- tion activities (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and might take less

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 19

advantage of the availability of wholesale funding or central bank financing than larger banks. Furthermore, bank size accounts for possible ‘‘too big to fail’’ status of large banks that could lead to moral hazard behavior and excessive risk taking, e.g. by compro- mising on the asset-liability maturity match in the balance sheet, namely by an over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding to finance long-term assets. We thus expect a negative relationship between bank size and NSFR.

Finally, we do not expect NSFR to be ‘‘business model neutral’’. Banks with more diversified income streams, e.g. also active in asset management and investment banking are more likely to use alternative funding sources including wholesale funding.

4.2.2. Owner characteristics Since we surmise that bank governance and liquidity manage-

ment mechanisms are at play, we include a dummy variable regarding foreign and domestic ownership and private and state ownership, respectively. The company is ‘‘foreign-owned’’ if pri- vate foreign individuals, companies or organizations own 50% or more of the bank. We classify a bank as state-owned if public sec- tor ownership exceeds 50%.

State-owned banks might have a higher NSFR because their owner(s) are possibly more risk averse and attach greater weight to the security aspect than to the potential of additional maturity transformation profits. Conversely, these banks might show moral hazard behavior, e.g. by the taking of excessive risks, since their funding benefits from an explicit or at least implicit guarantee by its public sector shareholders.

Foreign banks, on the other hand, might have a stronger reli- ance on wholesale funding because they would not be established enough to attract sufficient traditional deposits. On the other side, foreign banks might draw on deposits from their parent and thus benefit from lower funding costs also for long-term funding. The overall effect of these ownership variables is thus indeterminate from a theoretical point of view and needs to be investigated empirically.

4.2.3. Market/environmental characteristics The existing empirical literature about liquidity and liquidity

creation outlines the relevance of macroeconomic factors (see, e.g., Distinguin et al., 2013). We thus account for potential effects of macroeconomic developments by including variables for GDP growth, the yield curve spread and a dummy variable for the recent financial crisis.

Including the GDP growth variable allows us to control for busi- ness cycles effects that might impact the funding of banks. In eco- nomically prosperous times, banks would possibly more readily accept risks associated with maturity mismatches and thus rely on quickly available short-term funding to meet an increasing demand for loans. They might also have less customer savings as booming markets offer alternative higher yielding investment opportunities for customers. Therefore, we expect GDP growth to have a negative relation with NSFR.

We include the yield curve spread between long and short-term rates because bank lending and borrowing as well as banks’ profit margins strongly depends on the term structure of interests. The steeper the yield curve, i.e. the higher the yield curve spread, the more banks will expand attractive short-term funding. We thus foresee this maturity premium proxy to be in a negative relation- ship to NSFR.

In order to take into account the impact of the financial crisis on NSFR, we build a dummy variable, which takes the value of one for the years 2007–2010, and zero for the sample years before 2007. The financial crisis, which began in August 2007, had a significant impact on banks around the world. Before the crisis and under Basel II rules, potential threats related to issues of bank liquidity

were widely ignored and so many banks were incentivized to bor- row short-term from the markets rather than by means of more stable, yet more difficult to attract customer deposits. While this business model had a positive impact on profits during prosperous times, it had a negative impact starting 2007 when liquidity dried up abruptly for many banks. Banks realized that keeping higher liquidity reserves provided them with a greater cushion and would enable them to better absorb losses and liquidity pressures. Lack of funding typically forced them to shrink their balance sheets, which likewise would have had a beneficial impact on NSFR. There are also potential impacts of cheaper long-term funding sources avail- able under the ECB’s LTRO funding program, which provides some relief to banks cut off from the funding markets. Overall, we expect a positive sign for this variable, i.e. that NSFR has increased with the onset of the financial crisis.

4.3. Model 2 specification

In our step two model, we analyze whether NSFR influences bank performance in a broad sense including profitability mea- sures (namely returns on asset and equity, net interest margins), the funding costs, loan quality, as measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions over total loans, and the standard deviation of ROA. As a reminder, Table 4 includes a detailed definition of all variables employed in the following Model 2 specification.

4.3.1. Dependent variables Dependent performance measures include firstly the return on

average asset ratio (ROA) defined as the ratio of net profits to the average beginning and end of year total assets expressed as a per- centage. As alternative profitability measures, we use return on average equity (ROE), the ratio of net profit to average equity, as well as the net interest margin (NIM), defined as net interest income divided by average total assets. Funding costs, defined as interest expenses over average total deposits, are considered as they might well be affected by NSFR besides other market and bank-specific factors. The final two variables represent perfor- mance outcomes mainly relevant for regulators and policy makers. These are the loan quality, proxied by the loan loss provisions over total loans, as well as the standard deviation of ROA, a pertinent proxy for the riskiness of a bank’s earnings (see, e.g. Shehzad et al., 2009).

4.3.2. Independent variables As mentioned above, we include the net stable funding ratio

(NSFR) defined before as our central explanatory variable to inves- tigate whether it significantly influences bank performance. We expect NSFR to be negatively related to bank performance, i.e. that banks with a lower NSFR are more profitable. In times of ‘‘normal yield curves’’, long-term debt is more costly than short-term fund- ing and banks relying more on long-term funding thus pay a term premium, which in turn lowers their profitability, respectively increases their funding costs.

Furthermore, faster growing banks might rely more heavily on short-term funding, but this excessive credit growth might subse- quently lead to higher loan losses. We thus expect NSFR to have a negative influence on our loan loss provisions variable. In a similar vein, a more stable funding concept might contribute to less vola- tile profits and we thus expect NSFR to be inversely related to the volatility of ROA.

Following the literature, we include both internal and external control variables in our models where various bank performance proxies are our dependent variables. In most studies, variables such as bank size, loan quality, the capital ratio, the overhead costs, and a business model variable serve as internal determinants of banking profitability.

20 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

On one hand, we could expect a positive and significant rela- tionship between the size and the profitability of a bank as larger banks might profit from economies of scales and scope advantages. On the other hand, authors, such as Berger et al. (1987) have found that increasing the size of a bank produces only trivial cost savings and that very large banks often face scale inefficiencies. As to the impact of the capital ratio on bank performance, empirical evi- dence from Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Goddard et al. (2004) indicate that the best performing banks are those, which maintain a high level of equity relative to their assets.2 Over- head costs are an important determinant of profitability, i.e., the higher the overhead costs in relation to the assets, the lower the profitability of a bank. Banks with a higher share of interest income relative to the total income are usually less profitable, because profit margins of fee, commission and trading operations are usually higher than profit margins in interest operations (see, e.g., Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). Finally, we expect a negative effect from the loan loss provisions relative to total loans on bank performance.

As suggested by the literature, we use several macroeconomic variables as external controls that are likely to affect bank perfor- mance. In particular, we include the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy of the business cycle into our models. Most studies (e.g. Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008) have found a positive relationship between GDP growth and bank performance. Cyclical downswings often decrease the demand for borrowing and credit risk will increase due to uncertainty and vol- atility in the markets. Accordingly, during cyclical downswings the loan quality deteriorates and provisions for non-repayments increase, hence lowering banks’ profitability. Just as in Model 1 specification, we finally include the dummy variable for the recent financial crisis into our models.

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate results

Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (col- umn 2), and, separately, for bank-year observations that have NSFR less than 1 (i.e. 100%) and bank-year observations with NSFR greater than or equal to 1, respectively (columns (3) and (4)), along with the difference in means between the two groups and the asso- ciated t-test in columns (5) and (6). Table 7 reports correlation coefficients between these variables, showing that correlations are all on acceptable levels.

The average net stable funding ratio over all banks in our sam- ple amounts to 96.9%. The minimum value of NSFR in our sample is 20.8% while the maximum value is 208.5% (not reported). Note that 60% of all bank-year observations have an NSFR value of less than 100% and, therefore, do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirements.

Before looking in detail at the explanatory variables and how they differ between the two NSFR groups, it is worth analyzing NSFR by bank size. Fig. 3 shows the development of NSFR by bank size over the time period considered. The maturity mismatches, as proxied by NSFR, became more pronounced before the crisis, above all for larger banks (banks with more than 200 USD billion in assets) and – to a lesser extent – for medium-sized banks. The average NSFR ratio for our large bank group was around 80% before the crisis, worsened in 2008, before improving again in 2009 and 2010, with the ratio climbing to about 85%. Interestingly, the med- ium-sized banks had a declining NSFR since the onset of the crisis.

2 The authors explain this relation with the observation that banks with higher capital ratios tend to face lower costs of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs.

This might be explained by the recently observed shortening in the maturity profile of some medium-sized banks, which is related to a shorter-term funding structure, including the assumption of read- ily available and inexpensive central bank financing. Our break- down by size also shows that the smallest bank group in our sample (banks with less than 5 billion USD assets) have signifi- cantly improved their NSFR over the last years with an average value in excess of 110% in 2010. Note that NSFR of banks with USD assets between 5 and 20 billion remained stable during the crisis. Overall, we observe a wide dispersion across the different bank sizes with respect to the level of NSFR and the development over time.

Similarly, the difference between the available and required sta- ble funding in terms of USD varies widely by country. Table 5 reports the sum of total required equity by country for banks in the sample with NSFR < 100% in order to close the gap between the available and required stable funding based on data in 2010. While the Swiss banks in our sample already have a sustainable funding structure, French banks, among others, are characterized by a huge gap between the available and the required stable fund- ing. In order to fill this gap, the French banks in our sample would have to raise, all other things being equal, an additional USD 2.1 trillion in equity, which, for perspective, is equal to more than four times the sum of their current total equity. Of the 700 banks in the 2010 sample, 256 show an NSFR value of less than 100% and they would need USD 3.05 trillion in order to achieve the required sta- ble funding in line with the new liquidity framework of Basel III.

Looking at the mean values of our explanatory variables as out- lined in Table 6, the average bank in our sample has a return on average assets (ROA) of 0.32%, a return on average equity (ROE) of 5.32%, and a net interest margin of 2.44%. Note that banks in the group with NSFR below 100% appear more profitable compared to the group with NSFR above 100%, and this holds for all three measures of bank profitability. As to the funding costs ratio, the average is 1.84%, and the group with NSFR below 100% has signif- icantly lower funding costs. Overall, the credit allocation efficiency seems to be high as the stock of loan loss provision amounts to a mere 0.7% of total loans. This is quite a low number against the backdrop of an average annual loan growth of 8.78% over the sam- ple period. Note, however, that low NSFR banks exhibit signifi- cantly higher loan-loss provisions relative to total loans.

We use the volatility of return on assets as a proxy for the risk- iness of a bank’s earnings. With an average value of 10.9% (median 4.3%) for the three-year period, we conclude that profits are quite widely dispersed overall. Interestingly, the sub-sample with NSFR P 100% exhibits a significantly higher variability and thus also a higher risk in earnings.

The equity ratio amounts to 5.75%, on average. Unsurprisingly, the sub-sample with NSFR P 100% has a significantly higher capital ratio than the sub-sample with NSFR below 100%. As to bank size, the average bank has USD 17.2 billion in assets but a median value of a mere USD 1.8 billion. This reflects the skewed size distribution with a predominance of smaller banks and a few large institutions driving up the mean value statistics. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between the two NSFR sub-samples with respect to bank size.

Almost 85% of all income stems from interests, which is not sur- prising given that we focus our analyses on a sample of banks that generate a material share of their total income through traditional commercial banking activities (balance sheet business) and only to a lesser extent through ‘‘fee and commission income’’ and ‘‘trading operations’’. The non-interest income share for the sub-sample with NSFR < 100% is significantly lower than the one of the other sub-sample. Looking at the overhead costs relative to assets, one finds a value of 2.11% for whole sample, but a significantly higher ratio for the sub-sample having NSFR < 100%.

Table 5 Required equity for banks with NSFR < 100% in our sample in order to close the gap between available and required stable funding by country in 2010.

Country Number of bank in 2010s

Available stable funding

Required stable funding

Excess (shortfall)

Total bank assets

Total bank equity

Shortfall as % of equity

France 75 4177 6294 �2116 8817 447 473.8 Austria 30 707 801 �94 1191 90 104.0 Belgium 10 1176 1548 �372 2285 79 473.7 Switzerland 6 18 20 �2 25 2 107.9 Germany 128 1676 1994 �319 3345 107 297.5 Luxembourg 1 64 82 �19 118 9 220.5 Netherlands 6 1813 2394 �581 3415 117 494.8

Total 256 9631 13,133 �3503 19,196 851 411.8

Currency figures in USD billion.

Table 6 Descriptive statistics for the full sample and, separately, for banks with NSFR < 100% and banks with NSFR P 100%.

(1) Variable (2) All (3) NSFR < 100% (4) NSFR P 100% (5) Difference (6) t-Statistic

Nb. of observations 11,648 7034 4614 Bank specific factors NSFR 0.969 ROA 0.315 0.321 0.308 �0.013 �1.66**

ROE 5.320 5.385 5.224 �0.161 �1.02 Net Interest Margin 2.439 2.541 2.286 �0.255 �15.27***

Funding Costs 1.838 1.804 1.889 0.085 1.72**

Loan Loss Ratio 0.007 0.007 0.006 �0.001 �6.36***

Stdev ROA 3y 10.90 11.10 10.50 �0.60 �1.35*

Capital Ratio 5.753 5.661 5.890 0.229 3.45***

Growth Netloans 8.784 9.242 8.118 �1.124 �2.46**

Size (ln assets) 14.739 14.740 14.739 �0.001 �0.05 Non Interest Share 0.142 0.140 0.144 0.004 2.79***

Overhead/Total Assets 2.114 2.196 1.993 �0.203 �12.28***

Foreignowned 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.002 0.28 Stateowned 0.518 0.609 0.398 �0.211 �21.00***

Market characteristics GDP Growth 3.552 3.672 3.428 �0.244 �6.01***

Yield Curve 1.288 1.311 1.252 �0.059 3.475***

Dummy Crisis 0.266 0.189 0.347 0.158 21.32***

The table reports the means for the variables in our models as defined in Table 4. Column 2 presents the mean for all banks in our sample. We then split NSFR in two groups and create a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank has NSFR P 1 and a value of 0 if the bank has NSFR < 1. For each variable in column 1, column 3 shows the mean for all banks with NSFR < 1 and column 4 shows the means of banks with NSFR P 1. Column 5 presents the difference in the means of the banks with NSFR < 1 and P 1, respectively. Column 6 presents the results of t-tests for significance of the differences in means. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data are Bankscope, x and y, and include 12,722 observations from 7 countries over the 1996–2010 period. * Statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 21

By ownership, more than 96% of banks are domestically con- trolled and 52% of them are owned or co-owned by states. Note that we have numerous state-owned German ‘‘Landesbanken’’ and ‘‘Sparkassen’’ (savings banks) in our sample, which mainly

Fig. 3. NSFR by

drive this distribution. We find that state-owned banks are less likely to fulfill the minimum NSFR ratio.

In terms of market characteristics, the average GDP growth of the seven countries in our sample is 3.55%. The yield curve

bank size.

Table 7 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables of Model 1.

Capital Ratio

Growth Netloans

Size (ln assets)

Non Interest Share

Foreignowned Stateowned Dummy Crisis

Yield curve

GDP Growth

Capital Ratio 1.00 Growth Netloans 0.0156 1.00 Size (ln assets) �0.1278 0.0059 1.00 Non Interest Share 0.4615 0.0211 �0.0877 1.00 Foreignowned 0.2219 0.0702 0.1077 0.0817 1.00 Stateowned �0.1579 �0.0874 0.1207 �0.1496 �0.1927 1.00 Dummy Crisis 0.2029 �0.0740 0.2443 0.0972 0.0033 �0.0188 1.00 Yield curve �0.0061 0.0539 �0.0217 0.0063 0.0032 �0.0037 �0.2509 1.00 GDP Growth 0.0191 �0.0361 �0.0294 0.0627 0.0403 �0.0221 �0.2147 �0.4422 1.00

The table reports correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables of Model 1 with NSFR as dependent variable. The variables are defined as outlined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010.

22 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

variable, which measure the yield premium of a 10 year govern- ment bond over short rates, amounts to an average of 129 basis points. Our data thus tell us that a bank with a lower NSFR is more likely to be located in a country with a higher GDP growth, respec- tively a steeper yield curve. Looking at the distribution by survey year, 26.6% of the bank-year observations refer to 2007–2010, which we define as crisis period.

Table 8 Regressions results explaining the different NSFR levels among banks (Model 1 specification).

Explanatory variables NSFR

L.NSFR 0.796***

(0.049) Capital Ratio 0.002***

(0.001) Growth Netloans �0.001***

(0.000) Size (ln assets) �0.001

(0.001) Noninterestshare �0.057***

(0.016) Foreignowned �0.045***

(0.012) Stateowned �0.008

(0.005) Dummy Crisis 0.038***

(0.007) Yield Curve �0.020***

(0.004) GDP Growth �0.008***

(0.001) Constant 0.089**

(0.044)

Observations 7566 Number of banks 643 F-test 1679.20***

AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �16.10 (0.000) AB test AR (2) (p-val.) �0.20 (0.201) Hansen 0.72 (0.395)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of the effects of bank- and market-specific characteristics on NSFR. The dependent variable is NSFR as calculated and explained above. For the notation of the variables see Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with L.NSFR lagged at 2, Capital Ratio lagged at 1, and Growth Netloans lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. �Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

5.2. Multivariate results

5.2.1. Which factors influence the NSFR ratio? In Table 8, we present our multivariate results, using NSFR as

LHS-variable, as described in Model 1 specification in Section 4. Unsurprisingly, there is significant persistence of our dependent

variable NSFR. The structure of the balance sheet is not signifi- cantly changing every year but remains rather stable. Among firm characteristics, our results show that banks with a higher capital ratio also have a higher NSFR. Safer bank in terms of having more equity also have a statistically higher structural liquidity ratio. Besides the ‘‘safety aspect’’ and as discussed in the previous sec- tion, this relationship is also influenced by the fact that more equity automatically raises NSFR as the ASF-factor of equity is 100%.

Our results confirm the expectation that banks that are more aggressive in terms of credit expansion have a lower NSFR as they might rely more on short-term funds in order to support loan growth. With respect to size, larger banks do not have a statisti- cally different NSFR from smaller firms. The business model of a bank also significantly affects NSFR. Banks focusing on interest business have higher NSFRs than banks that are also active in the field of asset management or investment banking. This result con- firms our predictions that banks with a more diversified income structure are more likely to use alternative funding sources includ- ing wholesale funding. Therefore, the new liquidity rules would have a stronger effect on investment and universal banks, by reducing the NSFR differences between different business models.

The coefficient of our first owner characteristics variable, the state-owned or privately held banks, is statistically not significant. Accordingly, state ownership does not seem to affect NSFR. Con- versely, foreign banks have a statistically significant lower NSFR than domestically owned banks, which points to the fact that for- eign-owned banks might have a stronger reliance on wholesale funding because they are not established enough to attract suffi- cient traditional deposits in foreign markets.

We find a positive effect of our dummy variable for the financial crisis on NSFR. Since the financial crisis, banks have thus signifi- cantly improved their NSFR, quite likely in response to the growing awareness of general risks and refinancing risks associated with bulk funding in particular. This would also have pushed them to strengthen their equity ratios and thus raise their NSFR. Yet not

all banking groups have been acting in a similar way, as discussed in Section 4 (see also Fig. 3). This confirms our univariate result that banks have started increasing their long-term deposit funding with the times of turmoil and possibly also shrinking their asset base.

The slope of the yield curve and GDP growth have both a nega- tive impact on the level of NSFR. It is clear that banks prefer short- term over long-term funding if maturity premiums are. Banks might likewise have depressed levels of customer deposits in

Table 9 Regressions results explaining profitability measures with NSFR and control variables (Model 2 specification).

Explanatory (1) (2) (3)

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 23

prosperous times, as many savers prefer alternative higher yielding investments. high. In economically good times, banks require more short-term funding in order to meet the increasing demand for credit.

variables ROA ROE Net Interest Margin

L.ROA 0.191***

(0.053) L.ROE 0.310***

(0.100) L.Net Interest Margin 0.629***

(0.075) NSFR �0.046 0.070 0.741

(0.126) (3.999) (0.490) Loan Loss Ratio �0.154*** �3.090*** �0.799***

(1.688) (59.34) (29.76) Capital Ratio 0.040*** 2.202 �0.002

(0.008) (1.460) (0.052) Overhead/Total Assets �0.009 3.289* 0.238

(0.026) (1.685) (0.216) Size (ln assets) 0.007 0.830 �0.080**

(0.008) (0.550) (0.034) Noninterestshare 1.089*** �0.744* 2.936

(0.329) (38.43) (3.143) GDP Growth �0.001 0.069 0.073

(0.001) (0.047) (0.105) Dummycrisis �0.152*** �1.713** �0.008

(0.032) (0.741) (0.185) Constant �0.021 �15.32 0.740

(0.204) (15.25) (0.842)

Observations 9780 9780 9777 Number of banks 921 921 921

F-test 48.56*** 16.71*** 108.91***

AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �6.36 (0.000) �3.60 (0.000) �4.55 (0.000) AB test AR(2) (p-val.) 1.28 (0.200) �0.97 (0.331) �1.22 (0.221) Hansen test (p-val.) 2.45 (0.118) 0.91 (0.633) 0.72 (0.395)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of effects of NSFR as calculated and explained above, bank- and market-specific characteristics on bank performance. The dependent variables approximating bank performance are the ROA, ROE and the net interest margin. The variables are defined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with all instrumented variables L.ROA, L.ROE, L.Net Interest Margin, NSFR, Loan Loss Ratio, Capital Ratio and Overhead/Total Assets lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. * Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

5.2.2. What is the influence of NSFR on Bank performance measures? With our Model 2 specification we investigate to what extent

NSFR and control parameters affect bank performance. Table 9 shows the regression results of the profitability measures return on assets (column 2), return on equity (column 3) and net interest margin (column 4). Again, our estimation results have stable coef- ficients. The Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit for the esti- mated model and the p value for the Hansen test shows no evidence against the validity of the moment restrictions. Further- more, there is no second-order correlation (AR 2 errors), which confirms the consistency of the GMM estimator. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on our lagged dependent variables return on assets, return on equity, and the net interest margin in all models vindicate the use of a dynamic GMM-model as we report a high degree of persistence of these measures.

NSFR aims to promote more medium- and long-term funding of the assets and activities of banks, and should thus reduce the extent of maturity mismatch at the bank. In theory, we would thus anticipate a negative impact on bank profitability as the extent of this mismatch is expected to be positively related to the profits of a bank. Contrary to this expectation, our results show that NSFR does not have a statistically significant influence on our profitabil- ity measures ROA, ROE and net interest margin. It seems that low NSFR banks have offsetting disadvantages such as comparably higher loan loss provisions, higher loan growth rates (which in turn depresses lending rates) and also higher overhead costs. All these factors depress their profitability and thus neutralize potential advantages of lower funding costs.

In fact, the level of profitability of the banks in our sample appears driven by a number of other factors. The capital ratio, for example, has a positive and significant effect on bank profitability as measured by the return on assets. Banks with a higher capital ratio are safer and may thus benefit from lower funding costs. Even though we expect institutions with a lower equity ratio to be more risky, which should lead to higher returns, safer banks are more profitable (see e.g. Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Similarly, the non-interest income share, a proxy for the business model, posi- tively affects the return on assets variable. The significant and posi- tive sign of this business model variable shows that income diversification of banks has a positive effect on profitability as profit margins of fee, commission, and trading operations are usu- ally higher than profit margins in interest operations margins. In contrast, the level of the loan loss provisions as well as the crisis years have negative impacts on the ROA as expected. Overall, these results are in line with other research results analyzing Western European bank samples such as Staikouras and Wood (2004) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011).

Besides pure profitability measures, we also investigate the effects of the NSFR ratio on other relevant bank-specific perfor- mance variables. In Table 10, we present our regression results analyzing potential effects on the funding costs (column 2), the loan loss provision over total loans variable (column 3) and the vol- atility of the return on assets for three years (column 4). Again, our estimation results have stable coefficients. The Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit for the estimated model and the p value for the Hansen test shows no evidence against the validity of the moment restrictions. Furthermore, there is no second-order correlation (AR 2 errors), which confirms the consistency of the GMM estimator. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on our lagged dependent variables in all models confirm the use of a dynamic

GMM-model as we report a high degree of persistence of these measures.

Our results reveal that higher NSFR leads to (1) less favourable funding costs, with the coefficient being statistically significant at the 5% level, (2) lower loan loss provisions and (3) a reduction in the variability of profits as a proxy for the risk in bank earnings.

The unfavourable impact of a high NSFR on funding costs stands in line with our expectations and reflects the standard macroeco- nomic relationship that banks that rely more on less costly short- term funding (and thus have a lower NSFR) benefit from lower funding costs. This holds as long as yield curves are upwards slop- ing, i.e. the longer the maturity, the higher the yield.

The effects on the loan loss performance are shown in column 2 of Table 10 and we note that the coefficient of NSFR, of which we included the second lag due to the expected slow adjustment pro- cess, is significantly negative at the 1% level. In order to achieve faster growth, banks seem to rely more heavily on short-term funding (see also the result in Tables 6 and 8) and thus reduce their

Table 10 Regressions results explaining funding costs, loan loss provisions and return volatility with NSFR and control variables (Model 2 specification).

Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) Funding Costs Loan Loss Ratio Std ROA 3y

L.Funding Costs 0.910***

(0.134) L.Loan Loss Ratio 0.312***

(0.036) L.Stdev ROA 3y 0.944***

(0.028) NSFR 0.865*** �0.163***

(0.210) (0.039) L2.NSFR �0.005***

(0.002) Capital Ratio �0.069 �0.002 �0.001

(0.044) (0.001) (0.002) Overhead/Total Assets 0.139*** 0.005 0.028***

(0.028) (0.005) (0.007) Size (ln assets) 0.022 0.001 0.009***

(0.040) (0.001) (0.003) Non Interest Share �0.220 0.149** �0.145**

(0.482) (0.069) (0.066) GDP Growth 0.068*** 0.001

(0.003) (0.001) L.GDP Growth 0.001**

(0.000) Dummy Crisis 0.059 �0.001

(0.065) (0.001) Constant �1.393** �0.025 �0.006

(0.600) (0.027) (0.069)

Observations 9769 9475 8960

Number of banks 920 921 918 F-test 538.79*** 12.99*** 229.32***

Hansen test (p-val.) 5.10 (0.165) 1.39 (0.499) 1.85 (0.396) AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �2.94 (0.003) �3.30 (0.001) �3.22 (0.001) AB test AR(2) (p-val.) �1.06 (0.291) �0.42 (0.673) �0.42 (0.671)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of effects of NSFR as calculated and explained above, bank- and market-specific characteristics on the funding costs, the loan loss provisions over total loans, and the return volatility as measured by standard deviation of the ROA over 3 years. The variables are defined as outlined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with L.Funding Costs lagged at 3, L. Loan Loss Ratio lagged at 2, L.Stdev ROA 3y lagged at 1, NSFR lagged at 1, L2.NSFR lagged at 1, Capital Ratio lagged at 1, and Overhead/Total Assets lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. �Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

24 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

NSFR. Increased credit losses then seem to follow such rapid expansion of the loan portfolio.

Remarkably, we find that the volatility of bank earnings, as mea- sured by standard deviation of bankprofitability over 3 years, increases with lower NSFR, the coefficient being significant at the 1% level. Whilst NSFR does not seem to have any significant effect on the level of prof- itability, profits appear more variable for low NSFR banks. This finding has major implications not just for policy development and macropru- dential regulation but also for investment decisions.

As a robustness test, we also run the regressions separately on each country subsample. The results reconfirm that NSFR does not significantly affect profitability measures return on assets, return on equity, and the net interest margin in any of the seven countries. Results vary slightly among countries for the variability of the ROA, the loan loss provisions and the funding costs, as the above relationship turns out statistically insignificant in Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg only.

6. Conclusions

Under Basel III, individual banks will have to maintain higher and better-quality liquid assets and to better manage their liquid- ity risk. Therefore, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) was designed to promote stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis. In this paper, we analyze how NSFR for 921 banks from seven Western European countries have developed between 1996 and 2010, which factors influence this ratio and in what way NSFR is impacting various bank performance indicators.

Our findings include both good and bad news for banks them- selves and the economy more generally. To start with the bad news, we find that 60% of all bank-year observations in our sample do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirements by having an NSFR value below 100%. For some banks in our sample that do not yet meet the criteria, the liquidity gap is limited and possi- bly manageable. However, there are a number of Western Euro- pean banks that will be strongly affected by the NSFR requirement as they essentially rely on wholesale funding and thus report high loan-to-deposit ratios. In 2010, 256 banks in our sam- ple had an NSFR value of less than 100% and 207 of them even a value below 95%. As a model calculation, we determine the long- term liquidity gap of the banks with NSFR of less than 100% in the 2010 sample. Had these banks been forced to close the long- term liquidity gap purely by raising more equity, they would have required USD 3.05 trillion of new equity, representing a massive 4.1 times of total equity of these banks outstanding at the time. As discussed in the next paragraph, it is clear that NSFR adjust- ments would be achieved by a combination of balance sheet mea- sures, i.e. not purely by additional equity capital. These calculations nevertheless illustrate the significance of the NSFR shortfall for the Western European banking industry.

To improve their funding profiles and meet the NSFR require- ment, banks will have basically two options. The first option is to change the funding mix by lengthening the duration of their fund- ing, attempting to attract more customer deposits and/or increas- ing equity. All these measures will have their price. Long-term debt and equity funding are more costly and with more vigorous competition for customer deposits, one would expect higher sav- ings (interest) rates. We would thus see bank profits decline, which could ultimately even affect the resilience of the banking system.

The second option for these banks is to shrink their asset base, which might in turn negatively affect the economy through reduced lending volumes. Again, rationing interest-bearing assets means lost earning opportunities, foregone market share and thus decreasing profitability. Most likely, banks will adopt a combina- tion of these two options in order to meet the new Basel III liquid- ity requirements.

Bad news would also include the result that NSFR of banks not only depends of their business models (banks more active in asset management and investment banking have a lower NSFR than banks focusing on the interest business) but also capital ratios (bet- ter capitalized banks have stronger NSFR). We find evidence that quite a few banks have indeed started using more short-term funds in order to grow their long-term loan portfolio. In this respect, our research for the first time quantifies the extent of this phenomenon in the Western European banking system, which has led to wide- spread refinancing problems for banking institution with the onset of the financial crisis. Besides that, macroeconomic factors, namely the GDP growth rate and the maturity premium, appear to deter- mine NSFR shortfalls of banks. As expected, banks prefer short-term funding over long-term funding in a steep yield curve environment and higher NSFR do lead to higher funding costs.

As to good news from our study, our results do not confirm that lower NSFR in fact have negatively influenced profitability measures such as the return on assets, the return on equity, and

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 25

the net interest margin, even though the funding costs for banks with a lower NSFR are – as expected – significantly lower. This would mean that there are business models relying on a balanced funding structure that will not achieve lower profits in the long run even though there would be some apparent funding cost disadvan- tages in the short run. At the same time, there is clear evidence that low NSFR banks exhibit higher earnings volatility so from the per- spective of a policymaker the new liquidity framework might have beneficial impacts on the stability and resilience of the banking system. As such, the framework would complement more heavy- handed measures to restrain banks from risky activities.

Taking all this together, it is clear that the new liquidity rules, particularly the long-term NSFR, will limit the banks’ ability to do maturity transformation – a core function of banks – and hence enforce a shift in some business models. While our research has shown that only a few of the larger commercial banks are signifi- cantly affected by the new funding rules, these institutions tend to have some systemic importance and there is thus the potential of reduced lending capacity and higher interest rates. NSFR did not have a significant impact on profitability in the past but with all banks forced into similar balance sheet structures, the earnings dynamics might not be the same in future. This is because with the introduction of NSFR, shareholder pressure for high returns will not abate and banks might seek excessive risks yet in other areas. While our research thus provides some new insights, impli- cations of the Basel III liquidity framework undoubtedly warrant further exploration.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the participants of the 2013 Midwest Finance Association Conference in Chicago, the participants of the World Finance Conference 2013 in Cyprus, Horst Bienert, Martin Lettau, Yvonne Seiler Zimmermann, Johan Walden, and the anony- mous reviewers for valuable comments.

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  • The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Related literature
    • 3 Data
    • 4 Methodology and model specification
      • 4.1 Multivariate modelling technique
      • 4.2 Model 1 specification
        • 4.2.1 Bank characteristics
        • 4.2.2 Owner characteristics
        • 4.2.3 Market/environmental characteristics
      • 4.3 Model 2 specification
        • 4.3.1 Dependent variables
        • 4.3.2 Independent variables
    • 5 Results
      • 5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate results
      • 5.2 Multivariate results
        • 5.2.1 Which factors influence the NSFR ratio?
        • 5.2.2 What is the influence of NSFR on Bank performance measures?
    • 6 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

1-s2.0-S0378426614002003-main.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Bank regulation, risk and return: Evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.003 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1904325047. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Hoque), d.andriosopoulos@strath.

ac.uk (D. Andriosopoulos), [email protected] (K. Andriosopoulos), [email protected] (R. Douady).

Hafiz Hoque a,⇑, Dimitris Andriosopoulos b, Kostas Andriosopoulos c, Raphael Douady d,e

a University of York, Freboys Lane, YO10 5GD York, United Kingdom b Strathclyde University, 100 Cathedral Street, G4 0LN Glasgow, United Kingdom c ESCP Europe Business School, 527 Finchley Road, NW3 7BG London, United Kingdom d CNRS, University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France e Riskdata, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 9 September 2013 Accepted 4 June 2014 Available online 14 June 2014

JEL classification: E44 G2 G20 G28

Keywords: Distance to default Systemic risk Idiosyncratic risk Beta Buy-and-hold returns Regulations

a b s t r a c t

In this paper, we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks. In this regard, we examine distance to default (Laeven and Levine, 2008), systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2010), idiosyncratic risk, and systematic risk. We employ World Bank survey data on regulations to test our conjectures. We find that regulatory restrictions, offi- cial supervisory power, capital stringency, along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises. Additionally, we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard, as this encouraged banks to take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, official supervi- sion and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Journalists, policymakers, and academics have argued that leni- ent regulations, reliance on short-term funding, excessive risk tak- ing, and corporate governance failure are responsible for the recent crisis. This paper examines the impact of regulations on the risk and returns of global banks during the credit and sovereign debt crises. We examine an extensive sample of large international banks that are the targets of current regulatory efforts while many of them are considered to be too big to fail by central banks. These banks are characterized by their large capitalization, global activ- ity, cross-border exposure, and/or representative size in the local industry. In this regard, we examine the determinants of distance to default (Laeven and Levine, 2008), systemic risk (marginal

expected shortfall [MES] proposed by Acharya et al., 2010), idio- syncratic risk, and systematic risk.

There is scant literature examining the impact of bank regula- tions on bank fragility and risk. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) use the adherence to the core principles from the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and show that bank supervision and regulation have very little effect on bank risk. Barth et al. (2004) use the World Bank survey data II and show that countries with higher regulatory restrictions have a higher probability of experiencing a banking crisis. Barth et al. (2013) show that banking restrictions are negatively related to bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies examine the impact of World Bank regulations on bank risk and return during the recent credit and sovereign debt crises. We fill this gap in the literature and take this opportunity to examine the effectiveness of World Bank regula- tions in terms of bank risk taking and returns.

We use the 2008 World Bank survey on bank regulation data to examine whether lenient regulations were responsible for exces- sive risk taking by the banks, which led them to perform badly

456 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

during the crisis (Stiglitz, 2010). The banking regulations survey contains 312 questions on different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no type of answers. We form scores for mea- suring different dimensions and following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) capital regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) private monitor- ing; and (5) deposit insurance. We test whether capital regulations, restrictions on bank activities, official supervisory power, private monitoring, and deposit insurance are related to risk and whether they affected the banks’ stock performance during the credit and sovereign debt crises. We perform our tests on a number of differ- ent risk measurements.

Our first measure of risk is the distance to default (log z), as in Laeven and Levine (2009). Log z measures the distance from bank- ruptcy. Since a large number of banks went bankrupt following the credit and sovereign debt crises, it is imperative and timely to examine whether regulations have any impact on global banks’ distance to default risk during these periods of turmoil. Our second measure of risk is the systemic measure of risk, MES. The use of individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk is relatively new and allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. Most of the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship between regulation and systemic stabil- ity by using the incidence of banking crisis at the country level as a measure of systemic risk (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). We examine the impact of regulation on individual banks’ contribution to the overall systemic risk. Our third measure of risk is the idiosyncratic risk of banks. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) argue that banks have learned from previous financial crises, leading banks to change their behavior and protect themselves from a future financial crisis. In light of the regulatory changes that occurred after the credit crisis, we assess whether banks changed their business models by taking risk more sensibly, as captured by idiosyncratic risk. Our final measure of risk is banks’ systematic risk which is estimated based on the market model. We also exam- ine whether regulations impacted banks’ systematic risk during the credit and sovereign debt crisis.

Bank supervisors form their assessments on bank risk based on their proprietary information. However, this information is accessed over infrequent intervals. Moreover, the daily change of market variables reflects bank risk in a timelier manner, but does not fully reflect all the information that is available to supervisors (Berger et al., 2000). Therefore, the information on bank risk, which is inherent in equity market variables, can complement supervi- sory assessment markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Elmer and Fissel, 2001; Curry et al., 2001). To assess whether the market variables explain risk, we include buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) calculated before the credit and sovereign debt cri- ses.1 Since return is the reward for taking risk, we evaluate the impact of regulations on banks’ stock performance.

Our results show that restrictions, private monitoring, and deposit insurance explain the distance to default during the credit crisis, while official power and private monitoring had a consistent impact on banks during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we do not find any evidence of deposit insurance having an impact. Follow- ing the credit crisis, official supervisory power has a significant impact on banks’ distance to default. This suggests that countries with higher official power could take the necessary corrective actions and strengthen their banking system. Additionally, we find that deposit insurance explains the distance to default during the credit crisis, but not in the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that as sovereign states were affected during the sovereign debt crisis, they

1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

were unable to support banks at the time. Hence, banks in countries with deposit insurance schemes have a higher probability to default.

Regarding our second risk measurement (MES) we find that activity restrictions and deposit insurance explain MES during the credit and the sovereign debt crisis. Capital restrictions also explain MES but only during the sovereign debt crisis. This is due to the fact that not only Tier I capital requirements have increased, but the quality requirements of capital have also increased. After the credit crisis, there have been significant changes in terms of capital ade- quacy and stress testing. We find that banks in countries with stric- ter capital requirements have lower systemic risk contributions.

The results on the third risk measurement, idiosyncratic risk, show that with greater official power and in the presence of deposit insurance schemes, banks take more risk resulting in higher idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. However, official power is no longer significant during the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that this could be due to the fact that banks became sig- nificantly fragile and therefore, regulators could not exert benefits anymore. Finally, we find a positive relationship between deposit insurance and idiosyncratic risk during both crisis periods, rein- forcing the view that deposit insurance increases moral hazard.

We also examine whether regulations impacted banks’ system- atic risk during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. We find that higher official power results in banks having higher systematic risk. This suggests that rent extraction by the regulators is also reflected by market risk. Additionally, banks in countries with higher capital restrictions are more protected in case of financial turmoil, and private monitoring prevents banks from taking riskier decisions, as reflected by a lower systematic risk. These findings hold for both the credit and sovereign debt crises. BHAR is signifi- cant in most of the risk regressions, suggesting that market vari- ables reflect bank risk in a timely manner. Hence, regulators should complement their decisions with the information inherent in market variables. Our results have other policy implications.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the hypotheses. In Section 3, we perform a descriptive analysis of the credit and the sovereign debt crises. Section 4 describes the variables used and employed methodology. Section 5 discusses the data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 6 pre- sents the results on the impact of regulation on risk and returns during the credit and sovereign debt crises. In Section 7, we con- duct robustness checks. The conclusions are in Section 8.

2. Hypothesis development for testing the impact of regulations on bank risk and returns

We take advantage of the 2008 World Bank survey on bank reg- ulation data to examine whether lenient regulations were respon- sible for excessive risk taking by the banks, which led them to perform badly during the crisis. Following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) capital regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) private monitor- ing; (5) deposit insurance. Since, excessive risk taking is primarily blamed for the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), in this section, we show that these five categories of regulations can relate to the risk- taking behavior of the banks. Therefore, we focus on these five cat- egories of regulations to develop and test our hypotheses. Finally, due to the conflicting theoretical predictions, it is an empirical question whether bank regulations have a positive or negative impact on bank risk and returns.

2.1. Bank capital and capital regulation

Core (Tier I) capital is at the focal point of banking regulation, as it helps banks when they face liquidity problems. Likewise, an

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 457

index of regulatory capital oversight looks at the quality of regula- tory capital held by the banks. In this section, we pay attention at the quantity and quality of regulatory capital. Previous research finds that stringent capital requirements reduce banking risk (Fernández and González, 2005). We test the importance of capital adequacy and respective capital-requirement regulations and how they can impact banks and their tendency on risk taking and per- formance during the recent crises.

Bank regulations stress the benefits of capital adequacy require- ments (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), as adequate capital enables banks to absorb unexpected losses and thus remain solvent. Like- wise, banks with limited liability are less prone to assume more risk with larger amounts of capital at risk. Berger et al. (1995) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) argue that capital adequacy requirements along with deposit insurance can have a significant effect on aligning the incentives of bank owners with those of depositors and other creditors.

However, theory offers contradictory predictions as to whether the imposition of capital requirements will have posi- tive effects (see Santos, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2003). A number of studies argue that capital requirements may increase risk-taking behavior (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999). Sim- ilarly, Thakor (1996) models the effect of risk-based capital requirements on bank asset allocation decisions when screening borrowers is costly. Assuming that equity capital is more expen- sive to raise than deposits, then an increase in risk-based capital requirements reduces the banks’ tendency to screen investment opportunities and increase their lending. Gorton and Winton (2000) show that in a general equilibrium framework, the increase of capital requirements has an inverse impact on banks’ supply of deposits, hence reducing the traditional liquidity- provision role of banks.

We use the recent credit and sovereign debt crises and address the theoretical contradictions on capital adequacy requirements along with the shift on new risk-based capital requirements in Basel II and III accords. We do so by examining the impact of cap- ital requirements, regarding Tier I capital, on bank risk and stock performance across countries. Alternatively, we use Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. This capital index also includes indicators for capital sources, other than cash and government securities, that are included in regulatory capital and whether authorities verify the source of capital. During a crisis we expect the banks to benefit from higher capital requirements. Hence, our first hypothesis is:

H1a. Higher capital requirements reduce bank risk during finan- cial turmoil.

H1b. Higher capital requirements increase banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.2. Restrictions on bank activities

If banks are allowed to do a broad range of activities they might engage in risky ventures that can be suboptimal for investors (Boyd et al., 1998). Restricting bank activities means imposing restric- tions on activities and securities banks may hold. Since bank assets are opaque, during a financial turmoil the value of risky securities can decline significantly. Limiting risky undertakings may decrease the financial losses given the opacity of bank assets. However, the results of Barth et al. (2004) indicate the opposite: restricting bank activities is negatively related to bank stability and increases the probability of a banking crisis. Therefore, we examine the relation- ship between activity restrictions and risk taking and returns

during the recent financial and sovereign debt crises as it can assist in assessing the effectiveness of restrictions.

According to Barth et al. (2004), the reasoning for restricting bank activities and banking commerce rests on five hypothetical reasons. First, there can be significant conflicts of interest if banks are involved in diverse activities such as securities and insurance underwriting and real estate investment. For instance, banks may try to ‘‘push’’ securities of troubled firms to uninformed investors (John et al., 1994; Saunders, 1985). Second, due to moral hazard, if banks are allowed to diversify their operations and range of activities, they will be more likely to engage in riskier investments, thus increasing their risk (Boyd et al., 1998). Third, the size and complexity of certain banks makes them difficult to monitor. Fourth, such banks may become so politically and economically powerful that they become ‘‘too big to discipline’’ (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Finally, large financial conglomerates can stifle com- petition and reduce banking efficiency (Barth et al., 2013). Based on these arguments, government supervision and regulation can improve banking by restricting bank activities. Moreover, these arguments imply a negative relationship between activity restric- tiveness and bank risk and a positive relationship between return and activity restrictions.

However, there are alternate theoretical reasons for permitting banks to engage in a broader range of activities. For instance, less supervisory restriction will allow banks to better utilize economies of scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000). Moreover, fewer regulatory restrictions might increase the banks’ franchise value, thus increasing their incentive to adopt prudent behavior. Finally, if banks are allowed to engage in a wider array of activities, this will increase their income diversification, resulting in better stability. The empirical evidence largely shows that restricting bank activities has adverse outcomes. In a cross-country investiga- tion, Barth et al. (2001) find that more regulatory restrictions on bank actions are related to a higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis and lower banking sector efficiency. Barth et al. (2004) find that restricting bank activities is not related to less con- centration, more competition, or greater securities market devel- opment. Barth et al. (2013) find that tighter restrictions are negatively associated with bank efficiency. What is more, bank restrictions can be designed in such a manner that they give regu- lators discretion and thus enhance their bargaining power for rent seeking (Djankov et al., 2002). In summary, there are contradicting views on the effects of activity restrictions, and therefore, we assess empirically the effect of activity restrictions during the credit and sovereign debt crises on bank risk and return. Our test- able hypotheses are as follows:

H2a. Greater restrictions to banking activities reduce bank risk during financial turmoil.

H2b. Greater restrictions to banking activities increase banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.3. Official supervisory power

Supervisory power can affect risk taking, and during turbulent times, supervisors should be able to perform corrective actions. Stringent supervisory control can potentially prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior. There are evi- dence (e.g., Fernández and González, 2005) and contra evidence (e.g., Barth et al., 2004) on that issue. Since we observe two crises with a short time lapse between them, and official supervisory power is a core part of World Bank regulations, we examine whether risk taking depends on monitoring and supervisory power.

458 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

It is costly and difficult to monitor banks and yet too little mon- itoring would lead to suboptimal performance. Therefore, greater official supervision and monitoring can mitigate this suboptimal performance (Beck et al., 2006). Moreover, banks can be suscepti- ble to bank runs and respective contagion due to information asymmetries. Supervision can reduce information asymmetries and help protect banks from potential bank runs to a certain extent. In addition, greater official supervision can help reduce the inherent moral hazard of deposit insurance schemes – as deposit insurance can lead banks to take excessive risks – and at the same time reduce the depositors’ incentives for privately mon- itoring the banks. In this regard, supervisory power is expected to be positively associated with bank returns and negatively associ- ated with risk.

To the contrary, powerful supervisors may use their powers to benefit favored voters, attract campaign donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002; Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Therefore, more powerful supervision can lead to corruption and hurting bank performance and stability. Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) focus on a different perspec- tive, which is the agency costs between bank supervisors and tax- payers. Rather than focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the behavior of a self-interested bank super- visor when there is uncertainty about the supervisor’s ability to monitor banks. Under these settings, they show that supervisors might lead to socially suboptimal arrangements. Thus, greater supervision can hinder bank operations when conditional on bank supervisors’ incentives and the ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision. As Beck et al. (2006) argue, if bank supervisory agen- cies have the authority to discipline noncompliant banks, the supervisors might use this power to induce or force banks to allo- cate credit so as to generate private or political benefits. As a con- sequence, supervisor power might be negatively associated with bank returns and positively associated with risk. During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from higher supervisory power. Our hypotheses on supervisory power are stated as follows:

H3a. Greater supervisory power reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H3b. Greater supervisory power increases banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.4. Private monitoring

Apart from regulatory supervision and monitoring, sharehold- ers can also monitor banks’ operations and performance and influ- ence their policy through investors’ monitoring ability. Related to this market-based view of regulations where market reward good banks and penalize bad ones, Fernández and González, 2005 find that regulations that promote and assist private monitoring of banks increase banks’ financial soundness by reducing moral haz- ard created by information asymmetries. Therefore, this section provides a discussion on how private monitoring can substitute or complement regulators’ supervision and affect bank’s attitude towards risk taking and performance during the recent financial crisis.

Private monitoring can be motivated and enhanced by official bank supervisors. For instance, Barth et al. (2006) find that some regulatory agencies require banks to obtain certified audits and/ or ratings from international rating agencies and to produce accu- rate, comprehensive, and consolidated information on the full range of their activities and risk management procedures. A set of countries also hold bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or misleading. Also, some countries enact deliberately

a ‘‘no deposit insurance’’ policy to stimulate private monitoring. Nevertheless, there are opposing views regarding the role and impact of bank monitoring by the private sector. One view argues for greater reliance on private monitoring and against official supervision. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argue, regarding govern- ment regulations, that banks will put pressure on politicians who, in turn, can inappropriately exert influence on the supervi- sory oversight. Moreover, regulators do not invest their own wealth in banks, resulting in a divergence of their incentives, in terms of monitoring and disciplining banks, with those of private creditors.

In contrast, another view argues for less reliance on private monitoring. Countries with under-developed capital markets and weak accounting standards and legal systems might not be able to rely effectively on private monitoring. Moreover, the fact that banks are complex and opaque institutions makes it difficult for private monitoring to keep up even in the most developed econo- mies. Therefore, a greater reliance on private monitoring of banks may lead eventually to the exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance (Barth et al., 2004). We explore the effect of these supervisory schemes on bank risk taking and performance during the credit and sovereign debt crises. Our hypotheses are as follows:

H4a. Greater private monitoring reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H4b. Greater private monitoring increases banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.5. Deposit insurance

During the credit crisis deposit insurance schemes came in the limelight and are considered as one of the tools in the regulators’ disposal for preventing the credit crisis from spreading further in the financial services system. On the other hand, the moral hazard in presence of deposit insurance induces banks to engage in exces- sive risk taking (Barth et al., 2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) Therefore, in this section, we discuss how the presence of deposit insurance can affect risk taking and how it affects performance. The effectiveness and role of deposit insur- ance can be evaluated once a crisis happens. Hence, we examine the role of deposit insurance on risk taking by global banks during the credit and sovereign debt crises.

In order to protect banks that experience liquidity problems but remain solvent, countries adopt deposit insurance schemes in order to prevent bank runs. Since deposit insurance can safeguard payment and credit systems overall, it enjoys a great number of supporters. Starting with Merton (1977), a number of theoretical papers have studied the relationship between deposit insurance and banking sector stability. This positive stabilization effect of deposit insurance obviously has greater importance during eco- nomic downturns when contagion is more likely to spread and bank runs are more likely to occur. Consistent with this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) show that the adoption of deposit insur- ance is related to lower bank risk in the European Union. Similarly, Chernykh and Cole (2011) show that the adoption of deposit insur- ance in Russia created safer banks. For US credit unions, Karels and McClatchey (1999) find stabilization effects from the adoption of deposit insurance. Anginer et al. (2013) find that bank risk is lower during a crisis in countries with deposit insurance.

However, deposit insurance may have adverse consequences, as it may encourage excessive risk-taking behavior, which might offset any stabilization benefits (Barth et al., 2004). There is also sizable agreement in the literature that deposit insurance enhances

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 459

moral hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to take on excessive risk. When deposits are insured, how- ever, bank depositors lack incentives to monitor (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). The lack of mar- ket discipline leads to excessive risk taking, culminating in banking crises. Anginer et al. (2013), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), and Barth et al. (2004) find evidence in support of this view. Nonetheless, there is the argument that regulation and supervision can control the moral hazard problem by designing an appropriate insurance scheme. Therefore, we examine the relationship of deposit insurance with banks’ returns and risk. During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The hypotheses are stated as follows:

H5a. The presence of deposit insurance reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H5b. The presence of deposit insurance enhances banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

3. A narrative of the credit and sovereign debt crises

Over the period 2000–2007, banking activities over the world experienced rapid growth leading to an expansion of their balance sheets and therefore to an increase in their risk appetite. For instance, banks increasingly via financial innovation expanded into foreign currency assets such as US dollar-denominated claims, and European banks in particular showed the largest growth in foreign claims. Even though the exposures to the respective foreign cur- rency claims were hedged off-balance sheet, this still led to an increase in funding risk, in which European banks had substantial funding needs of $1.1 to $1.3 trillion USD by mid-2007 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). Similarly, Acharya and Schnabl (2010) argue that the global imbalances do not offer a valid explanation as to why the financial crisis spread internationally. Rather, they argue, it is the fact that large commercial banks in both current account surplus and deficit countries had large exposures to asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits (valued at $1.2 trillion USD of short-term ABCP outstanding in June of 2007) that caused the financial crisis to spread so rapidly in 2007. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) also argue that it was the lax regulation monitoring the financial services industry that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007.

Fig. 1. Market Capitalization to

When the financial crisis started to unfold in 2007, this funding risk became more pronounced for banks, which had a significant impact in the markets such as FX and money markets. Moreover, European banks required the support of central banks in dealing with this associated risk until the end of September, 2008 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). During 2008–09, there was limited concern regarding European sovereign debt, but the shockwaves of the 2007 financial crisis triggered a reevaluation of asset prices, risk, and growth prospects, especially in countries with economic imbalances (Lane, 2012). As shown in Fig. 1, there is a significant increase in the market valuations relative to GDP leading up to the financial crisis. Once the financial crisis starts unfolding in 2007, there is a significant decrease of market valuations relative to GDP. Accordingly, we use 2007–08 as the credit crisis period to measure risk and stock returns. In 2009 and 2010, the markets are recovering from the financial shock of 2007–08, when the sov- ereign debt crisis starts to take hold, leading to further reduction in market valuations across the board. We use 2011 to measure risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. In 2012, though, there are signs of recovery, and in both crises, there is a significant decrease in market valuations, due to reevaluations of asset prices and factoring new potential risks (Lane, 2012), lasting more than a year and followed by a recovery.

Figs. 2 and 3 show the evolution of total loans outstanding and the respective annual changes that were given by banking institu- tions (domestic and foreign) in a set of EU countries and the US. The figures show that after 2004, the value of loans outstanding experiences a significant increase, reaching their peak in 2007 when the financial crisis erupts. Following the financial crisis, there is a small adjustment in the value of loans in 2008 and 2009, which increases again in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis starts. In the 2 years that follow the sovereign debt crisis, there is a small down- ward readjustment in the value of loans.

After 2007, there is a constant growth in sovereign debt (Fig. 4), resulting in a significant and abrupt rise in the yields of sovereign debt bonds in a number of countries in the European periphery. Fol- lowing, there is a divergence for a number of European periphery countries in terms of sovereign bond yield spreads, starting in early 2010. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) find a relationship between high current account deficits over 2005–08 and significant current account reversals and expenditures over 2008–10. Toward the end of 2009, there is an increase in the number of countries reporting large deficit-to-GDP ratios (Lane, 2012). Hui and Chung, 2011 show that CDS spreads rose significantly to almost 250 bps in February 2010, which they surpass in the spring of the same year.

GDP. Source: World Bank.

Fig. 2. Total Bank Loans Outstanding. Source: Bankscope.

Fig. 3. Logarithmic Changes in Total Loans Outstanding. Source: Bankscope.

Pu bl

ic D

eb t t

o G

D P

in P

er ce

nt ag

es

Cyprus France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States

Fig. 4. Public Debt to GDP. Source: IMF Public Database, Eurostat, World Bank, OECD.

460 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

4. Variables used and methodology

4.1. Distance to default

We use log z, as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009), to cap- ture default risk. Log z, which measures the distance from bank- ruptcy, is estimated as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. A higher z-score

indicates lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of z-score in our regressions, because the distribution of z-score is highly skewed.

Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the impact of the capital stringency index on the distance to default depends critically on the ownership structure. In widely held banks, a marginal increase in capital stringency has little impact on bank distance to default, while stronger capital stringency boosts bank risk when the bank

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 461

has a powerful owner. The evidence is consistent with the view that capital regulations increase the risk-taking incentives of own- ers (Koehn and Santomero, 1980). In the absence of a powerful owner the stringency of capital regulations has little marginal influence on risk. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) assess the log of dis- tance to default in the credit crisis and report that banks with higher ownership by the controlling shareholder have a lower dis- tance to default. In addition, banks with a more shareholder- friendly board have a lower distance to default. Finally, the index of capital regulation has a positive coefficient, while the current account, the index of powers of the supervisors, the index of pri- vate monitoring, and the deposit insurance variable all have a neg- ative coefficient. Our focus in this paper is to assess whether regulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the following equation with log z calculated during the credit and the sovereign debt crises.

Logzi;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officiali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð1Þ

Log zi,j,crisis is log z for bank i, in country j during the credit and sov- ereign debt crises respectively. We calculate log z as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the standard devia- tion of ROA. For estimating log z during the credit crisis, we use the capital-to-assets ratio in 2008 and for ROA we use the average return on assets during 1998–2008 along with the standard devia- tion of ROA over the same period, as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, the capital-to-assets ratio is taken at 2011 and for ROA we use the average return on assets during 2001–2011, along with the standard deviation of ROA over the same period. Officiali,j is a score that reflects the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency where bank i is located in country j. Capi- tali,j is a score that reflects the regulatory oversight of bank capital for bank i in country j. Restricti,j is a score that measures the regula- tory restrictions on the activities of banks where bank i is located in country j. Private monitoringi,j is a score that measures the degree of private monitoring where bank i is located in country j. Deposit insurancei,j is a dummy variable equal to one where there is explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008).

The explanatory regulation variables are retrieved from the World Bank2 as in Caprio et al. (2007, revised in June 2008), The banking regulations survey contains 312 questions on different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no types of answers. We form scores for measuring different dimensions, which are called official, capital, restrict, and private monitoring. All the bank-level and country-level controls are described in Sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. Finally, we estimate Eq. (1) with ordinary least squares (OLS). We ensure that multicollinearity is not present by checking the correlation matrix and by estimating the variance infla- tion factor (VIF) following the estimation of our models.3

4.2. Marginal expected shortfall

The recent financial crisis has led to a reevaluation of risk taking and regulation of the financial system, with a transformed interest in systemic fragility and macro prudential regulation. This needs an effort to understand not only the risk of individual financial institutions but an individual bank’s contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, from a regulatory view- point, there is an increasing agreement that in safeguarding sys- temic stability, the link in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more important than the absolute level of risk taking in

2 This data set is taken from http://econ.worldbank.org/ 3 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

any individual institution. As an alternative measure of bank-level risk, we compute a measure of each bank’s contribution to the sys- tem as a whole. Our measure of marginal expected shortfall is based on the expected capital shortfall framework, as in Acharya et al. (2012).

The systemic expected shortfall of an institution refers to the capital deficiency a financial firm would face in case of a systemic event. It is based on the idea that a shortage of capital is hazardous for the individual firm but becomes risky for the whole economy if it happens just when the rest of the banking sector is also under- capitalized. This measure is intended to capture how much each firm adds to the risk of the banking system as a whole. The MES of a firm is the expected loss an equity investor in a financial firm would experience if the market declined substantially. Following Acharya et al. (2010), we use MES as our systemic risk measure. MES measures the average firm return on days when the market as a whole is in the tail of its loss distribution:

MESi t ¼

1 T

XT

t¼1

ðRi t jR

M t < CÞ ð2Þ

Ri t is the equity return of financial firm i, and RM

t is the market index return. A systemic event is defined as a drop of the market index below a threshold C, over a given time horizon. The systemic event is thus denoted by RM

t <C. We estimate the MES by following Acharya et al. (2010) at a standard risk level of 5%, using daily data for equity returns retrieved from DataStream. This means that we take the 5% worst days for the market returns (RM

t ) during the credit and sover- eign debt crises and then compute the average return on any given firm (Ri

t) for these days. Our main focus in this paper is whether reg- ulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We esti- mate the same equation using MES as left-hand side variable calculated during the credit crisis and the Sovereign Debt crisis.

MESi;j;Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þXBank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð3Þ

MESi,j,crisis is the marginal expected shortfall for bank i, in country j during the credit and sovereign debt crises respectively. We calcu- late MES, using Eq. (2), for the credit crisis from June 2007 to December 2008 to measure banks’ systemic risk,4 as in, Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sov- ereign debt crisis, we calculate MES from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure banks’ systemic risk during that period. In the robustness section, we use two alternative time period to calculate systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.3. Idiosyncratic risk

We analyze idiosyncratic risk as a measure of business/opera- tional risk of banks as in Kane and Unal (1988) and Flannery and James (1984). Recently, after being hit by the financial crisis, there was a significant increase in interest in idiosyncratic risks of banks. For instance, Hoque (2013) reports a positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank capital during the credit crisis and a negative relationship during the sovereign debt crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find a negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank capital and a positive relationship between owner- ship and idiosyncratic risk. Anginer et al. (2013) show that deposit insurance is positively associated with risk taking in the pre-crisis

4 Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) used the same period for the credit crisis to analyse share price performance.

462 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

period and negatively associated with risk taking in the crisis per- iod. Idiosyncratic is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annual- ized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta. We assess whether regulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation twice using idiosyncratic risk as the left-hand side variable calculated for the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.

Idiosyncratic Riski;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j

þ b3Restricti;j þ b4Privatei;j

þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1

þ ei;j;t ð4Þ

Idiosyncratic riski,j,crisis is the annualized residual risk for bank i, in country j for the credit and sovereign debt crises respectively. For the credit crisis, we calculate idiosyncratic risk from the one-factor market model regression residuals by using banks’ stock returns and the MSCI World Index returns, as a proxy for the market port- folio, over June 2007 to December 2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we calculate the idiosyncratic risk from the one factor market model regression residuals by using banks’ stock returns and the MSCI World Index returns, as a proxy for the market portfolio, from May 2011 to December 2011. In the robustness section, we use two alternative time periods to calculate idiosyncratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1

4.4. Systematic risk

We analyze systematic risk as a measure of banks’ market risk, as in Kane and Unal (1988) and Flannery and James (1984). A higher sensitivity of bank share prices with market indices during both crises leads us to examine what factors drive market risk. Haq and Heaney (2012) analyze the systematic risk of banks in European countries and find that systematic risk is negatively related to bank capital, size, and charter value. Our systematic risk measure, Beta, is the beta coefficient estimated based on the one- factor model (CAPM) by regressing individual banks’ stock returns against the MSCI World Index returns. We analyze whether regula- tions affect systematic risk when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation twice, using Beta as the left-hand side variable calculated during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.

Betai;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð5Þ

Beta,i,j,crisis is the measure of systematic risk for bank i, in country j for the credit and sovereign debt crises, respectively. For the credit crisis, we estimate beta by employing one-factor market model regressions from June 2007 to December 2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we estimate beta by employing one-factor market model regressions over May 2011 to December 2011. We use the MSCI World Index returns as the proxy for market returns. In the robust- ness section, we use two alternative time period for estimating beta during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explana- tory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.5. Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)

Since the late 1990’s, there has been a growing shift in the view of the importance of market variables on the risk assessment of banks and how these variables can enhance supervisory monitor- ing (Greenspan, 1998;Curry et al. 2001, 2003). Moreover, bank supervisors assess a bank’s risk through their proprietary informa- tion gathered at infrequent intervals. Berger et al. (2000) suggest that market data are not only informative but that they can also contain information not yet incorporated into supervisors’ infor- mation, while market data do not fully reflect all the information that is available to supervisors. Since market variables contain information on firm risk reflected in the daily price changes, super- visory assessment can be complemented via the equity markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Elmer and Fissel, 2001; Curry et al., 2001). Krainer and Lopez, 2001, 2003 also show that cumulative abnormal returns are able to anticipate changes to banks’ risk captured by credit ratings. Moreover, the authors argue that equity market variables add value to regulators’ assessment of banks and in a timely manner.

As in Krishnan et al. (2005), banks’ stock market performance contains supplementary information regarding banks’ risk, which is also reflected in a timely manner. Based on the learning hypoth- esis, banks that learn from a past bad experience will adjust their risk attitude (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). In turn, the shift in banks’ risk attitude should be reflected in their stock performance. There- fore, as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we estimate banks’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns to assess what drives their performance and whether supervision regulations and any capital measures affect banks’ risk as reflected in their stock price.

To measure stock market performance, we calculate the BHAR following Beltratti and Stulz (2012), as follows:

BHARi;j;crisis ¼ YT

t¼1

ð1þ Ri;j;crisisÞ � YT

t¼1

ð1þ RM;t;crisisÞ ð6Þ

where BHARi,j,crisis is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for bank i in country j during a crisis period, Ri,j,crisis is the daily return of bank i in country j, and RM,j,crisis is the daily return on the market proxied by the MSCI World Index return. Then, we estimate the following equation twice, using BHAR as the left hand side variable calculated during the credit and sovereign debt crises.

BHARi;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð7Þ

We calculate BHAR from June 2007 to December 2008 to mea- sure banks’ share price performance. Even though the credit crisis did not officially end at the end of 2008, since it continued through the first few months in 2009, the fall in share prices at the begin- ning of 2009 may have been partly due to bank rescues. Moreover, we use December 31, 2008, as a cut-off point to be consistent with Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We calcu- late the BHAR from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure banks’ share price performance during the sovereign debt crisis. In the robustness section, we use two alternative period definitions to calculate risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. We use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.6. Bank-level controls

To understand the importance of bank capital during times of turmoil, we use Tier I capital, which is a measure of capital

5 The list of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions is very much as had been expected, with 17 European banks, eight US ones, three Japanese, and one Chinese: Bank of America, Bank of China, Bank of New York Mellon, Banque Populaire CE, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, Crédit Agricole, HSBC, ING Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho FG, Morgan Stanley, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Société Générale, State Street, Sumitomo Mitsui, UBS, Unicredit Group, and Wells Fargo. The FSB and the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision drew up a list of G-SIFIs based on five criteria: their absolute size, their complexity, the extent of their cross-border activity, and the degree to which they are interconnected with the rest of the financial system.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 463

adequacy, following Laeven and Levine (2009), and which was more relevant during the crisis, according to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010). Tier 1 capital is defined as shareholder funds plus per- petual noncumulative preference shares relative to risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks, measured under the Basel rules. This figure is expressed as a percentage and should be at least 4%. Banks with greater quality capital are more able to absorb losses during financial turmoil (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Therefore, investors attach great importance to a bank’s capital quality, and we expect a positive relationship between bank capital and risk.

To shed light on the impact of liability structures, we use depos- its, defined as total deposits relative to total assets (Anginer et al., 2013). With explicit deposit insurance in place, deposit financing is not subject to runs. However, other money market-related funding is subject to runs (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Gorton, 2010) and dries up during crisis times. Therefore, we use funding fragility, intro- duced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), defined as the ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short-term bor- rowing to total deposits plus money market and short-term fund- ing. We expect banks with more deposits and less funding fragility to take more risk.

To capture the asset side of the balance sheet, we use several measures. The major asset of any type of commercial, mortgage, and cooperative bank is loans. Loans include residential mortgage loans, other mortgage loans, other consumer or retail loans, corpo- rate & commercial loans, and other loans minus reserve against possible losses on impaired or nonperforming loans. Banks with more loans on their books are more likely to have relatively lower exposure to off-balance sheet securities (e.g., derivatives), and thus run a lower risk with the widening of the credit spreads during a crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Therefore, banks with higher loans rather than risky securities should perform better, ceteris paribus. However, because we do not have the composition of loans as such, we do not have an expectation of the sign of loans. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use liquidity, defined as liquid assets scaled by total assets. As banks with more liquid assets are expected to perform better during a crisis, we expect a positive relationship between liquidity and stock performance.

To capture the income statement exposure, we use income diversity. Banks that derive their income from diverse activities have less exposure during a crisis. We use income diversity, by fol- lowing Laeven and Levine (2008), defined as the absolute value of difference between net interest income and other operating income divided by total operating income.

4.7. Country-level governance and macroeconomic variables

We include macroeconomic variables as additional controls. For instance, countries with a higher level of financial development and economic fundamentals might have different risk and returns. To control for country-level development, we use the gross domes- tic product (GDP) per capita at 2006 constant terms, as in Anginer et al. (2013). To control for the financial position of the country, we use current account balance, as in Klomp and de Haan, 2012. Cur- rent acc. bal. is the current account balance divided by GDP. To con- trol for level of market competition, we use concentration, as in Laeven and Levine (2009). Concentration is the total assets of the largest three banks in each country divided by total banking assets.

Evidence shows that companies in countries with better coun- try-level governance have better returns, as shareholders’ rights are better protected (John et al., 2008). ADRI is La Porta et al’s. (1998) anti-director index as revised by Djankov et al. (2008). A higher value means better protected shareholder rights. The vari- able institution is used, following Klomp and de Haan, 2012. It is the arithmetic average of six indicators called voice, political sta- bility, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,

and corruption that are reported in Kaufmann et al. (2008). A higher value for an institution means that better and more efficient supervisory institutions are present.

5. Data and descriptive statistics

5.1. Descriptive statistics

We collected bank data from Bankscope. We searched for the largest 1000 banks in Bankscope by asset size at the end of 2006. Included in the sample are commercial banks, savings banks, coop- erative banks, and mortgage banks. When we selected the largest 1000 banks, Bankscope provided both listed and unlisted banks, with a total of 502 unlisted banks. Since we focused on listed-only banks, this reduced the number of banks to a significant extent. Moreover, as we assessed the impact of regulations on global banks in the credit and sovereign debt crisis, we employed those banks listed during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. In total, 120 banks were delisted following the credit crisis. In addition, as we required bank balance sheet and income statement data for 2006 and 2010, we excluded the delisted banks, as data was not available in Bankscope. Our final sample included 378 global banks. We retained 378 banks for which we had accounting and share price data. All the systematically important banks (29) are included in the sample.5 Finally, we downloaded data on share prices and the MSCI World Index from DataStream; all data is in US dollars.

Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) distance to default is 3.106 (2.965) during the credit crisis. The dis- tance to default is higher during the credit crisis and significantly different than in the sovereign debt crisis. Our measure for sys- temic risk, MES, is lower during the credit crisis. The mean (med- ian) difference test shows a significant difference between the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Systematic risk, as mea- sured by beta, was lower during the credit crisis as compared to the sovereign debt crisis. It seems to increase after the 2007–08 credit crisis. Idiosyncratic volatility shows a similar picture, as it is higher before the 2011 crisis. The 2007–08 credit crisis contrib- uted to the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. The mean (med- ian) BHAR2007–08 during the credit crisis is �0.502 (�0.571), which shows that banks perform poorly. BHAR2011 is also nega- tive and shows that banks perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis as well.

All the accounting variables are calculated before the crisis. Tangible equity does not show any significant difference between these two periods. Average Tier I capital shows that banks increase regulatory capital significantly before the 2011 crisis period, in order to gradually comply with the new capital requirements introduced in Basel III. Liquid assets are significantly higher before the 2007–08 crisis than in 2011. There is no significant difference in the deposit ratios of the banks during those periods. Funding fra- gility is higher before the credit crisis compared to the sovereign debt crisis. The results give an early indication that in the after- math of the 2007–08 credit crisis, banks strive to strengthen their positions by reducing their funding fragility. The loan to total asset

Table 1 Descriptive statistics.

N Mean Median p5 p95

The 2007–08 credit crisis Log z 311 3.106 2.965*** 1.836 4.315 MES 378 �0.075*** �0.074*** �0.099 �0.050 Beta 326 1.006* 1.012 0.317 1.693 Idiosyncratic 378 42.335*** 37.669*** 19.108 79.695 BHAR 346 �0.502 �0.571 �0.894 0.022 Tier I capital 295 9.739*** 8.850*** 5.840 16.530 Liquidity 342 17.268*** 14.030** 2.910 42.180 Deposit 342 61.254 67.476 16.565 90.393 Funding fragility 342 21.259** 11.826** 0.952 73.279 Loan 342 59.094* 59.826*** 32.501 82.764 Income diversity 342 0.177* 0.120* �0.038 0.737 GDP 378 24.196 29.380 0.910 46.520 Current acc. bal. 378 1.806 1.532 �10.013 12.335

The sovereign debt crisis of 2011 Log z 311 2.765 2.730 2.124 3.483 MES 378 �0.066 �0.060 �0.095 �0.050 Idiosyncratic 372 48.606 44.200 14.161 86.492 Beta 310 1.072 1.028 0.358 1.852 BHAR 369 �0.283 �0.253 �0.711 0.068 ROA 354 0.716 0.605 �0.158 2.309 Tier I capital 321 11.159 10.400 6.800 17.100 Liquidity 356 14.668 11.400 3.180 34.980 Deposit 356 62.306 66.421 19.819 91.981 Funding fragility 356 17.710 10.310 0.484 67.742 Loan 356 61.178 62.528 34.360 82.639 Income diversity 354 0.144 0.100 �0.021 0.490 GDP 378 24.56 30.22 1.38 46.83 Current acc. bal. 378 1.060 1.23 �6.50 12.32 Total assets (bn$) 352 204.00 45.20 13.33 1176.21

Country-level variables Concentration 378 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.85 ADRI 378 3.69 4.00 1.00 5.00 Institute 378 0.83 1.18 �0.56 1.68 Official 378 10.11 10.00 7.00 13.00 Capital 378 5.91 6.00 4.00 8.00 Restrict 378 9.52 10.00 5.00 13.00 Private 378 6.74 7.00 5.00 8.00 Deposit insurance 378 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00

The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find accounting and share price data. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. *** Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 1% level. ** Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 5% levels. * Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 10% levels.

464 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

ratio is slightly higher before 2011. Even though the per-capita GDP is the same during both crisis periods, the current account bal- ance as a percentage of GDP deteriorates during the sovereign debt crisis.

All the regulations variables show a good degree of variability. The 5th percentile for official supervisory power is 7, and the 95th percentile is 13. Capital restrictions are bounded between 4 and 8. The country-level variables show a wide variety of regula- tion levels. For instance, concentration shows a minimum of 0.32 and a maximum of 0.85. Eighty-four percent of our sample banks have explicit deposit insurance. In sum, there is a lot of variation in the regulation levels, which makes it possible to test our conjectures.

5.2. Cross-country variations

Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the risk and return characteristics of banks across countries. In particular, we report cross-country variations for countries that have at least five banks in the sample. Banks in Poland have the highest distance to default

(log z) measure during the credit crisis, but this changes during the sovereign debt crisis, as banks in Poland become more vulnerable to sovereign debt exposure and uncertainty. We find that Chilean banks have the highest systemic risk, as the MES is the lowest for these two countries during both the credit and sovereign debt crises. Banks in Austria have the lowest idiosyncratic risk in both the credit (18.41) and the sovereign debt (27.34) crises. In contrast, banks in Indonesia have the highest idiosyncratic risk during both crisis periods. With regard to beta, banks in Switzerland and the US have the highest beta values for both crisis periods (beta2007:1.48, beta2011:1.67 for Switzerland and beta2007:1.45, beta 2011:1.78 for the US, respectively). Moreover, the banks based in Japan have the lowest beta during the credit crisis (0.67), and this remains low during the sovereign debt crisis (0.86). The lowest BHAR is reported for Greece during both the credit (�0.759) and the sover- eign debt (�0.902) crises. Banks in Japan perform relatively better during both crisis periods (BHAR is �0.230 in 2007–08 and 0.003 in 2011).

6. Empirical results

6.1. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the credit crisis

This section presents the results on bank risk and returns during the credit crisis. In particular, we assess the impact of a number of regulations, while controlling for bank-specific characteristics, on four measurements of bank risk and the buy-and-hold returns dur- ing the credit crisis.

6.1.1. Distance to default We first examine whether the regulations have any impact on

the distance to default, as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009). Table 4, columns (1)–(2) report the regression results, with distance to default (log z) as the dependent variable. The results for the credit crisis show that restriction, private monitoring, and deposit insurance are negatively and significantly related to the distance to default. These results imply that the restrictions imposed on bank activities do not increase the soundness of the banks when a crisis breaks out. Due to moral hazard issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to conduct any activities (Boyd et al., 1998). However, we find that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank soundness, consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), deposit insurance could influence bank soundness in two opposite ways. Firstly, if deposit insurance is in place, it increases bank soundness by reducing the chances of bank runs. In contrast, banks may engage in exces- sive risk-taking behavior. Our results here highlight the second view. In the presence of deposit insurance, banks are less sound amidst financial turmoil. Our results are consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who show that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises.

In column (2), we include buy-and-hold returns before the credit crisis, Tier 1 capital, funding fragility, loans, income diver- sity, log of assets, GDP per capita, current account balance, and concentration of banking sector. We find that our main results in terms of regulations survive after controlling for other variables. We include BHAR to test whether the market provides any infor- mation on bank soundness, but we find no such evidence. We include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are sounder, and we find it is strongly and positively related to bank soundness. However, this is in contrast to Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We find that size is negatively related to distance to default, which implies that larger banks are less safe. Finally, con- centration is significantly positively related to bank soundness.

Table 2 Cross-country variation in selected variables.

Country N Log Z 2007

Log Z 2011

MES 2007

MES 2011

Idiosync 2007

Idiosync 2011

BETA 2007

Beta 2011

BHAR crisis07

BHAR crisis11

Australia 6 1.140 1.048 �0.078 �0.060 0.271 0.407 1.12 1.15 �0.637 �0.253 Austria 5 1.103 0.929 �0.062 �0.058 0.184 0.273 0.67 0.62 �0.332 �0.288 Canada 9 1.120 0.992 �0.076 �0.0568 0.267 0.407 0.63 1.10 �0.556 �0.167 Chile 5 1.109 �0.112 �0.203 0.454 0.823 0.87 0.98 �0.471 �0.36 China-People’s Rep. 18 0.704 1.013 �0.068 �0.058 0.434 0.415 1.01 0.95 �0.529 �0.22 France 17 1.161 0.905 �0.071 �0.065 0.302 0.431 1.08 1.00 �0.683 �0.428 Germany 8 1.048 0.942 �0.074 �0.075 0.357 0.519 1.34 1.16 �0.692 �0.348 Greece 6 1.188 1.018 �0.075 �0.103 0.436 0.734 1.43 1.32 �0.759 �0.902 Hong Kong 6 1.193 1.132 �0.078 �0.061 0.326 0.298 1.19 0.89 �0.570 �0.258 India 28 1.007 1.014 �0.071 �0.061 0.574 0.491 1.07 1.04 �0.483 �0.500 Indonesia 6 1.198 1.176 �0.092 �0.072 1.087 0.674 1.09 1.24 �0.654 �0.212 Israel 5 1.053 1.047 �0.066 �0.068 0.340 0.451 1.12 1.12 �0.578 �0.403 Italy 21 0.937 1.031 �0.069 �0.068 0.302 0.478 0.93 0.91 �0.552 �0.485 Japan 71 1.025 0.898 �0.070 �0.053 0.392 0.379 0.67 0.86 �0.230 0.003 Poland 9 1.479 0.999 �0.083 �0.078 0.420 0.579 1.38 0.94 �0.711 �0.511 Russian Federation 6 1.112 1.256 �0.071 �0.081 0.626 0.574 0.74 0.55 �0.738 �0.296 Saudi Arabia 6 1.393 1.034 �0.076 �0.057 0.363 0.464 – 0.84 �0.342 �0.12 Spain 13 1.126 1.018 �0.064 �0.073 0.378 0.554 0.99 0.93 �0.577 �0.453 Switzerland 5 1.296 0.986 �0.078 �0.070 0.380 0.649 1.48 1.67 �0.604 �0.438 Taiwan 5 1.035 1.015 �0.061 �0.060 0.518 0.530 1.01 1.05 �0.313 �0.281 Thailand 7 0.935 1.076 �0.115 �0.081 0.614 0.633 0.99 1.33 �0.613 �0.257 Turkey 8 1.246 1.209 �0.079 �0.073 0.770 0.568 1.16 1.18 �0.634 �0.454 United Arab

Emirates 6 1.208 1.003 �0.070 �0.054 0.476 0.416 – 1.30 �0.406 �0.071

United Kingdom 16 0.779 0.858 �0.081 �0.0585 0.343 0.473 1.28 1.54 �0.664 �0.224 USA 18 1.197 0.917 �0.085 �0.071 0.381 0.727 1.45 1.78 �0.690 �0.300

The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find accounting and share price data. In this table we present the results for countries that have at least 5 banks. BHAR 2007–08 is the buy-and-hold return for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 period. BHAR 11 is the buy-and- hold return from June 2011 until December 2011. Beta2007 is estimated on a regression of weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from June 2007 to December 2008. Idiosync2007 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta2007. Beta2011 is estimated on a regression of the weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from June 2011 until December 2011. Idiosync2010 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta2011.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 465

6.1.2. Systemic risk From a regulatory viewpoint, there is increasing consensus that

the correlation in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk taking in any individual institution. The financial crisis of 2007–08 highlighted the impor- tance of systemic risk leading regulators to focus more on prevent- ing future financial crises from spreading through the financial system, e.g., the ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, striving to set new regulatory require- ments for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). Acharya (2009) suggests that if sovereign states or central banks provide an implicit guarantee to cover losses stemming from a sys- temic crisis, banks will have more incentives to take on correlated risks. Guaranteed banks will not have any incentives to diversify their operations, as they are protected by the guarantees. Accord- ing to Anginer et al. (2013), deposit insurance not only increases bank-level risk taking through the standard moral hazard channel, but it may also increase risk-taking on the whole as well. The use of individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk measure is rela- tively new and allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit crisis and sovereign debt crisis. Most of the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship between regulation and systemic stability by using the incidence of banking crisis at the country level as a measure of systemic risk (e.g., Demirgüç- Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).

In this section, we examine the relationship between regula- tions and bank-level systemic risk during the credit crisis. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.1. We use marginal expected shortfall as the dependent variable to measure banks’ systemic risk, as described in Section 4. The results are in columns (3)–(4) in Table 3. The results show that capital regulation and activity restrictions

are positively related to systemic risk during the credit crisis. This suggests that better oversight of capital is related to higher MES, which means lower systemic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005, who report that stringent capital requirements reduce banking risk. Moreover, higher activity restrictions reduce individual banks’ contribution towards systemic risk. The results also show that deposit insurance is negatively related to MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk, which increases the chance of bank runs. These results are consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who find that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. When we introduce bank- and country-level control variables (column (4), Table 3) most of the results related to regulations survive. None of the con- trol variables is significant. In this specification, private monitoring is positively related to MES, implying that higher private monitor- ing leads to higher MES. In other words, higher private monitoring reduces individual banks’ contribution towards systemic risk.

6.1.3. Idiosyncratic risk Next we examine the impact of regulations on idiosyncratic vol-

atility. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.1, and we use idiosyncratic vol- atility as the dependent variable to measure banks’ business risk, as described in Section 4. The results are in columns (5)–(6) in Table 3. The results in column (5), i.e., without bank- and coun- try-level controls, show that official power and deposit insurance is positively and capital and restrictions are negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. The results show that higher capital restrictions lower the idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. In the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risks, as deposit insurance is positively related to

Table 3 Risk analysis, the credit crisis.

Log z MES Idiosyncratic risk Beta

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Cons 4.532*** (12.45) 2.683*** (4.34) �10.348*** (�11.51) �12.103*** (�5.44) 52.856*** (5.83) 25.640 (1.28) 1.438*** (5.72) 0.041 (0.07) Official 0.022 (0.85) 0.012 (0.64) �0.059 (�0.99) �0.099 (�1.41) 1.728*** (2.88) 1.454** (2.32) 0.045*** (2.77) 0.066*** (3.50) Capital �0.043 (�1.24) 0.013 (0.47) 0.062 (0.81) 0.058 (0.59) �1.308** (�2.65) �0.734* (�1.83) �0.055** (�2.47) �0.028** (�2.03) Restriction �0.043* (�2.08) �0.034* (�1.74) 0.221*** (4.66) 0.269*** (3.94) �0.833* (�1.74) �0.937 (�1.49) �0.018 (�1.39) 0.000 (�0.01) Private monitoring �0.151*** (�3.07) �0.115** (2.32) 0.174 (1.50) 0.294* (1.78) �1.275 (�1.10) �1.550 (�1.07) �0.057* (�1.79) �0.097** (�2.26) Deposit insurance �0.047*** (�2.36) �0.041** (2.35) �0.674** (�2.18) �0.690* (�1.69) 2.119*** (2.66) 2.626*** (2.70) 0.069 (0.77) 0.013 (0.12) BHAR 0.001 (0.59) �0.003 (�0.62) 0.093** (2.27) 0.004*** (2.87) Tier 1 0.101*** (8.90) 0.057 (1.43) 0.412 (1.12) �0.001 (�0.08) Funding fragility �0.001 (�0.58) 0.006 (0.63) �0.284*** (�3.65) �0.002 (�0.70) Loans 0.002 (0.55) �0.001 (�0.10) 0.017 (0.17) �0.002 (�0.67) Income diversity �0.033 (�0.30) 0.121 (0.31) 0.990 (0.27) �0.081 (�0.79) Size �0.158** (�2.11) �0.124 (�0.47) 6.083** (2.51) 0.257*** (3.59) GDP per cap 0.001 (0.22) 0.003 (0.26) �0.144 (�1.60) 0.005* (1.73) Current acc. bal. �0.006 (�1.23) �0.003 (�0.19) �0.201 (�1.27) �0.015*** (�2.92) Concentration 0.532** (2.28) 0.794 (0.94) 5.247 (0.70) 0.113 (0.49) ADRI �0.067 (�1.60) 0.128 (0.87) 0.056 (0.04) �0.021 (�0.49)

Adj. R2 (%) 5.07 35.86 8.04 6.72 1.60 9.28 2.40 17.54 N 312 289 350 275 378 295 341 266

All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting data are taken end of 2006. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

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Table 4 Stock market performance, the credit crisis.

