Do regulators need to use the macroprudential policy tools to control financial risks?
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Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
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Journal of Economics and Business
Macro-prudential policy on liquidity: What does a DSGE model tell us?
Jagjit S. Chadha a,b,∗, Luisa Corrado c,d,e
a School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 9LP, UK b Centre for International Macroeconomics and Finance, University of Cambridge, UK c Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK d Department of Economics, University of Rome, Tor Vergata, Italy e Centre for Research in Microeconomics, University of Cambridge, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 1 January 2011 Received in revised form 26 April 2011 Accepted 28 April 2011
JEL classification: E31 E40 E51
Keywords: Liquidity Interest on reserves Policy instruments Basel
a b s t r a c t
The financial crisis has led to the development of an active debate on the use of macro-prudential instruments for regulating the bank- ing system, in particular for liquidity and capital holdings. Within the context of a micro-founded macroeconomic model, we allow commercial banks to choose their optimal mix of assets, appor- tioning these either to reserves or private sector loans. We examine the implications for quantities, relative non-financial and financial prices from standard macroeconomic shocks alongside shocks to the expected liquidity of banks and to the efficiency of the banking sector. We focus on the response by the monetary sector, in par- ticular the optimal reserve–deposit ratio adopted by commercial banks over the business cycle. Overall we find some rationale for Basel III in providing commercial banks with an incentive to hold a greater stock of liquid assets, such as reserves, but also to provide incentives to increase the cyclical variation in reserves holdings as this acts to limit excessive procyclicality of lending to the private sector.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The recent turmoil in financial and credit markets along with the decoupling of market interest rates from the central bank policy rate has reawakened a latent interest in the connection between
∗ Corresponding author at: School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 9LP, UK. Tel.: +44 7787122155.
E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (J.S. Chadha), [email protected] (L. Corrado).
0148-6195/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2011.04.004
38 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
money, bank lending, the price of credit and the conduct of monetary policy,1 particularly as there been an active and ongoing debate about the appropriate regulatory framework for commercial banking. What might ultimately be termed the first generation of micro-founded monetary policy models have had little to say on these questions, as money was determined by consumption and investment plans and there was no explicit banking sector creating credit, or broad money at variable interest rate mark-ups to the policy rate. In this paper, we seek to address the regulatory question by considering the role of commercial banks and their reserves by using a model in which commercial banks create loans actively and so any regulatory constraints will have clear macroeconomic consequences.
The Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) model is a standard Calvo–Yun monopolistically competitive production economy with sticky prices where households respect their budget constraint in formulat- ing consumption plans. But under a cash-in-advance constraint, households must hold bank deposits to effect transactions. A loans technology for the banking sector is adopted,2 which meets the require- ments of the private sector subject to screening and monitoring constraints. Households can work either in the goods producing sector or in the banking sector monitoring loans quality. But in order to consider the implications of liquidity, IN this version of the model, banks also have to make a choice on their asset mix between reserves with the central bank and loans with the private sector. The central bank in this model holds commercial bank reserves and sets the interest rate paid on those reserves. Finally, the government budget constraint is modified to include claims from reserves, as well as stan- dard issuance of public debt to meet excess of expenditures over taxes. We also examine the alternate case in which banks maintain a fixed reserves–deposit ratio.
A banking sector of this form can both amplify and add persistence to a standard macroeconomic set-up. This is because decision rules for consumption are shown to incorporate the equilibrium level of liquidity provision and the price (or spread) of that provision. The recent boom and bust in advanced country debtor economies would seem to confirm the relevance of this insight. And so we consider what role cyclical variation in commercial bank reserves – and in particular the payment of interest on these reserves – might play in improving the conduct of monetary policy, the stabilization of output and prices and the stability of the financial system, in the face of financial shocks to collateral and to monitoring. A key insight is that reserves increase the degree of freedom for commercial banks who can control their profitability and need for contingent planning with another tool, liquid assets, as well as ex ante screening of liquidity constrained households and requirements for posted collateral. Providing a cyclical incentive to hold reserves by paying policy interest rates also seems to increase the efficacy of monetary policy.
The payment of interest on reserves has long been an issue of contention in academic and public debate, Friedman (1960) argued for the need to close the interest gap between different forms of government liabilities. There has been some discussion on reserves as a policy instrument. For example, Hall (2002) develops a model in which the payment of interest on reserves can be used to control the price level as a mechanism to implement monetary policy in a world without money. And periodically the Federal Reserve formally asked Congress for authority to pay interest on bank reserves held with the Federal Reserve Banks (Kohn, 2004; Meyer, 2001). Permission to pay interest was granted in 2006 under the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act, but because of the implication for fiscal policy, the effective date of the legislation was originally postponed until 2011.3
1 The 2008 US Monetary Policy Forum, for example, discussed at length the need for policy makers to consider the level of credit extended to non-financial agents when setting monetary policy.
2 See Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Chadha, Corrado, and Holly (2008) for an outline of this modelling device and its implications for commercial bank asset creation. Other modelling devices have been used to understand capital requirements.
3 Estimates of the cost of paying interest made by the Congressional Budget Office suggest the cost in the first year would be $253 million, rising to $308 million by the fifth year, with a total over five years of $1.4 billion over five years. This is based on the assumption that the federal funds rate would average 4.5% from 2008 to 2016 and the Fed would pay interest at a rate 0.1–0.15% points below that. It projected required reserves of about $8.3 billion. If the Fed only paid interest on excess reserves held then the cost would be considerably smaller. Though that would rise if commercial banks took up more use of the facility. See Goodfriend (2002) for a recent survey.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 39
However, following the adoption of TARP,4 the Federal Reserve indicated to Congress that permis- sion be granted immediately. The Bank of England has, within certain limits, paid interest on bank reserves since 2006. And the suggested rules for global regulatory standards under Basel III has made recommendations, inter alia, for a transition to a minimum liquidity coverage ratio by 2018. And so given the regulatory trend towards more liquidity provision, we ask whether a move towards equal- izing the returns from different forms of government liabilities induces a stabilizing response from the holders of those liabilities as procyclical demand for liquid assets is induced that limits the growth (reduction) into (in) risky assets and lending classes during an expansion (contraction). As well as the regulatory question, we also consider whether procyclical variation helps the implementation of monetary policy by allowing commercial banks to have a greater incentive to hold liquid as well as illiquid assets. As the Turner Review put it: ‘at the macroeconomic and macro-prudential level, there is a tradeoff to be struck. Increased maturity transformation delivers benefits to the non bank sectors of the economy and produces term structures of interest rates more favourable to long-term invest- ment. But the greater the aggregate degree of maturity transformation, the more the systemic risks and the greater the extent to which risks can only be offset by the potential for central bank liquidity assistance’.
Compared to a model where the commercial banks are silent partners, commercial banks in this model are able to deliver an endogenous dynamic response for various risk premia and for the supply of liquidity. Using standard methods, we can also compare the responses of our artificial economy with and without an endogenous choice on asset allocation, that is, on the one hand where the reserve to deposit ratio is fixed by fiat (or custom and practice) or, on the other hand, is the result of the choice of the commercial banks in balancing the risks of a liquidity shortfall against the higher returns from lending to the private sector. We find that the economy where commercial banks have an endogenous choice over reserve holdings performs better in welfare terms than when commercial banks do not have such an incentive. The holding of reserves over the business cycle acts as a substitute for more costly employment of monitoring workers and thus reduces the volatility of interest spreads to shocks and increases the holding of liquid assets during an expansion and reduces such holdings over a contraction, which acts to help stabilize the impulse from the monetary sector.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple framework for understanding a stylized flow of funds and the role of commercial banks in the monetary system. We also set-up the government’s budget constraint in this section, showing that the payment of the policy rate on bank reserves will mean that there will be a direct impact on the equation of motion for government debt. Section 3 outlines the implications of the loans production function approach for key macroe- conomic decision rules, outlines the determination of key market interest rates and then derives the commercial banks’ decision rule over reserve holding. Section 4 considers the implications of com- mercial banks asset management in terms of reserve holdings to account for the relative returns from holding reserves or producing loans and liquidity concerns. Section 5 explains the standard calibration techniques used. Section 6 outlines the results of the impulse response analysis and undertakes some welfare analysis of some key results. Section 7 concludes and offers some final observations.
2. Monetary analysis
2.1. Reserves and the flow of funds
We introduce a simple framework for analyzing bank reserves on the monetary balance sheet. For simplicity, since we abstract from other forms of central bank money and concentrate on bank reserves alone in our model, high powered money is identical to reserves, as there is no outside money. More traditionally the central bank controls the stock of fiat money (outside money) and financial interme- diaries create other forms of money, which are claims on the private sector. As financial intermediation
4 The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is the US program to purchase assets and equity from financial institutions in order to strengthen its financial sector. It is the largest component of the government’s measures in 2008 to address the subprime mortgage crisis.
40 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
allows alternative assets to serve as money, it offers a close substitute to (outside) fiat money and the ability of the central bank to determine the overall nominal level of expenditure depends on the rela- tionship between outside and inside money. The central bank has a powerful tool to regulate financial intermediaries and to affect the quantity of money in circulation: reserves, which may be either or both of fractional and or voluntary.5
Private sector Government
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Deposits D Loans (D − r) Tax ∑∞
i=0 ˇi ti Bonds B
Bonds �B Tax ∑∞
i=0 ˇi ti
Commercial banks Central bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserves r Deposits D Bonds (1 − � )B Reserves r Loans (D − r)
We first look at the private sector’s balance sheet. The private sector has two forms of assets: deposits, D, held at banks and some fraction of bonds, � B, issued by the government.6 Their liabilities are loans, D − r, provided by banks and the present value of tax payments. The government sector has liabilities in the form of outstanding public debt, B and assets given by the present discounted value of future taxation. The commercial banks’ balance sheet liabilities are deposits, D. Some fraction of liabilities, r, is held as reserves and the rest, D − r, is available to be lent to the private sector. The central bank holds assets in the form of some fraction of government bonds (1 − � )B with liabilities determined by central bank money, which are reserves in this model.7 The net assets of commercial banks and of the central bank are both zero. The private sector has net assets given by D + �B −
( D − r +
∑∞ i=0ˇ
iti )
and so because r = (1 − � )B and ∑∞
i=0ˇ iti = B, we can note that the net private sector assets are also zero.