Dependent Variable: BHAR 2007–08

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant �118.438*** (�7.37) �68.023*** (�5.57) �63.911*** (�4.26) �46.089*** (�2.88) Official 1.824** (1.99) 2.888*** (4.90) 2.915*** (4.57) 2.641*** (4.08) Capital 1.33 (1.10) 0.983 (1.21) 0.05 (0.05) 0.665 (0.71) Restriction 2.009*** (2.62) 1.135** (2.27) 0.891** (2.32) 0.892* (2.27) Private monitoring 3.188* (1.69) 1.642*** (2.25) 2.806* (1.91) 1.573* (2.10) Deposit insurance �5.436 (�1.18) 3.749 (1.04) 7.796* (1.72) 3.977 (0.84) Tier 1 0.649 (1.33) 0.616* (1.70) 0.731** (1.92) 0.257 (0.66) Log z �0.694 (�0.86) �0.68 (�0.85) �0.939 (�1.16) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.133* (�1.86) �0.267*** (�3.14) �0.206** (�2.48) Beta �43.362*** (�15.78) �39.225*** (�12.02) �41.394*** (�12.55) Funding fragility 0.109 (1.38) Deposit 0.112 (1.70) Liquid �0.07 (�0.65) Loan �0.279*** (�3.16) GDP per cap �0.286*** (�2.65) Current acc. bal. 0.422** (2.31) 0.099 (0.52) Concentration �9.595 (�1.20) �5.685 (�0.65) ADRI 0.756 (0.50) 0.775 (0.52) Institution �0.923 (�0.34)

Adj. R2 (%) 8.13 61.98 63.14 63.71 N 275 247 247 247

The dependent variable is BHAR 2007–08 for the sample banks. BHAR 2007–08 is calculated for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 period. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2006. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 467

idiosyncratic risk, consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Anginer et al. (2013). Our results support the moral hazard channel of risk taking in the presence of deposit insurance.

We then introduce the bank- and country-level control vari- ables in column (6). The results with respect to the regulations are mostly the same, with the exception that restriction is no longer significant. We include BHAR before the crisis and find that it is positive and significant. This suggests that banks with high returns before the crisis have higher risk during the crisis. The mar- ket imposes some discipline in terms of returns, which leads banks to take more risk. Moreover, the higher the funding fragility the lower the risk, as before the credit crisis, the short-term funding market is working well. Finally, larger banks take more risks as the log of assets is positively related to idiosyncratic risk.

6.1.4. Systematic risk In this section, we examine the impact of regulations on banks’

systematic risk. Therefore, we use banks’ beta as the dependent variable, as described in Section 4, along with the same regression specifications and control variables as those in Section 6.1.1. The results are in columns (7)–(8) in Table 3. The results in column (7), excluding bank- and country-level variables, show that official supervision is positively related to banks’ market risk. This is puz- zling, as one would expect higher official supervision to prevent banks from taking excessive risks, hence resulting in lower market risk. In contrast, and as expected, we find that capital restrictions and private monitoring are negatively related to market risk. This finding, which is consistent with Fernández and González, 2005, suggests that more stringent capital regulations and private mon- itoring prevent banks from taking excessive risk, resulting in their increased ability to absorb losses and be less sensitive to system- atic risk. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that deposit insur- ance affects banks’ systematic risk.

We then introduce the bank- and country-level controls, and our results on the impact of regulations remain the same. We also introduce BHAR to test whether there is any feedback through the

market returns on beta, and we find that BHAR is highly significant and positive. This suggests that banks with high BHAR before the credit crisis are more sensitive to systematic risk during the crisis. In addition, we find that larger banks have higher beta, which shows the systemic importance of large banks in their respective stock markets. Finally, GDP per capita is positively related while current account balance is negatively related to beta.

6.1.5. Buy-and-hold-returns In this section, we assess the drivers of banks’ stock market per-

formance during the two crises. The results on the stock market performance during the credit crisis, reported in Table 4, show that official supervision is consistently positive and highly significant. This suggests that the markets show greater confidence in the banking sector in countries with better and more effective official monitoring and that banks in these countries are more resilient during the credit crisis. This is also supported by the fact that reg- ulatory restrictions are positive and significant, suggesting that in countries with stricter regulations, banks have a better stock mar- ket performance. This suggests that better official monitoring helps keep banks’ ultimate owners’ interests aligned with those of share- holders, resulting in a better stock performance during the crisis.

The results on private monitoring are positive and significant. Based on the argument of Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that better governance has a positive effect on bank stock performance, our results on private monitoring suggest that better external monitor- ing leads to better bank governance. This, in turn, leads to better stock performance. We find that capital requirements have no impact on the market valuation and pricing of bank risk. We also find some evidence, though not as strong, that banks with higher Tier 1 capital perform better, consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The results also show that banks in countries with deposit insurance perform better. Further, we find that banks with greater idiosyncratic volatility and systematic risk show a poor perfor- mance during the credit crisis, consistent with Acharya et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a negative relation-

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% .

468 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

ship between beta and returns during the credit crisis. We find no evidence of funding fragility, liquidity, or ratio of deposits having an impact on banks’ stock performance. We do find, though, that banks with a lower ratio of loans over assets operating in countries with slowing economies have a poor stock performance during the credit crisis. We also find some evidence that banks in countries with higher current account balances have better stock perfor- mance, consistent with Lane (2012), who argues that the 2007 financial shock caused a reevaluation of asset prices, especially in countries with greater economic imbalances.

6.2. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis

In this section we repeat the regressions on the same risk vari- ables and the buy-and-hold returns during the sovereign debt cri- sis. The objective here is to assess whether banks take more sensible risks in the aftermath of the credit crisis, and whether the regulations during the sovereign debt crisis affect banks’ risk and returns the same way as in the credit crisis.

6.2.1. Distance to default We examine whether regulations have any impact on the dis-

tance to default during the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. This is particularly important, as after the credit crisis, a large number of banks went bankrupt. Table 5, in columns (1)–(2), reports the regression results for log z. In column (1), we only use the regulations variables. The results for the sovereign debt crisis show that as in the credit crisis, private monitoring is negatively and significantly related to the distance to default. Unlike the credit crisis, however, official supervision is negatively related to the dis- tance to default. Deposit insurance is not significant in this regres- sion. Our results for the sovereign debt crisis do not provide conclusive evidence for deposit insurance. We do not find support for Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who show that an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises, as banks become less sound in the presence of a deposit insurance scheme.

In column (2), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. We find that restriction is negatively related to log z, implying that the restrictions imposed on bank activities do not increase their soundness when a crisis breaks out. Due to moral hazard issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to take any activities (Boyd et al., 1998). In contrast, we find that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank soundness, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We also include BHAR to test whether there is any market feedback on bank soundness in terms of returns. We find that BHAR is highly significant, suggesting that the market provides feedback regarding banks’ soundness after the credit crisis and before the sovereign debt crisis. This implies that market participants become more vigilant to provide feedback once a crisis breaks out. We include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are sounder and find that Tier 1 capital is strongly and positively related to bank soundness, which is similar to the findings on the credit crisis. We do not find evidence of size being significantly related to the distance to default. Moreover, we find that GDP per capita is negatively related to distance to default, which shows that banks based in countries with higher GDP are more susceptible to risk. This is also consistent with the fact that the sovereign debt crisis essentially originates from European countries.

6.2.2. Systemic risk In the aftermath of the financial crisis, systemic risk became

more important, as regulators’ objectives were to prevent another

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 469

crisis. However, since after the credit crisis, sovereign states were drawn into the sovereign debt crisis via bank rescues, examining the correlated risk taking in the sovereign debt crisis can extend our understanding of the extent to which state or central bank guarantees can shake the base of the sovereigns. Acharya (2009) argues that banks are more likely to take on more correlated risks when there is an implicit state or central bank guarantee to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis.

In this section, we examine the relationship between regula- tions and individual bank systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.2. As a dependent variable, we use marginal expected shortfall (MES), as described in Section 4, to proxy for the systemic risk. The results in Table 5, columns (3)–(4), show that capital regulation and activity restrictions are positively related, while deposit insurance is negatively related to systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis, as they are during the credit crisis. This implies that better oversight of capital is related to lower systemic risk, as denoted by higher MES. Restrict- ing banks’ activity reduces individual banks’ contribution toward systemic risk. In addition, deposit insurance is negatively related to MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk. Consequently, this increases the likelihood of bank runs. Using previous banking crisis data, Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. When we introduce bank- and country-level controls (Table 5, column (4)), most of the results related to regulations survive. None of the addi- tional control variables are significant except ADRI. This suggests that in countries with better protected shareholder rights, banks experience less systemic risk.

6.2.3. Idiosyncratic risk In this section, we assess the drivers of idiosyncratic risk during

the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variable is idiosyncratic volatility, and we use the same regression specifications and con- trol variables as those used in Section 6.1.2. The results are shown in Table 5, columns (5)–(6). The results in column (5), excluding bank- and country-level control variables, show that higher capital restrictions lead to lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. Moreover, we find that in the pres- ence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk, even following the credit crisis, as deposit insurance is positively related to idiosyn- cratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. As in the credit crisis, our results support the argument that the presence of deposit insurance increases moral hazard during the sovereign debt crisis. This is also consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Anginer et al. (2013).

In column (6), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. Our previous results regarding the impact of regulation remain mostly the same. The only exception is regulatory restric- tion, which is no longer significant. Moreover, the results show that a higher level of private monitoring leads to higher idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that even though investors monitor banks, they still entice banks to take more risks in the pursuit for higher returns. In addition, we find that the BHAR before the sovereign debt crisis is positive and significant. This suggests that banks delivering higher returns prior to the sovereign debt crisis end up being more exposed to idiosyncratic risk. We also find that hav- ing higher Tier 1 capital reduces idiosyncratic risk. This shows that one of regulators’ ways of making banks more resilient and able to absorb greater losses is successful, as suggested by the lower idio- syncratic risk. Moreover, the results show that banks with more diverse income have lower risk during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we find that unlike the credit crisis, funding fragility and size are not significant. We also find that current account

balance is negative and significant, suggesting that countries that are more financially sound have greater flexibility to intervene and prevent a bank from becoming insolvent, as opposed to finan- cially fragile states. Finally, we find that shareholder protection, captured by ADRI, is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk.

6.2.4. Systematic risk In this section, we assess the impact of regulations on banks’

market risk during the sovereign debt crisis. We use banks’ beta, discussed in Section 4, as the dependent variable, and we employ the same regression specifications and variables as in Section 6.1.2. The results are reported in Table 5, columns (7)–(8). The results (column (7)) show that official supervision is positively and capital and private monitoring are negatively related to market risk. This suggests that stringent capital regulations reduce systematic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. In addition, the results show that higher private monitoring leads to lower system- atic risk, which is consistent with the view that private monitoring reduces the systematic risk of banks. However, we find no evidence of deposit insurance having an impact on banks’ systematic risk during the sovereign debt crisis, similar to our findings on the credit crisis.

In column (7), we introduce the bank- and country-level con- trols. We find that the higher a bank’s BHAR is before the sovereign debt crisis, the higher its systematic risk is when the sovereign debt crisis unfolds. While private monitoring leads banks to take on greater risk, at the same time, investors require more returns. In addition, larger banks have higher beta, which shows the sys- temic importance of large banks in their respective stock markets. GDP per capita is positively and current account balance is nega- tively related to beta. Finally, higher levels of shareholder protec- tion lead to lower systematic risk.

6.2.5. Buy-and-hold-returns We assess the drivers of banks’ stock market performance dur-

ing the sovereign debt crisis in order to evaluate whether there is a shift in the factors that affect banks’ stock market performance during the credit crisis. The results reported in Table 6 show that the impact of capital requirements is still not significant, while official and private monitoring remain positive and significant dur- ing the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. However, regu- latory restrictions cease to influence banks’ stock performance, while deposit insurance schemes are negative and significant dur- ing the sovereign debt crisis, as opposed to the credit crisis. This suggests that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk and perform worse. Moreover, the adoption of higher Tier 1 capital levels that were introduced during the credit crisis becomes positive and significant. This is contrary to, who find a negative relationship between banks’ capital and stock returns during August, 2007, but is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a robust, positive relationship between Tier 1 capital and bank performance. This suggests that banks with stronger bal- ance sheets show a stronger stock performance. Idiosyncratic risk remains negative and significant, though beta has no impact during the sovereign debt crisis. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a negative relationship between banks’ beta and their stock performance.

Unlike the credit crisis, during the sovereign debt crisis, banks that are more financially robust in terms of funding fragility and overall deposits have a stronger stock performance, consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), while liquidity and bank loans have no impact during this period. The results on current account balance and concentration remain the same for the credit and sovereign debt crisis. This suggests that greater country stability and less uncertainty about future growth prospects have a significant impact on bank performance during

Table 6 Stock market performance, the sovereign debt crisis.

Dependent Variable: BHAR 2010–11

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant �85.803*** (�6.59) �50.931*** (�2.83) �30.512 (�1.62) �61.175*** (�3.19) Official 2.419*** (3.08) 2.780*** (3.80) 1.523** (2.21) 0.403*** (2.59) Capital 0.603 (0.58) �0.091 (�0.10) �1.384 (�1.40) 0.397 (0.40) Restriction �0.155 (�0.24) �0.398 (�0.66) �0.113 (�0.16) 0.032 (0.05) Private monitoring 5.018*** (3.49) 5.187*** (3.44) 2.852** (1.86) 2.567* (1.79) Deposit insurance �12.010*** (�3.11) �2.976*** (�2.72) �3.608*** (�2.83) �4.332*** (�2.95) Tier 1 0.651* (1.85) 0.012 (0.03) 0.078 (0.23) 0.610* (1.78) Log z �3.242 (�1.26) �3.249 (�1.38) �0.515 (�0.22) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.627*** (�6.82) �0.498*** (�5.85) �0.458*** (�5.65) Beta �0.966 (�0.27) �1.6 (�0.49) 0.407 (0.13) Funding fragility �0.296*** (�3.33) Deposit 0.369*** (5.60) Liquid 0.012 (0.09) Loan 0.014 (0.15) GDP per cap 0.097 (0.92) Current acc. bal. 1.493*** (6.29) 1.284*** (5.69) Concentration �10.272 (�1.29) �21.644 (�2.51) ADRI 3.138* (2.02) 1.332 (0.89) Institution 8.881*** (3.41)

Adj. R2 (%) 11.93 36.46 49.63 54.57 N 311 273 273 273

The dependent variable is BHAR 2011 for the sample banks. BHAR 2011 is calculated from June 2011 to December 2011. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

Table 7 Robustness checks: risk regressions.

MES MES Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Beta Beta January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Cons �6.179*** (�3.73) �6.504*** (�3.87) 0.964* (1.80) 52.419*** (3.00) �0.828* (�1.90) �0.817* (�1.88) Official �0.086 (�1.55) �0.100* (�1.76) �0.395 (�0.53) 0.942* (1.64) �0.033** (�2.31) �0.034** (�2.41) Capital �0.044 (�0.57) �0.012 (�0.15) �1.253*** (�2.43) �0.418 (�0.52) 0.039* (1.94) 0.040* (2.02) Restriction 0.111** (2.16) 0.125** (2.40) 1.247 (1.09) �1.337** (�2.42) �0.014 (�0.99) �0.013 (�0.95) Private monitoring �0.232* (�1.92) �0.265* (�2.17) 5.930* (2.09) 1.571 (1.28) 0.038 (1.24) 0.041 (1.34) Deposit insurance �0.778*** (�2.72) �0.852*** (�2.93) 0.023 (0.89) 6.507** (2.15) 0.382*** (5.06) 0.374*** (4.96) BHAR 0.003 (1.06) 0.004 (1.43) �0.678*** (�2.84) 0.022 (0.77) 0.005*** (7.64) 0.005*** (7.59) Tier 1 �0.012 (�0.42) �0.007 (�0.25) �0.01 (�0.15) �0.731*** (�2.87) �0.011* (�1.77) �0.011* (�1.80) Funding fragility 0.002 (0.24) 0.001 (0.11) 0.026 (0.32) �0.005 (�0.07) 0.003* (1.82) 0.003* (1.82) Loans �0.001 (�0.08) 0.001 (0.12) �4.726 (�0.93) 0.029 (0.33) 0.001 (0.47) 0.001 (0.45) Income diversity 0.818 (1.57) 0.787 (1.49) �2.627 (�1.32) �4.997 (�0.92) �0.179 (�1.33) �0.172 (�1.27) Size 0.07 (0.36) 0.114 (0.57) �0.179* (�2.19) �2.753 (�1.30) 0.279*** (5.27) 0.274*** (5.18) GDP per cap �0.007 (�0.83) �0.004 (�0.45) �0.560*** (�3.10) �0.189* (�2.17) 0.013*** (6.09) 0.013*** (6.20) Current acc. bal. 0.013 (0.70) 0.016 (0.89) 6.297 (1.03) �0.601*** (�3.12) �0.035*** (�7.31) �0.034*** (�7.07) Concentration 0.519 (0.83) 0.477 (0.75) �2.344* (�2.11) 6.763 (1.04) 0.290* (1.78) 0.291* (1.79) ADRI 0.184 (1.63) 0.177 (1.55) 51.975*** (3.18) �2.403* (�2.03) �0.153*** (�5.18) �0.154*** (�5.22) Adj. R2 (%) 8.70 10.72 11.28 11.21 57.50 57.06 N 299 299 313 313 313 313

The dependent variable is MES from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and MES from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for the sample banks. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at the end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

470 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we find that in countries with strong institutional and regulatory frameworks and better corpo- rate governance, captured by ADRI and institution, banks show a

stronger stock performance. This supports the argument that bet- ter governance leads to better stock performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).

Table 8 Robustness checks: return regressions.

Sovereign debt crisis–BHAR (January 2010–December 2011) Sovereign debt crisis – BHAR (May 2010–December 2011)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant 7.370 (0.26) �27.693 (�1.10) �30.512 (�1.62) �27.693 (�1.10) Official 3.098*** (2.78) 1.383*** (2.64) 1.523** (2.21) 1.383*** (2.69) Capital 1.383 (0.96) 0.875 (0.79) �1.384 (�1.40) 0.875 (0.79) Restriction �0.919 (�1.01) �1.05 (�1.58) �0.113 (�0.16) �1.05 (�1.58) Private monitoring �1.475 (�0.70) 1.932 (1.21) 2.852* (1.86) 1.932 (1.21) Deposit insurance �12.087*** (�2.22) �14.647*** (�3.32) �3.608*** (�2.83) �14.647*** (�3.32) Tier 1 0.302 (0.60) 0.891** (1.99) 0.078 (0.23) 0.891* (1.99) Log z �3.468 (�0.98) �1.109 (�0.37) �3.249 (�1.38) �1.109 (�0.37) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.526*** (�4.11) �0.530*** (�4.99) �0.498*** (�5.85) �0.530*** (�4.99) Beta 4.125 (0.84) 4.241 (1.04) �1.6 (�0.49) 4.241 (1.04) Funding fragility �0.362*** (�2.71) �0.296*** (�3.33) Deposit 0.423*** (4.91) 0.423*** (4.91) Liquid �0.025 (�0.13) 0.012 (0.09) Loan 0.141 (1.21) 0.141 (1.21) GDP per cap �0.277* (�1.74) 0.097 (0.92) Current acc. bal. 2.567*** (7.19) 2.153*** (7.29) 1.493*** (6.29) 2.153*** (7.29) Concentration �2.727 (�0.23) �14.775 (�1.31) �10.272 (�1.29) �14.775 (�1.31) ADRI 6.093** (2.61) 1.343 (0.69) 3.138** (2.02) 1.343 (0.69) Institution 7.127** (2.09) 7.127** (2.09)

Adj. R2 (%) 33.80 42.83 49.63 42.83 N 273 273 273 273

The dependent variable is BHAR from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and BHAR from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for sample banks. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 471

7. Robustness checks

Following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we calculate the BHAR from June 2007 to December 2008 to measure the risk and return for the credit crisis. For the sovereign debt crisis, we measure the risk and the BHAR starting from May 2011 until the end of 2011 (BHAR = �28.34). We use May 2011 as the starting point, because in May 2011, the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a €78 billion bailout for Portugal. For robustness checks, we use two alternative definitions, the beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 (BHAR = �25.89) and May 2010 to December 2011 (BHAR = �23.61).6 To examine the robustness of our results, we run the regressions using alternative measures of risks and BHARs, i.e., the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2011 and the period from May 2010 to the end of 2011.

The results on risk regressions are presented in Table 7. The results regarding MES show that irrespective of time periods, restriction is positively and private monitoring and deposit insur- ance are negatively related to MES. When we analyze idiosyncratic risk, we find that higher capital restrictions and private monitoring lower the idiosyncratic risk. The market risk regressions show that the higher the official power, the lower the beta. In the presence of deposit insurance, a higher beta is observed. BHAR is significant in idiosyncratic risk and beta regressions. Likewise, Tier I capital is significant in idiosyncratic and beta regressions. We also find that the higher the size, the lower the idiosyncratic and market risk. Overall, the results found in Table 7 are similar to previous results.

The official power of the regulators is significant in all the regressions, implying that banks perform better in countries with higher official power. Deposit insurance is negative and significant,

6 We choose the beginning of 2010 as the starting point, as concern starts to build about all the heavily indebted countries in Europe—Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Alternatively, we use May 2010 as a starting point, as on May 2, 2010 the Eurozone members and the IMF agree on a €110 billion bailout package to rescue Greece.

suggesting that banks in the presence of deposit insurance take more risk and perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis. The effect of private monitoring on stock performance is positive and significant only for the BHAR of May 2010 to Dec 2011. We argue that this is probably due to the fact that the concerns regard- ing the servicing of sovereign debt in the European periphery are gathering momentum in February 2010, initiating a new cycle of uncertainty in the markets with the announcement of the first bail- out package for Greece in early May, 2010, commanding greater scrutiny and monitoring of banks and their exposure to sovereign debt.

Overall, the results shown in Table 8 are similar to our previous results and interpretations regarding the factors that affect banks’ stock performance during the sovereign debt crisis. For instance, the results on ADRI and institution remain positive and significant. Consistent with the argument of Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that a better alignment of bank insiders’ and shareholders’ interests results in better performance, our results show that better investor monitoring leads to better corporate governance, resulting to better stock performance. Moreover, the results on Tier 1 capital and deposits remain positive and significant, and funding fragility remains negative, suggesting that banks with greater reliance on deposit and more robust funding show a better stock performance during the sovereign debt crisis. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012). The results on bank and country risk show that banks with higher idiosyncratic risk, which are based in more fragile coun- tries—captured by GDP per cap—have worse stock performance.

Finally, since our sample contains only 378 banks, it is impor- tant to check whether outliers are driving our results. We perform median regressions where the sum of the absolute weighted devi- ations is minimized. The results are qualitatively the same, as reported by using the ordinary least squares. We conclude that our results are not driven by outliers. We do not present these results, for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.

472 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

8. Conclusion

The financial crisis that originated in the securitized debt mar- ket spread rapidly, affecting all financial institutions to a certain degree, leading to numerous bank rescues and bankruptcies across countries. What is more, according to some commentators, this ignited the sovereign debt crisis. Even though our goal is not the identification of the reasons leading to the financial and sovereign debt crises, the poor bank performance in terms of risk and stock returns during both crises can be a good testing ground for regula- tion effectiveness. Hence, we shed light on the impact of regula- tions and regulatory and institutional frameworks.

In particular, we analyze whether regulations are effective for bank risk and returns across the world during the credit and sover- eign debt crisis periods. The results show that greater official supervision leads to higher systematic risk in banks during both crises. Moreover, official supervision leads to banks being riskier, captured by distance to default, but only during the sovereign debt crisis. We also find evidence that greater capital leads to lower bank risk during both crises, suggesting that banks having enough capital can insulate themselves from financial turmoil. Regarding regulatory restriction, we find that it has no impact on insulating banks during both crises. But we find that restriction leads to bet- ter stock performance, but only during the credit crisis. Moreover, we find that having a deposit insurance scheme in place increases moral hazard and induces banks to take greater risks, resulting in greater exposure during both crises. Additionally, we find that greater private monitoring leads to lower bank risk. This suggests that investors actively monitoring banks prevent them from taking excessive risks. Hence, countries with higher private monitoring show a better stock performance during both crises.

Our results have several policy implications regarding the effec- tiveness and design of regulations to better control risk and thus enhance the performance of global banks which are the focal point of regulators. More restrictions on banks increase the stability of global banks and reduce the systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. Moreover, restrictions on bank activities seem to be effective for controlling the stability of banks during times of turmoil. However, Barth et al. (2013) show that restric- tions reduce efficiency. Hence, policymakers should strive to find the right balance of restrictions for reducing systemic risk without decreasing efficiency. In line with Anginer et al. (2013) we find that deposit insurance is negatively related to bank stability and sys- temic risk, suggesting that deposit insurance increases moral haz- ard. This is also consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003) and Laeven (2002) who show that under weak institutional environ- ments deposit insurance may work detrimentally. Demirgüç- Kunt and Kane (2002) also show that a country’s private and public contracting environment is important in deposit-insurance adop- tion and design. Our findings raise the question: should policy makers rethink the design of deposit insurance as it increases the instability and systemic risk of individual banks?

In terms of returns, banks in countries with greater official power, restrictions and private monitoring performed better dur- ing the credit crisis. These results suggest that while regulatory restrictions and supervision are necessary, at the same time it is important to have better private monitoring. Hence private moni- toring, which is a market mechanism to reward better banks, com- plements regulatory supervision. Our findings also highlight the need for regulators to access market information in regular inter- vals to supplement other sources of regulatory information. While official power of supervisors and private monitoring still explain the stock return performance of banks during the sovereign debt crisis, imposing greater restrictions on bank activities does not

enhance bank returns. Policymakers need to bear this in mind especially when planning to impose more restrictions on banks while the banking system is still fragile. The results reported in this paper are consistent with the World Bank regulations IV in Barth et al. (2013) who find that some countries have eased the restric- tions following the global financial crisis.

Moreover, the evidence show that higher official power increases risk-taking during the credit crisis. This is consistent with the rent seeking view of supervisors as they use power to benefit favored voters, attract donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002; and Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Beck et al. (2006) point out that if bank supervisory agencies have the authority to discipline noncompliant banks, the supervi- sors might use this power to induce or force banks to allocate credit so as to generate private or political benefits. Our findings raise some concerns regarding the optimal supervisory power of bank regulators.

Most of the regulations were effective in controlling risk, apart from deposit insurance which has a detrimental effect on risk. Offi- cial power and private monitoring explains the returns during both the crises. Overall, our results can be extended to having policy implications: regulatory restrictions and supervision may be costly and difficult to enforce, but combined with the market’s scrutiny, they reduce the systemic risk, insulate banks from financial dis- tress, and enable banks to provide a stronger stock performance during a crisis.

Appendix 1. Variable definitions

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Log z

Average ROA plus capital to asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation of ROA

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Laeven and Levine, 2008).

MES

Average return on sample banks conditioned on 5% worse returns on the market

To measure the systemic risk of banks (Acharya et al., 2010).

Idiosyncratic

Annualized standard deviation from regressing weekly stock returns of individual stocks against the MSCI World Index.

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 2010).

Beta

Coefficient from regressing weekly stock returns of individual stocks against the MSCI World Index

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 2010).

BHAR

Buy-and-hold abnormal return for individual banks

To measure the stock market performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).

Official

A score that reflects the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency

To explain whether supervisory power can explain banks’ risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 473

Appendix 1 (continued)

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Capital

A score that reflects the regulatory oversight of bank capital.

To assess whether regulatory oversight of bank capital can explain banks’ risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

Restrictions

A score that measures the regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks

To measure the relationship between level of restrictions and bank risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

Private monitoring

A score that measures the degree of private monitoring

To analyze whether private monitoring can discipline bank risk taking and hence returns (Caprio et al., 2007)

Deposit insurance

A binary variable equal to one where there is explicit deposit insurance and zero otherwise

To better understand the role of deposit insurance in turmoil times (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2008)

Tier I capital

Shareholder funds plus perpetual non- cumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk- weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks measured under the Basel rules

To capture the importance of bank capital in times of turmoil (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2010)

Deposits

Total deposits as a fraction of total assets

To assess the impact of liability structures (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012)

Funding fragility

Ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short- term borrowing to total deposits, plus money market and short-term funding

To assess the impact of liability structures (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010)

Loans

Total loans divided by total assets

To capture the asset side of the balance sheet (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2010)

Size

Natural logarithm of total assets

To control for bank size

Income diversity

Absolute value of the difference between net interest income and other operating income divided by total operating income

To assess income diversity and how vulnerable a bank is during a crisis (Laeven and Levine, 2009)

GDP

GDP per capita at 2006 constant terms

Beltratti and Stulz (2012)

Current acc. bal.

Current account balance scaled by GDP

Beltratti and Stulz (2012)

Appendix 1 (continued)

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Concentration

The total assets of the largest three banks divided by total bank assets

To control for competition (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010)

Institution

Arithmetic average of six indicators: voice, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption

To control for country-level effects (Kaufmann et al., 2008)

ADRI

The revised anti- director index of La Porta et al. (1998)

To control for regulatory and institutional frameworks in each country (Djankov et al., 2008)

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  • Bank regulation, risk and return: Evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Hypothesis development for testing the impact of regulations on bank risk and returns
      • 2.1 Bank capital and capital regulation
      • 2.2 Restrictions on bank activities
      • 2.3 Official supervisory power
      • 2.4 Private monitoring
      • 2.5 Deposit insurance
    • 3 A narrative of the credit and sovereign debt crises
    • 4 Variables used and methodology
      • 4.1 Distance to default
      • 4.2 Marginal expected shortfall
      • 4.3 Idiosyncratic risk
      • 4.4 Systematic risk
      • 4.5 Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
      • 4.6 Bank-level controls
      • 4.7 Country-level governance and macroeconomic variables
    • 5 Data and descriptive statistics
      • 5.1 Descriptive statistics
      • 5.2 Cross-country variations
    • 6 Empirical results
      • 6.1 Impact of regulations on risk and return during the credit crisis
        • 6.1.1 Distance to default
        • 6.1.2 Systemic risk
        • 6.1.3 Idiosyncratic risk
        • 6.1.4 Systematic risk
        • 6.1.5 Buy-and-hold-returns
      • 6.2 Impact of regulations on risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis
        • 6.2.1 Distance to default
        • 6.2.2 Systemic risk
        • 6.2.3 Idiosyncratic risk
        • 6.2.4 Systematic risk
        • 6.2.5 Buy-and-hold-returns
    • 7 Robustness checks
    • 8 Conclusion
    • Appendix 1 Variable definitions
    • References

1-s2.0-S0378426614002004-main.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Bank regulation, risk and return: Evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.003 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1904325047. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Hoque), d.andriosopoulos@strath.

ac.uk (D. Andriosopoulos), [email protected] (K. Andriosopoulos), [email protected] (R. Douady).

Hafiz Hoque a,⇑, Dimitris Andriosopoulos b, Kostas Andriosopoulos c, Raphael Douady d,e

a University of York, Freboys Lane, YO10 5GD York, United Kingdom b Strathclyde University, 100 Cathedral Street, G4 0LN Glasgow, United Kingdom c ESCP Europe Business School, 527 Finchley Road, NW3 7BG London, United Kingdom d CNRS, University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France e Riskdata, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 9 September 2013 Accepted 4 June 2014 Available online 14 June 2014

JEL classification: E44 G2 G20 G28

Keywords: Distance to default Systemic risk Idiosyncratic risk Beta Buy-and-hold returns Regulations

a b s t r a c t

In this paper, we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks. In this regard, we examine distance to default (Laeven and Levine, 2008), systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2010), idiosyncratic risk, and systematic risk. We employ World Bank survey data on regulations to test our conjectures. We find that regulatory restrictions, offi- cial supervisory power, capital stringency, along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises. Additionally, we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard, as this encouraged banks to take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, official supervi- sion and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Journalists, policymakers, and academics have argued that leni- ent regulations, reliance on short-term funding, excessive risk tak- ing, and corporate governance failure are responsible for the recent crisis. This paper examines the impact of regulations on the risk and returns of global banks during the credit and sovereign debt crises. We examine an extensive sample of large international banks that are the targets of current regulatory efforts while many of them are considered to be too big to fail by central banks. These banks are characterized by their large capitalization, global activ- ity, cross-border exposure, and/or representative size in the local industry. In this regard, we examine the determinants of distance to default (Laeven and Levine, 2008), systemic risk (marginal

expected shortfall [MES] proposed by Acharya et al., 2010), idio- syncratic risk, and systematic risk.

There is scant literature examining the impact of bank regula- tions on bank fragility and risk. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) use the adherence to the core principles from the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and show that bank supervision and regulation have very little effect on bank risk. Barth et al. (2004) use the World Bank survey data II and show that countries with higher regulatory restrictions have a higher probability of experiencing a banking crisis. Barth et al. (2013) show that banking restrictions are negatively related to bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies examine the impact of World Bank regulations on bank risk and return during the recent credit and sovereign debt crises. We fill this gap in the literature and take this opportunity to examine the effectiveness of World Bank regula- tions in terms of bank risk taking and returns.

We use the 2008 World Bank survey on bank regulation data to examine whether lenient regulations were responsible for exces- sive risk taking by the banks, which led them to perform badly

456 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

during the crisis (Stiglitz, 2010). The banking regulations survey contains 312 questions on different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no type of answers. We form scores for mea- suring different dimensions and following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) capital regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) private monitor- ing; and (5) deposit insurance. We test whether capital regulations, restrictions on bank activities, official supervisory power, private monitoring, and deposit insurance are related to risk and whether they affected the banks’ stock performance during the credit and sovereign debt crises. We perform our tests on a number of differ- ent risk measurements.

Our first measure of risk is the distance to default (log z), as in Laeven and Levine (2009). Log z measures the distance from bank- ruptcy. Since a large number of banks went bankrupt following the credit and sovereign debt crises, it is imperative and timely to examine whether regulations have any impact on global banks’ distance to default risk during these periods of turmoil. Our second measure of risk is the systemic measure of risk, MES. The use of individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk is relatively new and allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. Most of the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship between regulation and systemic stabil- ity by using the incidence of banking crisis at the country level as a measure of systemic risk (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). We examine the impact of regulation on individual banks’ contribution to the overall systemic risk. Our third measure of risk is the idiosyncratic risk of banks. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) argue that banks have learned from previous financial crises, leading banks to change their behavior and protect themselves from a future financial crisis. In light of the regulatory changes that occurred after the credit crisis, we assess whether banks changed their business models by taking risk more sensibly, as captured by idiosyncratic risk. Our final measure of risk is banks’ systematic risk which is estimated based on the market model. We also exam- ine whether regulations impacted banks’ systematic risk during the credit and sovereign debt crisis.

Bank supervisors form their assessments on bank risk based on their proprietary information. However, this information is accessed over infrequent intervals. Moreover, the daily change of market variables reflects bank risk in a timelier manner, but does not fully reflect all the information that is available to supervisors (Berger et al., 2000). Therefore, the information on bank risk, which is inherent in equity market variables, can complement supervi- sory assessment markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Elmer and Fissel, 2001; Curry et al., 2001). To assess whether the market variables explain risk, we include buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) calculated before the credit and sovereign debt cri- ses.1 Since return is the reward for taking risk, we evaluate the impact of regulations on banks’ stock performance.

Our results show that restrictions, private monitoring, and deposit insurance explain the distance to default during the credit crisis, while official power and private monitoring had a consistent impact on banks during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we do not find any evidence of deposit insurance having an impact. Follow- ing the credit crisis, official supervisory power has a significant impact on banks’ distance to default. This suggests that countries with higher official power could take the necessary corrective actions and strengthen their banking system. Additionally, we find that deposit insurance explains the distance to default during the credit crisis, but not in the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that as sovereign states were affected during the sovereign debt crisis, they

1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

were unable to support banks at the time. Hence, banks in countries with deposit insurance schemes have a higher probability to default.

Regarding our second risk measurement (MES) we find that activity restrictions and deposit insurance explain MES during the credit and the sovereign debt crisis. Capital restrictions also explain MES but only during the sovereign debt crisis. This is due to the fact that not only Tier I capital requirements have increased, but the quality requirements of capital have also increased. After the credit crisis, there have been significant changes in terms of capital ade- quacy and stress testing. We find that banks in countries with stric- ter capital requirements have lower systemic risk contributions.

The results on the third risk measurement, idiosyncratic risk, show that with greater official power and in the presence of deposit insurance schemes, banks take more risk resulting in higher idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. However, official power is no longer significant during the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that this could be due to the fact that banks became sig- nificantly fragile and therefore, regulators could not exert benefits anymore. Finally, we find a positive relationship between deposit insurance and idiosyncratic risk during both crisis periods, rein- forcing the view that deposit insurance increases moral hazard.

We also examine whether regulations impacted banks’ system- atic risk during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. We find that higher official power results in banks having higher systematic risk. This suggests that rent extraction by the regulators is also reflected by market risk. Additionally, banks in countries with higher capital restrictions are more protected in case of financial turmoil, and private monitoring prevents banks from taking riskier decisions, as reflected by a lower systematic risk. These findings hold for both the credit and sovereign debt crises. BHAR is signifi- cant in most of the risk regressions, suggesting that market vari- ables reflect bank risk in a timely manner. Hence, regulators should complement their decisions with the information inherent in market variables. Our results have other policy implications.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the hypotheses. In Section 3, we perform a descriptive analysis of the credit and the sovereign debt crises. Section 4 describes the variables used and employed methodology. Section 5 discusses the data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 6 pre- sents the results on the impact of regulation on risk and returns during the credit and sovereign debt crises. In Section 7, we con- duct robustness checks. The conclusions are in Section 8.

2. Hypothesis development for testing the impact of regulations on bank risk and returns

We take advantage of the 2008 World Bank survey on bank reg- ulation data to examine whether lenient regulations were respon- sible for excessive risk taking by the banks, which led them to perform badly during the crisis. Following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) capital regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) private monitor- ing; (5) deposit insurance. Since, excessive risk taking is primarily blamed for the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), in this section, we show that these five categories of regulations can relate to the risk- taking behavior of the banks. Therefore, we focus on these five cat- egories of regulations to develop and test our hypotheses. Finally, due to the conflicting theoretical predictions, it is an empirical question whether bank regulations have a positive or negative impact on bank risk and returns.

2.1. Bank capital and capital regulation

Core (Tier I) capital is at the focal point of banking regulation, as it helps banks when they face liquidity problems. Likewise, an

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 457

index of regulatory capital oversight looks at the quality of regula- tory capital held by the banks. In this section, we pay attention at the quantity and quality of regulatory capital. Previous research finds that stringent capital requirements reduce banking risk (Fernández and González, 2005). We test the importance of capital adequacy and respective capital-requirement regulations and how they can impact banks and their tendency on risk taking and per- formance during the recent crises.

Bank regulations stress the benefits of capital adequacy require- ments (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), as adequate capital enables banks to absorb unexpected losses and thus remain solvent. Like- wise, banks with limited liability are less prone to assume more risk with larger amounts of capital at risk. Berger et al. (1995) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) argue that capital adequacy requirements along with deposit insurance can have a significant effect on aligning the incentives of bank owners with those of depositors and other creditors.

However, theory offers contradictory predictions as to whether the imposition of capital requirements will have posi- tive effects (see Santos, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2003). A number of studies argue that capital requirements may increase risk-taking behavior (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999). Sim- ilarly, Thakor (1996) models the effect of risk-based capital requirements on bank asset allocation decisions when screening borrowers is costly. Assuming that equity capital is more expen- sive to raise than deposits, then an increase in risk-based capital requirements reduces the banks’ tendency to screen investment opportunities and increase their lending. Gorton and Winton (2000) show that in a general equilibrium framework, the increase of capital requirements has an inverse impact on banks’ supply of deposits, hence reducing the traditional liquidity- provision role of banks.

We use the recent credit and sovereign debt crises and address the theoretical contradictions on capital adequacy requirements along with the shift on new risk-based capital requirements in Basel II and III accords. We do so by examining the impact of cap- ital requirements, regarding Tier I capital, on bank risk and stock performance across countries. Alternatively, we use Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. This capital index also includes indicators for capital sources, other than cash and government securities, that are included in regulatory capital and whether authorities verify the source of capital. During a crisis we expect the banks to benefit from higher capital requirements. Hence, our first hypothesis is:

H1a. Higher capital requirements reduce bank risk during finan- cial turmoil.

H1b. Higher capital requirements increase banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.2. Restrictions on bank activities

If banks are allowed to do a broad range of activities they might engage in risky ventures that can be suboptimal for investors (Boyd et al., 1998). Restricting bank activities means imposing restric- tions on activities and securities banks may hold. Since bank assets are opaque, during a financial turmoil the value of risky securities can decline significantly. Limiting risky undertakings may decrease the financial losses given the opacity of bank assets. However, the results of Barth et al. (2004) indicate the opposite: restricting bank activities is negatively related to bank stability and increases the probability of a banking crisis. Therefore, we examine the relation- ship between activity restrictions and risk taking and returns

during the recent financial and sovereign debt crises as it can assist in assessing the effectiveness of restrictions.

According to Barth et al. (2004), the reasoning for restricting bank activities and banking commerce rests on five hypothetical reasons. First, there can be significant conflicts of interest if banks are involved in diverse activities such as securities and insurance underwriting and real estate investment. For instance, banks may try to ‘‘push’’ securities of troubled firms to uninformed investors (John et al., 1994; Saunders, 1985). Second, due to moral hazard, if banks are allowed to diversify their operations and range of activities, they will be more likely to engage in riskier investments, thus increasing their risk (Boyd et al., 1998). Third, the size and complexity of certain banks makes them difficult to monitor. Fourth, such banks may become so politically and economically powerful that they become ‘‘too big to discipline’’ (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Finally, large financial conglomerates can stifle com- petition and reduce banking efficiency (Barth et al., 2013). Based on these arguments, government supervision and regulation can improve banking by restricting bank activities. Moreover, these arguments imply a negative relationship between activity restric- tiveness and bank risk and a positive relationship between return and activity restrictions.

However, there are alternate theoretical reasons for permitting banks to engage in a broader range of activities. For instance, less supervisory restriction will allow banks to better utilize economies of scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000). Moreover, fewer regulatory restrictions might increase the banks’ franchise value, thus increasing their incentive to adopt prudent behavior. Finally, if banks are allowed to engage in a wider array of activities, this will increase their income diversification, resulting in better stability. The empirical evidence largely shows that restricting bank activities has adverse outcomes. In a cross-country investiga- tion, Barth et al. (2001) find that more regulatory restrictions on bank actions are related to a higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis and lower banking sector efficiency. Barth et al. (2004) find that restricting bank activities is not related to less con- centration, more competition, or greater securities market devel- opment. Barth et al. (2013) find that tighter restrictions are negatively associated with bank efficiency. What is more, bank restrictions can be designed in such a manner that they give regu- lators discretion and thus enhance their bargaining power for rent seeking (Djankov et al., 2002). In summary, there are contradicting views on the effects of activity restrictions, and therefore, we assess empirically the effect of activity restrictions during the credit and sovereign debt crises on bank risk and return. Our test- able hypotheses are as follows:

H2a. Greater restrictions to banking activities reduce bank risk during financial turmoil.

H2b. Greater restrictions to banking activities increase banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.3. Official supervisory power

Supervisory power can affect risk taking, and during turbulent times, supervisors should be able to perform corrective actions. Stringent supervisory control can potentially prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior. There are evi- dence (e.g., Fernández and González, 2005) and contra evidence (e.g., Barth et al., 2004) on that issue. Since we observe two crises with a short time lapse between them, and official supervisory power is a core part of World Bank regulations, we examine whether risk taking depends on monitoring and supervisory power.

458 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

It is costly and difficult to monitor banks and yet too little mon- itoring would lead to suboptimal performance. Therefore, greater official supervision and monitoring can mitigate this suboptimal performance (Beck et al., 2006). Moreover, banks can be suscepti- ble to bank runs and respective contagion due to information asymmetries. Supervision can reduce information asymmetries and help protect banks from potential bank runs to a certain extent. In addition, greater official supervision can help reduce the inherent moral hazard of deposit insurance schemes – as deposit insurance can lead banks to take excessive risks – and at the same time reduce the depositors’ incentives for privately mon- itoring the banks. In this regard, supervisory power is expected to be positively associated with bank returns and negatively associ- ated with risk.

To the contrary, powerful supervisors may use their powers to benefit favored voters, attract campaign donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002; Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Therefore, more powerful supervision can lead to corruption and hurting bank performance and stability. Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) focus on a different perspec- tive, which is the agency costs between bank supervisors and tax- payers. Rather than focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the behavior of a self-interested bank super- visor when there is uncertainty about the supervisor’s ability to monitor banks. Under these settings, they show that supervisors might lead to socially suboptimal arrangements. Thus, greater supervision can hinder bank operations when conditional on bank supervisors’ incentives and the ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision. As Beck et al. (2006) argue, if bank supervisory agen- cies have the authority to discipline noncompliant banks, the supervisors might use this power to induce or force banks to allo- cate credit so as to generate private or political benefits. As a con- sequence, supervisor power might be negatively associated with bank returns and positively associated with risk. During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from higher supervisory power. Our hypotheses on supervisory power are stated as follows:

H3a. Greater supervisory power reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H3b. Greater supervisory power increases banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.4. Private monitoring

Apart from regulatory supervision and monitoring, sharehold- ers can also monitor banks’ operations and performance and influ- ence their policy through investors’ monitoring ability. Related to this market-based view of regulations where market reward good banks and penalize bad ones, Fernández and González, 2005 find that regulations that promote and assist private monitoring of banks increase banks’ financial soundness by reducing moral haz- ard created by information asymmetries. Therefore, this section provides a discussion on how private monitoring can substitute or complement regulators’ supervision and affect bank’s attitude towards risk taking and performance during the recent financial crisis.

Private monitoring can be motivated and enhanced by official bank supervisors. For instance, Barth et al. (2006) find that some regulatory agencies require banks to obtain certified audits and/ or ratings from international rating agencies and to produce accu- rate, comprehensive, and consolidated information on the full range of their activities and risk management procedures. A set of countries also hold bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or misleading. Also, some countries enact deliberately

a ‘‘no deposit insurance’’ policy to stimulate private monitoring. Nevertheless, there are opposing views regarding the role and impact of bank monitoring by the private sector. One view argues for greater reliance on private monitoring and against official supervision. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argue, regarding govern- ment regulations, that banks will put pressure on politicians who, in turn, can inappropriately exert influence on the supervi- sory oversight. Moreover, regulators do not invest their own wealth in banks, resulting in a divergence of their incentives, in terms of monitoring and disciplining banks, with those of private creditors.

In contrast, another view argues for less reliance on private monitoring. Countries with under-developed capital markets and weak accounting standards and legal systems might not be able to rely effectively on private monitoring. Moreover, the fact that banks are complex and opaque institutions makes it difficult for private monitoring to keep up even in the most developed econo- mies. Therefore, a greater reliance on private monitoring of banks may lead eventually to the exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance (Barth et al., 2004). We explore the effect of these supervisory schemes on bank risk taking and performance during the credit and sovereign debt crises. Our hypotheses are as follows:

H4a. Greater private monitoring reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H4b. Greater private monitoring increases banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

2.5. Deposit insurance

During the credit crisis deposit insurance schemes came in the limelight and are considered as one of the tools in the regulators’ disposal for preventing the credit crisis from spreading further in the financial services system. On the other hand, the moral hazard in presence of deposit insurance induces banks to engage in exces- sive risk taking (Barth et al., 2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) Therefore, in this section, we discuss how the presence of deposit insurance can affect risk taking and how it affects performance. The effectiveness and role of deposit insur- ance can be evaluated once a crisis happens. Hence, we examine the role of deposit insurance on risk taking by global banks during the credit and sovereign debt crises.

In order to protect banks that experience liquidity problems but remain solvent, countries adopt deposit insurance schemes in order to prevent bank runs. Since deposit insurance can safeguard payment and credit systems overall, it enjoys a great number of supporters. Starting with Merton (1977), a number of theoretical papers have studied the relationship between deposit insurance and banking sector stability. This positive stabilization effect of deposit insurance obviously has greater importance during eco- nomic downturns when contagion is more likely to spread and bank runs are more likely to occur. Consistent with this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) show that the adoption of deposit insur- ance is related to lower bank risk in the European Union. Similarly, Chernykh and Cole (2011) show that the adoption of deposit insur- ance in Russia created safer banks. For US credit unions, Karels and McClatchey (1999) find stabilization effects from the adoption of deposit insurance. Anginer et al. (2013) find that bank risk is lower during a crisis in countries with deposit insurance.

However, deposit insurance may have adverse consequences, as it may encourage excessive risk-taking behavior, which might offset any stabilization benefits (Barth et al., 2004). There is also sizable agreement in the literature that deposit insurance enhances

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 459

moral hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to take on excessive risk. When deposits are insured, how- ever, bank depositors lack incentives to monitor (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). The lack of mar- ket discipline leads to excessive risk taking, culminating in banking crises. Anginer et al. (2013), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), and Barth et al. (2004) find evidence in support of this view. Nonetheless, there is the argument that regulation and supervision can control the moral hazard problem by designing an appropriate insurance scheme. Therefore, we examine the relationship of deposit insurance with banks’ returns and risk. During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The hypotheses are stated as follows:

H5a. The presence of deposit insurance reduces bank risk during financial turmoil.

H5b. The presence of deposit insurance enhances banks’ stock returns during financial turmoil.

3. A narrative of the credit and sovereign debt crises

Over the period 2000–2007, banking activities over the world experienced rapid growth leading to an expansion of their balance sheets and therefore to an increase in their risk appetite. For instance, banks increasingly via financial innovation expanded into foreign currency assets such as US dollar-denominated claims, and European banks in particular showed the largest growth in foreign claims. Even though the exposures to the respective foreign cur- rency claims were hedged off-balance sheet, this still led to an increase in funding risk, in which European banks had substantial funding needs of $1.1 to $1.3 trillion USD by mid-2007 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). Similarly, Acharya and Schnabl (2010) argue that the global imbalances do not offer a valid explanation as to why the financial crisis spread internationally. Rather, they argue, it is the fact that large commercial banks in both current account surplus and deficit countries had large exposures to asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits (valued at $1.2 trillion USD of short-term ABCP outstanding in June of 2007) that caused the financial crisis to spread so rapidly in 2007. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) also argue that it was the lax regulation monitoring the financial services industry that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007.

Fig. 1. Market Capitalization to

When the financial crisis started to unfold in 2007, this funding risk became more pronounced for banks, which had a significant impact in the markets such as FX and money markets. Moreover, European banks required the support of central banks in dealing with this associated risk until the end of September, 2008 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). During 2008–09, there was limited concern regarding European sovereign debt, but the shockwaves of the 2007 financial crisis triggered a reevaluation of asset prices, risk, and growth prospects, especially in countries with economic imbalances (Lane, 2012). As shown in Fig. 1, there is a significant increase in the market valuations relative to GDP leading up to the financial crisis. Once the financial crisis starts unfolding in 2007, there is a significant decrease of market valuations relative to GDP. Accordingly, we use 2007–08 as the credit crisis period to measure risk and stock returns. In 2009 and 2010, the markets are recovering from the financial shock of 2007–08, when the sov- ereign debt crisis starts to take hold, leading to further reduction in market valuations across the board. We use 2011 to measure risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. In 2012, though, there are signs of recovery, and in both crises, there is a significant decrease in market valuations, due to reevaluations of asset prices and factoring new potential risks (Lane, 2012), lasting more than a year and followed by a recovery.

Figs. 2 and 3 show the evolution of total loans outstanding and the respective annual changes that were given by banking institu- tions (domestic and foreign) in a set of EU countries and the US. The figures show that after 2004, the value of loans outstanding experiences a significant increase, reaching their peak in 2007 when the financial crisis erupts. Following the financial crisis, there is a small adjustment in the value of loans in 2008 and 2009, which increases again in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis starts. In the 2 years that follow the sovereign debt crisis, there is a small down- ward readjustment in the value of loans.

After 2007, there is a constant growth in sovereign debt (Fig. 4), resulting in a significant and abrupt rise in the yields of sovereign debt bonds in a number of countries in the European periphery. Fol- lowing, there is a divergence for a number of European periphery countries in terms of sovereign bond yield spreads, starting in early 2010. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) find a relationship between high current account deficits over 2005–08 and significant current account reversals and expenditures over 2008–10. Toward the end of 2009, there is an increase in the number of countries reporting large deficit-to-GDP ratios (Lane, 2012). Hui and Chung, 2011 show that CDS spreads rose significantly to almost 250 bps in February 2010, which they surpass in the spring of the same year.

GDP. Source: World Bank.

Fig. 2. Total Bank Loans Outstanding. Source: Bankscope.

Fig. 3. Logarithmic Changes in Total Loans Outstanding. Source: Bankscope.

Pu bl

ic D

eb t t

o G

D P

in P

er ce

nt ag

es

Cyprus France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States

Fig. 4. Public Debt to GDP. Source: IMF Public Database, Eurostat, World Bank, OECD.

460 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

4. Variables used and methodology

4.1. Distance to default

We use log z, as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009), to cap- ture default risk. Log z, which measures the distance from bank- ruptcy, is estimated as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. A higher z-score

indicates lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of z-score in our regressions, because the distribution of z-score is highly skewed.

Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the impact of the capital stringency index on the distance to default depends critically on the ownership structure. In widely held banks, a marginal increase in capital stringency has little impact on bank distance to default, while stronger capital stringency boosts bank risk when the bank

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 461

has a powerful owner. The evidence is consistent with the view that capital regulations increase the risk-taking incentives of own- ers (Koehn and Santomero, 1980). In the absence of a powerful owner the stringency of capital regulations has little marginal influence on risk. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) assess the log of dis- tance to default in the credit crisis and report that banks with higher ownership by the controlling shareholder have a lower dis- tance to default. In addition, banks with a more shareholder- friendly board have a lower distance to default. Finally, the index of capital regulation has a positive coefficient, while the current account, the index of powers of the supervisors, the index of pri- vate monitoring, and the deposit insurance variable all have a neg- ative coefficient. Our focus in this paper is to assess whether regulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the following equation with log z calculated during the credit and the sovereign debt crises.

Logzi;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officiali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð1Þ

Log zi,j,crisis is log z for bank i, in country j during the credit and sov- ereign debt crises respectively. We calculate log z as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the standard devia- tion of ROA. For estimating log z during the credit crisis, we use the capital-to-assets ratio in 2008 and for ROA we use the average return on assets during 1998–2008 along with the standard devia- tion of ROA over the same period, as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, the capital-to-assets ratio is taken at 2011 and for ROA we use the average return on assets during 2001–2011, along with the standard deviation of ROA over the same period. Officiali,j is a score that reflects the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency where bank i is located in country j. Capi- tali,j is a score that reflects the regulatory oversight of bank capital for bank i in country j. Restricti,j is a score that measures the regula- tory restrictions on the activities of banks where bank i is located in country j. Private monitoringi,j is a score that measures the degree of private monitoring where bank i is located in country j. Deposit insurancei,j is a dummy variable equal to one where there is explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008).

The explanatory regulation variables are retrieved from the World Bank2 as in Caprio et al. (2007, revised in June 2008), The banking regulations survey contains 312 questions on different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no types of answers. We form scores for measuring different dimensions, which are called official, capital, restrict, and private monitoring. All the bank-level and country-level controls are described in Sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. Finally, we estimate Eq. (1) with ordinary least squares (OLS). We ensure that multicollinearity is not present by checking the correlation matrix and by estimating the variance infla- tion factor (VIF) following the estimation of our models.3

4.2. Marginal expected shortfall

The recent financial crisis has led to a reevaluation of risk taking and regulation of the financial system, with a transformed interest in systemic fragility and macro prudential regulation. This needs an effort to understand not only the risk of individual financial institutions but an individual bank’s contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, from a regulatory view- point, there is an increasing agreement that in safeguarding sys- temic stability, the link in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more important than the absolute level of risk taking in

2 This data set is taken from http://econ.worldbank.org/ 3 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

any individual institution. As an alternative measure of bank-level risk, we compute a measure of each bank’s contribution to the sys- tem as a whole. Our measure of marginal expected shortfall is based on the expected capital shortfall framework, as in Acharya et al. (2012).

The systemic expected shortfall of an institution refers to the capital deficiency a financial firm would face in case of a systemic event. It is based on the idea that a shortage of capital is hazardous for the individual firm but becomes risky for the whole economy if it happens just when the rest of the banking sector is also under- capitalized. This measure is intended to capture how much each firm adds to the risk of the banking system as a whole. The MES of a firm is the expected loss an equity investor in a financial firm would experience if the market declined substantially. Following Acharya et al. (2010), we use MES as our systemic risk measure. MES measures the average firm return on days when the market as a whole is in the tail of its loss distribution:

MESi t ¼

1 T

XT

t¼1

ðRi t jR

M t < CÞ ð2Þ

Ri t is the equity return of financial firm i, and RM

t is the market index return. A systemic event is defined as a drop of the market index below a threshold C, over a given time horizon. The systemic event is thus denoted by RM

t <C. We estimate the MES by following Acharya et al. (2010) at a standard risk level of 5%, using daily data for equity returns retrieved from DataStream. This means that we take the 5% worst days for the market returns (RM

t ) during the credit and sover- eign debt crises and then compute the average return on any given firm (Ri

t) for these days. Our main focus in this paper is whether reg- ulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We esti- mate the same equation using MES as left-hand side variable calculated during the credit crisis and the Sovereign Debt crisis.

MESi;j;Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þXBank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð3Þ

MESi,j,crisis is the marginal expected shortfall for bank i, in country j during the credit and sovereign debt crises respectively. We calcu- late MES, using Eq. (2), for the credit crisis from June 2007 to December 2008 to measure banks’ systemic risk,4 as in, Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sov- ereign debt crisis, we calculate MES from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure banks’ systemic risk during that period. In the robustness section, we use two alternative time period to calculate systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.3. Idiosyncratic risk

We analyze idiosyncratic risk as a measure of business/opera- tional risk of banks as in Kane and Unal (1988) and Flannery and James (1984). Recently, after being hit by the financial crisis, there was a significant increase in interest in idiosyncratic risks of banks. For instance, Hoque (2013) reports a positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank capital during the credit crisis and a negative relationship during the sovereign debt crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find a negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank capital and a positive relationship between owner- ship and idiosyncratic risk. Anginer et al. (2013) show that deposit insurance is positively associated with risk taking in the pre-crisis

4 Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) used the same period for the credit crisis to analyse share price performance.

462 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

period and negatively associated with risk taking in the crisis per- iod. Idiosyncratic is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annual- ized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta. We assess whether regulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation twice using idiosyncratic risk as the left-hand side variable calculated for the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.

Idiosyncratic Riski;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j

þ b3Restricti;j þ b4Privatei;j

þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1

þ ei;j;t ð4Þ

Idiosyncratic riski,j,crisis is the annualized residual risk for bank i, in country j for the credit and sovereign debt crises respectively. For the credit crisis, we calculate idiosyncratic risk from the one-factor market model regression residuals by using banks’ stock returns and the MSCI World Index returns, as a proxy for the market port- folio, over June 2007 to December 2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we calculate the idiosyncratic risk from the one factor market model regression residuals by using banks’ stock returns and the MSCI World Index returns, as a proxy for the market portfolio, from May 2011 to December 2011. In the robustness section, we use two alternative time periods to calculate idiosyncratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1

4.4. Systematic risk

We analyze systematic risk as a measure of banks’ market risk, as in Kane and Unal (1988) and Flannery and James (1984). A higher sensitivity of bank share prices with market indices during both crises leads us to examine what factors drive market risk. Haq and Heaney (2012) analyze the systematic risk of banks in European countries and find that systematic risk is negatively related to bank capital, size, and charter value. Our systematic risk measure, Beta, is the beta coefficient estimated based on the one- factor model (CAPM) by regressing individual banks’ stock returns against the MSCI World Index returns. We analyze whether regula- tions affect systematic risk when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation twice, using Beta as the left-hand side variable calculated during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.

Betai;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð5Þ

Beta,i,j,crisis is the measure of systematic risk for bank i, in country j for the credit and sovereign debt crises, respectively. For the credit crisis, we estimate beta by employing one-factor market model regressions from June 2007 to December 2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we estimate beta by employing one-factor market model regressions over May 2011 to December 2011. We use the MSCI World Index returns as the proxy for market returns. In the robust- ness section, we use two alternative time period for estimating beta during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explana- tory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.5. Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)

Since the late 1990’s, there has been a growing shift in the view of the importance of market variables on the risk assessment of banks and how these variables can enhance supervisory monitor- ing (Greenspan, 1998;Curry et al. 2001, 2003). Moreover, bank supervisors assess a bank’s risk through their proprietary informa- tion gathered at infrequent intervals. Berger et al. (2000) suggest that market data are not only informative but that they can also contain information not yet incorporated into supervisors’ infor- mation, while market data do not fully reflect all the information that is available to supervisors. Since market variables contain information on firm risk reflected in the daily price changes, super- visory assessment can be complemented via the equity markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Elmer and Fissel, 2001; Curry et al., 2001). Krainer and Lopez, 2001, 2003 also show that cumulative abnormal returns are able to anticipate changes to banks’ risk captured by credit ratings. Moreover, the authors argue that equity market variables add value to regulators’ assessment of banks and in a timely manner.

As in Krishnan et al. (2005), banks’ stock market performance contains supplementary information regarding banks’ risk, which is also reflected in a timely manner. Based on the learning hypoth- esis, banks that learn from a past bad experience will adjust their risk attitude (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). In turn, the shift in banks’ risk attitude should be reflected in their stock performance. There- fore, as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we estimate banks’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns to assess what drives their performance and whether supervision regulations and any capital measures affect banks’ risk as reflected in their stock price.

To measure stock market performance, we calculate the BHAR following Beltratti and Stulz (2012), as follows:

BHARi;j;crisis ¼ YT

t¼1

ð1þ Ri;j;crisisÞ � YT

t¼1

ð1þ RM;t;crisisÞ ð6Þ

where BHARi,j,crisis is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for bank i in country j during a crisis period, Ri,j,crisis is the daily return of bank i in country j, and RM,j,crisis is the daily return on the market proxied by the MSCI World Index return. Then, we estimate the following equation twice, using BHAR as the left hand side variable calculated during the credit and sovereign debt crises.

BHARi;j; Crisis ¼ aþ b1Officali;j þ b2Capitali;j þ b3Restricti;j

þ b4Privatei;j þ b5DepositInsurancei;j

þX Bank and Country controlsi;j;t�1 þ ei;j;t ð7Þ

We calculate BHAR from June 2007 to December 2008 to mea- sure banks’ share price performance. Even though the credit crisis did not officially end at the end of 2008, since it continued through the first few months in 2009, the fall in share prices at the begin- ning of 2009 may have been partly due to bank rescues. Moreover, we use December 31, 2008, as a cut-off point to be consistent with Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We calcu- late the BHAR from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure banks’ share price performance during the sovereign debt crisis. In the robustness section, we use two alternative period definitions to calculate risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. We use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in Section 4.1.

4.6. Bank-level controls

To understand the importance of bank capital during times of turmoil, we use Tier I capital, which is a measure of capital

5 The list of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions is very much as had been expected, with 17 European banks, eight US ones, three Japanese, and one Chinese: Bank of America, Bank of China, Bank of New York Mellon, Banque Populaire CE, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, Crédit Agricole, HSBC, ING Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho FG, Morgan Stanley, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Société Générale, State Street, Sumitomo Mitsui, UBS, Unicredit Group, and Wells Fargo. The FSB and the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision drew up a list of G-SIFIs based on five criteria: their absolute size, their complexity, the extent of their cross-border activity, and the degree to which they are interconnected with the rest of the financial system.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 463

adequacy, following Laeven and Levine (2009), and which was more relevant during the crisis, according to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010). Tier 1 capital is defined as shareholder funds plus per- petual noncumulative preference shares relative to risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks, measured under the Basel rules. This figure is expressed as a percentage and should be at least 4%. Banks with greater quality capital are more able to absorb losses during financial turmoil (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Therefore, investors attach great importance to a bank’s capital quality, and we expect a positive relationship between bank capital and risk.

To shed light on the impact of liability structures, we use depos- its, defined as total deposits relative to total assets (Anginer et al., 2013). With explicit deposit insurance in place, deposit financing is not subject to runs. However, other money market-related funding is subject to runs (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Gorton, 2010) and dries up during crisis times. Therefore, we use funding fragility, intro- duced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), defined as the ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short-term bor- rowing to total deposits plus money market and short-term fund- ing. We expect banks with more deposits and less funding fragility to take more risk.

To capture the asset side of the balance sheet, we use several measures. The major asset of any type of commercial, mortgage, and cooperative bank is loans. Loans include residential mortgage loans, other mortgage loans, other consumer or retail loans, corpo- rate & commercial loans, and other loans minus reserve against possible losses on impaired or nonperforming loans. Banks with more loans on their books are more likely to have relatively lower exposure to off-balance sheet securities (e.g., derivatives), and thus run a lower risk with the widening of the credit spreads during a crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Therefore, banks with higher loans rather than risky securities should perform better, ceteris paribus. However, because we do not have the composition of loans as such, we do not have an expectation of the sign of loans. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use liquidity, defined as liquid assets scaled by total assets. As banks with more liquid assets are expected to perform better during a crisis, we expect a positive relationship between liquidity and stock performance.

To capture the income statement exposure, we use income diversity. Banks that derive their income from diverse activities have less exposure during a crisis. We use income diversity, by fol- lowing Laeven and Levine (2008), defined as the absolute value of difference between net interest income and other operating income divided by total operating income.

4.7. Country-level governance and macroeconomic variables

We include macroeconomic variables as additional controls. For instance, countries with a higher level of financial development and economic fundamentals might have different risk and returns. To control for country-level development, we use the gross domes- tic product (GDP) per capita at 2006 constant terms, as in Anginer et al. (2013). To control for the financial position of the country, we use current account balance, as in Klomp and de Haan, 2012. Cur- rent acc. bal. is the current account balance divided by GDP. To con- trol for level of market competition, we use concentration, as in Laeven and Levine (2009). Concentration is the total assets of the largest three banks in each country divided by total banking assets.

Evidence shows that companies in countries with better coun- try-level governance have better returns, as shareholders’ rights are better protected (John et al., 2008). ADRI is La Porta et al’s. (1998) anti-director index as revised by Djankov et al. (2008). A higher value means better protected shareholder rights. The vari- able institution is used, following Klomp and de Haan, 2012. It is the arithmetic average of six indicators called voice, political sta- bility, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,

and corruption that are reported in Kaufmann et al. (2008). A higher value for an institution means that better and more efficient supervisory institutions are present.

5. Data and descriptive statistics

5.1. Descriptive statistics

We collected bank data from Bankscope. We searched for the largest 1000 banks in Bankscope by asset size at the end of 2006. Included in the sample are commercial banks, savings banks, coop- erative banks, and mortgage banks. When we selected the largest 1000 banks, Bankscope provided both listed and unlisted banks, with a total of 502 unlisted banks. Since we focused on listed-only banks, this reduced the number of banks to a significant extent. Moreover, as we assessed the impact of regulations on global banks in the credit and sovereign debt crisis, we employed those banks listed during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. In total, 120 banks were delisted following the credit crisis. In addition, as we required bank balance sheet and income statement data for 2006 and 2010, we excluded the delisted banks, as data was not available in Bankscope. Our final sample included 378 global banks. We retained 378 banks for which we had accounting and share price data. All the systematically important banks (29) are included in the sample.5 Finally, we downloaded data on share prices and the MSCI World Index from DataStream; all data is in US dollars.

Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) distance to default is 3.106 (2.965) during the credit crisis. The dis- tance to default is higher during the credit crisis and significantly different than in the sovereign debt crisis. Our measure for sys- temic risk, MES, is lower during the credit crisis. The mean (med- ian) difference test shows a significant difference between the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Systematic risk, as mea- sured by beta, was lower during the credit crisis as compared to the sovereign debt crisis. It seems to increase after the 2007–08 credit crisis. Idiosyncratic volatility shows a similar picture, as it is higher before the 2011 crisis. The 2007–08 credit crisis contrib- uted to the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. The mean (med- ian) BHAR2007–08 during the credit crisis is �0.502 (�0.571), which shows that banks perform poorly. BHAR2011 is also nega- tive and shows that banks perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis as well.

All the accounting variables are calculated before the crisis. Tangible equity does not show any significant difference between these two periods. Average Tier I capital shows that banks increase regulatory capital significantly before the 2011 crisis period, in order to gradually comply with the new capital requirements introduced in Basel III. Liquid assets are significantly higher before the 2007–08 crisis than in 2011. There is no significant difference in the deposit ratios of the banks during those periods. Funding fra- gility is higher before the credit crisis compared to the sovereign debt crisis. The results give an early indication that in the after- math of the 2007–08 credit crisis, banks strive to strengthen their positions by reducing their funding fragility. The loan to total asset

Table 1 Descriptive statistics.

N Mean Median p5 p95

The 2007–08 credit crisis Log z 311 3.106 2.965*** 1.836 4.315 MES 378 �0.075*** �0.074*** �0.099 �0.050 Beta 326 1.006* 1.012 0.317 1.693 Idiosyncratic 378 42.335*** 37.669*** 19.108 79.695 BHAR 346 �0.502 �0.571 �0.894 0.022 Tier I capital 295 9.739*** 8.850*** 5.840 16.530 Liquidity 342 17.268*** 14.030** 2.910 42.180 Deposit 342 61.254 67.476 16.565 90.393 Funding fragility 342 21.259** 11.826** 0.952 73.279 Loan 342 59.094* 59.826*** 32.501 82.764 Income diversity 342 0.177* 0.120* �0.038 0.737 GDP 378 24.196 29.380 0.910 46.520 Current acc. bal. 378 1.806 1.532 �10.013 12.335

The sovereign debt crisis of 2011 Log z 311 2.765 2.730 2.124 3.483 MES 378 �0.066 �0.060 �0.095 �0.050 Idiosyncratic 372 48.606 44.200 14.161 86.492 Beta 310 1.072 1.028 0.358 1.852 BHAR 369 �0.283 �0.253 �0.711 0.068 ROA 354 0.716 0.605 �0.158 2.309 Tier I capital 321 11.159 10.400 6.800 17.100 Liquidity 356 14.668 11.400 3.180 34.980 Deposit 356 62.306 66.421 19.819 91.981 Funding fragility 356 17.710 10.310 0.484 67.742 Loan 356 61.178 62.528 34.360 82.639 Income diversity 354 0.144 0.100 �0.021 0.490 GDP 378 24.56 30.22 1.38 46.83 Current acc. bal. 378 1.060 1.23 �6.50 12.32 Total assets (bn$) 352 204.00 45.20 13.33 1176.21

Country-level variables Concentration 378 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.85 ADRI 378 3.69 4.00 1.00 5.00 Institute 378 0.83 1.18 �0.56 1.68 Official 378 10.11 10.00 7.00 13.00 Capital 378 5.91 6.00 4.00 8.00 Restrict 378 9.52 10.00 5.00 13.00 Private 378 6.74 7.00 5.00 8.00 Deposit insurance 378 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00

The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find accounting and share price data. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. *** Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 1% level. ** Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 5% levels. * Represents whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007–08 and 2011 at 10% levels.

464 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

ratio is slightly higher before 2011. Even though the per-capita GDP is the same during both crisis periods, the current account bal- ance as a percentage of GDP deteriorates during the sovereign debt crisis.

All the regulations variables show a good degree of variability. The 5th percentile for official supervisory power is 7, and the 95th percentile is 13. Capital restrictions are bounded between 4 and 8. The country-level variables show a wide variety of regula- tion levels. For instance, concentration shows a minimum of 0.32 and a maximum of 0.85. Eighty-four percent of our sample banks have explicit deposit insurance. In sum, there is a lot of variation in the regulation levels, which makes it possible to test our conjectures.

5.2. Cross-country variations

Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the risk and return characteristics of banks across countries. In particular, we report cross-country variations for countries that have at least five banks in the sample. Banks in Poland have the highest distance to default

(log z) measure during the credit crisis, but this changes during the sovereign debt crisis, as banks in Poland become more vulnerable to sovereign debt exposure and uncertainty. We find that Chilean banks have the highest systemic risk, as the MES is the lowest for these two countries during both the credit and sovereign debt crises. Banks in Austria have the lowest idiosyncratic risk in both the credit (18.41) and the sovereign debt (27.34) crises. In contrast, banks in Indonesia have the highest idiosyncratic risk during both crisis periods. With regard to beta, banks in Switzerland and the US have the highest beta values for both crisis periods (beta2007:1.48, beta2011:1.67 for Switzerland and beta2007:1.45, beta 2011:1.78 for the US, respectively). Moreover, the banks based in Japan have the lowest beta during the credit crisis (0.67), and this remains low during the sovereign debt crisis (0.86). The lowest BHAR is reported for Greece during both the credit (�0.759) and the sover- eign debt (�0.902) crises. Banks in Japan perform relatively better during both crisis periods (BHAR is �0.230 in 2007–08 and 0.003 in 2011).

6. Empirical results

6.1. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the credit crisis

This section presents the results on bank risk and returns during the credit crisis. In particular, we assess the impact of a number of regulations, while controlling for bank-specific characteristics, on four measurements of bank risk and the buy-and-hold returns dur- ing the credit crisis.

6.1.1. Distance to default We first examine whether the regulations have any impact on

the distance to default, as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009). Table 4, columns (1)–(2) report the regression results, with distance to default (log z) as the dependent variable. The results for the credit crisis show that restriction, private monitoring, and deposit insurance are negatively and significantly related to the distance to default. These results imply that the restrictions imposed on bank activities do not increase the soundness of the banks when a crisis breaks out. Due to moral hazard issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to conduct any activities (Boyd et al., 1998). However, we find that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank soundness, consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), deposit insurance could influence bank soundness in two opposite ways. Firstly, if deposit insurance is in place, it increases bank soundness by reducing the chances of bank runs. In contrast, banks may engage in exces- sive risk-taking behavior. Our results here highlight the second view. In the presence of deposit insurance, banks are less sound amidst financial turmoil. Our results are consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who show that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises.

In column (2), we include buy-and-hold returns before the credit crisis, Tier 1 capital, funding fragility, loans, income diver- sity, log of assets, GDP per capita, current account balance, and concentration of banking sector. We find that our main results in terms of regulations survive after controlling for other variables. We include BHAR to test whether the market provides any infor- mation on bank soundness, but we find no such evidence. We include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are sounder, and we find it is strongly and positively related to bank soundness. However, this is in contrast to Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We find that size is negatively related to distance to default, which implies that larger banks are less safe. Finally, con- centration is significantly positively related to bank soundness.

Table 2 Cross-country variation in selected variables.

Country N Log Z 2007

Log Z 2011

MES 2007

MES 2011

Idiosync 2007

Idiosync 2011

BETA 2007

Beta 2011

BHAR crisis07

BHAR crisis11

Australia 6 1.140 1.048 �0.078 �0.060 0.271 0.407 1.12 1.15 �0.637 �0.253 Austria 5 1.103 0.929 �0.062 �0.058 0.184 0.273 0.67 0.62 �0.332 �0.288 Canada 9 1.120 0.992 �0.076 �0.0568 0.267 0.407 0.63 1.10 �0.556 �0.167 Chile 5 1.109 �0.112 �0.203 0.454 0.823 0.87 0.98 �0.471 �0.36 China-People’s Rep. 18 0.704 1.013 �0.068 �0.058 0.434 0.415 1.01 0.95 �0.529 �0.22 France 17 1.161 0.905 �0.071 �0.065 0.302 0.431 1.08 1.00 �0.683 �0.428 Germany 8 1.048 0.942 �0.074 �0.075 0.357 0.519 1.34 1.16 �0.692 �0.348 Greece 6 1.188 1.018 �0.075 �0.103 0.436 0.734 1.43 1.32 �0.759 �0.902 Hong Kong 6 1.193 1.132 �0.078 �0.061 0.326 0.298 1.19 0.89 �0.570 �0.258 India 28 1.007 1.014 �0.071 �0.061 0.574 0.491 1.07 1.04 �0.483 �0.500 Indonesia 6 1.198 1.176 �0.092 �0.072 1.087 0.674 1.09 1.24 �0.654 �0.212 Israel 5 1.053 1.047 �0.066 �0.068 0.340 0.451 1.12 1.12 �0.578 �0.403 Italy 21 0.937 1.031 �0.069 �0.068 0.302 0.478 0.93 0.91 �0.552 �0.485 Japan 71 1.025 0.898 �0.070 �0.053 0.392 0.379 0.67 0.86 �0.230 0.003 Poland 9 1.479 0.999 �0.083 �0.078 0.420 0.579 1.38 0.94 �0.711 �0.511 Russian Federation 6 1.112 1.256 �0.071 �0.081 0.626 0.574 0.74 0.55 �0.738 �0.296 Saudi Arabia 6 1.393 1.034 �0.076 �0.057 0.363 0.464 – 0.84 �0.342 �0.12 Spain 13 1.126 1.018 �0.064 �0.073 0.378 0.554 0.99 0.93 �0.577 �0.453 Switzerland 5 1.296 0.986 �0.078 �0.070 0.380 0.649 1.48 1.67 �0.604 �0.438 Taiwan 5 1.035 1.015 �0.061 �0.060 0.518 0.530 1.01 1.05 �0.313 �0.281 Thailand 7 0.935 1.076 �0.115 �0.081 0.614 0.633 0.99 1.33 �0.613 �0.257 Turkey 8 1.246 1.209 �0.079 �0.073 0.770 0.568 1.16 1.18 �0.634 �0.454 United Arab

Emirates 6 1.208 1.003 �0.070 �0.054 0.476 0.416 – 1.30 �0.406 �0.071

United Kingdom 16 0.779 0.858 �0.081 �0.0585 0.343 0.473 1.28 1.54 �0.664 �0.224 USA 18 1.197 0.917 �0.085 �0.071 0.381 0.727 1.45 1.78 �0.690 �0.300

The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find accounting and share price data. In this table we present the results for countries that have at least 5 banks. BHAR 2007–08 is the buy-and-hold return for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 period. BHAR 11 is the buy-and- hold return from June 2011 until December 2011. Beta2007 is estimated on a regression of weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from June 2007 to December 2008. Idiosync2007 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta2007. Beta2011 is estimated on a regression of the weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from June 2011 until December 2011. Idiosync2010 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta2011.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 465

6.1.2. Systemic risk From a regulatory viewpoint, there is increasing consensus that

the correlation in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk taking in any individual institution. The financial crisis of 2007–08 highlighted the impor- tance of systemic risk leading regulators to focus more on prevent- ing future financial crises from spreading through the financial system, e.g., the ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, striving to set new regulatory require- ments for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). Acharya (2009) suggests that if sovereign states or central banks provide an implicit guarantee to cover losses stemming from a sys- temic crisis, banks will have more incentives to take on correlated risks. Guaranteed banks will not have any incentives to diversify their operations, as they are protected by the guarantees. Accord- ing to Anginer et al. (2013), deposit insurance not only increases bank-level risk taking through the standard moral hazard channel, but it may also increase risk-taking on the whole as well. The use of individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk measure is rela- tively new and allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit crisis and sovereign debt crisis. Most of the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship between regulation and systemic stability by using the incidence of banking crisis at the country level as a measure of systemic risk (e.g., Demirgüç- Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).

In this section, we examine the relationship between regula- tions and bank-level systemic risk during the credit crisis. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.1. We use marginal expected shortfall as the dependent variable to measure banks’ systemic risk, as described in Section 4. The results are in columns (3)–(4) in Table 3. The results show that capital regulation and activity restrictions

are positively related to systemic risk during the credit crisis. This suggests that better oversight of capital is related to higher MES, which means lower systemic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005, who report that stringent capital requirements reduce banking risk. Moreover, higher activity restrictions reduce individual banks’ contribution towards systemic risk. The results also show that deposit insurance is negatively related to MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk, which increases the chance of bank runs. These results are consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who find that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. When we introduce bank- and country-level control variables (column (4), Table 3) most of the results related to regulations survive. None of the con- trol variables is significant. In this specification, private monitoring is positively related to MES, implying that higher private monitor- ing leads to higher MES. In other words, higher private monitoring reduces individual banks’ contribution towards systemic risk.

6.1.3. Idiosyncratic risk Next we examine the impact of regulations on idiosyncratic vol-

atility. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.1, and we use idiosyncratic vol- atility as the dependent variable to measure banks’ business risk, as described in Section 4. The results are in columns (5)–(6) in Table 3. The results in column (5), i.e., without bank- and coun- try-level controls, show that official power and deposit insurance is positively and capital and restrictions are negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. The results show that higher capital restrictions lower the idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. In the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risks, as deposit insurance is positively related to

Table 3 Risk analysis, the credit crisis.

Log z MES Idiosyncratic risk Beta

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Cons 4.532*** (12.45) 2.683*** (4.34) �10.348*** (�11.51) �12.103*** (�5.44) 52.856*** (5.83) 25.640 (1.28) 1.438*** (5.72) 0.041 (0.07) Official 0.022 (0.85) 0.012 (0.64) �0.059 (�0.99) �0.099 (�1.41) 1.728*** (2.88) 1.454** (2.32) 0.045*** (2.77) 0.066*** (3.50) Capital �0.043 (�1.24) 0.013 (0.47) 0.062 (0.81) 0.058 (0.59) �1.308** (�2.65) �0.734* (�1.83) �0.055** (�2.47) �0.028** (�2.03) Restriction �0.043* (�2.08) �0.034* (�1.74) 0.221*** (4.66) 0.269*** (3.94) �0.833* (�1.74) �0.937 (�1.49) �0.018 (�1.39) 0.000 (�0.01) Private monitoring �0.151*** (�3.07) �0.115** (2.32) 0.174 (1.50) 0.294* (1.78) �1.275 (�1.10) �1.550 (�1.07) �0.057* (�1.79) �0.097** (�2.26) Deposit insurance �0.047*** (�2.36) �0.041** (2.35) �0.674** (�2.18) �0.690* (�1.69) 2.119*** (2.66) 2.626*** (2.70) 0.069 (0.77) 0.013 (0.12) BHAR 0.001 (0.59) �0.003 (�0.62) 0.093** (2.27) 0.004*** (2.87) Tier 1 0.101*** (8.90) 0.057 (1.43) 0.412 (1.12) �0.001 (�0.08) Funding fragility �0.001 (�0.58) 0.006 (0.63) �0.284*** (�3.65) �0.002 (�0.70) Loans 0.002 (0.55) �0.001 (�0.10) 0.017 (0.17) �0.002 (�0.67) Income diversity �0.033 (�0.30) 0.121 (0.31) 0.990 (0.27) �0.081 (�0.79) Size �0.158** (�2.11) �0.124 (�0.47) 6.083** (2.51) 0.257*** (3.59) GDP per cap 0.001 (0.22) 0.003 (0.26) �0.144 (�1.60) 0.005* (1.73) Current acc. bal. �0.006 (�1.23) �0.003 (�0.19) �0.201 (�1.27) �0.015*** (�2.92) Concentration 0.532** (2.28) 0.794 (0.94) 5.247 (0.70) 0.113 (0.49) ADRI �0.067 (�1.60) 0.128 (0.87) 0.056 (0.04) �0.021 (�0.49)

Adj. R2 (%) 5.07 35.86 8.04 6.72 1.60 9.28 2.40 17.54 N 312 289 350 275 378 295 341 266

All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting data are taken end of 2006. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

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Table 4 Stock market performance, the credit crisis.

Dependent Variable: BHAR 2007–08

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant �118.438*** (�7.37) �68.023*** (�5.57) �63.911*** (�4.26) �46.089*** (�2.88) Official 1.824** (1.99) 2.888*** (4.90) 2.915*** (4.57) 2.641*** (4.08) Capital 1.33 (1.10) 0.983 (1.21) 0.05 (0.05) 0.665 (0.71) Restriction 2.009*** (2.62) 1.135** (2.27) 0.891** (2.32) 0.892* (2.27) Private monitoring 3.188* (1.69) 1.642*** (2.25) 2.806* (1.91) 1.573* (2.10) Deposit insurance �5.436 (�1.18) 3.749 (1.04) 7.796* (1.72) 3.977 (0.84) Tier 1 0.649 (1.33) 0.616* (1.70) 0.731** (1.92) 0.257 (0.66) Log z �0.694 (�0.86) �0.68 (�0.85) �0.939 (�1.16) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.133* (�1.86) �0.267*** (�3.14) �0.206** (�2.48) Beta �43.362*** (�15.78) �39.225*** (�12.02) �41.394*** (�12.55) Funding fragility 0.109 (1.38) Deposit 0.112 (1.70) Liquid �0.07 (�0.65) Loan �0.279*** (�3.16) GDP per cap �0.286*** (�2.65) Current acc. bal. 0.422** (2.31) 0.099 (0.52) Concentration �9.595 (�1.20) �5.685 (�0.65) ADRI 0.756 (0.50) 0.775 (0.52) Institution �0.923 (�0.34)

Adj. R2 (%) 8.13 61.98 63.14 63.71 N 275 247 247 247

The dependent variable is BHAR 2007–08 for the sample banks. BHAR 2007–08 is calculated for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 period. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2006. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 467

idiosyncratic risk, consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Anginer et al. (2013). Our results support the moral hazard channel of risk taking in the presence of deposit insurance.

We then introduce the bank- and country-level control vari- ables in column (6). The results with respect to the regulations are mostly the same, with the exception that restriction is no longer significant. We include BHAR before the crisis and find that it is positive and significant. This suggests that banks with high returns before the crisis have higher risk during the crisis. The mar- ket imposes some discipline in terms of returns, which leads banks to take more risk. Moreover, the higher the funding fragility the lower the risk, as before the credit crisis, the short-term funding market is working well. Finally, larger banks take more risks as the log of assets is positively related to idiosyncratic risk.