We can see that from this flow of funds, when the private sector demands a higher level of deposits to fund a level consumption then it is the job of commercial banks to match a higher level of D. Commercial banks then decide upon the allocation between reserves and loans, the former are lodged with the central bank and backed by some issuance of short term debt, (1 − � )B. The private sector net asset position is invariant to the proportion of reserves held as increases in r increase gross assets and liabilities by the same amount and the government finances its issuance of any short term debt with claims on tax payers.
2.1.1. The loan-deposit ratio and reserves The ratio of loans to deposits, L/D, is a measure of the bank multiplier and can be expressed as
1 − (r/D). Therefore the higher is the level of reserves, the lower is the amount of loans relative to deposits and the lower is the level of amplification by the banking sector of any given level of reserves. It has been documented by Adrian and Shin (2008) that the rate of growth in assets relative to liabilities for commercial bank holding companies over the business cycle has a strong procycli- cal element, which would imply here an increase in (L/D) over the business cycle. But this procyclical aspect might be mitigated if commercial banks are given an incentive to hold reserves during business cycle expansions and shed reserves during contractions.
Furthermore, as commercial banks have sought to minimize their holdings of liquid reserves on a secular basis, the importance of the banks’ behavior towards asset accumulation for the overall economy may have increased. Fig. 1 shows the secular decline in the holdings of liquid assets by UK banks since 1980 over a number of measures.8 And Fig. 2 shows the ratio of Sterling Reserves Balances
5 See Freeman and Haslag (1996) and Sargent and Wallace (1985). 6 In this example we assume that the private sector is represented by households. 7 If we operate in an open economy, central bank assets would also include foreign exchange reserves rf . 8 The narrow ratio corresponds to cash plus Bank of England balances plus eligible bills. The reserve ratio is proxied by Bank
of England balances plus money at call plus eligible bills. Finally the broad ratio is the reserve ratio plus cash plus UK gilts. Similar stories can be shown for most advanced economies.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 41
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
200820062004200220001998199619941992199019881986198419821980
Broad
Reserve
Narrow
%
Fig. 1. UK Eligible Sterling Liabilities at the Bank of England.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
%
Bankers' Operational Balances (% Eligible Sterling)
Banks' sterling Reserves (%
Sterling Liabilities)
Adoption of Money Market Reforms
Credit Crunch
Fig. 2. Liquid assets relative to total assets. (Bank of England)
held at the Bank of England to eligible Liabilities from July 2006 to June 2008 (and from 1997 to 2006 the ratio of Bankers’ operational balances to Eligible Sterling Liabilities).9 Note that, following the adoption of money market reforms, there is a price and a compositional effect, as both the return to reserves is higher and more financial institutions became part of the reserve scheme. Initially, UK banks as a whole chose to hold an average of almost 1.5% of eligible liabilities at the Bank of England.
9 Note that Sterling Reserve Balances can be held up to maximum of \mathchar 7̈024 1bn or 2% of Sterling Eligible Liabilities, whichever is higher, see Andrews and Janssen (2005).
42 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
However, this was steadily run down to only 0.88% in August of 2007, as alternative investments became available. But, possibly as a consequence of global money market meltdown from August 2007, by October reserves jumped to 1.25% and, with some seasonal variation, they stayed at this higher average level up to June 2008. In the face of turmoil in financial markets and doubts about the soundness of other borrowers in the interbank market, earning a risk free return at the repo rate by raising reserve deposits at the Bank of England arguably became an attractive proposition.
2.2. Reserves and the fiscal position
How might paying interest on reserves change matters? If reserves do not attract a nominal rate of return, the incentive for banks to increase lending may be substantial when demand for loans increases or the loans production technology improves. Clearly one possibility to induce commercial banks to increase the quantity of reserves in their balance sheet is to pay an interest rate on reserves lodged with the central bank. But this will have a fiscal consequence as the central bank’s ability to pay interest rates on reserves will require some funding from the government. So ultimately paying interest rates on reserves will rely on public sector’s budget constraint.
The per period government budget constraint means that any excess of government expenditure, Gt, over tax receipts, Tt, and payment of interest on debt, RBt+1�Bt+1, and/or reserves, R
IB t rt , will be
financed by the issuance of bonds or central bank money given the consumption good price index, PAt . Note that the interest paid to the private sector is RB and to commercial banks is RIB, which is the policy rate in our model. Hence if we look at the consolidated budget identity for the government sector we note that10:
gt − tax = rt
PAt (1 + RIBt ) − rt−1
PAt + �Bt+1
PAt (1 + RBt+1) − �Bt
PAt (1)
so the government can finance its net expenditure by issuing government debt, � B, or by issuing reserves, rt. However if interest rate are paid on reserves they will become interest bearing and there- fore comparable to government debt. Clearly any excess government expenditure can be financed by issuing bonds to the private sector or by supplying reserves to commercial banks at a differentiated interest. We leave the determination of the relative interest rates to Section 3.1. As we assume a sta- tionary level of debt in this model there are not implications for fiscal solvency in this set-up as all deviations from steady state debt to GDP are strictly temporary.