6.1.4. Systematic risk In this section, we examine the impact of regulations on banks’

systematic risk. Therefore, we use banks’ beta as the dependent variable, as described in Section 4, along with the same regression specifications and control variables as those in Section 6.1.1. The results are in columns (7)–(8) in Table 3. The results in column (7), excluding bank- and country-level variables, show that official supervision is positively related to banks’ market risk. This is puz- zling, as one would expect higher official supervision to prevent banks from taking excessive risks, hence resulting in lower market risk. In contrast, and as expected, we find that capital restrictions and private monitoring are negatively related to market risk. This finding, which is consistent with Fernández and González, 2005, suggests that more stringent capital regulations and private mon- itoring prevent banks from taking excessive risk, resulting in their increased ability to absorb losses and be less sensitive to system- atic risk. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that deposit insur- ance affects banks’ systematic risk.

We then introduce the bank- and country-level controls, and our results on the impact of regulations remain the same. We also introduce BHAR to test whether there is any feedback through the

market returns on beta, and we find that BHAR is highly significant and positive. This suggests that banks with high BHAR before the credit crisis are more sensitive to systematic risk during the crisis. In addition, we find that larger banks have higher beta, which shows the systemic importance of large banks in their respective stock markets. Finally, GDP per capita is positively related while current account balance is negatively related to beta.

6.1.5. Buy-and-hold-returns In this section, we assess the drivers of banks’ stock market per-

formance during the two crises. The results on the stock market performance during the credit crisis, reported in Table 4, show that official supervision is consistently positive and highly significant. This suggests that the markets show greater confidence in the banking sector in countries with better and more effective official monitoring and that banks in these countries are more resilient during the credit crisis. This is also supported by the fact that reg- ulatory restrictions are positive and significant, suggesting that in countries with stricter regulations, banks have a better stock mar- ket performance. This suggests that better official monitoring helps keep banks’ ultimate owners’ interests aligned with those of share- holders, resulting in a better stock performance during the crisis.

The results on private monitoring are positive and significant. Based on the argument of Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that better governance has a positive effect on bank stock performance, our results on private monitoring suggest that better external monitor- ing leads to better bank governance. This, in turn, leads to better stock performance. We find that capital requirements have no impact on the market valuation and pricing of bank risk. We also find some evidence, though not as strong, that banks with higher Tier 1 capital perform better, consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The results also show that banks in countries with deposit insurance perform better. Further, we find that banks with greater idiosyncratic volatility and systematic risk show a poor perfor- mance during the credit crisis, consistent with Acharya et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a negative relation-

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468 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

ship between beta and returns during the credit crisis. We find no evidence of funding fragility, liquidity, or ratio of deposits having an impact on banks’ stock performance. We do find, though, that banks with a lower ratio of loans over assets operating in countries with slowing economies have a poor stock performance during the credit crisis. We also find some evidence that banks in countries with higher current account balances have better stock perfor- mance, consistent with Lane (2012), who argues that the 2007 financial shock caused a reevaluation of asset prices, especially in countries with greater economic imbalances.

6.2. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis

In this section we repeat the regressions on the same risk vari- ables and the buy-and-hold returns during the sovereign debt cri- sis. The objective here is to assess whether banks take more sensible risks in the aftermath of the credit crisis, and whether the regulations during the sovereign debt crisis affect banks’ risk and returns the same way as in the credit crisis.

6.2.1. Distance to default We examine whether regulations have any impact on the dis-

tance to default during the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. This is particularly important, as after the credit crisis, a large number of banks went bankrupt. Table 5, in columns (1)–(2), reports the regression results for log z. In column (1), we only use the regulations variables. The results for the sovereign debt crisis show that as in the credit crisis, private monitoring is negatively and significantly related to the distance to default. Unlike the credit crisis, however, official supervision is negatively related to the dis- tance to default. Deposit insurance is not significant in this regres- sion. Our results for the sovereign debt crisis do not provide conclusive evidence for deposit insurance. We do not find support for Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who show that an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises, as banks become less sound in the presence of a deposit insurance scheme.

In column (2), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. We find that restriction is negatively related to log z, implying that the restrictions imposed on bank activities do not increase their soundness when a crisis breaks out. Due to moral hazard issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to take any activities (Boyd et al., 1998). In contrast, we find that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank soundness, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). We also include BHAR to test whether there is any market feedback on bank soundness in terms of returns. We find that BHAR is highly significant, suggesting that the market provides feedback regarding banks’ soundness after the credit crisis and before the sovereign debt crisis. This implies that market participants become more vigilant to provide feedback once a crisis breaks out. We include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are sounder and find that Tier 1 capital is strongly and positively related to bank soundness, which is similar to the findings on the credit crisis. We do not find evidence of size being significantly related to the distance to default. Moreover, we find that GDP per capita is negatively related to distance to default, which shows that banks based in countries with higher GDP are more susceptible to risk. This is also consistent with the fact that the sovereign debt crisis essentially originates from European countries.

6.2.2. Systemic risk In the aftermath of the financial crisis, systemic risk became

more important, as regulators’ objectives were to prevent another

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 469

crisis. However, since after the credit crisis, sovereign states were drawn into the sovereign debt crisis via bank rescues, examining the correlated risk taking in the sovereign debt crisis can extend our understanding of the extent to which state or central bank guarantees can shake the base of the sovereigns. Acharya (2009) argues that banks are more likely to take on more correlated risks when there is an implicit state or central bank guarantee to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis.

In this section, we examine the relationship between regula- tions and individual bank systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.2. As a dependent variable, we use marginal expected shortfall (MES), as described in Section 4, to proxy for the systemic risk. The results in Table 5, columns (3)–(4), show that capital regulation and activity restrictions are positively related, while deposit insurance is negatively related to systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis, as they are during the credit crisis. This implies that better oversight of capital is related to lower systemic risk, as denoted by higher MES. Restrict- ing banks’ activity reduces individual banks’ contribution toward systemic risk. In addition, deposit insurance is negatively related to MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk. Consequently, this increases the likelihood of bank runs. Using previous banking crisis data, Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. When we introduce bank- and country-level controls (Table 5, column (4)), most of the results related to regulations survive. None of the addi- tional control variables are significant except ADRI. This suggests that in countries with better protected shareholder rights, banks experience less systemic risk.

6.2.3. Idiosyncratic risk In this section, we assess the drivers of idiosyncratic risk during

the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variable is idiosyncratic volatility, and we use the same regression specifications and con- trol variables as those used in Section 6.1.2. The results are shown in Table 5, columns (5)–(6). The results in column (5), excluding bank- and country-level control variables, show that higher capital restrictions lead to lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. Moreover, we find that in the pres- ence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk, even following the credit crisis, as deposit insurance is positively related to idiosyn- cratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. As in the credit crisis, our results support the argument that the presence of deposit insurance increases moral hazard during the sovereign debt crisis. This is also consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Anginer et al. (2013).

In column (6), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. Our previous results regarding the impact of regulation remain mostly the same. The only exception is regulatory restric- tion, which is no longer significant. Moreover, the results show that a higher level of private monitoring leads to higher idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that even though investors monitor banks, they still entice banks to take more risks in the pursuit for higher returns. In addition, we find that the BHAR before the sovereign debt crisis is positive and significant. This suggests that banks delivering higher returns prior to the sovereign debt crisis end up being more exposed to idiosyncratic risk. We also find that hav- ing higher Tier 1 capital reduces idiosyncratic risk. This shows that one of regulators’ ways of making banks more resilient and able to absorb greater losses is successful, as suggested by the lower idio- syncratic risk. Moreover, the results show that banks with more diverse income have lower risk during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we find that unlike the credit crisis, funding fragility and size are not significant. We also find that current account

balance is negative and significant, suggesting that countries that are more financially sound have greater flexibility to intervene and prevent a bank from becoming insolvent, as opposed to finan- cially fragile states. Finally, we find that shareholder protection, captured by ADRI, is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk.

6.2.4. Systematic risk In this section, we assess the impact of regulations on banks’

market risk during the sovereign debt crisis. We use banks’ beta, discussed in Section 4, as the dependent variable, and we employ the same regression specifications and variables as in Section 6.1.2. The results are reported in Table 5, columns (7)–(8). The results (column (7)) show that official supervision is positively and capital and private monitoring are negatively related to market risk. This suggests that stringent capital regulations reduce systematic risk, consistent with Fernández and González, 2005. In addition, the results show that higher private monitoring leads to lower system- atic risk, which is consistent with the view that private monitoring reduces the systematic risk of banks. However, we find no evidence of deposit insurance having an impact on banks’ systematic risk during the sovereign debt crisis, similar to our findings on the credit crisis.

In column (7), we introduce the bank- and country-level con- trols. We find that the higher a bank’s BHAR is before the sovereign debt crisis, the higher its systematic risk is when the sovereign debt crisis unfolds. While private monitoring leads banks to take on greater risk, at the same time, investors require more returns. In addition, larger banks have higher beta, which shows the sys- temic importance of large banks in their respective stock markets. GDP per capita is positively and current account balance is nega- tively related to beta. Finally, higher levels of shareholder protec- tion lead to lower systematic risk.

6.2.5. Buy-and-hold-returns We assess the drivers of banks’ stock market performance dur-

ing the sovereign debt crisis in order to evaluate whether there is a shift in the factors that affect banks’ stock market performance during the credit crisis. The results reported in Table 6 show that the impact of capital requirements is still not significant, while official and private monitoring remain positive and significant dur- ing the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. However, regu- latory restrictions cease to influence banks’ stock performance, while deposit insurance schemes are negative and significant dur- ing the sovereign debt crisis, as opposed to the credit crisis. This suggests that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk and perform worse. Moreover, the adoption of higher Tier 1 capital levels that were introduced during the credit crisis becomes positive and significant. This is contrary to, who find a negative relationship between banks’ capital and stock returns during August, 2007, but is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a robust, positive relationship between Tier 1 capital and bank performance. This suggests that banks with stronger bal- ance sheets show a stronger stock performance. Idiosyncratic risk remains negative and significant, though beta has no impact during the sovereign debt crisis. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a negative relationship between banks’ beta and their stock performance.

Unlike the credit crisis, during the sovereign debt crisis, banks that are more financially robust in terms of funding fragility and overall deposits have a stronger stock performance, consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), while liquidity and bank loans have no impact during this period. The results on current account balance and concentration remain the same for the credit and sovereign debt crisis. This suggests that greater country stability and less uncertainty about future growth prospects have a significant impact on bank performance during

Table 6 Stock market performance, the sovereign debt crisis.

Dependent Variable: BHAR 2010–11

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant �85.803*** (�6.59) �50.931*** (�2.83) �30.512 (�1.62) �61.175*** (�3.19) Official 2.419*** (3.08) 2.780*** (3.80) 1.523** (2.21) 0.403*** (2.59) Capital 0.603 (0.58) �0.091 (�0.10) �1.384 (�1.40) 0.397 (0.40) Restriction �0.155 (�0.24) �0.398 (�0.66) �0.113 (�0.16) 0.032 (0.05) Private monitoring 5.018*** (3.49) 5.187*** (3.44) 2.852** (1.86) 2.567* (1.79) Deposit insurance �12.010*** (�3.11) �2.976*** (�2.72) �3.608*** (�2.83) �4.332*** (�2.95) Tier 1 0.651* (1.85) 0.012 (0.03) 0.078 (0.23) 0.610* (1.78) Log z �3.242 (�1.26) �3.249 (�1.38) �0.515 (�0.22) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.627*** (�6.82) �0.498*** (�5.85) �0.458*** (�5.65) Beta �0.966 (�0.27) �1.6 (�0.49) 0.407 (0.13) Funding fragility �0.296*** (�3.33) Deposit 0.369*** (5.60) Liquid 0.012 (0.09) Loan 0.014 (0.15) GDP per cap 0.097 (0.92) Current acc. bal. 1.493*** (6.29) 1.284*** (5.69) Concentration �10.272 (�1.29) �21.644 (�2.51) ADRI 3.138* (2.02) 1.332 (0.89) Institution 8.881*** (3.41)

Adj. R2 (%) 11.93 36.46 49.63 54.57 N 311 273 273 273

The dependent variable is BHAR 2011 for the sample banks. BHAR 2011 is calculated from June 2011 to December 2011. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

Table 7 Robustness checks: risk regressions.

MES MES Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk Beta Beta January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

January 2010– December 2011

May 2010–December 2011

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Cons �6.179*** (�3.73) �6.504*** (�3.87) 0.964* (1.80) 52.419*** (3.00) �0.828* (�1.90) �0.817* (�1.88) Official �0.086 (�1.55) �0.100* (�1.76) �0.395 (�0.53) 0.942* (1.64) �0.033** (�2.31) �0.034** (�2.41) Capital �0.044 (�0.57) �0.012 (�0.15) �1.253*** (�2.43) �0.418 (�0.52) 0.039* (1.94) 0.040* (2.02) Restriction 0.111** (2.16) 0.125** (2.40) 1.247 (1.09) �1.337** (�2.42) �0.014 (�0.99) �0.013 (�0.95) Private monitoring �0.232* (�1.92) �0.265* (�2.17) 5.930* (2.09) 1.571 (1.28) 0.038 (1.24) 0.041 (1.34) Deposit insurance �0.778*** (�2.72) �0.852*** (�2.93) 0.023 (0.89) 6.507** (2.15) 0.382*** (5.06) 0.374*** (4.96) BHAR 0.003 (1.06) 0.004 (1.43) �0.678*** (�2.84) 0.022 (0.77) 0.005*** (7.64) 0.005*** (7.59) Tier 1 �0.012 (�0.42) �0.007 (�0.25) �0.01 (�0.15) �0.731*** (�2.87) �0.011* (�1.77) �0.011* (�1.80) Funding fragility 0.002 (0.24) 0.001 (0.11) 0.026 (0.32) �0.005 (�0.07) 0.003* (1.82) 0.003* (1.82) Loans �0.001 (�0.08) 0.001 (0.12) �4.726 (�0.93) 0.029 (0.33) 0.001 (0.47) 0.001 (0.45) Income diversity 0.818 (1.57) 0.787 (1.49) �2.627 (�1.32) �4.997 (�0.92) �0.179 (�1.33) �0.172 (�1.27) Size 0.07 (0.36) 0.114 (0.57) �0.179* (�2.19) �2.753 (�1.30) 0.279*** (5.27) 0.274*** (5.18) GDP per cap �0.007 (�0.83) �0.004 (�0.45) �0.560*** (�3.10) �0.189* (�2.17) 0.013*** (6.09) 0.013*** (6.20) Current acc. bal. 0.013 (0.70) 0.016 (0.89) 6.297 (1.03) �0.601*** (�3.12) �0.035*** (�7.31) �0.034*** (�7.07) Concentration 0.519 (0.83) 0.477 (0.75) �2.344* (�2.11) 6.763 (1.04) 0.290* (1.78) 0.291* (1.79) ADRI 0.184 (1.63) 0.177 (1.55) 51.975*** (3.18) �2.403* (�2.03) �0.153*** (�5.18) �0.154*** (�5.22) Adj. R2 (%) 8.70 10.72 11.28 11.21 57.50 57.06 N 299 299 313 313 313 313

The dependent variable is MES from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and MES from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for the sample banks. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at the end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

470 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we find that in countries with strong institutional and regulatory frameworks and better corpo- rate governance, captured by ADRI and institution, banks show a

stronger stock performance. This supports the argument that bet- ter governance leads to better stock performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).

Table 8 Robustness checks: return regressions.

Sovereign debt crisis–BHAR (January 2010–December 2011) Sovereign debt crisis – BHAR (May 2010–December 2011)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat

Constant 7.370 (0.26) �27.693 (�1.10) �30.512 (�1.62) �27.693 (�1.10) Official 3.098*** (2.78) 1.383*** (2.64) 1.523** (2.21) 1.383*** (2.69) Capital 1.383 (0.96) 0.875 (0.79) �1.384 (�1.40) 0.875 (0.79) Restriction �0.919 (�1.01) �1.05 (�1.58) �0.113 (�0.16) �1.05 (�1.58) Private monitoring �1.475 (�0.70) 1.932 (1.21) 2.852* (1.86) 1.932 (1.21) Deposit insurance �12.087*** (�2.22) �14.647*** (�3.32) �3.608*** (�2.83) �14.647*** (�3.32) Tier 1 0.302 (0.60) 0.891** (1.99) 0.078 (0.23) 0.891* (1.99) Log z �3.468 (�0.98) �1.109 (�0.37) �3.249 (�1.38) �1.109 (�0.37) Idiosyncratic volatility �0.526*** (�4.11) �0.530*** (�4.99) �0.498*** (�5.85) �0.530*** (�4.99) Beta 4.125 (0.84) 4.241 (1.04) �1.6 (�0.49) 4.241 (1.04) Funding fragility �0.362*** (�2.71) �0.296*** (�3.33) Deposit 0.423*** (4.91) 0.423*** (4.91) Liquid �0.025 (�0.13) 0.012 (0.09) Loan 0.141 (1.21) 0.141 (1.21) GDP per cap �0.277* (�1.74) 0.097 (0.92) Current acc. bal. 2.567*** (7.19) 2.153*** (7.29) 1.493*** (6.29) 2.153*** (7.29) Concentration �2.727 (�0.23) �14.775 (�1.31) �10.272 (�1.29) �14.775 (�1.31) ADRI 6.093** (2.61) 1.343 (0.69) 3.138** (2.02) 1.343 (0.69) Institution 7.127** (2.09) 7.127** (2.09)

Adj. R2 (%) 33.80 42.83 49.63 42.83 N 273 273 273 273

The dependent variable is BHAR from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and BHAR from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for sample banks. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at end of 2010. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. *** Represents significance at 1%. ** Represents significance at 5%. * Represents significance at 10%.

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 471

7. Robustness checks

Following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we calculate the BHAR from June 2007 to December 2008 to measure the risk and return for the credit crisis. For the sovereign debt crisis, we measure the risk and the BHAR starting from May 2011 until the end of 2011 (BHAR = �28.34). We use May 2011 as the starting point, because in May 2011, the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a €78 billion bailout for Portugal. For robustness checks, we use two alternative definitions, the beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 (BHAR = �25.89) and May 2010 to December 2011 (BHAR = �23.61).6 To examine the robustness of our results, we run the regressions using alternative measures of risks and BHARs, i.e., the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2011 and the period from May 2010 to the end of 2011.

The results on risk regressions are presented in Table 7. The results regarding MES show that irrespective of time periods, restriction is positively and private monitoring and deposit insur- ance are negatively related to MES. When we analyze idiosyncratic risk, we find that higher capital restrictions and private monitoring lower the idiosyncratic risk. The market risk regressions show that the higher the official power, the lower the beta. In the presence of deposit insurance, a higher beta is observed. BHAR is significant in idiosyncratic risk and beta regressions. Likewise, Tier I capital is significant in idiosyncratic and beta regressions. We also find that the higher the size, the lower the idiosyncratic and market risk. Overall, the results found in Table 7 are similar to previous results.

The official power of the regulators is significant in all the regressions, implying that banks perform better in countries with higher official power. Deposit insurance is negative and significant,

6 We choose the beginning of 2010 as the starting point, as concern starts to build about all the heavily indebted countries in Europe—Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Alternatively, we use May 2010 as a starting point, as on May 2, 2010 the Eurozone members and the IMF agree on a €110 billion bailout package to rescue Greece.

suggesting that banks in the presence of deposit insurance take more risk and perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis. The effect of private monitoring on stock performance is positive and significant only for the BHAR of May 2010 to Dec 2011. We argue that this is probably due to the fact that the concerns regard- ing the servicing of sovereign debt in the European periphery are gathering momentum in February 2010, initiating a new cycle of uncertainty in the markets with the announcement of the first bail- out package for Greece in early May, 2010, commanding greater scrutiny and monitoring of banks and their exposure to sovereign debt.

Overall, the results shown in Table 8 are similar to our previous results and interpretations regarding the factors that affect banks’ stock performance during the sovereign debt crisis. For instance, the results on ADRI and institution remain positive and significant. Consistent with the argument of Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that a better alignment of bank insiders’ and shareholders’ interests results in better performance, our results show that better investor monitoring leads to better corporate governance, resulting to better stock performance. Moreover, the results on Tier 1 capital and deposits remain positive and significant, and funding fragility remains negative, suggesting that banks with greater reliance on deposit and more robust funding show a better stock performance during the sovereign debt crisis. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012). The results on bank and country risk show that banks with higher idiosyncratic risk, which are based in more fragile coun- tries—captured by GDP per cap—have worse stock performance.

Finally, since our sample contains only 378 banks, it is impor- tant to check whether outliers are driving our results. We perform median regressions where the sum of the absolute weighted devi- ations is minimized. The results are qualitatively the same, as reported by using the ordinary least squares. We conclude that our results are not driven by outliers. We do not present these results, for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.

472 H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474

8. Conclusion

The financial crisis that originated in the securitized debt mar- ket spread rapidly, affecting all financial institutions to a certain degree, leading to numerous bank rescues and bankruptcies across countries. What is more, according to some commentators, this ignited the sovereign debt crisis. Even though our goal is not the identification of the reasons leading to the financial and sovereign debt crises, the poor bank performance in terms of risk and stock returns during both crises can be a good testing ground for regula- tion effectiveness. Hence, we shed light on the impact of regula- tions and regulatory and institutional frameworks.

In particular, we analyze whether regulations are effective for bank risk and returns across the world during the credit and sover- eign debt crisis periods. The results show that greater official supervision leads to higher systematic risk in banks during both crises. Moreover, official supervision leads to banks being riskier, captured by distance to default, but only during the sovereign debt crisis. We also find evidence that greater capital leads to lower bank risk during both crises, suggesting that banks having enough capital can insulate themselves from financial turmoil. Regarding regulatory restriction, we find that it has no impact on insulating banks during both crises. But we find that restriction leads to bet- ter stock performance, but only during the credit crisis. Moreover, we find that having a deposit insurance scheme in place increases moral hazard and induces banks to take greater risks, resulting in greater exposure during both crises. Additionally, we find that greater private monitoring leads to lower bank risk. This suggests that investors actively monitoring banks prevent them from taking excessive risks. Hence, countries with higher private monitoring show a better stock performance during both crises.

Our results have several policy implications regarding the effec- tiveness and design of regulations to better control risk and thus enhance the performance of global banks which are the focal point of regulators. More restrictions on banks increase the stability of global banks and reduce the systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. Moreover, restrictions on bank activities seem to be effective for controlling the stability of banks during times of turmoil. However, Barth et al. (2013) show that restric- tions reduce efficiency. Hence, policymakers should strive to find the right balance of restrictions for reducing systemic risk without decreasing efficiency. In line with Anginer et al. (2013) we find that deposit insurance is negatively related to bank stability and sys- temic risk, suggesting that deposit insurance increases moral haz- ard. This is also consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003) and Laeven (2002) who show that under weak institutional environ- ments deposit insurance may work detrimentally. Demirgüç- Kunt and Kane (2002) also show that a country’s private and public contracting environment is important in deposit-insurance adop- tion and design. Our findings raise the question: should policy makers rethink the design of deposit insurance as it increases the instability and systemic risk of individual banks?

In terms of returns, banks in countries with greater official power, restrictions and private monitoring performed better dur- ing the credit crisis. These results suggest that while regulatory restrictions and supervision are necessary, at the same time it is important to have better private monitoring. Hence private moni- toring, which is a market mechanism to reward better banks, com- plements regulatory supervision. Our findings also highlight the need for regulators to access market information in regular inter- vals to supplement other sources of regulatory information. While official power of supervisors and private monitoring still explain the stock return performance of banks during the sovereign debt crisis, imposing greater restrictions on bank activities does not

enhance bank returns. Policymakers need to bear this in mind especially when planning to impose more restrictions on banks while the banking system is still fragile. The results reported in this paper are consistent with the World Bank regulations IV in Barth et al. (2013) who find that some countries have eased the restric- tions following the global financial crisis.

Moreover, the evidence show that higher official power increases risk-taking during the credit crisis. This is consistent with the rent seeking view of supervisors as they use power to benefit favored voters, attract donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002; and Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Beck et al. (2006) point out that if bank supervisory agencies have the authority to discipline noncompliant banks, the supervi- sors might use this power to induce or force banks to allocate credit so as to generate private or political benefits. Our findings raise some concerns regarding the optimal supervisory power of bank regulators.

Most of the regulations were effective in controlling risk, apart from deposit insurance which has a detrimental effect on risk. Offi- cial power and private monitoring explains the returns during both the crises. Overall, our results can be extended to having policy implications: regulatory restrictions and supervision may be costly and difficult to enforce, but combined with the market’s scrutiny, they reduce the systemic risk, insulate banks from financial dis- tress, and enable banks to provide a stronger stock performance during a crisis.

Appendix 1. Variable definitions

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Log z

Average ROA plus capital to asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation of ROA

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Laeven and Levine, 2008).

MES

Average return on sample banks conditioned on 5% worse returns on the market

To measure the systemic risk of banks (Acharya et al., 2010).

Idiosyncratic

Annualized standard deviation from regressing weekly stock returns of individual stocks against the MSCI World Index.

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 2010).

Beta

Coefficient from regressing weekly stock returns of individual stocks against the MSCI World Index

To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 2010).

BHAR

Buy-and-hold abnormal return for individual banks

To measure the stock market performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).

Official

A score that reflects the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency

To explain whether supervisory power can explain banks’ risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

H. Hoque et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 455–474 473

Appendix 1 (continued)

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Capital

A score that reflects the regulatory oversight of bank capital.

To assess whether regulatory oversight of bank capital can explain banks’ risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

Restrictions

A score that measures the regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks

To measure the relationship between level of restrictions and bank risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio et al., 2007).

Private monitoring

A score that measures the degree of private monitoring

To analyze whether private monitoring can discipline bank risk taking and hence returns (Caprio et al., 2007)

Deposit insurance

A binary variable equal to one where there is explicit deposit insurance and zero otherwise

To better understand the role of deposit insurance in turmoil times (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2008)

Tier I capital

Shareholder funds plus perpetual non- cumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk- weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks measured under the Basel rules

To capture the importance of bank capital in times of turmoil (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2010)

Deposits

Total deposits as a fraction of total assets

To assess the impact of liability structures (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012)

Funding fragility

Ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short- term borrowing to total deposits, plus money market and short-term funding

To assess the impact of liability structures (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010)

Loans

Total loans divided by total assets

To capture the asset side of the balance sheet (Demirgüç- Kunt et al., 2010)

Size

Natural logarithm of total assets

To control for bank size

Income diversity

Absolute value of the difference between net interest income and other operating income divided by total operating income

To assess income diversity and how vulnerable a bank is during a crisis (Laeven and Levine, 2009)

GDP

GDP per capita at 2006 constant terms

Beltratti and Stulz (2012)

Current acc. bal.

Current account balance scaled by GDP

Beltratti and Stulz (2012)

Appendix 1 (continued)

Variables

Definitions

Reasons for inclusion

Concentration

The total assets of the largest three banks divided by total bank assets

To control for competition (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010)

Institution

Arithmetic average of six indicators: voice, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption

To control for country-level effects (Kaufmann et al., 2008)

ADRI

The revised anti- director index of La Porta et al. (1998)

To control for regulatory and institutional frameworks in each country (Djankov et al., 2008)

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  • Bank regulation, risk and return: Evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Hypothesis development for testing the impact of regulations on bank risk and returns
      • 2.1 Bank capital and capital regulation
      • 2.2 Restrictions on bank activities
      • 2.3 Official supervisory power
      • 2.4 Private monitoring
      • 2.5 Deposit insurance
    • 3 A narrative of the credit and sovereign debt crises
    • 4 Variables used and methodology
      • 4.1 Distance to default
      • 4.2 Marginal expected shortfall
      • 4.3 Idiosyncratic risk
      • 4.4 Systematic risk
      • 4.5 Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
      • 4.6 Bank-level controls
      • 4.7 Country-level governance and macroeconomic variables
    • 5 Data and descriptive statistics
      • 5.1 Descriptive statistics
      • 5.2 Cross-country variations
    • 6 Empirical results
      • 6.1 Impact of regulations on risk and return during the credit crisis
        • 6.1.1 Distance to default
        • 6.1.2 Systemic risk
        • 6.1.3 Idiosyncratic risk
        • 6.1.4 Systematic risk
        • 6.1.5 Buy-and-hold-returns
      • 6.2 Impact of regulations on risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis
        • 6.2.1 Distance to default
        • 6.2.2 Systemic risk
        • 6.2.3 Idiosyncratic risk
        • 6.2.4 Systematic risk
        • 6.2.5 Buy-and-hold-returns
    • 7 Robustness checks
    • 8 Conclusion
    • Appendix 1 Variable definitions
    • References

1-s2.0-S1042957312000423-main.pdf

J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

J. Finan. Intermediation

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jfi

Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: Evidence from 1900 to 1930

1042-9573/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2012.09.005

⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (P.H. Kupiec), [email protected] (C.D. Ramirez).

Paul H. Kupiec a,⇑, Carlos D. Ramirez b

a Division of Insurance and Research, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429, United States b George Mason University, Department of Economics, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 27 December 2010 Available online 4 October 2012

Keywords: Bank failures Output growth Credit channel Systemic risk Vector autoregressions Non-bank commercial failures

a b s t r a c t

We measure the effect of bank failures on economic growth using data from 1900 to 1930, a period without active government sta- bilization policies and several severe banking crises. VAR model estimates suggest bank failures have long-lasting negative effects on economic growth. A bank failure shock involving one percent of system liabilities leads to a 6.5% reduction in GNP growth within three quarters and a measurable reduction for 10 quarters. Panel VAR model estimates for the 48 states show bank failures aggra- vate commercial non-bank failures. Institutional and regulatory features affect the intensity of the bank failure effect. We find that bank failures have a larger impact in states with deposit insurance, in states more heavily concentrated in agriculture, and in states with fewer large firms. However, because a number of states exhi- bit all three characteristics, we are not able to clearly identify the true marginal effects of these factors independently.

Published by Elsevier Inc.

1. Introduction

The impact of bank failures on economic growth is an important topic in macroeconomics. In this paper we investigate the effect of bank failures on economic activity using data from 1900 to 1930. The sample includes many episodes of bank distress, including at least one serious banking panic and several less severe crises in which many small banks failed or temporarily suspended redemp- tions. Unlike data from modern banking crisis, our sample excludes the confounding effects of a

286 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

systematic government reaction function. During the 1900–1930 sample period, the government es- chewed policies to offset the economic consequences of bank suspensions and failures.1 Studies that use modern data to measure the effects of banking sector distress on economic growth may produce unreliable estimates unless they account for government policies enacted to attenuate the effects of a banking crisis.2 The combination of bank failures and the absence of a modern-style government reaction function during our sample period allow us to identify the effect of bank distress on economic activity.

We use a vector autoregression (VAR) to model the relationship between bank failures and the growth rate of industrial production and aggregate output (GNP). The severity of bank failures is mea- sured as the share of banking system liabilities (predominantly deposits) in failed banks and trusts including all state- and nationally-chartered institutions. In addition to measures of economic activity and bank system distress, we include stock market returns, interest rate spreads, inflation, and money growth in the VAR system.

Granger causality tests show that, other things equal, an increase in the liabilities of failed banks reduces industrial production and GNP growth. We find that, all else constant, a one standard devia- tion innovation (14 basis points) in the share of liabilities in failed banks results in a cumulative 1.9% decline in industrial production (IP) growth and a cumulative 0.8% decline in GNP growth over the fol- lowing three quarters. Our estimates suggest that the effects of bank failures are long-lasting: after 10 quarters the cumulative decline in both IP growth and GNP growth is still approximately 0.9%. A direct implication of our results is that the failure of an important financial institution (or institutions), in the absence of intervention, is likely to have protracted macroeconomic effects.3

Regarding banking system distress, we find that stock market returns and interest rate spreads both Granger-cause failed bank liabilities over this sample period, but negative shocks to economic growth and industrial production do not lead to an increase in failed-bank liabilities. In many ways, our findings are consistent with Davis, Hanes, and Rhode (2009) and Hanes and Rhode (2010) who ar- gue that the primary cause of bank failures and banking panics during the National Banking Era were weather-driven fluctuations in the cotton harvest that created banking sector instability indirectly through their effects on financial markets. During this period, a sizable proportion of US export reve- nues came from cotton exports to Europe. Severe weather in the US cotton belt impacted US financial markets—stock prices declined and domestic interest rates rose in reaction to negative weather news. These market shocks affected banks’ balance sheets and in some cases lead to bank suspensions or fail- ures. Our VAR model captures a similar transmission mechanism between the real and financial sec- tors over the 1900–1930 period.

We supplement our aggregate growth analysis using data on the liabilities of non-bank commercial failures at the state level. We provide additional evidence on the strength of the bank credit channel using a panel VAR model for all 48 states. Our estimates suggest that a bank failure shock has a pro- nounced effect on non-bank commercial failures for multiple subsequent quarters. We also investigate whether institutional or regulatory differences across states influence the intensity with which bank failures propagate commercial failures. Using the existing literature as a guide, we focus on differences in state deposit insurance, industrial composition (agriculture versus manufacturing), population den- sity and average firm size as factors that may determine the magnitude of bank failure effects. We find the impact of bank failures to be 3.4–6 times larger in states with deposit insurance and 2.5–4 times worse in agricultural states. We also find that bank failures have a larger impact in states with smaller than average firm size. A number of states exhibit all three characteristics in our sample period and our methodology is not able to distinguish the marginal contributions of these separate factors.

In addition to examining the importance of selected differences among states, we investigate whether effect of bank failure differs between pre- and post-1914, the year in which the Federal

1 The government did not use expansionary monetary or fiscal policies to offset the economic impacts of bank failures. Some government actions were taken that likely reduced the likelihood that banks might fail, but no modern-style policies were used to stimulate aggregate demand after banks failed. We elaborate in Section 2.

2 Hogart, Reis, and Saporta (2002) and Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) compare financial crisis output losses relative to long-run trend growth or the growth in potential output. Their loss estimates include the growth effects of government policy reactions to attenuate the recessions associated with the financial crisis studied in these papers.

3 Hogart, Reis, and Saporta (2002), Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) and Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005) also find long lasting effects associated with bank failures. We elaborate more on this issue in Section 4.

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Reserve began operations and the classical gold standard was abandoned. Panel VAR estimates indi- cate a stronger bank failure effect in the post-1914 period (1914–1929) but we attribute this finding to a technical feature of the Panel VAR methodology. Pre-1914, bank failure shocks were associated with a relatively few large institutions and severe nationwide recessions whereas post-1914 bank fail- ure shocks were characterized by the failure of small banks with economic impacts that were limited to specific geographic areas.4 When bank failures are associated with widespread commercial failures across many states, the panel VAR methodology is not able to distinguish between the bank failure effect and a quarterly fixed effect.

Many papers investigate the extent to which bank failures amplify economic distress but the liter- ature has not reached consensus. Much of the exiting evidence is derived from Great Depression era data. For example, Friedman and Schwarz (1963) find that bank failures triggered a loss of public con- fidence in the banking system and an increase in the demand for currency (a decline in bank deposits) which reduced the money multiplier and the money supply. Because the decline in the money supply was not offset by monetary policy, nominal economic activity declined.5 Bernanke (1983) goes beyond the Friedman–Schwarz analysis to link bank failures to reduced investment spending. In particular, he argued that because of asymmetric information problems, financial disintermediation combined with the decrease in borrowers’ net worth adversely affected investment spending during the 1930s. His evi- dence indicates that bank failures propagate economic distress. Other studies of the Depression-era find a causal relationship between bank failures and output include Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005).

In contrast to the US experience, Great Depression era data from other countries do not suggest that bank failures depress economic activity. For example, Haubrich (1990) studies the Great Depres- sion in Canada using Bernanke’s methodology. Although there were no Canadian bank failures during the Great Depression, the number of bank branches declined by about 10%.6 Still, Haubrich (1990) finds no measurable effect of branch closures on Canadian GDP.

Studies that use data from the US savings and loans (S&L) crisis period also fail to reach consensus. Ashcraft (2005) investigates FDIC-induced closures of 38 subsidiaries of First Republic Bank Corpora- tion in 1988 and 18 subsidiaries of First City Bank Corporation in 1992 and finds that, subsequent to these closures, real income declined by about 3% in areas served by these banks. In contrast, Alton, Gil- bert and Kochin (1989), using county-level data from Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma over the period 1981–1986, do not find any significant relationship between bank failures and measures of local eco- nomic activity. Clair and O’Driscoll (1994) use Alton, Gilbert and Kochin’s methodology to study the impact of bank failures on local economic activity in several Texas counties between 1981 and 1991 and find no significant bank failure effect.

A separate important issue is that measures of the economic impact of bank failures that are based on S&L crisis data are not directly comparable to the results derived from Great Depression era data. During the S&L crisis, both the Federal Reserve and banking regulators took actions to attenuate the economic impacts of banking system distress. Bank failures were delayed (relative to what would have happened in the Great Depression) as weak institutions continued funding themselves with insured deposits which reduced the risk of a bank run. While legislative inaction and resource constraints slo-

4 For example, the Panic of 1907 was centered in New York in a few large banks but was associated with negative nationwide economic consequences (Moen and Tallman, 1990). In contrast, the banking crises of the 1920s involved a series of small bank failures that occurred in different states at different times with associated economic effects that were more geographically contained.

5 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that the banking failures of the Great Depression era could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, if the Federal Reserve System had been more generous in providing discount window lending to troubled banks, which would have given solvent banks access to liquidity without changing their need to hold currency reserves thereby stabilizing the money supply.

6 The source of the Canadian system’s resilience has been attributed to the diversification benefits of branch banking (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Bordo, 1986; Ely, 1988; O’Driscoll, 1988); to effective lender of last resort function provided by the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA) (Bordo, 1986); and to the existence of a 100% implicit government guarantee on deposits (Kryazanowski and Roberts, 1993). However, Carr, Mathewson and Quigley (1995) argue that the CBA did not arrange mergers for insolvent institutions and depositors were not protected by a government guarantee (or a perception thereof) as some faced losses when banks were suspended.

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wed the resolution process, undercapitalized depository institutions continued to fund lending activ- ity.7 Deposit insurance quelled the public’s demand for precautionary currency holdings while the Fed- eral Reserve discount window was available to provide liquidity to solvent banks which mitigated their need to call in loans. The Federal Reserve also pursued a monetary policy designed to offset problems in depository institutions.8 All of these factors work toward mitigating the negative effects of bank failures on economic growth, but the magnitude of estimation bias on the bank failure effect is unknown. Our data from the pre-Depression era period is not contaminated by the effects of systematic government policy reactions.

Among existing studies that investigate the relationship between banking crises and economic activity during the pre-Depression era, Grossman (1993), Jalil (2011), and Ramirez and Shively (2012) are most closely related to our work. Using data on the number of national banks that failed over the period 1863–1914, Grossman (1993) estimates a structural IS-LM model that includes the number of failed national banks as an endogenous variable in the system.9 Grossman’s estimates sug- gest that a ‘‘small’’ shock in the number of national bank failures can erase 8% points of GDP growth, whereas a ‘‘large’’ shock in the number of national bank failures can reduce GNP growth by 26% points. Grossman measures the effect of the number of national bank failures without considering the failed na- tional banks’ size or importance during a period in which state-chartered institutions held more than a third of the banking system assets, outnumbered national banks, and often were the institutions expe- riencing distress (White, 1983, pp. 12–13).

The economic importance of a bank failure should be related to the size of the failed bank. Bank size is a proxy for the importance an institution’s valuable relationships with bank-dependent borrowers as well as indicator of the bank’s provision of transactions services.10 Large banks also are more likely to have correspondent banking relationships which were particularly important during the era we study. The failure of a key correspondent bank can have wide-ranging affects on the reserves and lending capac- ity of many smaller state-chartered institutions (White, 1983, pp. 68–69). These issues argue for using a measure of banking system distress that includes state-charted institutions and accounts for the size of failing institutions and not just the number of failed or suspended banks.

In a recent study, Jalil (2011) investigates the effect of banking panics on economic growth using data from 1825 to 1915. He identifies panic periods from contemporary newspaper reports and re- gresses measures of economic activity (such as Davis’ (2004) annual industrial production index) on lagged values of the economic activity proxy and the bank panic indicator. His analysis tests for aver- age differences in economic activity between panic and non-panic periods; it does not provide a con- tinuous measure of banking sector distress. He finds that major panic episodes are associated with a protracted decline in output.

Ramirez and Shively (2012) use pre-Depression data to create a 4-state variable (low, medium-low, medium-high, and high) that indicates the degree to which bank failures cause economic distress in each of the 48 states. Their analysis focuses on identifying the economic characteristics, regulatory dif- ferences, or banking structure differences among states that help to explain the value of the categor- ical variable assigned to each of the 48 states and find that state deposit insurance schemes are associated with a stronger bank failure effect. They also find that differences in state minimum capital requirements help to explain the degree to which bank failures aggravate economic conditions. They do not attempt to estimate the effects of bank failures on aggregate economic growth.

The rest of our paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) discusses the importance of the sample period. Section 3 focuses on the VAR model using aggregate macroeconomic data, and discusses the empirical results. Panel VAR tests linking banking system distress and commercial fail- ures are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

7 See for example Kane (1989) or Romer and Weingast (1991). 8 See for example Clouse (1994) or Mussa (1994). 9 The number of national bank failures is modeled as a function of the lagged number of bank failures and the contemporaneous

change in real output growth. Grossman’s estimates suggest that only the lagged number of bank failures is statistically significant and so bank failures are essentially exogenous in this model.

10 Wicker (2000, p. 85) also notes the number of failed institutions is unlikely to be an accurate measure of banking system distress and the size of failed institutions must matter as well.

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2. The importance of the sample period

During the period 1900–1930, the United States experienced three major banking crises: one in May 1901, one in October 1907, and one during the early 1920s. In addition, it endured eight minor crises.11 During this period, there were no federal government policies implemented to stimulate the economy, to counteract recessions, or to offset the adverse economic effects of bank failures.12 In the remainder of this section we briefly review the historical features of fiscal and monetary policy over this period.

2.1. Fiscal policy

From 1900 to 1916, federal government fiscal policy had little impact on US aggregate demand. Over this period, federal expenditures varied between 1.5% and 2.5% of GDP (Romer, 1989) and budget surplus or deficits were of negligible size (DeLong, 1998). With the onset of World War I, federal gov- ernment expenditures increased dramatically, to 20% of GDP by 1918, before declining throughout the 1920s (Romer, 1989).

Prior to the federal programs created under the New Deal, there is little evidence that federal expenditure policies were intentionally designed to counteract weak aggregate demand; indeed even New Deal programs do not appear to have been motivated by Keynesian economic ideas. Romer (1999) argues that the Employment Act of 1946 was the first law enacted that explicitly embraced the idea of using fiscal policy to regulate aggregate demand. More importantly, no fiscal stimulus pol- icies were designed or implemented to counteract the economic impacts of any of the banking panics of this era.

2.2. Monetary policy

The Federal Reserve System, created in 1913, was established to smooth regional credit cycles asso- ciated primarily with agricultural borrowing demands.13 Miron (1986) argues that Federal Reserve pol- icies were successful in dampening the seasonal variation of nominal interest rates which likely reduced the frequency of banking panics. Notwithstanding its impact on the seasonal agricultural cycle, early Federal Reserve policies did not include an explicit counter-cyclical (business cycle) role for monetary policy (White, 1983, p. 115 ff).

In practice, the earliest coordinated Federal Reserve policies were dictated by the US Treasury’s de- sire to finance World War I on favorable terms. Under pressure from Treasury, the Federal Reserve abandoned the ‘‘real bills’’ doctrine and allowed member banks to discount Treasury certificates is- sued to finance the war at rates below those on the Treasury certificates (Meltzer, 2003, pp. 84–90). This discounting policy created monetary expansion and inflation. It was not until late 1919 that the Federal Reserve System banks were permitted to raise discount rates and penalize excessive bor- rowing.14 A severe recession followed with widespread unemployment, declines in industrial production and substantial deflation.15 The wholesale price index fell from 100 in 1920 to 62.8 in 1923.

11 Calomiris and Gorton (1991, p. 114), Miron (1986, p. 131), Kemmerer (1910, pp. 222–223). Jalil (2011, p. 61), Table 2, identify one major panic (in 1907) and nine minor ones during the 1900–1929 period.

12 Temporary government policies were enacted to reduce the probability of bank failures or suspensions, but no federal government policies were in place to mitigate the effects of bank failures. For instance, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 allowed large national banks (with at least $5 million in capital) to issue bank notes in excess of their capital as emergency currency if so authorized by the Treasury. This act provided liquidity and facilitated a temporary devaluation of the dollar in the face of foreign demands for US gold stocks following the suspension of the gold standard in 1914. Wells (2004) and Silber (2007) argue that this act may have prevented a financial crisis in 1914 when war broke out in Europe by preventing large national bank suspensions. This act expired on June 30, 1915.

13 The Federal Reserve began operations in 1914. Throughout the early years, Federal Reserve officials believed that monetary policy should follow a ‘‘real bills’’ doctrine focused on discounting commercial paper at penalty rates and providing lender of last resort facilities when needed.

14 Following WWI, several regional Federal Reserve Banks had attempted to raise discount rates but were prohibited from doing so by the Federal Reserve Board (see Meltzer, 2003).

15 The severity of this recession has been in part attributed to a failure of Federal Reserve policy (Meltzer, 2003, p. 120 ff).

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Federal Reserve operating policies were modified following the 1920–1922 recession, but as late as 1924, few officials in the Federal Reserve System believed that open market operations should be used to attenuate recessions (White, 1983, p. 122). Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, Federal Reserve policies were guided by three perceived goals: (1) to re-establish the pre-World War I gold standard as the international system of exchange; (2) to maintain price stability and avoid repeating the events of 1920–1922; and, (3) to curb the growth of speculative credit (i.e., credit used to purchase securities).16

The Federal Reserve did not embrace countercyclical monetary policies and indeed the system could not effectively coordinate monetary policy until after the Banking Act (1935) established the Federal Open Market Committee to coordinate operations among the reserve banks (Meltzer, 2003, p. 5).

The well-known Bagehot (1906) rule for furnishing liquidity during panics is a policy designed to mitigate the probability of bank suspensions and there is evidence that the Federal Reserve used its lender of last resort powers to ease liquidity pressures in some circumstances.17 However, Federal Re- serve Districts pursued different policies regarding lending to troubled institutions (Richardson and Troost, 2009) and there is no evidence that the Federal Reserve pursued coordinated monetary policy to offset weakness in aggregate demand associated with bank failures.

3. Banking system distress and economic growth: VAR tests

This section discusses the data underlying our tests, the VAR model, Granger causality results, the impulse response functions, and the forecast error variance decompositions. It also investigates whether deposit insurance alters the economic impact of bank failures.

3.1. The data

We employ a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to estimate the linkages between bank failures and subsequent economic growth. Our VAR model includes a measure of bank failures, a measure of aggregate economic activity, and four additional variables to control for non-bank factors that affect aggregate economic activity: money growth, inflation, stock market returns, and an estimate of the prevailing risk premium in credit markets. The data sources for the variables used in the VAR analysis are listed in Table A of the appendix. We discuss selected characteristics of these data series in the remainder of this section.

Our measure of bank system distress, ‘‘Bank Failures’’ (the share of liabilities in failed institutions), is constructed from data on the liabilities (primarily deposits) of failed depository institutions as re- ported in issues of Dun’s Review. These data include nearly 6000 quarterly observations for the 48 states from 1900Q1 through 1931Q2.18 State figures are aggregated to produce national data for each quarter. The data include failed national banks as well as failed state-chartered banks and trust compa- nies.19 The failed depository liability series is normalized by total deposits as reported in Flood (1998).20

16 See for example, the discussions in Costigoliola (1977) or Meltzer (2003). 17 Carlson, Mitchener, and Richardson (2011) argue that the Federal Reserve District of Atlanta provided exceptional liquidity

support to slow down the spread of a banking panic in Florida in 1929 following the outbreak of a Mediterranean fruit fly infestation.

18 Dun’s Review reports failure data beginning in 1895, but there are periods in the 1890s when the data are unreported. From 1900 to 1931, the data are reported regularly for each quarter. The original data are corrected for typographical errors. We exclude post-1929 data in order to ensure that our results are not being driven by any of the 1930s Depression panics.

19 Dun’s Review does not indicate whether bank suspensions are included in bank failures. Compared to the aggregate number of US bank failures reported by Goldenweiser (1932, Table 1), our numbers are marginally higher than Goldenweiser’s before 1921 but smaller thereafter. Because the Goldenweiser data excludes national bank suspensions before 1921 (and includes them thereafter), it appears that our data may include a few (but not all) suspensions. This feature is unlikely to affect our results since the largest proportion of bank suspensions occurred after 1931 (Calomiris and Mason, 2003). Moreover, even a temporary suspension can lead to disintermediation in at least two ways: First, because there is uncertainty whether a suspension will be temporary, depositors react by shifting their liquid portfolio away from the banking system (Ramirez, 2009) as consumer confidence declines. Second, the heighted uncertainty associated with bank suspensions induces bank managers to contract loan growth (Anari, Kolari, and Mason, 2005).

20 The primary source of the data reported in Flood is All Bank Statistics. The denominator in our measure is a quarterly estimate of total liabilities interpolated from annual figures.

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Exhibit 1. Alternative Measures of Banking System Distress. Notes: SLFI is the ratio of suspended bank liabilities relative to total deposits (‘‘Bank Failures’’ in the text). ‘‘Total Bank Failure Rate’’ is the ratio of the number of suspended banks relative to total number of banks. ‘‘National Bank Failure Rate’’ is the ratio of suspended national banks relative to total number of national banks. Sources: Dun’s Review (1900–1930), Historical Statistics of the United States (Series X585), All Bank Statistics, NBER business cycle dates, and authors’ calculations.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 291

-50% -40% -30% -20% -10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 year

pe rc

en t c

ha ng

e

quarterly change in Miron-Romer industrial production index

quarterly change in Balke-Gordon GNP estimates

Exhibit 2. Alternative measures of the change in aggregate economic activity. Source: Gordon (1986, p. 781), Miron and Romer (1990, pp. 336–337), and authors’ calculations.

292 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

Exhibit 1 shows the ‘‘Bank Failures’’ series, and, for comparison purposes, it also shows two addi- tional bank failure-rate series: the total bank failure rate, and the national bank failure rate.21 Exhibit 1 also includes estimates of the recession periods (shaded bars) as identified by the National Bureau of Eco- nomic Research (NBER).

The alternative series plotted in Exhibit 1 suggest a significantly different record of banking system distress. A comparison of the series suggests that the bank failure rate gives a misleading indication of the overall health of the banking sector in at least two important periods. For example, the bank failure rate data suggests that banking conditions were comparable during the 1903–1904 and 1907–1908 recessions, whereas the ‘‘Bank Failures’’ data clearly identifies the true severity of the banking panic of 1907. The 1907 panic involved the failure or temporary suspension of a few large money-center institutions that accounted for about 1.5% of all system deposits.22 This level of banking system distress was not exceeded until the Great Depression. In the second instance, the bank failure rate series may overstate the degree of stress in the banking system over the period 1922–1929. Although a large num- ber of banks failed during this period, the failed institutions were relatively small and often state- chartered.

The Federal Reserve did not publish an aggregate industrial production index until 1919, and real GNP estimates were not reported by the US Commerce Department until 1929. For our analysis, we focus on two measures of aggregate economic activity for which quarterly data exists: the Miron and Romer (1990) industrial production series and the Balke–Gordon (1986) estimates of real GNP.

Exhibit 2 shows estimates of the quarterly changes in the two measures of aggregate activity. It is well-known that measures of aggregate economic activity over the period 1900–1930 are imperfect (e.g., Romer, 1999) and alternative measures of aggregate output differ as to their historical volatility characteristics. Industrial production is a much more volatile measure of aggregate economic output compared to GNP. The volatility difference between these series may be explained in part by a ten- dency for asynchronous changes in the outputs of the services, transportation, and other non-com- modity sectors (Romer, 1999).

We follow the literature and include the growth rate of a monetary aggregate and a measure of inflation to control for nominal as well as real shocks. In order to capture real shocks, we include stock

21 The total bank failure rate series is the number of failed depository institution as reported in Dun’s Review divided by the quarterly estimate of the total number of banking institutions from data reported in Historical Statistics of the United States (1975). The quarterly estimate of the total number of institutions is computed using logarithmic interpolation. The national bank failure rate is constructed as the number of national banks placed into receivership during a quarter as a percentage of the number of operating national banks in that quarter as reported in the Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency.

22 The institutions included Knickerbocker Trust, Hamilton Bank, International Trust Company, and United Exchange Bank.

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market returns as well as an estimate of the spread between risky and safe debt instruments. Stock markets returns are generally thought of as a forward-looking measure of economic activity and help control for expectations.

Left-hand-side variable

Right-hand- side (lagged) variable

Chi- squared p-value

Equation 1: IP growth

Stock returns 12.656 0.005

Spread 4.208 0.240

Money growth 6.818 0.078

Inflation 5.656 0.130

Δ Bank failures 8.098 0.044

All variables 61.069 0.000

Equation 2: Stock Returns

IP growth 1.916 0.590

Spread 17.628 0.001

Money growth 9.437 0.024

Inflation 3.932 0.269

Δ Bank Failures 1.200 0.753

All variables 35.691 0.002

Equation 3: Spread

IP growth 0.435 0.933

Stock returns 14.964 0.002

Money growth 4.200 0.241

Inflation 0.873 0.832

Δ Bank Failures 4.131 0.248

All variables 31.009 0.009

Equation 4: Money growth

IP growth 4.621 0.202

Stock returns 6.227 0.101

Spread 13.977 0.003

Inflation 9.240 0.026

Δ Bank Failures 5.431 0.143

All variables 33.869 0.004

Equation 5: Inflation

IP growth 0.984 0.805

Stock returns 0.272 0.965

Spread 15.518 0.001

Money growth 11.599 0.009

Δ Bank Failures 1.708 0.635

All variables 26.795 0.030

Equation 6: Δ Bank Failures

IP growth 1.938 0.585

Stock returns 15.808 0.001

Spread 13.782 0.003

Money growth 1.524 0.677

Inflation 0.306 0.959

All variables 27.351 0.026

Exhibit 3. Aggregate VAR Granger Causality Tests: IP growth. Notes: This table presents Granger causality tests for the aggregate VAR model. The variables included in the system are: ‘‘IP growth,’’ defined as growth in industrial production, ‘‘Stock returns,’’ defined as the percentage change in stock prices (Cowles Commission common stock prices), ‘‘spread,’’ defined as the spread between the commercial paper rate and the call money rate, ‘‘Money growth,’’ defined as the percentage change in money stock, ‘‘inflation,’’ defined as the percentage change in US general price level index, and ‘‘D Bank failures,’’ defined as the change in the share of system liabilities in failed institutions (ratio of failed bank liabilities to total deposits). See Data appendix for sources.

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The spread between the commercial paper rate and the call money rate is included as a proxy for the risk premium in financial markets. Many studies that use modern data find that interest rate spreads (between risky and safe debt instruments) do a better job in predicting subsequent output growth than money supply growth, interest rate levels, or other financial variables (Stock and Watson, 1989; Friedman and Kuttner, 1993). In pre-World War I gold standard data, Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) find that the interest rate spread had a positive effect on business failures and a negative effect on output growth and so we expect bank lending and economic activity to be negatively correlated with the risk premium in credit markets.23

3.2. VAR model

We estimate two VAR models. One model includes: (1) the growth rate in Miron-Romer’s index of industrial production (yt); (2) the stock market return (stockreturnt); (3) the spread between the com- mercial paper rate and the call money rate (spreadt); (4) the inflation rate (inflationt); (5) the growth rate of money (moneygrowtht); and (6) the change in the share of system liabilities in failed institu- tions (D Bank failurest).24 The second VAR specification substitutes the growth rate in the Balke-Gordon GNP series for the IP growth series. Both VAR models are estimated using three lags.25

Formally, our 3-lag VAR model takes on the following form:

23 The and aga

24 For variable Eigen v stability

25 The criterio and HQ statistic estimat degrees

xt ¼ c þ A1xt�1 þ A2xt�2 þ A3xt�3 þ et

xt � ðyt; stockreturnt; spreadt ; inflationt;moneygrowtht ;D Bank failurestÞ 0 ð1Þ

where yt, the measure of aggregate output growth, can be either the growth in industrial production or GNP growth, depending on the model we estimate. The Ai’s are 6 � 6 matrices of estimated VAR model coefficients, and Eðete0t Þ ¼ R is the 6 � 6 variance–covariance matrix of contemporaneous error terms.

3.3. Granger-causality

We estimate Eq. (1) and identify the temporal relationships among the model’s variables. Temporal relationships need not imply economic causality, but causal relationships are expected to generate temporal relationships that can be identified in the data. We construct Granger-causality tests to determine whether the D Bank failures series Granger-causes changes in IP and GNP growth. The D Bank failures series Granger-causes economic growth if lagged values of D Bank failures are helpful in explaining changes in economic growth, but lagged values of economic growth do not have a sta- tistically significant influence on subsequent values of D Bank failures.

Exhibit 3 reports the Granger causality Chi-squared test statistics and the corresponding level of statistical significance (p-values) for the hypothesis that all coefficients of the individual lagged explanatory variable in the equation are jointly zero. For example, in Exhibit 3 Eq. (1), IP growth is the dependent variable; lagged values of IP growth, stock returns, spread, inflation, money growth, and D Bank failures are the explanatory variables. The effect of D Bank failures on output growth is summarized by the Chi-squared statistic of 8.098 (p-value of 0.044) which indicates that the lagged values of D Bank failures are jointly statistically significant in explaining output growth at the 5% level.

Exhibit 3 (Eq. (6)) also tests the reverse causality, where the dependent variable is D Bank failures and the independent variables are IP growth, stock returns, spread, inflation, and money growth. The

volatility of this interest rate spread is pronounced during the 1907 panic when the US experienced heavy outflows of gold in around the second quarter of 1914 when the classical gold standard collapsed and World War I began. robustness purposes, we estimated a variety of alternative model specifications by randomly excluding the control s. The effect of bank failures on output was always significant, and in fact, became stronger as we included the controls.

alue stability tests indicate that all the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle and so the estimated VAR satisfies dynamic conditions. Dickey Fuller tests reject a unit root for all series used in the VAR model. lag order was selected using the standard information criteria: the Final Prediction Error (FPE), the Akaike information

n (AIC), the Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion (BSIC), and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQIC). Both BSIC IC generally recommend a lag order of 2 or 3, while FPE and AIC recommend a lag order of 4 or 5. The SBIC and HQIC s give consistent estimates of the true lag order, while the AIC and the FPE tend to overestimate it (Luktepohl, 2005). We e both models with 3 lags. The results do not change significantly if the lag order is increased to 4 or 5, but the number of of freedom is reduced considerably. The results are only modestly weaker if the model includes only two lags.

Left-hand-side variable

Right-hand- side (lagged) variable

Chi- squared p-value

Equation 1: GNP growth

Stock returns 4.539 0.209

Spread 12.032 0.007

Money growth 9.399 0.024

Inflation 4.922 0.178

Δ Bank failures 8.270 0.041

All variables 41.916 0.000

Equation 2: Stock Returns

GNP growth 4.457 0.216

Spread 18.570 0.000

Money growth 7.114 0.068

Inflation 6.323 0.097

Δ Bank failures 0.614 0.893

All variables 38.992 0.001

Equation 3: Spread

GNP growth 1.627 0.653

Stock returns 16.450 0.001

Money growth 4.610 0.203

Inflation 0.741 0.864

Δ Bank failures 4.688 0.196

All variables 32.529 0.005

Equation 4: Money growth

GNP growth 11.975 0.007

Stock returns 9.398 0.024

Spread 13.041 0.005

Inflation 9.708 0.021

Δ Bank failures 9.360 0.025

All variables 43.084 0.000

Equation 5: Inflation

GNP growth 0.936 0.817

Stock returns 0.498 0.919

Spread 15.702 0.001

Money growth 9.517 0.023

Δ Bank failures 1.615 0.656

All variables 26.736 0.031

Equation 6: ΔBank failures

GNP growth 3.525 0.318

Stock returns 16.936 0.001

Spread 12.895 0.005

Money growth 1.112 0.774

Inflation 1.106 0.776

All variables 29.295 0.015

Exhibit 4. Aggregate VAR Granger Causality Tests: GNP growth. Notes: This table presents Granger causality tests for the aggregate VAR model. The variables included in the system are: ‘‘GNP growth,’’ defined as growth in GNP, ‘‘Stock returns,’’ defined as the percentage change in stock prices (Cowles Commission common stock prices), ‘‘spread,’’ defined as the spread between the commercial paper rate and the call money rate, ‘‘Money growth,’’ defined as the percentage change in money stock, ‘‘inflation,’’ defined as the percentage change in US general price level index, and ‘‘D Bank failures,’’ defined as the change in the share of system liabilities in failed institutions (ratio of failed bank liabilities to total deposits). See Data appendix for sources.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 295

Chi-squared statistic on lags of output growth is 1.938 (p-value of 0.585) and so the lagged values of IP growth are not statistically significant in explaining D Bank failures and so D Bank failures Granger- causes variation in IP growth, even after controlling for stock return shocks, inflation, and money growth, all of which are also statistically significant predictors of output growth.26

26 The Chi-square test results in Table 1 show that stock returns, money growth, and inflation also Granger-cause movements in IP growth.

Exhibit 5. Cumulative orthogonalized impulse response function: IP growth. Notes: This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of growth in industrial production (IP growth) to a one-standard deviation shock in ‘‘D Bank failures,’’ as defined in Section 3.1. Dash lines represent 95 confidence intervals.

296 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

Exhibit 4 reports the results of Granger causality tests when economic activity is measured by the growth rate in the Balke-Gordon estimate of GNP. From Exhibit 4 (Eq. (1)), it is clear that the lagged values of D Bank failures are significant for explaining the variation in GNP growth controlling for all other independent variables (Chi-squared statistic 8.27, p-value 0.041). Estimates (Eq. (6)) also show that reverse causality does not hold; lagged values of GNP growth do not help to explain the variation in D Bank failures (Chi-squared statistic 3.525, p-value 0.318). D Bank failures Granger-causes variation in GNP growth, after controlling for shocks to interest rates spread, stock returns, money growth, and the inflation rate, all of which also influence GNP growth.

The lack of statistically significant causality between GNP or IP growth and D Bank failures does not imply that shocks to the banking sector are purely exogenous events that magnify business cycles. Banks are exposed to real shocks through their loan portfolio. Although output does not seem to di- rectly Granger-cause bank distress, the interest rate spread and stock returns do generate statistically significant effects for D Bank failures. In addition, the Granger-causality tests also indicate that shocks to the interest rate spread affect stock returns, inflation, and money growth. These results suggest that the transmission mechanism for real shocks run through the financial sector.

Our Granger causality results are consistent with Davis, Hanes, and Rhode (2009), and Hanes and Rhode (2010) who link bank distress during the late 19th century to shocks to the cotton harvest. Bank losses were not generated by direct exposure to indebted cotton farmers, but rather through indirect exposures linked to export-revenue fluctuations tied to cotton exports. The Granger-causality results reported in Exhibits 3 and 4 are consistent with the Hanes and Rhode interpretation that a cotton har- vest shock affects stock returns and the interest rate spread, thereby affecting money growth and these variables in turn determine the health of the banking sector.

3.4. Impulse response functions

The quantitative effect of a bank-failure shock can be measured using cumulative orthogonalized impulse response (COIR) functions. COIR functions trace out the change that occurs over time to the value of one variable in the system as another variable in the system is shocked.27 Exhibit 5 plots the cumulative impulse response function estimates of the IP growth rate when D Bank failures experi- ences a one-standard deviation shock (an unexpected increase of about 14 basis points). Also plotted are the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates. The COIR estimates suggest that a D Bank failures shock has a statistically significant and long-lasting effect on industrial production. In terms of magnitudes, a

27 The Cholesky decomposition is used to orthogonalize innovations with the equations ordered as they appear in Exhibits 3 and 4. Changing the order of the variables has only a minimal effect on the results.

Exhibit 6. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function: GNP growth. Notes: This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of GNP growth to a one-standard deviation shock in ‘‘D Bank failures,’’ as defined in Section 3.1. Dash lines represent 95 confidence intervals.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 297

one standard deviation increase in D Bank failures translates into a cumulative decline of about 1.9% points in IP growth after three quarters.28

Exhibit 6 plots the COIR estimates for GNP growth along with the 95% confidence bands. The COIR estimates suggest that a one-standard deviation unexpected increase to D Bank failures has a statisti- cally significant, long-lasting depressing effect on GNP growth, causing a cumulative decline of about a 0.8% point after three quarters with lingering effects for more than 10 quarters.

Our results indicate that bank failures have a sizable negative and protracted effect on both IP growth and GNP growth. These long-lasting effects are not a consequence of dynamic instability as the eigenvalues of the moving average representation of the VAR model matrix have modulus less than one, a condition required for dynamic stability in the VAR process (Luktepohl, 2005).

Our findings are consistent with the results of a number of other studies. Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005) find that a shock to failed-bank deposits during the Depression Era had negative effects that lasted up to 5 years. The length of the transition can be explained, in part, because bank failures during this period had a long-lasting effect on transactions balances. It took years to recover failed bank deposits and loss rates were typically large.

Studies using data from recent crisis also suggest that bank failures have protracted real economic effects notwithstanding widespread use of government stabilization policies. Using a cross-country sample of modern systemic banking crisis, Hogart, Reis and Saporta (2002) find that, on average, bank- ing crises effect GDP growth for about 12 quarters and result in a cumulative decline in GDP of about 11.5% relative to trend. Using similar data but a different methodology, Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) find that many economies operate well-below estimates of long-run trend GDP for many years follow- ing a banking crisis with cumulative lost growth possibly as large as 300% of pre-crisis GDP in some cases.

There are mechanisms that can plausibly explain why bank failures have long-lived effects. Ennis and Keister (2003) develop an endogenous growth model in which bank runs reduce capital accumu- lation and growth. Banking crisis can also leave a lasting impact on consumer and investor expecta- tions with negative effects on growth. For example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) use survey evidence and demonstrate that consumer and investor expectations are permanently altered by the economic environment they experience. Ramirez (2009) finds that bank panics erode consumer con- fidence in banks for years, thereby reducing banks’ lending capacity, and growth.

3.5. Forecast error variance decomposition

One measure of the importance of bank-failure shocks for explaining IP and GNP growth is the fore- cast error variance decomposition (FEVD). FEVD measures the extent to which individual variable innovations in the VAR system contribute toward generating time-variation in another VAR variable

28 The CIOR estimates are also negative and statistically significant 10, 13 and 14 quarters after the shock.

(A) (B)

Exhibit 7. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition. Notes: This figure presents the forecast error variance decomposition for growth in Industrial Production (A) and GNP growth (B) as a result of an innovation in ‘‘D Bank failures,’’ as defined in Section 3.1. Dash lines represent 95 confidence intervals.

298 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

over a selected time horizon. Exhibit 7 plots the FEVD for D Bank failures on IP growth (left panel) and GNP growth (right panel). Our estimates suggest that, within our sample period, time variation in D Bank failures is responsible for generating about 4% of the volatility of the IP growth rate over a 10- quarter horizon and also about 4% of the volatility in GNP growth over the same interval.

4. Bank failures cause non-bank commercial failures: evidence from a panel VAR model

In this section, we exploit the panel aspect of our dataset to provide additional evidence on the links between bank failures and economic activity at the state level. There are no consistent measures of economic activity at the state level on a quarterly basis for the period 1900–1929.29 Instead, we use the liabilities of commercial failures (which include trade and manufacturing) as an indicator of eco- nomic distress. These data are published quarterly at state level in Dun’s Review.

In order to isolate a causality channel between bank failures and non-bank commercial failures at the state level, we must include variables that control for variation in other state conditions that may cause commercial failures. Paralleling our VAR model for the aggregate economy, these additional variables should control for financial conditions as well as other relevant economic conditions at the state level. To control for financial conditions we include state-level interest rates.30 Previous lit- erature has emphasized that many of the banking problems during the 1920s can be linked to distress in the agricultural sector (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock, 1994) and to control for this we include state farm failures.31

Given the available data, we are able to estimate a 4-variable panel VAR model that includes: (1) the log of the liabilities of bank failures divided by state deposits (Log(Bank failuresit))32 (2) the log of the liabilities of commercial failures normalized by deposits (Comm failuresit), (3) the log of the num-

29 The Bureau of Economic Analysis series on gross state product begins in 1929, but even then, these series are largely interpolated during the 1930s, 1940s, and even the 1950s. Some economic historians have constructed state level activity measures during this period but these measures are not available on a consistent basis for 1900 to 1930. For example, Fishback, Horace, and Kantor (2001) have constructed measures of economic activity using retail sales, but only sporadically from 1929 to 1939. Other researchers rely on the Census of Manufactures to construct alternative measures of economic activity (Holmes, 2003) for the 1900–1929 period but these data are only available every 5 years.

30 Interest rate data at the state level are from Bodenhorn (1996). 31 Farm failure data are available at annual frequency. 32 The aggregate VAR model described in Eq. (1) includes the changes in bank failures, while the panel VAR (Eq. (2)) includes the

log of bank failures. There are two reasons for this difference. First, in Eq. (1) the output measure is either the change in GNP or the change in IP, while in Eq. (2) the output measure is the log of commercial failures normalized by deposits. The inclusion of the changes in Eq. (1) and the log transformation in Eq. (2) maintains a natural congruency with respect to the units of the output measure. Second, the log transformation makes the estimation less susceptible to the influence of extreme values that can arise in a cross-sectional setting (Reimann, Filzmoser, Garrett, and Dutter, 2008). For robustness purposes, we also estimated the model without the log transformation and the results were similar.

Left-hand-side variable

Right-hand- side (lagged) variable

Chi- squared p-value

Equation 1: Comm failures

Farm failures 1.04 0.308

Interest rates 6.31 0.012

Bank failures 18.56 0.000

All variables 119.50 0.000

Equation 2: Farm failures

Comm failures 0.21 0.643

Interest rates 1.94 0.163

Bank failures 8.05 0.005

All variables 12382.74 0.000

Equation 3: Interest rates

Comm failures 4.32 0.038

Farm failures 6.00 0.014

Bank failures 0.24 0.623

All variables 6332.55 0.000

Equation 4: Bank failures

Comm failures 11.53 0.001

Farm failures 11.00 0.001

Interest rates 0.00 0.960

All variables 93.42 0.000

Exhibit 8. Panel VAR Granger Causality Tests. Notes: This table presents Granger causality test from the panel VAR model for all 48 states from 1900 to 1929. The variables in the system are: ‘‘Commercial failures,’’ defined as the log of the liabilities of commercial failures divided by state deposits; ‘‘bank failures,’’ defined as the log of the liabilities of bank failures divided by state deposits; ‘‘Farm failures,’’ defined as the log of the number of farm failures relative to the total number of farms, and ‘‘Interest rates,’’ which is the interest rate at the state level. See Data appendix for sources.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 299

ber of farm failures relative to the total number of farms (Farmfailuresit), and (4) the interest rate at the state level (rit).33

Formally, our one-lag34 panel VAR model is specified as follows:

33 Nor 34 The 35 All

test and 36 See

who gr

zi;t ¼ C0 þ C1ðzi;t�1Þ þ ei;t

zi;t ¼ ðCommfailuresi;t ; Farmfailuresi;t; ri;t; LogðBankfailuresi;tÞ 0 ð2Þ

Prior to estimating the panel VAR model, all of the variables are processed to remove state fixed effects and quarterly fixed effects. This procedure ensures that the estimated effect of bank failures on com- mercial failures is not being driven by aggregate macroeconomic influences and it controls for unob- servable fixed effects across states.35 The panel VAR is estimated via system GMM, which has been shown to provide more reliable results than the differenced GMM procedure used in dynamic panel models.36

4.1. Granger causality results

Exhibit 8 presents the Granger-causality results for our 4-variable panel VAR model. The results indicate that bank failures and commercial failures Granger-cause each other. The lagged values of bank distress are statistically important for explaining commercial failures (p-value of 0.000), and lagged values of commercial failures also explain bank failures (p-value of 0.001). In addition, the ex- hibit indicates that bank failures and farm failures are simultaneously determined. This set of results is

malization of variables (1–3) is done to ensure comparability of those variables across states. Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion (BSIC) suggests a one lag specification.

variables were tested for the presence of a unit root in a panel setting using the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root a unit root was rejected at standard test levels.

, for example, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000). We wish to acknowledge Inessa Love aciously shared her STATA panel VAR program.

Exhibit 9. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function—Panel VAR 1900–1929. Note: This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of the percent increase in commercial failures to a one-standard deviation shock in bank failures using the panel VAR from 1900 to 1929. The solid line traces the estimated effect implied by the model. The dashed lines delineate 95% confidence intervals.

300 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

consistent with previous studies that find banking problems during the 1920s linked to shocks in the agricultural sector. The results also show that bank distress aggravates both commercial distress as well as farm failures. Thus, in cases in which economic distress triggers bank failures, economic con- ditions will be further depressed by distress in the banking system. These results provide additional evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that banking system distress reduces subsequent eco- nomic activity.37

4.2. Impulse response functions: all states from 1900 to 1930

Exhibit 9 presents the COIR function tracing the dynamic effect of a one standard deviation shock to bank failures along with 95% confidence intervals. The results indicate that the commercial failure rate increases in the short run with a cumulative effect of about 20 basis points after four quarters. These results are consistent with our earlier findings that banking system distress reduces subsequent eco- nomic growth. Next we analyze the degree to which bank failures amplify commercial distress under different regulatory regimes, different economic characteristics, and for different time periods.

4.3. Deposit insurance

Between 1908 and 1929, eight states instituted some form of deposit insurance.38 None of these deposit insurance schemes survived the wave of bank failures of the 1920s. The literature suggests rea-

37 The exhibit also indicates that commercial failures and interest rates Granger-cause each other suggesting that commercial failures translate into a higher risk premium that further amplifies commercial distress.

38 The eight states and years in which deposit insurance was in effect were: Kansas (1909–1929), Mississippi (1914–1930), Nebraska (1911–1930), North Dakota (1917–1929), Oklahoma (1908–1923), South Dakota (1916–1927), Texas (1910–1927), and Washington (1917–1921). Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1955).

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Exhibit 10. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function—Panel VAR 1900–1929, Split by Deposit Insurance. Note: This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of the percent increase in commercial failures to a one- standard deviation shock in bank failures using the panel VAR for 1900–1929, split by deposit insurance status. For states with deposit insurance the lines are marked in with circles, for states without it the lines are plain. The solid line traces the estimated effect implied by the model. The dashed lines delineate 95% confidence intervals.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 301

sons why the impact of bank failures may vary depending on whether a state has a deposit insurance scheme during this period. Chung and Richardson (2006) conclude that in states with deposit insurance, failures involving bank runs declined but failures due to mismanagement rose. Second, the literature finds that deposit insurance schemes of the 1920s encouraged banks to exploit moral hazard options (Calomiris, 2000; Wheelock, 1992; Wheelock and Wilson, 1994). Banks increased their leverage which increased their vulnerability to economic shocks and relaxed their lending standards, thereby increasing the dependency of the real sector to bank lending (Calomiris, 1990, 2000).

Exhibit 10 presents the COIR function depicting the dynamic effect of the bank failure shock on commercial failures for states with deposit insurance (lines depicted with circles) and for states with- out deposit insurance (plain lines). State deposit insurance amplifies the degree to which bank failures affect the real economy. The effect of a one standard deviation shock in bank failures on commercial distress is 3.38–6 times as large in deposit insurance states relative to non-insurance states.39 This evi- dence is consistent with the intuitive notion that poorly designed deposit insurance schemes not only result in moral hazard, but may also amplify the degree to which banking system distress reduces sub- sequent economic growth.

Before concluding that deposit insurance was the cause of the enhanced bank failure effect, one must recognize that the states that adopted deposit insurance were rural agriculture-oriented states. As we point out further below, rural and agriculture focused states appear to have a more pronounced bank failure effect. Given the limits of the data, we cannot identify the true marginal effects of deposit insurance from the rural–agriculture effect.

39 The chart also indicates that the estimated standard error bands for deposit insurance states are relatively wider and become more so over time, relative to those estimated for non-deposit insurance states. This is due to the fact that the panel VAR for deposit insurance states relies on far fewer degrees of freedom, as there were only eight states that experimented with such schemes over only a part of the sample period.

Exhibit 11. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function—Panel VAR 1900–1913 versus Panel VAR 1914–1929. Note: This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of the percent increase in commercial failures to a one- standard deviation shock in bank failures using the panel VAR for 1900–1929, split by periods. 1900–1913 panel VAR results are marked with circles. 1914–1929 panel VAR results are in plain lines. The solid line traces the estimated effect implied by the model. The dashed lines delineate 95% confidence intervals.

302 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

4.4. Pre- versus post-1914 periods

The economic importance of the bank distress may differ over time as economic institutions change. 1914 is a milestone date in our sample as from this year the Federal Reserve began operations and the classical gold standard was suspended. The Federal Reserve was created in 1914 in part to ar- rest the recurrent banking panics that plagued the US financial system during the National Bank Era. In addition to the possibility that Federal Reserve operations may have altered the severity of the bank failure effect, previous research has found that prices were much more stable under the classical gold standard (1870–1914) than afterwards (e.g., Bordo and Rockoff, 1996; Meissner, 2002).40 Increased price instability may impact economic stability and alter the importance of bank failures following the abandonment of the gold standard. We estimate the panel VAR model separately for the pre- and post-1914 periods and test for changes in the strength of the bank failure effect.

Exhibit 11 plots both the pre- (lines depicted with circles) as well as the post-1914 (plain lines) COIR functions. Pre-1914, bank failure shocks had only a limited and short-lived effect on commercial failures. Although the effect is positive, the lower 95th percentile band is not above zero after two quarters. Post-1914, the effect of bank failures is much more pronounced and persistent. Following a bank failure shock, commercial failures increase by 0.3% points after four quarters. In addition, the effect is persistent over time.

The difference between these two results can be attributed to our panel VAR methodology. Prior to 1914, bank failures tended to be more concentrated among a few, relatively large institutions and these banking crises were associated with national recessions. By contrast, during the 1920s, the majority of bank failures were relatively small institutions linked to the agricultural sector (Alston et al., 1994) and episodes of banking distress were not closely connected with national recessions.

40 The US did return to another version of the gold standard during the mid 1920s, the price level remained unstable due in part to the collapse in agricultural prices in the early 1920s (Eichengreen, 1996).

Exhibit 12. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function—Panel VAR 1900–1929—Manufacturing States versus Agricultural States. This figure presents the cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of the percent increase in commercial failures to a one-standard deviation shock in bank failures using the panel VAR for 1900–1929, split by industrial composition. Results of panel VAR for manufacturing states are marked with circles. Results of panel VAR for agricultural states are in plain lines. The solid line traces the estimated effect implied by the model. The dashed lines delineate 95% confidence intervals.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 303

The panel VAR model identifies the effects of bank distress by exploiting the variation across states in bank failures and non-bank commercial firm failures. Because pre-1914 episodes of bank distress occurred closely concurrent with nationwide recessions, non-bank failure variation during these epi- sodes is removed by quarterly fixed effects and so banking distress has little additional explanatory power in the pre-1914 sample.41 By contrast, in the post-1914 period, bank and commercial failures were geographically localized and distributed across time so variation across states remains after we re- move quarterly fixed effect. As a consequence, we can identify the effect of bank failures on non-bank failures in the post-1914 sample.

4.5. Manufacturing versus agriculture

Industrial composition may have altered the intensity of the bank failure effect. As already men- tioned, a significant portion of bank distress occurred in agricultural states, especially during the 1920s. In addition, the Granger-causality tests indicate that bank sector distress and farm failures simultaneously affected each other. Therefore, a relevant characteristic we examine is the relative industrial composition of the states: manufacturing versus agriculture.

Exhibit 12 presents the plots of the COIR functions for manufacturing states (lines depicted with circles) as well as for agricultural states (plain lines).42 The estimated effect of a bank failure shock

41 We are able to confirm this suspicion by comparing the bank failure coefficient estimated with and without time effects (while keeping all other control variables). When time effects are included in the regression the bank failure coefficient drops by 32.8 percent, enough to render it statistically insignificant at standard levels.

42 A state is classified as being a ‘‘manufacturing’’ state if its share of its population employed in manufacturing is above the median for all states. It is classified as an ‘‘agricultural’’ state if this figure is below the median.

304 P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307

on commercial failures is approximately 2.5–4 times larger in agricultural states than in manufacturing states.

4.6. Other state characteristics

We also explored the possibility that differences in population density and/or differences in aver- age firm size may have influenced the effect of bank failures on commercial failures. Differences in population density could be important if it influences the demand and supply for banking services. A similar argument can be made for looking at differences in firm size across states.43

We test for the possibility that population density influenced the effect of bank failures on eco- nomic activity by splitting states into two distinct categories: ‘‘high’’ population density states (states with above median population density) versus ‘‘low’’ population density states (states with below the median population density). The results indicate that the effect of bank failures on commercial distress in low population density states was approximately twice as large as the estimated effect in high pop- ulation density states.44 Because low population density states also tend to be states that are more ori- ented towards agriculture, as well as states that had deposit insurance, we may be identifying the same underlying phenomenon when we split the sample by agriculture, population density and deposit insurance.

We also examined whether firm size influenced the effect of bank failures on economic activity. Specifically, we investigated whether the effect was different in states with firm size above the median relative to states with firm size below the median.45 The results show that the effect of a bank failure shock is approximately 1.3–1.5 times stronger in states with ‘‘small’’ firms than in states with ‘‘large’’ firms, and the difference is statistically significant.46 This finding indicates that bank failure shocks are particularly more damaging for the economy when firms are relatively smaller which is consistent with the literature that finds that small firms are more dependent on bank financing.

5. Concluding remarks

Using data from 1900 to 1930, a period that predates active federal government stabilization pol- icies, we have shown that bank failures have a statistically and economically important negative effect on economic growth. We find that an increase in the share of liabilities in failed depository institutions has a negative and long-lasting effect on the growth rate of industrial production and GNP. On average, a 1% unexpected increase in the liabilities of failed banks (an exceptionally large shock), contracts industrial production by 15% points and GNP by 6.5% points within three quarters. Our findings sug- gest that, absent government intervention to offset the impact of failures, banking system distress im- poses a drag on real economic activity for at least 10 quarters. We find evidence that differences in the regulatory and economic environments affected the relationship between bank failures and economic distress. In particular, we find that state deposit insurance systems amplified the degree to which bank failures propagated economic distress. We also find that the effect of bank failures on commercial dis- tress is much more precisely identified in the post-1914 period, when bank and commercial distress were more geographically localized. We also find that banking system distress has a larger impact in agricultural states and states high a concentration of smaller firms although these two characteristics are also prevalent in states that had deposit insurance during this period.

43 Of course, other dimensions could be considered as well. For example, one could posit that other regulatory variables or even differences in banking market structures may make a difference. Ramirez and Shively (2012) investigate the extent to which bank density and competition and other regulatory variables (e.g. minimum capital requirements, double liability, branching restrictions, etc.) affect the extent to which the variability in commercial distress is explained by variability in bank distress.

44 To limit the number tables and figures, we do not present a separate exhibit with these results. 45 Firm size is defined as the amount of capital equipment per establishment. Source: Census of Manufactures, Bureau of the

Census, various years. 46 The chart with these results is omitted in order to limit the number of tables and figures in the paper.

P.H. Kupiec, C.D. Ramirez / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 285–307 305

Our results suggest that bank failures have important adverse consequences for economic growth. The magnitude of negative growth externality associated with a bank failure is linked directly to the share of banking system liabilities in the failing institution.

Acknowledgments

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. We are grateful to Jerry Dwyer, Mark Fisher, Mark Flan- nery, Ed Kane, Thomas Philippon, Peter Praet, Philip Strahan, Larry Wall, Lee Davidson, Vivian Hwa, Daniel Parivisini, Xiaoling Ang, and two anonymous referees as well as seminar participants at the 2008 New York Federal Reserve Banking Conference, 2009 Mitsui Conference at the University of Michigan, 2009 National University of Singapore Risk Management Institute Summer Conference, 2009 Southern Finance Association Meetings, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for helpful com- ments and suggestions. Ramirez acknowledges financial support from the FDIC’s Center for Financial Research.

Appendix A. Data appendix

US Commercial Paper Rates, New York City 01/1857- 12/1971 (m13002)

http://www.nber.org/databases/ macrohistory/contents/chapter13.html

Great Britain Open Market Rates of Discount, London 01/1824-11/1939 (m13016)

http://www.nber.org/databases/ macrohistory/contents/chapter13.html

US Index of the General Price Level 01/1860-11/1939 (m04051)

http://www.nber.org/databases/ macrohistory/contents/chapter04.html

US Index of All Common Stock Prices, Cowles Commission (m11025a)

http://www.nber.org/databases/ macrohistory/contents/chapter11.html

US Monetary Gold Stock (m14076a splined with m14076b)

http://www.nber.org/databases/ macrohistory/contents/chapter14.html

Miron-Romer Industrial Production Series, JEH

Miron and Romer (1990, pp. 321–337)

Balke-Gordon GNP Series

Gordon (1986).

Num of Bank Failures

Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1943, p.

283

Total Number of Banks, All banks

Historical Statistics of the United States

(HSUS), Series X580

Deposits at Failed or Suspended Banks

Dun’s Review, various years

Liabilities at Failed Commercial Establishments (sum

of trade, manufacturing, and others)

Dun’s Review, various years

US Farm Bankruptcies

U.S. Department of Agriculture (1936)

Total Deposits, All Banks HSUS, Series X585

State level interest rates

Bodenhorn (1996)

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  • Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: Evidence from 1900 to 1930
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 The importance of the sample period
      • 2.1 Fiscal policy
      • 2.2 Monetary policy
    • 3 Banking system distress and economic growth: VAR tests
      • 3.1 The data
      • 3.2 VAR model
      • 3.3 Granger-causality
      • 3.4 Impulse response functions
      • 3.5 Forecast error variance decomposition
    • 4 Bank failures cause non-bank commercial failures: evidence from a panel VAR model
      • 4.1 Granger causality results
      • 4.2 Impulse response functions: all states from 1900 to 1930
      • 4.3 Deposit insurance
      • 4.4 Pre- versus post-1914 periods
      • 4.5 Manufacturing versus agriculture
      • 4.6 Other state characteristics
    • 5 Concluding remarks
    • Acknowledgments
    • Appendix A Data appendix
    • References

1-s2.0-S1042957313000028-main.pdf

J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

J. Finan. Intermediation

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jfi

Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis

1042-9573/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2013.01.001

⇑ Corresponding author. Address: 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA. E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Torna).

1 The FDIC’s problem bank list contains all banks with a composite CAMELS rating of 4 or 5.

Robert DeYoung a, Gökhan Torna b,⇑ a University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA b SUNY-Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 31 March 2012 Available online 23 January 2013

Keywords: Bank failure Banking deregulation Financial crisis

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was nei- ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.

Published by Elsevier Inc.

1. Introduction

The global financial crisis was brought on by the collapse of a small number of now (in)famous sys- temically important financial institutions. But hundreds of smaller U.S. banks and thrifts also failed during the crisis and in its aftermath, with about one-in-nine U.S. banks and thrifts appearing on the FDIC’s list of problem institutions.1 The root causes of these non-systemic bank failures are not yet fully understood. Many commentators immediately blamed the episode on the most recent changes in bank regulation—in particular, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 that allowed banks to en- gage more freely in nontraditional activities such as investment banking, venture capital, security bro- kerage, insurance underwriting and asset securitization—and argued that bank supervisors were lax

398 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

and/or unprepared for the challenges of deregulated financial markets. In contrast, the first academic studies to look at the question (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; Cole and White, 2012) concluded that the causes and nature of banks’ financial weaknesses during the financial crisis were similar to those ob- served at banks that failed or performed poorly during previous (pre-GLB) banking recessions.

GLB gave an additional boost to changes in banks’ business models and income mixes that were already underway. For example, noninterest income at U.S. banks peaked at 44% of operating income in 2003, up from 35% in 1993 and 24% in 1983 (FDIC data). This long-run movement away from tra- ditional interest was made possible by myriad innovations in information, communications and finan- cial technologies, and was made necessary by increasing competition from other financial institutions and markets for banks’ depositors and borrowers. The disintermediation that resulted reduced banks’ share of economy-wide financial assets—but banks retained stakes in the cash flows associated with those assets by originating loans, servicing loans, guaranteeing loans, and providing other ancillary services in exchange for fee income. GLB not only eased this transition, but also allowed banks to re- place lost business by shifting into less traditional financial activities.

This paper aims to understand whether and how banks’ shift from traditional to nontraditional in- come sources contributed to the failure of hundreds of U.S. depository institutions between 2008 and 2010. A key ingredient of our methodology is the recognition that different fee-generating or nonin- terest activities have different production and risk-return characteristics, and hence are likely to have different impacts on the probability of financial distress and insolvency. Following and extending the work of DeYoung and Rice (2004), we separate noninterest income into three categories: noninterest income from nontraditional Stakeholder activities (i.e., investment banking, venture capital, proprie- tary trading or other activities that do or may require the bank to hold risky assets); noninterest in- come from nontraditional Fee-for-Service activities (i.e., securities brokerage, insurance sales or other activities that do not require the bank to hold risky assets); and noninterest income from Tra- ditional Fee banking activities permitted prior to deregulation (e.g., depositor services, fiduciary ser- vices). This three-way taxonomy of noninterest income allows us to estimate whether the new activities permitted by deregulation increased the probability of bank failure, while also allowing us to test for differential impacts among the newly permitted activities.

We find that nontraditional banking activities had economically meaningful effects on the proba- bility of bank failure during the crisis—even after controlling for the traditional drivers of insolvency risk identified in past studies—and that these effects varied depending on the financial condition of the bank. For the most part, nontraditional income had either no effect or a beneficial effect on the chance of bank failure. High concentrations of Stakeholder income reduced the chance that financially healthy banks suffered financial distress and failed, while high concentrations of Fee-for-Service income helped financially distressed banks avoid failure. However, once a bank became financially distressed, Stakeholder activities made it more likely to fail. An important related finding is that banks with sub- stantial amounts of Stakeholder activities also tended to take more risk in their traditional banking activities. For example, Stakeholder banks were also more aggressive lenders, had less diversified and more fundamentally risky loan portfolios, and funded their loans with less stable deposit bases. Finally, although our nontraditional income variables were strong predictors of bank failure during the short-run window of the financial crisis, these variables were not especially good predictors of bank failure over longer time horizons; thus, these variables are unlikely to improve the performance of long-run early warning models.

Our results have implications for research and for policy. First, bank performance studies should whenever possible separate fee-based lines of business by types, rather than aggregating these activ- ities into a single noninterest income variable and/or a single off-balance sheet activities variable. Our approach that separates Fee-for-Service, Stakeholder and Traditional Fee sources of noninterest in- come is one possibility. Second, heading into economic downturns, bank supervisors attempting to gauge bank insolvency risk should take banks’ mix of nontraditional activities into consideration, especially for banks on the cusp of or already suffering from financial distress. Third and perhaps most critically, our results suggest that product line deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis; while GLB provided banks with increased opportunities for risk taking, not all banks expanded into risky new activities and those that did tended to have high- er ex ante preferences for risk-taking.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 399

The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. We review the relevant literature in Section 2 and posit testable hypotheses in Section 3. We describe our data in Section 4 and our empirical method- ology in Section 5. We present our results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature review

A large stream of research focuses on the determinants and predictability of bank failures. One of the major purposes of such studies is to construct early warning models that identify risky banks prior to failure and signal bank supervisors to take corrective actions. Most of these studies have used data from the wave of bank and thrift failures during the late-1980s and early 1990s. Examples include Thomson (1991), Whalen (1991), Cole and Gunther (1995), Wheelock and Wilson (2000), DeYoung (2003), Oshinsky and Olin (2006) and Schaeck (2008). These studies have identified a robust set of bank failure predictors: low asset quality (nonperforming loans), high concentrations of business or commercial real estate loans, illiquidity, cost inefficiency and/or poor management, rapid asset growth, reliance on non-core deposit funding and, not surprisingly, low profitability and low equity capital. While ‘‘early warning’’ is not the purpose of our study, we use these predictors as control variables in our models.

A small but growing set of studies have begun to apply these techniques to more recent data on bank failures during the financial crisis (e.g., Rossi, 2010; Altunbas et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2012; Cole and White, 2012).2 One of the central findings is that not much has changed. For example, Cole and White (2012) apply a standard early warning model approach to 263 U.S. banks that either failed or were technically insolvent in 2009, and conclude that the basic drivers of bank financial performance and fail- ure during the financial crisis—in particular, concentrations of commercial real estate loans—were sim- ilar to the drivers of bank performance and failure during earlier industry downturns.

A separate set of studies measures the impact of noninterest income on bank stability and risk. The earlier studies (e.g., Litan, 1985; Wall, 1987; Kwast, 1989; Gallo et al., 1996; Uzun and Webb, 2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008) tend to find that expansion into nonbanking activities such as securities underwriting, securities brokerage, and asset securitization helps banks diversify away risk, at least partially. But more recent studies tend to find increased risk. Allen and Jagtiani (2000) find that expanding into nonbanking securities and insurance activities increases both systematic risk and interest rate risk at bank holding companies. DeYoung and Roland (2001) show that noninterest in- come contributes positively to bank earnings volatility. Stiroh (2004, 2006) finds no substantial evi- dence of diversification benefits from pairing noninterest income with interest income. DeJonghe (2010) shows that noninterest income-intensive banks have higher tail betas and as such are more sensitive than traditional banks to extreme market and macro-economic swings; consistent with this, Clark et al. (2007) find that fee income from retail banking activities tends to be pro-cyclical. Elyasiani and Wang (2008) report that bank holding companies that generate large amounts of their incomes from fees are less transparent to investors.3 While Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find some evi- dence of diversification gains from low levels of noninterest income, they conclude that ‘‘banking strat- egies that rely prominently on generating noninterest income. . .are very risky’’.

DeYoung and Rice (2004) point out a number of fallacies regarding bank noninterest income, including the misconception that banks earn noninterest income chiefly by expanding into nonbank- ing activities or nontraditional banking activities. We exploit this idea in our study by specifying non- interest income as three separate lines of business: noninterest income from Traditional Fee banking activities, noninterest income from nontraditional Stakeholder activities, and nontraditional Fee-for- Service income.

2 Among these studies, Berger et al. (2012) innovate by adding corporate governance variables to the established set of bank failure predictors.

3 Another stream of literature links nontraditional and/or deregulated banking with an increasingly homogenous banking sector and increased systemic risk (e.g., Rajan, 2005; Wagner, 2008; Boot and Thakor, 2009; Sheleifer and Vishny, 2010). According to these studies, deregulation has allowed large financial institutions to become more alike—either because lending, underwriting, brokerage and insurance activities can now occur under the same roof; because the geographic footprints of increasingly large financial institutions now overlap; and/or because entrenched financial institution managers are now better able to ‘herd’ by adopting business models and risk exposures very similar to those of their rivals. The resulting reduction in intra-industry diversification increases systemic risk in the macro-economy. Our work is not directly related to this literature, as we only measure risk outcomes at individual banks and do not model the correlations in banks’ business models or performances.

400 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

3. Main hypotheses

Banking involves certain risks, and the nature of those risks varies substantially with the character- istics of the lines of business in which a bank engages. In its most classical incarnation, banking com- bines deposit-taking with loan-making, and these activities expose banks to credit risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk; in combination, these risks can result in financial distress and/or insolvency. Other banking activities are unrelated or only indirectly related to deposit-loan intermediation, and as such these activities contribute to bank insolvency risk in different fashions. Some lines of business (e.g., securities and insurance underwriting, venture capital, securities trading) place equity capital at risk because they require banks to take investment, or Stakeholder, positions that can gain or lose va- lue with movements in market prices (i.e., market risk). In contrast, purely fee-driven lines of business (e.g., asset management, securities brokerage, M&A advising) are not subject to capital losses, but these activities can place equity capital at risk from operating losses, as volatile revenue streams may not cover their related fixed costs of operation during down years (i.e., business risk).

The research reviewed above suggests that the newer, nontraditional banking activities may be more likely than traditional fee-based activities to generate either capital losses or operating losses. Hence, we test the following null hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Engaging in nontraditional (Stakeholder and/or Fee-for-Service) banking activities increases the probability that a financially healthy bank will fail.

Once a bank becomes financially distressed, the financial and behavioral relationships between nontraditional banking activities and the probability of failure may change. First and most obvious, distressed banks have smaller equity buffers to absorb downside movements in income (due to either operating losses or capital losses), so lines of business with especially volatile income streams may more become even more likely to lead to bank failure. Second, history shows that banks are more likely to be financially distressed during macro-economic downturns, so lines of business that exhibit large amounts of systematic risk will be associated more strongly with bank failure during these times. Third, with their jobs and reputations in jeopardy, managers at thinly capitalized banks may engage in ‘go-for-broke’ or ‘gambling for resurrection’ behaviors (Brumbaugh, 1988; Romer and Wein- gast, 1990), shifting increased downside risk to depositors and deposit insurers while shareholders claim the upside returns (Keeley, 1990; Ritchken et al., 1993). While this classic story imagined bank risk-shifting via risky lending, it is no less plausible that banks could shift into riskier non-lending activities, especially if doing so allows the bank to book immediate fee income. Fourth, supervisory intervention can alter the trajectory with which a distressed bank fails. When a bank becomes under- capitalized, bank supervisors can use their prompt corrective action authority to command the bank to alter its investment and financing profile in order to slow or staunch its financial decline; if the bank’s book equity-to-assets falls below 2%, supervisors have the authority to shut down the bank even though it remains technically solvent. Hence, we also test the following null hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. Engaging in nontraditional (Stakeholder and/or Fee-for-Service) banking activities increases the probability that an already financially distressed bank will fail.

4. Data

Insolvent banks do not have access to protection from creditors under the bankruptcy code. When a bank becomes insolvent or nears insolvency, it ‘fails’ in the sense that it is closed by its primary (state or federal) regulator and its assets are seized by the FDIC. As shown in Fig. 1, U.S. commercial banks began to fail in increasing numbers during the second half of 2008, and failures remained at elevated levels during the following two years. We observe the identities of these banks from the FDIC’s Failed Bank list. We attempt to identify the defining characteristics of banks that failed between the third quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2010, based on their activities two quarters prior to their failure. Thus, we observe bank characteristics each quarter from 2008:Q1 through 2010:Q2 to esti- mate the probability of bank failure from 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4.

Source: FDIC Quarterly Bank Profile

0

5

10

15

20

25

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35

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45

0

100

200

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Q2 08

Q3 08

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Q3 09

Q4 09

Q1 10

Q2 10

Q3 10

Q4 10

Troubled

Failed

Fig. 1. Number of commercial banks on the FDIC problem bank list (left scale) and number of commercial banks that failed (right scale) in the U.S. in each quarter, 2007:Q1–2010:Q4. Source: FDIC Quarterly Bank Profile.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 401

We collected quarterly financial data for each bank from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (call reports); we observe quarterly state-level macro-economic conditions from the Bu- reau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Office of Federal Housing Enter- prise Oversight; and we use geographic branching information from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits database to create a unique deposit-weighted economic conditions variables for each bank in each quarter. We focus on commercial banks, rather than their parent bank or financial holding companies, because during our pre-Dodd-Frank Act sample the FDIC lacked the legal authority to shut down insolvent parent companies, but could seize and resolve the commercial bank affiliates within bank or financial holding companies. As of 2008:Q1, approximately 15% of the banks in our sample were free-standing firms, 70% were the sole banks in one-bank holding companies (within which the bank affiliate generated all or virtually all the business activity) and the remain- ing 15% were affiliates in multi-bank holding companies. We control for multi-bank holding company affiliation in our tests.

We exclude from our sample banks with more than 50% foreign ownership, banks with loans less than 25% of their total assets, banks with no deposit financing, and banks that had been in operation for less than 3 years. We also exclude banks with more than $100 billion in assets, because the probability of failure for a too-big-to-fail bank is not endogenous to its financial performance.4 Finally, we exclude banks for which either of the nontraditional banking activities (Stakeholder income or Fee-for-Service income) as a percentage of total assets put them above the 99.5th percentile of the sample distribution. We exclude this last set of banks because we are most interested in whether the addition of nontraditional banking activities to a traditional banking franchise affects its financial stability—in other words, we exclude banks with business models focused on nontraditional activities. Indeed, the banks in the top 0.5th percentile were truly different: their ratio of nontraditional-to- traditional income averaged 45.9% during the sample period (i.e., about one-third of their operating revenues came from Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service activities) compared with an average of just 1.1% for the banks retained in our sample.

4 As of year-end 2008, only 14 U.S. commercial banks (that met our other exclusion restrictions) held more than $100 billion in assets. In declining order of size: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, US Bank, Bank of New York Mellon, Suntrust Bank, Branch Banking and Trust, National City, Regions Bank, PNC Bank, Capital One, and Keybank.

402 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

We began with 77,615 bank-quarter observations between 2008:Q1 and 2010:Q2. Given the above restrictions and exclusions, and after further excluding some bank-quarters for which a complete set of variables could not be constructed, our final data sample includes 62,934 quarterly observations of 6851 separate banks.5

4.1. Identifying financially distressed banks

Fig. 1 also displays the number of ‘problem banks’ (banks with composite CAMELS ratings of 4 or 5) each quarter from the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile. Because these banks are suffering from various forms of financial distress, they are especially strong candidates for failure. The FDIC keeps the iden- tities of problem banks confidential, so we use four different methods to identify the banks that are most likely to be the ones on this list; because these are estimates on our part, we refer to them as ‘financially distressed’ banks rather than problem banks.

The first approach is the Equity Ranking method. In each quarter, we place all U.S. banks in order by their core (net) capital ratios and identify the x banks with the lowest core capital ratio as financially distressed, where x is the number of problem banks on the published FDIC list that quarter.6 Using this method, we identified 1263 distinct banks (4200 separate bank-quarter observations) as being finan- cially distressed at some time during our sample period.

The second approach is the Enforcement Action method, which exploits data on supervisory ac- tions collected by hand from the FDIC ED&O database, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur- rency (OCC) Formal Enforcement Actions search engine, and the Federal Reserve’s Enforcement Actions search engine. We identify as financially distressed any bank that received a consent order, an order to cease & desist, a prompt corrective action directive, a written or formal agreement, or an order for restitution, starting two quarters before the date of the enforcement action and in each subsequent quarter up until the termination date of the enforcement action.7 Using this ap- proach, we identified 1191 distinct banks (5612 separate bank-quarter observations) as financially distressed during the sample period.

The third approach is the Z-Score Ranking method.8 We place all banks in each quarter in order by their Z-score, and then identify the x banks with the lowest Z-score in each quarter as financially dis- tressed, where x is the number of problem banks on the published FDIC list that quarter. Using this ap- proach, we identify 1160 distinct banks (4203 bank-quarter observations) as financially distressed during the sample period.

The fourth approach is the Failure Probability Ranking method. We estimate a separate binomial lo- git model of bank failure for each of the 10 cross-sections t in our 2008:Q3–2010:Q4 data, conditional on bank characteristics and market conditions at the end of quarter t � 2. The logit model is specified

5 We excluded 211 bank-quarter observations due to foreign ownership, an additional 5623 due to low loan-to-asset ratios, an additional 4589 due to lack of deposit financing, an additional 2699 that were less than three years old, an additional 137 that had more than $100 billion in assets, an additional 811 due to all missing data to construct variables, and finally an additional 611 that exceeded the 99.5th percentile for Stakeholder and/or Fee for Service.

6 A bank’s core capital ratio equals its primary capital minus its classified assets, divided by total bank assets. This measure has been employed in the past by Sinkey (1977), Thomson (1991) and Whalen (1991). As a robustness check, we tried replacing the core capital ratio with the Tier 1 capital ratio and also with the total risk-adjusted capital ratio. These changes had little effect on the banks identified as problem banks.

7 It is sensible to identify banks as distressed two quarters prior to the enforcement action, because there is likely a lag between the onset of the unacceptable bank behavior or condition and its discovery by the supervisor. Indeed, about one quarter of the failed banks in our data received enforcement actions in the same quarter they failed. See Curry and O’Keefe (1999) for detailed discussion of enforcement actions. As a robustness check, we tried adding two other enforcement actions—civil money penalties and suspension and removal actions—and we also tried recognition lags longer than two quarters. While these changes did increase the total number of distressed bank observations, virtually all of this increase came from banks that did not eventually fail.

8 Following Boyd and Graham (1986), we calculate a quarterly Z-score for each bank as follows: Z ¼ equity=assetsþlðROAÞ rðROAÞ , where

equity/assets is the core capital ratio, ROA is quarterly net income divided by assets, r(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over the previous 12 quarters, and ROA is assumed to be distributed normally. Boyd and Graham interpret the Z-score as ‘‘an estimate of the number of standard deviations below the mean that consolidated profits would have to fall to make consolidated equity negative’’.

Table 1 (A) Number of banks and bank-quarter observations identified as distressed between 2008:Q1 and 2010:Q4. Data based on 62,934 bank-quarter observations of 6851 individual banks. (B) The on-diagonal cells show the number of eventually failed banks that were identified as distressed during at least one quarter by each of the four methods. The off-diagonal cells show the concordance across pairs of methods. Data based on the subsamples of 255 banks that failed between 2008:Q3 and 2010:Q4.

Observations Banks

Panel A Equity Ranking 4200 1263 Enforcement Action 5612 1191 Z-Score Ranking 4203 1160 Failure Probability Ranking 4209 1862

[1] [2] [3] [4] Equity Ranking

Enforcement Action

Z-Score Ranking

Failure Probaility Ranking

Panel B [1] Equity Ranking 229 [2] Enforcement Action 205 227 [3] Z-Score Ranking 226 212 235 [4] Failure Probability

Ranking 223 210 224 235

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similar to Cole and White (2012) and the resulting coefficient estimates are similar as well.9 We place all banks in each quarter in order by their estimated probabilities of failure, and then identify the x banks with the highest failure probabilities in each quarter as financially distressed, where x is the number of problem banks on the published FDIC list that quarter. Using this approach, we identify 1862 distinct banks (4209 bank-quarter observations) as financially distressed during the sample period.

The number of banks and bank-quarters identified as distressed varies somewhat across the three approaches (see Table 1, Panel A). However, we find substantial concordance across approaches within the subsample of 255 banks that failed during our sample period (Table 1, Panel B).

4.2. Income from nontraditional activities

While the product mix at some U.S. commercial banks has remained purely traditional, most banks have diversified to at least some degree into nontraditional banking services. Nearly two-thirds of the banks in our sample generated income from nontraditional Fee-for-Service activities during one or more quarters in our sample period (see Table 2). Insurance sales was the most popular source of these fees (50.7% of the banks), followed by loan servicing (27.5%) and securities brokerage (22.8%). In con- trast, only about 16% of the banks generated income from nontraditional Stakeholder activities, engag- ing mainly in investment banking (9.8%), insurance underwriting (4.6%) and trading (2.5%) activities.

Although the rate of participation in nontraditional banking activities is high, the average bank in our sample generates a relatively small portion of its income from these activities. Based on data from bank-quarters in which nontraditional income was non-zero, Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service activi- ties accounted for just $0.14 cents and $0.64 cents of income, respectively, per $1000 of assets. By comparison, traditional fee-based activities and net interest income accounted for $6.53 and $35.09 of income per $1000 of assets, respectively.

Consistent with the recent literature on noninterest income, the income generated by nontradi- tional activities can be quite volatile. Even after excluding bank-quarter observations with zero

9 The right-hand side of these models includes the following variables: Liquidity, Loan Concentration, Cost Inefficiency, Return- on-Assets, Nonperforming Loans, Equity Capital, ln(Assets), ln(Age), a Multibank Holding Company indicator, Brokered Deposits, Core Deposits, Goodwill, Commercial Real Estate Loans, Construction and Development Loans, Multifamily Mortgages, Business Loans, Stakeholder Income, Fee-for-Service Income, Traditional Noninterest Income, Net Interest Income, and a vector of state-level Macroeconomic Conditions. The estimated parameters of these 10 separate logit models are available from the authors upon request.

Table 2 Distribution of income from nontraditional sources (Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service activities) and traditional sources (Traditional Fee Income and Net Interest Income). Figures are based on 62,934 quarterly observations on 6851 different U.S. commercial banks from 2008:Q1 through 2010:Q2.

Source of income Banks with income from this source in at least one quarter

Annualized income per $1000 of bank assets (for bank-quarters with income from this source)

Number Percentage Mean Median Std. Dev.

% Of banks with average negative Income

% Of quarters for which the activity is negative

Stakeholder activities

1086 15.85 0.142 0.097 1.603 13.54 14.59

Insurance Underwriting

313 4.57 0.134 0.048 0.242 10.22 3.29

Investment Banking

673 9.82 0.350 0.133 0.679 3.86 3.37

Securitization 32 0.47 �0.789 0.029 3.749 21.88 0.77 Trading 172 2.51 �0.529 0.001 3.270 47.67 6.26 Venture Capital 61 0.89 �0.109 0.000 0.696 49.18 2.18

Fee-for-Service activities

4495 65.61 0.644 0.233 1.871 1.74 1.85

Brokerage 1563 22.81 0.371 0.195 0.686 0.70 0.25 Insurance Sales 3471 50.66 0.401 0.086 1.055 0.89 0.97 Loan Servicing 1884 27.50 0.491 0.207 2.371 6.00 1.63

Traditional Fee Income

6851 100.00 6.533 5.144 13.722 0.07 0.56

Net Interest Income

6851 100.00 35.094 35.079 7.843 0.06 0.32

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income, standard deviations exceed means for all three categories of noninterest income: the average subsample standard deviation is about eleven times the subsample mean for Stakeholder, about three times the mean for Fee-for-Service, and about twice the mean for Traditional Fee noninterest income. Approximately one-in-eight banks experienced at least one quarter of negative income from Stake- holder activities, driven primarily by negative income from loan securitization (21.9%), trading (47.7%) and venture capital (49.2%) activities.10 Note, however, that episodes of negative income in Stakeholder activities were rare: income from loan securitization, trading and venture capital activities was negative in only about 3%, 6% and 2% of the bank-quarter observations, and none of the median aver- ages associated with these lines of business are negative. Fee-for-Service activities generated negative income less frequently than did Stakeholder activities, but far more frequently than the two traditional banking categories. Thus, despite the small share of income generated by nontraditional activities, the volatility of this income may have had a non-trivial influence on the probability of bank failure.

4.3. Comparing healthy banks to distressed banks

Table 3 contains definitions and descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in our bank failure and distress models. The right hand columns display difference-in-means tests for the subsamples of healthy banks and financially distressed banks, using the Equity Ranking approach to delineate be- tween these two states of nature. (Results were nearly identical using the other three methods.) On average, distressed banks generated less income per dollar of assets than did healthy banks, in partic- ular, significantly lower levels of Net Interest income, Traditional Fee income, and nontraditional

10 Income from trading and venture capital activities can be negative due to short-run and long-run capital losses, respectively. Income from securitization activities can be negative due to recourse arrangements that require banks to take back poorly performing asset-backed securities.

Table 3 Variable definitions and mean values for 62,934 quarterly observations of 6851 U.S. commercial banks over 2008:Q1–2010:Q2. All flow variables are expressed in annualized magnitudes. Distressed banks are identified using the Equity Ranking approach.

Variable Definition All banks (N = 62,934) Healthy banks (N = 58,734)

Distressed banks (Based on Equity Ranking) (N = 4200)

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. De Mean Std. Dev.

Components of income Stakeholder Sum of income from venture capital,

insurance underwriting, and trading activities, securitization and investment banking, per $1000 of assets

0.0285 0.3895 0.0278 0.390 0.0373 0.3704***

Fee-for-Service Sum of income from servicing, brokerage, and insurance sales activities, per $1000 of assets

0.4202 1.5435 0.4334 1.279 0.2353 3.5730***

Traditional Fee Noninterest income minus Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service income, per $1000 of assets.

6.4816 12.0764 6.5587 12.174 5.4047 10.5554***

Net Interest Interest Income minus interest expense, per $1000 of assets

35.3785 8.5925 35.9395 8.223 27.5330 9.7266***

Components of Stakeholder income Insurance Underwriting Premiums earned in insurance

underwriting or reinsurance activities, per $1000 of assets

0.0037 0.0537 0.0038 0.054 0.0018 0.0396**

Investment Banking Income from underwriting securities, M&A advising, or other services, per $1000 of assets

0.0301 0.2429 0.0298 0.231 0.0343 0.3641

Securitization Fees earned and gains on assets sold in securitization transactions (net of transaction costs), per $1000 of assets

�0.0009 0.1301 �0.0009 0.134 0.0001 0.0052*

Trading Net gains/losses from trading cash and derivative instruments per $1000 of assets

�0.0041 0.2677 �0.0045 0.277 0.0012 0.0313

Venture Capital Net gains/losses from equity of debt investments in start-up or high risk companies, per $1000 of assets

�0.0003 0.0398 �0.0003 0.040 0.0000 0.0245

Components of Fee-for-Service income Brokerage Security brokerage fees and income, per

$1000 of assets 0.0837 0.3630 0.0848 0.367 0.0677 0.2854**

Insurance Sales Income from Insurance sales and customer referrals, per $1000 of assets

0.1967 0.7882 0.2051 0.804 0.0791 0.4862***

Loan Servicing Net servicing fees from securitized assets, 0.1398 1.2520 0.1435 0.890 0.0884 3.5198

(continued on next page)

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Table 3 (continued)

Variable Definition All banks (N = 62,934) Healthy banks (N = 58,734)

Distressed banks (Based on Equity Ranking) (N = 4200)

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. D . Mean Std. Dev.

per $1000 of assetsa

Bank-level control variables Liquidity Noninterest and interest bearing cash and

securities, normalized by total borrowings and deposits.

0.2913 0.1633 0.2969 0.165 0.2128 0.1070***

Loan Concentration Loan share-based Herfindahl index (loans secured by real estate, commercial and industrial loans, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, loans to individuals, and loans to foreigners)

0.5905 0.1680 0.5808 0.165 0.7262 0.1465***

Cost Inefficiency Noninterest expenses, divided by total assets

0.0710 0.0513 0.0701 0.050 0.0841 0.0617***

ROA Net income, divided by total assets 0.0090 0.0441 0.0136 0.033 �0.0554 0.0937 Nonperforming Loan Loans 90 days past due plus nonaccrual

loans, divided by total assets 0.0171 0.0242 0.0128 0.013 0.0780 0.0464***

Equity Total equity capital, divided by total assets 0.1054 0.0363 0.1079 0.035 0.0694 0.0265***

Assets Total assets in thousands of same year dollars

371122 1320875 359768 1294 10 529894 1642283***

MBHC Dummy equal to 1 for banks in multibank holding companies

0.1835 0.3871 0.1869 0.389 0.1367 0.3435***

Age Bank age in years 68.9595 42.6718 70.7888 42.243 43.3783 40.3533***

Brokered Deposits Brokered Deposits, divided by total assets 0.0382 0.0769 0.0344 0.071 0.0916 0.1159***

Core Deposits Total Deposits minus time deposits more than $100,000 and brokered deposits under $100,000, normalized by total assets

0.6519 0.1146 0.6537 0.112 0.6275 0.1374***

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4

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Goodwill Goodwill, normalized by total assets 0.0041 0.0127 0.0044 0.0131 0.0009 0.0040***

CRE Loans Real estate nonfarm nonresidential mortgages, scaled by total assets.

0.1691 0.1158 0.1642 0.1144 0.2382 0.1142***

C&D Loans Real estate constructions and development loans, divided by assets

0.0696 0.0782 0.0645 0.0729 0.1414 0.1078***

Multifamily Mortgage Real estate multifamily properties, normalized by total assets

0.0146 0.0261 0.0137 0.0247 0.0265 0.0397***

Business Loans Commercial and Industrial Loans, normalized by total assets

0.0970 0.0686 0.0975 0.0688 0.0894 0.0649***

Macro-economic Indicators Income Growth Growth in state-level personal income

(quarterly %, seasonally adjusted) �0.8637 1.2672 �0.8588 1.2857 �0.9329 0.9700***

Unemployment State-level unemployment rate (%, seasonally adjusted)

2.0373 2.0111 1.9264 1.9852 3.5885 1.7079***

Home Price Growth Growth in state-level housing prices (quarterly %, seasonally adjusted)

�1.6319 1.5372 �1.5856 1.5175 �2.2804 1.6599***

a Loan servicing includes gains and losses from marking to market value of loan servicing rights. * Statistically significant difference in the means of distressed banks and healthy banks at the 10% levels. ** Statistically significant difference in the means of distressed banks and healthy banks at the 5% levels. *** Statistically significant difference in the means of distressed banks and healthy banks at the 1% levels.

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Fee-for-Service income. However, distressed banks generated significantly higher amounts of Stake- holder income per dollar of assets than did healthy banks. Given that Stakeholder income also tends to be more volatile than the income generated by the other activities, this suggests a positive link be- tween Stakeholder activities and bank failures during the financial crisis.

Among the other bank characteristics, we find plentiful indications consistent with findings of the extant bank failure and financial distress literature (e.g., Curry and O’Keefe, 1999; Cole and White, 2012). Distressed banks were significantly less liquid, less well-capitalized, less cost efficient, and gen- erated lower earnings than healthy banks. Their loan portfolios were less diversified, of lower quality, and were tilted heavily toward lending categories (commercial real estate, construction and develop- ment) that tend to perform poorly during economic downturns. Their loans tended to be funded with non-core and brokered deposits. Moreover, distressed banks were more likely to do business in states where macro-economic conditions were relatively weak (i.e., lower income growth, lower home price appreciation, higher unemployment). Hence, decisions made by bank managers, as well as external conditions beyond the control of bank managers, were both important drivers of financial distress and failure.

5. Bank failure probability model

We use a multi-period logit model to test hypotheses H1 and H2 that the likelihood of bank failure increases as banks engage in nontraditional banking activities. This approach is very flexible: it allows the passage of time to be measured in discrete increments, permits the use of right-hand-side covar- iates that vary across time, and does not impose any parametric shape on the intertemporal distribu- tion of the hazard event.11 Consider a cross section of banks i (i = 1,N) observed at consecutive times t (t = 1,T). Also consider a series of event windows s (s = 1,S) where s occurs after t. For each bank i we define an event history Di(1), . . .Di(Ti), where Di(t) = 1 if bank i fails during the event window s and Di(t) = 0 otherwise.12 We ‘stack’ these N separate event histories one on top of the other, resulting in a column of zeros and ones with one row for each bank-quarter observation. Define D�is as a latent index value that represents the unobserved propensity of bank i to fail during event window s, conditional on exogenouos conditions:

11 Thi We not continu from th

12 For sixth ev the enti non-fai

D�is ¼ Zit/þ eis ð1Þ

where Z is a vector of covariates that can vary over time, / is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated, and e is an error term assumed to be distributed as standard logistic. The probability that Dis = 1 is given by prob(Dis = 1) = ^(Zit /), where ^(�) is the logistic cumulative distribution func- tion. We specify the model as follows for estimation using quarterly data:

Pr½Dis ¼ 1jZ� ¼ ^½Stakeholderit; Fee-for-Serviceit ;Traditional Feeit;Net Interestit ;

ðStakeholderit ; Fee-for-Serviceit;Traditional Feeit;Net InterestitÞ � Distressedit ;Distressedit;Bank Controlsit ;Macro Controlsit ;Timet ; /� þ eis ð2Þ

The main test variables Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service (as well as the two benchmark variables Tra- ditional Fee and Net Interest) appear in the model twice: once by themselves and a second time inter- acted with the Distress dummy variable that equals 1 during quarters in which bank i is identified as financially distressed. The test of H1 is provided by the coefficient on the non-interacted terms, while the test of H2 is provided by the sum of the coefficients on the interacted and non-interacted terms.

s multi-period logit approach has been used in at least one previous studies of bank failure probability (Cole and Wu, 2009). e that our results are robust across a variety of other hazard models, including the Cox proportional hazard model and ous time hazard models that specify Weibull or exponential distributions. Results of those alternative models are available e authors upon request. example, assume that we observe 10 consecutive event windows. Then the event history for a bank that fails during the ent window will contain five zeros followed by a one (0,0,0,0,0,1) and the event history for a bank that survives through re sample period will be a string of 10 zeros. A bank that drops out of the sample during the eighth event window due to a lure event (e.g., it is acquired by another bank) is right-censored, and its event history is a string of 7 zeros.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 409

The variables that comprise the Bank Controls and Macro Controls vectors are defined in Table 3. Time is a vector of fixed time dummies.

We observe the elements of Z at the end of each quarter t and, in most of our tests, we define a two- quarter event window s that occurs roughly 90–180 days after t. In other words, the event window includes all of the days within quarter t + 2, but includes none of the days within quarter t + 1. This short-run window is consistent with the main objective of our study, which is to reveal whether non- traditional activities increase or decrease the probability of bank failure during an economic down- turn. Although we do show some results for longer run failure windows in the tables below, it is not our intention to estimate an early warning model. We estimate all of the failure models below using standard binomial logit estimation techniques, and we cluster the standard errors at the bank level.

6. Results

We begin by estimating an unconditional version of Eq. (2) that does not differentiate between dis- tressed versus healthy banks at time t. This is easily accomplished by excluding from Eq. (2) all of the terms containing the Distressed variable:

13 Non Estimat

Pr½Dis ¼ 1jZ� ¼ ^½Stakeholderit ; Fee-for-Serviceit;TraditionalFeeit;NetInterestit;

Bank Controlsit ;Macro Controlsit ;Timet ; /� þ eis ð20Þ

The results are displayed in Table 4. We employ numerous different event windows s, ranging from one quarter ahead (roughly 0–90 days after t) to eight quarters ahead (roughly 640–730 days after t).

None of the four income-based test variables—Stakeholder, Fee-for-Service, Traditional Fee or Net Income—has predictive power beyond seven quarters; statistically significant and economically mean- ingful predictive power is limited to shorter-run time horizons. For example, in column [1] a one-stan- dard deviation increase in Stakeholder is associated with a 7.4% increase in the probability of bank failure over the next 90 days. This effect continues for up to six quarters out, fluctuating between 5.4% and 10.0% before becoming statistically insignificant in the seven- and eight-quarter models. Both Fee-for-Service and Traditional Fee income are associated with reductions in the probability of bank failure, but these effects are sporadic and tend to be economically small. Not surprisingly, Net Interest income exhibits the cleanest failure-reducing pattern: a one-standard deviation increase in Net Inter- est income reduces the chance of failure within one quarter by about 27% (1–0.734). The magnitude of this effect declines nearly monotonically for more distant event windows, becoming statistically non- significant in the eight quarter-ahead test.

The relatively poor performance of our income-based test variables over these longer time horizons indicates that income-based activity ratios like Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service may not be useful additions to early warning models of bank failure. However, our objective is to test hypotheses con- cerning the marginal impact of nontraditional banking activities on bank insolvency risk during the financial crisis, not to improve the fit of early warning models. Finding robust results for Stakeholder and Net Interest (and to a lesser extent for Fee-for-Service and Traditional Fee) across various event windows—even while controlling for variables demonstrated in the extant literature to be strong long-run predictors of bank failure—is an encouraging start.

The coefficients on 12 of the 19 control variables are statistically significant with expected signs in at least half of the columns in Table 4. Among the bank financial ratios, Equity, Core Deposits and MBHC affiliation tend to be associated with a reduced probability of failure, while Loan Concentration, Cost Inefficiency, Nonperforming Loans, Brokered Deposits, Goodwill, Construction and Development Loans, Multifamily Mortgage Loans and Business Loans tend to be associated with an increased chance of failure.13 Among the state-level economic conditions variables, stronger Home Price appreciation and a lower Unemployment Rate tend to reduce the probability of bank failure.

performing Loans, Cost Inefficiency, Equity and ROA are potentially endogenous to the financial condition of the banks. ing the various models in our study without these four variables yielded no material differences in our results.

Table 4 Multi-period logit estimation of the unconditional probability of bank failure, Eq. (20), during quarters 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4. Right-hand side variables are observed with various lead times ranging from one to eight quarters ahead. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The displayed estimates are odds ratios that correspond to one-standard deviation changes in the exogenous variables. Standard errors clustered at the bank level. t-Statistics are shown in parentheses.

Failure window One quarter ahead

Two quarters ahead

Three quarters ahead

Four quarters ahead

Five quarters ahead

Six quarters ahead

Seven quarters ahead

Eight quarters ahead

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Test variables Stakeholder 1.074*** 1.080*** 1.054** 1.067** 1.100*** 1.063** 0.943 0.946

(2.70) (3.84) (2.25) (2.24) (5.46) (2.19) (1.51) (1.12) Fee-for-service 1.005 0.966*** 1.111 0.998 0.959*** 0.964 0.982 0.968

(0.51) (6.36) (1.18) (0.50) (7.30) (0.80) (0.98) (0.40) Traditional fee 1.141 0.974 0.967 0.973 0.968 0.716*** 0.960*** 1.002

(1.48) (0.26) (0.59) (0.40) (0.31) (3.00) (4.60) (0.04) Net interest 0.734*** 0.919*** 0.931*** 0.939*** 0.953*** 0.961*** 0.959*** 0.970

(3.14) (6.34) (5.95) (5.50) (4.04) (3.20) (3.05) (1.42)

Control variables Liquidity 0.479*** 0.879 0.907 0.901 0.855 0.932 0.891 0.853

(3.34) (1.10) (0.87) (0.86) (1.24) (0.52) (0.75) (1.12) Loan concentration 0.634 1.055 1.144 1.215* 1.206* 1.219* 1.183 1.344***

(1.64) (0.40) (1.19) (1.91) (1.89) (1.93) (1.53) (2.84) Cost inefficiency 0.815 1.090 1.143*** 1.154** 1.133* 1.303*** 1.149*** 1.084

(0.98) (1.35) (2.71) (2.50) (1.92) (5.79) (4.31) (1.64) ROA 0.944 0.997 1.012 1.04 1.054 1.128** 1.123* 0.996

(0.96) (0.06) (0.27) (0.67) (0.94) (2.06) (1.78) (0.08) Nonperforming loan 1.051 1.146*** 1.185*** 1.210*** 1.159*** 1.108** 1.055 1.018

(0.88) (3.54) (4.28) (5.04) (3.90) (2.47) (1.03) (0.48) Equity 0.026*** 0.146*** 0.297*** 0.422*** 0.465*** 0.469*** 0.458*** 0.606***

(14.44) (15.66) (10.21) (7.15) (6.19) (5.50) (4.55) (4.22) Log (Assets) 0.982 0.94 0.958 0.941 0.958 0.928 0.961 0.981

(0.15) (0.82) (0.58) (0.79) (0.53) (0.88) (0.42) (0.21) Log (Age) 1.191* 1.051 0.985 1.019 1.019 1.009 0.967 0.966

(1.68) (0.69) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.12) (0.39) (0.45) MBHC 1.035 0.91 0.89 0.826** 0.831** 0.669*** 0.748*** 0.760***

(0.29) (1.18) (1.48) (2.39) (2.52) (4.57) (3.26) (3.33) Brokered deposits 1.102* 1.126*** 1.148*** 1.147*** 1.113** 1.139*** 1.104** 1.074

(1.85) (3.29) (3.71) (3.45) (2.30) (2.78) (1.99) (1.47)

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Core deposits 0.883 0.945 0.911* 0.870*** 0.841*** 0.870*** 0.858*** 0.846***

(1.63) (1.07) (1.93) (2.86) (3.45) (2.76) (2.76) (3.16) Goodwill 2.788*** 1.601*** 1.353*** 1.358*** 1.335*** 1.544*** 1.520*** 1.353***

(6.10) (4.06) (2.80) (3.65) (3.62) (5.67) (4.74) (4.35) CRE loans 1.378** 1.062 1.046 1.066 1.078 1.100 1.092 1.073

(2.24) (0.72) (0.60) (0.84) (0.98) (1.13) (0.97) (0.85) C&D loans 1.350** 1.481*** 1.507*** 1.518*** 1.682*** 1.780*** 1.915*** 1.816***

(2.44) (5.11) (6.11) (6.57) (8.25) (8.40) (8.27) (8.69) Multifamily

mortgage 1.188*** 1.132*** 1.137*** 1.137*** 1.143*** 1.115*** 1.128*** 1.138***

(3.06) (4.18) (5.06) (5.26) (5.30) (3.84) (4.12) (4.74) Business loans 0.867 1.158* 1.135* 1.187** 1.223*** 1.215*** 1.243*** 1.196***

(0.74) (1.65) (1.73) (2.53) (3.27) (3.07) (3.24) (2.63) Income growth 0.621** 0.742* 0.945 0.803 0.845 1.090 0.974 1.039

(2.20) (1.67) (0.38) (1.43) (1.17) (0.61) (0.22) (0.37) Unemployment rate 1.013 1.284** 1.412*** 1.456*** 1.461*** 1.608*** 1.256** 1.137

(0.08) (2.11) (3.18) (3.19) (2.96) (3.44) (2.03) (1.24) Home price growth 0.964 0.802*** 0.765*** 0.742*** 0.757*** 0.706*** 0.690*** 0.714***

(0.21) (2.80) (3.71) (4.55) (4.40) (5.50) (6.62) (5.70)

Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Distressed dummy No No No No No No No No Pseudo R-square 0.690 0.44 0.321 0.264 0.244 0.217 0.224 0.205 Number of failed

banks 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255

Number of banks/ clusters

6797 6851 6930 6929 6925 6915 6996 6996

Observations 62,618 62,934 63,121 63,295 63,650 63,955 64,996 64,996

* Difference from 1.0 at the 10% level of significance. ** Difference from 1.0 at the 5% level of significance. *** Difference from 1.0 at the 1% level of significance.

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Table 5 Multi-period logit estimation of the probability of bank failure conditional on bank financial distress, Eq. (2), during quarters 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4. Right-hand side variables are observed two quarters ahead. The displayed estimates are odds ratios that correspond to one-standard deviation changes in the exogenous variables. Standard errors clustered at the bank level. t- Statistics are shown in parentheses. The values reported for (Distressed = 1) are the odds ratios associated with the variable in question for financially distressed banks.

Distressed method Equity Enforcement Z-Score Failure Probability [1] [2] [3] [4]

Test variables Stakeholder 0.983* 0.976*** 0.983 0.969***

(1.71) (2.81) (1.29) (2.71) Stakeholder distressed 1.021*** 1.030*** 1.015*** 1.055***

(3.87) (3.54) (4.04) (6.06) Stakeholder (Distressed = 1) 1.070*** 1.062*** 1.080*** 1.150***

(3.50) (2.70) (3.78) (5.57) Fee-for-service 0.959 0.973 0.958 0.929***

(1.49) (1.32) (1.18) (2.93) Fee-for-service distressed 1.007 0.998 1.006 1.027*

(0.40) (0.13) (0.28) (1.79) Fee-for-service (Distressed = 1) 0.957*** 0.956*** 0.955*** 0.959***

(6.48) (6.10) (7.03) (6.40) Traditional fee 1.046 1.058 1.051 0.817**

(0.34) (0.54) (0.27) (2.31) Traditional fee distressed 0.974 0.966 0.962 1.071**

(0.65) (0.81) (0.60) (2.07) Traditional fee (Distressed = 1) 0.937 0.943 0.922 1.030

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) Net interest 0.843 0.674*** 0.841 0.870

(0.81) (0.91) (0.67) (0.52) Net interest distressed 0.970 1.457*** 0.995 0.988

(0.16) (4.14) (0.02) (0.05) Net interest (Distressed = 1) 0.776*** 0.944 0.802** 0.824**

(3.06) (0.01) (2.44) (2.43)

Control variables Liquidity 0.750** 0.853 0.747** 0.897

(2.50) (1.33) (2.43) (0.97) Loan concentration 0.890 1.001 0.853 0.891

0.88 0.00 (1.19) (0.88) Cost inefficiency 1.046 1.038 1.026 1.099**

(0.95) (0.68) (0.58) (2.08) ROA 0.996 1.009 1.046 0.996

(0.10) (0.18) (1.25) (0.12) Nonperforming loan 1.026* 1.062* 1.026 1.083**

(1.67) (1.68) (0.79) (2.47) Equity 0.247*** 0.209*** 0.242*** 0.276***

(12.21) (12.97) (12.83) (11.04) Log (Assets) 0.983 0.939 0.995 0.924

(0.24) (0.87) (0.09) (1.16) Log (Age) 1.061 1.060 1.079 1.078

(0.92) (0.85) (1.24) (1.19) MBHC 0.995 0.994 0.975 0.999

(0.07) (0.08) (0.37) (0.02) Brokered deposits 1.078** 1.091** 1.070** 1.058*

(2.27) (2.47) (2.23) (1.67) Core deposits 0.945 0.955 0.946 0.964

(1.17) (0.90) (1.20) (0.76) Goodwill 1.566*** 1.448*** 1.551*** 1.540***

(4.81) (2.82) (4.49) (4.57) CRE loans 1.027 1.032 1.018 1.062

(0.34) (0.37) (0.22) (0.79) C&D loans 1.288*** 1.349*** 1.266*** 1.340***

(3.52) (4.08) (3.35) (4.19)

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Table 5 (continued)

Distressed method Equity Enforcement Z-Score Failure Probability [1] [2] [3] [4]

Multifamily mortgage 1.122*** 1.098*** 1.121*** 1.128***

(4.01) (3.27) (3.74) (4.22) Business loans 1.060 1.050 0.99 1.083

(0.64) (0.49) (0.11) (0.87) Income growth 0.722** 0.702** 0.707* 0.861

(1.80) (2.09) (1.90) (0.86) Unemployment rate 1.135 1.181 1.103 1.129

(1.17) (1.53) (0.90) (1.09) Home price growth 0.851** 0.869* 0.867* 0.880*

(2.14) (1.77) (1.96) (1.68) Distressed 2.034*** 1.511*** 2.275*** 2.142***

(3.14) (3.77) (3.04) (2.70)

Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo R-square 0.469 0.482 0.482 0.484 Number of failed banks 255 255 255 255 Number of banks/clusters 6851 6851 6851 6851 Number of observations 62,934 62,934 62,934 62,934

* Difference from 1.0 at the 10% levels of significance. ** Difference from 1.0 at the 5% levels of significance. *** Difference from 1.0 at the 1% levels of significance.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 413

6.1. Conditioning on distress

We now turn to our main model, Eq. (2), in which the marginal probabilities of bank failure are estimated conditional on bank distress. The results are displayed in Table 5. Each of the four columns correspond to the different methods for identifying financially distressed bank-quarters (Equity Rank- ing, Enforcement Action, Z-Score Ranking and Failure Probability). For these and all remaining logit estimations in the study, we use a two quarter-ahead event window (i.e., roughly 90–180 days after the end of quarter t). We have three reasons for this restriction. First, the final financial statements of a failed bank (i.e., those recorded within 90 days of failure) may be relatively inaccurate statements of financial condition. Second, these data are unlikely to be truly exogenous, as they may be influenced by the banks’ failing financial condition. And third, as stated earlier, our objective is to test whether and how nontraditional banking activities affected the risk of insolvency during the financial crisis, not to estimate a long-run bank failure prediction model.

The results are straightforward and relatively robust across the four columns. In this more flexible specification, we find that Stakeholder income helps stabilize healthy banks but makes distressed banks more fragile. For example, in column [1] a one-standard deviation increase in Stakeholder re- duces the chance of healthy bank failure by 1.7%, but increases the chance of distressed bank failure by 7.0% (where the reported value 1.070 is the odds ratio associated with a one-standard deviation increase in Stakeholder while holding Distressed = 1).14 In contrast, a one-standard deviation increase in Fee-for-Service income reduced by about 4% the chance that a distressed bank would fail, but had little affect on healthy banks. For the traditional banking activities, Net Interest income tended to reduce the probability of distressed bank failure by substantial amounts—a one-standard deviation increase reduced the chance of distressed bank failure by as much as 22%—while Traditional Fee income was statistically unrelated to the probability of bank failure.15

These initial estimates establish three important findings. First, there is no support for H1 that either Stakeholder or Fee-for-Service income contribute to healthy bank failure. However, we find

14 For an illustration, see ‘‘Logistic regression with an interaction term of two predictor variables’’ in Introduction to SAS (2012). 15 We re-estimated the models in Table 5 using alternative definitions of Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service. In one version we

reassigned Investment Banking income from Stakeholder to Fee-for-Service; in another version we reassigned Securitization income from Stakeholder to Fee-for-Service. In both cases, the results for Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service were robust. These re- definitions recognize the fact that investment banking and securitization activities share attributes of both categories.

414 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

strong statistical evidence consistent with H2 that Stakeholder income contributes to distressed bank failure. Hence, nontraditional banking activities do not appear to increase insolvency risk for banks per se; rather, this depends more on the types of nontraditional business in which the bank engages and the financial condition of the bank engaging in those activities.16

Second, the probability of bank failure is related in sensible ways to the characteristic differences across the four types of bank income that we specify in the model. Net interest income is the most traditional source of bank income and it generates the lion’s share of total income at the banks in our data; it is no surprise that the probability of failure declines substantially with increases in this income source. Traditional Fee income is comprised predominantly of service charges paid by core depositors, a source of income that is relatively stable (e.g., DeYoung and Roland, 2001) and unrelated to the credit risk and business cycle risk typically associated with bank failure. Stakeholder income requires banks to take ownership in assets; when banks are healthy (i.e., their assets are performing well) increased income from these investments reduces insolvency risk, but when banks are dis- tressed (i.e., their assets are performing poorly) this type of income is associated with higher insol- vency risk. Fee-for-Service income does not require banks to take ownership of assets, so increased income from these activities—similar to the effects of increased Net Interest income—helps distressed banks back away from the brink.17

Third, the failure-enhancing impact of Stakeholder activities is economically meaningful. The esti- mated odds ratio for Nonperforming Loans—the most commonplace catalyst for bank financial distress and failure—provides a natural quantitative benchmark for judging economic magnitudes. Across the four columns in Table 5, a one-standard deviation increase in Nonperforming Loans heightens the chance of failure at healthy banks by 2.0–8.3%. In comparison, the marginal impact of Stakeholder on the probability of distressed bank failure is clearly material, ranging from 6.2% to 15.0%.18

We further explore the failure-increasing effect of Stakeholder income at distressed banks by esti- mating an abridged form of Eq. (2) for a subsample that includes only distressed banks:

16 In p became

17 In u $1 billio

18 We associat

Pr½Dis ¼ 1jZ;Distressedit ¼ 1� ¼ ^½Stakeholderit; Fee-for-Serviceit ;Traditional Feeit;

Net Interestit ;Bank Controlsit ;Macro Controlsit ;Timet ; /� þ eis ð200Þ

where D�is is the unobserved propensity of bank i, observed to be financially distressed at time t, to fail sometime during time period s. Partial results are displayed in Table 6, and are robust in terms of coef- ficient signs, significance and magnitudes.

6.2. Inferring banks’ preferences for risk

As discussed above, empirical studies of bank failure have repeatedly linked certain bank charac- teristics with the probability of failure: poor loan quality, aggressively high levels of loans-to-assets, a lack of loan portfolio diversification, heavy concentrations of commercial and development (C&D) loans, reliance on non-core deposits to fund loan growth, etc. Banks with these characteristics are likely to have a greater preference or tolerance for risk, ceteris paribus. In Table 7 we show that these failure-increasing characteristics are more pronounced for distressed banks than for healthy banks (row 1) and are also more pronounced for Stakeholder banks (bank-quarter observations with non- zero values for Stakeholder) than for non-Stakeholder banks (row 2).

One implication of these data is that industry deregulation—which gave banks access to Stake- holder activities—was not a sufficient condition for banks’ expansion into Stakeholder activities. Rather, deregulation merely made access to additional risk-taking opportunities possible, and banks with higher preferences for risk-taking were more likely to exploit these opportunities. In other words,

revious versions of this study, we tested whether nontraditional activities increased the probability that healthy banks financially distressed, but found no evidence of this. Results are available upon request. nreported subsample tests, we find that this Fee-for-Service result is especially strong for large healthy banks (assets over n) and small distressed banks. Results are available upon request. find even larger economic effects in subsample tests for large distressed banks (asset over $1 billion), where the odds ratios ed with Stakeholder range from 10% to 27%. Results are available upon request.

Table 6 Multi-period logit estimation of the probability that a distressed bank fails, model (200), during the quarters 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4. Estimation based on a subsample that includes only distressed banks. Control variables are present in the model but are not reported here. Right-hand side variables are observed two quarters ahead. The displayed estimates are odds ratios that correspond to one-standard deviation changes in the exogenous variables. Standard errors clustered at the bank level. t-Statistics are shown in parentheses.

Distressed method Equity Enforcement Z-Score Failure Probability [1] [2] [3] [4]

Stakeholder 1.049*** 1.070*** 1.049*** 1.176***

(2.72) (2.91) (4.07) (4.82) Fee-for-service 0.928*** 0.936*** 0.929*** 0.932***

(6.52) (6.89) (6.87) (6.05) Traditional fee 0.923 0.928 0.895 0.977

(0.83) (1.16) (0.94) (0.23) Net interest 0.772*** 0.815*** 0.777*** 0.805***

(3.50) (2.71) (2.98) (3.13)

Control variables and time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo R-square 0.237 0.254 0.228 0.237 Number of failed banks 229 227 235 235 Number of banks/clusters 1263 1191 1160 1862 Number of observations 4200 5612 4203 4209

� Difference from 1.0 at the 10% levels of significance. �� Difference from 1.0 at the 5% levels of significance. *** Difference from 1.0 at the 1% levels of significance.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 415

banks that sought out higher-than-average levels of risk engaged in riskier mixes of both traditional (e.g., C&D loans, Brokered Deposits) and nontraditional (e.g., Stakeholder) banking activities.

It is also possible that high-risk banks increased their Stakeholder income in response to bad ex post risk-taking outcomes. For example, upon becoming financial distressed, banks may have decided to sell off trading assets (thus generating Stakeholder income); doing so would reduce the need for equi- ty capital by shrinking assets and would actually increase equity capital if the sale allowed the bank to book capital gains. Alternatively, upon becoming distressed, banks may have gambled for resurrection by engaging in high-risk Stakeholder activities. In either case, the resulting increased in Stakeholder income would be endogenous to the probability of failure.

6.3. Endogenous Stakeholder income

To address the potential endogeneity of Stakeholder at distressed banks, we repeat the Table 6 esti- mations after making one change: we replace the contemporaneous value of Stakeholder with a 16- quarter lag of Stakeholder. Although treating endogeneity by using lagged values is not a preferred practice, in this case 4-year lagged Stakeholder values give us exactly what we want: a measure of bank-specific Stakeholder activity uninfluenced by the wave of distress brought on by the financial cri- sis (see Fig. 1). The results, displayed in Table 8, show that our main results continue to hold. A one- standard deviation increase in Stakeholder at a distressed bank is associated with a 6–8% increase in the probability that the bank will fail, and both Fee-for-Service and Net Interest remain statistically and economically associated with reductions in the probability of distressed bank failure.

We investigate further by testing whether Stakeholder income increases when equity capital de- clines at financially distressed banks. We use the following difference-in-difference approach:

%DStakeholderi;t ¼ b0 þ b1 � Distressedi;t�1 þ b2 � Equity Declinei;t�1 þ b3 � Distressedi;t�1

� Equity Declinei;t�1 þ ei;t ð3Þ

where %DStakeholder is the quarterly change in Stakeholder income, Distressed is a dummy equal to one for banks that are financially distressed, and Equity Decline is a dummy equal to one for banks experiencing declines in equity capital. We estimate Eq. (3) using a panel of bank-quarter data for banks with non-zero Stakeholder income. Because Stakeholder transactions occur intermittently over

Table 7 Difference in means tests for the full sample of banks and for the healthy banks and distressed bank subsamples. Tests based on 62,934 quarterly observations of 6851 commercial banks over 2008:Q1–2010:Q2. Distressed banks are identified using the Equity Ranking approach. Stakeholder banks are defined as bank-quarter observations in which Stakeholder is non-zero.

C&D Loans to Assets

C&D Loan Chargeoffs to Assets

All other Loan Chargeoffs to Assets

Loans to Assets

Loan Concentration (HHI)

Brokered Deposits to Assets

1. Whole Sample Distressed banks 0.1414 0.0028 0.0030 0.7197 0.7262 0.0916 Healthy banks 0.0645 0.0003 0.0008 0.6623 0.5808 0.0344 Difference 0.0769*** 0.0025*** 0.0022*** 0.0574*** 0.1454*** 0.0572***

2. Whole Sample Stakeholder banks 0.0736 0.0006 0.0010 0.6775 0.5997 0.0420 Non-Stakeholder banks 0.0689 0.0005 0.0010 0.6640 0.5887 0.0375 Difference 0.0047*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0135*** 0.0110*** 0.0045***

� Statistically significant difference in the means of variables at the and 10% levels. �� Statistically significant difference in the means of variables at the 5% levels. *** Statistically significant difference in the means of variables at the 1% levels.

416 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

time for the typical bank in our sample (e.g., exiting a venture capital investment, taking a client pub- lic), the variable %DStakeholder is quite noisy; we address this by aggregating Stakeholder income across two quarters of data before calculating its percent change. For comparison, we also estimate (3) using %DFee-for-Servicet as the dependent variable.

The results are reported in Table 9. In columns 1 and 2 (where we calculate %DStakeholdert using data from quarter t � 2 through quarter t), negative equity shocks are associated with reductions in Stakeholder income at healthy banks but not at distressed banks (b2 + b3 = 0). In columns 3 and 4 (where we calculate %DStakeholdert using data from quarter t � 1 through quarter t + 1), negative equity shocks are associated with reductions in Stakeholder income at distressed banks (b2 + b3 < 0) but not at healthy banks. Thus, while healthy banks appear to react more quickly than distressed banks, both experience reductions in Stakeholder income after equity capital shocks. We find no similar changes in Fee-for-Service income at healthy or distressed banks in columns 5 through 8.

The most likely channel through which these post-equity shock reductions in Stakeholder occur is trading activities. Trading is by definition a short-run activity, as opposed to the other components of Stakeholder (venture capital, insurance underwriting, securitization and investment banking) that re- quire long-term investments and/or bank–client relationships that generate repeated transactions. In- deed, Fig. 2 shows that the ratio of trading assets-to-total assets declines markedly as banks approach failure, direct evidence that distressed banks engage in asset sales as their financial condition deteri- orates.19 Note that these data are inconsistent with gambling for resurrection, which if anything would require a short-run increase in trading assets.

6.4. Disaggregating by line of business

To test whether some of the individual lines of business within Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service are more responsible than others for our findings, we re-specify our main model, replacing the aggregate Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service variables with their component parts. Partial results of these estima- tions are displayed in Table 10. (We use the Equity Ranking method to define Distressed throughout Table 10; results are robust to using the other three methods.) Because the Trading and Securitization measures contain the net results of capital gains and losses (and hence may misrepresent the volume of ongoing activity in these areas), we replace them in the even-numbered columns with asset-based

19 We cannot similarly investigate the sale of assets related to other Stakeholder activities, such as venture capital, investment banking, or insurance underwriting, because banks are not required to report those assets separately in the call reports.

Table 8 Controlling for endogenous Stakeholder income. Multi-period logit estimation of the probability that a distressed bank fails, Eq. (200), during quarters 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4. Stakeholder is lagged 16 quarters. Estimation based on a subsample that includes only distressed banks. Control variables are present in the model but are not reported here. Right-hand side variables are observed two quarters ahead. The displayed estimates are odds ratios that correspond to one-standard deviation changes in the exogenous variables. Standard errors clustered at the bank level. t-Statistics are shown in parentheses.

Distressed method Equity Enforcement Z-Score Failure Probability [1] [2] [3] [4]

Stakeholder (lagged 16 quarters) 1.071** 1.079* 1.069** 1.063 (2.37) (1.69) (1.96) (1.05)

Fee-for-Service 0.929*** 0.938*** 0.929*** 0.933***

(6.01) (6.04) (6.22) (6.23) Traditional Fee 0.949 0.932 0.937 0.997

(0.55) (1.25) (0.66) (0.04) Net Interest 0.809*** 0.852* 0.815** 0.854*

(2.59) (1.96) (2.22) (1.96)

Control variables and time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo-R square 0.245 0.255 0.224 0.246 Number of failed banks 229 227 235 235 Number of banks/clusters 1199 1119 1001 1736 Observations 3898 5164 3618 3854

* Difference from 1.0 at the 10% levels of significance. ** Difference from 1.0 at the 5% levels of significance. *** Difference from 1.0 at the 1% levels of significance.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 417

measures. Trading is replaced by trading assets, while Securitization is replaced by assets securitized for which the bank still has recourse exposure.20

This disaggregation shows that our previous results for Stakeholder have been driven mainly by in- come from Insurance Underwriting and Investment Banking. For healthy banks, a one-standard devi- ation increase in Insurance Underwriting (Investment Banking) income is associated with about a 3% (16%) reduction in the probability of failure. For distressed banks, a one-standard deviation increase in Insurance Underwriting (Investment Banking) income is associated with about a 7–10% (4%) increase in the probability of failure. Although Venture Capital income is positively related to the chance of fail- ure for both healthy and distressed banks, we note that only a small portion of the banks in our data participate in this activity (see Table 2).

Loan Servicing income appears to be driving our previous results linking Fee-for-Service income to reduced failure probabilities for distressed banks. Because home mortgage-related losses were a key feature of bank distress during the financial crisis, income from retained mortgage servicing rights may have served as a hedge that staved off failure at some of these banks. In contrast, both Insurance Sales and Brokerage activities reduce the probability of healthy bank failure. Because these are pure commission businesses that do not expose the bank (directly) to credit risk, interest rate risk or market risk, income from these activities may yield failure-reducing diversification benefits when paired with banks’ traditional intermediation activities.

7. Conclusion and policy implications

The ongoing process of financial disintermediation has made U.S. commercial banks more reliant on fee-based activities, and there is a near consensus among bank researchers that the revenues from these activities tend to be more volatile than revenues from traditional interest-based banking busi- ness. It is natural, then, to ask whether fee-based banking activities played a significant role in the hundreds of commercial bank failures that occurred during the financial crisis.

On-the-one-hand, we find that noninterest income from Stakeholder activities such as investment banking, insurance underwriting and venture capital increased the probability of bank failure—though

20 While the income-based Venture Capital variable suffers from similar problems, the call reports do not contain any suitable asset-based replacement for this activity.

Table 9 Difference-in-difference estimations of Eq. (3), for banks with positive amounts of Stakeholder (columns 1 through 4) or F -for-Service [columns 5 through 8). The regression equation is:

%DStakeholdert ¼ b0 þ b1 � Distressedt�1 þ b2 � Equity Declinet�1 þ b3 � Distressedt�1 � Equity Declinet�1 þ et :

In columns 1 and 2, %DStakeholdert is calculated as (Rt�1,tStakeholder � Rt�2,t�1Stakeholder)/Rt�2,t�1Stakeholder. In lumns 3 and 4, %DStakeholdert is calculated as (Rt,t+1Stake- Rt,t+1Stakeholder � Rt�1,tStakeholder)/Rt�1,tStakeholder. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Dependent variable: %DStakeholdert %DFee-for-Servicet

%D in the dependent variable calculated over quarters: (t � 2, t) (t � 2, t) (t � 1, t + 1) (t � 1, t + 1 (t � 2, t) (t � 2, t) (t � 1, t + 1) (t � 1, t + 1) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Intercept 0.3432 0.4384*** 0.3298 0.3745** 0.0351 0.0602 0.1274*** 0.1690***

(0.1447) (0.1391) (0.1502) (0.1457) (0.0491) (0.4110) (0.0405) (0.0463) Distressedt�1 �0.4233* �0.6496** 0.2119 0.7015 �0.2467 �0.3448** �0.0593 �0.1082

(0.2327) (0.3096) (0.2666) (0.5305) (0.1910) (0.1675) (0.2193) (0.2309) Equity Declinet�1 �0.3240*** �0.4202*** �0.1234 �0.1794 0.0210 �0.0045 �0.0645 �0.0816

(0.1171) (0.1320) (0.1341) (0.1604) (0.0475) (0.0430) (0.0499) (0.0668) Distressedt�1

* Equity Declinet�1 0.4454* 0.6306** �0.2243 �0.4538 0.4030 0.3662 �0.0034 0.0124 (0.2532) (0.2883) (0.2401) (0.3853) (0.2625) (0.2472) (0.2309) (0.2137)

Bank fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes b1 + b3 > 0 0.0220 �0.0190 �0.0124 0.2477 0.1563 0.0214 �0.0627 �0.0959

(0.1079) (0.1535) (0.1145) (0.2717) (0.1856) (0.1506) (0.0743) (0.1684) b2 + b3 > 0 0.1213 0.2104 �0.3477* �0.6332* 0.4240 0.3616 �0.0679 0.0693

(0.2223) (0.2553) (0.2098) (0.3814) (0.2594) (0.2464) (0.2274) (0.2055)

Number of banks 963 963 969 969 4467 4467 4442 4442 Observations 5333 5333 5247 5247 30,127 30,127 30,139 30,139

* Significance level at 10%. ** Significance level at 5%. *** Significance level at 1%.

418 R

.D eYoung,G

.Torna /J.Finan.Interm

ediation 22

(2013) 397–

421

ee

co

)

0.000

0.005

0.010

0.015

0.020

0.025

024681012

Quarters until failure

Fig. 2. Ratio of trading assets-to-total assets as banks approaching failure. data for ‘trading banks’ that had non-zero trading income during the sample period and in the quarters leading up to failure.

Table 10 Multi-period logit estimation of the probability that a distressed bank fails, model (2), during quarters 2008:Q3 through 2010:Q4. Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service variables are disaggregated into their underlying income components. The Distressed dummy is defined using the Equity Ranking method. Control variables are present in the model by not reported here. The displayed estimates are odds ratios that correspond to one-standard deviation changes in the exogenous variables, alternately, for financially healthy or financially distressed banks. Right-hand side variables are observed two quarters ahead. The displayed estimates are odds ratios, not raw logit coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the bank level. t-Statistics are shown in parentheses.

[1] [2] [1] [2]

Components of Stakeholder Components of Fee-for-Service Insurance underwriting (Distressed = 0) 0.963*** 0.968*** Brokerage (Distressed = 0) 0.645*** 0.688***

(3.30) (2.91) (6.33) (4.77) Insurance underwriting (Distressed = 1) 1.069*** 1.110*** Brokerage (Distressed = 1) 1.057 1.085

(2.68) (3.43) (0.91) (1.22) Investment banking (Distressed = 0) 0.836*** 0.842*** Insurance Sales

(Distressed = 0) 0.667*** 0.652***

(6.49) (6.37) (5.49) (7.79) Investment banking (Distressed = 1) 1.038*** 1.039** Insurance Sales

(Distressed = 1) 0.981 0.976

(2.77) (2.39) (0.24) (0.26) Securitization (Distressed = 0) 1.025 1.03 Loan Servicing

(Distressed = 0) 0.973 0.986

(0.86) (1.60) (0.91) (0.29) Securitization (Distressed = 1) 0.965 1.245*** Loan Servicing

(Distressed = 1) 0.962*** 0.976***

(1.45) (3.27) (7.37) (0.35) Trading (Distressed = 0) 1.041** 0.719

(2.35) (1.05) Trading (Distressed = 1) 1.482 1.202

(1.45) (0.52) Venture capital (Distressed = 0) 1.022** 1.023**

(1.96) (2.06) Venture capital (Distressed = 0) 1.154*** 1.162***

(7.11) (10.04)

Replace trading with asset-based measure No Yes Replace securitization with asset-based

measure No Yes

Distress method Equity Equity Control variables and time dummies Yes Yes Pseudo R-square 0.469 0.480 Number of failed banks 255 255 Number of banks/clusters 6851 6851 Observations 62,934 62,934

� Difference from 1.0 at the 10% levels of significance. ** Difference from 1.0 at the 5% levels of significance. *** Difference from 1.0 at the 1% levels of significance.

R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421 419

420 R. DeYoung, G. Torna / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 397–421

only if the bank was already suffering from financial distress. On-the-other-hand, we find that Fee-for- Service income from nontraditional activities such as insurance sales, loan servicing and securities brokerage actually reduced the probability that banks failed during the crisis. These disparate results are indicative of the fundamentally different production and risk characteristics of these two sets of activities. For example, Stakeholder activities expose banks to market risk, because they require banks to take positions in assets that can gain or lose value with movements in market prices. This places equity capital directly at risk, similar to the risk of loan defaults but without the offsetting stream of income from loan interest. In contrast, Fee-for-Service activities expose banks to business risk, as market demand for these services can vary with competition from rival financial institutions, substi- tute products, and macro-economic conditions. This places equity at risk only if sales revenues from these lines of business do not cover the associated fixed costs of operation.

Because we estimated our models using short windows in time during the financial crisis, we can- not claim that variables like Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service will improve the performance of multi- year early warning models. However, our findings may be informative for bank supervision in other ways. First, we show that banks engaging in risk-enhancing Stakeholder activities also tend to engage in above-average levels of risk in their main deposit-and-loan intermediation businesses. Second, knowing that the probability of distressed bank failure increases with Stakeholder income but de- creases with Fee-for-Service income may be useful for implementing supervisory prompt corrective action (PCA) at troubled banks.

Our findings have two broad implications research on commercial banks. First, given our findings that different sources of noninterest income have non-uniform effects on bank failure, researchers building models of bank financial performance should whenever possible disaggregate noninterest in- come into categories such as Traditional Fee, Stakeholder and Fee-for-Service. Second, given our find- ings that risk-taking tends to express itself simultaneously in both traditional and nontraditional banking activities, bank financial performance models should look beyond product mix and attempt to assess the risk preferences of bank managers (DeYoung et al., forthcoming).

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the Journal Editor Phil Strahan, two anonymous referees, and John O’Keefe for their helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at the Financial Management Association, the Southern Finance Association, and the University of Kansas.

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Statist. 82, 127–138.

  • Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Literature review
    • 3 Main hypotheses
    • 4 Data
      • 4.1 Identifying financially distressed banks
      • 4.2 Income from nontraditional activities
      • 4.3 Comparing healthy banks to distressed banks
    • 5 Bank failure probability model
    • 6 Results
      • 6.1 Conditioning on distress
      • 6.2 Inferring banks’ preferences for risk
      • 6.3 Endogenous Stakeholder income
      • 6.4 Disaggregating by line of business
    • 7 Conclusion and policy implications
    • Acknowledgments
    • References

1-s2.0-S1058330003000661-main.pdf

www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase

Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177

Deposit insurance and specialization in commercial bank lending

James R. Bootha, Lena Chua Boothb,*

aDepartment of Finance, College of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA bDepartment of World Business, Thunderbird, American Graduate School of International Management,

15249 N. 59th Avenue, Glendale, AZ 85306, USA

Received 1 February 2003; received in revised form 20 June 2003; accepted 9 September 2003

Abstract

Recent literature focuses on liquidity provision as a unique service provided by financial intermediaries. In this

paper, we address why commercial banks dominate the provision of these services. Liquidity provision in lending

is reflected in offering loan commitments. We argue that commercial banks have a unique advantage in providing

this form of liquidity. This unique advantage derives from their access to deposit insurance, and perhaps to a lesser

degree, their access to the discount window of the Federal Reserve System. We empirically examine business loans

offered by commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies. We show that commercial banks have a

comparative advantage in offering loan commitments with fixed-formula floating interest rates. Other major

financial intermediaries such as investment banks favor bridge loans for corporate restructuring, and insurance

companies favor longer term fixed interest rate spot loans. These results are consistent with commercial banks’

unique corporate lending role (that of liquidity provision) deriving from their access to fixed-price deposit

insurance.

D 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

JEL classification: G21

Keywords: Deposit insurance; Commercial bank lending; Loan characteristics; Loan commitments

1. Introduction

Traditionally, a commercial bank is defined as an institution that simultaneously engages in two

activities: deposit taking and commercial lending. However, in recent years, many insurance companies

and investment banks also make commercial loans and collect deposits. This has again led to debates on

1058-3300/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2003.09.006

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-602-978-7418.

E-mail address: [email protected] (L.C. Booth).

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177166

what is unique about commercial banks versus other financial intermediaries. The differences in services

provided by banks and other financial intermediaries are important for policy debates on bank regulation

and the role of banks in monetary policy. In this paper, we argue that the bundle of liquidity services

(loan commitments and demandable deposits) that commercial banks offer make them unique, and that

access to deposit insurance assures them a comparative advantage in providing these activities.

A number of studies have focused on the environment that might motivate a combination of deposit

services and lending activities within a single intermediary.1 A recent paper by Kashyap, Rajan, and

Stein (2002) provides a convincing economic rationale for combining the provision of liquidity services

related to lending and deposit taking in a single intermediary. What they do not address is why these

services should be housed in a commercial bank. In this paper, we provide a complementary explanation

for the merging of these two services in one intermediary and why this intermediary should be a

commercial bank. Our focus is quite different though complementary to the synergies described by

Kashyap et al. In their model, synergies arise naturally because shocks to liquidity from the lending and

deposit sides of the balance sheet are not perfectly correlated. The intermediary can economize on the

amount of assets they hold for liquidity purposes, and as a result, lower the cost of providing these

services.

To focus on the unique aspects of commercial banks, we consider the type of lending that financial

intermediaries undertake. We argue that the lending product that distinguishes commercial banks from

other intermediaries such as investment banks and insurance companies is loan commitment or credit

lines (we use the two terms interchangeably thereafter). The loan commitment contract is the primary

instrument most commercial banks offer in their corporate lending (see Avery & Berger, 1991). The

central feature of a loan commitment is that the borrower has the option to draw down and repay the loan

at any time during the life of the contract. In our analysis, we note that virtually all loan commitments

have a fixed price component at the time the loan is made. This component is usually in the form of fixed

default spread relative to a floating index (prime or LIBOR).2 This desirable feature (from the borrower’s

perspective) often leads to potential adverse selection problem for the bank offering the contract. In a

period of volatile interest rates, commercial banks will likely face an increase in the proportion of high-

risk borrowers choosing to draw down the loans. This means that borrowing under this kind of

agreements may take on a nonrandom pattern. This adverse selection risk associated with offering loan

commitments is very unattractive from the bankers’ perspective. It is exactly this type of risk, we argue,

that fixed-price deposit insurance can reduce. The deposit insurance is serving as a hedge against some

of the risks associated with contracts with less than complete contingent pricing. For commercial banks,

the adverse selection costs are partially offset by the inefficient deposit insurance pricing schedule

offered by the FDIC. Since only commercial banks have access to deposit insurance, they have an

advantage in this type of lending relative to other types of financial intermediaries. They also have an

additional advantage in offering loan commitments because of their access to the discount window at the

Federal Reserve.

The analysis thus far suggests an important prediction about financial intermediaries’ lending patterns.

While we expect to see all major intermediaries providing funds to businesses, we should see

1 These include Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001), Flannery (1994), and Qi (1998) among others. 2 This argument however ignores that commercial finance companies also specialize in lending through loan commitments

(see Carey, Post, & Sharpe, 1998). The findings of their study suggest that regulation on risk taking imposed on insured

commercial banks may leave open a segment of the high-risk loan commitment market for commercial finance companies.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 167

commercial banks doing more commitment-based lending since this will be a complementary activity to

the issuance of insured deposits. We also expect to find commercial banks lending to smaller borrowers

on an unsecured basis where the adverse selection problems are likely to be more severe. Lending by

other intermediaries is influenced by their liability structure and their complementary activities. We look

to see if the lending pattern of other financial intermediaries is related to synergies associated with their

other activities. For example, insurance companies sell life insurance liabilities that provide them with a

long-term source of financing at a relatively fixed cost. (historically, commercial banks have been

precluded from offering these liabilities.) Thus, we expect to see life insurance companies having the

advantage in lending long term and on a fixed-rate basis. Alternatively, investment banks have expertise

in capital raising and corporate restructuring. Thus, loans for these purposes are expected to represent a

greater fraction of lending by investment banks.

Using a sample of large corporate loans filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),

we examine the pattern of lending by each type of financial intermediary during the sample period. We

confirm that commercial banks have an overall advantage in lending to businesses. We also find,

consistent with model predictions, that commercial banks have additional advantage in lending via loan

commitments, holding other features constant. We find that long-term fixed-rate loans are more likely to

be originated by insurance companies. We also find that lending done by investment banks is more often

associated with bridge loans and leverage buyouts (LBOs), both shorter maturity loans.

Overall, the results of the empirical analysis indicate that financial intermediaries specialize in their

lending activities, even though there is no artificial restriction that limits what they can do and whom

they can lend to. Evidence shows that commercial banks dominate lending via loan commitments, a

traditional form of liquidity provision to corporation. This evidence is consistent with commercial banks

having access to deposit insurance and Federal Reserve discount window that provide them with a

competitive advantage in this form of lending.

The remainder of the paper is presented in four sections. In Section 2, we examine the adverse

selection aspects of loan commitments and how deposit insurance can partially offset the relative funding

cost of commercial banks. This is followed by a description of corporate lending by financial

intermediaries and an analysis of how fixed-price deposit insurance benefits commercial banks when

they design contract terms. In Section 3, we present sample data and results of empirical examination of

lending specialization. A summary and implications of the analysis conclude the paper.

2. Loan commitments and deposit insurance

Although there are various loan contracts through which financial intermediaries lend to businesses,

certain lending arrangements dominate. Most corporate loans made by commercial banks derive from

commitments to lend. Generally, these are in the form of revolving credit agreements and lines of credit.

They usually specify a time within which the firm may draw down and repay the loan up to a

prespecified total dollar amount. Commercial banks also lend under traditional loan contracts funded

immediately and amortized over the life of the loan or a balloon payment at maturity. Common forms of

these loans are term loans, bridge loans, and bank notes.

Several studies address moral hazard and adverse selection consequences of fixed-formula floating

rate loan agreements. James (1982) and Melnik and Plaut (1986) address the additive spread formula and

show that the real value of the default risk premium declines with increases in interest rates. Riskier

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177168

borrowers experience the greatest decline in the real default risk premium and therefore have added

incentive to exercise the commitment even when their own risk does not change. This results in banks

facing adverse selection in borrowers taking down the loan under previously committed terms. The

average default risk of borrowers choosing to take down the loan will be higher than the average default

risk of firms with loan commitments with the bank. Thus, as interest rates increase, commitment

purchasers will choose to takedown loans that are most mispriced. James (1982) provides evidence that

the rate of takedown under loan commitments is a positive function of the level of interest rates.3

To illustrate this problem, the real risk premium is analyzed under an index plus (minus) a fixed

spread. It is assumed the borrower pays 1 + rt +m for every dollar borrowed at time t, with rt representing

the index used in the loan and the intermediary’s opportunity cost and m is the nominal default premium

(discount). Defining Rt a as the real default risk markup, 1 +Rt

a= 1 +m/(1 + rt). The sensitivity of the real

premium to the index rate is:

BRt a=Brt ¼ �m=ð1þ rtÞ2 < 0: ð1Þ

Thus, the real default risk premium falls whenever the index rate increases and vice versa. This creates

an adverse selection problem associated with offering fixed default premiums with borrower-determined

quantity features.

While access to deposit insurance does not resolve the adverse selection problem associated with less

than complete indexing, it does provide commercial banks with two advantages relative to other

financial intermediaries in offering this type of contract. The first is related to the issue of liquidity.

Commercial banks have greater access to liquid funds because of the presence of deposit insurance and

their potential borrowing from the discount window. Since the riskiness of their loan portfolio increases

with an increase in interest rates, banks can avoid credit (or deposit) rationing even when the market

recognizes the increased riskiness in their loan portfolio. The second advantage banks have involves the

pricing of deposit insurance. Since deposit insurance premiums are fixed in nominal terms, this serves to

partially mitigate the indexing problem by providing a partial hedge for commercial banks. Thus, in high

interest rate periods, the value of fixed-price deposit insurance increases as the real value of the deposit

insurance premium falls.

To illustrate the benefit of fixed-price (nominal) deposit insurance, let the cost of funds for the

commercial bank be rt b. This cost of funds rt

b = rT + ID +Mb where rT equals the risk-free rate, ID is the

fixed nominal price deposit insurance, and Mb is the commercial bank’s default risk premium on insured

deposits. Mb is expected to be less if no deposit insurance is present. Also, assume the index used for

loan agreements by the bank is rt and initially rt = rt b. As the level of interest rate increases, the banks’

cost of funds increases through rT and Mb, but not ID. Assuming the loan index, rt, reflects changes in

credit market conditions, then as rates (including default premiums) increase, rt will increase faster than

rt b; thus,

Brt b

Brt ¼ BðrT þ ID þMbÞ

Brt < 1: ð2Þ

3 Melnik and Plaut (1986) show that this cost to the bank may be hedged if the bank is short on fixed nominal interest rate

contracts.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 169

This means that the banks’ cost of funds with deposit insurance will be less sensitive to changes in

market conditions than cost without deposit insurance. Additionally, Mb may be less interest sensitive

because of deposit insurance. When general market interest rates rise, the increased value of deposit

insurance is hedged against the decline in the real value of the risk premium on loans.

The analysis indicates that commercial banks will have a comparative advantage in offering the fixed-

formula loan commitment contracts. James (1982) shows that the decline in the real value of the default

risk premium is most severe in borrower-determined quantity contracts, such as revolving credit

agreements. The commercial bank also faces an adverse-selection problem because the real value of

risk premiums declines faster (in percentage terms) for higher risk borrowers, thus creating an adverse

selection problem in the take down of previously negotiated loan contracts.

From the above analysis, we can develop empirical predictions about the types of lending activities

that commercial banks have a comparative advantage in providing versus those that other financial

intermediaries are more likely to provide. The dimensions of commercial banks’ advantages may be

reflected in characteristics of the loans they offer such as type of contract, maturity, pricing, and use of

proceeds.

From the model, we expect that the use of the loan commitment contract will be most important to the

commercial banks. Thus, a prediction for our empirical analysis is that when we examine a corporate

borrowing using loan commitment, we expect the financing to be provided by a commercial bank, all

else equal. Since the adverse selection aspects of loan commitments will likely increase with the maturity

of the commitments, we expect the dominance of loan commitment contracts by commercial banks to

increase with the maturity of the loans.

Since commercial banks historically have been restricted with regard to offering insurance contracts, a

source of long-term fixed-rate liability, we expect this limits their willingness to offer fixed-rate loans.

Thus, the empirical prediction from our analysis is that if the financing is on a fixed-rate basis, we expect

higher likelihood of it being offered by an insurance company.

The last financing characteristic we consider is the purpose of the loans. Loans used to finance normal

business operations are more likely to be offered by commercial banks and insurance companies.

Commercial banks are more likely to dominate commitment to lend while insurance companies are more

likely to dominate long-term fixed-rate financing. Since investment banks do not specialize in

monitoring borrowers, we expect that they only become lenders in activities incidental to capital raising

services they provide. The reason is that they do not generally have access to deposit insurance or long-

term capital associated with offering life insurance contracts. However, if investment banks offer bridge

loans that will be repaid through a security issuance or through coordinating an LBO transaction, they

are offering loans that represent cross selling of their traditional services. Thus, loans that facilitate a tie-

in to restructuring are more likely to be offered by investment banks than by commercial banks or

insurance companies.