3. The general equilibrium monetary model
As pointed out by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) money aggregates should be reconnected to general equilibrium models as they affect consumption decisions of liquidity constrained households and the spreads across several financial instruments and assets. Similarly optimal reserve management by banks will affect loans and therefore consumption. A simple way to incorporate money and spreads into a general equilibrium setting is to study the banking sector proposed by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). The model by GM complements the traditional accelerator effect (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999) with an attenuator effect, which is present in the model because monitoring effort is drawn into the banking sector in response to the expansion of consumption, which is accompanied by an expansion of bank lending that raises the marginal cost of loans and the external finance premium (EFP). Fig. 3 describes the timeline of events. The main feature of the model is the inclusion of a banking sector alongside households, production and the monetary authority.
10 In this setting the government sector includes both the government and the Bank of England. We also assume that high powered money comprises only reserves not coins.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 43
t t+1Intermediate
Households
· De cide th e lev el of consumption ct and the quantity of labou r nt and mt which is supplied elastic all y to the production sector an d to bank s.
· Depo sit s Dt are demanded by Households thr ough the cash-in- advance con strai nt to me et planned consumption.
Produc tio n
· Determi nes th e fle x pric e and stic ky price aggre gate supply yt and the demand for labou r nt. .
Banks
· Match deposit demand from liqu idit y constrained cons umers with a Cobb -Douglas tech nolo gy to produce Loans Lt and decid e on the level of re serve s rt supplied by the Central Ba nk.
· The ban k technolog y produc tion fo r loa ns uses moni tori ng wor k mt and collat eral bt
and depen ds on shocks to asset pri ces and moni torin g effic ienc y.
· The deman d for reserve s depends on the penal ty ra te of a liq uidit y shortfa ll, on
the intere st rate se t on reser ves by the CB an d on retur n on loan s.
Shocks in Al l sector s
· Re al and monetary shocks are realised and uncertain ty re veale d.
Monetary Policy
· The CB sets the policy rate an d the interes t rat e pa id on bank re ser ves in the follow ing perio d.
Fig. 3. Timeline of events.
3.1. Households and the production sector
Households are liquidity constrained and decide the amount of consumption and the amount of labour they wish to supply to the production sector and to the banking sector according to the following utility function:
U = E0 ∞∑
t=0 ˇt [� log(ct ) + (1 − �) log(1 − nst − mst )], (2)
where ct denotes real consumption, nst is the supply of labour to the goods sector, m s t is the supply
of monitoring work in the banking sector and � denotes the weight of consumption in the utility function. They are subject to the budget constraint:
qt (1 − ı)Kt + �Bt
PAt + Dt−1
PAt + wt (nst + mst ) + cAt
( Pt
PAt
)1−�
+ ˘t − wt (nt + mt ) − Dt
PAt − taxt − qt Kt+1 −
�Bt+1 PAt (1 + RBt )
− ct , (3)
where qt is the price of capital, Kt is the quantity of capital, Pt is the price of households’ produced good, PAt is the consumption good price index, nt is the labour demanded by households as producer, mt, is the labour demanded by household’s banking operation, wt is the real wage, Dt is the nominal holding of broad money, taxt is the real lump-sum tax payment, RBt is the nominal interest rate on government bonds purchased in t + 1, Bt+1. We also assume that any profit from the banking sector, ˘ t, goes to the households’ sector. The Lagrange multiplier of this constraint is denoted as �t and � is the elasticity of household demand. Household choose the level of monitoring work, mt, and the level of employment work, nt, they wish to offer to the production and the banking sector.
At the same time households’ consumption, given the cash-in-advance constraint, is affected by the amount of loanable funds they can obtain:
ct = vt Dt PAt
, (4)
where vt denotes velocity and Dt are deposits.
44 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
The production sector, characterized by monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing, adopts a stan- dard Cobb–Douglas production function with capital, Kt, and labour, nt, subject to productivity shocks. Firms decide the amount of production they wish to supply and the demand for labour by equalizing sales to net production:
K � t (A1t nt )
1−� − cAt (
Pt
PAt
)−� = 0, (5)
where � denotes the capital share in the firm production function, A1t is a productivity shock in the goods production sector whose mean increases over time at a rate � and � denotes the elasticity of aggregate demand, cAt . The Lagrange multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, �t. By clearing the household and production sectors,11 we can define the equilibrium in the labour market and in the goods market. Specifically the demand for monitoring work:
mt = (
�
�t ct − 1
) 1 − ˛
wt ct (6)
depends negatively on wages, wt , and positively on consumption, ct, and where 1 − ̨ is the share of monitoring in the loan production function. These two sectors also provide the standard relationship for the riskless interest rate and the bond rate.