The fixed-price deposit insurance provides commercial banks with a comparative advantage in

commitment-based lending. Specifically, commercial banks find it comparatively less costly to offer

contracts in which the borrower has a timing option to takedown the loan. As the value of the timing

option increases, the value of the partial hedge provided by deposit insurance also increases. Thus, while

nonbank financial institutions may not be totally shut of from offering lines of credit and revolving credit

agreements, commercial banks with access to deposit insurance tend to dominate this kind of lending.

Other financial intermediaries are expected to offer these agreements only with a very short-term

duration.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177170

From the discussion presented above, we expect to see lending specialization reflecting the

comparative advantages of the various financial intermediaries. In the next section, we examine a

sample of large corporate loans offered by commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance

companies.4 The sample consists of loans where competition is likely to be the greatest between the

various types of financial intermediaries. Insurance companies and investment banks rarely compete in

small business lending. Insurance companies typically lend in larger amounts than do commercial banks.

Investment banks typically deal with firms in or approaching the public capital markets, in other words,

large national firms. Thus, we focus on borrowers who are large enough to have access to capital markets

for their financing needs. These firms are also likely to obtain services from large insurance companies

and investment banks besides direct borrowing.

3. Empirical analysis on loan contracts

3.1. Sample

A sample of commercial loans is collected from filings with the SEC, American Banker, Bank

Letter, Bank Loan Officers Report, Wall Street Journal, and Dow Jones News Retrieval.5 Loan

agreements with active dates from January 1987 through January 1990 are included, resulting in 3817

individual loan agreements. To develop a representative sample, we include only commercial bank

loans offered by the eight most frequently represented banks in the sample. This represents lending by

banks that compete in national and international markets. This also helps to make certain that the

sample consists of money-center banks that will likely deal with firms with access to large insurance

companies and investment banks. We then add all loans made by investment banks and insurance

companies. This results in a sample of 1837 loans made to large borrowers by all three intermediaries.

We expect these are the loans where competition between different types of intermediaries is the most

intense. Over 90% of these loans involved commercial banks as lead lenders, consistent with

commercial banks having an overall advantage over other financial intermediaries in providing

corporate financing.

4 Several have suggested that finance companies represent a special case against the uniqueness of commercial banks. We

exclude finance companies for the following reasons. First, finance companies occupy a relatively small market share in lending

to businesses. Most finance companies are either subsidiaries of commercial bank holding companies (both domestic and

foreign) or affiliates of a few large nonfinancial firms (GE, GM, Ford, etc). The question as to whether bank-affiliated finance

companies are truly independent lenders is beyond the scope of this paper. The benefits of deposit insurance may spillover to

finance company lending activities when the finance company is owned by a bank holding company. Second, the segmentation

within the financial services industry suggests that finance companies tend to lend to borrowers with higher default risk (for

evidence, see Carey et al., 1998). Kashyap et al. (2002) also note that finance companies use loan commitments less frequently

than commercial banks do in the sample of small loans that they consider. They find that commercial banks lend through lines

of credit 70% of the time and that 31% of their loans are unsecured. Comparatively, finance companies only use lines of credit

51% of the time and almost 95% of their loans are secured. Kashyap et al. argue that unsecured arrangements represent

commitments that are more unpredictable in terms of drawn down behavior compared to secured arrangements. If the borrowers

have to arrange collateral for their secured lines, they are more likely to take down the loan. Also, one can argue that the

uncertainty about the value of the collateral may be less than the uncertainty about generalized value of the borrower. If so, this

suggests less of an adverse selection problem with secured lines than with unsecured lines. 5 Approximately 83% are from SEC filings.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 171

Table 1 provides summary information on the lending patterns of the various financial intermediaries

in the sample. The sample consists of 1682 commercial bank loans, 128 investment bank loans, and 127

insurance company loans. Commercial bank loans represented in the sample tend to be smaller than

those made by investment banks and insurance companies. The average size for commercial bank loans

is approximately 25 million dollars, while those for investment banks and insurance companies are 377

million and 450 million dollars, respectively. The smaller average size for commercial bank loans is

consistent with these institutions lending more to corporations where monitoring is more difficult. The

large size of investment bank and insurance company loans is consistent with these loans being

substitutes for public security offerings.

There are also differences in the average maturity of the loans for each type of intermediary.

Loans by commercial banks averaged approximately 4 years (47.5 months) in maturity, while those

by investment banks averaged slightly less than 3 years (34.5 months) in maturity. Insurance

company loans had the longest average maturity of slightly over 6 years (74.2 months). This

evidence on maturity of the insurance company loans is consistent with the findings by Carey,

Prowse, and Rea (1993). They find that private debt contracts typically are placed with insurance

companies and pension funds, and they traditionally carry maturities substantially longer than bank

loans. The maturity of commercial bank loans in our sample is longer than that analyzed in Carey

et al. (1993). The longer average maturity of our sample is similar to those analyzed by Carey et

al., 1998.

Table 1

Sample of loan agreements collected from Security and Exchange Commission filings between January 1987 and January 1990a

Commercial

banksb Investment

banks

Insurance

companies

Number of loans in sample 1682 128 127

Loan size (US$ millions) 25.1 377.8 450.3

Maturity (months) 47.5 34.3 74.2

Secured (%) 43.0 38.3 65.0

Type (proportion of sample)

Term loan and note 33.3 23.2 78.1

Revolving credit 52.9 19.4 17.0

Bridge loan 9.5 56.3 5.0

Other 4.3 1.1 –

Purpose (proportion of sample)

Working capital 20.8 1.9 2.8

General corporate 16.1 7.8 28.6

Takeover 16.0 20.4 22.8

LBO 18.1 49.5 5.7

Debt repayment/consolidation 17.8 15.5 34.2

Other 11.2 4.9 5.9

Pricing(proportion using each)

Fixed 0.7 15.5 51.4

Prime 69.8 49.5 20.0

LIBOR 72.0 42.7 –

Other 40.4 19.3 28.6 a See El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) for filing requirements related to private loans. b Represents loans made by the eight largest U.S. commercial banks. Size measured by total loans in the sample.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177172

The loans made by these intermediaries also exhibit differences in their use of collateral. Forty-

three percent of the commercial bank loans in the sample are secured. Investment banks made

collateralized loans less frequently, with only 38% of the loans secured. Loans by insurance

companies were secured 65% of the time. The less frequent use of collateral by investment banks

likely reflects the larger average loan size (approximately 20 times as large as commercial banks) and

shorter maturity of their loans. Among the three intermediaries, insurance companies use collateral

most frequently. This may also reflect the longer average maturity of their loans. The loan maturity

and the use of collateral suggest that investment banks lend for a short duration and to observably less

risky borrowers.

We also observe differences in the type of contract favored by each intermediary. Approximately 53%

of loans issued by commercial banks are in the form of revolving credit agreements. Term loans and

bridge loans represent approximately one third and 9.5% of commercial bank loan contracts, respectively.

Loans by insurance companies are predominately term loans and notes. These represent loans where

borrowing occurs immediately, with the loans either amortizing or resulting in a balloon payment at

maturity. As a result, these loans do not contain options to borrow, unlike the majority of commercial bank

contracts. These contracts represent approximately 80% of insurance company’s loans. The majority of

lending in which investment banks participate is in the form of bridge loans. Representing 56.3% of the

loan contracts for investment banks, these shorter maturity contracts typically are due to be repaid

immediately after corporate events such as security issuance or an asset sale.

The evidence related to loan purpose indicates that investment banks lend primarily to corporations

involved in LBOs or corporate takeovers (70% of total loans). Loans offered by commercial banks are

used in more variety purposes than those by investment banks. Insurance companies primarily lend for

longer term purposes, and their primary purpose for the loans is seldom for working capital or for LBOs.

Approximately 21% of commercial bank lending is for working capital purpose, compared to only 1.9%

and 2.8% of lending for this purpose by investment banks and insurance companies, respectively.

Insurance companies tend to lend for debt repayment and consolidation and also for general corporate

purposes.

Finally, the three intermediaries differ on the loan pricing practices. Consistent with earlier

discussions, we see that commercial banks almost always index their loans to the prime, LIBOR, or

some other indices. Less than 1% of the loans they make carry a fixed rate of interest. Investment banks

make both floating rate and fixed-rate loans. The form of pricing mechanism is less important for loans

offered by investment banks because they are of shorter stated maturity and are usually event-driven

bridge loans. The majority of the insurance company loans (51.4%) carry a fixed rate of interest. This is

consistent with the longer term nature of their liabilities providing them an advantage in offering this

contractual feature.

In Table 2, we compare the role played by each intermediary in the sample. We can see that lead

lender or manager of the loan is most often an investment bank (77% of the time), followed by 52%

of the time by commercial banks. Insurance companies serve as lead lender in only 27% of the loans

they participate. These findings are consistent with insurance companies having a funding advantage

through their ability to offer insurance contracts. This advantage translates into their willingness to

serve as participants in loans originated by commercial banks. Investment banks, at the other extreme,

serve as lead lender in most of the loans in which they participate. The loans they issue are of shorter

maturity and thus are not usually syndicated. Commercial banks participate in both roles approxi-

mately an equal amount of the time.

Table 2

Statistics on the number of loans and role that each intermediary plays in sample loans

Type of intermediary

Commercial

bank

Investment

bank

Life insurance

company

Total number of loans 1682 128 127

Number as lead lender or manager 875 98 34

Percentage as lead or manager 52.0 77.0 27.0

Difference in the mean proportion

as lead or manager (z statistic)

Commercial

bank

Investment

bank

Life

insurance

Commercial bank � 0.27 (� 6.149)* 0.24 (5.63)*

Investment bank 0.27 (6.149)* 0.51 (8.84)*

Life insurance � 0.24 (5.63)* � 0.51 (� 8.84)*

*Statistically significant at the .01 level.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 173

We next consider the type of lender that will be involved in the loan based on loan contract

characteristics in a multinomial logit framework. In this analysis, the dependent variable is the likelihood

that the loan is made by an investment bank or an insurance company compared to the likelihood that it

is offered by a commercial bank. The loan contract features included as independent variables in the

maximum likelihood estimates are also listed as follows:

Dependent variable:

Prob = 0 if the loan is made by a commercial bank, 1 if the loan is made by an investment bank, and

2 if the loan is made by a life insurance company.

Explanatory variables:

Size = natural log of the size of the loan or commitment in millions of dollars,

Maturity = natural log of the original maturity of the loan,

Fixed = 1 if the loan is a fixed-rate loan or offers a fixed-rate option, 0 otherwise,

Secured = 1 if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise,

Commitment = 1 if the loan is a commitment to lend, 0 otherwise,

LBO= 1 if leveraged buyout is listed as the primary purpose for the loan, 0 otherwise,

Bridge loan = 1 if the loan is identified as a bridge loan, 0 otherwise.

Multinomial logit is used to estimate the maximum likelihood estimates on the probability that the

loan is offered by an investment bank or a life insurance company against the probability that it is made

by a commercial bank. This analysis adds to the univariate results presented in Table 1 and the evidence

related to an intermediary role in Table 2.

3.2. Empirical results on type of intermediary

The results of the maximum likelihood estimations are presented in Table 3. These results are

generally consistent with the summary statistics and univariate results discussed thus far. The results

show significance in predicting whether the loan is more likely to be from an investment bank or a

Table 3

Multinomial logit estimates of the likelihood that a given loan will have a commercial, investment bank, or life insurance

company as lead lender based on loan characteristics

Explanatory variable Dependent variable

Likelihood of investment bank Likelihood of life insurance

1 2 3 4 5 6

Intercept � 1.89 (.001) 1.87 (.001) 0.05 (.001) � 3.88 (.001) 0.002 (.197) 0.004 (.795)

Sizea 0.01 (.001) 0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.001)

Maturityb � 0.02 (.001) � 0.015 (.001) � 0.001 (.091) 0.02 (.040) 0.001 (.005) 0.001 (.015)

Fixedc 3.17 (.001) 3.26 (.001) 0.217 (.001) 3.81 (.001) 0.409 (.001) 0.410 (.001)

Securedd � 0.08 (.677) � 0.001 (.769) � 0.02 (.873) 1.24 (.001) 0.055 (.001) 0.056 (.001)

Commitmente � 1.65 (.001) � 1.36 (.001) � 0.02 (.033) � 0.47 (.045) � 0.017 (.099) � 0.018 (.115)

LBOf 1.19 (.001) 0.05 (.001) 0.01 (.360) 0.01 (.930)

Bridge loang 0.19 (.001) � 0.001 (.830)

N 1937

Log-likelihood � 679.61

v2 0.0001

Significance levels in parentheses. a Size is the natural log of the size of the loan or commitment in millions of dollars. b Maturity is the natural log of the original maturity of the loan. c Fixed takes on one if the loan is a fixed-rate loan or offers a fixed-rate option, zero otherwise. d Secured takes on one if the loan is secured, zero otherwise. e Commitment takes on one if the loan is a commitment to lend, zero otherwise. f LBO takes on one if leveraged buyout is listed as the primary purpose for the loan, zero otherwise. g Bridge Loan takes on one if the loan is identified as a bridge loan, zero otherwise.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177174

commercial bank (Table 3: Eqs. (1) and (2), Eq. (3)). The second set of estimates pertains to the

likelihood that the loan is offered by an insurance company versus a commercial bank (Eqs. (4), (5), (6)).

Not surprisingly, the coefficients on the loan characteristics are important in explaining the likelihood

that the loan is made by a nonbank financial institution. These results give us an indication of the

statistical significance of the independent variables.

From Table 3, we can see that as size increases, the loan is more likely to involve either an investment

bank or an insurance company than a commercial bank. As loan maturity increases, the loan has an

increased probability of involving a commercial bank but not an investment bank. Alternatively, as

maturity increases, the chance of a life insurance company’s involvement in the loan is enhanced. If the

loan has a fixed rate of interest, it increases the likelihood that the loan involves either an investment

bank or an insurance company as opposed to a commercial bank. Regarding the security status of the

loan, we can see that if the loan is secured, it is equally likely to involve either a commercial bank or an

investment bank. However, the presence of collateral increases the likelihood that an insurance company

is involved in the loan.

One of the strongest results is related to whether the loan involves a commitment to lend. If the

contract involves a commitment to lend, it is less likely that either an investment bank or an

insurance company will be involved. Loans for LBOs are unique in many ways because the

borrower is moving from publicly traded to privately held (see Booth, 1992, for a discussion of the

impact on monitoring costs). We see that these loans are more likely to involve an investment bank

than to involve a commercial bank. Also, if the loan is a bridge loan, the likelihood that it involves

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 175

an investment bank increases relative to the likelihood that only commercial banks are involved in

the loan.

In Table 4, the marginal probabilities of the independent variables are presented. They are evaluated at

the means of the independent variables. This provides us with an analysis of how a change in each of the

independent variable affects the likelihood that the loan is made by a particular financial institution.

Starting with the size of the loan, a decrease in loan size relative to the average for the sample results in a

statistically significant increase in the likelihood that the loan is made by a commercial bank. An

increase in the size results in an increased probability that the loan is associated with an investment bank

or an insurance company. Consistent with earlier findings, this suggests that investment bank and

insurance companies tend to lend to larger borrowers.

A marginal increase in loan maturity indicates mixed results for the probability that the loan is made

by a commercial bank. This results from the large number of commercial bank loans in the sample and

the fact that the maturity of commercial bank loans is similar to, though slightly longer than, that in

investment banks. The evidence for investment banks and insurance companies is more direct. As

maturity increases away from the mean, the likelihood that the loan is offered by an investment bank is

Table 4

Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics computed at the means of the independent

variables

Explanatory variable Dependent variable

Likelihood of

commercial bank

Likelihood of

investment bank

Likelihood of

life insurance

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Intercept 0.221

(.001)

0.239

(.001)

0.275

(.001)

� 0.065

(.039)

� 0.079

(.027)

� 0.109

(.011)

� 0.157

(.001)

� 0.159

(.001)

� 0.166

(.001)

Sizea � 0.001

(.001)

� 0.001

(.001)

� 0.001

(.001)

0.001

(.001)

0.001

(.002)

0.001

(.002)

0.001

(.001)

0.001

(.001)

0.001

(.001)

Maturityb 0.001

(.009)

0.001

(.019)

� 0.001

(.074)

� 0.001

(.001)

� 0.005

(.001)

� 0.001

(.203)

0.001

(.383)

0.001

(.372)

0.001

(.129)

Fixedc � 0.271

(.001)

� 0.271

(.001)

� 0.265

(.001)

0.118

(.004)

0.116

(.006)

0.113

(.007)

0.153

(.001)

0.154

(.001)

0.152

(0.001)

Securedd � 0.047

(.001)

� 0.046

(.001)

� 0.046

(.001)

� 0.001

(.649)

� 0.005

(.616)

� 0.03

(.720)

0.052

(.001)

0.051

(.001)

0.050

(.001)

Commitmente 0.078

(.001)

0.063

(.001)

0.039

(.012)

� 0.061

(.001)

� 0.047

(.003)

� 0.027

(.053)

� 0.016

(.257)

� 0.015

(.245)

� 0.012

(.298)

LBOf � 0.054

(.001)

� 0.036

(.017)

0.042

(.001)

0.026

(.014)

0.012

(.362)

0.009

(.438)

Bridge loang � 0.070

(.001)

0.053

(.001)

0.017

(.339)

Significance levels in parentheses. a Size is the natural log of the size of the loan or commitment in millions of dollars. b Maturity is the natural log of the original maturity of the loan. c Fixed takes on one if the loan is a fixed-rate loan or offers a fixed-rate option, zero otherwise. d Secured takes on one if the loan is secured, zero otherwise. e Commitment takes on one if the loan is a commitment to lend, zero otherwise. f LBO takes on one if leveraged buyout is listed as the primary purpose for the loan, zero otherwise. g Bridge Loan take on one if the loan is identified as a bridge loan, zero otherwise.

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177176

reduced. As maturity increases, the likelihood that the loan is made by an insurance company increases,

though the increase is not statistically significant.

The largest marginal probabilities are related to the binary variable indicating whether the loan is

priced at a fixed rate of interest. If the loan rate is fixed, the probability that the loan is made by a

commercial bank is substantially reduced. Alternatively, if the loan is priced at a fixed rate, the

likelihood that it is made by an investment bank or an insurance company increases. This is consistent

with the summary statistics and indicates that commercial banks avoid the use of fixed rates of interest in

their lending. Secured loans are more likely to be offered by insurance companies and they are less likely

to be offered by commercial banks. The results on loan security for investment banks are statistically

insignificant. As for the marginal probabilities of the commitment variable, the results show that

commercial banks are significantly more likely to offer loan commitments, while investment banks and

insurance companies are less likely. However, the marginal probabilities for insurance companies are not

statistically significant.

The marginal probabilities for the binary variables on bridge loans and loans to finance LBOs reveal

that commercial banks are less likely to offer bridge loans and loans used for the purpose of an LBO

while investment banks are substantially more likely. This is consistent with commercial banks being

more conservative and avoiding highly leveraged transactions compared to investment banks and

insurance companies. This also indirectly supports the findings of Carey et al. (1998) that regulation

restricts commercial banks from taking risky lending activities.

Overall, these findings are consistent with financial institutions specializing in lending based on their

comparative advantages. Commercial banks’ comparative advantage arises from their access to deposit

insurance, and thus they offer more loan commitments. Concurrent regulation limits commercial banks

from taking excessive risk in lending activities and thus provides room for commitment lending by other

institutions such as finance companies. This is consistent with the regulation hypothesis developed by

Carey et al. (1998) comparing banks and finance companies. Regulations related to insurance

underwriting provide insurance companies a comparative advantage in offering fixed-rate long-term

loans. Investment banks specialize in loans used for LBOs and takeovers since they are directly involved

in these activities, either as advisors or underwriters.

4. Summary and implications

The analysis in this paper indicates that commercial banks have a funding cost advantage in offering

loan commitments due to their access to fixed-price deposit insurance. It is argued that this cost

advantage gives commercial banks an advantage over investment banks and insurance companies in

offering loan commitment contracts. Evidence from a sample of large corporate loans confirms that

commercial banks continue to dominate commitment-based lending to businesses. Investment banks and

insurance companies usually offer loans where deposit insurance gives commercial banks the smallest

advantage. Investment banks primarily focus on short-term self-liquidating bridge loans, often for

undertaking LBOs. Life insurance companies, like investment banks, focus on offering spot loans and

not loan commitments. However, insurance companies generally lend longer term and frequently at fixed

interest rates due to the nature of their funding structure.

Consistent with their funding cost advantage in short-term lending, commercial banks serve as lead

lender and participant in approximately equal number of sample loans. Investment banks generally serve

J.R. Booth, L.C. Booth / Review of Financial Economics 13 (2004) 165–177 177

only as lead lender in the loans that they participate and they usually lend for purposes associated with

their other lines of business (e.g., corporate restructuring, security issuance, etc.). Insurance companies

serve as lead lenders less often but they frequently involve as participants in longer term fixed-rate loans

and notes. This is consistent with insurance companies having a funding cost advantage in loans with

these characteristics. The empirical findings in this study suggest that specialization in types of lending is

largely motivated by regulation. These are consistent with previous rationale for specialization in lending

activities suggested by Carey et al. (1998) and Kashyap et al. (2002).

The findings in this study indicate that regulation has, in the past, been playing a major role in

determining which kind of activities different financial intermediaries engage in. As more and more

financial intermediaries are integrating and merging, we are likely to see less specialization in financial

services in the future.

Acknowledgements

We thank Fred Furlong, Mary Daley, Elizabeth Laderman, and John Krainer for comments. Some of

the data used in this study were collected while the first author was a visiting scholar at the FDIC and the

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

References

Avery, R. B., & Berger, A. N. (1991). Loan commitments and bank risk exposure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 173–192.

Booth, J. R. (1992). Contract costs, bank loans and the cross-monitoring hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 21–35.

Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991). The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements. American

Economic Review, 81, 497–513.

Carey, M., Post, M., & Sharpe, S. (1998). Does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ? Evidence on

specialization in private debt contracting. Journal of Finance, 53, 845–878.

Carey, M., Prowse, S., Rea, J., & Udell, G. (1993). The economics of the private placement marker: A new look. Federal

Markers, Institutions and Instruments, 2(3), 1–67.

Diamond, D., & Rajan, R. (2001). Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility: A theory of banking. Journal of

Political Economy, 109, 287–327.

El-Gazzar, S., & Pastena, V. (1990). Negotiated accounting rules in private financial contracts. Journal of Accounting and

Economics, 12, 381–396.

Flannery, M. (1994). Debt maturity structure and the deadweight cost of leverage: Optimally financing banking firms.

American Economic Review, 84, 320–331.

James, C. (1982). An analysis of bank loan rate indexation. Journal of Finance, 37, 809–825.

Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., & Stein, J. (2002). Banks as providers of liquidity: An explanation for the co-existence of lending and

deposit taking. Journal of Finance, 57, 33–67.

Melnik, A., & Plaut, S. E. (1986). Loan commitment contracts, terms of lending, and credit allocation. Journal of Finance, 41,

425–435.

Qi, J. (1998). Deposit liquidity and bank monitoring. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 7, 198–218.

  • Deposit insurance and specialization in commercial bank lending
    • Introduction
    • Loan commitments and deposit insurance
    • Empirical analysis on loan contracts
      • Sample
      • Empirical results on type of intermediary
    • Summary and implications
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

1-s2.0-S1566014101000292-main.pdf

Emerging Markets Review Ž .3 2002 31�50

Predicting bank failures using a hazard model: the Venezuelan banking crisis

Carlos A. Molina�

Finance Department, McCombs School of Business, CBA 6.222, Uni�ersity of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1179, USA

Received 10 September 2001; received in revised form 3 December 2001; accepted 10 December 2001

Abstract

This paper uses a proportional-hazard model with time-varying covariates to determine the financial indicators that could have predicted the bank failures during the 1994�1995 Venezuelan banking crisis. A proportional-hazard model is an adequate econometric tool to analyze this case of limited cross-sectional financial information. I find that both a bank’s ability to generate sound profits and the support of low risk government bonds were the key to not failing in a crisis that took down more than half of the system. These results can be extended to a general case of bank failures under volatile economic environments. � 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classifications: G21; C14; C41

Keywords: Bank failures; Hazard model; Venezuelan banking crisis

1. Introduction

Previous studies on the Venezuelan banking crisis�as well as those on the banking crises in other Latin American countries�have focused on the general factors that surrounded the defaults of multiple banks. These descriptive studies

� Corresponding author. Tel.: �1-512-496-0935; fax: �1-512-471-5073. Ž .E-mail address: [email protected] C.A. Molina .

1566-0141�02�$ - see front matter � 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Ž .PII: S 1 5 6 6 - 0 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 9 - 2

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�5032

focus on the macroeconomic environment and on the general financial situation of the systems before the crisis. Although looking at the general picture is useful, previous literature does not consider the significance of individual financial factors that were common in both the surviving and the failed banks.

Undoubtedly, the volatile macroeconomic environments and the poor banking supervision have been common factors to the banking crises in Latin America. However, why are some banks able to survive under such hostile environments? Analyzing this issue can lead one to a better understanding of the crises, and can improve the chance to predict further failures in extreme macroeconomic environ- ments, if one addresses the issues I identify here for a better regulatory-supervision effort.

The Venezuelan case is a good case study because it represents the most recent banking crisis in a developing economy and because of its relative importance with respect to the size of the economy. In this paper, I use a proportional-hazard model to study the financial indicators that were most important for banks to survive the Venezuelan banking crisis.

The previous literature on Latin American banking crises shares similar goals and characteristics: it is descriptive and focused on the macroeconomic situations

Ž .surrounding the crisis. Garcia 1997 points out five reasons or causes for the Venezuelan banking crisis. These reasons were also shared, totally or partially, by the public opinion in Venezuela at the time. First, Garcia mentions the macroeconomic factors as one of the main causes for the bank defaults.1 The second he mentions was the weak supervision and regulation that did not avoid further damage once the first signs of the crisis were triggered. The third cause he points out was the interest rates liberalization under a very unstable macroeconomic environment.2 Fourth, Garcia mentions that the motives for the crisis include the bankers’ corruption and mismanagement, the latter of which was characterized by an excessive risk taking and accelerated growth. The fifth and last consideration was the government explanation: the crisis was just an ending for a financial deterioration process that was unavoidable.

Garcia focuses mainly on explaining the macroeconomic hypothesis, regarded as needed but not a sufficient condition for the crisis. The mismanagement- and corruption-hypothesis is then used to explain why some banks were able to survive the adverse economic situation under weak banking supervision. However, no specific mention was made about the financial factors that were common among the survived banks.

Similar explanations to banking crises under volatile economic environments are Ž .given by Trebat 1991 , who identifies as the causes for the Latin American

banking crises that occurred before the 1990s: foreign exchange risks; unsound

1 The crisis would be the result of a changing economic cycle, mixed with political uncertainty, higher fiscal deficit, a decrease in the economic activity, negative real interest rates, local currency instability, capital flights and the consequent decrease in bank deposits.

2 The Venezuelan economic reform process in the early 1990s was not complete. The interest rates were liberalized, but direct foreign investment was not allowed in the banking sector.

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lending and borrowing practices, and inadequate regulatory and supervisory frame- Ž .works. In an earlier paper, Morris 1990 makes a cross-country comparison of the

Latin American banking systems during the 1980s. Morris offers a descriptive focus on the macroeconomic situations and the weak supervision surrounding Latin

Ž .American banking systems. Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1995 address the lessons from banking crises in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, to deal with banking difficulties in developing countries. They focus on the banking systems’ compositions, crisis recoveries and macroeconomic environment.

Ž .Garcia-Herrero 1997 presents a description and analysis of the 1990s banking crises in Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela. She finds that the exchange rate regime, the degree of dollarization and the structure of the banking system affected the macroeconomic variables and induced the banking crises. She pays special attention to the behavior of monetary and credit aggregates, the economic growth, and the inflation of each economy.

These studies are basically descriptive, presenting their analysis from a macroeconomic point of view. No article up to now has presented an econometric model that explains cross-sectional differences in the bank failures. The main motivation of this paper is to build an econometric model that accounts for the different factors that affected the bank failures in the Venezuelan crisis. Could we have predicted which banks were in a more vulnerable situation when the crisis exploded? Instead of the previous literature’s subjective arguments, an economet- ric analysis will give the financial data a much needed relevance for understanding one of the largest world banking crises.3

One limitation of doing a cross-sectional analysis on the Venezuelan banking system is the number of observations available: only 36 banks had significant operations in Venezuela at the time of the crisis. I use the proportional-hazard

Ž .model, first developed by Cox 1972 , because of its advantage for modeling time-to-failure probabilities using time-varying covariates. This model allows a cross-sectional analysis of time series data, eliminating the problem of a limited number of observations. Additionally, the hazard model considers how far each bank is from defaulting�or surviving the crisis�when its financial characteristics are measured.

Using this setup, I find that both a bank’s ability to generate sound profits and the support given by the low risk of government bonds were the key to not failing in a crisis that took down more than half of the system. In particular, banks that presented more return on assets, and more investments in government bonds were less probable to fail.

The composition of a bank’s costs was also important. A bank with a higher proportion of operative costs and lower financial expenses was less likely to fail. Other less significant indicators were the capitalization index and the bank’s return on investments. As expected, a bank with more capitalization, less financial

3 As a percentage of the country GDP.

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expenses and more return on its investments resulted in a lower probability of failure.

When negative external factors are present, a bank that lowers its operating costs and increases its deposits’ remuneration significantly is showing signs of trouble. Additionally, the massive presence of government bonds in its assets, although inconsistent with the bank’s intermediation goal, can provide soundness to the profits and more liquidity. It is better for a bank to acquire government bonds than attempt an increase in its loan portfolio in a troublesome macroeconomic environment like the one surrounding the Venezuelan crisis.4

The financial characteristics that drove Venezuelan banks to the bankruptcy can be extended for other volatile economies. An analysis of the factors that were common among the surviving banks in this crisis can help to visualize how banking regulation can be improved in a more general setup, that of emerging economies with undeveloped banking systems.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of the history of the Venezuelan banking crisis. Section 3 discusses the data and defines the model variables. Section 4 contains a univariate analysis for the variables chosen in Section 3. Section 5 explains and discusses the econometrics model used in this paper, to model the banks’ time-to-failure. Section 6 presents the model estimation and results. Finally, Section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusions.

2. Venezuelan banking crisis overview

In this section, I describe some facts surrounding the Venezuelan banking crisis. Ž .Molano 1997 presents a good review of the crisis, which, together with press

releases and articles, constitutes the sources for this overview. Seventeen out of 49 Commercial Banks, and some of their subsidiaries, failed

between January 1994 and August 1995, representing 53% of the system assets. These banks failed in four waves, which can be grouped into two, depending on how the bankruptcies were managed.

Banco Latino, the second biggest bank, was the first that failed, in December 1993, even after receiving approximately US$ 700 million from FOGADE in additional liquidity.5 After that, in June 1994, another seven commercial banks and a financial society went on to fail.6 The way in which FOGADE managed these failures was similar to the Latino case. First, FOGADE, using Venezuelan Central

Ž .Bank BCV funds, provided liquidity support to the troubled banks, trying to save them from failure. The failures occurred, and the banks were completely closed,

4 The result that banks with less government bonds and more loans in its asset composition were Ž .more likely to fail is consistent with Trebat 1991 , who argues that two of the factors that most

contributed to undermining Latin American banking systems were the unsound lending practice and the loans’ growth.

5 Ž .FOGADE is the Venezuelan FDIC the provider of banking insurance deposit . 6 The failed financial society was FIVECA; that is not object of this study.

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feeding the public’s panic.7 Table 1 shows how the total deposits for the Venezue- lan banking system declined approximately 50% from 1990 to 1996. In that period, the Venezuelan banking system went from the fourth place to the seventh place in total deposits among the major Latin American banking systems. Panel B of Table 1 shows how the total banking deposits as a percentage of the GDP went from 25.72% in Venezuela to only 15.85% in 1996. This value for the United States, between 30 and 33%, matches only those for Chile and Uruguay, among the Latin American countries.

The amount given by FOGADE in bailouts to these seven troubled banks was approximately US$ 4 billions.8 Until that moment, the FOGADE bailouts amounted to approximately 10% of the Venezuelan GDP and 40% of the M2.

In spite of their different failure dates, I group these seven commercial banks together with Banco Latino in what is the called ‘first wave’. I do this grouping because all these failures were managed in a similar way, completely closing the bank to the public with the promise of honoring the deposit insurance later.

All these bank failures triggered a decline in the exchange rate to VEB 200�US$ in June 1994. Then, the Venezuelan government fixed the exchange rate at VEB 170�US$, combined with price and interest rate controls. The second wave of failures, with eight more banks failing, occurred between August 1994 and Febru- ary 1995, including two of the largest banks at the time.9 However, the failures were managed in a very different way. The FOGADE tried to copy the way in which other banking crises in the world had been managed: bank ‘open door’ intervention, taking over the property of the bank’s equity as soon as the first signs

Ž .of trouble appears i.e. banks going out of the clearing house . With significantly less cost, the bigger and sounder banks were re-capitalized and restructured for privatization and the smaller ones were closed by transferring their deposits and good loans to the bigger open-banks. Finally, in August 1995, the last failure occurred. It was one of the smallest banks in the system, and its failure was managed in the same way. Table 2 shows the failed banks, their failure dates and their last emitted financial reporting date before the failure.

Before the crisis in 1993, the Venezuelan State owned only 7% of the total system assets. After the crisis in 1995, almost 40% of the total system assets were in the State’s hands. As another indicator of the capital flight this banking crisis produced, the total system assets, in US$, decreased by 35% from 20 to 12 billions. The total cost of this crisis to the Venezuelan government has not been clearly

Ž .quantified. In an article published on December 14 in The Economist 1996 , the estimated costs are estimated to be US$ 12 billions, representing approximately 20% of the Venezuelan GDP.

7 The public began to withdraw their deposits from what they considered the less safe banks. Some of this money went out of the system in capital flight.

8 Ž .This amount is an approximation. The exact amount in Bolivars Venezuelan currency was 490 billions between January and June 1994. However, this amount can vary depending on the source.

9 I refer to Banco de Venezuela and Banco Consolidado.

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Table 1 Evolution of the total banking system deposits in Latin America

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Ž .Panel A: Total banking system deposits in Latin America in mill. US$ Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Venezuela 13 375.71 4 12 605.57 5 10 992.55 6 8774.93 7 9356.66 7 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Argentina 25 567.90 3 35 439.16 3 42 263.13 3 40 826.00 3 49 998.00 3 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Brazil 74 766.04 2 88 042.02 2 149 523.64 1 178 761.56 1 171 000.00 1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Chile 13 225.54 5 14 701.65 4 17 560.94 4 22 599.91 4 26 234.32 4 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Colombia 6091.26 6 7741.49 6 12 118.08 5 12 430.82 5 15 228.23 5 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Mexico 84 242.47 1 96 815.42 1 68 998.31 2 65 073.73 2 80 482.62 2´ Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Peru 3954.60 8 5402.78 7 7657.80 7 9402.16 6 11 834.23 6´ Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Uruguay 4122.41 7 43238.00 8 4788.89 8 5142.71 8 5685.32 8

Panel B: Total banking system deposits as a percentage of the country GDP Venezuela 25.72% 24.47% 25.47% 22.08% 15.85% Argentina 10.29% 13.74% 15.00% 14.60% 16.81% Brazil 52.55% 74.32% 36.22% 26.92% 22.81% Chile 33.29% 35.25% 33.17% 35.56% 39.07% Colombia 14.75% 16.18% 17.37% 16.73% 17.23% Mexico 25.36% 23.94% 25.81% 27.01% 24.84%´ Peru 12.42% 14.27% 15.14% 16.34% 20.58%´ Uruguay 40.01% 35.04% 32.75% 32.56% 32.78% United States 33.83% 33.05% 30.75% 30.29% 29.98%

The source used was the IMF International Financial Statistics. ‘Total deposits’ are taken as the demand, and the time-and-saving deposits for the commercial banks in each country. In Panel A, it is shown the total deposits in US$ millions for each of the major Latin American countries. The respective market exchange rate was used to translate from local currencies to US$. The numbers in parentheses indicate the ranking of the country’s total deposits in Latin America. Panel B shows the total deposits as a percentage of the country GDP for Latin American countries, and also presents the United States case as a benchmark.

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Table 2 Official failure dates, dates of last financial report issues and values for dummy variable

Panel A Panel B

Failed banks in the sample Censored banks in the sample

Bank Official date Date of last d Bank Date of last di i of failure results issue results issue

First Latino Jan 94 Dec 93 1 Banesco Jun 96 0 wave Amazonas Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Capital Jun 96 0

Bancor Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Caracas Jun 96 0 Barinas Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Caribe Jun 96 0 Construccion Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Caronı Jun 96 0´ ´ La Guaira Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Citibank Jun 96 0 Maracaibo Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Exterior Jun 96 0 Metropolitano Jun 94 Dec 93 1 Federal Jun 96 0

Second Venezuela Aug 94 Jun 94 1 Industrial Jun 96 0 wave Consolidado Sep 94 Jun 94 1 Internacional Jun 96 0

Andino Dec 94 Jun 94 1 Lara Jun 96 0 Progreso Dec 94 Jun 94 1 Mercantil Jun 96 0 Republica Dec 94 Jun 94 1 Occidental Dscto. Jun 96 0´ Italo Venezolano Feb 95 Jun 94 1 Occidente Jun 96 0 Principal Feb 95 Jun 94 1 Orinoco Jun 96 0 Profesional Feb 95 Jun 94 1 Plaza Jun 96 0 Empresarial Aug 95 Dec 94 1 Provincial Jun 96 0

Union Jun 96 0´ Vzlno. De Credito Jun 96 0´

Panel A presents all the failed banks in the sample. These banks failed in two waves according with their failure dates. The official date of failure was determined as the date in which the bank stocks were

Ž .taken by FOGADE government regulators . FOGADE took the property to either close the bank or re-capitalize it. ‘Date of last results issue’ indicates the date of the last financial statements issued by each bank. This last statement’s date was taken as the failure date. The dummy variable, d , is used ini the proportional-hazard model to indicate censored observations. All censored observations are the

Ž .banks that did not fail Panel B .

3. Data and variables

To analyze the Venezuelan crisis, 36 banks out of 49 in the total system were used. The discarded banks were foreign banks with only representation offices or reduced operations in Venezuela, small banks owned by the Government, and very small and regional banks without complete data.10

The data used account for all the public financial information available about commercial banks in Venezuela. Some information considered public in most of the developed countries was private information for Venezuelan banks during the

10 The foreign banks with reduced operations in Venezuela were Do Brasil, Canarias de Venezuela, Extebandes, Ganadero and Tequendama; the small banks owned by the Government were Fomento Regional Coro, Fomento Regional Los Andes, Guayana and Popular; and the regional banks without complete data were Confederado, Monagas, Noroco and Sofitasa.

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1994�1995 crisis. An example is the percentage of bad loans out of the total bank loans. This figure was available only as an aggregated number for the total banking system in the regulators’ reports. The bad loan percentage was approximately 20% in the 1994�1996 period.

The information used for the model correspond to the financial statements Ž .balance sheets and income statements issued by the banks each 6-month period from June 1987 until June 1996 as published in the Venezuelan newspapers, and collected in the IESA’s Finance Center and SuperIntendencia de Bancos databases. Information for the SuperIntendencia’s annual reports was used to complete the data for the crisis years of 1993, 1994 and 1995. Financial information was reported, by banks, in very general accounts at the moment of the crisis. Although the quality of banking information has improved after the crisis, it still remains limited. The total bank sample is in Table 2.

The variable selection was limited due to the information scarcity that is typical of an undeveloped and poorly supervised banking system. As a result, one needs to leave out indicators of asset quality and management efficiency, which are central to the popular CAMEL model used to analyze bank failures.11

In choosing the financial variables, I tried to be as exhaustive as possible, given the data limitations pointed out above. I chose 13 financial indicators as the covariates. Three indicators were proxies for three of the CAMEL categories of bank performance. It was impossible to construct an adequate asset quality indicator and an imperfect proxy of cost efficiency was used for the management efficiency category. To consider the asset quality in some way, I used an asset-com- position measure based on the percentage of government bonds in the asset side. Seven more indicators were included, some of them to account for the window- dressing present in the banks’ accounting data, which is very likely to exist due to poor banking supervision.12 I used two more variables, one to account for govern- ment deposits and the other to control for size.

All these variables, and their predicted contribution on the default probability, are defined as follows:

1. CAP: The indicator of capital adequacy, defined as Total Capital�Total Assets, is expected to have a negative influence on the probability of failure.

2. EFFIC: The indicator for costs management efficiency and composition, Ždefined as Payroll Expenses � Operating Costs � FOGADE

.contributions �Financial Income, is expected to have a positive contribution.

11 CAMEL is the acronym for the well-known methodology for bank analysis based on five indicators: Capital adequacy; Asset quality; Management; Earnings; and Liquidity. CAMEL model has been extensively used in the literature about bank ratings and failures. For instance, Weelock and Wilson Ž .2000 use CAMEL indicators with a similar approach, but for predicting bank failures in the US. For

Ž .additional reference of the CAMEL methodology use, please see Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan 2000 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Berger and Davies 1998 Siems and Barr 1998 Cole and Gunther 1998 and DeYoung 1998 .

12 Window-dressing in Venezuelan bank accounting has been much criticized by government supervi- sors and local analysts.

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3. ROA: A profitability index, defined as Net Profits�Average Total Assets, is expected to have a negative contribution.

Ž4. LIQUID: The liquidity indicator is defined as Total Cash availability in .national and foreign currencies �Total Liabilities. A bank with more liquidity

can be in a better position to face a deposit run. The expected influence is negative.

Ž5. INTERM: The intermediation indicator, measured as Total Government .Bonds �Total Assets, has an effect that is unknown in advance.

6. INV RET: The risk return indicator, just based on the bank investments’�

return, will have an effect dependent on the risk-return relation of the bank investments. It is measured as Total Investments Income�Average Total Investments.

Ž7. EXTRA INC: The first window-dressing indicator is defined as Extraor-�

.dinary Income � Related Operations Income �Total Income. During the crisis, extraordinary return was reported by the failing banks, usually related to assets purchase and sale within the same bank. Its contribution can be ambiguous. However, as a window-dressing proxy, it is expected to be positive.

8. FIN EXP: The proxy for aggressive competition through interest rates�

measures the relative deposits’ financial expenses, to account for the competi- tion in attracting new customers’ deposits during the crisis. Its effect is expected to be positive. It is calculated as Deposits Financial Income�Aver- age Total Deposits.

9. OTH ASSET: The second window-dressing indicator is measured as Other�

Assets�Total Assets. ‘Other assets’ is an account that banks used to hide bad assets. Its defaulting effect, if any, is expected to be positive.

10. OUT BAL: Another window-dressing indicator, similar to the previous one,�

is measured as Off-Balance-Sheet Accounts�Total Assets. It is also used to try to detect hidden assets. Its defaulting effect is also expected to be positive.

11. OTH LIAB: Yet another window-dressing indicator, similar to the previous�

ones, is measured as Other Liabilities�Total Liabilities, with a positive expected effect.

12. FIX ASSET: The fixed-assets index measures how much of the total assets is�

not dedicated to financial activities. Its effect in default is expected to be positive. It is calculated as Fixed Assets�Total Assets.

13. ASSETS: The variable, used to control for the bank size, is measured as Ž .Log Total Assets in US$ Millions . It is unclear how this variable will affect

the bank failures.

The correlation coefficients between these variables, for the data collected in December 1993, are in Table 3.

4. Univariate analysis

I begin by describing the main statistical patterns of the variables used in the

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Table 3 Correlation Table

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

� �1 CAP 1 � �2 EFFIC 0.2128 1 � �3 ROA 0.6600 0.1667 1 � �4 LIQUID 0.1938 �0.1348 0.1142 1 � �5 INTERM 0.1227 0.0690 �0.0008 0.7136 1 � �6 INV RET �0.1406 �0.2598 �0.1033 0.3057 �0.1711 1�

� �7 EXTRA INC 0.0610 0.3048 0.1327 0.0036 �0.0952 �0.0728 1�

� �8 FIN EXP �0.4156 �0.4112 �0.5205 0.2387 0.2635 0.2615 0.0057 1�

� �9 OTH ASSET �0.0685 0.1498 �0.2678 0.1347 0.0309 0.1735 0.4159 0.4038 1�

� �10 OUT BAL 0.1290 0.6211 0.1856 0.0649 0.0578 �0.2062 0.4184 �0.2816 �0.0088 1�

� �11 OTH LIAB 0.2241 0.4582 0.1140 0.0727 0.1439 0.0168 0.1475 0.1490 0.6582 0.0429 1�

� �12 FIX ASSET 0.0989 0.0918 �0.1382 �0.1438 �0.2138 �0.0700 0.6284 �0.1054 0.3044 �0.0771 �0.0608 1�

� �13 ASSETS �0.3929 �0.0274 �0.3014 �0.4009 �0.1112 �0.1399 0.0104 0.4119 �0.1648 0.1163 �0.0705 �0.1782 1

This table contains the correlation coefficients of the explanatory bank-specific variables based on the December 1993 financial data.

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Table 4 Univariate analysis results

Failed Non-failed t-Stat Effect on banks banks the failure

aCAP 6.93% 9.09% 2.40 Negative aEFFIC 20.58% 29.91% 3.23 Negative aROA 0.37% 2.62% 5.42 Negative aLIQUID 45.90% 56.58% 2.43 Negative aINTERM 11.59% 24.66% 4.40 Negative

INV RET 50.15% 40.21% �0.61 ��

EXTRA INC 14.66% 11.10% �0.93 �� aFIN EXP 24.31% 12.93% �5.00 Positive� bOTH ASSET 8.99% 5.52% �2.39 Positive�

OUT BAL 100.89% 134.66% 1.21 ��

OTH LIAB 12.20% 12.85% 0.29 �� cFIX ASSET 6.55% 4.33% �1.62 Positive�

ASSETS 5.71 5.49 �0.69 �

The Univariate analysis was performed on the indicators’ means over the Venezuelan financial crisis. Three 6-month periods are considered, ending in December 1993, June 1994 and December 1994. The second column shows the means of each variable for the failed banks. The third column provides the means for the banks that did not fail. The last column shows the t-statistic for the differences in means.

a Indicates 1% significance level. b Indicates 5% significance level. c Indicates 10% significance level.

hazard model. The sample was split into two groups: failed and non-failed banks. I calculated the differences in means of the explanatory variables of both groups and tested the statistical significance of those differences. The means are calculated averaging the three 6-month periods where the failures occurred.13 My goal was to determine whether the proposed variables, analyzed alone, might have an impact on the bank failures, before using them together in the hazard model.

The univariate comparison of mean differences confirms the predictions to a Ž .large extent see Table 4 . All CAMEL indicators, including the intermediation

indicator, have highly significant differences in their means. The failed banks presented a lower capitalization, less relative operating expenses, lower profitabil- ity, lower liquidity and lower investments in government bonds.

All the signs were as predicted, except for the efficiency indicator. That means that non-failing banks had more operating costs as percentage of their financial income. There are two possible explanations for this. First, it should be seen as an expenses composition indicator and not as an efficiency indicator. In particular, when one looks at the sign and significance for the FIN EXP indicator, one finds�

that the typical failing bank had less relative operating expenses and more relative

13 The values to be averaged were taken at the end of each of these three periods: December 1993; June 1994; and December 1994.

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financial expenses. The important goal in the cost efficiency management for a Venezuelan bank was to keep financial expenses lower without entering into an interest-rate war and to keep the expenses in operations at an adequate level. Second, failed banks cut their operating expenses as a last resort measure when they were in financial trouble. To assimilate these explanations, one has to look at the situation of the Venezuelan banking system during the crisis. When the first banks failed, and after signs of possible trouble in other banks began appearing, fiercer competition was triggered. The more financial problems a bank had, the more aggressive it was in cutting operating expenses, increasing their deposit interest rates, and showing accounting profits.

Given the financial intermediation function of a bank, the intermediation index sign is quite interesting. A bank with a higher percentage of assets in government bonds, rather than in loans, is deviating from its financial intermediation function. However, the Venezuelan economic situation affecting banks during the 1993�1995 crisis produced an uncharacteristic situation, where government bonds meant a low-risk investment with an adequate return. During the 1993�1995 period, several firms defaulted on their loans. Therefore, few new loans were being given, contributing to the government bonds’ attractiveness. As a result, non-failing banks had more government bonds investments during the crisis period than they would have in more stable situations.

It is important to point out that banks were not obliged to purchase government bonds. Government debt was available in the internal market to any investor. The perceived risk of the Venezuelan government did not make its obligation risk-free. However, the risk was relatively low in comparison to the high percentage of bad performing loans at the moment of the crisis.

Others indicators, with significant differences in their means, were OTH AS-�

SET and FIX ASSET, both with positive influence on the probability of default.�

The non-failed banks had more assets concentrated in the ‘other assets’ and ‘fixed assets’ accounts. A possible interpretation for their signs is that ‘other assets’ was an account where banks hide bad performing assets, and a bank with more ‘fixed assets’ can be considered as less efficient in a profit sense.

Although the other four variables do not show significant differences, I decided to keep them in the hazard model to analyze their impact on the timing of bank failures and as control variables. The proportional-hazard model also measured the effect of all these variables on the bank probability of failure.

5. The hazard model specification

Without control for correlation across characteristics, a univariate analysis is solely suggestive and cannot ensure whether the differences are related to the proxies of interest or other factors. Use a hazard model of bank failures to examine whether these results can be supported when one controls for correlations across characteristics.

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The model utilized in this paper is the proportional-hazard model first developed Ž .by Cox 1972 . Using this method, I modeled the Venezuelan banks time-to-failure

as a function of different bank-specific characteristics. I used a proportional-hazard model because, by using time-varying covariates, it

allows one to check not only the cross-sectional importance of each financial factor, but also to consider the factors’ time series effect on each bank failure, and it solves the problem of limited number of observations of the Venezuelan banking crisis case.

The focus of the hazard model is cross-sectional, but it allows the measurement of each cross-sectional observation at different times, taking into account the time between measuring the observation and the event of bank failure. A more common logit or probit model would be inefficient not only because of the limited number of cross-sectional observations in this case, but also because I would be leaving out some useful information considered in the hazard model, such as the length of time that the bank survives, after its characteristics are taken into account.

Hazard models, also called duration models, are commonly employed to analyze Žtime-to-failure events. These models were first used in engineering e.g. time-to-

. Žfailure of materials and in medicine e.g. survival time of patients under treat- .ment . The hazard model also has been previously used to examine a number of

finance issues, including the time that firms spend under Chapter 11 protection Ž . ŽBandopadhyaya, 1994; Li, 1999 , the rate of new firm survival Audretsch and

. Ž .Mahmood, 1995 , and the rate of IPO survival Hensler et al., 1997 . In a related Ž .context, Shumway 2001 uses a hazard model to forecast bankruptcy more accu-

Ž . Ž .rately. Related to this paper, Weelock and Wilson 1995, 2000 , Whalen 1991 and Ž .Lane et al. 1986 have used this method to explain bank failures in the United

States. In duration analysis, the interest is centered on an event that ends a length of

time or duration. In this case, the duration time, measured in 6-month periods,14 is defined as the time until the bank failure. For this model, bank failure is defined as the last 6-month period of financial statement publication before government intervention. The government intervention was defined as the moment in which the regulators closed the bank or took over the property of the bank’s equity. Hence, I have three different failure dates: the last financial statements issued by the eight

Ž .banks in the first wave of failures December 1993 ; the eight banks failing in the Žsecond wave from August 1994 to February 1995, which issued their last state-

.ments in June 1994 ; and the last failed bank, which issued its last statement in December 1994.15 These dates are in Table 2. Non-failed banks are treated as censored in the proportional-hazard model.

14 Venezuelan commercial banks published complete financial statements semiannually. Monthly balance sheets become available only after the crisis.

15 One of the frequently cited disadvantages of hazard models is the difficulty of defining the failure event accurately. In this case, although the model failure does not exactly coincide with the actual failure event, taking the last date of financial statements publication by the failed bank as the failure event is a very reasonable assumption.

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To estimate the model, I used the semi-parametric ‘partial likelihood’ approach Ž . Ž . Ž .proposed by Cox 1972, 1975 and described in Cox and Oakes 1984 Chapter 7 ,

where the bank’s time-to-failure depends on the time-varying covariates explained in Section 3. The estimation is semi-parametric because no baseline hazard is specified. The Appendix A shows the technical details of the proportional-hazard model utilized here.

6. Hazard model estimation and results

The estimation results are in Table 5, in six model specifications. The model in Ž .the first column I includes all the covariates discussed previously. The other

columns present variations of this specification. The reported coefficients have to be interpreted as the covariate effect on the hazard rate or instantaneous probabil- ity of default.

The results are generally consistent with the univariate analysis. The EFFIC, ROA and INTERM indicators are highly significant with the same sign predicted by the univariate analysis. A bank with higher operative costs, higher return on assets and higher investments in government bonds was less probable to fail.

Unlike in the univariate analysis, the CAMEL’s liquidity indicator resulted in no significant effect on the hazard rate. The ‘other assets’ indicator, significant in the univariate analysis, is insignificant in the hazard model. EXTRA INC, OUT BAL� �

and OTH LIAB are also insignificant, as they are in the univariate analysis.�

Ž .When I take out the ROA indicator from the model columns II�IV , the Ž .financial expenses indicator FIN EXP becomes significant. Moreover, when I�

Ž .take out other controls column IV , the capitalization and the investments return indicators also became significant. A bank with a higher capitalization, a higher investments return and lower financial expenses was less probable to fail. All these effects are as expected and consistent with the univariate analysis. However, the interaction between the efficiency and the financial expenses indicators is espe-

Ž .cially interesting. When both are included in the model column I , only the Ž .efficiency indicator EFFIC shows significance, but when I leave in only the

Ž .financial expenses indicator FIN EXP , it turns out to be significant, suggesting�

that both indicators are measuring the same effect. This conclusion is consistent with the story noted earlier about a bank that both cuts operating expenses and increases deposit interest rates.

One can attribute the few differences observed between the univariate analysis as well as the hazard model to the fact that the hazard model additionally measures the timing of the variable.

The two most robust results from the hazard model estimation are that banks with higher profitability and higher proportion of government bonds in their assets

Ž .composition higher liquidity are less likely to fail. These results are consistent Ž .with Weelock and Wilson 2000 . They found that banks with higher profitability

Ž .and less loans in their assets composition higher liquidity were in a lower risk of Ž .default, using a hazard model in a sample of US banks. Logan 2001 , using a logit

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�50 45

Table 5 Cox proportional-hazard estimation

I II III IV V VI

CAP 1.217 �15.434 �10.620 �17.293 c0.074 �1.499 �1.199 �1.683

EFFIC �16.183 �9.692 �7.672 b b b�2.333 �2.081 �2.476

ROA �73.983 �73.110 �41.573 c a b�1.688 �3.400 �2.158

LIQUID �2.442 1.130 �1.080 �0.651 0.373 �0.505

INTERM �10.577 �7.564 �6.015 �8.175 �6.570 �6.273 b b b b b b�2.240 �2.021 �2.003 �2.469 �2.043 �2.034

INV RET �1.178 �0.885 �1.500� c�1.221 �1.227 �1.850

EXTRA INC 1.119 �1.880 �3.522�

0.304 �0.645 �1.233 FIN EXP 2.473 12.419 10.642 8.366 7.326�

a a b b0.443 2.755 2.82 2.115 2.003 OTH ASSET �6.255 �0.905�

�0.698 �0.104 OUT BAL 0.487 0.226 0.517�

0.664 0.519 1.041 OTH LIAB 7.443 1.325 �1.539 7.152�

1.139 0.294 �0.392 1.166 FIX ASSET 8.801 10.969 7.239 19.778�

0.757 1.288 1.223 1.965 ASSETS �0.016 �0.159 �0.043

�0.031 �0.366 �0.161 LLF �43.41 �47.51 �48.68 �45.30 �46.64 �47.96

This table presents the results of the proportional-hazard partial likelihood estimation, including controls. The estimated coefficients are reported for six different model specifications. The z-values are in italics below each coefficient. The last row provides the maximized log likelihood value for each regression.

a Indicates 1% significance level. b Indicates 5% significance level. c Indicates 10% significance level.

model, also finds that poor profitability and illiquidity are common among small UK bank failures in the 1990s.

The bank’s size, which is considered important in studies about the US banking system,16 does not have anything to do with the Venezuelan bank failures. Small and big banks failed with the same probability.

Given the obvious macroeconomic influence on the Venezuelan bank failures, I also model the same hazard model including two exogenous macro-variables:, the non-oil GNP real growth lagged one 6-month period; and the average oil prices

16 Ž .For instance, see Weelock and Wilson 2000 .

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�5046

return in the previous three 6-month periods. These macro-variables do not vary among banks, so their influence on the hazard model is only interesting as time-series control variables. The results, not reported here, do not change with the inclusion of these macro-variables, corroborating the robustness of the model by only including bank-specific variables

7. Summary and conclusions

The Venezuelan banking crisis has been one of the most severe crises�as a percentage of a country’s GDP�in world history. Nevertheless, the bank failures that occurred during this crisis have not been modeled.

Using a non-parametric proportional-hazard model, I find that a bank’s ability to generate more and sounder profits during the crisis was the most important factor. The banks with higher ROA, and more investments in government bonds were less probable to fail. The result for the government bonds is quite interesting. The possession of government bonds and funds has been pointed out as negative because of the financial intermediation role that a bank should have. However, as a simple univariate analysis for the Venezuelan crisis shows, the fact that non-failed banks feature a higher proportion of their assets in government bonds instead of loans is one of the main reasons for their soundness and ability to emerge from the crisis. The investments in government bonds have to be seen as an adequate-re- turn�low-risk asset allocation alternative for Venezuelan banks during the 1993�95 crises that provided additional liquidity during these troubled times.

Overall, the two most robust results of this paper: banks that survived the crisis Ž .were more profitable and had more liquid and sounder assets government bonds ,

Ž . Ž .are consistent with the findings of Weelock and Wilson 2000 and Logan 2001 , in samples of US and UK banks, respectively.

I also find that a bank with less operational costs and more financial expenses was more probable to fail. The interaction between these two variables observed in the hazard model analysis suggests that during the Venezuelan banking crisis, banks on the verge of failure cut operating costs and increased interest rates in an effort to attract depositors and show higher accounting earnings. Higher capitaliza- tion and higher return on investments are other important factors for a bank’s lower probability of default.

A more profitable bank was regarded as sounder and better managed.17 Since the depositors were unable to know about the loans’ quality, they looked at the bank profits as an indicator of soundness and at the interest rate paid for deposits as a measure of how risky the bank was.18

As a limitation, it is important to point out that the results presented here are subject to the public financial information available at the time of this crisis. The

17 This fact is reinforced when one see that the Venezolano de Credito bank was perceived as the soundest bank in the system during the crisis, and this was also the most profitable bank in these years.

18 The banks did not report the troubled and bad loans until 1996.

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�50 47

attractiveness of my analysis, however, is its quantitative objectivity and the possibility of getting measurable results of the financial indicators’ effects on the Venezuelan bank failures.

The effects found in this paper can be translated to a more general case of a banking system in a volatile economy environment typical of a developing country.

Ž .Regulators in such cases should pay attention to: i the process of profits Ž .generation by the banks in the system; ii how government bonds provide banks

Ž .with sound support for surviving hostile economic environments; and iii the degree in which customers look at the interest rates paid for their deposits as a measure of the bank’s risk when the system is under macroeconomic pressure.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank very helpful comments from an anonymous referee, Andres Almazan, Thomas Moeller, Laura Starks, Paul Wilson and seminar participants at the University of Texas at Austin, at IESA and at the 2000 BALAS meetings in

Ž .Caracas, Venezuela. I also thank IESA Caracas, Venezuela for providing finan- cial support and the data used in this paper. Any remaining errors are my sole responsibility.

Appendix A: The proportional-hazard model

This Appendix presents the details of the proportional-hazard model introduced in Section 5. Let t be the failure time for bank i. The data for each bank arei,J i

Ž .observed in j periods j � 1...J , the last observed period being June 1996. Thei banks that survived until this date without failing are considered to be censored observations in the model, with t � June 1996. To consider this censoring, ai,J i dummy variable d is included. The dummy variable is equal to 1 if the bank isi

Ž .failed before June 1996 not censored, t � June 1996 , and equal to 0 if the banki,J i has not failed at June 1996, that is, if it is a censored observation.

Ž .For the duration T , I need to define a distribution function: F t � Prob Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .T � t , a density function f t � dF t �dt, a survivor function S t � 1 � F t and a hazard function.

Ž . Ž . Ž Ž ..Pr t � T � t � h�T t f t d lnS t Ž . Ž .� t � lim � � 1Ž .h S t dth�0

The hazard rate is the continuous probability of failure, which is the probability of failing in a small period of time h, given the bank survived until time t. The duration is usually modeled using some known distribution families such as: exponential; gamma; Weibull; lognormal; log-logistic; and Gompertz�Makeham.

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�5048

With these functions, one can derive the hazard function. However, I would like to introduce explanatory variables that can affect the distribution.

Introducing the effect of explanatory variables in the proportional-hazard model is simple. One just needs to multiply the hazard function by a scale factor:

Ž Ž . . Ž . Ž Ž . . Ž .� t , X t ,�,� � � t exp X t � 2i 0 0 i

Ž .Here � t is the base-line hazard, and � is the vector of parameters affecting the0 Ž .time-varying covariates vector X t , which is observed at times t , t , . . . , t .i j i,1 i,2 i,J i

Ž .X t is permitted to vary between intervals, but it is assumed to remain constanti j � � Ž .during each interval t ; t . In the estimation, X t includes the variablesi,j i,j�1 i j

presented in Section 3. To estimate the model, I use the semi-parametric ‘partial likelihood’ approach

Ž . Ž . Ž .proposed by Cox 1972, 1975 and described in Cox and Oakes 1984 Chapter 7 . It is semi-parametric because the parameter vector � is estimated without specify- ing the base-line hazard. The main advantage of using this approach is that one does not need to define the base-line hazard, density function, or survivor function. On the other hand, the cost of using partial likelihood estimation is a certain loss of efficiency considered small, and null in asymptotic results.19

Let me order the duration times, t � t � . . . � t , and define a ‘risk set’ for1 2 n � 4each bank i as R � k: t t , the set of banks that did not fail before bankŽ i. k,Jk i,J i

Ž .i failure. Let me also define the ‘history’ H t as the collection of all failures andi,J i censoring before t .i,J i

Ž .Then the conditional probability of bank i failing at t , given H t as:i,J i i,J i

Ž Ž . .� t , X t ,�J i i J iŽ Ž .. Ž .Pr i�H t � 3nJ i Ž Ž . .� t , X t ,�Ý J i k J i

k R Ž i.

This equation represents the contribution of observation i to the likelihood function. To account for failure, the dummy variable d is included in thei numerator. Non-failed bank observations do not contribute to the numerator of

Ž .the likelihood function. After one considers Eq. 3 and eliminates the base-line hazard, the likelihood function is:

d in Ž Ž . .exp X t ,�i J i Ž .LF � 4Ł Ž Ž . .i�1 exp X t ,�Ý k J i

k R Ž i.

19 Ž .For more information, please see Cox and Oakes 1984, pp. 120�123 . Kalbfleisch and Prentice Ž .1980 do a graphical comparison between a fully parametric estimation and the proportional-hazard

Ž . Ž .model proposed here. They did not find a significant difference. Efron 1977 and Oakes 1977 also argue that the parameters, found through the Cox proportional-hazard Model, are ‘reasonably rich’.

( )C.A. Molina � Emerging Markets Re�iew 3 2002 31�50 49

After one takes logs and makes substitutions, the log-likelihood function is written as:

n

Ž . Ž Ž . . Ž .LLF � d X t � � ln exp X t � 5Ý Ýj i J i k J i½ 5 j�1 k�R Ž i.

Then, this log-likelihood function is maximized to estimate the parameter �. The parameter � significance can be analyzed through z-values because its distribution is asymptotically normal.

References

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Bandopadhyaya, A., 1994. An estimation of the hazard rate of firms under Chapter 11 protection. Rev. Econ. Statistics 76, 346�350.

Berger, A.N., Davies, S.M., 1998. The information content of bank examinations. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 14, 117�144.

Cole, R.A., Gunther, J.W., 1998. Predicting bank failures: a comparison of on- and off-site monitoring systems. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 13, 103�117.

Ž .Cox, D.R., 1972. Regression models and life-tables with discussion . J. R. Stat. Soc. 34B, 187�220. Cox, D.R., 1975. Partial likelihood. Biometrika 62, 269�276. Cox, D.R., Oakes, D., 1984. Analysis of Survival Data. Chapman and Hall, London and New York. DeYoung, R., 1998. Management quality and X-inefficiency in national banks. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 13,

5�22. ŽEfron, B., 1977. The Efficiency of Cox’s Likelihood Function for Censored Data in Theory and

.Methods . J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 72, 557�565. Garcia, G., 1997. Lecciones de la Crisis Bancaria de Venezuela. Ediciones IESA, Caracas. Garcia-Herrero, A., 1997. Banking crisis in Latin America in the 1990s: lessons from Argentina,

Paraguay and Venezuela. Working Paper 97-140. International Monetary Fund. Gilbert, R.A., Meyer, A.P., Vaughan, M.D., 2000. The role of a CAMEL downgrade model in bank

surveillance. Working Paper 2000-021A. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Hensler, D.A., Rutherford, R.C., Springer, T.M., 1997. The survival of initial public offerings in the

aftermarket. J. Financ. Res. 20, 93�110. Kalbfleisch, J.D., Prentice, R.L., 1980. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data. John Wiley and

Sons, New York. Lane, W.R., Looney, S.W., Wansley, J.W., 1986. An application of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model

to bank failure. J. Banking Finance 10, 511�531. Li, K., 1999. Bayesian Analysis of Duration Models: An Application to Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.

Economics Lett. 63, 305�312. Logan, A., 2001. The United Kingdoms small banks’ crisis of the early 1990s. What were the leading

indicators of failure? Bank of England Working Paper No 139. Molano, W.T., 1997. Financial reverberations: the Latin American banking system during the mid-1990s.

SBC Warburg Working Paper. Social Science Research Network. Morris, F., 1990. Latin America’s banking systems in the 1980s. World Bank Discussion Papers 81. Oakes, D., 1977. The asymptotic information in censored survival data. Biometrika 64, 441�448. Rojas-Suarez, L., Weisbrod, S.R., 1995. Financial fragilities in Latin America. Ocasional Paper 32.

International Monetary Fund. Shumway, T., 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: a simple hazard model. J. Bus. 74,

101�124.

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Siems, T.F., Barr, R.S., 1998. Benchmarking the Productive Efficiency of U.S. Banks. Financ. Industry Stud. 0, 11�24.

The Economist. A Fresh Start? Selling Venezuela’s Banks, December 14, 1996, 75�76. Trebat, T.J., 1991. The banking system crisis in Latin America. Contemp. Policy Issues 9, 54�66. Weelock, D.C., Wilson, P.W., 1995. Explaining bank failures: deposit insurance, regulation and effi-

ciency. Rev. Econ. Statistics 77, 689�700. Weelock, D.C., Wilson, P.W., 2000. Why do banks disappear? The determinants of U.S. bank failures

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1-s2.0-S1572308912000605-main.pdf

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Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Financial Stability

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfstabil

theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics

obert DeYounga,∗, Michal Kowalikb, Jack Reidhill c

University of Kansas, 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawrence, KS 66045, United States Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, MO 64198, United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20219, United States

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 8 August 2011 eceived in revised form 21 June 2012 ccepted 14 September 2012 vailable online 3 October 2012

EL classification: 21

a b s t r a c t

We model the failed bank resolution process as a repeated game between a utility-maximizing govern- ment resolution authority (RA) and a profit-maximizing banking industry. Limits to resolution technology and political/economic pressure create incentives for the RA to bail out failed complex banks; the inabil- ity of the RA to credibly commit to closing these banks creates an incentive for bank complexity. We solve the game in mixed strategies and find equilibrium conditions remarkably descriptive of govern- ment responses to actual and potential large bank insolvencies during the recent financial crisis. The central role of the technology constraint in this model highlights a crucial determinant of failed bank

28

eywords: ank failures ailed bank resolution

resolution policy that has been overlooked in the theory literature to date; without improved resolution technologies, future bank bailouts are inevitable. The effects of political pressure in this model remind us that regulatory reform (e.g., Dodd-Frank) is only as good as the regulators that implement the reform.

© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

t F o P F a t t f h “ t t

l t d b

ankruptcy DIC

. Introduction

Government bailouts of large insolvent financial institutions as one of the most critical and controversial events of the recent

nternational financial crisis. While the details of these bailouts iffered, the underlying policy motivations were the same: to pre- ent the financial troubles at single institutions from spreading to ther parts of the financial system, thus avoiding a collapse of credit arkets and disastrous macro-economic consequences. By guaran-

eeing that creditors of these institutions suffered few if any losses, olicymakers struck an implicit bargain with the financial system: reserve financial market liquidity today at the cost of increasing he moral hazard incentives of financial market participants in the uture. In other words, policymakers traded market discipline in xchange for market liquidity.

We explore the implications of this policy tradeoff for the risk omposition of the banking industry. In our theory model, we stress

crucial determinant of policy that has received scant attention

n the previous literature: the limited set of failed bank resolu- ion technologies that can leave regulators with little choice but to ail out systemically important banks. Our study is timely, as the

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 785 864 1806; fax: +1 785 864 5328. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. DeYoung), [email protected]

M. Kowalik), [email protected] (J. Reidhill).

t o w T d o s h

572-3089/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2012.09.003

echnology sets of bank resolution authorities—most notably the ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—are in the process f expanding. For example, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer rotection Act of 2010 (a.k.a. the Dodd-Frank Act) expands the DIC’s resolution authority beyond insolvent banks, and gives the gency “orderly liquidation authority” to place systemically impor- ant financial companies of all types into receivership and liquidate hem. Dodd-Frank also mandates that financial institutions per- orm more of their derivatives trading through centralized clearing ouses and requires systemically important financial firms to file living wills” with the FDIC—changes that improve the FDIC’s ability o accurately value the assets, and better understand the produc- ion processes, of troubled complex banking firms.

But having authority to resolve insolvent banks is not equiva- ent to actually wielding that authority. Our model also emphasizes he likelihood that mounting political and/or economic pressure uring a financial crisis can lead even a well-armed regulator to ailout systemically important banks. The public relations message hat accompanied Dodd-Frank was clear and seemingly unequiv- cal. At bill’s signing, President Obama said “The American people ill never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.

here will be no more taxpayer-funded bailouts. Period.” Like most

eclarative statements, this one contains some wiggle room: ruling ut “taxpayer-funded bailouts” does not rule out bailouts funded by ome other third party and hence does not by itself reduce moral azard incentives. Dodd-Frank provides a resolution mechanism

inanci

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w t o made for preserving market liquidity while still imposing at least a modicum of discipline on depositors. Kaufman and Seelig (2002) proposed a combination of quick access to insured deposit funds

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

n which losses are borne by stockholders and unsecured credi- ors at the insolvent firm, with losses larger than this shared across he entire banking industry. But this new structure is untested, and egulatory credibility will not be established until a firm previously onsidered “too big to fail” is closed and liquidated without creating

crisis in financial markets. Our model is a straightforward, repeated game between a

tility-maximizing resolution authority that chooses between clos- ng and bailing out failed banks, and an expected profit-maximizing anking industry that chooses between simple (transparent, easy o unwind) and complex (opaque, difficult to unwind) loan pro- uction processes. The regulator values resolutions that generate oth market discipline and market liquidity, but it is forced to rade the former for the latter (i.e., choose a bail out) when its esolution technology is insufficient to close a failed complex ank without imposing spillover costs on the macro-economy. he key innovation in our model is the inclusion of a technology onstraint—a realistic condition not considered in previous mod- ls of bank resolution—and tightening or loosening this constraint rovides key results. In equilibrium, insufficient resolution tech- ology, combined with short-run political or economic pressure, upport a too-complex-to-fail (TCTF) resolution policy; this inabil- ty of regulators to credibly commit to closing failed complex banks ncourages continued or increased bank complexity. These condi- ions are remarkably descriptive of government responses to actual nd potential large bank insolvencies before and during the recent nancial crisis. Improvements in resolution technology have over ime allowed the FDIC to close increasingly large and complex anks, but economic and political pressures during the financial rises resulted in resolution choices (e.g., allowing already TCTF anks to acquire insolvent TCTF banks) that exacerbated the gap etween bank complexity and the ability of regulators to close ailed complex banks. In the end, a deeper technological toolbox an be useless if regulators favor preserving short-run liquidity over mposing long-run discipline.

It is important to state what our model is not about. The banks in ur model do not choose to be risky or safe; rather, they choose to e either complex or simple, where complexity is unrelated to the robability that a bank fails, but makes a bank difficult for regula- ors to unwind should it fail. Thus, the regulator in our model is not hoosing its strategy in order to minimize moral hazard incentives hat make banks more prone to take pre-failure risks, but rather to educe the post-failure complexity that makes it necessary to bail ut failed banks. These distinctions set our paper apart from most f the theoretical literature on bank failure regulation.

Because the U.S. has the longest history of deposit insurance and ailed bank resolution, we couch our discussion of bank resolution uthority in terms of the FDIC; nevertheless, our findings have clear mplications for bank failure resolution outside the U.S. The remain- er of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical radeoff between preserving liquidity and imposing discipline in ailed bank resolution policy in the U.S. Section 3 describes the echniques used by the FDIC to resolve failed banks and how this echnology set has evolved over time, including during and after he financial crisis. (A substantially more detailed discussion of the

aterial in Sections 2 and 3, along with an historical appendix, are vailable in the longer working paper version of this study.) Section

presents our theory model and analyzes its main results. Section 5 iscusses the implications of our analysis for bank resolution policy.

. Market liquidity versus market discipline

Commercial banks play a central role in our economy, but heir inherent fragility requires special regulatory attention. Absent e

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 613

ppropriate regulation, depositors and short-term creditors may ithdraw their funds from banks experiencing declines in asset

uality, prompting reductions in economic liquidity beyond the roubled banks themselves. Bank failures can also reduce liquid- ty by disrupting borrower access to credit (e.g., Ashcraft, 2005). epending on the size and/or number of the affected banks, these isruptions to market liquidity can be debilitating for the econ- my at large.1 Repeated banking panics in the United States during he nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the creation f the FDIC in 1934, a new federal agency with the mandate to nsure bank deposits and the power to seize and quickly resolve ailed banks. Deposit insurance reduced incentives for small depos- tors to run and precipitate bank failure, and bypassing lengthy ankruptcy proceedings for failed banks reduced disruptions to epositor liquidity, borrower liquidity and payments.

The potential cost of preserving liquidity in this fashion is he creation of moral hazard incentives and the resulting loss of

arket discipline. Like all regulatory solutions to market failure, eposit insurance protections and bank resolution procedures are econd-best arrangements that result in incentive incompatibili- ies. Knowing (or suspecting) their deposits are protected from loss, nsured (and to a lesser extent, uninsured) depositors have little ncentive to monitor the financial condition of their banks, and have he perverse incentive to make deposits at troubled banks paying bove-market interest rates. The deposit insurance put option gives anagers of troubled banks incentives to “gamble for resurrec-

ion” by paying above-market rates for deposits and investing those unds in risky loans. Extending deposit insurance protection to all ank creditors in failed banks, or providing financial assistance to eep insolvent banks open, reduces market discipline further and xacerbates the risk-taking behaviors of both bank depositors and ank managers.

.1. Regulator incentives

As a first principle, one might reasonably presume that gov- rnment deposit insurers strongly identify with their mission of rotecting insured depositors and, when administratively possible, his culture can easily err on the side of protecting uninsured depos- tors and non-deposit creditors as well. Such predilections may be xacerbated when political and/or economic pressures arise to pre- ent illiquidity at all costs—for instance, during economic crises hen numerous large banks become insolvent. Whether or not

hese predilections rise to the level of serious principle-agent prob- ems is the subject of some debate (Kane, 1990; Mishkin, 1992). ane and Klingebiel (2004) weigh in with an especially cynical ssessment: Regulators exhibit a bias toward bailing out all deposi- ors because they do not want to be blamed (rightly or wrongly) for he bank failure by disgruntled (unprotected) depositors. Looking rom a different angle, Kane (1995) shows how existing legal and egulatory arrangements (including the prompt corrective action eatures of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-

ent Act of 1991) create incentives for regulators to practice orbearance.

Regardless of regulator motive, making uninsured depositors hole reduces deposit market discipline: it reinforces the incen-

ives for depositors to lend to risky banks, and it enhances the value f the deposit insurance put option. Numerous proposals have been

1 Hoggarth et al. (2002) estimate that the economic costs of a systemic bank failure vent could run as high as 15–20% of a nation’s GDP.

6 inanci

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14 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

nd a partial “advance dividend payment” to uninsured deposi- ors, the amount of the latter based on a first approximation of the alue of the failed bank’s assets.2 Slight delays in paying deposi- ors may have positive market discipline effects by imposing costs n depositors who knowingly provide funds to risky banks; under his line of thought, if authorities can credibly commit to such a ractice, depositors will have incentives to monitor the banks and emand higher rates on funds they deposit in risky banks. A con- inuing line of policy proposals in this same vein is provided by aufman (2004), Mayes (2004), Kaufman and Eisenbeis (2005) and arrison et al. (2007).

.2. Resolution policy in practice

Fig. 1 briefly describes the main resolution techniques used by he FDIC since its inception; some of these techniques have only ecently become available to the FDIC via legal changes or improved echnologies, while others are no longer available or have fallen nto disuse over time.3 The various techniques are displayed in rank rder based on the degree to which they preserve liquidity. Because here is a roughly inverse relationship exists between preserving

arket liquidity and enhancing market discipline among these echniques, Fig. 1 also illustrates the primary economic tradeoff liquidity versus discipline) facing policymakers. Finally, the fig- re also shows that borrower liquidity and depositor liquidity tend o be positively correlated across these techniques—for example, hen a receivership liquidates a failed bank’s assets gradually over

ime, some depositors will be denied full access to their (uninsured) unds, and some borrowers will be denied full access to their lines f credit, until enough assets are sold to cover these obligations.

Over the past three-quarters of a century, bank resolution prac- ices in the U.S. have swung between the extremes of Fig. 1 pectrum. Prior to the establishment of the FDIC in 1933, bank ailures were typically resolved in a manner analogous to chap- er 7 bankruptcies of non-bank corporations. This approach clearly avored imposing discipline over preserving liquidity. Insolvent anks were closed and a receiver was named to manage the resolu- ion, usually the state banking authority for state chartered banks r the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for national anks. The receiver was responsible for liquidating the assets of he failed bank and repaying the depositors and other creditors of he bank. This process could take many years, during which depos- tors and other liability holders of the failed bank lost access to heir funds.4 Borrowers also faced large costs, having to establish ew credit relationships at other banks while still having to pay off ny existing loans from the closed bank. A number of studies have ocused on the economic impact of bank failures during the 1920s

nd early 1930s; these studies find that bank failures by them- elves, even if unaccompanied by an extended financial panic, had egative effects on the economy (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris

2 There is an important difference between an uninsured depositor dividend ased on perfected asset estimates and the “advance dividend” to uninsured depos-

tors. The latter is based on a conservative estimate of the value of the failed bank n cases in which the resolution authority wishes to provide liquidity but lacks he time, information, or other resources necessary to complete a full insurance etermination. 3 Additional details concerning the resolution techniques listed in Fig. 1, as well

s a short history of their use in the U.S., are contained in a companion Appendix A hat is available upon request from the authors.

4 Anari et al. (2005) showed that depositors and other creditors of national banks hat failed in 1929 received only 66.12% of their funds; only about 20% of this amount 13.22 cents on the dollar) were returned during the first year, approximately double hat amount was returned during the second year, and declining amounts were eturned each year after that. The average liquidation period was about four years.

a s

a t

T i l p U i U c M A

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

nd Mason, 2003; Kupiec and Ramirez, 2009; Ramirez and Shively, 012).

The creation of FDIC and the introduction of federal deposit nsurance greatly mitigated the immediate ill effects of bank fail- re. Insured depositors (and often uninsured creditors as well) ere made whole immediately when a failed bank was closed, and

epeated application of this practice defused incentives for bank uns. Moreover, most borrowers retained access to their credit lines uring FDIC failed bank resolutions. While over 10,000 banks had ailed during the 1920s alone, only a handful of banks failed annu- lly during the 1940s through the 1970s. But polices that favored epositor liquidity to the exclusion of market discipline created

ax practices and moral hazard incentives. The extreme supervi- ory forbearance practices by regulatory authorities during the U.S. avings and loan crisis of the 1980s is the textbook example. Insol- ent thrift institutions were permitted to continue operating, and in he most extreme cases of forbearance, authorities provided finan- ial assistance to thrifts without removing thrift management and ithout a pledge of additional support from thrift owners.5 As Kane

1989, 1995) has argued, allowing these “zombie” thrifts to oper- te, virtually without any safeguards, permitted thrift managers to amble for resurrection by making risky loans with big financial psides. Ultimately, these extreme practices cost $153 billion in esolution costs, with the U.S. taxpayers paying about $125 billion f this (Curry and Shibut, 2000).

Congress responded to the savings and loan crisis (and the ave of commercial bank failures that followed) with legislation esigned to tilt failed bank policy away from blanket protec- ion of liquidity and toward imposing at least some discipline on ninsured creditors and bank management. The Federal Deposit

nsurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 con- trained the decision-making latitude of bank supervisors and egulators. Among other changes, FDICIA established a “prompt orrective action” (PCA) regime that restricted the activities of trou- led institutions before they became insolvent; mandated that the DIC resolve failed banks in the “least costly” manner; increased the requency and regularity of safety and soundness examinations; nd took an initial step toward risk-based deposit insurance pri- ing. But these steps proved to be inadequate in the fall of 2008, hen the FDIC was powerless to resolve failing financial institu-

ions such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Citigroup and Bank of merica, where were either too large, too complex, or were orga- ized as non-bank corporations beyond the legal reach of the FDIC. o avoid a massive reduction in economy-wide liquidity, the Trea- ury and the Federal Reserve now had no choice but to intervene, nd it required a series of extraordinary and costly steps to stabilize redit markets, shore up the solvency of large financial institutions, nd prevent the systemic crisis from spreading even further.6

After the events in the fall of 2008, policy makers sought to cre- te a set of authorities that would allow an “orderly liquidation” of ystemically important bank and non-bank financial firms, while

5 The assistance came in the form of regulatory accounting adjustments that llowed thrifts to carry nonperforming loans at artificially high values, thus inflating heir accounting capital and making the thrift “book solvent.”

6 A partial list of actions taken during September and October of 2008 includes: he Federal Reserve Board created hundreds of billions of dollars in special lend- ng facilities and direct asset purchase programs, all aimed at providing increasing iquidity for suppliers of short-term credit. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York rovided an $85 billion line of credit to American International Group (AIG), a large .S. insurance company that also experienced a liquidity shortage, due to large losses

n its sales of credit default swaps on subprime mortgage-backed securities. And the .S. Treasury injected $115 billion of equity into eight of the largest U.S. banking ompanies (Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, organ Stanley, State Street, Goldman Sachs, and Wells Fargo) under the Troubled

sset Repurchase Program (TARP).

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 615

Resolution Technique A shor t description of each

resolution technique

Most liquidity preserved

Least li quidity p reserv ed

Open bank assistance Cash or in-kind assistance provided to

bank, ban k o wne rs remain intact

Forbearance

All owi ng inso lvent o r undercapitalized bank to co ntinue to op erate, o ften with old man agemen t intact. No c ash or in-

kind assistan ce is p rovided.

Bridge bank

A tempo rary Nation al Ban k c reated with F DIC in con trol. Assets and mos t liabilities of failed bank transferred to

new bank. Old o wnership, ho lding compan y c red itors, and man agemen t

are severed fr om ban k.

Purchase and assumption Acquirer of failed bank pu rch ases

designa ted assets fr om the failed b ank and assu mes the liab ilit ies.

Partial pa yout

Acquirers o f fail ed ban k may on ly wish to b id on a sub -set o f the failed

banks d epo sits. Re maining depo sit ors paid directl y b y F DIC.

Asset liqu idation

Failed b ank a ssets are li quida ted b y the FDIC o r it s de signe es. Uninsu red

Depositor co verage is limited to the proc eed s of the sale.

ues, in

m h W i t r t a n a t r T e F a p r u s s

3

i r a c t t

r t i a b W t t u b

3

a p p b c d t o o can embark on such sales and other actions without waiting for a reorganization plan to be developed and approved by a bankruptcy judge.7

Fig. 1. A list of failed bank resolution techniq

aintaining market liquidity and forcing stockholders and debt olders to bear the losses in event of failure. Under the Dodd-Frank all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the FDIC

s named as the receiver of such failed financial companies, and he Act provides the FDIC it with the necessary legal authority to esolve these firms. All assets, deposits, and other financial con- racts would transfer to a temporary “bridge financial company” nd the FDIC would provide the bridge company with the liquidity eeded to continue all essential functions and maintain its ongoing sset values (funding made available via an FDIC line of credit with he U.S. Treasury). A new board directors would be appointed to un the temporary firm, which would hire new senior managers. he bridge structure would provide the FDIC with the time nec- ssary to assess the true values of the failed firm’s assets, and the DIC would advance dividend payments to non-insured creditors s these assessments allowed. To support this orderly liquidation rocess, all large complex financial institutions are required to file esolution plans (so-called “living wills”) with regulators on a reg- lar basis. Ideally, the FDIC would sell the bridge company—now maller, less complex, and solvent—to private investors within a hort period of time.