3.2. Banking sector
We now turn to the analysis of how the banking sector affects the economy. The production function for the quantity of loans is given by:
Lt
PAt = F (�bt+1 + A3t kqt Kt+1)˛(A2t mt )1−˛ 0 < ̨ < 1, (7)
where A2t denotes a shock to monitoring work, A3t is a shock on capital as collateral and bt+1 = Bt+1/PAt (1 + RBt+1) the real value of bonds. The parameter k denotes the inferiority of capital as collateral in the banking production function, while ̨ is the share of collateral in the loan production function. Increasing monitoring effort is achieved by increasing the number of people employed in the banking sector and therefore reducing the employment in the goods production sector.
While in standard Calvo–Yun models nominal consumption plans pin down the demand for money, in this model with banking, money is produced by banks, so any shift in the supply of loanable funds generated by shocks to monitoring effort or collateral also affect consumption. Specifically the banking sector matches deposit demand from liquidity constrained consumers with a technology to produce loans by substituting monitoring work for collateral in supplying loans. Also, we assume that loans are affected by the reserve/deposit ratio, rrt:
Lt = (1 − rrt )Dt . (8)
Note that while Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) assume a fractional reserve requirement where the reserve–deposit ratio is given, we analyze the implications of an endogenous bank choice of reserves holdings, which is derived in Section 4.
Simple substitution of the bank’s loan production function in the household’s cash in advance constraint (4) leads to:
ct = vt F (�bt+1 + A3t kqt Kt+1)˛(A2t mt )1−˛
PAt (1 − rrt ) . (9)
11 For details of the model set-up, derivation and notation, see the Technical Appendix, which is available from the authors on request.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 45
The differentiation of (9) with respect to Kt+1 gives an expression ˝tA3tkqt which is a function of the marginal value of collateralized lending:
˝t = ct ˛
�bt+1 + A3t kqt Kt+1 , (10)
which depends on consumption, ct, and on the value of the collateral, qt and bt.This expression also enters in the asset price equation:
qt = (Et (�t+1/�t )qt+1(1 − ı) ̌ + Et ˇ�[(�t+1/�t )(�t+1/�t+1)(A1t nt /Kt )1−�])
(1 − ((�/ct �t ) − 1)˝A3t k) . (11)
Finally the Central Bank sets the policy rate which affects the incentives of banks to hold reserves.
3.3. Consumption, monitoring work and asset prices
We now describe in more detail the main log-linear relationships which characterize the model. In our notation variables without time subscript denote steady-state values whereas those with a time subscript denote log-deviation from steady-state. A log-linear formulation of (9) shows how loanable funds affect the consumption of liquidity constrained consumers:
ct = {
vt c + rrt c + (1 − ˛)(mt +a2t )+˛ [
b
b + k1 bt +
k1 b + k1
(qt + a3t ) ]} (
b + k1 b(1 − ˛) + k1
) . (12)
With the presence of a cash in advance constraint, a shock to velocity, vt , will increase consumption. Consumption, ct, is also positively affected by the amount of monitoring work, mt, where ˛ is the share of collateral in the loans production function and (1 − ˛) represents the share of monitoring costs. It is also affected by the amount of collateral represented by bonds, bt, and capital whose value is given by qt. A positive shock to monitoring, a2t, by increasing the efficiency with which banks produce loans, increases the supply of loans and therefore consumption. Similarly a negative shock to collateral, a3t, by reducing the price of capital, qt, will negatively affect consumption. The parameters c, b and k1 represent the steady-state fraction of consumption in output, the holding of bonds and a composite parameter reflecting the inferiority of capital compared to bonds as liquidity.12
The demand for monitoring work, which derives from (6), is given by:
mt = −wt − (1 − ˛)c
mw
( ct +
�
� �t
) . (13)
A higher wage, wt , will reduce the resources devoted to monitoring. Similarly monitoring will be affected by the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal value of households’ funds, �t. The steady state parameters, m, w, and �/� represent the steady-state proportions of employment in the banking sector, the level of the real wage, and the ratio of the weight of consumption in the utility function relative to the steady-state shadow value of consumption.
With a banking sector of this type in the model, we can link money and asset prices directly to output and inflation, as consumption, which accounts for most of the fluctuations in output in this model, is closely dependent on money market perturbations, the development of banking technology and asset prices outcomes. Now money and lending affect consumption, the level of economic activity and will also have implications for asset prices.
A key term here is the marginal value of collateralized lending, ˝t, from (10), which increases as consumption rises and falls as collateral becomes more widely available:
˝t = k2
b + k2 (ct − qt − a3t ) −
b
b + k2 bt . (14)
˝t depends on the value of the collateral, qt and bt, on a collateral shock, a3t, and on consumption, ct. Higher levels of consumption increase the marginal value of capital and hence the collateral value, qt.
12 The parameter k1 = (1 + � )kK/c is a function of consumption, c, of the parameter reflecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k, of steady-state capital, K, and of the trend growth rate, � .