. The technology of failed bank resolution

A number of factors constrain the ability of banking author- ties to efficiently resolve an insolvent financial firm—that is, to e-organize its ownership and management, re-allocate its assets,

nd at the same time preserve the liquidity of its depositors, reditors and borrowers. We characterize these constraints into hree categories: legal limits that prevent the authorities from aking certain actions; asymmetric or missing information that

o c

order by the amount of liquidity preserved.

etards the resolution process; and economic spillovers due to he shortcomings of the resolution process (systemic effects). The nefficiencies imposed by these constraints may cause banking uthorities to abandon attempts to impose discipline on failed anks and their customers and instead “bail out” these banks. hile in theory these constraints should be less binding under

he Dodd-Frank Act, the constraints remain important for at least wo reasons: the FDIC’s new authorities under Dodd-Frank remain ntested, and these new authorities are not generally available to anking authorities outside the U.S.

.1. Legal limitations

The FDIC’s special legal authority to take over insolvent banks nd act as receiver differs materially from the regular bankruptcy rocedures used to resolve insolvent non-banks. Bankruptcy laws rotect the owners of insolvent firms from their creditors, and ankruptcy proceedings typically take weeks or months to con- lude. In contrast, as receiver the FDIC steps in on behalf of the epositors and other creditors, and the owners never regain con- rol of the firm. The FDIC can act quickly—generally overnight or ver a weekend—to provide depositors with access to all or most f their funds, has broad discretion to sell the bank’s assets, and

7 Bliss and Kaufman (2011) argue that the U.S. bankruptcy practices could be tail- red in a way that lessens or eliminates its inefficiencies when applied to banking ompanies; these changes would arguably allow insolvent banks to be reorganized

6 inanci

i p m t r t B a i fi

3

b d m a p r i r b a c

i c d r a r t t “ i a u d i w a d a f

r c o

u i 2 F o d

r f a

a m m c a

d c t

p p d t m o i fi

3

d fi t m r a t d m

fi a b a c s d a c r s e

4 p

16 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

The FDIC has been granted these special powers because depos- tor illiquidity resulting from a slow, bankruptcy-like resolution rocess would cause disruptions to the payments system, financial arkets, and the real economy. In countries where bank regula-

ors lack these special powers, bankruptcy courts must be used to esolve insolvent banks, creating strong incentives for regulators o subsidize financially troubled banks rather than closing them.8

ut even in the U.S. these powers have been limited. As discussed bove, the FDIC special resolution authority did not extend to the nsolvent non-bank financial companies at the center of the 2008 nancial crisis.

.2. Information problems

Immediately after taking control of an insolvent bank, the FDIC egins the insurance determination process. The aim is to quickly etermine how many of the bank’s deposits are insured, how any of the deposits are uninsured, and to whom these deposits

re owed. Insurance determination has historically been a manual rocess, working from depositor signature cards and other paper ecords kept at banks’ branch offices. Over time, technological mprovements—some as prosaic as requiring banks keep deposit ecords electronically and in uniform format, and equipping mem- ers of the government resolution team with laptop computers nd wireless Internet—have automated this process and is usually ompleted overnight.9

Insured depositors have full and immediate access to the nsured portion of their funds, either at the acquiring bank (for pur- hase and assumption, or P&A, resolutions) or by some form of a irect payout from the FDIC (for asset liquidation or partial payout esolutions). Uninsured depositors do not have immediate and full ccess to their funds, and are issued receivership certificates that epresent their claims. The percentage of their funds they will even- ually receive, and the delay in receiving those funds, is a function of he asset valuation process. Uninsured depositors usually receive a partial dividend” payment relatively quickly, once the FDIC has an nitial estimate of the value of the failed bank’s assets. If the bank’s ssets are complex (e.g., structured asset-backed securities), illiq- id (e.g., loans to small businesses), of questionable quality (e.g., erivatives contracts with troubled counterparties), international

n scope, or otherwise difficult to value, then uninsured depositors ill receive smaller initial dividends and will have to wait longer for

ny additional dividend payments.10 This combination of imme-

iate access to partial funds, delays in receiving additional funds, nd a potential loss of some funds provides substantial liquidity or uninsured depositors while providing incentives under which

ather than being closed or bailed out. These changes in the Bankruptcy Code, if suc- essful, would represent a new resolution technique for banks within the meaning f our model. 8 An international survey conducted by the FDIC in 2000 found that failed banks

sed the regular corporate bankruptcy process in 12 of 18 advanced economies, ncluding Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and the UK (Bennett, 001), although the UK has since adopted legislation (Banking Act, 2009) creating DIC-like bank resolution authority. A more recent World Bank study found that nly 18% of 143 surveyed countries in 2008 had bank insolvency laws separate and ifferent from regular bankruptcy laws (Marinč and Vlahu, 2011). 9 For example, in 2008 the FDIC mandated that large banks establish electronic

ecords containing all of their deposit account information, with the goal of trans- orming insurance determinations from a slow and manually intensive process to n automated overnight process. 10 Cumming and Eisenbeis (2010) propose that complex banking companies adopt

simpler and more transparent form of corporate organization that would arguably ake the asset valuation process faster and more accurate. In the same vein, require- ents that banks conduct derivatives transactions through separately capitalized

entral exchanges could speed the process by reducing the valuation problems ssociated with counterparty default risk.

t c t d t b

l p C t k o a e b c l c s t

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

epositors may better monitor bank risk-taking and potentially dis- ipline the bank by requiring higher interest rates or withdrawing heir funds.

Bank borrowers are also dealt a degree of discipline during this rocess. Borrowers may temporarily lose access to the undrawn ortions of their credit lines and/or a portion of any compensating eposit balances. In a P&A resolution, borrowers retain access to heir existing credit lines in the short-run, but the acquiring bank

ay or may not renew the credit relationship. In a liquidation res- lution, the existing banking relationship dissolves, and borrowers ncur the information costs necessary to establish entirely new nancial relationships with other banks.

.3. Systemic effects

The FDIC is able to impose delays and losses on uninsured epositors at small banks without causing systemic economic and nancial disruptions. In contrast, large banks have hundreds of housands of depositors, borrowers and other counterparties in

arkets throughout the country; imposing delays or losses when esolving a large insolvent bank can cause substantial financial nd economic disruption. As banks grow larger and/or more sys- emically important, the external costs of imposing discipline on epositors, borrowers and bank decision-makers can increase dra- atically. As the FDIC attempts to resolve increasingly larger and/or more

nancially complex failed banks, completing an overnight insur- nce determination and a relatively complete initial asset valuation ecomes more difficult, due to both the sheer number of deposit ccounts to be administered and the large number and potential omplexity of assets to be valued. Fig. 2 illustrates the potential cope of this problem. Prior to 2008, the largest FDIC insurance etermination was First City Houston in 1992 with 322,983 sep- rate deposit accounts; in sobering contrast, Bank of America urrently has over 60 million separate deposit accounts. The dis- uption of such a large number of liquidity arrangements—on both ides of the balance sheet—could have significant macro-economic ffects.

. Modeling the impact of technology on bank resolution olicy

We will now formalize much of the above discussion in a game- heoretic framework. The technology of failed bank resolution is entral to our model, and this marks an innovation to the existing heory literature on bank failure policy. The model allows us to emonstrate how technological limits impact the choices available o the bank resolution authority, leading to increases in both bank ailouts and bank risk-taking.

Our model contains many of the characteristics present in ear- ier theory models of failed bank resolution. Like much of the revious literature (e.g., Freixas, 1999; Goodhart and Huang, 2000; ordella and Yeyati, 2003), the regulator in our model faces a radeoff: it can close a failed bank, and by doing so impose mar- et discipline that reduces moral hazard incentives, or it can bail ut the bank, and by doing so preserve market liquidity and void potential systemic harm to financial markets and the macro- conomy. The banks in our model can choose to run a “complex” usiness strategy that is both highly prone to failure and, in the ase of failure, imposes large reductions in market liquidity; given

imited technologies for resolving failed banks, this can pose a too- omplex-to-resolve (TCTR) problem for the resolution authority imilar to the TBTF problem present in most of the extant litera- ure (e.g., Ennis and Malek, 2005). Thus, as in a number of previous

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 617

Larg est Insured Institutions (as of Ju ne 201 0)

Domestic Depo sits

($ billion s)

Depos it Accou nts

(number)

Ban k o f Ameri ca NA $829 64,080,664

Wells Fargo & Company $719 92,432,109

Cit ibank $254 24,144,341

JPMo rgan Chase Bank NA $633 46,588,519

US Ban k, NA $169 12,395,340

Five Largest FDIC Insurance Determinations

Deposits

($ billion s)

Deposit Accounts

(number)

IndyMac Bank, F SB $28.5 301,878

First City Houston , NA $2.5 322,983

NetBank $2.3 191,194

ABN Financial NA $1.8 27,209

Silver State Bank $1.7 20,677

and fi

s 2 l r i e u 2 s c 1 o n t f a h l

4

o n d l d p d o i m d o f u i e w

o t

a u l c m d r c fi a t ( a t a a s a A ( t i e o d w t i a p u c w

Fig. 2. Five largest U.S. commercial banks

tudies (e.g., Mailath and Mester, 1994; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 007), the regulator in our model faces a time inconsistency prob-

em which makes it difficult to credibly commit to a disciplinary esolution policy. Moreover, our model demonstrates how polit- cal pressure, macro-economic conditions, or herding by banks xacerbates the regulator’s problem and leads to increased reg- latory forbearance (e.g., Acharya, 2001; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 008a,b; Brown and Dinc, 2009). We solve our game in random trategies, but unlike other studies that use this equilibrium con- ept to suggest a policy of “constructive ambiguity” (e.g., Freixas, 999; Goodhart and Huang, 2000; Gong and Jones, 2010), our use f random strategies is merely a convenient equilibrium device and ot a policy prescription. In contrast to previous studies that exploit he differences between solvency-driven and liquidity-driven bank ailures (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2002; Freixas et al., 2003; Freixas nd Parigi, 2010), we model failed banks as pure insolvencies and ence are concerned only with bank resolution policy, not with

ender-of-last-resort policy.

.1. Game set-up

We construct a multi-period game between a government res- lution authority (RA) and a banking industry comprised of a on-trivially large number of identical investors who have to ecide each period how to allocate their capital to a non-trivially

arge number of banks. The banks have access to two loan pro- uction processes: simple loan production and complex loan roduction. Simple loans are easy to value and the simple loan pro- uction process (e.g., originate and hold; core deposit funding; no ff-balance sheet obligations) is transparent and easy to unwind n bankruptcy and hence generates relatively small social and/or

acroeconomic externalities upon bank failure. Complex loans are ifficult to value and the complex loan production process (e.g., riginate, securitize and sell; financial market rather than deposit unding; off-balance sheet obligations) is opaque and difficult to

nwind in bankruptcy and hence generates larger failure external-

ties. These two loan production processes are separable and both xhibit diminishing returns; banks can mix these processes, and it ill be useful in some cases to refer to a bank as “mostly complex”

t F c S

ve largest FDIC insurance determinations.

r “highly complex” depending on its loan mix. We will also use he terms “investors” and “bank(s)” interchangeably below.

We emphasize that what we call “complexity” is not the same s “large size.” While both of these characteristics will make fail- re resolution more difficult, the former is more likely than the

atter to cause economy-wide externalities—i.e., one side of the entral liquidity-versus-discipline tension facing the RA in our odel. The assets created and held by complex banks are more

ifficult to value (e.g., deeply subordinated tranches of loan secu- itizations, loan servicing contracts, venture capital investments), omplex banks are more likely to be interconnected with other nancial institutions and hence exposed to their risks (loans or ssets sold with recourse, trading positions in financial deriva- ives contracts), and complex bank funding is more apt to run repos, purchased fed funds, commercial paper) and hence encour- ge runs at similarly funded banks. And although large banks do end to be more complex than smaller banks, there is far from

one-to-one correspondence between these two characteristics mong financial companies in the U.S. For example, MetLife is the ixth largest financial holding company in the U.S. with assets of round $800 billion, and under the provisions of the Dodd-Frank ct it is classified as a systemically important financial institution

SIFI). Despite its large size, however, MetLife resembles the easy- o-unwind simple banks from our model. Its main liabilities are nsurance contracts backed largely by fixed income assets that are asy-to-value and sell, and its commercial banking affiliate issues nly about $10 billion of deposits, has zero trading assets, and its erivatives positions are limited to vanilla interest rate swaps, for- ards and futures (data from www.fdic.gov). Perhaps even more to

he point, the FDIC was able to resolve the failed $300 billion sav- ngs bank Washington Mutual (WAMU) in September 2008 without ny macro-economic disruption and without any cost to the tax- ayer. The resolution imposed losses on WAMU’s shareholders and ninsured creditors and transferred WAMU’s retail deposit fran- hise to JPMorgan Chase. This clean resolution of such a large bank as possible WAMUs assets (mainly mortgage loans) were easy

o value quickly. At the other extreme, the Federal Reserve and DIC have been charged with identifying which non-bank finan- ial firms with assets less than $50 billion should be classified as IFIs.

6 inancial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

f o t p a p p l s

p o b d v d r a i b 1

a m p L t i t b l o b d l fi

4

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w c F d t b

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t i

(

w o F

e t i t b ( c p p b o o q h t a w j l l ( w b

18 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

Banks issue deposits at the beginning of the period, invest those unds (along with the investors’ capital) in either simple loans LS r complex loans LC that mature at the end of the period, and use he loan proceeds to pay back depositors. If a bank’s investment roceeds are greater than its deposit liabilities, the resulting profits re distributed to the investors who play the game again in the next eriod. Otherwise, if a bank’s investment proceeds are too small to ay off its depositors, then the bank becomes insolvent, its investors

eave the game, and an equal amount of new investors arrive at the tart of the next period.11

Loans default with probability �i (i = C,S) for complex and sim- le loans; each �i follows a two-part stochastic process consisting f a macroeconomic (systematic) shock felt by all banks and a ank-specific (idiosyncratic) shock that is distributed indepen- ently across all banks. We place no constraints on the relative alues of �C and �S, and we allow complex and simple loan efaults to be uncorrelated. Banks follow an internal (i.e., non- egulatory) value-at-risk (VaR) capital policy that protects the bank gainst default in all states of nature except for the tail-risk event n which both complex loans and simple loans default. Thus, a ank fails with probability ϕ = �C�S and survives with probability

− ϕ = (1 − �C)(1 − �S) + (1 − �C)�S + �C(1 − �S). A failed bank generates a social externality, the costs of which

re truly external to the banks in our model and hence we need not odel them explicitly. Consistent with recent experience, we sim-

ly assume that the social externality increases in the amount of C at the failed bank. Within the context of our model, it is natural o consider an externality that manifests itself as macro-economic lliquidity. For example, if depositors at failed complex banks have o wait to receive access to their funds, then fewer deposits will e available in the next period of the game, reducing the supply of

iquidity to all banks but more importantly reducing the amount f liquidity in the economy. Similarly, if assets at failed complex anks take time to be sold off (or if they can be sold off only at a iscount), increased investor uncertainty about the value of simi-

ar financial assets can reduce the amount of available liquidity in nancial markets in general.

.2. Game without bank failure regulation

A game without a resolution authority (RA) lacks strategic inter- ction. Investors maximize profits each period as follows, as if they ere playing a one-period game:

maximize : LC ,LS

� = (1 − �C )FC (LC ) + (1 − �S)FS(LS)

subject to : L = LC + LS

(1)

here the Fi(Li) are increasing and concave profit functions for omplex and simple loans satisfying the standard conditions i(0) = 0, F′

i(0) = +∞ and limLi→∞ F′ i(Li) = 0. L is the fixed exogenous

emand for loans, which the bank can satisfy using any combina-

ion of the simple and complex production processes. Given that oth production processes exhibit diminishing returns and satisfy

11 The arrival of new investors is not technically necessary so long as the total umber of solvent investors remains “non-trivially large.” We could just as easily ssume that the surviving banks proportionately absorb the deposits and remaining ssets of the failed bank. Either assumption obviates modeling strategic interac- ions that occur as the industry becomes concentrated and market power develops Enrico Perotti and Javier Suarez, European Economic Review, 2002). Moreover, this ssumption simplifies the solving of the dynamic (repeated) version of the game. In ny case, entry is relatively easy in U.S. banking markets, either via new (de novo) ank charters, geographic expansion by existing banks, or expansion by non-bank nancial services firms into banking product markets.

h s a o b i ( L

4

T

Fig. 3. Game without regulation.

he above standard conditions, the solution LC * to this problem is

nterior and given by the first order condition:

1 − �C )F ′ C (LC ) − (1 − �S)F ′

S(L − LC ) = 0

here LC * is the amount of complex loans produced in a game with-

ut regulation. The solution is straightforward and is illustrated in ig. 3.

Eq. (1) assumes additive separability between the profits gen- rated by simple and complex banking; by definition, this means hat there are no cost or revenue synergies between the two bank- ng methods. While one can perhaps imagine synergies between hese two banking approaches, cost and revenue synergies across anking lines of business have been notoriously difficult to quantity Berger et al., 1999; Mester, 2008) and many banking researchers onclude that they limited at best. Nevertheless, in the face of either roduction or marketing synergies, each of the single-product rofit functions would surely maintain their fundamental, well- ehaved economic properties (increasing at a decreasing rate with utput); hence, synergies would only serve to increase the height f the parabolic shape shown in Fig. 3 and consequently have no ualitative effect on the equilibra in the one-period and infinite orizon games described below. Similarly, we make no assump- ions in Eq. (1) about the relative costs, revenues or profits of simple nd complex loans. Again, so long as the two portions of (1) are each ell-behaved profits functions (concave down in output), then the

oint profit function in Fig. 3 will have an interior maximum regard- ess of the relative expenses and revenues of simple and complex oans. For example, scale economies for complex loan production relative to smaller scale economies for simple loan production) ould simply skew the inverted-U shape in Fig. 3 toward the right

ut maintain an interior optimum. Because we assume that all investors are identical, all banks will

ave the same LC *. Some of these banks will fail—loan default is

tochastic and contains an idiosyncratic component—but as stated bove the failure probability is unrelated to LC

*. In the absence f bank failure regulation, these failed banks enter the regular ankruptcy process, which (because it protects banks against cred-

tors for some period of time) fosters macro-economic illiquidity the social externality) in amounts that are positively related to C

*.

.3. Bank failure regulation

We now introduce a bank failure resolution authority (RA). he resolution process works more quickly than bankruptcy

inancial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 619

p t n a o n i b

p p s t p s t t t t o t T a s p

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s f e i W p l

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

roceedings, returns failed bank deposits to the banking system in ime for the next round of the game, which mitigates the macroeco- omic liquidity shock. The RA’s technology set is finite, however, nd it lacks the ability to quickly resolve banks with large amounts f complex loans. Letting LT represent the limits of resolution tech- ology (i.e., the lowest level of failed bank complexity that the RA

s unable to resolve), the RA closes failed banks when LC < LT and ails out failed banks when LC ≥ LT.12

In a failed bank closure, the RA seizes the insolvent bank and ays off the depositors, using the bank’s (insufficient) investment roceeds plus an insurance fund which is capitalized prior to the tart of the game.13 The bank’s owners receive zero profit distribu- ion (i.e., the bank fails with limited liability), are prohibited from laying the game again, and new investors enter the game at the tart of the next period. In a bailout, the RA pays off the deposi- ors (or, equivalently, gives the bank the funds necessary to pay off he depositors) and pays investors an amount b large enough so hat they can play the game again in the next period (i.e., recapi- alizes the bank).14 Bailout in our model is similar in nature to the pen bank assistance policy discussed above and used sparingly in he past by the FDIC, and is similar in spirit to the U.S. Treasury’s ARP program and other ad hoc actions used to support insolvent nd/or illiquid financial institutions during the recent financial cri- is. Bank closure in our model is similar to the depositor payout olicy discussed above and used often by the FDIC.

Faced with the task of resolving an insolvent bank, the RA aximizes its own utility by selecting a method of resolution

hat maintains some non-negative amount of liquidity (LIQ) and mposes some non-negative amount of market discipline (DISC).

he RA’s preferences for LIQ and DISC need not be exactly consis- ent with social welfare—for example, as discussed above in Section , the regulator may identify closely with depositors, hence favor

12 These two alternative resolution techniques, “closure” and “bailout,” are meant o represent the two ends of the liquidity-discipline spectrum illustrated in Fig. 1. imiting the RA’s tradeoff to just two techniques keeps the model tractable with no eal loss of generality. 13 Imagine that the insurance fund is capitalized by charging each of the “non- rivially large number of investors” a small and identical entry fee at the beginning f the game. For the sake of simplicity, we characterize a flat-rate insurance pre- ium; conceptually, including a risk-based deposit premium would make little

ifference because in our model bank insolvency risk is by assumption unrelated to ank complexity. Moreover, the central focus of our model is neither insolvency risk or systemic risk; rather, we focus on how innovations in bank failure resolution echnology can improve regulators’ ability to resolve complex failed banks, and by oing so change bank incentives and result in an equilibrium with banks that are

ess complex and a regulator that is less likely to bail out complex banks should hey fail. Of course, one can imagine a complexity-based (as opposed to a flat-rate) nsurance premium large enough to deter banks from choosing to be complex in he first place—however, such a solution requires that the RA monitor all banks (in ur model, the RA takes no actions until a bank fails), can accurately detect (without ype I and II errors) complexity at non-failed banks and in non-crisis situations, and an do this at a reasonable cost. We choose to avoid these complications to keep ur model tractable, and further note that none of this matters unless in the end the A has both the technology and the political will to actually close complex failed anks, which is the main lesson from our model. Other studies have focused on

nnovations in deposit insurance pricing. For example, Acharya et al. (2010) explore he relationships between systemic risk and deposit insurance pricing, and show hat charging higher premiums to large banks with correlated insolvency risks can

itigate systemic risk and minimize costs to the insurance fund. 14 We make the simplifying assumption that the bailout payment b is unrelated to oan complexity LC . If complexity makes it difficult for the RA to value a bank’s assets, t should also make it impossible to determine the size of b needed to recapitalize he bank. The RA could easily deal with this problem by including loan guarantees long with b. Issuing these guarantees would be costless to the RA in the short- un. As the value of the complex loans are revealed in the long-run, the RA could ay out extra capital above b to banks that incur larger than expected loan losses, nd fund these payments by collecting capital back from banks that incur smaller han expected loan losses. This only requires the RA to be able to estimate b in an nbiased fashion across multiple banks.

s

w o t d c

L

w t a a d t w r s ( m

L

t w i

Fig. 4. The RA’s problem.

omewhat more liquidity and somewhat less discipline than is wel- are maximizing—but in any case we specify both LIQ and DISC as conomic goods in the RA’s utility function. The RA is constrained n its choices of LIQ and DISC by available resolution technologies T.

ith little loss of generality we specify this utility maximization roblem as follows using a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a

inear technology constraint T:

maximize LIQ,DISC

U = ˛LIQ ˇDISC� (2)

ubject to : T ≥ �LIQ + ωDISC (2a)

0 ≤ LIQ < 1 (2b)

0 ≤ DISC < 1 (2c)

here � and ω are, respectively, the “prices” of maintaining a unit f liquidity LIQ or imposing a unit of discipline DISC. To emphasize he policy tradeoff between maintaining liquidity and imposing iscipline, we arbitrarily set � = 1 and then rewrite the technology onstraint as:

IQ = T − ωDISC (2a’)

hich allows the straightforward interpretation of the slope ω as he “liquidity price of discipline,” that is, the marginal rate at which n efficient RA can transform one unit of sacrificed liquidity into dditional discipline. Consistent with the discussion above, ω will ecline with efficiencies in insurance determination, asset valua- ion, and other activities necessary to resolve a failed bank, and ω ill increase with the size and complexity of the failed bank being

esolved. The constraints (2b) and (2c) scale the problem so that the olution set lies within the unit square (see Fig. 4).15 Maximizing 2) with respect to LIQ and DISC yields the RA’s optimal resolution

ethod:

IQ∗ = ˇT

̌ + �

15 The RA cannot maintain maximum liquidity (LIQ = 1) because failed bank resolu- ions require the bank to be shut down for a short period of time (typically over the eekend). The RA cannot impose maximum discipline (DISC = 1) because deposit

nsurance will shield some creditors from the costs of bank failure.

6 inancial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

D

t R l s s i w

a w a o − i c T o l p o d

W e d i a h o i t t ( i

t m

m

w r H d t

a h i h i s r m w

t c o t

t s b o w

I t F L l i t t s

p t c l i C L p w d

20 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

ISC∗ = �T

ω( ̌ + �)

The results are economically intuitive. Discipline increases with he RA’s strength of preference for discipline �, decreases with the A’s strength of preference for liquidity ˇ, and decreases with the

iquidity price of discipline ω. Liquidity increases with the RA’s trength of preference for liquidity ̌ and decreases with the RA’s trength of preference for discipline �. Both liquidity and discipline ncrease, proportionate with their strength of preferences ̌ and �,

ith efficiencies that relax the technology constraint T. The solution is illustrated in Fig. 4. The indifference curves

re drawn with a relatively shallow slope, indicating an RA ith a strong preference for maintaining market liquidity and

weak preference for imposing market discipline ( ̌ > �).16 (For ur Cobb-Douglas utility function this policy tradeoff is given by �U(1/ˇ)DISC( ̌ − �/ˇ)/ˇ˛(1/ˇ) which shows a diminishing will-

ngness by the RA to substitute DISC for LIQ.) The four indifference urves correspond to ordered utility levels � where �4 > �3 > �2 > �1. he technology constraint T has linear slope ω (the liquidity price f discipline) and runs between “bailout,” which generates high iquidity (depositors are fully paid off) and low discipline (investors lay again next period), and “close,” which generates lower levels f liquidity (some depositors receive haircuts) but higher levels of iscipline (investors are wiped out).

The RA clearly prefers insolvent banks that are mostly simple. hen a relatively simple bank fails, the RA has access to the more

fficient resolution technology Tsimple with a low liquidity cost of iscipline, and will prefer closure (utility = �3) over bailout (util-

ty = �2). When a relatively complex bank fails, then the RA has ccess only to a less efficient resolution technology Tcomplex with a igh liquidity cost of discipline, and will prefer bailout (utility = �2) ver closure (utility = �1). To make the model easier to solve we nclude the “quiet life” utility �4 which the RA consumes when here are no bank failures in a given period. The arrow suggests a echnology expansion path: As the resolution technology improves i.e., as LT increases), the RA will close, rather than bail out, increas- ngly complex banks.17

The investor maximization problem changes with the introduc- ion of the RA and the possibility of being bailed out. Investors now

aximize profits as follows:

axLC ,LS

{ (1 − �C )FC (LC ) + (1 − �S)FS(L − LC ), if LC < LT

(1 − �C )FC (LC ) + (1 − �S)FS(L − LC ), ϕb, if LC ≥ LT

(3)

here banks that choose LC ≥ LT and hence are too complex to esolve (TCTR) gain access to the expected bailout subsidy ϕb.

ence, the solution to the game with bank failure regulation will epend on the technology LT that is available to the RA. There are hree cases. In the first case, illustrated in Fig. 6a, the resolution

16 Preferences such as these are plausible in a number of scenarios: (a) the RA nd/or elected officials who influence the RA identify strongly with depositors and ence prefer liquidity over discipline; (b) the RA and/or economic authorities that

nfluence the RA feel that an illiquidity shock would harm the macro-economy and ence prefer liquidity over discipline; and/or (c) the RA and/or bank supervisors who

nfluence the RA wish to conceal the financial deterioration of a bank or the banking ystem, and the regulatory forbearance that results naturally generates liquidity ather than discipline. As illustrated at length in Appendix A, the resolution choices ade by FDIC during the post-deposit insurance era have been largely consistent ith a strong preference for liquidity over discipline.

17 Improvements in the insurance determination process, improved asset valua- ion techniques, and other efficiencies in bank resolution would relax the technology onstraint by reducing the liquidity price of discipline; in contrast, greater bank size r increased bank complexity would make the resolution process more difficult, ightening the constraint by increasing the liquidity price of discipline.

s i L i l b

4

e c b

( a

Fig. 5. Game tree with payoffs.

echnology is very imperfect, such that LT ≤ LC * and does not con-

train investors’ choices. Investors choose LC = LC * and the bank gets

ailed out if it fails. In the second case, illustrated in Fig. 6b, the res- lution technology is only weakly imperfect, such that LC

* < L� ≤ LT, here L� is defined by the condition

�(LC > L∗ C ) = �(L∗

C )

(1 − �C )FC (L∗ C ) + (1 − �S)FS(L − L∗

C ) = (1 − �C )FC (L�) + (1 − �S)FS(L − L�) + ϕb.

nvestors are once again unconstrained and choose LC = LC *, but in

his case the bank gets closed if it fails. In the third case, illustrated in ig. 6c, the resolution technology is moderately imperfect, such that C

* < LT < L� . In this case the investors are constrained by the reso- ution technology, choose LC = LT = LC

**, and the bank gets bailed out f it fails. Thus, we have the first main implication from our model: he presence of a resolution authority with imperfect resolution echnology can increase the amount of complexity in the banking ystem (i.e., LC

** > LC *).

We now solve two versions of the game with regulation: a one- eriod game in which the RA’s response to a bank failure marks he end of the game, and an infinite horizon game in which banks an change their loan mixes after each RA response. In what fol- ows, we assume the most interesting case (illustrated in Fig. 6c) n which the RA’s resolution technology is moderately imperfect. onsistent with this case, we assume that “simple” banks choose C

* and earn expected profits �S(LC *), and we assume that “com-

lex” banks choose LC ** and earn expected profits �C(LC

**) = �C + ϕb, here �C is the non-governmental part of its expected profits.18 (As iscussed above, it may be instructive to think about two same- ized banks, one of which chooses LC** and hence is a SIFI whose nsolvency will create systemic external costs, and one that chooses C* and hence is a non-SIFI.) Because the resolution technology s moderately imperfect, it holds that �C(LC

**) > �S(LC *) > �C. The

ast inequality holds because LC * is the optimal solution without

ailouts.

.4. One-period game

The solution of the one period game is straightforward, and is

asy to see in the game tree illustrated in Fig. 5. The RA always loses failed simple banks (node 4) because �3 > �2 and it always ails out failed complex banks (node 5) because �2 > �1. Banks will

18 We note that each of the production options available to the bank in this set-up LC

* and LC **) include both simple loans and complex loans. This implies that banks

lready know how to produce both types of loans at the beginning of the game.

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of Financi

Fig. 6. Game with regulation. Panel A: very imperfect resolution technology. Bank optimizes at LC

* and failed banks are bailed out. Panel B: weakly imperfect resolution t i o

a t p i t o t

a i f i

4

i i c t i t a a o b p a b

l c e ( T s t s t b b b

b p a o

•

•

a i

• The equilibrium path strategy Be: If st = NB, the bank chooses to be simple with certainty.

19 There is no inconsistency here: one can think of the RA playing the same repeated game simultaneously with each bank in the industry. This merely requires us to assume that the RA’s preference ordering (�4 > �3 > �2 > �1) is invariant to the number of banks that fail in any given period. Nevertheless, in our comparative sta- tics analysis below, we analyze the impact that political pressure or macro-economic circumstances may have on the RA’s policy choices during times of multiple and/or large bank failures.

20 This ‘one-period memory’ makes sense for our problem. The history of bank failure and resolution in the U.S. has been marked by discrete episodes of bank

echnology. Bank optimizes at L∗ C

and failed banks are closed. Panel C: moderately mperfect resolution technology. Bank optimizes at L∗∗

C and failed banks are bailed

ut.

lways choose to be complex (node 2), due to the RA’s TCTR policy hat introduces the regulatory wedge b that makes expected com- lex profits �C(LC

**) exceed expected simple profits �S(LC *). Thus,

n the subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-period game, all of he banks are complex because this strategy promises unambigu- usly higher expected returns, and the RA will always choose to bail hem out should they become insolvent. Without a history of past

f b t p f

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 621

ctions, or the promise of future actions, the RA will not close an nsolvent complex bank, because it cannot consume the expected uture benefits (i.e., fewer complex banks) that would derive from mposing discipline today.

.5. Infinite horizon game

In the one-period game, the RA’s current policy decisions cannot nfluence the industry’s future business model decisions. Specif- cally, the RA might choose to forfeit some short-run utility (by losing insolvent complex banks and suffering reduced liquidity oday) in order to establish a credible reputation that makes the ndustry less likely to choose complexity in the future. In order o study this interplay between banks’ and RA’s actions we study n infinitely repeated version of the one-period game described bove. We add the assumption that all players weight future pay- ffs with positive discount factors: ı < 1 for the RA and < 1 for the anks. Although our objective is to characterize the strategic inter- lay between the RA and the banking industry, in what follows we nalyze a repeated version of the one-period game described above etween the RA and a single bank.19

In what follows, we derive the conditions that support an equi- ibrium in which a bank repeatedly chooses to be simple with ertainty. We focus on Markov strategies in which the past influ- nces current decisions only through its effect on the state variables Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, chapter 13; Maskin and Tirole, 2001). here are two possible states of the world at the beginning of each tage of the game, defined by whether there was a bailout at time

− 1 (denoted by st = B) or there was no bailout at t − 1 (st = NB). If t = NB, then the game repeats with the successful bank (i.e., when here was no bank failure at t − 1) or with the new replacement ank (i.e., when there was a failure at t − 1 and the RA closed the ank). Otherwise if st = B, the game repeats with the bailed out ank.20

The desired equilibrium upon which we focus has only simple anks that are always closed when they fail. The banks and the RA lay one set of strategies when the desired equilibrium obtains, and

different set of strategies when the desired equilibrium does not btain. We consider the following profile of strategies for the RA:

The equilibrium path strategy RAe: The RA closes insolvent simple banks with certainty. The off-equilibrium path strategy RAo: The RA closes insolvent complex banks with probability q and bails them out with prob- ability 1 − q.

nd we consider the following profile of strategies for the banking ndustry:

ailures (e.g., the 1930s; the late 1980s and early 1990s; and the late 2000s) followed y clear policy shifts in response to those episodes (e.g., the creation of the FDIC and he Glass-Steagall Act; the FDIC Improvement Act; and the Dodd bill). Enough time assed between these events for both banks and regulators to ‘forget’ the past, and ocus only on the new episode.

6 inanci

•

t c b

a r

•

•

t t b m q a p i c

�

fi b r p r t T o s t

�

w t a i a v c

a c e

b b o b w b a

d fi d a q r c W a

(

T u e a

4

p e B w t c s

t W i t t f p C l u a s t R d t i t

22 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

The off-equilibrium path strategy Bo: If st = B, the bank chooses to be simple with probability p and complex with probability 1 − p.

The following proposition provides the conditions under which his profile of strategies constitutes an equilibrium in which banks hoose the simple business model and the RA always closes failed anks:

Proposition: There exists a non-negative value ı- such that for ny ı ∈ (ı-; 1) there also exists the following “disciplinary equilib- ium” in the infinitely repeated game:

The RA always closes a failed simple bank. Furthermore, the RA is indifferent in expected payoffs between closing or bailing out a failed complex bank and chooses closure with probability q∗ = 1 − (1− (1−ϕ))

ϕ[ �S+(1− (1−ϕ))b] (�S − �C ). When st = NB, banks always choose the simple business model. But when st = B, banks are indifferent in expected payoffs between the simple and complex business models and choose the simple model with probability p∗ = 1 −

( 1 ı

− 1 )

�2−�1 ϕ(�3−�2) .

The proof of this proposition appears in Appendix A. The first important insight of the proposition is that, in order

o credibly establish a disciplinary mechanism that encourages he bank to make mostly simple loans, the RA should randomize etween closing and bailing out failed complex banks.21 The RA ixes its response to complex bank failure proportionately (i.e.,

*) so that the banks are just indifferent between being complex nd simple—in other words, banks cannot increase their expected rofits by deviating from the simple bank strategy. More explic-

tly, the RA is indifferent between bailing out and closing a failed omplex bank if and only if

1 + ı (1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3

1 − ı = �2 + ı

(1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 − (1 − p)ϕ(�3 − �2) 1 − ı

.

(4)

The left-hand side is the value of playing closure to the RA. The rst term is the immediate utility �1 from closing the failed complex ank. The second term is the discounted utility arising from the eplacement bank choosing the mostly simple loan model in future eriods, i.e., the future returns from imposing discipline today. The ight-hand side is the value of playing bailout to the RA. The first erm is the immediate utility �2 from bailing out the complex bank. he second term is the discounted utility arising from the bailed ut bank randomizing between the complex and simple lending trategies in future periods. It is instructive to rewrite this equation o compare the RA’s immediate utilities to its future utilities:

2 − �1 = ı

1 − ı (1 − p)ϕ(�3 − �2), (5)

here the left-hand side is the immediate utility from bailing out he complex failed bank relative to closing it (illiquidity avoided),

nd the right-hand side is the expected future utility from clos- ng the complex failed bank relative to bailing it out (moral hazard voided). When a bank chooses to be simple after a bailout with ery high probability (p close to 1) then the future gain of today’s losure becomes negligible and the RA will prefer to bail out the

21 Note that an RA threat to always close a failed complex bank is not a solution nd outside our real world experience: if the RA could credibly commit to always losing failed complex banks, then banks would never choose to be complex, and stablishing this credibility would be unimportant for the RA.

b R

p

i

p r

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

anks.22 Similarly, when a bank chooses to be complex after a ailout with very high probability (p close to 0) then the future gain f today’s closure becomes larger than the immediate gain from a ailout. By this logic we obtain the RA’s best response function, hich stipulates that the RA closes failed complex banks if p < p*,

ails out such banks if p > p*, and is indifferent between these two ctions if p = p*.

The second important insight of the proposition is that the isciplinary equilibrium exists only if the discount factor ı is suf- ciently high—that is, only when the future matters for the RA. A isciplinary equilibrium requires ı > ı-; otherwise, the RA prefers lways bailing out failed complex banks, as the future utility conse- uences associated with this action will get deeply discounted. By e-arranging the above expression for p* we can derive a boundary ondition for this cutoff threshold, ı- = 1/1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2)/(�2 − �1).

e can gain some intuition by rewriting the boundary condition s

�2 − �1) (

1 ı

− 1 )

< ϕ(�3 − �2). (6)

he disciplinary equilibrium requires that the expected marginal tility from avoiding moral hazard in the future (right-hand side) xceeds the marginal utility from avoiding illiquidity by bailing out

complex bank today (left-hand side) by a factor of (1/ı − 1).

.6. Comparative statics

Explicit expressions for the comparative static results (i.e., the artial derivatives of ı, q*, and p* with respect to model param- ters �1, �2, �3, �4, ϕ, �s, �c, b, and ı) are shown in Appendix .23 We report the signs of the comparative static tests here, along ith logical interpretations of these results that are consistent with

he structure of our model. The relevance of these findings for the urrent debate on failed bank resolution policy is discussed in the ection that follows.

The threshold ı identifies the discount factor that separates he disciplinary equilibrium from the non-disciplinary equilibrium.

hen ı > ı (i.e., the future is relatively important), the RA accepts lliquidity today in exchange for reducing moral hazard incen- ives in the future; when ı < ı (i.e., the future is unimportant), he RA accepts moral hazard incentives in the future in exchange or reducing illiquidity today. Changes in the values of the model arameters influence the sensitivity of this inter-temporal tradeoff. eteris paribus, increases in �1, �3 and ϕ make the disciplinary equi-

ibrium more attractive to the RA, and thus push ı lower. Higher tility from closing failed complex banks (�1) makes bailouts rel- tively less attractive to the RA; higher utility from closing failed imple banks (�3) makes simple banks relatively more attractive to he RA. A higher probability of the bank default state ϕ increases the A’s expected marginal utility from avoiding moral hazard and/or ecreases its expected marginal utility of avoiding illiquidity (see he discussion that accompanies Eq. (5) above). In contrast, an ncrease in �2 makes the disciplinary equilibrium less attractive o the RA, and thus pushes ı higher. Obviously, higher utility from ailing out failed banks (�2) makes discipline less attractive to the

A.

The RA’s off-the-equilibrium-path behavior is given by q*, the robability that the RA will close a failed complex bank. Ceteris

22 This is why a RA announcement that it will always close failed complex banks s not credible. 23 Although �s , �c and ϕ are functions, we treat them as parameters in the com- arative statics section in order to provide some additional intuition behind our esults.

inanci

p t p t e e b c b t

p C p m o f i o d l

� i T c w t s t i ( c i f a r f t w h p a v c o c

5

f a r

t r d S w o t e i

d t r B s a T o o a t

r g b i b m t t p t r n ( o

m f a i s r p t m c t a R i t c h e b w b t

t

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

aribus, increases in b and �c make complex lending more attrac- ive to banks by increasing its expected returns; an increase in the robability of bank failure ϕ makes complex lending more attrac- ive by creating greater possibilities for bailouts that extend the xpected life of the bank; and an increase in makes a longer xpected life more valuable to the bank. In response, the RA ecomes more likely to impose discipline, thus increasing q*. In ontrast, an increase in �s makes simple lending more attractive to anks. In response, the RA becomes less likely to impose discipline, hus decreasing q*.

The bank’s off-the-equilibrium-path behavior is given by p*, the robability that the bank chooses to make mostly simple loans. eteris paribus, increases in �1 and �3 directly strengthen the RA’s references to establish discipline, making banks more likely at the argin to make simple loans; an increase in �2 obviously has the

pposite effect. A higher probability of bank failure ϕ increases the uture chances of illiquidity and moral hazard behavior while an ncrease in ı makes the RA care more about these future states f the world, both of which make the RA more likely to impose iscipline and hence the bank becomes more likely to make simple

oans. Two of these results bear special attention: (1) An increase in

1 (holding �2 constant) is equivalent to a reduction in the liquid- ty price of imposing discipline on failed complex banks (see Fig. 4). hus, the comparative static results ∂ı/∂�1 < 0 and ∂p*/∂�1 > 0 indi- ate that more efficient failed bank resolution technologies alone ill make the disciplinary equilibrium more likely to obtain. An RA

hat can close a failed complex bank more efficiently—that is, pre- erving more liquidity and generating more discipline—will impose he disciplinary equilibrium more often (∂ı/∂�1 < 0) and banks fac- ng this RA will have a higher probability of making simple loans ∂p*/∂�1 > 0).24 (2) A decrease in the RA’s discount factor ı (holding onstant the banks’ discount factor ) means that the RA increas- ngly values current liquidity and/or discipline at the expense of uture liquidity and/or discipline. This is most likely to occur during n economic downturn or financial crisis, when preserving cur- ent liquidity becomes relatively more important than preventing uture moral hazard incentives. Such a time revaluation could be riggered if, for example, multiple complex banks become insolvent ithin months or weeks, the threat of contagion increases due to erding or inter-connectedness, the government or central bank ressures the RA to keep banks open, and/or the bank supervisory uthority pressures the RA to forebear to cover up gross super- isory mistakes. Thus, in a world where bailouts are possible, the omparative static result ∂p*/∂ı > 0 indicates that systematic devel- pments or political events can create incentives for banks to make omplex loans.

. Implications and conclusions

When a bank fails in the U.S., the FDIC is assigned as a receiver

or the insolvent bank and has special powers to take immedi- te and unilateral action to resolve the situation. These special esolution powers yield potential macro-economic efficiencies:

24 These comparative static results are based on a shock in the technology available o the RA at the beginning of the repeated game, and assumes that the technology emains static after that. Technically, a change in LT (or any of the other parameters) uring the game would invalidate our equilibrium solution. As discussed at length in ection 3 above, resolution technology does change over time, often unpredictably, ith changes in laws and regulations and with advances in information technol-

gy. For a change in LT to materially influence either the banks’ or the RA’s actions oday—and hence the comparative static results—then (a) the players would have to xpect the future change in LT and (b) because these expected changes would occur n the future, their effects would be discounted in the players’ decisions.

fi p n h a fi c e t n c T F f

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 623

epositors and line-of-credit customers can have immediate access o their funds, thus avoiding illiquidity problems in the local, egional or nationwide economies in which failed bank operates. ut these protections make bank depositors and borrowers pas- ive counterparties, reducing banks’ exposure to market discipline nd encouraging bank managers to take greater insolvency risk. his policy tradeoff—which we refer to here as the liquidity price f discipline—is the underlying motivation for much of the debate ver how we should regulate financial institutions. We construct

theory model of failed bank resolution policy that is centered on his tradeoff.

We model a repeated game between a utility maximizing bank esolution authority (RA) and profit maximizing banks that can enerate negative externalities should they fail. In our model, anks choose to be either complex or simple, where complex-

ty is unrelated to the probability that a bank fails, but makes a ank difficult for regulators to unwind if it does fail. Thus, our odel does not focus on the positive relationship between risk-

aking and the probability of bank failure; rather, it focuses on he positive relationship between failed bank complexity and the ropensity of regulators to bail out insolvent banks. In equilibrium, he degree of complexity chosen by banks and the propensity of egulators to bailout failed banks are dependent on two exoge- ous conditions: (1) the technology set available to the RA and 2) the political and economic pressures under which the RA must perate.

We define resolution technology set as the tradeoff the RA ust make between preserving liquidity for the customers of a

ailed bank (and by extension, liquidity in the macro-economy) nd imposing market discipline on the bank’s other stakeholders, .e., the liquidity cost of discipline. A positive (liquidity increasing) hock to the resolution technology set generates two important esults. First, improved technology makes the RA more likely to ursue a disciplinary resolution policy, closing failed banks rather han providing them with financial assistance. Second, an improve-

ent in the RA’s technology makes banks less likely to pursue omplex business strategies that make them difficult for the RA o efficiently resolve in the case of failure. We specify the political nd/or economic pressure facing the RA even more simply as the A’s value of time. The logic is straightforward: in an environment

n which bank closures create negative externalities that threaten he current health of the macro-economy, policymakers will dis- ount the long-run consequences of bank bailouts (increased moral azard incentives) relative to the short-run social and political ben- fits of bank bailouts (preventing financial disruptions, avoiding ank failures and the blame that goes with them). In our model, hen the RA increasingly discounts future consequences, banks

ecome more likely to pursue risky business strategies that make hem difficult to efficiently resolve.

We can use our model as a prism for viewing the policy solu- ions imposed on insolvent banking companies during the recent nancial crisis. In some cases, extant laws and regulations simply revented authorities from applying their existing resolution tech- ologies to insolvent financial institutions. For example, the FDIC ad the legal authority to resolve insolvent banks, but lacked this uthority over parent bank holding companies (e.g., Citigroup, the nancial holding company that owns Citibank) or non-bank finan- ial firms (e.g., Bear Stearns, AIG). Outside the U.S., the FSA had ven less legal authority, so effectively policymakers in the UK had o choose between nationalizing Northern Rock or letting it enter ormal commercial bankruptcy. In other cases, the size and/or

omplexity of insolvent financial firms (e.g., some of the initial ARP recipients) simply outstripped the technological ability of the DIC to close them down without inducing large losses in liquidity or bank customers, for counterparties of bank customers exposed

6 inanci

t i d fi a

p d l t l e l B a t i t t m t t q m

S C l b m C m F r c K t w t d f

F U fi a e fi g a t o m

“ g s H t

t s W t

t t d s w c i c

g v w a R t r t o m t t i t s c n b c t c t t c l S c e f f

A

n o a H K a

24 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

o contagion-like effects, and for investors potentially exposed to ncreased uncertainty in financial markets. Pressure was felt by ecision makers to provide immediate assistance to large complex nancial firms to prevent further disruptions to financial markets nd the macro-economy.

While it is generally agreed—though ultimately not rovable—that government assistance prevented a larger melt- own, the decisions to provide this assistance were made with

ittle thought of the longer term consequences for bank risk- aking.25 Absent the technological ability to close the very argest insolvent banking companies, federal bank regulators ncouraged/facilitated the purchase of these banks by other arge banks (Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia in October 2008; ank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in September 2008), ctions that substantially increased the size and complexity of he surviving acquirers.26 Even if we experience continuous mprovements in resolution technology that allow regulators o close increasingly larger banks, allowing the largest banks o grow even larger nullifies these technological gains. In our

odel, in which such scenarios correspond to a higher rate of ime discount for the RA, increased focus on the present relative o the future (i.e., the discounting of future moral hazard conse- uences) makes banks more likely to choose high-risk business odels. The seeming inconsistency of U.S. regulators’ treatment of Bear

tearns and Lehman Brothers—providing assistance for JP Morgan- hase to purchase the former investment bank, but several months

ater standing by and forcing the latter investment bank to enter ankruptcy—can also be interpreted within the framework of our odel. McDonald and Robinson (2009) argue that Lehman Brothers

EO Richard Fuld falsely believed that the United States govern- ent would save the company, and with this put option in hand

uld played a game of brinksmanship, engaging in unnecessarily isky behavior and rejecting as too low private sector offers to pur- hase controlling interest in the firm (e.g., an $18 per share from the orea Development Bank in August 2008). Assuming this charac-

erization is an accurate one, the behavior of Lehman is consistent ith a departure from the desired simple equilibrium strategy, and

he seeming reversal of regulatory policy is consistent with the ran- om strategy necessary to support the desired equilibrium in the uture.

The “orderly liquidation authority” provision in the Dodd- rank Act of 2010 represents a positive technological shock for .S. bank regulators. The ability to place systemically important nancial companies (not just banks) into receivership provides an lternative to ad hoc policy interventions necessary to avoid the conomy-wide reductions in liquidity that could result if these rms gained corporate bankruptcy protections. The legislation also ives regulators the authority to force a decrease in the operational nd/or financial complexity of large systemic financial firms. In

he context of our model, this new authority expands the technol- gy set available to the RA, reduces the liquidity cost of discipline, akes the closure of large insolvent bank more likely, and reduces

25 In a September 19, 2008 address, President George W. Bush said that TARP should be enacted as soon as possible” because “our entire economy is in dan- er” and that “the risk of not acting would be far higher.” These remarks were made hortly after Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and U.S. Treasury Secretary enry Paulson lobbied the White House to provide large and immediate assistance

o financial markets and troubled financial firms. 26 In September 2008, the FDIC seized and closed Washington Mutual Bank—at he time, the largest U.S. thrift institution with assets of about $300 billion—and old its assets and most of its liabilities to JPMorgan Chase. The parent company,

ashington Mutual Corporation, stripped of its major asset, declared bankruptcy he following day.

U B N

A

t i f s e

t s

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

he incentives for banks to choose high-risk business models. These heoretical effects, of course, are conditional on the RA’s rate of time iscount (i.e., pressures to act in the short run) remaining low. The uccess of the Dodd-Frank provisions may ultimately depend on hether regulators can invoke their new authority to close large,

omplex financial firms without succumbing to the inevitable polit- cal and economic pressures to do otherwise during a financial risis.

At the other end of the policy spectrum lie proposals that would reatly, or even completely, reduce the probability of bank insol- ency. Indeed, a world in which banks do not fail is a world in hich bank failures do not need to be resolved. Various examples

re mentioned in Dodd-Frank, most notably: the co-called Volcker ule that would eliminate proprietary trading at banks; “skin-in- he-game” provisions that would require banks to hold a portion of isky assets they create and sell off; and contingent capital schemes hat would keep failed banks operating by converting the claims f junior creditors to an ownership stake. Such policies are not agic bullets: while they may reduce the number of failed banks

hat regulators must resolved, they come with attendant costs of heir own. Eliminating proprietary trading surely does not elim- nate credit risk, the underlying cause of bank insolvency during he financial crisis. Reductions in credit risk large enough to sub- tantially reduce bank failures can only be accomplished by greatly urtailing lending (by definition, loans are risky), which in our eco- omic system is the central purpose of banks. Similarly, holding ack some portion of loan securitization tranches (the skin) may hange bank incentives but reduces the total amount of risk in he system only by reducing securitizations, which in the end allo- ates less capital to loans (the game). Finally, bail-ins leave in place he fundamental deficiencies of failed banks—that is, the organiza- ional, behavioral, geographic, and product mix inefficiencies that aused poor bank performance in the first place—rather than real- ocating bank assets to more efficient and sounder financial firms. imply stated, we must not forget that bank failures, like bankrupt- ies of inefficient non-banking firms, are essential phenomena for fficient reallocation of society’s resources in the long run. This calls or a regulatory regime that not only expects and allows banks to ail, but also improves our capacity for resolving those failed banks.

cknowledgements

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do ot necessarily reflect positions held by the Federal Reserve Bank f Kansas City or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The uthors thank two anonymous referees; the journal editor Iftekhar asan; Robert Bliss, Ken Jones, George Kaufman, Paul Kupiec, Rose ushmeider, Emre Ergungor, Carlos Ramirez, Laurence Scialom, nd seminar participants at City University of London, Erasmus niversity, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve ank of Cleveland, Tilburg University, and University of Paris- anterre for their insights and suggestions.

ppendix A. Proof of the proposition

We derive conditions under which the strategies described in he proposition constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of our nfinitely repeated game. We use the concept of the Markov Per- ect Equilibrium, i.e., we derive conditions under which the Markov trategies mentioned in the paper constitute a subgame perfect

quilibrium.

The RA’s strategy on the equilibrium path (RAe). First, we show hat the RA always prefers to close failed “simple” banks. If the RA ticks to its strategy RAe and closes the banks, the closure yields

inanci

t t t v i a 1 R u

P

t

�

d i t i s p f t

P

T a p t 1 w w t o

�

b

�

�

t H t

s t ( c t t

V

w p

t b t f t s e B p

V

w p r T

V

(

m p d

e t p T t ( f t a t

P

�

o

b t e o b{

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

he immediate utility �3. Moreover, the closure in period t implies hat st+1 = NB and the “simple” strategy by the new investors in he future. Thus, the RA receives from period t + 1 on the present alue of future utility from closing the failed “simple” banks, which s equal to PV(RAe) = ((1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3)/(1 − ı). PV(RAe) takes into ccount that in each period the RA receives �4 with probability

− ϕ (the “simple” banks survives) or �3 with probability ϕ (the A closes the failed “simple” banks). Formally, PV(RA)e is derived sing the following equation:

V(RAe) = (1 − ϕ)(�4 + ıPV(RAe)) + ϕ(�3 + ıPV(RAe)).

Hence the utility from closing the failed “simple” banks at period is:

3 + ı (1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3

1 − ı .

Now consider the situation in which the RA makes a one-time eviation and bails out the failed “simple” banks. It receives the

mmediate utility �2. However, the bailout results in st+1 = B, and he bailed-out investors and the new investors (should the existing nvestors be banned from the banking banks in the future) play the trategy Bo, i.e., they randomize between the “simple” and “com- lex” business strategy. This alters the present value of the RA’s uture utility, which is denoted by PV(BOS). PV(BOS) is a solution to he following equation:

V(BOS) = p[(1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 + ıPV(BOS)] + (1 − p)[(1 − ϕ)�4

+ ϕq�1 + ϕ(1 − q)�2 + ıPV(BOS)].

his equation takes into account that after a bailout both the RA nd the investors randomize between their pure strategies. With robability p the banks become “simple”. With probability 1 − p he banks become “complex”. The RA receives �4 with probability

− ϕ if the banks succeed. Otherwise, the RA receives either �1, hen it closes the failed “complex” banks with probability ϕq, or �2 ith probability ϕ(1 − q) when it bails out such banks. After solving

he last equation with respect to PV(BOS) the utility from the RA’s ne-time deviation is

2 + ı (1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 − (1 − p)ϕ[�3 − (q�1 + (1 − q)�2)]

1 − ı .

The RA sticks to its strategy of closing down the failed “simple” anks if and only if

3 + ı (1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3

1 − ı ≥ �2 + ı

(1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 − (1 − p)ϕ[�3 − (q�1 + (1 − q)�2)] 1 − ı

This can be rewritten as

3 − �2 ≥ −(1 − p)ıϕ �3 − (q�1 + (1 − q)�2)

1 − ı .

This expression holds always because �3 > �2 > �1 implies that he LHS of the last expression is positive and the RHS negative. ence, the RA will never deviate from RAe under the stated assump-

ions. The investors’ strategy on the equilibrium path (Be). Second, we

tudy the investors’ decision to choose the “simple” bank when here was no bailout in the previous period. Assume that st = NB observe that in this state both the existing investors that suc- eeded in the period t − 1 and the new investors after closure of he old bank at t − 1 decide about its strategy for period t). When he investors choose the “simple” bank, their payoff is:

s = �s + (1 − ϕ)�s + · · · + t−1(1 − ϕ)t�s + · · · = �s

1 − (1 − ϕ) ′

here the bank succeeds with probability 1 − ϕ and is closed with robability ϕ.

w

p

al Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627 625

If the investors deviate and choose the “complex” bank, this has he following consequences for their payoff. When the “complex” ank succeeds, the investors return to choosing a “simple” bank in he next period and its payoff is (�c + (1 − ϕ)Vs). When the bank ails while being “complex”, the RA starts to play RAo. RAo prescribes hat a failed “complex” bank is closed with probability q (implying t+1 = NB and the “simple” strategy by the new investors), or oth- rwise it is bailed out (which implies that the investors will play o from st+1 = B on). Denote the investors’ continuation payoff from laying Bo as VB0 . Then VB0 is given by the following equation:

B0 = p(�s + (1 − ϕ)VB0 ) + (1 − p)(�c + (1 − ϕ)VB0 )

+ (1 − p)ϕ(1 − q)(b + VB0 ),

here the bank is “simple” with probability p or “complex” with robability (1 − p). In the latter case the failed “complex” bank eceives b and is allowed to continue with probability (1 − p)ϕ (−q). hen:

B0 = p�s + (1 − p)�c + (1 − p)ϕ(1 − q)b 1 − (1 − ϕ + (1 − p)(1 − q)ϕ)

.

Hence the payoff from deviating from Be is:

�c + (1 − ϕ)Vs) + ϕ(1 − q)(b + VB0 ).

Because the last expression depends on p and q, we have to find ixed strategies played by the both parties out of the equilibrium

ath in order to check under which conditions the investors do not eviate from Be.

The mixed strategy of the RA. Third, we have to find the off- quilibrium response of the RA to the failed “complex” banks. If he RA plays a mixed strategy once it deals with the failed “com- lex” banks, it has to be indifferent between closure and bailout. he RA’s utility from closing the failed “complex” banks amounts to he immediate utility �1 and the future continuation value ıPV(RAe) the closure implies st+1 = NB). The RA’s utility from bailing out the ailed “complex” banks amounts to the immediate utility �2 and he future continuation value ıPV(BOC). PV(BOC) is the RA’s utility fter the investors play Bo following the bailout and is the solution o the following equation:

V(BOC) = p[(1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 + ıPV(BOC)] + (1 − p)[(1 − ϕ)�4

+ ϕ�2 + ıPV(BOC)].

Solving out for PV(BOC) the RA’s indifference condition reads:

1 + ı (1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3

1 − ı = �2 + ı

(1 − ϕ)�4 + ϕ�3 − (1 − p)ϕ(�3 − �2) 1 − ı

r

ı

1 − ı (1 − p)ϕ(�3 − �2) = �2 − �1.

Both sides of the last equality are positive because of �3 > �2 > �1. The last equality describes the RA’s reaction to the investors’

ehavior. The RA’s payoff from bailouts is increasing in p: the higher he probability p that the investors play “simple”, the higher the xpected utility of bailouts of the “complex” banks because they ccur less frequently. From this expression we can derive the RA’s est response given the strategy played by the investors:

close the “compelx” banks for p < p∗ indifferent between closing and bailing out the "complex" banks for p = p∗ bail out the "complex" banks for p > p∗

here

∗ = 1 − (

1 ı

− 1 )

�2 − �1

ϕ(�3 − �2) .

626 R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 612– 627

(solid

T e o t p V b c p b b

V

a

V

p d

q

q b � � l b q

o s T i

t t c a T w B

i e

ı

S B

V

d

i b l fi m f

A

Fig. A1. The best responses of the RA

he mixed strategies of the investors. Fourth, we derive the off- quilibrium mixed strategy for the investors. After the investors bserve st = B, they will randomize according to Bo, which requires hat the investors are indifferent between the “simple” and “com- lex” bank. Being “simple” delivers Vs to the investors. Denote as c the investors’ payoff from the “complex” bank. If the “complex” ank is successful, the investors’ expected profit is �c and the future ontinuation value is Vc with the probability 1 − ϕ. If the “com- lex” bank fails with probability ϕ, it is closed with probability q, ut with probability 1 − q it is allowed to continue and receives

+ Vc. Formally Vc comes from the following equation:

c = �c + (1 − ϕ)Vc + ϕ(1 − q)(b + Vc)

nd it is equal to

c = �c + ϕ(1 − q)b 1 − (1 − qϕ)

.

The investors are indifferent between the “complex” or “sim- le” bank after a bailout, when Vs = Vc. Solving this equation for q elivers that the investors are indifferent for

∗ = 1 − (1 − (1 − ϕ)) ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]

(�s − �c) ∈ (0; 1).

* < 1 follows because of �s > �c. q* > 0 follows ecause of �s < �c + ϕb. Indeed, q* > 0 is equivalent to s − ( ϕ)/(1 − (1 − ϕ))�S < �C + ϕb, which is weaker than s < �c + ϕb. The reaction function of the investors is as fol-

ows. Hence, the investors’ best response is to set up the “complex” ank for q < q*, the “simple” for q > q*, and they are indifferent for

= q*. Finding the mixed strategies. Fifth, we combine the best responses

f the RA and the investors to find the optimal off-equilibrium trategies. q* is always between 0 and 1. p* is always lower than 1. he following two figures summarize the potential cases depend- ng on the parameters of the model (Fig. A1).

The solid line represents the best response of the RA, q(p), and he dashed line the one of the investors, p(q). Now we will show that he only case which supports an equilibrium, in which the investors hoose to the “simple” industry, is the case in which p* is between 0

nd 1. When p* ≤ 0, the RA always bails out the “complex” industry. his cannot lead to a desired equilibrium because the investors ould always choose to the “complex” industry and deviate from

e.

line) and the investors (dashed line).

Now, we will check if for parameters such that p* > 0 the result- ng out-of-equilibrium mixed strategies can support the desired quilibrium. First, p* > 0 holds for

> 1

1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2)/(�2 − �1) = ı- ∈ (0; 1).

econd, in order to check whether the investors do not deviate from e, we insert p* and q* in the condition

s ≥ (�c + (1 − ϕ)Vs) + ϕ(1 − q)(b + VB0 ),

erived when checking the one-time deviation from Be. It turns out that the investors are indifferent between deviat-

ng or not. This is intuitive because the investors are indifferent etween the “simple” and “complex” industry out of the equi-

ibrium, so the same has to hold on the equilibrium path. This nalizes the proof of the claim in the proposition that the above entioned mixed strategies support the disciplinary equilibrium

or any ı ∈ (ı-; 1).�

ppendix B. Comparative static results

Comparative statics for ı-:

∂ı

∂ϕ = −(�3 − �2)/(�2 − �1)

(1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2))/(�2 − �1))2 < 0

∂ı

∂�1 = − ϕ(�3 − �2)/(�2 − �1)

(1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2))/(�2 − �1))2 < 0

∂ı

∂�2 = − ϕ(�3 − �2)/(�2 − �1)2

(1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2))/(�2 − �1))2 < 0

∂ı

∂�3 = − ϕ

(�2 − �1)(1 + (ϕ(�3 − �2))/(�2 − �1))2 < 0

Comparative statics for q*:

∂q∗ ∂

= �s(�s − �c)

ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]2 > 0

∂q∗ ∂b

= (1 − (1 − ϕ))2ϕ

ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]2 > 0

inanci

e s

p � n

R

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

B

B

B

B

B

C

C

C

C

D

D E

F

F

F

F G

G

H

H

K

K

K

K

K

K

K

K

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

R. DeYoung et al. / Journal of F

To derive the next three results, we treat ϕ, �C, and �S as param- ters that freely vary rather than as functions. Doing so provides ome additional intuition.

∂q∗ ∂�c

= 1 − (1 − ϕ) ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]

> 0

∂q∗ ∂�S

= −(1 − (1 − ϕ))( �C + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b)

ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]2 < 0

∂q∗ ∂ϕ

= (�s − �c)( (1 − )�s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))2b)

[ϕ[ �s + (1 − (1 − ϕ))b]]2 > 0

Comparative statics for p*

∂p∗ ∂ı

= 1 ı2

�2 − �1

ϕ(�3 − �2) > 0

∂p∗ ∂�1

= (1/ı) − 1 ϕ(�3 − �2)

> 0

∂p∗ ∂�2

= (

1 ı

− 1 )

�3 − �1

ϕ(�3 − �2)2 < 0

∂p∗ ∂�3

= (

1 ı

− 1 )

�2 − �1

ϕ(�3 − �2)2 > 0

Unlike ∂q */∂ϕ above, the following derivative ∂p */∂ϕ is a com- arative static result because ϕ = �C�S increases equally with both C and �S and that we impose no restrictions on the relative mag- itudes of �C and �S.

∂p∗ ∂ϕ

= (

1 ı

− 1 )

�2 − �1

ϕ2(�3 − �2) > 0

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askin, E., Tirole, J., 2001. Markov perfect equilibrium: I. Observable actions. Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2), 191–219.

ayes, D., 2004. Who pays for bank insolvency? Journal of International Money and Finance (23), 515–551.

cDonald, L.G., Robinson, P., 2009. Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers. Crown Business Publications, New York.

ishkin, F.S., 1992. An evaluation of the treasury plan for banking reform. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (1), 133–153.

ester, L.J., 2008. Optimal industrial structure in banking. In: Anjan, T.V., Boot,

A.W.A. (Eds.), Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking. North- Holland, Amsterdam.

amirez, C.D., Shively, P.A., 2012. The effect of bank failures on economic activity: evidence from U.S. states in the early 20th century. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 44 (2/3), 433–455.

  • A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Market liquidity versus market discipline
      • 2.1 Regulator incentives
      • 2.2 Resolution policy in practice
    • 3 The technology of failed bank resolution
      • 3.1 Legal limitations
      • 3.2 Information problems
      • 3.3 Systemic effects
    • 4 Modeling the impact of technology on bank resolution policy
      • 4.1 Game set-up
      • 4.2 Game without bank failure regulation
      • 4.3 Bank failure regulation
      • 4.4 One-period game
      • 4.5 Infinite horizon game
      • 4.6 Comparative statics
    • 5 Implications and conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Proof of the proposition
    • Appendix B Comparative static results
    • References

1-s2.0-S1572308914000497-main.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Financial Stability

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfstabil

atharsis—The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution

osef Korte ∗

oethe University Frankfurt, Germany

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 14 May 2013 eceived in revised form 14 March 2014 ccepted 8 May 2014 vailable online 22 May 2014

EL classification: 21 28 33

a b s t r a c t

This paper analyzes the impact of rules-based bank insolvency resolution on real economic growth. Resolving insolvent banks can positively affect the real economy by overcoming moral hazard prob- lems and improving banks’ credit allocation and monitoring. We propose a new indicator to measure the strength of ‘catharsis’, i.e., how strictly banks are resolved, and use a large firm-level dataset to test its effect. We find that a relatively stronger implementation of bank resolution rules has a statistically and economically significant positive effect on firm growth – particularly with respect to firms that are struc- turally more dependent on bank financing. Our findings are robust to various specifications. Investigating the transmission channels of this ‘catharsis effect’ reveals that it essentially works by means of benefiting higher quality firms (quality channel) and reallocating credit to firms that need it most (quantity channel).

eywords: ank insolvency ank resolution ank closure ank regulation

Additional analysis suggests that the ‘catharsis effect’ works best in banking systems that offer access to international financing because such access mitigates the potentially negative credit supply effects of liquidating insolvent banks. Taken together, our findings indicate that more attention should be focused on developing incentive-compatible bank resolution regimes.

© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

b i p i e t r e v s

t o o s

inance and growth

. Introduction

In this paper, we test how strict and rules-based resolution of nsolvent banks affects the real economy. Although the theoretical nd empirical literature shows that financial intermediation gen- rally has positive effects on the real economy, misled incentives or banks, their creditors, and regulators in connection with bank nsolvency may distort banks’ credit allocation and monitoring ecisions. This may lead to suboptimal real economic performance.

strict and rules-based resolution of insolvent banks, however, ight restore incentives in credit allocation and monitoring, which ould result in positive effects for the real economy. Such a echanism would be a manifestation of Schumpeter’s concept of

reative destruction in the financial sector: Insolvency and reso- ution regimes promote the efficient reallocation of resources and ave a cleansing effect on financial intermediation. Therefore, we

rgue that insolvency and resolution can be thought of as a form f ‘catharsis’ in the banking system that cleans out moral hazard roblems and distorted incentives.

∗ Correspondence to: Department of Economics and Business Administra- ion, Goethe University Frankfurt, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, ermany. Tel.: +49 69 79833733.

E-mail address: [email protected]

a o i q a a m a a

ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.05.003 572-3089/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Based on this rationale, we hypothesize that strict and rules- ased regulatory insolvency leads to a ‘catharsis effect’: When

nsolvent banks that warrant legal closure in accordance with a rompt resolution rule are led into strict insolvency resolution,

ncentives in credit allocation are restored, which increases real conomic performance. However, the strength and direction of he effect are a priori not obvious because positive real effects of estored incentives might be outweighed by negative credit supply ffects of individual bank closures. Moreover, the effect is likely to ary across different types of firms and across different financial ystems.

Thus, we subject our hypotheses to empirical testing and inves- igate whether such ‘catharsis’ in the banking system has an effect n the real economy and what the mechanisms and conditions f its operation are. We propose a new indicator to measure the trength of ‘catharsis’, i.e., how strictly insolvent banks are resolved, nd use a firm-level dataset with more than 2 million firm-year bservations to test its effect on firm growth. However, research nto the real economic implications of the financial system is fre- uently subject to concerns about causality and endogeneity. We ttempt to overcome these concerns and to establish causality with

three-step identification strategy. We begin with a regression odel that exploits the panel characteristics of our dataset, employ

n instrumental variable setup, and finally utilize an interaction pproach, which presumes that firms that are more dependent on

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14 J. Korte / Journal of Financ

ank financing will experience stronger growth when the resolu- ion regime for insolvent banks is stronger compared with firms hat depend less on bank financing.

We find that a relatively stronger implementation of bank reso- ution rules has a statistically and economically significant positive ffect on firm growth – particularly for firms that are structurally ore dependent on bank financing. Our findings are robust to var-

ous specifications. An investigation of the transmission channels f the ‘catharsis effect’ reveals that it essentially works by means f benefiting higher quality firms and reallocating credit to firms hat need it most. Additional analysis suggests that the ‘catharsis ffect’ works best in banking systems that offer access to interna- ional financing because such access mitigates the negative credit upply effects of liquidating insolvent banks.

This paper contributes to the empirical literature at the intersec- ion of three areas of research. First, it augments previous research n the real effects of the structure and conduct of financial inter- ediation. Significant contributions have thus far evaluated the

conomic effects of foreign bank entry and financial integration Giannetti and Ongena, 2009), bank competition (Cetorelli and trahan, 2006; Cetorelli, 2004), deregulation (Bertrand et al., 2007), ank efficiency (Hasan et al., 2009), and systemic banking crises Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Kroszner et al., 2007; Rancière et al., 2008). o the best of our knowledge, the effects of bank insolvency and esolution regimes on real economic performance have not been mpirically evaluated thus far. Second, this paper contributes to the iterature on alternative treatments of failing banks. Whereas the ffects of various accommodating policies have attracted a signif- cant amount of attention (Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Claessens t al., 2005; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; onohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Laeven and Valencia, 2013), there

emains a lack of conclusive empirical evidence about the real ffects of cleansing resolution regimes. Third, this paper adds to he literature that evaluates the implications of bank insolvency. revious research examines the effects of insolvency on bank ehavior (Caballero et al., 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Igan nd Tamirisa, 2008), regulatory behavior (Brown and Dinç , 2011; mai, 2009), and individual bank customers (Djankov et al., 2005).

e attempt to complement the empirical literature by testing for he implications of rules-based bank insolvency regimes for firm rowth.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 iscusses the related literature from which our motivation and ypotheses result. In Section 3, we introduce our model and iden- ification strategy. The dataset, our proposal of a bank catharsis ndicator, and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. In ection 5, the results of the analyses are presented along with ana- ytical extensions on the transmission mechanisms and conditions f operation of the ‘catharsis effect’. These are complemented with everal robustness tests in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

. Related literature and hypotheses

Banks generally contribute to the performance of the real econ- my by collecting, transforming, allocating, and monitoring credit n its most productive uses, thereby improving the efficiency of apital allocation and reducing the cost of external financing (Beck t al., 2000; Levine, 2005). This link between financial intermedia- ion and the real economy has been empirically established in the iterature (Fisman and Love, 2007; King and Levine, 1993; Rajan

nd Zingales, 1998). However, there are sources of market fail- re in financial intermediation. For example, agency problems and oral hazard distort incentives and lead to economically subop-

imal outcomes that materialize in the misallocation of credit or

bility 16 (2015) 213–231

n the inherent fragility of the financial system. One area of par- icular concern is the treatment of distressed banks, particularly ith respect to the resolution of insolvent financial institutions.

he previous literature analyzes several dimensions in which the reatment of failed banks can establish or distort incentives and hereby influence the behavior of financial intermediaries, which ltimately has an impact on the real economy:

First, banks may exhibit distorted incentives arising from their anticipated treatment in the case of insolvency. Because bank failures are associated with strong negative externalities, individ- ual banks may not need to fear bankruptcy but can anticipate a bailout based on implicit or explicit government guarantees. This can lead not only to intentional (excessive) risk-taking (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fortin et al., 2010) and the unsound inflat- ing of balance sheets (Demirgüç -Kunt and Detragiache, 2005) but also to insufficient screening and monitoring of borrowers (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) and incentives to create exces- sive complexity (DeYoung et al., 2013). Consequently, distorted and suboptimal credit allocation and monitoring may result in negative effects on the real economy. Second, in addition to individual bank behavior, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Acharya (2009) model how the time- inconsistency of bank closure decisions can lead to incentives for banks to herd into the same asset classes in an effort to be ‘too-many-to-fail’ – effectively creating systemic risk. Empirical evidence supports their predictions by showing that govern- ments are less likely to close or take over a bank if the entire banking system is in crisis (Brown and Dinç , 2011; Kasa and Spiegel, 2008) and that banks tend to herd in times of low capital- ization (Stever and Wilcox, 2007). Such herding behavior distorts the credit allocation and monitoring functions of financial inter- mediaries because it leads to a concentration on particular asset classes that may not necessarily be merited by economic consid- erations. Third, incentive distortions that have detrimental effects on the real economy can also arise when a bank is severely undercapital- ized or about to fail. In such a situation, a financial intermediary can be seen as an option to its owners that is more or less out of the money and that can only create value through volatility. Thus, the incentives grow to further substitute risk for economic soundness in an effort to ‘gamble for resurrection’ (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Marinc and Vlahu, 2011). Distressed banks may also discontinue effective credit monitoring and roll over non- performing loans (Igan and Tamirisa, 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Rajan, 1994), which will eventually depress economic growth (Caballero et al., 2008), or even engage in ‘looting’, i.e., channel funds to related firms (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; La Porta et al., 2003). Leaving banks at low net worth could also harm economic growth by raising the agency cost of finance and sup- pressing investment. Such effects are similar to those described in Bernanke and Gertler’s Bernanke and Gertler (1990) concept of financial fragility. Fourth, when banks’ lending decisions are prone to moral haz- ard, banks’ creditors might be considered a disciplining force. However, little monitoring and disciplining are exerted by depos- itors that are typically small, dispersed, and properly insured by a deposit insurance system (Demirgüç -Kunt et al., 2008; Demirgüç -Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Kaufman, 2006). The disciplining role of debtholders is also dubi- ous when the expectation of (implicit) bailout guarantees gives

such debtholders little incentive to monitor the banks or to adjust risk premiums accordingly (Acharya et al., 2013; Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Gropp and Richards, 2001; Morgan and Stiroh, 1999). Creditors that share the rents from bank risk-taking may

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even collude with the bankers they are supposed to monitor, which sustains the incentive distortions and the negative impli- cations for the real economy. Finally, regulators frequently do not prevent distorted credit allo- cation and monitoring but prefer bailout and support measures for troubled banks that sustain implicit guarantees and incen- tive distortions. This may result from the time-inconsistency of bank closure decisions, which suggests that regulators are unable to credibly commit ex ante on bank closures (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç , 2011; Mailath and Mester, 1994). Alternatively, a lack of appropriate resolution technologies (DeYoung et al., 2013) might simply leave regulators technologically unable to close failed banks without incurring high costs. Finally, regulators may themselves exhibit corrupted incentives or suffer from principal-agent problems that lead to rent-seeking behavior, distorted closure decisions, and collusion with the banking industry (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Brown and Dinç , 2005; Kane, 1990; Imai, 2009), which ultimately sustain banks’ moral hazard problems and potentially harm the real economy.

These arguments share the finding that distorted incentives sur- ounding bank insolvency can corrupt the credit allocation and onitoring functions of financial intermediaries and thus dam-

ge real economic performance. This raises the question of which esolution policies are most effective in (re)establishing proper ncentives in financial intermediation. In the following, we contrast wo stereotypical approaches of how to handle insolvent banks, he ‘accommodating’ approach and the ‘cleansing’ approach, which xert different influences on banks’ incentive structures and, ulti- ately, on real economic performance. Accommodating resolution policies include extensive govern-

ent interventions in failed banks with the aim of sustaining the pecific financial intermediary. Typical bailout instruments include lanket guarantees, open liquidity assistance, recapitalization, or orbearance of regulatory prescriptions. The economic rationale ehind these policies is to preserve the charter value, borrower elationships, and growth opportunities of the failed or distressed ank (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Djankov et al., 2005). This is rgued to protect not only the individual bank but also to shield he real economy from the negative effects of bank failures (such as redit supply shocks) and to prevent contagion effects that threaten nancial and economic stability (DeYoung et al., 2013; Kroszner t al., 2007). Recent empirical evidence from Laeven and Valencia 2013) suggests that certain targeted bailout policies, such as bank ecapitalizations, can alleviate credit supply frictions and thereby ustain real economic performance. Moreover, accidentally closing n otherwise healthy bank has been shown to have detrimental real conomic consequences (Ashcraft, 2005).

However, although they help protect failed banks (and hence reserve credit supply), such accommodating resolution policies re frequently blamed for their distorting effects on incen- ives. Bagehot (1873) previously warned that liquidity assistance hould not be extended to insolvent institutions because this upport would sustain or even encourage worse credit alloca- ion decisions. Accommodating policies are sometimes blamed or aggravating incentive distortions that induce banks to exter- alize their risk-taking to society at large (Calomiris et al., 005; Kane and Klingebiel, 2004). Additionally, empirical evi- ence suggests that accommodating policies, particularly when ot well executed, frequently do not accelerate financial and

conomic recovery and do not mitigate the negative effects on he real economy, but instead increase both the cost of bank- ng crises and the risk of moral hazard problems in the long run Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; Honohan

i d v s

bility 16 (2015) 213–231 215

nd Klingebiel, 2003). The Japanese experience of accommo- ating policies giving rise to ‘zombie’ banks that led to the reation of artificially surviving and underperforming ‘zombie’ rms that depressed the real economy provides an illustrative xample (Caballero et al., 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). Finally, everal recent contributions analyze the effects of bailout poli- ies or (implicit) state guarantees and show that these increase oral hazard problems and bank risk-taking (e.g., Black and azelwood, 2013; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 013).

Cleansing resolution policies are characterized by the bank ceas- ng to exist in its previous form, including wiping out the equity nd ousting the management. Such policies focus in particular n straightforward closure and liquidation or on purchase and ssumption (P&A), i.e., an assisted merger or acquisition of a fail- ng bank by another viable financial institution. The main argument upporting a policy of strict closure is the reestablishment of incen- ives: The expectation of cleansing resolution policies in the event f insolvency is intended to reduce moral hazard problems in finan- ial intermediation (Acharya, 2009; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; avies and McManus, 1991; Panyagometh and Roberts, 2009) nd to ensure a competitive, efficient, and sound financial system Lindgren, 2005). Kane (2002) explicitly formulates the implica- ions of cleansing resolution policies that lead to ‘catharsis’ in the anking sector and relates these policies to Schumpeter’s con- ept of creative destruction. Empirical evidence tends to support

‘catharsis effect’ of bank resolution, i.e., a positive real effect, at east over the long run (Demirgüç -Kunt et al., 2006; Rancière et al., 008). Thus, prompt closures of insolvent institutions may benefit he real economy by (re)establishing incentives for efficient credit llocation and monitoring.

However, substantial arguments can be made against cleansing esolution policies. As indicated above, bank closure may come at ignificant cost to the financial and real sectors of the economy, uch as through lost charter value and banking relationships, con- agion, and interruption of credit supply. Additionally, it can be rgued that P&A policies, for example, increase concentration in he banking sector.

Taken together, the literature on the implications of the treat- ent of failed banks on real economic performance provides

everal predictions that are empirically testable. First, cleansing esolution policies will reestablish the proper incentive struc- ure and provide for economically superior credit allocation and

onitoring. To arrive at this intended result while limiting for- earance caused by self-interested or captured regulators, some uthors argue for a rules-based closure policy with little regula- ory discretion (Demirgüç -Kunt and Servén, 2010; Dewatripont nd Rochet, 2009; Boot and Thakor, 1993). Kaufman (2011, 2006) roposes the regulatory insolvency policy that suggests prompt nd non-discretionary legal resolution as soon as a bank falls below

(positive) threshold capital ratio. Based on this rationale, we ypothesize that strict regulatory insolvency will lead to a ‘cathar- is effect’: When insolvent banks that warrant legal closure in ccordance with a prompt resolution rule are led into strict insol- ency resolution, incentives in credit allocation are reestablished, hich increases real economic performance. However, a compet-

ng hypothesis may be proposed regarding the direction of the catharsis effect’. The positive real effects of reestablished incen- ives may be outweighed by the negative real effects of individual ank failures that were outlined above. Thus, the direction of the ffect is a priori not necessarily obvious. Additionally, the effect

s likely to vary across different types of firms (e.g., firms in bank- ependent versus less bank-dependent industries and/or profitable ersus unprofitable firms) or across different financial systems (e.g., ystems more or less open to alternative sources of financing for

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16 J. Korte / Journal of Financ

he real economy). We subject these hypotheses to empirical tests n the following sections.

. Methodology and identification strategy

The challenge to identify an effect of bank regulation on real eco- omic growth is structurally similar to the problem that confronts he finance and growth literature in general: Although we can easily etect correlations between certain characteristics of the financial ystem and real outcomes, establishing a causal link is somewhat ore difficult because of the numerous possibilities of endogene-

ty and omitted variables. At the outset, there is an endogenous elationship between the financial system and economic growth, hich must be controlled for: Growth might be caused by financial

ystem characteristics but also vice versa, and there might be other rivers of growth that are closely related to financial system char- cteristics. Using a post hoc approach, i.e., financial structure and egulation at the beginning of a period, to explain economic growth ver that respective period still leaves room for the interpretation hat common omitted variables influence both regulation and eco- omic outcomes or that the regulation anticipates future growth nd is thus enacted before the growth period – but is nonetheless ndogenously related to growth (Levine, 2005).

In attempting to mitigate these problems, we construct a firm- evel panel dataset, use instrumental variables, and apply an dentification strategy that exploits industry-level differences in ank dependence. Our identification framework is closely related o previous empirical research on the effects of banking sector tructure and regulation on the real economy. Essentially, we fol- ow a three-step regression framework suggested by Giannetti and ngena (2009), who use identification strategies proposed by Rajan nd Zingales (1998), La Porta et al. (2003), and others. These three teps are outlined below and constitute the key pillars of our iden- ification strategy.

In the first step, we use a simple regression framework and xploit the nature of our panel dataset that allows us to control or time- and firm-invariant unobserved effects. We test the rela- ionship using the following baseline specification:

ln(outputi,t) = ̨ + ̌ ∗ bank catharsis indicatork,t + Xi,t + Zk,t

+ ∑

i

�i ∗ firmi + ∑

t

ıt ∗ yeart + εi,t (1)

ith i = 1, . . ., I denoting individual firms, k = 1, . . ., K denoting coun- ries, and t = 1, . . ., T years. The dependent variable, �ln(output) is

measure of firm output growth (e.g., operating revenue growth). he bank catharsis indicatork,t, which is a proxy for the degree of ules-based resolution of de facto insolvent banks, serves as the ain explanatory variable.1 Firmi and yeart are two sets of fixed

ffects that control for unobserved time- and firm-invariant effects n our data. To control for covariates that vary over both the firm and ime dimensions, we insert a vector of firm-specific control vari- bles, Xi,t, and a vector of country-specific control variables, Zk,t. Xi,t ncludes observable time-varying firm characteristics, such as size, ge, and profitability, and Zk,t includes observable time-varying ountry characteristics, such as financial development, bank sector apitalization, bank sector concentration, economic development,

nd institutional quality. All variables are defined in the following ection, in which a particular emphasis is given to the concep- ualization of the catharsis indicator. Note that the constant ̨ is

1 A detailed explanation of the conceptualization and computation of the bank atharsis indicator is provided in the following section.

b s

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ncluded in the model but the coefficient estimates are not shown n the tables for brevity.

Although we exploit the panel characteristics of our dataset and ttempt to control for the remaining observable variables, it is easy o argue that there are numerous problems that cast doubt on the alidity of our results in this first step. On the one hand, not all otentially omitted variables may be captured by the fixed effects nd controls. On the other hand, it remains possible to argue for the ndogeneity of bank catharsis, which could simply be an answer to ast growth or a prelude to expected growth.2 Thus, we subject his baseline specification to two additional tests in attempting to stablish a causal relationship.