46 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
The increase in collateral value leads to more borrowing and more consumption. The parameter k2 is again a composite coefficient similar to k1.13
The marginal value of collateralized lending also feeds back into the capital asset price equation, qt, derived from (11):
qt = (ı1 + �1)(Et �t+1 − �t ) + ı1Et qt+1 − k˝�
c� (ct + �t ) +
k˝ (
�
c� − 1
) (˝t + a3t ) + �1Et [mct+1 + (1 − �)(nt+1 + a1t+1)]. (15)
In (15) the marginal value of collateralized lending, ˝t, potentially can amplify asset price volatility and magnify the response of the economy to both real and financial shocks. Both real, a1, and financial shocks, a3, directly feed back into asset prices alongside the expected marginal productivity of capital [mct+1 + (1 − �)(nt+1 + a1t+1)] where mct+1 denotes marginal cost in period t + 1, � is the share of capital in the goods production function and n is employment in the goods production sector. Similarly expected asset prices, Etqt+1, the change in the shadow value of households’ funds (Et�t+1 − �t) alongside the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the shadow value of funds also affect the value of capital, qt. The parameter ı1 is a composite function of the depreciation rate of capital while the parameter � 1 is a composite function of steady-state marginal costs, of steady-state employment in the goods sector and of the capital share in the production of goods.14
3.4. Market interest rates
The decision of the banking sector is articulated in two stages. In the first one interest rates are determined and then, given the constellation of spreads, banks decide the optimal level of reserves and assets in order to maximize expected returns. The benchmark theoretical interest rate RT is simply a standard intertemporal nominal pricing kernel, priced off real consumption and inflation. Basically it boils down to a one-period Fisher equation:
RTt = Et (�t − �t+1) + Et �t+1. (16)
The interbank rate or policy rate is set by a standard feedback rule responding to inflation, �t, and output, yt, with parameters, �� and �y, respectively. Policy rates are smoothed by 1 > > 0.
RIBt = RIBt−1 + (1 − )(�� �t + �yyt ). (17)
To find that loan rate, RL we must equate the marginal product of loans per unit of labour (1 − ˛)(Lt/mt) to their marginal cost (wt /PAt ) with loans defined by the following relationship Lt = Dt (1 − rrt ) = (ct PAt /vt )(1 − rrt ). Therefore in log-linear form the interest rate on loans, RLt , is greater than the policy rate by the extent of the external finance premium.
RLt = RIBt + [vt + wt + mt + rrt − ct ]︸ ︷︷ ︸ EFPt
. (18)
The external finance premium, EFPt, is the real marginal cost of loan management, and it is increasing in velocity, vt , real wages, wt , monitoring work in the banking sector, mt, and reserve requirements, rrt, and decreasing in consumption, ct. The yield on government bonds is derived by maximizing households’ utility with respect to bond holdings, RTt − RBt = [(�)/ct �t − 1]˝t . In its log-linear form it
13 The parameter k2 = (k1 · K/c) is a function of k1 , of steady-state capital, K, and of the steady-state ratio of consumption, c. 14 The parameter ı1 = (ˇ(1 − ı)/1 + � ) is a function of the discount factor, ˇ, of the depreciation rate of capital, ı, and of the
trend growth rate, � . The parameter � 1 = (ˇ�mc/1 + � )(n/K)1−� is function of steady-state employment in goods sector, n, of steady-state marginal costs, mc, of steady-state capital, K, and of the parameter reflecting the capital share in the production function of the goods sector, �. Details of the derivation are reported in the Technical Appendix, Eq. (A.12), available on request.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 47
is the riskless rate, RTt , minus the liquidity service on bonds, which can be interpreted as a liquidity premium (LP):
RBt = RTt − [(
�
c� − 1
) ˝˝t −
�˝
c� (ct + �t )
] ︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPt
, (19)
where (ct + �t) measures the household marginal utility relative to households shadow value of funds while ˝t is the marginal value of the collateral. It is in fact these key margins – the real marginal cost of loan management versus the liquidity service yield – that determine the behavior of spreads. In the above expression, � denotes the consumption weight in the utility function whereas �t is the shadow value of consumption, ct. The interest rate on deposits is the policy rate, RIBt , minus a term in the reserve deposit ratio:
RDt = RIBt − rr
1 − rr rrt . (20)
4. Commercial banks asset management
Monetary policy operates through the manipulation of short-term interest rates as the policy instrument, which affects the market clearing level of high powered money, or reserves. The pre- vious section shows that this short term rate also impacts on other interest rates spreads via the external finance premium and/or the liquidity premium by changing the path of aggregate private or public demand. In this section, we develop an approach for considering the implications of introducing an incentive for commercial banks to hold reserves to account for the relative returns from holding reserves or producing loans and to deal with liquidity concerns.
Commercial banks may decide to vary the liquidity mix of their assets. One problem that has emerged in this business cycle is that insufficient attention was paid to the following problem that banks perform extensive maturity transformations which expose them to liquidity risks as they con- tinually rollover credit supply to the real economy and so procyclical swings in price of credit may then shift the loans function in a procyclical manner. We therefore feel it is important in this model to allow commercial bank reserves to be endogenously chosen and respond to varying incentives for banks to hold liquid assets. In this respect our model differs from Goodfriend and McCallum’s (2007) benchmark model where commercial banks operate under a fixed fractional reserve requirement but that case will also be explored in comparison.
We adopt a simple expression for the commercial bank’s within period expected returns. Given the constellation of interest rates as defined in the previous section, the bank’s problem (see Baltensperger, 1980) is to maximize total returns within period subject to the returns from loans, Lt, which are lent out at the collateralized interest rate of RLt , reserves held at the central bank, rt, which are assumed to pay the interbank (policy) interest rate, RIBt , and the payment of deposit interest, R
D t , to deposits:
max ˘t rt
= RLt Lt + RIBt rt − RDt Dt , (21)
s.t. Ct = 1 2
RTt (r̄ − rt )2 + t (r̄ − rt ). (22)
Here commercial banks’ profits are subject to a side-constraint motivated by concerns about the management of liquid reserves. Note that reserves are returned at the end of the period but loans at the beginning of the next period. We assume that there is an exogenous target for the level of reserves, r̄, perhaps set by custom and practice or by legislation.15 The costs of reserve management, Ct, are then modelled in two parts: banks wish to smooth reserves and face a penalty rate of an uncollateralized
15 In the Eurozone, for example, 2% of commercial bank reserves are lodged with central banks. In the UK, up to 2% of eligible reserves can be lodged with the Bank of England as interest bearing accounts. Basel III’s liquidity coverage ratio will seek to increase the holdings of liquid assets.
48 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
external finance premium, RTt , in deviations of reserves from target and are also subject to a liquidity preference term, t, which we can think of as an ex ante probability of a liquidity shortfall. The first term will imply that reserves are likely to be smoothed over time because banks may not wish to implement large-scale changes in their asset allocation from period to period, as these may signal mismanagement of previous asset allocations or run reputational risks. The cost of deviation from target is the penalty interest rate, which is symmetric in this set-up. This is because if rt < r̄, the commercial banks will fund its shortfall at the penalty rate, and if rt > r̄ the commercial banks will not be paid interest on excess reserves and pays the opportunity cost of lending its assets out at RTt . The liquidity preference term represents shifts in the commercial banks’ chosen level of reserves and reflects an exogenous probability of a liquidity shortfall and so an increase in t corresponds to a fall in bank liquidity below the minimum required level r̄.
Note that by choosing the reserve level, the asset side of the commercial banks balance sheet, Lt + rt, is now fully determined and so by construction are liabilities, that is deposits, Dt. From the balance sheet of the banking sector, discussed in the previous section, Lt = Dt − rt so we can substitute and write the Lagrangian as:
˘t = RLt (Dt − rt ) + RIBt rt − RDt Dt + �rt (
Ct − 1 2
RTt (r̄ − rt )2 − t (r̄ − rt ) )
. (23)
For which the first order conditions are:
∂˘t ∂rt
= −RLt + RIBt + �rt (RTt (r̄ − rt ) + t ) = 0. (24)
The Lagrange multiplier is the shadow value of reserve management and is given by the ratio of profits on reserves to the ‘precautionary’ motives for holding reserves:
�rt = RLt − RIBt
RTt (r̄ − rt ) + t , (25)
If �rt is set to one as to reflect the equal relative importance of the two arguments, we can solve for the optimal level of bank reserves:
rt = t + RIBt − RLt
RTt + r̄. (26)
Hence at the optimal profit rate the reserve ratio is determined by the interbank loan rate (the return on reserves) minus the returns on collateralized loans, RIBt − RLt , scaled by the penalty uncollateralized loan rate if reserves are different from target, RTt . Because the loan rate is higher than the interbank loan rate there is an incentive for banks to hold reserves below the target level, r̄, and that helps us understand the secular tendency to hold fewer reserves. But with a sufficiently high preference for liquidity, t, then reserves will be held in excess. Another way to think about this expression is that the deviation of reserve requirements from steady-state is the ratio of the cost of a liquidity shortfall to the opportunity cost of holding further deposits.
Now let us examine the reserve choice by commercial banks in terms of market interest rates. Given (18) we can re-write (26) as:
rt = t RLt
+ R IB t − RLt
RLt + r̄
= t RIBt + EFPt
− EFPt RIBt + EFPt
+ r̄, (27)
which introduces the trade-off between reserves being driven down (up) by higher (lower) external finance premia and the need to offset changes in the probability of a liquidity shortfall. Let us also note that that the responsivess of reserves to either t or EFPt will be higher if the external finance premium is a lower fraction of the overall loan rate. This is because an increase in the costs of providing loans (e.g. which may result from an increase in real wages and/or extent of monitoring required) will directly reduce the supply of loans and hence increase the external finance premium for a given level of loans and raise the opportunity cost of holding reserves, which will then fall.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 49
C’’C
C’
A
B’
L 1
R1 D +
tL
tr
IB 1
R1 D +
O
R
B B’’
Fig. 4. The bank’s optimal choice between loans and reserves.