In the second step, we use an instrumental variable setup, which ssumes that the regulation of bank insolvency and resolution in ountry k and period t can serve as a valid instrument for actual res- lution of insolvent banks as captured by the catharsis indicator. his idea is similar to the identification strategies of earlier research hat have employed legal prescriptions for banks and bank regula- ion as an instrument for the actual characteristics of the banking ector or manifestations of the law in actual policies (Jayaratne and trahan, 1996; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). Thus, we utilize (a) the xistence of a separate bank insolvency law and (b) the existence of uperseding insolvency declaration power of a regulatory body as nstruments for the catharsis indicator. A heteroskedasticity-robust MM estimator is used for the IV estimation (Baum et al., 2007), nd we discuss and test for the validity of the instruments (with espect to both the relevance and the exogeneity conditions) in the espective section.

If the validity of the instrumental variable approach continues o not be fully convincing, we resort to the third step in our identifi- ation strategy, which was suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) nd has recently been applied in various attempts to establish ausal links between banking and the real economy.3 The iden- ifying assumption of this approach rests on the presumption that rms that are more dependent on bank financing should experi- nce stronger (or weaker) growth in countries and periods in which he resolution regime for insolvent banks is stronger when com- ared with firms that depend less on bank financing. Following ajan and Zingales (1998) and the subsequent applications of their

dea, we assume that a firm’s dependence on bank financing is a echnological or economic characteristic of the industry or sector o which the firm belongs. Under this assumption, bank depen- ence is relatively stable across countries and over time (at least ver short to medium time horizons), but varies with the financial eatures of an industry, such as its cash-flow and investment struc- ures in the aggregate.4 Thus, we can compute bank dependence t the industry level and test our presumption by augmenting our aseline specification with an interaction term that accounts for he bank dependence of the firm:

ln(outputi,t ) = ̨ + ˇ1 ∗ bankdepi + ˇ2 ∗ bank catharsis indicatork,t

+ ˇ3 ∗ (bankdepi ∗ bank catharsis indicatork,t ) + Xi,t + bankdepi ∗ Zk,t

∑ ∑

2 It should be noted that endogeneity due to reverse causality is already reduced y employing firm-level data, since it seems implausible that output growth of a ingle firm affects bank closure policies.

3 Refer, for example, to Bertrand et al. (2007), Cetorelli (2004), Cetorelli and trahan (2006), Claessens and Laeven (2005), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), Fisman and ove (2007) and Giannetti and Ongena (2009). 4 For a detailed discussion of the validity of this assumption, refer to Kroszner

t al. (2007).

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ith i = 1, . . ., I denoting individual firms, k = 1, . . ., K denoting ountries, and t = 1, . . ., T years. The bank catharsis indicatork,t is ow interacted withbankdepi, which is an index that measures he (industry-specific) bank dependence of a firm. This augmented pecification has two key advantages over our baseline specifica- ion and the IV approach. First, it allows us to control not only or firm- and year fixed effects but also for country trends, i.e., or country-year fixed effects that would have absorbed the bank atharsis indicator in the baseline specification and could thus not e included before. Hence, we are able to control for a full range f additional unobservables – and are thus closer to controlling for lmost any potentially omitted variable. Consequently, this spec- fication should help us overcome endogeneity concerns: Even if rms’ average growth rates are correlated with the strength of bank esolution due to reverse causation and/or omitted variables that re not captured by the control variables (or that make the instru- ents invalid), it is difficult to find an argument for such a variable

eing able to drive the relationship between firm performance and ank resolution in a systematic way that varies with firms’ bank ependence. Second, such an approach provides a more convincing est for establishing causality. In the words of Rajan and Zingales 1998): It provides a ‘smoking gun’ by testing a specific mecha- ism through which bank resolution can affect economic growth, amely, by disproportionately benefiting firms more dependent on ank finance.

It should be noted that the simple effects of the ank catharsis indicatork,t and bankdepi are absorbed by the xed effects in the above specification. Additionally, we interact he vector Z with bank dependence to preclude absorption of the ountry-year specific control variables.

. Data

.1. Data and sources

To test the specifications outlined above in Section 3, we con- truct a new dataset based on several sources. The dataset contains ore than 2 million firm-year observations and covers 39 countries

etween 2003 and 2010. We limited our sample to European coun- ries. As a first restriction, data availability and reliability limit the ataset, excluding most other regions. Although data is available or U.S. firms and banks as well, the variance of the main explana- ory variable – the bank catharsis indicator – is presumably low t an interstate level because it is largely governed by a unified ederal regulatory framework. This is not the case in Europe. The ules for bank insolvency and, particularly, the individual decisions n actual bank resolution were largely determined by national uthorities5 and thus vary not just over time but also between ountries. This setup is beneficial to our identification strategy and uggests a dataset focused on European countries rather than U.S. tates. Regarding the timeframe, we aspire to construct the dataset ith a minimum number of observations and regional variance for

ach period and that covers more than a part of the business cycle, ncluding both years with and without the influence of financial nd economic crises.

The main firm-level data is taken from Bureau van Dijk’s madeus database, which provides the largest coverage of data

n European firms. Bureau van Dijk also provides data on Euro- ean banks in its Bankscope database that is used to compute the ank catharsis indicator as described in the following subsection.

5 Note that this holds for the timespan of our dataset but might eventually change ith the introduction of a unified resolution framework currently discussed in the

uropean Union.

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nformation on bank insolvency legislation and regulation is taken rom the Bank Regulation and Supervision dataset published by he World Bank (Barth et al., 2001, 2004; Caprio et al., 2008). Fur- her country-level control variables are constructed from the World ank Financial Structure dataset (Beck et al., 2009), the World ank Open Data database, and the Polity IV database provided by arshall et al. (2011). Following several authors who use data from similar sources

Bertrand et al., 2007; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; Klapper et al., 006), we include only firms that meet one of the following criteria: a) total assets of minimum USD 20 million, or (b) total operating evenue of at least USD 10 million, or (c) at least 150 employees. his is done mainly due to data availability and the employability f the dataset and leaves us with 443,597 individual (both listed nd unlisted) firms that report data for at least part of the sample eriod, i.e., two consecutive years. A summary table displaying the umber of firms in our sample by country and year is provided in able 10 in the Appendix. For most of the firms below the thresh- lds discussed above, financial and accounting data are limited or ppear to be unreliable. Additionally, the availability of micro and mall firm data strongly varies over countries. In order not to make ur dataset too unbalanced or inconsistent in coverage, we employ hese limits. Doing so should also largely exclude ‘phantom’ firms hat are established only for tax or other purposes.6 Additionally, e test the robustness of our results by running the analyses on

ubsamples of the dataset. Nevertheless, this sample restriction hould be considered when determining the external validity of ur results.

.2. Conceptualizing a measure for bank catharsis

Our approach depends on a valid and powerful operationaliza- ion of the main explanatory variable, the bank catharsis indicator. irst, the indicator must capture the idea of how orderly or rules- ased failed banks are resolved. Ideally, it should measure the ollowing:

ank catharsis indicatork,t = Failed bank assets that have been resolvedk,t

Bank assets that should have been resolvedk,t (3)

owever, there are restrictions imposed by data quality or, more enerally, by data availability. Regarding the numerator (i.e., failed ank assets that have been resolved), there is often no unified frame- ork for when and how to resolve banks. Accordingly, there is o or only limited regulatory reporting available, which is also ot necessarily consistent across countries. With regard to the enominator (i.e., bank assets that should have been resolved), we ncounter the question of how to define and identify which banks hould have been resolved. The challenge is to find an approach hat correctly identifies failed and to-be-resolved banks (minimizes ype I error), while it avoids declaring healthy banks as failed and esolving them accordingly (minimizes or avoids type II error). To vercome these challenges, we suggest a relatively simple indi- ator that combines sufficient identification power to proxy for he hypothesized ‘catharsis’ and that can be effectively built for

multitude of countries based on available data and despite incon- istent and incomplete regulatory reporting on bank failures. We onceptualize this indicator in the following.

For the nominator, we require data on failed/resolved banks

hat are as encompassing as possible. Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope atabase reports inactive banks, their last account dates and finan- ial data in addition to the reasons for their inactivity (bankruptcy,

6 Refer to Giannetti and Ongena (2009) for a detailed discussion of the justification or such cutoffs.

2 ial Sta

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a a a s f l i c t t i after falling below the threshold scaled by the banks that would have been regarded as failed because they fell below the threshold. Nevertheless, we compute several alternative bank catharsis indi-

18 J. Korte / Journal of Financ

n liquidation, dissolved by merger, etc.). Despite valid criticism irected at it, Bankscope is likely the broadest and most represen- ative cross-country database, covering 80% or more of bank assets or a multitude of countries (Bhattacharya, 2003; Detragiache et al., 008; Shehzad et al., 2009). We assume that Bankscope data is sim-

larly representative for bank closures. In any case, there should be o sampling bias or, at least, no inconsistency between numerator nd denominator if the population from which the bank closures re taken (all banks reported in Bankscope) in the numerator is et in relation to a denominator composed of the same population. his is the case with the following matching procedure employed. e define as resolved in insolvency resolution all banks that have

a) fallen below a pre-determined capital ratio threshold in the revious7 or the current year and (b) ceased existence as a legal ntity by ways of purchase and assumption (or M&A) or closure and iquidation. We exclude M&A from this definition as a robustness heck.

Concerning the denominator, the preferred option for detecting hich banks should be resolved is to test for a regulatory insolvency

hreshold such as a closure rule at positive capital, i.e., a simple apital ratio (total equity/total assets) as a should-be-resolved- rigger for bank insolvency. This basic principle follows from the iterature on bank insolvency, particularly from the suggestions of aufman (2011) and Lindgren (2005). A closure rule at positive apital stipulates automatic regulatory intervention and eventu- lly even closure or purchase and assumption of a bank if it falls hort of pre-specified positive capital ratios. The main rationale upporting the use of such rules is their simplicity in identifying nsolvency, relatively small room for manipulation, and their natu- al tendency to be biased upwards, i.e., to avoid type II errors rather han type I errors. In fact, the literature on bank insolvency detec- ion also suggests that simple capital ratios score surprisingly well n detecting failure (Arena, 2008; Estrella et al., 2000) and show etter results than more complex regulatory capital ratios (such as he tier 1 capital/risk-weighted assets ratio) in predicting failure uring the financial crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Blundell- ignall and Atkinson, 2010). Thus, we define all banks that fall

elow a pre-determined, simple capital ratio threshold as failed ccording to this regulatory definition.

In calculating the numerator and denominator, we take total eported asset values of resolved and failed banks to account for he effect that small banks might be more easily resolved by a reg- lator, but an orderly closure rule at positive capital should lead to

closure of a de facto failed bank irrespective of bank size.8 Nev- rtheless, we compute an alternative catharsis indicator that uses ank numbers instead of assets for a robustness test. The actual easurement and summary statistics of the bank catharsis indica-

or are presented in the following section.

.3. Composition of other variables and descriptive statistics

Table 1 reports the sources and summary statistics of the ariables used in our analyses. The definitions of the individual

ariables are given below. It should be noted that we cleaned the ataset from observations that exhibit logically impossible values nd obvious data errors. Apart from that action, all cleanings or

7 This allows for a time-lag of regulatory action. 8 Following the core idea of the catharsis indicator, a country which resolves two

mall banks that failed according to the rule but supports continued operations of a ailed large bank should have a smaller indicator than a country which resolved one mall and one large failed bank and forbears on the second small bank that failed. his can be attained by resorting to asset values.

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bility 16 (2015) 213–231

estrictions on the dataset are reported with the relevant variables r specifications.

ependent variables We measure our main dependent variable – firm performance –

y the growth of a firm’s operating revenue. The operating revenue rovides a simple measure of firm performance that is less prone o disturbances, such as extraordinary revenues or non-recurring ffects, financial/non-operating business, or accounting and amor- ization rules that can influence net income or assets.9 The growth ate of the operating revenue is computed as ln(operating revenuei,t/ perating revenuei,t−1) and denoted �ln(OpRev) in the following ables. To limit the influence of outliers, we trim the sample at the st and 99th percentiles of the growth rates. A robustness check is lso undertaken on an untrimmed sample.

In addition to operating revenue growth as a main depen- ent variable, we analyze how changes in financing structure are

nfluenced by the bank catharsis indicator to assess the chan- els through which resolution of insolvent banks may influence eal economic performance. Essentially, this additional dependent ariable allows us to test whether and explain why particu- ar firms experience stronger growth following more rules-based ank insolvency resolution. One potential channel might be the eallocation of bank credit. Thus, we examine changes in financ- ng structures toward debt financing as an additional dependent ariable. This is proxied by the change in the financial debt atio of a firm, denoted � debt/assets and computed as [(short- erm loansi,t + longterm debti,t) − (shortterm loansi,t−1

longterm debti,t−1)]/non equity liabilitiesi,t.10 We also trim the sam- le at the 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the influence of outliers.

xplanatory variables The bank catharsis indicator as a main explanatory variable

s defined and operationalized above. This indicator is computed ased on individual bank-year level observations and aggregated t the country-year level. Since we employ the matching proce- ure described above, all our results are between 0% and 100% by efinition.11

Because we are calculating the bank catharsis indicator based on hypothetical closure rule at positive capital, we must determine cutoff serving as a hypothetical trigger for insolvency resolution ccording to this rule. We choose to construct the bank cathar- is indicator for an 8% capital ratio closure rule. The first reason or this choice is intuitive: 8% is consistent with traditional regu- atory requirements – although these are now far more complex n computation than a simple capital ratio – and thus is a logical utoff for insolvency regulation. The second reason is more quan- itative: Among several cutoffs that we computed, the 8% cutoff for he matched catharsis indicator exhibits the best ‘detection rate’, .e., it peaks in the average identification of banks that really failed

ators that are used for robustness checks to determine that our

9 Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our results using net income and asset rowth and find directionally similar results for our main regressions. However, hese are less stable in their significance, potentially due to these other influences. 10 Note that we use the change in the debt-to-non-equity-liabilities ratio to make ure that the results are not driven by a loss in equity rather than by an increase in ebt finance. 11 It should be noted that we limit our sample to country-year combinations for hich at least ten bank observations are available in order to ensure that our indi-

ator is not driven by extreme observations. In addition, we also trim the sample at he 1st and 99th percentiles of the catharsis indicator for a further robustness test.

J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231 219

Table 1 Summary statistics. This table reports variable names, sources, means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and the number of firm-year observations for which data is available in our sample. The sources are: Amadeus company database by Bureau van Dijk (AM), Bankscope bank database by Bureau van Dijk (BS), Marshall and Jaggers Polity IV database (P4), World Bank Open Data database (WB OD), World Bank Bank Regulation and Supervision dataset (WB BRS), World Bank Financial Structure dataset (WB FS).

Variable group and name Source Mean SD Min Max N

Dependent variables Growth oper. revenue (�ln(OpRev)) AM 12.66 (46.50) −174.11 321.2 1,794,189 Growth debt/asset (�debt/assets) AM 1.18 (17.88) −95.75 71.59 1,311,729

Explanatory variables Catharsis indicator (7% CR) BS 2.52 (6.49) 0 54.25 2,188,814 Catharsis indicator (8% CR) BS 2.34 (5.25) 0 44.07 2,192,690 Catharsis indicator (9% CR) BS 2.23 (4.76) 0 33.24 2,196,761 Catharsis indicator (8% CR, avg) BS 2.90 (8.38) 0 63.81 1,508,650 Catharsis indicator (8% tier 1) BS 4.48 (15.37) 0 100.00 1,972,574 Catharsis indicator (8% CR, number) BS 3.09 (4.5) 0 100.00 2,193,516 Bank dependence (NACE-based) AM 19.62 (7.03) 0.8 57.68 2,195,945 Bank dependence (SIC-based) AM 19.56 (6.01) 0.8 51.52 2,195,941

Industry- and firm-level variables Share of firm in country-year total assets AM 0.01 (0.28) 0 100 2,118,478 Firm age (log) AM 2.54 (0.98) 0 6.8 2,163,383 RoA (profits/assets) AM 5.64 (11.7) −43.75 59.07 1,919,068 Firm status AM 0.96 (0.18) 0 1 2,152,150

Country-level variables Financial development WB FS 109.05 (52.03) 13.24 269.76 1,796,423 Bank system undercapitalization BS 72.63 (30.54) 0 98.74 2,196,075 Bank concentration CR3 WB FS 62.78 (24.23) 11.9 100 1,882,352 GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) WB OD 27,620 (9329) 2192 74,021 2,196,441 Political openness index P4 9.12 (1.87) −7 10 2,179,883 Bank insolvency law WB BRS 0.44 (0.50) 0 1 878,093 Bank insolvency power WB BRS 0.21 (0.40) 0 1 2,053,421

r d r o w f 1 a v p

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c i B s a t a t c w c o i o

o l u t that firms of a specific industry exhibit based on the typical cash- flow and financing structures in that industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We include only industries with more than 30 firms for

12 A problem of limited identification power could occur if the banks that are closed down are not identifiable by a closure rule at positive capital, for example, if they regularly have more than 8% capital ratio when they fail. To exclude this possibility, we computed unmatched bank catharsis indicators (i.e., we sum all failed banks

International debt issues/GDP WB FS 60.46

Loans from non-resident banks/GDP WB FS 62.22

esults are not driven by the choice of the cutoff or the indicator efinition. We compute the indicator for 7% and 9% simple capital atio thresholds (i.e., 1% around the peak and the reference case f 8%). With regard to alternative catharsis indicator definitions, e compute an indicator using average values of capital and assets

or the capital ratio and another indicator using tier 1 ratios (tier capital/risk-weighted assets) instead. In addition, we compute

catharsis indicator based on the numbers rather than the asset alues of concerned banks. We use these alternative definitions to erform additional robustness checks.

Table 1 shows that the sample mean of the bank cathar- is indicators is between 2.2% and 4.5%. These numbers may ppear surprisingly low at first glance. However, this finding can e explained by two factors. First, it indicates that regulators requently put undercapitalized banks on probation rather than esolve them even when their capital ratios drop below certain hresholds. This is generally done to give banks time to recapital- ze but may also be due to the limited willingness of regulators to nforce resolution by closure. Second, there are many banks that ould be considered to be in healthy financial condition despite

heir capital ratio dropping below 8%. Whether they are sustainable s a different question. Both rationales – the limited willingness to lose banks and the existence of otherwise healthy banks with low apital ratios – drive down the indicator in the aggregate. However, e argue that this phenomenon does not blur the identification ower of our indicator because we basically test whether coun- ries that follow a more rules-based insolvency resolution policy as proxied by closer implementation of the closure rule at positive

apital) experience higher growth rates in the real economy. This dentification is possible as long as there is some variation in the xplanatory variable and assuming that there is some relationship etween the health and capital ratio of banks that is somewhat

i t i n r

(40.39) 0.13 344.39 1,880,281 (84.88) 2.16 1509.92 1,882,619

omparable across countries.12 Although the latter assumption s confirmed by the previous literature (Arena, 2008; Berger and ouwman, 2013; Estrella et al., 2000), our indicator exhibits con- iderable variation over time and across countries. Figs. 1 and 2 give n overview of both the variation over time and the distribution of he catharsis indicator on the country-year level. We use this vari- tion as one source of our identification henceforth. In addition, o ensure that this variation is not driven by outliers or by small ountries that only have a few bank-year observations available, e conduct robustness tests (a) using a trimmed catharsis indi-

ator and (b) excluding the countries with the lowest number of bservations. Finally, by separately controlling for the overall cap- talization of the banking system, we ensure that it is not the over- r undercapitalization of banks in general that drives our results.

The index of bank dependence is defined as the ratio f financial debt to total liabilities of a firm, i.e., (shortterm

oansi,t + longterm debti,t)/total liabilitiesi,t. This index is computed sing firm-level data that are aggregated at the industry level o provide a measure of the technological or economic demand

n the numerator, regardless of their capital ratio) for the 8% cutoff and found that hey are not much larger on average. This demonstrates that the matched catharsis ndicator should cover most of the banks that have, in fact, failed (and that it is ot driven down to a large extent by excluding failed banks due to the matching equirement). It thus exhibits good insolvency detection properties.

220 J. Korte / Journal of Financial Sta

F s

w d d a b fi a w a o

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F o i

i g r p m w a a

u fi o

O

i o b g s d c i b f b o r t t l t t t a i p w p

ig. 1. Variation of the catharsis indicator over time. This figure displays the cathar- is indicator over time, averaged across all countries in the dataset.

hich all necessary data are available in the calculation to avoid isturbances by outliers and erroneously computed bank depen- ence indices. The initial index of bank dependence is calculated s a sector average at the NACE-4 industry classification level ecause this classification is available for the largest number of rms in Amadeus, and it provides bank dependence measures on

fine-grained level for approximately 700 sectors. For robustness, e compute an alternative bank dependence index for industries

ccording to the U.S. SIC classification, which provides a rougher cut n bank dependence by distinguishing approximately 200 sectors.

ther firm-level variables In order to account for firm characteristics that are not captured

y firm fixed effect, i.e., that vary over time for a given firm, and that ight influence firm growth (or financing structure), we introduce

rm-level covariates. Firm size is typically seen as a determinant f firm growth as smaller firms are expected to growth faster on verage. To control for this growth convergence effect (Kroszner t al., 2007), we include the relative size of a firm measured as ts lagged share in total assets (on a country-year level to account

or diverging economic structures in different countries). Likewise, s young companies are typically expected to grow faster than ld ones (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009), we account for this by

ig. 2. Distribution of the catharsis indicator. This figure displays the distribution f the catharsis indicator as a histogram of the pooled country-year level catharsis ndicators.

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bility 16 (2015) 213–231

ncluding firm age as a control variable. As the age effect on firm rowth is expected to decline with age, we include the natural loga- ithm of this variable in our regressions. Finally, we expect that firm rofitability also influences firm growth as highly profitable firms ight be expected to grow faster than firms that do not perform as ell. Hence, we construct a simple profitability measure from the

vailable data that provides a proxy for the return on assets (RoA) nd is computed as profit or lossi,t/total assetsi,t.

Additionally, we run tests for which a firm’s activity status is sed. Firm status is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a rm is active (i.e., operating/in business) throughout the timespan f our dataset and 0 if a firm has been dissolved or liquidated.

ther country-level variables Although the time-invariant covariates can be controlled for

n our regression framework by exploiting the panel character of ur dataset, there may nevertheless be other variables that vary y country and year and that are potential determinants of firm rowth. For example, it could be argued that our bank cathar- is indicator just proxies for other factors that cause comparative ifferences in firm growth. Thus, we identify five such potential ovariates that should be controlled for. First, the strength of bank nsolvency resolution could be a mere proxy for the state of the anking system in general, particularly for its capitalization. There- ore, we insert another control variable, undercapitalization of the anking sector, that is computed on a country-year level as the ratio f bank assets of undercapitalized banks (i.e., below a simple capital atio of 8%) to total bank assets. In addition, competition (or the lack hereof) in the banking sector could play a role for firm growth and he resolution of insolvent banks. For example, the regulator may be ess open to a purchase and assumption policy in a country in which he banking sector is already highly concentrated. We control for his by employing a simple CR3 concentration index computed as he ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total banking sector ssets. In addition, financial development has been shown to pos- tively impact firm growth in numerous studies13 and could also otentially be related to the treatment of insolvent banks. Thus, e control for financial development by making use of the usual roxy bank creditk,t/GDPk,t that is taken from the latest version of he World Bank Financial Structure dataset (an update to Beck et al., 009). Finally, we control for a country’s overall economic devel- pment and institutional quality/political openness by taking the urchasing power parity-adjusted real GDP per capita on a country- ear level from the World Bank database as a proxy for economic evelopment. Political openness is proxied by the polity IV index omputed and published by Marshall et al. (2011).

The legal provisions for bank insolvency regulation (bank insol- ency law) and insolvency declaration power of the regulator (bank nsolvency power) are taken from the World Bank’s Bank Regula- ion and Supervision dataset that has been collected over several ounds since 2000 (Barth et al., 2001, 2004; Caprio et al., 2008). Both ariables are dummies that indicate the existence of a specific bank nsolvency law and the power of a regulator to order insolvency esolution against a bank (even superseding the bank’s manage- ent or shareholders). For additional tests, we employ data on the

ccess to international finance, namely, international debt issues nd loans from non-resident banks as ratios to GDP. These data are

lso provided by the World Bank Financial Structure dataset on a ountry-year level.

13 Refer to Section 2.

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I v a r t v i b c m a test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the validity of instru- ments in a robust GMM estimation (Baum et al., 2007). The J statistic essentially tests the exogeneity of the instruments with the null

J. Korte / Journal of Financ

. Results

This section presents and discusses our main results, structured long the three-step analytical framework outlined above. We dis- uss the results of each step in turn and extend these results into dditional analyses on the channels of transmission of the ‘catharsis ffect’ and the conditions under which it works most effectively.

.1. Simple OLS

In the first step, we estimate the impact of the catharsis indicator n firm growth in a simple OLS model. We also exploit the nature f our panel dataset by controlling for time- and firm-invariant nobserved effects. Moreover, consistent with the literature (e.g., iannetti and Ongena, 2009), all specifications reported below mploy heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard rrors clustered at the firm-level. However, because of the poten- ial problems with endogeneity discussed in section 3, care should e exercised when interpreting these results. Although one might ot be able to attribute causality to these estimates, they never- heless provide an initial indication of the direction and economic ignificance of the effect.

Table 2 reports the results. Overall, we posit that these results upport our initial hypothesis that the catharsis indicator has a ositive and significant effect on firm growth. Model (1) tests for

baseline effect without any controls or fixed effects and finds positive and highly significant coefficient. However, this effect ight potentially be a proxy for other variables that explain the

ositive relationship. We test for this possibility by including two ets of control variables, one with firm-level controls and one with ountry-level controls. If the positive effect of the catharsis indi- ator really proxies for one of these factors, the coefficient on the atharsis indicator would be expected to drop in magnitude or to ecome insignificant. Neither is the case: Not in model (2), which

ntroduces the firm-level controls, nor in model (3), which controls or the country-level covariates. Even when controlling for both ets of control variables simultaneously in model (4), the coeffi- ient on the catharsis indicator remains statistically significant, as n the baseline specification. Finally, we exploit the full possibili- ies of our panel dataset by testing two-way fixed effects models hat control not just for explicitly included variables but also for ear fixed effects and country or firm fixed effects. The columns or models (5) and (6) report the results. The coefficient estimates rop in magnitude, which is not surprising because we are now ble to control for a large array of potentially omitted variables hat are absorbed by the fixed effects. Most importantly, however, he coefficients remain highly significant statistically.

To provide an impression of the economic significance of these esults, we evaluate the statistically significant coefficient on the atharsis indicator by computing a growth rate differential. This easure captures the difference in the growth rate between a firm

ocated in a country half a standard deviation above the mean of he catharsis indicator compared with a firm in a country whose atharsis indicator is half a standard deviation below the mean. pplying this growth rate differential to the results reported in able 2 yields an impact between 0.5% (model (6)) and 2.2% (model 2)) of operating revenue growth. Taken together, the relationship etween growth in operating revenue and the catharsis indicator eems robust to the inclusion of controls and fixed effects and is oth statistically and economically significant.

.2. IV model

This second step is intended to extend our results from showing positive and significant relationship to demonstrating that this

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bility 16 (2015) 213–231 221

elationship is causal. Thus, we run the same sequence of specifica- ions that was used in the previous OLS analyses in an instrumental ariable setup, which employs the regulation of bank insolvency nd resolution in country k and period t as an instrument for he catharsis indicator. More specifically, we use two variables rom bank insolvency regulation: The existence of a separate bank nsolvency law and the bank insolvency declaration power of a egulatory agency. Having two instruments has a particular advan- age: We can use overidentification tests as diagnostic tools for the alidity of our instrumental variables. However, because only the nsolvency declaration variable exhibits sufficient variation over ime within the same country, we must rely on one instrumental ariable when including country or firm fixed effects in our model. onsequently, we cannot run the overidentification tests for these xed effects models. All our tests use a heteroskedasticity-robust MM estimator. The results are reported in Table 3.

All models yield a positive and highly significant coefficient n the catharsis indicator, which confirms our initial findings. o test the necessity of this instrumental variable setup, we mploy an endogeneity test that investigates whether the assumed ndogenous regressor, our catharsis indicator, is in fact endoge- ous, recommending the use of IV over simple OLS. We use a eteroskedasticity robust test statistic equivalent to the Durbin- u-Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis that the

stimates are not altered by using IV compared with OLS, support- ng the assumption that the catharsis indicator is exogenous in our nitial models. The null is rejected with low p-values, which con- rms our initial concerns about the endogeneity of the catharsis

ndicator. However, the validity of our instruments rests on two con-

itions. First, a minimum relevance of bank insolvency law and nsolvency declaration power for the catharsis indicator is required. ntuitively, this seems to be the case: Legal prerequisites of bank nsolvency are a logical determinant of actual bank resolution. We lso find a positive and significant correlation between the catharsis ndicator and the suggested instruments. Furthermore, employing

weak instrument diagnostic test confirms the validity of this con- ition. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic is generally used to est whether the instrumental variables are sufficiently correlated ith the potentially endogenous variables in a heteroskedasticity-

obust setup (Baum et al., 2007). The reported values are far above reviously tabulated critical values (not reported), and also far bove any other rule of thumb.14 Thus, we have no reason to assume hat our initial proposition of regulatory and legal prerequisites of ank insolvency as a determinant of actual bank resolution should e doubted.

The second condition, the exogeneity restriction, is less obvious. t demands the exclusion of any causal relationship of bank insol- ency law to firm growth other than through the actual insolvency nd resolution of banks – otherwise, the instrument may not be egarded as exogenous. Arguing purely on the grounds of economic heory, it is unlikely that there is any direct effect of bank insol- ency law on economic growth not working through actual bank nsolvencies. However, considering the interplay between growth, anks, and regulation (e.g., lobbying in favor of some regulatory hanges in certain expected economic situations), this argument ight be doubted. Thus, we use Hansen’s J statistic, which provides

14 Baum et al. (2007, 2010), for example, suggest referring to the general rule of humb of a test statistic larger than ten indicating less concern with weak instru-

ents, as the critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo are for i.i.d. errors only.

222 J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231

Table 2 Firm growth and bank ‘catharsis effect’ (OLS models). This table reports the results from an OLS model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in firm operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator as main explanatory variable. Firm-level and country-level control variables and country, firm and year fixed effects are included as indicated. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

Catharsis indicator (8% CR) 0.344*** 0.441*** 0.313*** 0.399*** 0.138*** 0.0931*** (0.00564) (0.00511) (0.00672) (0.00630) (0.00737) (0.00725)

Bank dependence 0.0730*** 0.132*** 0.0961*** (0.00614) (0.00695) (0.00687)

Firm age (log) −0.0733*** −0.0699*** −0.0662*** −0.281*** (0.000468) (0.000520) (0.000520) (0.00456)

Lagged share of total assets 0.310** 0.0907 −0.241 −0.273

(0.126) (0.128) (0.179) (0.473) Profitability 0.459*** 0.444*** 0.381*** 0.801***

(0.00338) (0.00376) (0.00368) (0.00676) Financial development −0.0747*** −0.0709*** −0.0828*** −0.0756***

(0.00112) (0.00107) (0.00417) (0.00432) Bank undercapitalization 0.00986*** 0.0499*** 0.00797** −0.00623

(0.00260) (0.00244) (0.00381) (0.00381) Bank concentration −0.0149*** −0.0153*** 0.0266*** 0.0146***

(0.00222) (0.00204) (0.00529) (0.00521) GDP per capita −0.0022*** −0.0019*** −0.0341*** −0.028***

(0.0001) (0.00009) (0.0007) (0.0007) Political openness 0.00244*** 0.0111*** −0.0235*** 0.0163***

(0.000399) (0.000365) (0.00365) (0.00113) Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES Country FE NO NO NO NO YES NO Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO YES

1,4 0.0

h t a t e t

w e a a e t d t t t e e w f t

5

t fi p m fi i

W c c o i t

p t A c i t s t s A l t o v o t t fi

m f

Observations 1,792,558 1,555,980

R-Squared 0.002 0.040

ypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residual erm. Table 3 reports p-values for this null hypothesis. In models (1) nd (3), with p-values of approximately 0.5–0.6, we cannot reject he exogeneity of the instruments. However, low p-values in mod- ls (2) and (4) raise concerns about the potential endogeneity of he instruments.

When turning to the economic magnitude of the IV estimates, e find considerably higher effects compared with the benchmark

stimates in Table 2. Computing the difference in the growth rate s outlined above yields an effect between 1.8% and 5.7% of oper- ting revenue growth. In general, it is not uncommon to find larger stimates in IV estimations due, for example, to heterogeneous reatment effects. Although this might be the case here, the large ifference could also be conservatively interpreted as an indication hat the instruments are weak or not entirely exogenous. We are hus not able to conclusively rule out the possibility of failing on he conditions underlying IV estimation, particularly regarding the xogeneity condition, due to the large difference in the coefficient stimates and the varying results of the Hansen tests. Therefore, e supplement our results with a further identification idea in the

ollowing step of the analysis that is used to trace the causality of he ‘catharsis effect’.

.3. Interaction approach

This third step of our identification strategy relies on the iden- ifying assumption that firms that are more dependent on bank nancing should experience stronger growth in countries and

eriods in which the resolution regime for insolvent banks – as easured by the catharsis indicator – is stronger compared with

rms in countries and periods in which it is weak. Thus, we exploit ndustry differences in bank dependence to establish causality.

c t w t

40,787 1,252,126 1,252,126 1,252,126 12 0.045 0.123 0.165

e use the augmented specification presented in Section 3 and ontinue to employ heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust lustered standard errors. The results are reported in Table 4, which nly displays the main coefficients of interest and indicates the nclusion of control variables and their interactions in the respec- ive rows for brevity.

The first specification serves as a starting point that can be com- ared with the results of model (5) in Table 2. Here, we simply add he interaction of the catharsis indicator and bank dependence. lthough the coefficient on the level effect of the catharsis indi- ator becomes insignificant, it is notable that the coefficient on the nteraction term is positive and significant. This alludes to a par- icularly strong effect of bank insolvency resolution for firms that tructurally depend more on bank financing. In model (2) we test he interaction term between bank dependence and the cathar- is indicator, the level effects, and the sets of control variables. dditionally, where these controls vary only at the country-year

evel, we also interact them with the bank dependence indicator o ensure that our interaction term of interest does not proxy for ther unobserved variables whose influence on firm growth also aries systematically with bank dependence. Both the coefficient n the catharsis indicator and – more notably – the coefficient on he interaction are positive and significant, further corroborating he hypothesized ‘catharsis effect’, particularly for bank dependent rms.

In models (3) and (4), we exploit the full advantages of the aug- ented model, which allows us to control for country trends, i.e.,

or country-year fixed effects that would have absorbed the bank

atharsis indicator in the baseline specification. When we include hese country-year fixed effects alongside a set of firm fixed effects, e capture unobserved variance in all of these dimensions. We first

est this fixed effects model without control variables in model (3).

J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231 223

Table 3 Firm growth and bank ‘catharsis effect’ (IV models). This table reports the results from an Instrumental Variable (GMM) model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in firm operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator as main explanatory variable. We use the existence of a separate bank insolvency law and the insolvency declaration power of a regulatory authority as instruments for the catharsis indicator. Firm-level and country-level control variables and country, firm and year fixed effects are included as indicated. When country or firm fixed effects are included, only the insolvency declaration power can be used as an instruments as it exhibits sufficient variation over time. The endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the estimation results are not altered by using instrumental variables. The weak instrument test uses the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic. The Hansen test tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residual. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

Catharsis indicator (8% CR) 1.146*** 0.828*** 0.364*** 0.905*** 0.979*** 1.151*** (0.0281) (0.0239) (0.0725) (0.0641) (0.199) (0.191)

Bank dependence 0.0666*** 0.0675*** 0.0884*** (0.00997) (0.00990) (0.00758)

Firm age (log) −0.0734*** −0.0642*** −0.0663*** −0.295*** (0.000722) (0.000716) (0.000571) (0.00670)

Lagged share of total assets 0.191 −0.538* −0.444** −4.046*** (0.252) (0.303) (0.174) (1.410)

Profitability 0.375*** 0.342*** 0.386*** 0.846*** (0.00514) (0.00519) (0.00399) (0.00780)

Financial development 0.0674*** 0.0839*** −0.200*** −0.214*** (0.00205) (0.00201) (0.0156) (0.0162)

Bank undercapitalization −0.123*** −0.0599*** 0.0823*** 0.109*** (0.00549) (0.00490) (0.0134) (0.0143)

Bank concentration 0.144*** 0.219*** 0.0895*** 0.0887*** (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.00639) (0.00642)

GDP per capita −0.0033*** −0.0038*** −0.0257*** −0.0246*** (0.0002) (0.00018) (0.00082) (0.00082)

Political openness −0.0313*** −0.0320*** 0.00629* 0.00371 (0.00135) (0.00127) (0.00359) (0.00316)

Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES Country FE NO NO NO NO YES NO Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO YES Observations 717,211 612,857 707,328 606,588 1,054,117 1,018,668

R-Squared 0.001 0.039 0.026 0.055 0.116 0.154

0. 42 0.

T b s i m a

c s

T F T o c c

Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.000 0.000

Weak instrument test (F) 7700 4800

Hansen test (p-value) 0.567 0.000

o ensure that the coefficient on the interaction term is not driven y one of the control variables that also influences firm growth ystematically varying with bank dependence, we also include the

nteracted country-level control variables and firm-level controls in

odel (4). The coefficient on the interaction term remains positive nd significant in both specifications.

fi a s

able 4 irm growth and bank ‘catharsis effect’ (Interaction models). his table reports the results from a regression model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in firm f firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level), and the interaction between ontrol variables (the latter also interacted with bank dependence) and firm, year, and lustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated b

Model (1)

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev)

Catharsis indicator (8% CR) −0.00586

(0.0256)

Bank dependence

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence 0.509***

(0.135)

Firm-level controls YES

Country-level controls YES

Country-level controls × bank dependence NO

Firm FE YES

Year FE YES

Country-Year FE NO

Observations 1,252,126

R-Squared 0.165

000 0.000 0.000 0.000 00 3800 2865 2590

6 0.000 N/A N/A

This step should finally help us to overcome the endogeneity oncerns. Because we control for country-time and firm fixed unob- ervables and a range of potential covariates that may influence

rm growth systematically with bank dependence, there is hardly ny other channel of endogeneity conceivable. Even if reverse cau- ation or omitted variables drive a correlation between the average

operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator, an indicator these two variables as main explanatory variables. Firm-level and country-level

country-year fixed effects are included as indicated. Robust standard errors are y ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

(2) (3) (4) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

0.312*** (0.0251) 0.310*** (0.0544) 0.429*** 0.691*** 0.549*** (0.133) (0.149) (0.164) YES NO YES YES NO NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES

1,252,126 1,792,441 1,252,126 0.046 0.398 0.432

2 ial Sta

g fi s q o

s c a t t i s t b a t a

b s o c g o s g

5 ‘

i e v T u s p

t i i t i q b i i e t ‘ w

i t l u e f a f t

q c

fi o fi h s a c T i m t w q fi e

o t e o i ( s a i s l m p w s m o fi t l t n a a

m ‘ e m o u t

24 J. Korte / Journal of Financ

rowth rates of firms and the strength of ‘catharsis’, it is difficult to nd an argument that would provide that such a variable would do o in a systematic way relating to firms’ bank dependence. Conse- uently, we treat this finding as strong evidence for the causality f the ‘catharsis effect’ on firm growth.

Interpreting the economic significance of the estimates is lightly more complex for the interaction term models. In these ases, we evaluate the economic significance at one standard devi- tion around the mean of both variables, i.e., bank dependence and he bank catharsis indicator. According to this evaluation approach, he results shown in model (4) suggest a difference of approx- mately 0.6% in the growth rate between a firm located half a tandard deviation above the mean of bank dependence compared o a firm with a bank dependence measure half a standard deviation elow the mean, if located in a country half a standard deviation bove the mean of the bank catharsis indicator (i.e., with a rela- ively strict resolution of failed banks) rather than in a country half

standard deviation below this mean.15

Taken together, our results thus far suggest that rules-based ank insolvency resolution has an economically and statistically ignificant effect on economic growth. Particularly the third step f our identification strategy provides an indication of the spe- ific mechanism by which the ‘catharsis effect’ influences economic rowth, i.e., it disproportionately benefits those firms that depend n bank finance. However, what exactly is the channel of transmis- ion of this effect from the resolution of insolvent banks to firm rowth?

.4. Extension of analyses I – exploring the mechanisms of catharsis’

Thus far, we have shown that there is a predominantly pos- tive ‘catharsis effect’. However, we are also interested in finding vidence with respect to the transmission channel from bank insol- ency resolution to firm growth through which this effect works. hus, we are essentially searching for a ‘smoking gun’ that indicates nder which conditions or for which firms we find a particularly trong ‘catharsis effect’. In this section, we define and test two otential transmission channels.

Starting with the first channel, which could be described as he ‘quality effect’, we stipulate that the growth effect we find s essentially driven by higher quality firms. Returning to our nitial argumentation in support of the ‘catharsis effect’, we essen- ially argued that the resolution of insolvent banks reestablishes ncentives in financial intermediation and thereby increases the uality of credit allocation decisions. In such an environment, anks prefer high-quality customers to gambling for high volatil-

ty. Consequently, firms that offer more attractive (e.g., profitable) nvestments as opposed to more volatile investments should ben- fit, in particular, from this shift to quality. If this proposition holds

rue, we should find a different magnitude or even direction of the catharsis effect’ for firms of high and low quality. In a nutshell,

e expect the quality effect to surface in higher growth of higher

15 All of the values used for evaluation of economic significance have been tested ndividually for their statistical significance by marginal evaluation. They are found o be individually significant at least at the 95% level, in most cases even at the 99% evel or above. We consistently apply these additional significance tests to all values sed for evaluation in all following tables. It should be noted that we correct for scale ndpoints (i.e., we do not go beyond realistic endpoints when computing the values or economic evaluation by limiting values to being ≥0 for bank dependence as well s for the catharsis indicator). Differences between this method and not correcting or scale endpoints are very marginal, though, and do not exert a large influence on he computed growth differentials.

p t n e w t b r t

b t

bility 16 (2015) 213–231

uality firms because they should be the beneficiaries of efficient redit allocation decisions.

To test this prediction, we set up two alternative definitions of rm quality. First, we distinguish those firms that went bankrupt ver the time horizon of our dataset as low quality, and those rms that continued operations uninterruptedly are defined as igh-quality firms. This definition provides rather unbalanced sub- amples with approximately 2 million firm-year observations of ctive firms and less than 100,000 observations of firms that are lassified as bankrupt, dissolved, in receivership, or in liquidation. hus, we apply an alternative definition of firm quality: Firms n the top tercile of firm profitability (as defined by the RoA

easure outlined above) are considered high-quality firms, and hose in the bottom tercile are defined as ‘low quality’. To test hether there is a differential ‘catharsis effect’ for high- and low-

uality firms, we split our main dataset along these definitions of rm quality into subsamples and run our main specification on ach.16

The results are reported in Table 5 together with the results of ur augmented specification as a reference case. For each defini- ion of firm quality, we observe a considerably different ‘catharsis ffect’. Whereas the coefficient on our main interaction increases nly slightly for active firms, it becomes negative, but insignificant, n the sample of firms that went out of business (models (2) and 3)). A test for the equality of the coefficients shows that they are ignificantly different across subsamples and rejects equality with

p-value of 0.037. It is not surprising that there is only a small ncrease in the coefficient for the active firm sample insofar as this ample comprises far more than 90% of the observations, and a arge move in the coefficient might not be expected. Comparing the

odels run on the samples split along the top and bottom tercile of rofitability, which are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5, e find similar results. The coefficient on the main interaction is

ignificant and economically much larger than in our reference odel when the test is run on a sample of high-quality firms

nly. When we run the model on the subsample of low-quality rms, the coefficient becomes negative but also insignificant. Again, he equality of these coefficients is rejected at a high significance evel (p-value of 0.011). These results cast some light on our first ransmission channel: The ‘catharsis effect’ seems to impact eco- omic growth through a positive effect on higher quality firms, nd firms with worse performance are not (or are even negatively) ffected.

Turning to a second potential transmission channel, which ight be described as the ‘quantity effect’, we suggest that the

catharsis effect’ stimulates a reallocation of credit supply that ben- fits traditional bank customers at the expense of credit supply to ore untraditional bank investments. Although the overall amount

f credit supplied to the economy may stagnate or even decrease nder a policy of strict bank insolvency resolution, businesses that raditionally depend on credit may see an increase in their credit rovision. Theoretically, it could be argued that this result is due o a reestablishment of incentives in the credit allocation chan- el. Instead of allocating credit where it finds the highest volatility, .g., outside the traditional lending business (as a gambling bank ould do), banks reallocate credit back to their traditional cus-

omers. In addition, they particularly allocate it to firms that need

ank credit most and are thus presumably willing to pay interest ates that are not excessively high and volatile, but high enough o allow banks to obtain optimal risk-adjusted positive NPVs from

16 One could also run models with triple interactions (which yield similar results), ut we decided to report the results of the subsamples for simplicity of interpreta- ion.

J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231 225

Table 5 Transmission channel: Firm growth and bank ‘catharsis effect’ by firm quality. This table reports the results from a regression model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in firm operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator interacted with an indicator of firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level) as main explanatory variable. All models include both firm-level and country-level control variables (the latter interacted with bank dependence), in addition to firm and country-year fixed effects. Column (1) displays the results from the reference model. Panel B displays the results from the model run on subsamples containing only firms that continued operations uninterruptedly (column (2)) and firms that went bankrupt (column (3)) over the time horizon of our dataset. Panel C displays the results from the model run on subsamples containing firms in the top tercile of profitability (column (4)) and firms in the bottom tercile of profitability (column (5)); profitability being defined as RoA lagged by one year. The growth rate differential evaluates a measure (in % growth) of the difference in the growth rate between a firm located half a standard deviation above the mean of bank dependence as compared to a firm with a bank dependence measure half a standard deviation below the mean, if located in a country half a standard deviation above the mean of the bank catharsis indicator rather than in a country half a standard deviation below the mean. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Dependent variable �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

Panel A Panel B: Split sample Panel C: Split sample Full sample (reference model) Active firms Insolvent firms High pro-fitability firms Low pro-fitability firms

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence 0.549*** 0.604*** -0.999 0.746** −0.516 (0.164) (0.167) (0.760) (0.365) (0.488)

Firm-level controls YES YES YES YES YES Country-level controls × bank dependence YES YES YES YES YES Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES

Test for equality of coefficients (p-value) 0.037 0.011

Observations 1,252,126 1,179,171 44,540 368,497 314,343 .428

.7

t t s C n d

t t p i t c r e t a a d o o n s ( o A n f i a a t c

e b

l m

5 w

t c i t m n s m t t v W o p

m i e s b d i i

R-Squared 0.432 0

Growth rate differential (% of firm growth) 0.6 0

heir lending. Thus, this result would be a quantity effect not in he sense of increasing overall quantity of credit supply but in the ense of increasing credit supply to firms that need credit most. onsequently, we expect to see an increase in loan financing, not ecessarily for companies in general, but particularly for firms that epend more on bank finance.17

We use an alternative dependent variable, change of debt ratio, o test this prediction. To analyze the effect of the catharsis indica- or on this variable, we run three specifications, and the results are resented in Table 6. In the first specification, we regress the change

n debt ratio on the catharsis indicator (still without interaction), he full set of controls, and firm and year fixed effects. The coeffi- ient on the catharsis indicator is small and far from significant. This esult is not surprising, because the ‘catharsis effect’ is generally not xpected to increase the usage of bank debt in the real economy. On he contrary: While it may be credited with other beneficial effects, n increase in total credit supply is unlikely to be an outcome of

more rules-based resolution of insolvent banks. Rather, it may ecrease credit supply when some banks are liquidated. However, ur presumption is not focused on a general increase in the usage f bank debt but on an increase in credit provision to firms that eed credit as part of their business model, i.e., firms with high tructural bank dependence. We test this presumption in model 2) by including interactions of the country-specific variables, and f the catharsis indicator in particular, with bank dependence. lthough the level impact of the catharsis indicator now turns egative, we find a strongly positive and highly significant effect

or firms that are more bank dependent. This result is confirmed n model (3), which applies even more stringent country-year nd firm fixed effects – a model similar to our reference case bove. Taken together, these results provide strong indications that

here is not only a quality effect that explains the impact of our atharsis indicator on firm growth but also a quantity effect that

17 To take this further, we suggest that one could also look at bank level data for vidence of this effect, for example via a reshuffling between asset classes on bank alance sheets. We leave this for future research.

r r n o I l s

fi

0.460 0.653 0.616

N/A 0.9 N/A

eads to an improved channeling of credit to firms that need it ost.

.5. Extension of analyses II – where the ‘catharsis effect’ does not ork

We argued at the beginning of this paper that the direction of he ‘catharsis effect’ is far from obvious a priori. Although we may onclude that this positive ‘catharsis effect’ resulting from restored ncentives is confirmed by our tests, it would be premature to not ake the counterargument into consideration. This counterargu-

ent stipulates that the positive effect might be outweighed by the egative effects of individual bank failures. Not investigating what eems to be a valid argument may lead to myopic policy recom- endations. Although in general we find an overall positive effect,

here may be particular economic conditions in which this is not he case. In this situation, recommending a more rules-based insol- ency resolution policy may have no or even detrimental effects. e investigate one such potentially influential condition, i.e., the

penness of the banking system and the presence of foreign com- etitors and foreign credit supply.

The rationale for this characteristic of the banking system to oderate the ‘catharsis effect’ is straightforward. In an open bank-

ng system, banks that are resolved in insolvency can be more asily replaced by competitors, potentially from abroad, on the upply side. Likewise, on the demand side, domestic firms may e able to satisfy their credit demand by borrowing from non- omestic creditors, provided that they really exhibit profitable

nvestment opportunities. Where this is not the case, i.e., in a bank- ng system relatively closed to international entry and competition, esolved banks (or their share of the market) may not be assumed or eplaced, and firms with profitable investment opportunities may ot have access to alternative creditors. Thus, we propose that an pen banking system plays a catalytic role for the ‘catharsis effect’: t provides the environment for resolution to work more seam-

essly as it mitigates its potentially negative impact with regard to hortages in credit supply.

We test this hypothesis by defining access to international nance as a proxy for the openness of the banking system. Access to

226 J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231

Table 6 Transmission channel: Firm finance and bank ‘catharsis effect’. This table reports the results from a regression model using �debt/assets, the change in firm debt ratios, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator (column (1)) or the catharsis indicator, an indicator of firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level), and the interaction between these two variables (columns (2) and (3)) as main explanatory variables. Firm-level and country-level control variables (the latter interacted with bank dependence when country-year fixed effects are included in the model) and firm, year, and country-year fixed effects are included as indicated. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Model (1) (2) (3) Dependent variable �debt/assets �debt/assets �debt/assets

Catharsis indicator 0.00393 −0.126*** (0.00433) (0.0138)

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence 0.670*** 0.709*** (0.0709) (0.0840)

Firm-level controls YES YES YES Country-level controls YES YES NO Country-level controls × bank dependence NO NO YES Firm FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES NO Country-Year FE NO NO YES

i r i d o i s c s o a a o ( s r c s

6

v r n T f i o m m w t

T E T w v d ( f l i s

Observations 957,432

R-Squared 0.041

nternational finance is measured by the ratio of loans from non- esident banks and international debt issues (i.e., debt securities ssued by residents in non-domestic capital markets) to GDP. As we id above, we split our sample at the terciles of this variable and run ur main specification on the subsamples. The results are displayed n Table 7 alongside the reference model. Examining only the sub- ample with high access to international finance (model (2)), the oefficient on the main interaction more than doubles and is highly ignificant, which indicates a strong ‘catharsis effect’ in a relatively pen system. However, in a closed system, i.e., the bottom tercile of ccess to international finance, the coefficient drops close to zero nd becomes insignificant. The difference between the coefficients f interest in the two subsamples is highly statistically significant p-value of 0.000). These results indicate that the ‘catharsis effect’ eems not to be found in the presumably adverse environment of

elatively closed banking systems, which highlights an important orollary to be considered in any policy recommendation favoring trict and rules-based insolvency resolution.

a c c

able 7 xtensions: firm growth and bank sector ‘catharsis effect’ by access to international finan his table reports the results from a regression model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in fir ith an indicator of firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level) as main e

ariables (the latter interacted with bank dependence), in addition to firm and country-y isplays the results from the model run on subsamples containing only firms located in co 2)) and firms located in countries in the bottom tercile of an indicator for access to inte rom non-resident banks + international debt issues)/GDP. The growth rate differential ev ocated half a standard deviation above the mean of bank dependence as compared to a

f located in a country half a standard deviation above the mean of the bank catharsis in tandard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance l

Model (1)

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev)

Panel A

Full sample (reference model)

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence 0.549***

(0.164)

Firm-level controls YES

Country-level controls × bank dependence YES

Firm FE YES

Country-Year FE YES

Test for equality of coefficients (p-value)

Observations 1,252,126

R-Squared 0.432

Growth rate differential (% of firm growth) 0.6

957,367 957,367 0.042 0.312

. Robustness

The robustness of the results shown above is tested using arious alternative specifications of the variables and several estrictions on the dataset. This section summarizes the robust- ess test specifications and reports the main results. For brevity, ables 8 and 9 display only the results of the robustness test for the ull specification of the augmented model (interaction approach), ncluding all fixed effects and control variables. Thus, the results f the robustness tests should be compared with the results of odel (4) in Table 4, which are also reported as the reference odel in Tables 8 and 9. If we expect to find any deviations, we ill find them here, and other results are at least as robust as

hese. As a first test, we address concerns related to our sample by

pplying or lifting restrictions on the dataset. There may be con- erns that the results are driven by observations from particular ountries. We employ two – admittedly arbitrary – sample cuts to

ce. m operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator interacted xplanatory variable. All models include both firm-level and country-level control ear fixed effects. Column (1) displays the results from the reference model. Panel B untries in the top tercile of an indicator for access to international finance (column rnational finance (column (3)). Access to international finance is defined as (loans aluates a measure (in % growth) of the difference in the growth rate between a firm firm with a bank dependence measure half a standard deviation below the mean, dicator rather than in a country half a standard deviation below the mean. Robust evels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

(2) (3) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

Panel B: Split sample High access to international finance Low access to

international finance 1.181*** 0.0366 (0.387) (0.246) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES

0.000

337,343 503,041 0.530 0.530

1.4 N/A

J. Korte / Journal of Financial Stability 16 (2015) 213–231 227

Table 8 Firm growth and bank sector ‘catharsis effect’ (Robustness tests I: Restricted samples). This table reports the results from a regression model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in firm operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator interacted with an indicator of firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level) as main explanatory variable. All models include both firm-level and country-level control variables (the latter interacted with bank dependence), in addition to firm and country-year fixed effects. Column (1) displays the results from the reference model. The model in column (2) excludes the three largest countries (DE, FR, UK) from the dataset. The model in column (3) excludes all countries for which fewer than 10,000 observations are available from the dataset. The models in columns (4) and (5) use a sample in which the dependent variable is not trimmed or the explanatory variable is trimmed (at the 1st and 99th percentile), respectively. The growth rate differential evaluates a measure (in % growth) of the difference in the growth rate between a firm located half a standard deviation above the mean of bank dependence as compared to a firm with a bank dependence measure half a standard deviation below the mean, if located in a country half a standard deviation above the mean of the bank catharsis indicator rather than in a country half a standard deviation below the mean. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Robustness test Reference model Excluding top-3 countries Excluding countries

with few observations No trimming in dep. variable

Trimming in expl. variable

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence

0.549*** 0.573*** 0.575*** 0.799** 0.597***

(0.164) (0.175) (0.164) (0.358) (0.220) Firm-level controls YES YES YES YES YES Country-level controls × bank

dependence YES YES YES YES YES

Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES

Observations 1,252,126 890,227 1,221,023 1,272,329 854,737 R-Squared 0.432 0.433 0.429 0.348 0.477

t t a c t o F i b d t

r a b i

c t

T F T w v m a a u a a d fi

Growth rate differential (% of firm growth) 0.6 0.7

est these concerns. On the upper end, we run our tests on samples hat exclude the largest economies (Germany, the United Kingdom, nd France). On the lower end, we employ a panel that excludes all ountries for which fewer than 10,000 firms are available. In addi- ion, we perform the tests using a sample that is not trimmed from utliers in the dependent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. inally, we trim the main explanatory variable, the bank catharsis

ndicator, at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Although there cannot e any obviously unrealistic result (below 0% or above 100%) by efinition because we are using a matched indicator, we use this rimmed sample as a further robustness check to ensure that the

9 r t s

able 9 irm growth and bank sector ‘catharsis effect’ (Robustness tests II: Variations in variables his table reports the results from a regression model using �ln(OpRev), the growth in fir ith an indicator of firms’ bank dependence (evaluated at the industry level) as main e

ariables (the latter interacted with bank dependence), in addition to firm and country- odels in columns (2) and (3) include catharsis indicators that are computed using alterna

nd acquisitions of banks falling below the capital ratio threshold from the definition of r re computed using yearly averages of the capital ratio or using the reported tier 1 ratio sing numbers of banks instead of bank assets. The model in column (8) includes an alte ccording to U.S. SIC. The growth rate differential evaluates a measure (in % growth) of t bove the mean of bank dependence as compared to a firm with a bank dependence measu eviation above the mean of the bank catharsis indicator rather than in a country half a rm-level and reported in parentheses, significance levels are indicated by ***p < 0.01, **p

Model (1) (2) (3) (4 Robustness test Reference

model Alternative cutoff (7%)

Alternative cutoff (9%)

Re M

Dependent variable �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �

Catharsis indicator × bank dependence

0.549*** 0.350*** 0.631*** 0.6

(0.164) (0.128) (0.173) (0 Firm-level controls YES YES YES YE Country-level controls × bank

dependence YES YES YES YE

Firm FE YES YES YES YE Country-Year FE YES YES YES YE

Observations 1,252,126 1,252,126 1,252,126 1,2 R-Squared 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.4

Growth rate differential (% of firm growth)

0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7

0.7 0.9 0.7

esults are not driven by extreme values within this range. All the bove samples yield highly significant and economically compara- le results for the coefficient of interest. These results are reported

n columns (2)–(5) of Table 8. Second, to check that our results are not driven by the threshold

hosen for computing the catharsis indicator, we use alternative hresholds. We compute the catharsis indicator based on a 7% and

% simple capital ratio (instead of 8% in the reference case). The esults are reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9 and are close o those of our reference case with respect to their economic and tatistical significance.

). m operating revenues, as dependent variable and the catharsis indicator interacted xplanatory variable. All models include both firm-level and country-level control year fixed effects. Column (1) displays the results from the reference model. The tive capital ratio thresholds (7% and 9%). The model in column (4) excludes mergers esolved banks. The models in columns (5) and (6) include catharsis indicators that

instead. The model in column (7) includes a catharsis indicator that is computed rnative bank dependence indicator evaluated at the industry classification levels

he difference in the growth rate between a firm located half a standard deviation re half a standard deviation below the mean, if located in a country half a standard

standard deviation below the mean. Robust standard errors are clustered at the < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

) (5) (6) (7) (8) solution w/o &A

Avg. capital ratio (8%)

Tier 1 ratio (8%)

Number of banks (8%)

SIC-level bank dep.

ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev) �ln(OpRev)

07*** 0.238* 0.301*** 1.039*** 0.395**

.171) (0.130) (0.0619) (0.0382) (0.171) S YES YES YES YES S YES YES YES YES

S YES YES YES YES S YES YES YES YES

52,126 812,358 1,087,004 1,252,126 1,251,744 32 0.476 0.452 0.042 0.432

0.4 0.8 1.1 0.4

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t e a n fi A v t d i c a a c

c t g c o a T

i l T r fi

n r v

7

i w r g

fi e a t w v p c i H c p r e

o s m t u e c

p v t s t e i c fi fi

v n h i e a o d S o o e n t n h t q t fi t m g

e u s c a c m o v t i T t e e

i a ‘ t t i i i t c

28 J. Korte / Journal of Financ

Third, our results may also be driven by the manner in which he catharsis indicator is defined. To test the robustness of the ffect, we use four alternative definitions, varying both the numer- tor and denominator of the catharsis indicator. Regarding the umerator, we exclude the M&As of banks that fall below the prede- ned capital ratio threshold from the definition of resolved banks. lternating the computation of the denominator, we use average alues of capital and assets in computing the capital ratio. Addi- ionally, we compute the catharsis indicator based on an entirely ifferent capital ratio definition, i.e., using reported tier 1 ratios

nstead of simple capital ratios. Finally, we use a catharsis indi- ator that is computed with numbers of banks instead of bank ssets. The results are reported in columns (4)–(7) of Table 9 nd all display coefficients that are positive and highly signifi- ant.

Fourth, we test an alternative bank dependence index that is omputed as the sector average of industries classified according o the U.S. SIC. This provides a less detailed classification (distin- uishing only 200 sectors) than NACE-4, which is our reference lassification framework. Applying these alternative measures f bank dependence yields a result with comparable economic nd statistical significance, which is reported in column (8) of able 9.

Finally, various specifications are tested, including and exclud- ng the control variables and fixed effects, for example, or with the agged share of assets replaced by a natural logarithm of assets. he coefficient on the interaction of the bank catharsis indicator emains quantitatively similar and highly significant for all speci- cations (not reported).

Taken together, the robustness tests suggest that our results are ot driven by sample selection or variable definition. Instead, the esults prove robust to a range of restricted samples, alternative ariables, and alternative specifications.

. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we analyze the impact of a rules-based bank nsolvency resolution policy on economic growth. In particular,

e examine a specific insolvency resolution policy – the closure ule at positive capital – and test its effects on individual firm rowth.

Economic theory and empirical research demonstrate that nancial intermediation generally has a positive effect on the real conomy. However, misguided incentives for banks, their creditors, nd regulators in connection with bank insolvency and resolu- ion may distort banks’ credit allocation and monitoring decisions, hich may lead to suboptimal real economic performance. Con-

ersely, theory also postulates that a rules-based prompt resolution olicy stipulating purchase and assumption or straightforward losure and liquidation of distressed banks will reestablish the ncentive system and provide for economically superior outcomes. owever, this result may come at a cost, e.g., when a negative redit supply effect accompanies bank closures. Thus, we test the ostulated ‘catharsis effect’ of regulatory insolvency and closure ules at positive capital with respect to their impact on the real conomy.

We assemble a panel dataset of more than 2 million firm-year bservations and propose a catharsis indicator that measures how trictly a hypothetical closure rule at positive capital is imple- ented by essentially forming a ratio between insolvent banks

hat have been resolved and banks that should have been resolved nder the closure rule. We use a three-step identification strat- gy to overcome potential endogeneity concerns and to establish ausality. Beginning with a regression framework that exploits the

A d b e

bility 16 (2015) 213–231

anel characteristics of our dataset, we also utilize an instrumental ariable approach and an interaction specification. In the lat- er model, we assume that the regulatory insolvency of banks hould have a particularly strong effect on firms that are struc- urally more dependent on bank finance. Thus, any ‘catharsis ffect’ should surface in an interaction with bank dependence, n particular. In all our specifications, we find an economi- ally and statistically significant positive impact of ‘catharsis’ on rm growth – particularly for firms that depend more on bank nancing.

We are convinced that these results show that rules-based insol- ency resolutions have a causal effect on firm growth and are ot spurious for several reasons. First, our identification strategy elps us overcome potential endogeneity concerns. If we use the

nteraction specification, we can control for various channels of ndogeneity. Even if reverse causation or omitted variables drive

correlation between the growth rates of firms and the strength f bank insolvency resolution, it seems inconceivable that they o so systematically with the level of firms’ bank dependence. econd, the robustness of the results is confirmed by testing vari- us alternative specifications, variable definitions, and restrictions n the dataset. Finally, we find not only a significant ‘catharsis ffect’ but also trace evidence for two potential transmission chan- els from bank insolvency resolution to firm growth. Through he quality channel, the ‘catharsis effect’ mainly impacts eco- omic growth by exerting a disproportionately positive effect on igher quality (e.g., more profitable) firms because those firms are he beneficiaries of more efficient credit allocation decisions. The uantity channel, moreover, stipulates a (re)allocation of credit hat results in an increase in bank debt – particularly for those rms that structurally depend more on bank credit. Thus, these wo channels effectively provide a ‘smoking gun’ that reveals the

echanisms through which the ‘catharsis effect’ influences real rowth.

We also demonstrate that the effectiveness (and potentially ven the direction) of the ‘catharsis effect’ is determined by the reg- latory and economic conditions in which it is implemented. One uch determinant is the openness of the banking system, which an work as a catalyst to the ‘catharsis effect’. The potentially neg- tive consequences of bank closures – ranging from contagion to redit crunches – should be less severe in the mitigating environ- ent of an open banking system in which foreign banks can take

ver the positions of insolvent competitors and supply credit to iable firms. Our results lend support to this rationale and show hat there is a much stronger ‘catharsis effect’ when access to nternational finance is high and no such effect when it is low. his finding should guard against premature policy recommenda- ions because there may be circumstances in which the negative ffects of bank closures outweigh the generally positive ‘catharsis ffect’.

This last result underlines one of the weaknesses of our find- ngs insofar as policy recommendations are concerned. First, there re circumstances in which we find that the generally positive

catharsis effect’ does not work. Second, our data indicate that he hypothetical closure rule at positive capital remains – at least hus far – rather hypothetical because we find only low levels of mplementation for most countries and years. Although this allows nferences about the effects of the catharsis indicator in the range n which we find it here (roughly between 0% and 50%, skewed oward the lower end), care should be exercised in drawing con- lusions about a fully implemented closure rule at positive capital.

lthough it may exhibit similar effects, it could also be that the ocumented implementation of the rule is sufficient to discipline anks and restore incentives and that a full implementation would xacerbate the negative effects of bank closures. Further research

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J. Korte / Journal of Financ

s required to shed light on the ‘catharsis effect’ under the full mplementation of a closure rule at positive capital.

In general, several directions remain for future research con- erning (a) the policies and rules of bank insolvency (such as testing he effect of different resolution policies), (b) its mechanisms and ransmission channels, and (c) the conditions for the effective- ess of such rules. The ability of future researchers to include redit demand and supply effects in the analysis may also greatly mprove our understanding of the ‘catharsis effect’. Notwithstand- ng this future research, our results strongly advocate for placing ank insolvency and resolution regimes center stage in discussions bout reforming bank regulation. Setting up incentive-compatible ank resolution regimes that facilitate the ‘catharsis effect’ should e a focal point of policymakers’ efforts.

cknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Bob DeYoung, Christopher James, hristoph Memmel, Steven Ongena, Jean-Charles Rochet, Jörg

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able 10 ppendix A – Number of firms by country and year. his table reports the number of firms in our sample by country and year. Only firms tha inimum USD 20 million, or (b) total operating revenue of at least USD 10 million, or (c)

equired data is available.

Country 2003 2004 2005

Austria 245 245 2016

Belgium 9473 9473 9730

Bosnia and Herzegovina 296 296 333

Bulgaria 2171 2171 2397

Croatia 1506 1506 1576

Cyprus

Czech Republic 4917 4917 5537

Denmark

Finland 2980

France 32,299 32,299 33,619

Germany 9900 9900 13,699

Greece 2802 2802 2947

Hungary 2022 2022 2962

Iceland 193 193 223

Ireland 1816 1816 1975

Italy 30,319 30,319 38,424

Latvia 716 716 788

Liechtenstein 31 31 34

Lithuania 743

Luxembourg 336 336 423

Macedonia 33 33 27

Malta 102 102 114

Moldova 34 34 34

Montenegro

Netherlands 10,045 10,045 11,616

Norway 6107 6107 6460

Poland 7790 7790 8230

Portugal 4228 4228 4869

Romania 3509 3509 3774

Russian Federation 22,030 22,030 24,169

Serbia 1388 1388 1442

Slovakia 895 895 1078

Slovenia 913 913 958

Spain 29,049 29,049 30,402

Sweden 8168 8168 8650

Switzerland 2323 2323 6295

Turkey 99

Ukraine 7364 7364 8112

United Kingdom 24,107 24,107 25,659

bility 16 (2015) 213–231 229

ocholl, Sascha Steffen, Mark Wahrenburg, two anonymous eferees for the Journal of Financial Stability, and conference par- icipants at the 28th Annual Congress of the European Economic ssociation, the 12th FDIC Annual Bank Research Conference,

he Annual Meetings of the German Economic Association (VfS), he Bank Resolution Mechanisms Conference in Dublin, the Bun- esbank Conference on ‘The Stability of the European Financial ystem and the Real Economy in the Shadow of the Crisis’, he 5th International IFABS Conference, the 3rd International EBS/LabEx Conference, the Marie Curie ITN Conference in Con- tance, the National Bank of Poland/Cracow University Conference Ethics in Banking’, the 3rd IWH/INFER Workshop on Applied conomics and Economic Policy, the 15th INFER Annual Con- erence, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, and the oethe University Frankfurt for their suggestions and helpful

omments.

ppendix A.

t meet one of the following criteria are included in the sample: (a) total assets of at least 150 employees. In addition, the sample only contains firms for which the

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

3578 4077 4234 3793 3523 10,034 11,106 11,275 11,409 10,668

373 440 654 648 655 2383 2599 2927 2935 2458 1652 1709 1707 1700 1666

54 62 102 103 51 6003 6661 6952 6797 4913

5244 5681 5895 6104 3168 3694 4351 4476 4077

34,832 36,450 36,701 35,056 28,239 32,223 45,910 46,972 47,299 17,097

3070 3246 3336 3351 3220 2920 3061 3412 3568 3718

257 327 337 349 341 2300 2660 2967 2834 1348

40,297 43,353 45,519 45,384 42,963 917 1049 866 777 735

37 46 52 57 58 816 886 1396 1389 1371 640 1063 1241 1356 794

24 75 131 262 371 142 166 185 185 50

32 33 41 32 27 42 32 33 39

14,215 17,446 18,452 19,252 10,932 6951 11,071 11,658 12,155 12,320 9013 10,588 11,672 12,319 8630 7505 7691 7737 7743 6649 3508 3680 4566 4835 5028

28,231 33,420 33,628 32,632 31,981 1538 1667 1703 1692 1625 1416 1610 1385 1249 1116 1002 1082 1116 1135 1140

32,421 33,551 30,503 30,770 17,939 9275 10,111 10,483 10,903 11,075 6630 7653 14,037 15,767 15,175

285 590 777 769 516 8785 9610 10,000 10,093 9767

27,656 29,853 30,871 31,547 31,486

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  • Catharsis—The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Related literature and hypotheses
    • 3 Methodology and identification strategy
    • 4 Data
      • 4.1 Data and sources
      • 4.2 Conceptualizing a measure for bank catharsis
      • 4.3 Composition of other variables and descriptive statistics
        • Dependent variables
        • Explanatory variables
        • Other firm-level variables
        • Other country-level variables
    • 5 Results
      • 5.1 Simple OLS
      • 5.2 IV model
      • 5.3 Interaction approach
      • 5.4 Extension of analyses I – exploring the mechanisms of ‘catharsis’
      • 5.5 Extension of analyses II – where the ‘catharsis effect’ does not work
    • 6 Robustness
    • 7 Concluding remarks
    • Acknowledgements
    • References
    • References

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Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency Author(s): David C. Wheelock and Paul W. Wilson Source: The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 689-700 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109816 Accessed: 21-03-2015 20:12 UTC

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES: DEPOSIT INSURANCE, REGULATION, AND EFFICIENCY

David C. Wheelock and Paul W. Wilson*

Abstract-This paper uses micro-level historical data to exam- ine the causes of bank failure. For state-chartered Kansas banks during 1910-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework. In addition to stan- dard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and a measure of technical efficiency to explain bank failure. The results indi- cate that deposit insurance system membership increased the probability of failure, and technically inefficient banks were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks.

I. Introduction

HE sharp increase in bank failures in the United States since 1980 has focused atten-

tion on the causes of banking instability and the appropriate role of government policy.) To gain insight into recent experience with bank failures, researchers have begun to draw on evidence from previous episodes when failures were similarly high. The sharp increase in bank failures during the 1920s resembles the experience of the 1980s; in both decades, branching restrictions left banks vulnerable to localized distress, and failures were confined mainly to regions suffering depressed commodity and real estate prices. Banks in other regions were largely spared in both episodes.2

Laws restricting branching and other forms of diversification are one government policy that exacerbated bank failures in both the 1920s and 1980s. Deposit insurance is a second policy that has been linked to banking instability in both

decades.3 Deposit insurance removes the incen- tive for depositors to monitor bank risk, and thereby encourages banks to substitute deposits for equity and to maintain greater portfolio risk than they otherwise would. Although there was no federal insurance of bank deposits until 1934, several states experimented with insurance during the 19th and early 20th centuries, including eight states that enacted insurance systems between 1907 and 1920 for their state-chartered banks.4 Calomiris (1992) shows that during the agricul- tural boom associated with World War I, insured banks grew more rapidly than their uninsured competitors and banks in states without insur- ance systems. Insured banks then suffered the greatest asset declines and had the highest failure rates after the collapse of commodity prices in mid-1920. Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) show that bank failure rates were highest in states with deposit insurance systems, after controlling for branch banking, other government policies, and differences in economic activity across states.'

Since the causes of banking instability during the 1920s and 1980s were similar, microeconomic analysis of bank behavior during the 1920s might provide useful insights for the recent experience. We use information about a sample of banks operating in Kansas during 1910-28 to examine the causes of bank failure. Roughly one-quarter of Kansas state-chartered banks either failed or merged with other banks during this period. Be- cause membership in the state deposit insurance

Copyright ? 1995 [ 689 1

Received for publication July 29, 1993. Revision accepted for publication July 21, 1994.

* Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and University of Texas, Austin, respectively.

We are grateful for helpful comments from Knox Lovell, Jon Pritchett and two anonymous referees (the authors alone are responsible for any remaining errors). The views ex- pressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect official posi- tions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.

ISee, for example, Mishkin (1992) and Kane (1989). 2 This is in contrast to the Great Depression, when failures

were widespread. Even then, however, failure rates were highest among small, unit banks in rural areas. White (1983) and Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) trace the banking instability of the 1920s to branch banking restrictions. O'Driscoll (1988, 1990) makes the case for the 1980s.

3 For the 1980s, see O'Driscoll (1988), Kane (1989), Mishkin (1992), and the references therein. Robert Forrestal, Presi- dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, argued that branching restrictions and deposit insurance were responsible for many of the banking industry's problems in a speech delivered in Atlanta, September 25, 1992 at the Conference on Efficiency in the Financial Services Industries.

The eight states and the years in which their insurance systems operated are Oklahoma (1907-23), Texas (1909-25), Kansas (1909-29), Nebraska (1909-30), South Dakota (1909-31), North Dakota (1917-29), Washington (1917-29), and Mississippi (1914-30). Cooke (1909), Robb (1921), Ameri- can Bankers Association (1933), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1956), and Calomiris (1989) compare the fea- tures and performance of the systems.

5See also Thies and Gerlowski (1989).

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690 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

system was voluntary, this data set permits com- parison of insured and uninsured banks facing otherwise similar regulatory and economic condi- tions.

In addition to investigating the impact of de- posit insurance on failure, we also consider the possible relationship between managerial effi- ciency and failure. To our knowledge, no previ- ous study has incorporated measures of efficiency in a model of bank failure, though Barr et al. (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1992) report that in the 1980s, failing banks had lower mean measured efficiency than non-failing banks. Inef- ficiently managed banks produce less output from given quantities of inputs than efficiently man- aged banks. In competitive banking markets, inef- ficient banks will, on average, be less profitable and more likely to fail than efficient banks. Mea- sures of inefficiency could thus prove to be im- portant for distinguishing failing banks from sur- vivors.

We model time-to-failure explicitly using a pro- portional hazards framework. We use balance sheet information, deposit insurance system membership status, and a measure of technical efficiency to explain failure and survival of indi- vidual banks. Numerous studies have investigated the determinants of recent bank failures, though only a few have employed the hazard model framework. This framework allows estimation of the probability of a bank's failure at any point in time and incorporates changes in the bank's char- acteristics over time. Discrete choice models, on the other hand, only allow estimation of the prob- ability that a bank fails within a specified interval of time, and characteristics of the bank are neces- sarily assumed to be constant.6 We find that both deposit insurance and technical efficiency provide useful information about failure not captured by conventional financial ratios. Our findings indi- cate that insured banks were more likely to fail, as were inefficiently operated banks, suggesting that measures of technical efficiency could prove useful for predicting bank failures in other set- tings.

II. Banking in the Early Twentieth Century

Whereas bank failures in the 1980s were closely associated with the boom and subsequent bust in real estate markets, bank failures in the 1920s were tied to the fortunes of agriculture. Ameri- can agriculture expanded rapidly during World War I and in the immediate postwar months. Between 1910 and 1920, the total value of farm property nearly doubled, as did farm output prices.7 Accompanying the increase in farm acreage and value was a 132% increase in farm mortgage debt, much of which was supplied by commercial banks.8 The number of commercial banks in the United States rose during the decade from 25,151 in 1910 to 30,909 in 1920.9 After peaking in mid-1920, farm output prices plunged. An index of farm output prices that equaled 150.7 in 1920 had fallen to 88.4 by 1921 (1926 = 100). 1 Farm income collapsed, and many farmers were unable to repay debt incurred before 1920. Banks in agricultural regions experienced sharp increases in loan defaults and many became in- solvent. l

In Kansas, 122 state-chartered banks failed be- tween September 1920 and September 1926. Of those, 94 were members of the state deposit insurance system when they failed, while 28 were not, and the failure rate of insured banks (4.6%) was twice that of uninsured state banks (2.3%). By contrast, just six national banks (0.8%) failed during this period.

The Kansas deposit guaranty system was begun in 1909, and membership was made optional in response to complaints that deposit insurance penalizes conservative banks by forcing them to protect depositors of banks that are more likely

6 Lane et al. (1986) and Whalen (1991) are two recent studies that employ the hazard approach, modeling time-to- failure as a function of various bank characteristics such as capital adequacy, rate of return, non-performing loans, and local economic conditions.

7An index of farm product prices equaled 74.3 in 1910 and 150.7 in 1920 (1926 = 100) (Department of Commerce, 1960, series E15).

8Moreover, the ratio of farm debt to value rose from 27.3% to 29.1% (Department of Commerce, 1920, p. 737).

9Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959). The number of banks reached its all-time record of 31,076 in 1921.

Department of Commerce (1960, series E15). The north central states of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,

North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas had 2652 of the 5712 bank suspensions in the United States during the 1920s. Kansas alone had 220 failures. By contrast, New England had just 14,- and California 31. Board of Gover- nors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 284-285). See Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) for analysis of state differences in bank failure rates during the 1920s.

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES 691

to fail. Only state-chartered banks that had oper- ated for at least one year were permitted to

join." Insured banks were required to maintain minimum ratios of capital to deposits and of surplus and undistributed profits to capital of 0.10.13 Banks were permitted to withdraw from the system with six months notice, but remained subject to levies needed to pay depositors of banks that failed while the bank carried deposit insurance.

Some attempt was made to discourage risk-tak- ing by setting insurance premiums at 1/20th of 1% of a bank's insured deposits less capital. The low assessment rate meant, however, that relative to the cost of capital, the incentive to hold addi- tional capital was small."4 Insured banks were required to deposit $500 of cash or eligible bonds with the state banking commissioner for each $100,000 of insured deposits as a guarantee of assessment payment.

Despite regulations implemented to discourage risk-taking and a reputation for relatively strict supervision, the comparatively high failure rate of insured banks in Kansas suggests that excess risk-taking was not prevented entirely. Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995) show that during its first ten years, the Kansas system attracted the most risk-prone banks, and that once insured, banks tended to reduce their capital/asset ratios. The evidence indicates, therefore, that the system suf- fered from both adverse selection and moral haz- ard problems. Not surprisingly, insured banks had the highest failure rates when farm prices col- lapsed and loan losses rose.

Wheelock (1992) estimates a probit model to identify the characteristics of Kansas banks that failed between 1920 and 1926. Using financial ratios suggested by White (1984), Wheelock finds that a bank was more likely to fail the lower was its surplus/loan, bond/asset, reserve/deposit, or

deposit/asset ratio."5 A bank was also more likely to fail, the higher was its loan/asset or short-term borrowed funds/asset ratio. Wheelock (1992) also includes deposit insurance membership (mea- sured with a dummy variable equal to 1 for in- sured banks and to 0 for uninsured banks) as a regressor and finds that deposit insurance mem- bership is a useful predictor of bank failure, especially for banks closer to failure.

This paper builds on Wheelock (1992) in two ways. First, we explicitly model the hazard distri- bution with time-varying covariates obtained from panel data. Second, we test whether managerial inefficiency increased the probability of failure. Several recent studies have investigated technical efficiency in the banking industry; e.g., Sherman and Gold (1985), Rangan et al. (1988), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Aly et al. (1990), Fixler and Zieschang (1992), Berg et al. (1992, 1995), and Fried et al. (1993). In measuring technical effi- ciency, one attempts to answer questions such as how much more output could be produced from the same inputs, or how much less input could be used to produce the same output. Our empirical results suggest that measures of technical effi- ciency are useful for explaining the probability of failure in our data.

The remainder of the paper is divided as fol- lows. The next section discusses the methodology underlying the measurement of technical effi- ciency; the fourth section describes the data used to measure efficiency and presents the results of this measurement. The fifth section discusses the hazard model used to investigate bank failures and presents estimation results.

III. Efficiency Measurement

To measure technical efficiency among banks in this study we construct production set bound- aries using a nonparametric, linear programming (LP) framework. Our methodology derives from work by Charnes et al. (1978, 1979) and Fire et al. (1985) which gave rise to a large and grow- ing literature that has been termed Data Envel- opment Analysis (DEA).16

12 This requirement was waived if there were no other insured banks in an applicant's town. National banks, trust companies, unincorporated banks and state banks not meet- ing the various requirements for membership were ineligible for deposit insurance.

13 The minimum capital/deposit ratio was eliminated in 1917 (Warburton, 1958).

14 For example, a bank with $100,000 of deposits and $10,000 of capital would pay $45 per year, versus $42.50 if it had $15,000 of capital.

15 Surplus refers to paid-in capital beyond the par value of a bank's stock plus undistributed profits.

16 Lovell (1993) provides an excellent survey of this literature.

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692 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

We use the output distance function intro- duced by Shephard (1970). The production tech- nology T characterizes the transformation of in- puts x E St+ into outputs y E S t, and is given by the set

P(x) = {(x, y) I x can produce Y}. (1)

The technology T denotes all output vectors that are technically feasible which employ the input vector x, and is assumed to satisfy the axioms in Fare (1988) (these axioms include weak dispos- ability of outputs; i.e., if y E T(x) and 0 E (0, 1), then Oy E P(x)).

The output distance function is defined as

D(x,y) -inf{ 0 I(x,y/0) E T}. (2)

Note that D(x, y) < 1, with D(x, y) < 1 denot- ing the presence of inefficiency. The generalized technology in (1) may be formalized in numerous ways. Following Fare et al. (1985), let

P =({(x, y) I y < Yq, x 2 Xq, lq = 1, q el},

(3)

where K gives the number of DMUs, Y=

[YI ... YK], X = [Xl ... XK], 1 is a(1 x K) vector of ones, and q is a (K x 1) vector of intensity variables which serve to form the technology. Fire et al. (1992) note that the technology formed by the intensity variables in (2) is the convex cone of observed inputs and outputs. The constraint lq = 1 imposes variable returns to scale on the reference technology; other returns to scale may be imposed by modifying this constraint (e.g., see Grosskopf, 1986). With variable returns, the tech- nology may exhibit either increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale at different points along the technology.

Having specified the technology in (3), the dis- tance function for DMU k can be computed by solving the LP problem

Dk1 = max{Ok I Xqk < Xk vYqk 2 OYkX

lqk= 1, qk E +}. (4)

The output distance function is equal to the inverse of the weak output efficiency measure described by Fire et al. (1985). Note that the optimal solution to the LP problem in (4) will likely result in slack in the output constraints for

some DMUs, which represents an additional source of inefficiency.17

IV. Results of Efficiency Measurement

Our data consist of a panel of Kansas banks for which we collected balance sheet and other infor- mation as of August 31 of each even numbered year from 1910 to 1926 (except 1912 and 1916, when this information was not published)."8 The sample includes 259 banks (approximately one- fourth the total operating in 1914).19 Of these, 47 (18%) had failed by September 1, 1928.

In order to measure technical efficiency, we must first specify an input/output mapping for the banks in our sample. Since our aim is to investigate whether efficiency, as commonly mea- sured, is useful for explaining bank failures, and not to develop a new theory of the banking firm, we choose to follow convention in modeling the technical efficiency of banks. The literature treats banks as going concerns that combine labor, capi- tal, and various financial inputs to produce finan- cial outputs. One approach, termed the produc- tion approach, measures output by the number of deposit and loan accounts serviced by the bank. The more common internediation approach views banks as financial intermediaries, with outputs measured in dollar amounts and with labor, capi- tal, and various funding sources treated as

20 inputs. The intermediation approach has several vari-

ants. Berger and Humphrey (1991, 1992) classify activities for which banks create high value- added, such as loans, demand deposits, and time and savings deposits as " important" outputs, with

17 Ideally, we would like to measure both technical and allocative inefficiency. Fare et al. (1985) describe DEA formu- lations for measuring allocative efficiency; these have been used by Aly et al. (1990), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), and English et al. (1993), who report large differences between technical and allocative efficiency among modern banks. Fare et al. define overall inefficiency as the product of technical and allocative inefficiency. Lacking price data, we are unable to estimate allocative efficiency. Clearly, our measure of techni- cal inefficiency will tend to understate overall inefficiency.

18 The source of our data is the Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Banking for Kansas.

19 We dropped seven banks for missing data. Others fall out of the panel after failing, closing voluntarily, merging with other banks, or switching to a national charter.

2(0 For further discussion of the two approaches, see Berger et al. (1987). Mester (1987) observes that the choice between the production and intermediation approaches often depends upon the data being used; the majority of studies on banking efficiency have adopted the intermediation approach.

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES 693

labor, capital, and purchased funds classified as inputs. Alternatively, Aly et al. (1990), Hancock (1991) and Fixler and Zieschang (1992) adopt a " user-cost" framework where a bank asset is clas- sified as an output if the financial return on the asset exceeds the opportunity cost of the invest- ment, and a liability is classified as an output if the financial cost of the liability is less than its opportunity cost.21 While their details differ, em- pirically the value-added and user-cost ap- proaches tend to suggest similar classifications of bank inputs and outputs, with the principal ex- ception being the classification of demand de- posits as an output in most user-cost studies and as both an input and an output when the value- added approach is taken.

Lacking information on the number of ac- counts serviced by banks in our sample, we treat banks as intermediaries and measure outputs in dollar amounts. We assume that the production technology of banks in the period we study was sufficiently like that of modern banks to enable our specification of inputs and outputs to be guided by modern studies. Because our measure- ment of technical efficiency depends on a mutu- ally exclusive distinction between inputs and out- puts, we follow Aly et al. (1990) and other studies which classify inputs and outputs on the basis of user-cost.

For early years of the sample, our data source separates real estate loans from all other loans, but because such a distinction was not made in later years, we combine real estate and other loans in all years. In addition, we combine total loans and bond holdings into a single output describing earning assets (Y1). Demand deposits, referred to in our data source as "individual deposits," are treated as a second output (Y2), reflecting the large allocation of labor and capital for maintaining these accounts and the transac- tions services they provide bank customers. In this era, interest was typically not paid on de- mand deposits.

We treat time and savings deposits as an input (XI). Interest was paid on such deposits and studies of modern banks indicate that substan- tially less labor and capital are devoted to main- taining time and savings accounts than to main-

taining demand deposit accounts. Borrowed funds, consisting of rediscounts of bank loans (referred to as "bills rediscounted or bills payable" in our data source), form a second financial input (X2).22 Our other inputs are capital (X3), mea- sured as the book value of bank premises and fixtures, and labor (X4), measured by the number of officers a bank had. Lacking information on the actual number of employees in each bank, we must assume that the number of officers was proportional to the total number of employees; since most of the banks in the sample were quite small, this does not seem an unreasonable as- sumption.

The LP model in (4) must be solved once for each observation in the sample. For each bank in each year, efficiency is computed relative to all banks in the given year. Since we are interested in all sources of technical inefficiency, we com- bine the radial inefficiency measured by the dis- tance function with the slacks in the output con- straints from the LP problem in (4). The distance function value indicates how much outputs can be proportionately increased, holding inputs fixed, by moving the DMU to the frontier of the pro- duction set. Since both outputs are measured in dollars, (D-l - 1)(YI + Y2) gives the dollar value of radial inefficiency. We add this quantity to the slack in the output constraints, multiply by 100, and divide by total output to obtain a measure of total technical inefficiency expressed as a per- centage of total output; we denote this quantity INEFF. Clearly, INEFF> 0, with INEFF = 0 in- dicating a bank with no measured technical inef- ficiency.

Summary statistics for INEFF are shown in table 1 for survivors and failures over the seven periods covered in the data. The data used to compute INEFF reflect beginning-of-period val- ues. Failed banks are those reported as failed by the bank commissioner during the given interval. Survivors are those banks that operated through- out the given period. Banks that underwent merger, voluntary liquidation, or that switched from a state to a national charter during a given period are regarded as censored (a total of 31 observations are censored; censored observations

21 See Hancock (1991, pp. 27-33) or Berger and Humphrey (1992, pp. 248-250).

22 Our data source includes a category titled "other liabili- ties," which we combine with borrowed funds. For most banks, this term is either zero or very small.

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694 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

TABLE l.-STATISTICS FOR INEFF, SURVIVORS v. FAILURES

Number Number Survivors Failures

Period Survivors Failures Mean Median Mean Median

1910-14 227 0 247.23 183.87 1914-18 246 1 190.84 168.57 85.83 85.83 1918-20 242 1 299.03 261.87 261.50 261.50 1920-22 233 4 315.98 304.43 213.35 140.35 1922-24 213 13 326.79 299.36 447.16 451.44 1924-26 198 10 444.06 405.74 866.32 580.03 1926-28 181 11 136.75 121.16 155.48 136.43

are omitted from table 1). Median efficiency is included in table 1 because the distribution of efficiencies measured by (4) is typically skewed; in such cases the median statistic provides a more robust measure of location than the mean statis- tic. Both mean and median efficiency fluctuate over the period covered by the data, and INEFF is skewed toward zero in each year.

For the periods covering 1914-22, the small number of failing banks were less inefficient than surviving banks. For the last three periods (1922-28), when the number of failures was sub- stantially larger, the mean inefficiency of failing banks was higher than that of surviving banks. Among survivors, mean inefficiency increased each year from 1910-1926, then sharply de- creased during 1926-28 as it did also for failing banks.

V. Explicit Modeling of Bank Failures

We use the proportional hazards model devel- oped by Cox (1972) to model time-to-failure for banks. The proportional hazards model assumes the hazard relationship

O(t I z) = Oo(t)ez13 (5)

where z is a row vector of measured covariates and 13 is a column vector of parameters with the appropriate dimensions. The hazard O(t I z) gives the instantaneous rate of failure per unit time period at time t. This model assumes a baseline hazard, 00(t), which is identical for all banks in the sample; the covariates in z influence the overall hazard for each bank through the expo- nential term in (5) (the choice of an exponential form here is common throughout the literature on hazard estimation and simplifies the estima- tion problem relative to choices of other func- tional forms). The model is semiparametric since

the exponential in (5) is a parametric form, while the baseline hazard involves an unspecified form and hence is nonparametric. Consequently, the model is more flexible than models where the failure time distribution is assumed known except perhaps for a few scalar parameters.

Given the hazard specification in (5), the corre- sponding survivor function (which gives the prob- ability of survival up to time t) may be written as

S(tIz) = exp[-ftoo(u)ezdu], (6)

and the density function is then f(t I z) = O(t I z)S(t I z). For uncensored observations with failure at time T, the contribution to the likeli- hood is f(T I z); for observations censored at time T, the contribution to the likelihood is S(T I z), i.e., the probability of survival until time T.

Each bank i in the sample is observed at Ji different times til < ti2 < .. < tiji, with either failure or censoring occurring at time ti. Here time refers not to calendar time, but to time relative to the date of charter, so that tio = 0 where tio is the date of charter for the ith bank. The balance sheet information and efficiency scores used in z corresponding to time t1j, j =

1,... , (Ji - 1), are assumed to reflect the posi- tion of bank i over the interval [tij, ti(j+ 1)). The estimated model is time-varying in that covariates in z are assumed constant for intervals of time

[tjj, ti(j+ )), but may vary across different inter- vals. Thus for the ilh bank there are (Ji - 1) censored observations whose contribution to the log-likelihood is given by [S(ti(j+ 1) I z) - S(tij I z)]; again, the jilh observation represents either fail- ure or censoring.

In addition to balance sheet data from August 31 of even-numbered years (except 1912 and

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES 695

1916), the charter date of each bank and the failure date for banks that failed prior to August 31, 1928 are known. Banks that merged with other banks or adopted a national charter before that date are considered censored at the date of .merger or change in charter. Data on banks which did not voluntarily liquidate, merge, fail, or change their charter prior to August 31, 1928 were recorded as censored at that date.

We model time-to-failure as a function of various bank-specific characteristics, including fi- nancial ratios, technical efficiency, and deposit insurance system membership. Inefficient banks produce relatively small volumes of earning assets from given amounts of labor, capital, time and savings deposits, and borrowed funds. We would expect inefficient banks to be less profitable than efficiently managed banks, and more likely to fail when loan losses are high. Inefficiency is mea- sured by INEFF, the total dollar value of radial and slack inefficiency as a percentage of total output value (as defined in the previous section), and thus the coefficient on INEFF should be positive if increasing inefficiency raises the proba- bility of failure.

We test whether deposit insurance affected the probability of failure by including a dummy vari- able INS set equal to 1 for members of the state insurance system and set to 0 otherwise. The insurance premiums assessed Kansas banks were only minimally related to risk. Because insured banks had twice the failure rate of uninsured banks, we expect that insurance may have created a moral hazard, encouraging banks to hold less capital and more risky portfolios than uninsured banks.23 If deposit insurance thereby increased the probability of failure, the coefficient on the insurance dummy variable should be positive.

The remaining explanatory variables in our hazard model include total bank assets (ASSETS) to control for size, and various finan- cial ratios that are plausibly related to the proba- bility of bank failure. These include the ratio of the book value of bank equity to total assets (CAPRAT);24 the ratio of bond holdings to total assets (BNDRAT); the ratio of total loans to total assets (LOANRT); the ratio of cash items, cur-

rency and coin to total deposits (CSHDEP); and the ratio of borrowed funds (bills payable or rediscounted) and miscellaneous liabilities to to- tal assets (LIABRT). Finally, we include dummy variables corresponding to the last four periods listed in table 1 (PER4, PER5, PER6, and PER7, respectively) to capture any systematic determi- nants of failure not otherwise accounted for by the model.

We expect the coefficient on CAPRAT to be negative because the better capitalized a bank is, the greater its ability to absorb loan losses before becoming insolvent. We are somewhat uncertain about the potential effect of a bank's bond hold- ings, but because U.S. Government bonds proba- bly comprised the largest share of most banks' bond holdings, especially after U.S. entry into World War I, we expect to find a negative rela- tionship between BNDRAT and failure.25 The coefficient on CSHDEP is also expected to be negative. Banks with high ratios of cash and other reserves to deposits were relatively better pro- tected against large or sudden deposit with- drawals, and hence had' a lower probability of closure from illiquidity.

Banks that rely heavily on non-deposit sources of funds might do so because they are unable to attract sufficient deposits. Alternatively, signifi- cant deposit withdrawals may force a bank to borrow against its loan portfolio or to sell assets. Conservative banks, on the other hand, are prob- ably better able to attract deposits, and hence rely less on borrowed funds. If reliance on bor- rowed funds reflected risk-taking or a weakened condition, we expect the coefficient on LIABRT to be positive. Finally, we expect the coefficient on LOANRT to be positive because loans typi- cally are riskier than other bank investments.26

The model we estimate is a reduced form, and the use of balance sheet ratios virtually guaran- tees the presence of multicollinearity.27 In addi- tion, because deposit insurance lowers the cost of

23 The incentives created by fixed-rate deposit insurance are examined in Merton (1977).

24 Total equity includes the par value of bank stock, paid in surplus, and undistributed profits.

25 Only bonds issued by the Federal Government, State of Kansas, or Kansas municipalities were eligible for deposit with the state banking commissioner as a guarantee of deposit insurance assessment.

26 See White (1984) or Wheelock (1992) for further devel- opment of the specific hypotheses tested with each of these variables.

27 Inspection of the correlation matrix for the balance sheet

ratios, as well as the variance-covariance matrix of the param- eter estimates from the hazard model indicates considerable multicollinearity.

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696 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

TABLE 2.-SUMMARY STATISTICS BY INSURANCE SYSTEM MEMBERSHIP, 1922-24

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum

Uninsured Banks (74 observations)

INEFF 361.2 341.0 0.0 2043.76 ASSETS 224530.69 187136.98 45827.97 1133001.25 CAPRAT 0.1789 0.0532 0.0992 0.3261 BNDRAT 0.0291 0.0492 0.0 0.2589 LOANRT 0.7673 0.1196 0.3649 0.9430 CSHDEP 0.2064 0.1174 0.0349 0.7054 LIABRT 0.0658 0.0962 0.0 0.4248

Insured Banks (159 observations)

INEFF 336.4 288.7 0.0 1405.63 ASSETS 313640.14 347894.05 47352.96 2363497.50 CAPRAT 0.1619 0.0526 0.0618 0.4054 BNDRAT 0.0367 0.0537 0.0020 0.3550 LOANRT 0.7569 0.1045 0.3736 0.9456 CSHDEP 0.2054 0.0958 0.0340 0.5364 LIABRT 0.0545 0.0914 0.0 0.5708

deposits, insured banks likely held lower capital/asset ratios (and higher deposit/asset ra- tios) than uninsured banks. Mean values of finan- cial ratios and INEFF for insured and uninsured banks for 1922-24 are reported in table 2 (means are similar for other years; the 1922-24 period had the largest number of failures). We find no statistically significant relationship between inef- ficiency and insurance status in comparing mean values of INEFF for insured and uninsured banks in each period under study. However, insured banks were typically larger and maintained lower capital/asset ratios than uninsured banks.28 We include the deposit insurance dummy as a sepa- rate regressor because the financial ratios may not capture all effects of deposit insurance, such as the tendency for insured banks to hold riskier asset portfolios. The coefficient on the deposit insurance dummy variable will, however, not re- flect the entire impact of insurance on the proba- bility of failure.

The effect of deposit insurance is further clouded by its possible dependence on the proba- bility of failure. Risky banks have a greater de- mand for insurance than conservative banks, and a bank might have been more likely to join the insurance system if it was close to failure. The empirical significance of the potential depen-

dence of insurance membership on the probabil- ity of failure is likely to be small, however, be- cause only nine banks in our sample joined the insurance system after 1920 (six joined in 1920-22; three joined in 1922-24), and there were few bank failures in Kansas before then. Thus, banks appear not to have rushed into the system as they approached failure. Nonetheless, we estimate our model both with and without deposit insurance as an independent variable. We find that while the deposit insurance dummy adds significant ex- planatory power to the model, the signs and statistical significance of the remaining variables are unaffected by whether or not the insurance dummy is included.29

The proportional hazard model described above was estimated using the partial likelihood method described by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980, pp. 70-142). Results of the estimation of the parameters in ,3 are reported in table 3. Since the covariates in the hazard model are time-varying, estimates of the baseline hazard are difficult to obtain and are inconsistent; hence we do not report the baseline hazard since it has ambiguous meaning when time-varying covariates are used.

28 The only statistically significant differences between vari- ables for insured and uninsured banks in table 2 are for ASSETS and CAPRAT. Results for the other periods are similar.

29 We also estimated separate models for banks that were insured in 1920 and those that were not, and found no significant differences in the other coefficients. Ideally, one could employ a two-stage procedure where the insurance variable is instrumented out of the hazard model. Unfortu- nately, our data do not contain enough variables to allow this.

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES 697

TABLE 3.-RESULTS OF PROPORTIONAL HAZARD ESTIMATION (t-ratios in parentheses)

I II III

INEFF 0.001350a 0.001356a 0.001319a (2.14) (2.14) (2.20)

PER4 0.8462 0.8171 0.7326 (0.90) (0.87) (0.79)

PER5 2.030a 1.992a 2.874" (2.36) (2.30) (3.06)

PER6 2.099a 2.068a 3.236b (2.30) (2.25) (3.15)

PER7 3.184" 3.161" 4.256" (3.56) (3.53) (4.24)

INSBEF - 1.415a (2.28)

INSAFT - -0.3531 (-0.80)

INS 0.1631 (0.141)

ASSETS - 0.2227 - 0.2132 - 0.2810 (-0.26) (-0.25) (-0.33)

CAPRAT - 13.72t - 13.56" -12.406 (-3.06) (-3.01) (-2.88)

BNDRAT -5.461 -5.259 -5.941 (- 1.18) (- 1.13) (- 1.28)

LOANRT -3.209 -3.042 -3.327 (-1.03) (-0.96) (-1.09)

CSHDEP -7.3806 -7.240a -7.331a

(-2.58) (-2.51) (-2.56) LL4BRT 8.025" 8.077" 6.880"

(5.16) (5.16) (3.94) LLF -136.230 -136.144 -132.367

af-ratios significant at 0.05 (two-sided. a t-ratios significant at 0.01 (two-sided).

In column I of table 3, our basic specification includes the explanatory variables described above except for the insurance dummy variable. As expected, the coefficient on INEFF is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that increasing inefficiency increases the probability of failure. The less efficient a bank was at trans- forming labor, capital, and financial inputs into earning assets and demand deposits, the higher its probability of failure.

Among the financial ratios in column I, the coefficients on CAPRAT and CSHDEP have the expected signs and are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The lower a bank's capi- tal/assets or cash/deposits ratios, the more likely it was to fail. LIABRT is significant at the 0.01 level; as expected, the higher this ratio, the more likely a bank was to fail. BNDRAT and LOANRT are insignificant at the 0.10 level. Finally, the coefficient on ASSETS is not statistically signifi- cant; after controlling for the various financial

ratios and technical efficiency, failure was appar- ently not a function of size.30

The time dummy variables PER5, PER6, and PER7 are each significant at the 0.01 level in column I. The positive signs indicate that banks were more likely to fail in these periods, holding other factors constant. PER4 is insignificant at 0.10; there were only four failures during this period (1920-22).

Adding INS to the basic specification in col- umn I of table 3 yields the results shown in column II. The coefficient on INS is insignificant at 0.10, and there is only a slight increase in the value of the (partial) log-likelihood. Significance

30 Scale efficiency was examined using the distance function defined in section III along the lines suggested by Grosskopf (1986). Although we found considerable fluctuation in the number of banks operating under the decreasing and increas- ing returns portion of the variable returns production technol- ogy, consistent with our result for ASSETS, this analysis failed to suggest any pattern among survivors versus banks that failed.

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698 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

levels of the remaining coefficients are un- changed, and a pairwise comparison of coeffi- cient values between columns I and II reveals nc significant changes in coefficient values.

A Kansas state supreme court ruling in April 1926 effectively ended the insurance of bank de- posits in Kansas. There is evidence that the insur- ance system lost credibility among banks and depositors before then, especially after the pay- ment of claims was suspended in early 1925. If depositors lost faith in the system, they should have begun to monitor their banks, demand risk premiums on deposit interest rates and withdraw their funds from banks taking unacceptable risks. In other words, if depositors did not believe an insurance payoff was likely in the event of failure, they should have demanded the same terms from an insured bank as from an uninsured bank. Hence the ability (and incentive) for insured banks to take greater risks than uninsured banks would have disappeared. By 1925, therefore, the rela- tionship between insurance system membership and the probability of failure might have changed.3" To test for this possibility, we define two additional variables: INSBEF equals INS prior to September 1, 1924, and 0 otherwise; INSAFT equals INS for September 1, 1924 and thereafter, and 0 otherwise. Adding these vari- ables to our basic specification yields the results shown in column III of table 3. As expected, the coefficient on INSBEF is positive and significant (at the 0.05 level), while the coefficient on

INSAFT is insignificant. A test of the restriction that the coefficients on INSBEF and INSAFT are equal produces a likelihood-ratio statistic of 7.554. With one degree of freedom, we reject the null hypothesis that insurance system member- ship had the same effect on failure probabilities before and after 1924 at 0.01 significance. Mem- bership in the deposit insurance system appears to have increased the probability of failure prior to 1924, but not afterward.32

VI. Conclusions

As in the 1980s, during the 1920s a collapse of commodity and real estate prices precipitated a high number of bank failures. Though hundreds of banks failed, many more survived. What char- acteristics distinguish the failures from the sur- vivors? As other researchers have found using both historical and modern data, our results indi- cate that in Kansas, weakly capitalized banks, those holding few reserves, and those relying heavily on short-term borrowed funds ex ante, had a higher probability of failure than their more conservatively managed competitors. We also found that members of the state deposit insurance system had a higher probability of fail- ure than non-members, consistent with the hy- pothesis that insurance encourages banks to hold higher-risk portfolios than they otherwise would.

Finally, we found that the more adept a bank was at transforming inputs-savings deposits, borrowed funds, labor and capital-into loans and demand deposits, the better its chance of surviving Kansas' economic downturn. In the em- pirical model of bank failures, our measure of output technical inefficiency contributed signifi- cant explanatory power, and did not simply mimic the effects of deposit insurance and management behavior captured by various financial ratios. To the extent that technical inefficiency understates overall inefficiency, we expect that including overall inefficiency in the hazard model by com-

31 The state deposit insurance systems of the 1920s were not guaranteed by state governments. If a fund had insuffi- cient assets to pay depositors, it was the depositors, not taxpayers, who lost. The high number of bank failures in Kansas that followed the collapse of commodity prices in 1920 put a severe strain on the state deposit insurance system. The failure of the state's largest insured bank in early 1923 marked the beginning of a decline in deposit insurance system mem- bership. Although the bank's depositors were eventually made whole, it was generally recognized that the insurance fund would go bankrupt without higher insurance premiums and a marked decline in failures. Although premiums were in- creased to their legal maximum, the number of failures did not decline, and in March 1925 the state bank commissioner suspended the payment of insurance claims. In April 1926 the state supreme court ruled that banks could leave the system without liability for future claims by simply forfeiting the bonds they had deposited to guarantee payment of insurance assessments. Membership then declined rapidly. In December 1925 62% of eligible banks belonged to the insurance system. By December 1926 membership was down to 42%, and by December 1927 just 9% of eligible banks remained insured (FDIC, 1956, p. 68).

32 Rather than arbitrarily dividing the effect of insurance status at 1924 as with the INSBEF and INSAFT variables, the switching point could (in principle) be estimated from the data. Unfortunately, this is difficult in the context of hazard models with time-varying covariates. However, we redefined INSBEF and INSAFT with the break occurring at September 1, 1922; reestimating model I yields a log-likelihood of - 134.545, which is well below the value obtained from the original specification reported in table 3.

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EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES 699

bining allocative and technical inefficiency would strengthen this result. Whether measures of inef- ficiency will prove generally useful for explaining bank failures awaits application to other data sets. Our findings suggest, however, that effi- ciency may well be an important determinant of which banks fail and which survive during periods of significant economic distress.

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  • Article Contents
    • p. 689
    • p. 690
    • p. 691
    • p. 692
    • p. 693
    • p. 694
    • p. 695
    • p. 696
    • p. 697
    • p. 698
    • p. 699
    • p. 700
  • Issue Table of Contents
    • The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 4, Nov., 1995
      • Volume Information [pp. 715 - 720]
      • Front Matter
      • Symposium on Hedonic Methods in Industrial Economics
        • Model Entry and Exit in a Differentiated-Product Industry: The Personal Computer Market [pp. 571 - 584]
        • Pricing and Financial Resources: An Analysis of the Disk Drive Industry, 1980-88 [pp. 585 - 598]
        • Competing Compatibility Standards and Network Externalities in the PC Software Market [pp. 599 - 608]
        • Improving Hedonic Estimation with an Inequality Restricted Estimator [pp. 609 - 621]
        • Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The Case of Brazilian Microcomputers [pp. 622 - 633]
        • Exact Hedonic Price Indexes [pp. 634 - 653]
      • The Measurement of Firm-Specific Indexes of Technical Change [pp. 654 - 663]
      • Factor Price Distortions, Resource Allocation, and Growth: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis [pp. 664 - 676]
      • Are U.S. Nontariff Barriers Retaliatory? An Application of Extreme Bounds Analysis in the Tobit Model [pp. 677 - 688]
      • Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency [pp. 689 - 700]
      • Testing Data for Consistency with Revealed Preference [pp. 701 - 710]
      • Editorial Collaborators [pp. 711 - 714]
      • Back Matter

art%3A10.1007%2Fs10693-008-0028-5.pdf

Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach

Klaus Schaeck

Received: 11 December 2006 /Revised: 21 January 2008 /Accepted: 24 January 2008 / Published online: 28 February 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract Deposit insurers are particularly concerned about high-cost failures. When the factors driving such failures differ systematically from the determinants of low- and moderate-cost failures, a new estimation technique is required. Using a sample of more than 1,000 bank failures in the U.S. between 1984 and 2003, I present a quantile regression approach that illustrates the sensitivity of the dollar value of losses in different quantiles to my explanatory variables. These findings suggest that reliance on standard econometric techniques results in misleading inferences, and that losses are not homogeneously driven by the same factors across the quantiles. I also find that liability composition affects time to failure.

Keywords Bank liability structure . loss given default . market discipline . time to failure .

quantile regression

1 Introduction

To adequately price deposit insurance, create reasonable reserves, and adjust the resources of the insurance fund accordingly, deposit insurers need to determine the losses incurred by bank failures. An ongoing debate about the setting of the designated reserve ratio and the differentiation of pricing schemes according to bank size motivated a recent proposal by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to reform deposit insurance legislation.

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 DOI 10.1007/s10693-008-0028-5

This research was undertaken during my stay as a visiting scholar at the Department of Finance at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This study has benefited from valuable guidance by George Pennacchi. I am indebted to Christopher James, Rosalind Bennett, Lynn Shibut, and Philip Shively for sharing their extensive expertise, and to the editor, Haluk Unal, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. I also would like to thank Roger Koenker, Carlos Ramirez, Masaki Yamada, Martin Cihak, Evangelos Benos, Simon Wolfe, conference participants at the 6th Annual Bank Research Conference in Arlington, Virginia, and seminar participants at the University of Southampton for their suggestions. Sandra Sizer provided editorial assistance. All remaining errors are my own.

K. Schaeck (*) Cass Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, UK e-mail: [email protected]

Studies by Bovenzi and Murton (1988), James (1991), Brown and Epstein (1992), Osterberg and Thomson (1994), McDill (2004), Barth et al. (1990), and Blalock et al. (1991), model deposit insurers’ losses as a function of the failed institution’s asset composition and asset quality. However, these studies focus only on bank assets. But liability structure also has a substantial bearing on the pricing of deposit insurance, and eventually impacts insurers’ losses (Pennacchi, 2005). Moreover, Shibut (2002) under- scores that liability structure not only determines which depositors must be compensated, but also that a bank’s liability structure influences its risk-taking behavior. Thus, liability structure affects FDIC losses in two ways: directly, by determining the FDIC’s obligations and its relative position among the bank’s creditors; and indirectly, through market discipline and the impact on asset quality.

Previous studies also use standard techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS), which do not account for the skewed distribution of losses. Since deposit insurers are particularly concerned about high-cost failures due to their potentially systemic ramifica- tions, it is critical to understand whether losses are homogeneously driven by the same determinants, or if systematic differences exist between the determinants of high-cost and low-cost failures. If systematic differences do exist, then it may be possible to derive recommendations for regulation and supervision.

My paper examines failure resolution costs in three ways: first, to differentiate between the factors driving high-cost and low-cost failures, I use quantile regression to examine more than 1,000 bank failures in the U.S. between 1984 and 2003. This technique makes it possible for me to focus on the tails of the distribution of the loss variable and to make inferences about factors affecting high-cost failures. Moreover, quantile regression mitigates the problems associated with relying on a single measure of mean tendency of the distribution of the losses, and allows inferences about the relative importance of the regressors at different points of the distribution of the losses. I note that an OLS estimator cannot substitute quantile regression, since it only focuses on the mean tendency of the distribution and does not permit the researcher to obtain different slopes at different points of the distribution of the loss variable.

Second, I test whether liability structure plays a role for determining FDIC loss. Thus, my study is also related to the literature on depositor discipline (Goldberg and Hudgins 1996, 2002; Jordan 2000; Billet et al. 1998; Park and Peristiani 1998; Maechler and McDill 2006; Davenport and McDill 2006) and depositor preference laws (Hirschhorn and Zervos 1990; Osterberg 1996).1

Third, I investigate how liability composition affects the time to failure. Given that the new Basel Capital Accord highlights the role of market discipline to constrain the risk- taking behavior of banks, I hypothesize that depositories that rely heavily on uninsured deposits are likely to fail faster than are institutions funded by other sources. This assertion reflects the fact that holders of uninsured claims tend to respond to impending failure by withdrawing funds. Failing banks respond by substituting cash outflows with insured deposits, thus increasing the FDIC’s exposure.

This assertion bears important policy considerations: if such banks tend to fail faster, they would have to be subject to additional means of prompt corrective action (PCA) to prevent the described substitution effect. To test this hypothesis, I estimate accelerated failure time (AFT) models for a sample of U.S. banks during the period 1982–2003.

1 The Depositor Preference Act (1993) shifts the burden of bank failure from taxpayers to uninsured depositors. Several states had such laws in place prior to 1993 (Osterberg 1996). Such laws gives depositors claims on a failed bank’s assets superior to those of other creditors.

164 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

In sum, the goal of this paper is to answer three questions: Are there systematic differences in the determinants of high-cost and low-cost failures? How are FDIC losses related to the failed banks’ liability composition? Is the time to failure related to liability structure?

Three main results emerge from the analysis: (1) Quantile regression underscores that FDIC losses in different quantiles exhibit significantly different sensitivity to the explanatory variables. This result suggests systematic differences in the determinants of high-cost and low-cost failures. (2) Relying on OLS estimates is less informative, because it does not show the impact of deposits on losses, but the quantile regression estimator shows that brokered deposits and Fed funds significantly affect losses for the costly failures. (3) Banks that rely on brokered deposits exhibit a shorter time to failure.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the method. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.

2 Data and Method

The initial sample consists of 1,548 failed banks which were resolved by the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) during the period 1984–2003. I focus on the period up to 2003 since the FDIC database indicates that no bank failed in 2004 or 2005.2

I follow the FDIC’s bank failure database3 and classify failure as having occurred if any one of the following events took place: assisted merger, purchase and assumption, transfer and assumption of insured deposits, re-privatization, closing and reopening, or depositor payoff. I also classify a bank as failed if it was subject to the management consignment programme. Under this programme, federal regulators replaced the management of problem institutions by new management teams who were compensated on a contractual basis until a permanent solution could be found.

Bank data are taken from the Call Report prior to failure. In instances in which no final report is available, I use the last available Call Report.4 I apply selection criteria for including a bank in my analysis. First, inferences may be misleading if failures caused by fraud are included, since Call Reports have no information in such instances, so I exclude fraud cases mentioned by Gup (1995). For the sampling period not covered by Gup, I review FDIC press releases and exclude failures for which fraud is mentioned. Second, I remove cross-guarantee failures (e.g., First Republic), since they cannot be viewed as individual failures (Ashcraft 2003). Third, I consolidate multibank holding company failures into one.

I obtain information on resolution costs from the FDIC’s database on bank failures. This information is an estimate of the resolution cost calculated as the difference between net cash outlays and the estimated discounted net recovery on any assets remaining in the receivership’s books. I normalize the explanatory variables by total assets to enable comparison with previous work (e.g., Shibut et al. 2003).

2 In unreported regressions, I performed sensitivity tests that restrict the sample until 1996 because the Fed funds variable is grouped together with repurchase agreements during the 1997–2003 period. Since repos are treated very differently from Fed funds in a bank receivership, examining a potential bias is important. However, the results from these additional sensitivity tests for both the quantile regressions and the hazard rate models are virtually identical and can be obtained from the author on request. 3 http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/faild/index.html 4 Note that reliance on Call Report data on a quarterly basis from the report immediately prior to failure hampers separating out insured and uninsured deposits. The Call Report item containing information on deposit accounts with balances over 100,000 USD was only reported in June Call Reports prior to 1991 (Maechler and McDill 2006).

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 165

To test the effect of liability structure on FDIC loss, I include several deposit and nondeposit categories into the regressions. First, I consider the ratio of transactions deposits to total assets. Second, I incorporate the ratios of demand deposits, time and savings deposits, and brokered deposits to total assets, because they capture important information about the breakdown of the failed banks’ deposit structures by account type. These categories do not discriminate between the status of deposit insurance. Therefore, it is ex-ante not clear whether they increase or decrease resolution costs. To the extent that they are insured, they increase losses; to the extent that they are not insured, they mitigate losses. Recent microlevel evidence by Davenport and McDill (2006) provides strong evidence that insured depositors withdraw larger volumes than do uninsured depositors. Thus, if most of deposits that are left in the bank at the time of failure are uninsured, these results suggest a negative link between these types of deposits and FDIC loss.

I also test the effect of nondeposit variables, since large institutions rely heavily on nondeposit funding (Shibut 2002). Therefore, I incorporate the ratio of Fed funds to total assets. Fed funds are obtained in the interbank market and are not insured. I expect that this variable decreases losses.

I group together the remaining nondeposit liabilities of the failed banks’ balance sheets in the ratio of other liabilities to total assets. These liabilities can enter the loss equation negatively or positively, depending on whether holders of such claims seek collateral in the run-up to failure. Such behavior would expose the FDIC to higher losses. To avoid perfect collinearity among the liability variables, I omit the ratio of transactions deposits to assets. Therefore, the coefficients on the liability components measure the effect of shifting from transactions deposits into other liability components. For instance, if shifting into Fed funds decreases losses, then the coefficient will show a negative sign, and vice versa.

I include several controls. The ratios of loans past due and real estate owned to total assets account for asset quality as James (1991) shows that asset quality is a key determinant for FDIC losses. I also incorporate the ratio of uncollected income to total assets (James 1991). Since failures are often preceded by asset growth (McDill 2004), I control for asset growth 24months prior to failure. I also consider the book value of equity to total assets. Given that equity serves as a cushion between asset value and the payments to debt holders, I anticipate an inverse relation between this variable and FDIC loss. Brown and Epstein (1992) show that different types of assets exhibit different recovery rates. Consequently, I control for composition of the loan portfolio and test for the effect of the ratios of C&I, agricultural, real estate, and individual loans to assets on the loss variable. I omit the ratio of individual loans to total loans to avoid perfect collinearity. The coefficients from the different loan categories measure the effect of shifting from the omitted category into the other loan components.

McDill (2004) finds a link between personal income growth, bankruptcy growth, unemployment, and FDIC losses. Therefore, I obtain information from the databases of the American Bankruptcy Institute (http://www.abiworld.org), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm), and the Bureau for Economic Analysis (http://bea.gov/ bea/regional/statelocal.htm) to account for such effects. These variables are obtained on the state level and are matched with the bank data based on the state in which the bank is located.

I also include a dummy that takes the value one if the observation comes from the period following enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991, which was designed to reduce costs to the deposit insurer that result from bank failures. I include a dummy variable that takes the value one if depositor preference law was in place at the time of the failure in the relevant state, or zero otherwise. I also control for bank size, using the log of total assets. This variable is adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator. Larger institutions are assumed to have a higher loss on assets. Table 1 presents summary statistics.

166 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

To facilitate comparison with previous studies, I compute a loss rate, which I calculate as resolution costs divided by total assets. The average loss rate for the full sample is 22% of total assets. My detailed breakdown illustrates a large degree of variation across the quantiles. Although the loss rate is 3% of total assets for the low-cost failures (5th quantile), failures at the upper tail of the distribution cost the insurer more than 46% of total assets. The most expensive failure shows a loss rate of more than 73% of total assets. I note that that FDIC losses increase substantially above the 75th quantile, which suggests a considerable increase at the upper tail of the distribution. Therefore, I consider “expensive failures” as those failures for which losses lie at the 90th quantile and above of the distribution. This approach reflects the idea that deposit insurers are particularly concerned about those failures that may pose a systemic threat to the insurance fund. Jones and Oshinsky (2007) point out that the solvency of the bank insurance fund is closely tied to the soundness of the largest institutions.

2.1 Cost of Failure

My sample consists of different types of banks that pursue different business activities. Brown and Epstein (1992) claim that banks that concentrate on commercial loans are likely to exhibit larger losses than are banks that primarily engage in retail lending. Moreover, the sample shows large variation with respect to bank size. Bank size, in turn, influences liability structure, which ultimately affects losses. Thus, numerous factors suggest that losses vary across the distribution of the dependent variable and that a regression technique is required that helps gain detailed insights on whether the factors driving losses differ systematically.

To account for the skewed distribution of the loss variable and draw more appropriate inferences about the sensitivity of the explanatory variables at the tails of the distribution, I use the conditional quantile regression estimator developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Given the heterogeneity of the data, quantile regression permits inferences about the impact of regressors conditional on the distribution of the loss variable. The crucial difference between quantile regression and OLS is that quantile regression provides information about the slope at different points of the dependent variable (FDIC loss) given the set of explanatory variables (e.g., bank size, liability variables, macroeconomic variables, …), whereas OLS provides information about the slope at different points of the explanatory variables. Moreover, quantile regression provides estimates that are robust to departure from normality, because linear estimators are likely produce inefficient estimates. Although I could have used robust regression to address this problem, robust regression does not permit me to estimate coefficients for different quantiles, which is one of the objectives of this paper.

Whereas classical linear regression estimates conditional mean functions, quantile regression estimates conditional quantile functions, i.e., models in which quantiles of the dependent variable are expressed as functions of a set of explanatory variables (Koenker and Hallock 2001).5 Therefore, quantile regression is appropriate when a large degree of variation in the data suggests that there may be more than a single slope parameter that describes the relation between the dependent variable and the regressors. Thus, quantile estimation goes beyond linear regression in that it gives a more complete picture of the effect of regressors on the different quantiles of the dependent variable.

5 Quantiles divide the cumulative distribution function of a random variable into a number of equally sized segments. Quantiles are the general case of splitting a population into segments. For instance, quartiles divide a population into four segments with equal proportions of the reference population in each segment.

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 167

T ab

le 1

D es cr ip tiv

e st at is tic s

V ar ia bl e

N M ea n

p5 0

M ax

M in

S D

p5 p1

0 p2

5 M ed ia n

p7 5

p9 0

p9 5

C os t (l og )

1, 05

5 8. 64

8. 59

14 .5 2

0. 69

1. 44

6. 55

7. 08

7. 76

8. 59

9. 45

10 .3 9

11 .2 4

To ta l as se ts (l og )

1, 05

5 7. 95

7. 72

13 .6 0

5. 39

1. 32

6. 26

6. 55

7. 00

7. 72

8. 64

9. 76

10 .6 7

C os t/t ot al

as se ts

1, 05

5 0. 22

0. 21

0. 73

0. 00

0. 13

0. 03

0. 07

0. 13

0. 21

0. 30

0. 40

0. 46

R ea l es ta te

ow ne d/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 05

0. 03

0. 53

0. 00

0. 05

0. 00

0. 00

0. 01

0. 03

0. 07

0. 11

0. 13

E qu ity

/to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 00

0. 01

0. 16

−0 .5 8

0. 06

−0 .1 1

−0 .0 6

−0 .0 2

0. 01

0. 03

0. 06

0. 07

L oa ns

pa st du e/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 03

0. 01

0. 26

0. 00

0. 03

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 01

0. 03

0. 07

0. 09

U nc ol le ct ed

in co m e/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 01

0. 01

0. 06

0. 00

0. 01

0. 00

0. 00

0. 01

0. 01

0. 02

0. 02

0. 03

C & I lo an s/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05

5 0. 18

0. 16

0. 89

0. 00

0. 12

0. 04

0. 06

0. 10

0. 16

0. 25

0. 35

0. 40

A gr ic ul tu ra l lo an s/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 06

0. 00

0. 61

0. 00

0. 12

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 07

0. 25

0. 34

R ea l es ta te

lo an s/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05

5 0. 27

0. 25

0. 87

0. 00

0. 16

0. 06

0. 09

0. 15

0. 25

0. 35

0. 49

0. 59

F ed

fu nd

s/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05

5 0. 01

0. 00

0. 34

0. 00

0. 02

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 02

0. 04

B ro ke re d de po

si ts /to

ta l as se ts

1, 05

5 0. 02

0. 00

0. 84

0. 00

0. 08

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 07

0. 17

D em

an d de po si ts /to

ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 15

0. 14

0. 60

0. 00

0. 08

0. 05

0. 06

0. 10

0. 14

0. 19

0. 25

0. 29

T im

e an d sa vi ng s de po si ts /to

ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 82

0. 83

1. 37

0. 10

0. 10

0. 65

0. 70

0. 77

0. 83

0. 88

0. 93

0. 97

O th er

lia bi lit ie s/ to ta l as se ts

1, 05 5

0. 02

0. 01

0. 39

0. 00

0. 03

0. 00

0. 01

0. 01

0. 01

0. 02

0. 04

0. 07

A ss et

gr ow

th 1, 05

5 −0

.0 3

−0 .1 4

4. 39

−0 .7 1

0. 46

−0 .4 3

−0 .3 8

−0 .2 7

−0 .1 4

0. 06

0. 38

0. 73

P er so na l in co m e gr ow

th (l ag ge d)

1, 05

5 0. 06

0. 07

0. 14

0. 00

0. 03

0. 01

0. 01

0. 04

0. 07

0. 10

0. 11

0. 12

B an kr up

tc y gr ow

th 1, 05

5 0. 22

0. 16

0. 94

−0 .2 7

0. 22

−0 .0 3

−0 .0 1

0. 04

0. 16

0. 42

0. 58

0. 58

U ne m pl oy

m en t ra te

1, 05

5 0. 07

0. 07

0. 13

0. 03

0. 02

0. 05

0. 05

0. 06

0. 07

0. 08

0. 09

0. 09

F D IC IA

du m m y

1, 05

5 0. 09

0. 00

1. 00

0. 00

0. 29

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

1. 00

D ep os ito

r pr ef er en ce

la w

du m m y

1, 05

5 0. 37

0. 00

1. 00

0. 00

0. 48

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

0. 00

1. 00

1. 00

1. 00

168 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

Given that the θth quantile of a conditional distribution of yi is linear in xi and assuming (yi, xi), i = 1,…,n is drawn from the population of failed institutions whereby xi is a K × 1 vector of explanatory variables, I write the conditional quantile regression model as:

yi ¼ x 0 ibq þ uqi ð1Þ

Quantθ yijxið Þ � inf y: Fi yjxð Þfqf g ¼ x 0 iβq ð2Þ

Quantθ uθi xijð Þ ¼ 0 ð3Þ where Quantθ uθi xijð Þcaptures the θth conditional quantile of yi on the regressor vector xi. βθ is the vector of parameters to be estimated for different quantiles θ, lying in the range (0;1). The error term uθ is assumed to have a continuously differentiable c.d.f. Fuq : xjð Þ and a density function fuθ : xjð Þ: The distribution of y conditional on x can be traced by moving along the (0;1) interval of θ. To estimate βθ I minimize:

min Xn

i

rq yi � x 0 ibq

� � ð4Þ

using a simplex algorithm whereby ρθ (u) is defined as follows:

ρθ uð Þ ¼ θu if u � 0 θ� 1ð Þu if u < 0

� � : ð5Þ

2.2 Timing of Failure

To test the effect of liability composition on time to failure, I use an accelerated failure time (AFT) model with time-varying covariates. Such models are so-named because the effect of the explanatory variables is to accelerate or decelerate time to failure.

I formalize time to failure as a probability density function of time t. A convenient way of describing survival of a depository past time t is through its survivor function S(t) = P(T < t), which equals one minus the cumulative distribution function of T. I can then compute the conditional probability of closure within the time interval t until t + h, given survival until time t, as

P t � T t þ hh jT < tf g: ð6Þ This probability can be divided by h, to calculate the instantaneous rate of failure, i.e.,

the average probability of leaving per unit time period over the interval t until t + h such that the hazard function can be written as:

l tð Þ ¼ lim h#0

P t � T t þ h T � tjhf g h

¼ �d log S tð Þ dt

¼ f tð Þ S tð Þ : ð7Þ

Accelerated failure time models take the form:

ln tj � � ¼ xjbx þ t j ð8Þ

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 169

T ab

le 2

O rd in ar y le as t sq ua re s an d qu an til e re gr es si on s. I re po rt O L S re gr es si on s in

co lu m n 1 an d qu an til e re gr es si on s in

co lu m ns

2– 8.

T he

de pe nd

en t va ri ab le

is th e lo ss

on as se ts (l og

). R ob us t st an da rd

er ro rs

ar e re po rt ed

fo r th e O L S re gr es si on

s, an d bo

ot st ra pp

ed st an da rd

er ro rs

ba se d on

50 0 re pl ic at io ns

ar e re po

rt ed

in pa re nt he se s fo r th e qu an til e

re gr es si on s. P se ud o R 2 re po rt ed

fo r qu an til e re gr es si on s. T he

ps eu do

R 2 is ca lc ul at ed

as 1 − (s um

of th e w ei gh te d de vi at io ns

ab ou t es tim

at ed

qu an til e/ su m

of w ei gh te d de vi at io ns

ab ou

t ra w

qu an til e)

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

O L S

q. 05

q. 10

q. 25

q. 50

q. 75

q. 90

q. 95

To ta l as se ts (l og )

0. 88 37

** *

0. 76 89

** *

0. 85

93 ** *

0. 85 50

** *

0. 87

66 ** *

0. 94 30

** *

0. 94

93 ** *

1. 04 28

** *

(0 .0 29

5) (0 .0 76

2) (0 .0 58

1) (0 .0 35

8) (0 .0 26

2) (0 .0 31

9) (0 .0 40

7) (0 .0 50

0) R ea l es ta te

ow ne d/ to ta l as se ts

4. 02 06

** *

5. 71 84

** *

5. 68

89 ** *

4. 54 65

** *

3. 06

99 ** *

2. 36 59

** *

1. 89

06 ** *

0. 77 64

(0 .4 73

3) (0 .9 45

5) (0 .8 73

8) (0 .5 95

9) (0 .4 37

7) (0 .4 86

8) (0 .5 39

6) (0 .5 35

4) E qu ity

ca pi ta l/t ot al

as se ts

−1 .7 36 1*

** −0

.8 12 1

−2 .4 34

3* *

−2 .4 45 5*

** −1

.5 73

4* **

−1 .0 87 2*

−1 .3 46

9 −0

.9 90 4

(0 .6 40

8) (1 .8 23

6) (1 .1 52

3) (0 .5 28

2) (0 .5 72

9) (0 .5 85

7) (0 .8 59

2) (0 .9 38

5) L oa ns

pa st du e/ to ta l as se ts

0. 05 69 ** *

0. 07 73 *

0. 08 09 **

0. 06 20 ** *

0. 02 37

0. 01 25

0. 04 68 ** *

0. 06 34 ** *

(0 .0 19

0) (0 .0 46

2) (0 .0 38

2) (0 .0 23

4) (0 .0 19

1) (0 .0 16

1) (0 .0 17

4) (0 .0 21

5) In co m e ea rn ed , no

t co lle ct ed /to

ta l as se ts

0. 41 73

** *

0. 70 52

** *

0. 52

56 ** *

0. 47 40

** *

0. 43

68 ** *

0. 42 91

** *

0. 34

33 ** *

0. 33 87

** *

(0 .0 81

7) (0 .1 85

4) (0 .1 25

5) (0 .0 80

8) (0 .0 71 1)

(0 .0 67

8) (0 .0 64

6) (0 .0 80

8) A ss et

gr ow

th , ei gh t qu ar te rs

pr io r to

fa ilu

re 0. 22 58

** *

0. 26 69

** *

0. 20

87 **

0. 23 15

** *

0. 14

85 ** *

0. 12 84

* 0. 18

72 **

0. 19 19

(0 .0 52

4) (0 .0 88

1) (0 .0 85

4) (0 .0 70

6) (0 .0 44

2) (0 .0 68

6) (0 .0 80

7) (0 .1 44

5) F D IC IA

du m m y

−0 .7 22 9*

** −1

.0 09 6

−0 .8 91

6* **

−0 .5 01 7*

** −0

.6 10

0* **

−0 .8 19 1*

** −0

.9 25

9* **

−0 .9 56 6*

** (0 .1 45

9) (0 .8 35

3) (0 .2 98

6) (0 .1 91

8) (0 .1 00

9) (0 .1 16

7) (0 .1 57

8) (0 .2 15

0) F ed

fu nd s pu rc ha se d/ to ta l as se ts

−0 .0 30 8*

−0 .0 33 7

−0 .0 22

1 −0

.0 03 9

−0 .0 37

6* *

−0 .0 50 4*

** −0

.0 54

9* **

−0 .0 26 4

(0 .0 17

5) (0 .0 52

3) (0 .0 26

4) (0 .0 22

5) (0 .0 16

2) (0 .0 15

6) (0 .0 20

3) (0 .0 21

9) B ro ke re d de po si ts /to

ta l as se ts

0. 47 73

0. 51 97

0. 21 62

0. 03 27

0. 77 95 **

0. 85 79 ** *

0. 98 37 *

1. 44 21 ** *

(0 .4 01

8) (0 .6 64

0) (0 .5 19

1) (0 .4 21

3) (0 .3 80

5) (0 .3 04

4) (0 .5 44

6) (0 .4 93

9)

170 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

T im

e an d sa vi ng s de po si ts /to

ta l as se ts

−0 .3 19 2

2. 55 85

* 0. 26

40 −0

.1 31 7

−0 .1 31

0 −0

.2 12 8

−0 .7 17

9 −0

.9 74 0

(0 .2 58

4) (1 .3 48

0) (0 .9 81

5) (0 .3 93

7) (0 .3 81

8) (0 .3 31

7) (0 .5 86

1) (0 .6 30

1) D em

an d de po si ts /to

ta l as se ts

−0 .0 00 6

0. 21 79

−0 .0 33

6 0. 03 89

0. 04

10 −0

.0 01 2

−0 .0 56

3 −0

.0 59 8

(0 .0 51

5) (0 .2 38

2) (0 .1 19

8) (0 .0 74

7) (0 .0 63

2) (0 .0 60

2) (0 .1 28

5) (0 .1 50

4) O th er

lia bi lit ie s/ to ta l as se ts

0. 12 56 ** *

0. 27 29 ** *

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J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 171

where ln(tj) is the log of time to failure, xj denotes my explanatory variables, βx are the parameters to be estimated, and τj is a random variable that follows a distribution. Thus, to estimate the model, I specify τj to follow the log-logistic distribution. Other studies, such that by Cole and Gunther (1995), also utilize the log-logistic distribution in their work on bank failures.

The sampling period for this analysis starts in 1982. I use the same set of failed institutions as those I use in the cost equations. I choose the start year, 1982, to assert that I have at least eight quarterly observations for the banks that fail in the first quarter of 1984. Since supervisors cannot discriminate between sound and failing banks ex-ante, I include nonfailed institutions in the duration model.

3 Empirical Results

I report the results for the effect of liability composition on resolution costs in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 presents the findings from the AFT model.

3.1 Liability Composition and FDIC Loss

Table 2 shows the coefficients I obtain with OLS for comparability with previous studies. The table also illustrates the effect of explanatory variables at the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th quantile of the distribution of the loss variable using quantile regression. Figure 1 plots the quantile regression estimates for θ as solid curve. These estimates illustrate a one-unit change of the regressor on losses with the other covariates held constant. The vertical axis indicates the covariate effect and the horizontal line represents the quantile θ scale. The grey area shows a 95% confidence band for the quantile regression, and the dashed line represents the OLS estimator.

The OLS test suggests that the ratio of other liabilities to total assets has an increasing effect on losses. This result may be due to the fact that some of the liabilities grouped together in this category are collateralised, thus reducing the proceeds available to the FDIC in a receivership. None of the other liability components assumes significance.

The results for the control variables agree with theory. Bank size, real estate owned, poor asset quality, asset growth, uncollected income, and a weak macroeconomy increase losses, whereas the level of capitalization decreases resolution costs. The dummy for the period following enactment of FDICIA enters negatively and significantly, indicating that the law helps reducing losses.

As highlighted, the estimates I obtain with OLS only approximate the mean tendency of the distribution and do not allow for the impact of explanatory variables to be different for high-cost and low-cost failures. However, the FDIC is particularly concerned about high-cost failures and has an interest in the factors that drive such losses. I can investigate these factors by using quantile regression, since I can obtain point estimates for the effect of the regressors for the most costly failures. In fact, columns 2–8 in Table 2 highlight that several variables show a varying impact on FDIC losses. The size, sign, and significance of these variables reflect these varying effects at the different quantiles of the distribution.

In terms of liability structure, the quantile regression estimates highlight that only the ratio of time and savings deposits to total assets has a significantly varying effect on FDIC losses. The coefficient enters significantly and with a positive sign for the low-cost failures, indicating that shifting from transaction deposits into time and savings deposits increases

172 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

losses for the low-cost failures. Figure 1i depicts considerable departures of the quantile regression estimates at the lower tail of the distribution.

The ratio of Fed funds to total deposits to total assets enters significantly and negatively for moderate-cost failures. This result is intuitive: Fed funds are not insured and decrease FDIC losses.

In contrast, brokered deposits show a significantly increasing effect on moderate and high-cost failures. This finding implies that liability shifting into brokered deposits in the run-up to failure exposes the FDIC to higher losses. Although FDICIA restricts the use of brokered deposits of critically undercapitalized depositories, institutions that are not subject to this classification may nevertheless be able to turn to insured brokered deposits, thus increasing FDIC losses. Moreover, this finding supports findings by Marino and Bennett (1999) who mention that troubled banks engage in liability shifting.

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Figure 1 Quantile regression estimators. a Total assets (log). b Real estate owned/total assets. c Equity capital/total assets. d Loans past due/total assets. e Income earned, not collected/total loans. f Asset growth, eight quarters prior to failure. g Fed funds purchased/total assets. h Brokered deposits/total assets. i Time and savings deposits/total assets. j Demand deposits/total assets. k Other liabilities/total assets. l C&I loans/total assets. m Agricultural loans/total assets. n Real estate loans/total assets. o Personal income growth (lagged). p Bankruptcy growth. q Unemployment rate. r Depositor preference law dummy. s FDICIA dummy

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 173

The remaining liability category also shows an increasing effect on losses. I also note that the width of the confidence bands for the quantile regressions in Fig. 1g, h, and j suggests that caution must be exercised when drawing inferences.

Many control variables show considerable departures from the OLS estimates. Figure 1a shows a departure of the quantile estimates from the OLS estimate for the effect of size, and illustrates its variation in magnitude. Figure 1b also demonstrates sensitivities between the ratio of real estate owned to total assets and losses. At the upper quantiles, the impact of this variable on losses declines. This result implies that this variable is less important for explaining the costly failures. The effect of the ratio of C&I loans to total assets also declines as FDIC losses increase, indicating that C&I loans have a much stronger effect on losses for low- and moderate-cost failures than on the most costly failures. This observation suggests that there are marked differences in loan portfolio composition between high-cost and low-cost failures.

Both the bankruptcy growth and unemployment rate are positive and significant across all quantiles and also show a varying sensitivity on losses. The increasing effect on FDIC losses for the costly failures arising from unemployment in Fig. 1q can be explained as follows: in states with a poorly performing local economy, defaults of bank borrowers will adversely affect other banks, which are the likely buyers of the failed institution’s assets. Thus, if the pool of potential buyers is operating in the same region as the failed bank, buyers may be constrained from paying high prices, which affects recovery rates and FDIC losses. Figure 1p shows a declining effect for the more costly failures for bankruptcy growth, implying decreasing importance for explaining costly failures. In contrast, personal income growth only significantly reduces FDIC losses for the failures lying at the 50th quantile of the distribution. Losses of both low- and high-cost failures are dominated by other factors, e.g., reliance on brokered deposits.

Figure 1r indicates that no strong inferences can be drawn about the effect of depositor preference laws on losses. The width of the confidence band for the quantile regression estimates suggests remaining cautious about drawing strong inferences.

The results for the other control variables support the findings obtained from the OLS test. Moreover, the coefficients of these variables remain largely within the confidence band of the OLS estimator, indicating that there are no marked differences between high- and low-cost failures.

To validate inferences from the visual inspection, Table 3 presents the F-tests to investigate if the coefficients are jointly statistically different from zero across all quantiles. To evaluate if median losses are affected differently by the variables from the losses in the tails of the distribution, I also test if coefficients at the median and at the tails are jointly significantly different from zero. Finally, I examine differences for the coefficients in the tails of the distribution. This test shows if there are differences between drivers of high- and low-cost failures.

The F-tests reject the null hypothesis for the equality of coefficients across all quantiles in five instances. The results improve when I test for differences between the median and the tails (5th, 50th, and 95th quantiles). The F-tests indicate significant differences in seven instances. When I focus on the tails (5th and 95th quantile), I find that six variables impact high- and low-cost failures differently. In particular, the effect of time and savings deposits to total assets varies significantly between the median and the tails of the distribution of the losses.

Among the controls, bank size, the ratio of real estate owned to total assets, and two of the three macroeconomic variables show a varying impact on losses. Moreover, variables that provide information on loan portfolio composition also exhibit significantly varying

174 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

sensitivities. Losses are influenced by a variety of factors, such as how quickly ailing banks are put into receivership, the claim structure of creditors, and the FDIC’s ability to sell the bank or its assets. Thus, the longer an ailing bank operates freely, the higher its losses. This result reflects bank managers’ propensity to “gamble for resurrection”. Further, bad market conditions after resolution can increase losses, since adverse conditions have a negative effect on the recovery value of the assets in the receivership.

3.2 Liability Composition and Time to Failure

Using an AFT model to explore the nexus between liability structure and time to failure is an alternative way of assessing the role of market discipline. In addition, with the exception of the studies by Marino and Bennett (1999), Hall et al. (2002), and Davenport and McDill (2006), the link between market discipline and different types of liabilities has been left largely untouched in the literature. Assessing the role of depositor discipline has gained increasing importance with the new Basel Accord. If risky institutions cannot increase the volume of insured deposits by offering higher interest rates to compensate outflows of uninsured deposits, then troubled banks that rely on uninsured deposits may fail faster due to their inability to substitute cash outflows. This finding could be a signal of market discipline, and it underscores the importance of Pillar 3 in Basel II. Further, evidence that

Table 3 F-tests for the equality of coefficients across quantiles. This table presents F-tests for the equality of the slope coefficients for the explanatory variables used in the cost equations. The F-tests are based on the coefficients reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports F-tests for the equality of coefficients across all quantiles from the 5th–95th quantile; column 2 presents F-tests for the equality of the coefficients for the 5th, 50th and the 95th quantile and column 3 presents F-tests for the equality of the coefficients for low-cost (5th quantile) and high-cost (95th quantile) failures

Variable 1 2 3

F-test (equality across all quantiles)

F-test (equality between 5th, 50th, and 95th quantile)

F-test (equality across tails)

Total assets (log) 2.64** 6.39*** 9.42*** Real estate owned/total assets 5.06*** 10.31*** 17.13*** Equity/total assets 1.30 0.55 0.14 Loans past due/total assets 1.20 1.13 0.06 Uncollected income/total assets 1.10 2.90* 5.44** Asset growth 0.51 0.38 0.00 Fed funds/total assets 1.04 0.13 0.01 Brokered deposits/total assets 1.33 1.02 1.15 Demand deposits/total assets 0.62 0.62 1.24 Time and savings deposits/total assets 1.44 3.30** 6.44*** Other liabilities/total assets 1.27 1.13 1.88 C&I loans/total assets 3.71*** 8.23*** 16.43*** Agricultural loans/total assets 0.71 0.29 0.09 Real estate loans/total assets 0.88 2.17 4.22** Personal income growth (lagged) 2.17** 6.36*** 0.04 Bankruptcy growth rate 2.10** 4.59** 0.37 Unemployment rate 1.16 0.49 0.91 Depositor preference law dummy 1.27 0.71 1.27 FDICIA dummy 1.36 1.46 0.03

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

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Table 4 Duration models. I report duration models with time-varying covariates based on the log-logistic distribution in column (1)–(3) for the period 1982–2003. The dependent variable is the log of time to failure. Specification (1) contains variables used in previous studies and a dummy that takes on the value one if the observation is from the period following enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in 1991 and additionally tests for covariates that capture the funding structure. Control variables are included in specification (2) to capture composition of the loan portfolio. I also incorporate a dummy variable for depositor preference in specification (2) that takes the value one if depositor preference law is in place or zero otherwise. Specification (3) additionally includes variables that capture the macroeconomic setting on the federal state level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Errors clustered by bank

Duration models 1 2 3

Equity capital/total assets 51.3484*** 48.9449*** 49.6933*** (2.3779) (2.3068) (2.4423)

Troubled assets/total assets −3.3825*** −4.9461*** −4.8650*** (1.0944) (1.0618) (1.0800)

Operating income/total assets −0.1411 −0.1658 −0.2631 (0.3213) (0.5469) (2.1122)

Total assets (log) 0.2368*** 0.2585*** 0.2684*** (0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0217)

FDICIA dummy 0.2346*** 0.0573 −0.0583 (0.0709) (0.0666) (0.0729)

Liquidity/total assets 3.1872*** 3.3792*** 3.3275*** (0.1311) (0.1958) (0.2024)

Fed funds purchased/total assets 0.0099 0.0085 0.0105 (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0082)

Brokered deposits/total assets −10.7121*** −8.8188*** −8.4226*** (2.3653) (3.1589) (3.0422)

Time and savings deposits/total assets 0.7490*** 0.7623** 0.8128** (0.0795) (0.3615) (0.3372)

Demand deposits/total assets 0.0330 0.2460*** 0.2323*** (0.0300) (0.0866) (0.0830)

Other liabilities/total assets 0.1807*** 0.1225*** 0.1139*** (0.0285) (0.0294) (0.0316)

C&I loans/total assets −0.0826*** −0.0768*** (0.0279) (0.0280)

Agricultural loans/total assets 2.3448*** 2.4631*** (0.2143) (0.2289)

Real estate loans/total assets 1.5103*** 1.5086*** (0.2270) (0.2389)

Depositor preference law dummy 0.0396 0.0582* (0.0334) (0.0342)

Personal income growth (lagged) 1.7958*** (0.5433)

Bankruptcy growth rate −0.5581*** (0.1024)

Unemployment rate 0.1310** (0.0660)

Observations 743,025 741,987 741,987 Number of banks 13,731 13,495 13,495 Number of failures 1,054 1,050 1,050 Log likelihood function −4,287.168 −4,033.444 −4,017.917

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

176 J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179

holders of certain account types withdraw deposits in the period prior to failure suggests that these account holders are also sensitive to the bank’s financial condition.

In Table 4, I include covariates that capture liability structure, composition of the loan portfolio, variables that provide information on the macroeconomic environment, and dummy variables for depositor preference law and for FDICIA. I use total assets to control for bank size. I augment these regressions with variables that provide information used by supervisors to predict failures. These regressors are components of the CAMELS framework.6 I use the ratio capital to total assets as a proxy for capitalization. To measure asset quality, I calculate troubled assets as the sum of real estate owned and loans past due over total assets. I use operating income to total assets as a proxy for earnings. I capture liquidity effects with a variable that I calculate as the sum of securities and cash over total assets. I do not include management quality, because this would require qualitative information not contained in Call Reports.

Specification 1 uses a parsimonious set of variables, augmented by the FDICIA dummy and the covariates that capture liability composition. Among the liability variables, the ratio of brokered deposits to total assets enters negatively and significantly. This result indicates that liability shifting from transaction deposits (the omitted category) into brokered deposits reduces bank survival time. To the extent to which these deposits are insured, they are not priced according to the bank’s default risk. Thus, the increased use of brokered deposits may be a sign of impending distress. In contrast, increasing reliance on time and savings deposits lengthens banks’ survival time. This result can be due to a signalling effect. If holders of such deposits do not withdraw their funds, then that sends a strong signal to other market participants that these deposit holders trust this institution will not fail. Moreover, a large proportion of time and savings deposits is likely to be insured, thus reducing depositors’ propensity to run. The remaining category that captures other liabilities to total assets enters consistently positively. To the extent to which these liabilities are insured, creditors will have no incentive to obtain their funds prior to failure.

In specification 2 and 3, the ratio of demand deposits to total assets also assumes significance and enters with a positive sign. These results hold when I account for regressors that capture information on the loan portfolio, the macroeconomy, and depositor preference law.

The results for the controls are intuitive. The coefficients show that troubled assets decrease survival time, but time to failure increases with capitalization and liquidity. The coefficient for size suggests that larger banks enjoy increased survival time. Banks that move from individual loans into C&I loans exhibit a shorter time to failure. In contrast, real estate loans and agricultural loans increase survival time. These lending categories consist of relatively safe loans that tend to have higher recovery rates than other loans. Banks that operate in a sluggish macroeconomy fail faster, but personal income growth increases survival time. The dummy for depositor preference shows a weakly significant and positive sign, highlighting depositor’s lower propensity to run if such a law is in place.

6 CAMEL is an acronym for components of a rating system employed to assess bank soundness: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. The system has been augmented by adding a component that captures Sensitivity to market risk in 1997. The system is therefore now referred to as CAMELS rating system.

J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 177

4 Conclusion

In this paper I analyze three questions. First, are there systematic differences in the determinants of high-cost and low-cost failures? Second, how are FDIC losses related to liability composition? Third, is the time to failure related to bank liability structure? These questions are pertinent to the estimation of loss given default, since depositories’ liability structure not only determines which depositors have to be compensated, but also has an impact on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior.

Using quantile regression analysis that allows for different slopes at different points of the distribution of the deposit insurer’s losses, I explore the sensitivity of the explanatory variables over the entire distribution of the FDIC losses. My analysis builds on previous work by presenting empirical evidence for the varying relations between losses and a number of explanatory variables. In addition, my findings highlight the shortcomings associated with standard econometric techniques due to the better use of the information in the sample distribution.

The results indicate the importance of certain types of liabilities on FDIC losses. Fed funds significantly decrease costs for the more costly failures, a finding that is only observable through the use of quantile regression. I also uncover the fact that losses are not homogeneously driven by the same determinants. Use of brokered deposits, poor asset quality, uncollected income, and a weak macroeconomic environment increase losses for costly bank failures.

When I investigate liability structure and time to failure, I find evidence that suggests liability shifting into brokered deposits, as an increasing reliance on brokered deposits shortens time to failure.

In terms of policy implications, the findings suggest that liability structure deserves more regulatory attention. Monitoring the behavior of certain types of deposits can provide better insights into time to failure of ailing depositories. Moreover, applying capital charges to liabilities that tend to leave the bank faster might curb banks’ risk-taking behavior. While Call Reports provide information on the levels of insured and uninsured deposits for the U. S., such practice is not common on an international level. For instance, Pillar 3 of the new Basel Accord currently neglects disclosure of insured and uninsured deposits.7 In light of the findings in this study, disclosing the levels of insured and uninsured deposits to the public in countries other than the U.S. might further enhance market discipline.

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resiliency of the U.S. bank insurance fund. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Mimeo Jordan JS (2000) Depositor discipline at failing banks. N Engl Econ Rev, March/April, pp 15–28 Koenker R, Bassett G (1978) Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46:33–50 Koenker R, Hallock KF (2001) Quantile regression. J Econ Perspect 15:143–156 Maechler AM, McDill K (2006) Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks. J Bank Financ 30:1871–1891 Marino JA, Bennett RL (1999) The consequences of national depositor preference. FDIC Bank Rev 12:19–

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J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33:163–179 179

  • Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach
    • Abstract
      • Introduction
      • Data and Method
        • Cost of Failure
        • Timing of Failure
      • Empirical Results
        • Liability Composition and FDIC Loss
        • Liability Composition and Time to Failure
      • Conclusion
      • References

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Bank-capital-regulation-diversification-loss-and-the-probability-of-bank-failure_1999_Japan-and-the-World-Economy.pdf

Bank capital regulation, diversi®cation loss and the probability of bank failure

Kenji Tsuji*,1

Faculty of Economics, Osaka City University, 5-13-14-406 Karita, Sumiyoshi-ku, Osaka 558, Japan

Received 30 September 1997; received in revised form 21 October 1998; accepted 6 November 1998

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of bank capital regulation on the probability of bank failure.

Utilizing a two-parameter approach, it is shown that the relationship between bank capital ratio and

probability of bank failure is not necessarily negative, and that capital ratio regulation may increase

the probability of bank failure. This is because an increase in bank capital ratio may lead to

diversi®cation loss via a decrease in the number of borrowers to which a bank offers loans. # 1999

Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classi®cation: G28

Keywords: Bank capital ratio regulation; Diversi®cation loss; The probability of bank failure

1. Introduction

There are many studies on bank capital regulation. Some papers have criticized uniform

capital ratio regulation for bringing about a moral hazard problem. For example, Kahane

(1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), and Kim and Santomero (1988) have shown that

uniform capital ratio regulation induces banks to increase the share of higher yielding

assets without increasing equity capital,2 and thus may not decrease the probability of bank

failure. Risk-based capital ratio regulation requires a bank to increase equity capital in

tandem with an increase in the share of higher yielding assets, thus circumventing the

moral hazard problem.

Japan and the World Economy

11 (1999) 485±495

* Tel.: +81-06-609-5169; fax: +81-06-605-3066 (until December 31, 1998)

E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Tsuji) 1Tel.: 06-6609-5169 ; fax: 06-6605-3066 (From January 1, 1999). 2Furlong and Keeley (1989) have shown that `̀ regulatory efforts to raise capital standards do not lead a value-

maximizing bank to hold a more risky asset portfolio, as long as regulators do not also relax efforts to limit asset

risk and size'' by considering deposit insurance.

0922-1425/99/$ ± see front matter # 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

PII: S 0 9 2 2 - 1 4 2 5 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 5 1 - 6

The most important function of bank capital is to absorb losses in order to prevent the bank

from failing. That is, bank capital works as a buffer. Increasing the bank capital ratio

strengthens the buffer effect, since bank capital per unit of bank assets increases. However,

banks may decrease loans as a means to increase their capital ratio in order to comply with

the bank capital ratio regulation.3 For example, in Japan banks choose a policy of not lending

in response to the introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action, which is an administrative

means by which the supervisory authority attempts to secure banks' sound management

using the bank capital ratio. If decrease in bank lending decreases the number of borrowers

to which a bank offers loans, then it limits the diversi®cation of risk,4 and thus promotes

diversi®cation loss, which has the effect of increasing the probability of bank failure. Thus, in

order to investigate the effect of bank capital ratio regulation on the probability of bank

failure, we have to consider not only the buffer effect of bank capital, but also diversi®ca-

tion loss.5 Does the bank capital ratio regulation secure banks' sound management, even

if it promotes diversi®cation loss? To answer this question is the purpose of this paper.

In the literature on bank capital ratio regulation, many studies have focused on the moral

hazard caused by uniform capital ratio regulation, but no study, as far as I know, has

considered diversi®cation loss. We focus not on the moral hazard aspect, but rather on

diversi®cation loss, which is important not only because it has the effect of increasing the

probability of bank failure, but also because diversi®cation of risk is one of the crucial

functions of ®nancial intermediaries as indicated by Diamond (1984).

We analyze the effect of bank capital ratio regulation on the probability of bank failure,

considering the loss of diversi®cation. Utilizing a two-parameter approach, it is shown that

the relationship between bank capital ratio and probability of bank failure is not necessarily

negative, and that capital ratio regulation may increase the probability of bank failure. Still,

bank capital ratio regulation is not undesirable for a bank with a large correlation

coef®cient among returns from borrowers, and is unnecessary for a bank with a small

correlation coef®cient as long as the maximum probability of bank failure that regulators

permit is not small.

In Section 2, we offer the model used in our analysis. In Section 3, we investigate the

relationship between bank capital ratio and probability of bank failure. In Section 4, we

analyze the effect of capital ratio regulation on the probability of bank failure. In Section 5,

we summarize the major conclusions.

2. Model

We denote the loan which a bank lends to a borrower by L, which is assumed to be ®xed and

the same across borrowers. We also denote bank capital by K which is assumed to be ®xed6

3The analysis of aggregate quarterly Japanese data from the second quarter of 1967 to the third quarter of

1994 in Honda et al. (1996) has shown that bank capital ratio regulation puts a curb on the growth of bank loans. 4The diversification we considered is not the `risk subdividing'-type, but the `adding risks'-type. As to the two

types of diversification, see Diamond (1984, pp. 404±405). 5Winton (1995) does not analyze the probability of bank failure but focuses on the conflicting forces of

diversification and capitalization. 6Winton (1995) also assume that loan size is fixed and the same across borrowers and that bank capital is

fixed.

486 K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495

and larger than L,7 and denote the number of borrowers by n. It is assumed that the bank

holds only loans as assets. Thus, total bank assets are represented by nK/�, where � � K/

L(> 1).

The bank issues the deposits, the among of which is represented by (K/�)m, where m is

non-negative. Thus, Eq. (1) holds.

n � �� m > 1 (1)

We denote by ~ri 8 the rate of return which the bank obtains from the loan offered to borrower

i. The rate of return on the loan, ~ri, is assumed to be normally distributed9 and unknown at

the time of the loan decision. For simplicity, the mean and the variance of the rate of return

is assumed to be the same across borrowers. Thus, ~ri is represented by a probability density,

f(ri|�,�2), where � and �2 are, respectively, the mean and the variance of the rate of return10.

We denote by rD the rate of deposit, which is non-stochastic.11 To ensure that the expected

value of a bank portfolio is positive, we assume 1 > � > rD > 0. We denote the return per

unit of bank capital by ~RP, which is given by Eq. (2).

~RP � Xn

i�1

~ri�1=�� (2)

We denote the mean and variance of ~RP, respectively, by �P and �2 P. We also assume that

the correlation coef®cient between the return from borrower i and that from borrower j is

�(� 0, < 1) for all i 6� j12. For simplicity, we assume that � is given exogenously. From

Eq. (2), we obtain Eqs. (3) and (4).

�P � Xn

i�1

E�~ri�=� � n�=� (3)

where E is the expectation operator.

�2 P � n��n� �1ÿ �����=��2 (4)

We shall de®ne bank failure to occur if losses from the portfolio held by a bank exceed

equity capital:

~RPK ÿ rD�K=��m < ÿK (5)

7Bank capital must exceed bank loan in size because of the regulation on large-lot loans. 8Throughout the paper, random variables are denoted by a tilde, `~.' 9We can utilize the Chebyshev Inequality in place of the assumption of normality. Then we analyze the upper

bound of the probability of failure, not the probability of failure. See Roy (1952) and Koehn and Santomero

(1980). 10Throughout the paper, f(x|v1, v2) is the normal density function with mean v1 and variance v2. 11We assume that deposits are insured by the deposit insurance system, since rD is constant. See Keeley and

Furlong (1990). It is also assumed that rD includes the fixed insurance premium. 12We suppose the following model. ~ri � �� ~Y � ~Zi; �i � 1; 2; 3; � � ��; E�~Y� � E�~Zi� � 0; �i � 1; 2; 3; � � ��;

Var�~Y� � �2 Y � 0;Var�~Zi� � �2

Z > 0; �i � 1; 2; 3; � � ��; Cov�~Y ; ~Zi� � 0; �i � 1; 2; 3; � � ��; Cov�~Zi; ~Zj� � 0; �i 6� j�; Using the above model, �2 � �2

Y � �2 Z ; � � �2

Y=��2 Y � �2

Z�.

K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495 487

The probability of bank failure is

Zÿ1�rD�m=�

ÿ1 f �RPj�P; �

2 P�dRP � G�Z�

where G(�) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, and Z � ÿ1�rD�m=�ÿ�P

�P .

3. Bank capital ratio and the probability of bank failure

From the de®nition of Z and n, and Eqs. (3) and (4), we have

Z � ÿ�1� rD� ÿ ��ÿ rD�n=� fn��n� �1ÿ ���g1=2��=��

: (6)

Differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to results in

@Z

@� � f�1� rD� � ��ÿ rD�n=�g�nÿ 1�=2

��n� �1ÿ ���3=2 n1=2��=��

> 0: (7)

Since n > 1, the right hand side of Eq. (7) is positive. Thus, the probability of bank failure

increases as the correlation coef®cient among returns from borrowers, �, gets larger. This

implies that a bank that lends to a variety of borrowers, say borrowers who belong to

different industries, has a lower probability of failure, ceteris paribus.

Differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to n results in13

@Z

@n � ��1� rD��1ÿ �� ÿ ��1ÿ ����ÿ rD� ÿ 2��1� rD���n

2�f�n2 � �1ÿ ��ng3=2 : (8)

From Eq. (8), the following proposition holds.

Proposition 1. Suppose that �� and n� are defined as follows:14

�� � 1

1� 2��1� rD�=��ÿ rD� < 1

n� � 1� rD

��ÿ rD�=�ÿ 2�1� rD��=�1ÿ �� > 1; for � 2 �0; ���:

1. For � 2 [��,1), the probability of bank failure increases as the number of borrowers, n,

increases.

2. For � 2 [0,��), if n < n�, the probability of bank failure increases, if n � n�, the

probability of bank failure is unchanged, and if n > n�, the probability of bank failure

decreases as the number of borrowers, n, increases.

13Note that since both K and L are assumed to be fixed, �(� K/L) is also fixed. 14We obtain that n� � ��1� rD�=��ÿ rD� > 1, since we assume 1 > � > rD > 0 and � > 1.

488 K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495

The increase in the number of borrowers reduces the capital per unit of bank assets, and

thus has the effect of increasing the probability of bank failure. The increase in the number

of borrowers also brings about a diversi®cation of risk, and thus has the effect of decreasing

the probability of bank failure. Whether the probability of bank failure increases or

decreases with increases in the number of borrowers depends jointly on these two effects.

Bank capital ratio, �/n, decreases as the number of borrowers, n, increases, and vice

versa. Proposition 1 implies that bank capital ratio does not necessarily have a negative

relationship with probability of bank failure, and that there are cases where the relationship

between them is positive.

4. Bank capital ratio regulation

We denote bank pro®ts per unit of equity capital by ~�. We now investigate the

relationship between mean and standard deviation of ~�. We denote the mean of ~� by

Y, which is given by Eq. (9).

Y � �P ÿ rDm=� � rD � f��ÿ rD�=�gn (9)

The standard deviation of ~� is equal to �P. From Eqs. (4) and (9), we obtain

�2 P � �����Y ÿ rD�=��ÿ rD� � �1ÿ ��=�2���2 ÿ f�1ÿ ��=�2��g2���=��2;

if 0 < � < 1;� �Y ÿ rD��2=f��ÿ rD��g; if � � 0: (10)

Eq. (10) is a hyperbola if 0 < � < 1, and is a parabola if � � 0 in (�P, Y) space. We call

Eq. (10) a risk-return frontier or a frontier for short. Fig. 1 depicts Eq. (10). The slope of a

line from (0, ÿ1) through another point, say (� 0P, Y 0), in (�P, Y) space is (1�Y 0)/� 0P. From

the de®nition of Y, G(ÿ(1�Y 0)/� 0P) is the probability of failure for a bank which selects a

portfolio yielding (� 0P, Y 0). Thus, in Fig. 1, Point A has a higher probability of failure than

Point B, since the slope of a line from (0,ÿ1) through Point A is smaller than the slope of a

line from (0,ÿ1) through Point B. From Fig. 1, it is clear that the probability of bank failure

is not necessarily positively related to the standard deviation of bank pro®ts, and that there

are cases where a negative relationship between them holds.15

If 0 < � < 1, the asymptote to the hyperbola indicated in Eq. (10) is given by the

following equation.

Y � rD ÿ ��ÿ rD��1ÿ ��=�2��� � f��ÿ rD�=��1=2��g�P (11)

From the de®nition of �� and Eq. (11), if � 2 (��,1), then the asymptote to the hyperbola

intersects the vertical line at the point above (0,ÿ1). If � � ��, then the asymptote to the

hyperbola intersects the vertical line at (0,ÿ1). If � 2 (0, ��), then the asymtote to

hyperbola intersects the vertical line at the point below (0,ÿ1). Also, the slope of the

asymptote gets steeper as � gets smaller.

We suppose that bank regulators try to bound the probability of bank failure by a

predetermined level, �, that is, G�Z� � � through capital ratio regulation. Since

15This is verified from d�P/dn > 0 and Proposition 1.

K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495 489

G�Z� < G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=��, regulation G�Z� � � 2 �G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=��; 1� is redundant.

Thus, we assume that 0 < � < G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=��. From intermediate value theorem, there

exists � 2 (0,1), denoted by ��, such that the slope of the asymptote is equal toÿGÿ1��� 2 ���ÿ rD�=�;1�, where Gÿ1(�) is the inverse function of G(�). From the de®nition of ��

and Eq. (11), �� is given by Eq. (12).

�� � f��ÿ rD�=�Gÿ1�����g2 (12)

We call the line with a slope equal to ÿGÿ1��� and which passes on (0,ÿ1) in (�P, Y)

space, Line R. Let us denote the right hand side of Eq. (6) by Z(n,�). Suppose that

G�Z1� > � � G�Z2�, where Z1� lim�!�� �Z�n����; ����ÿ ������������������������������������������������������ 1� 2��� �1� rD�=��ÿ rD�

p ��ÿ rD�=� and Z2 � Z�n��0�; 0� � ÿ2

���������������������������������������ÿ rD���1� rD� p

=�. From the intermediate

value theorem, there exists � 2 [0, ��), denoted by �̂, such that Line R is tangent to a risk-

Fig. 1. The risk-return frontier and the probability of bank failure.

490 K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495

return frontier. From the de®nition of �̂,

Gÿ1��� � Z�n���̂�; �̂�; (13)

where n�(�) is given by n� of Proposition 1. It is easily shown that 1 > �� > �� > �̂ � 0.

Also, the risk-return frontier moves to the right, as � increases.

It is assumed that the capital ratio is constrained by regulation:

�=n � cR (14)

where cR is determined by bank regulators. From Eq. (14),

�=cR � n (15)

We de®ne nR � �=cR, which gives the upper bound of the number of borrowers allowed by

bank regulators.

Fig. 2. The risk-return frontier with � 2 [��,1).

K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495 491

If 1 > � � ��, then Line R intersects the frontier only once. If �� > � > �̂, then Line R

intersects the frontier twice. Figs. 2 and 3 show how to set nR, respectively, for � 2 [��, 1)

and for � 2 (�̂, ��) such that the probability of bank failure is less than a predetermined

level, �16,17. If �̂ � � � 0, then Line R is either at a tangent to, or below the frontier. Thus,

we have the following proposition.

Proposition 2. Suppose that G�Z1� > � � G�Z2�. 1. If 1 > � � ��, then the bank capital ratio regulation may decrease the probability of

bank failure, but does not increase it.

Fig. 3. The risk-return frontier with � 2 (�̂,��).

16The determination of nR means the determination of cR. 17Strictly speaking, the maximum number of borrowers that bank regulators permit must be a maximum

integer which does not exceed nR in Figs. 2 and 3, since nR is an integer. Also, we need only assume that

G�ÿf��ÿ rD� � ��1� rD�g=�� < � < G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=��, in place of assuming that 0 < � < G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=�� if we want to assure nR > 1.

492 K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495

2. If �� > � > �̂, then the bank capital ratio regulation may increase or decrease the

probability of bank failure.

3. If �̂ � � � 0, then the bank capital ratio regulation is unnecessary.

If �� > � > �̂, then whether the bank capital ratio regulation increases or decreases the

probability of bank failure depends on the portfolio selected by the bank. However, if

regulators set cR � �/nR, where nR is given in Fig. 3, then the probability of bank failure

does not exceed �.

Suppose that G�Z2� > � > 0. In this case, Line R is not at a tangent to the frontier. If

1 > � � ��, then Line R intersects the risk-return frontier only once. If �� > � � 0, then

Line R intersects the frontier twice. Thus, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 3. Suppose that G�Z2� > � > 0.

1. If 1 > � � ��, then the bank capital ratio regulation may decrease the probability of

bank failure, but does not increase it.

2. If �� > � � 0, then the bank capital ratio regulation may increase or decrease the

probability of bank failure.

Suppose that G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=�� > � � G�Z1�. In this case as well, Line R is not at a

tangent to the frontier. If 1 > � > ��, then Line R intersects the risk-return frontier only

once. If �� � � � 0, then Line R is below the frontier. This leads to the following

proposition.

Proposition 4. Suppose that G�ÿ��ÿ rD�=�� > � � G�Z1�. 1. If 1 > � > ��, then the bank capital ratio regulation may decrease the probability of

bank failure, but does not increase it.

2. If �� � � � 0, then the bank capital ratio regulation is unnecessary.

Propositions 2, 3 and 4 imply that if regulators properly impose capital ratio regulation

on banks, then the probability of bank failure does not exceed a predetermined level, �, but

the probability of bank failure in cases where bank capital ratio regulation is imposed is

not necessarily lower than that in cases where it is not. That is, the regulation may increase

the probability of bank failure.

These propositions also imply that bank capital ratio regulation is not undesirable

for a bank with suf®ciently large �, while it is unnecessary18 for a bank with suf®ciently

small � as long as the maximum probability of bank failure that the regulators permit

is not small, that is, as long as � � G(Z2) is satis®ed. This is because diversi®cation loss

caused by bank capital ratio regulation gets smaller as the value of � gets larger.

18If the bank capital ratio regulation induces a bank to select small �, then it may be not unnecessary, although

the analysis in this paper ignores incentive effects of the regulation by assuming that � is given exogenously. A

detailed examination regarding incentive effects of the bank capital ratio regulation on banks' selection of �

involves portfolio choice of banks and is left to the future.

K. Tsuji / Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 485±495 493

5. Conclusions

We have analyzed the effect of bank capital ratio regulation on the probability of

bank failure in consideration of the loss of diversi®cation, a factor which previous

studies on bank capital ratio regulation have neglected. We showed that the relation-

ship between bank capital ratio and probability of bank failure is not necessarily

negative, and that the probability of bank failure is not necessarily positively related

to the standard deviation of bank pro®ts. It was also shown that bank capital ratio

regulation may increase the probability of bank failure. Further, bank capital ratio

regulation is not undesirable for a bank with a large correlation coef®cient among

returns from borrowers, while it is unnecessary for a bank with a small correlation

coef®cient as long as the maximum probability of bank failure that the regulators permit

is not small.

In Japan, the Prompt Corrective Action, which we hereafter call the PCA, was

introduced in April 1998 for internationally active ®nancial institutions. The PCA is a

new administrative means by which the supervisory authority promotes banks' sound

management in the early stage by issuing necessary correction orders to banks

whose capital ratio is below a certain level. According to an MITI19 survey released

to the press on 31 March 1998, banks choose a policy of not lending in order to

increase their capital ratio. In this paper, it has been shown that lending restraint imposed

by bank capital ratio regulation may increase the probability of bank failure by promot-

ing diversi®cation loss. This may be one cause of the recent instability in the Japanese

®nancial system.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for comments and

suggestions. Of course, the author is solely responsible for any possible error.

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