Fig. 4 illustrates this key result. The two axes show reserves (rt) and loans (Lt). For a given level of deposit creation, D1, which depends on the nominal consumption expenditure and the velocity of circulation, the slope of the Asset Allocation Curve (AAC) is −(1 + RLt )/(1 + RIBt ) and intercepts are set by D1/(1 + RIBt ) and D1/(1 + RLt ). The ray OR draws the set of feasible equilibria under a fixed reserve ratio system for commercial banks. At the steady-state, A, the reserve ratio is at its long-run level, the slope of the AAC reflects the steady-state ratio of policy rates to lending rates. Around this steady state are concentric circle indifference curves reflecting the liquidity target of commercial banks. And we can see that when deposits increase to D2 > D1 commercial banks have an incentive to increase the proportion of reserve holdings, B′, over and above the level implied by a fixed reserve ratio, B. This is because reserves are preferred to loans when there is a target level of reserves required to deal with expected liquidity shocks, t. Furthermore, if relative interest rates change when D2 > D1 such that the policy rate rises relative to the loan rate the slope of the AAC curve becomes flatter and there is an even greater demand for reserves, B
′ ′ . The argument is symmetric with a fall in deposits,
D3 < D1, inducing reserves to fall by more than the reduction in loans. We can thus trace a slope for the endogenous reserve–deposit ratio, which is steeper than that for fixed reserve deposits and means that that commercial banks are induced to hold a higher fraction of reserves to deposits during an expansion and a lower fraction during a contraction. We will return to the policy implications of this result in the conclusion.
In the simulation exercise of the following sections we will consider two possible scenarios. In the first the reserve/deposit ratio, rrt, is determined by the following relationship:
rrt = rt Dt
= 1 Dt
( t RLt
+ R IB t − RLt
RLt + r̄
) . (28)
In the second we adopt a fixed reserve system where the reserve–deposit ratio is fixed:
rr = rt Dt
. (29)
In the following paragraphs we introduce the calibrating assumptions of our exercise and we will then proceed to simulate the full model reported in the Technical Appendix (available on request).
50 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
Table 1 The variables.
c Real consumption n Labour input m Labour input for loan monitoring, or ‘banking employment’ w Real wage q Price of capital goods p Price level � Inflation mc Marginal cost r Reserves rr Reserves/Deposit ratio D Deposits L Loans pA Aggregate prices b Real bond holding
̋ Marginal value of collateral EFP Uncollateralized external finance premium (RT − RIB ) LSYB Liquidity service on bonds LSYKB Liquidity service on capital (kLSYB ) RT Benchmark risk free rate RB Interest rate for bond RIB Interbank rate RL Loan rate RD Deposit rate � Lagrangian for budget constraint (shadow value of consumption) � Lagrangian for production constraint T Real transfer (%)
5. Calibration
Table 1 provides a complete list of the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model and their meaning while Table 2 reports the values for the parameters and steady-state values of relevant variables.16 Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose the consumption weight in utility, �, to yield 1/3 of available time in either goods or banking services production. We also set the relative share of capital and labour in goods production � to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity of substitution of differentiated goods, �, to be equal to 11. The discount factor, ˇ, is set to 0.99 which is the canonical quarterly value while the mark-up coefficient in the Phillips curve, �, is set to 0.05. The depreciation rate, ı, is set to be equal to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, � , is set to 0.005 which corresponds to 2% per year. The steady-state value of bond holding level relative to GDP, b, is set to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005.17
The parameters linked to money and banking are defined as follows. Velocity at its steady state level is set at 0.276 which is close to the ratio between US GDP and M3 at fourth quarter 2005, yielding 0.31. The fractional reserve requirement, rr, is set at 0.1 which is higher than the value of 0.005 assumed by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) to allow for more symmetric fluctuation in reserves. The fraction of collateral, ˛, in loan production is set to 0.65, the coefficient reflecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k, is set to 0.2 while the production coefficient of loan, F, is set to 9.14. The low value of capital productivity reflects the facts that usually banks use higher fraction of monitoring services and rely less on capital as collateral.
With these parameters values we see that the steady state of labour input, n, is 0.31 which is close to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the banking service sector, (m/m + n), is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, not far the 1.6% share of total US employment in depository credit intermediation as of August 2005. As the steady-states are computed at zero inflation we can interpret
16 The full set of derivation of the model with a detailed description are reported in the Appendix, which is available on request. 17 The steady state of the transfer level, the Lagrangian of the production constraint and base money depend on the above
parameters. The steady state of the marginal cost is mc = (� − 1)/�.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 51
Table 2 Calibration.
Parameter Description Value
ˇ Discount factor 0.99 � Coefficient in Phillips curve 0.05 ˛ Collateral share of loan production 0.65 � Consumption weight in utility 0.4 � Capital share of firm production 0.36 ı Depreciation rate of capital 0.025 � Trend growth rate 0.005 rr Reserve ratio 0.1 Interest rate smoothing 0.8 �� Coefficient on Inflation in Policy 2.5 �y Coefficient on Output in Policy 0.5 F Production coefficient of loan 9.14 k Inferiority coefficient of capital as collateral 0.2 � Elasticity of substitution of differentiated goods 11
Steady-states Description
m Steady state of banking employment 0.0063 n Steady state of labour input 0.3195 RT Steady state of benchmark risk free rate 0.015 RIB Steady state of interbank rate 0.0021 RL Steady state of loan rate 0.0066 RB Steady state of bond rate 0.0052 b/c Steady state of bond holding over consumption 0.56 c Steady state of consumption 0.8409 T/c Steady state of transfers over consumption 0.0126 w Steady state of real wage 1.9494 � Steady state of shadow value of consumption 0.457 v Steady state level of velocity 0.276 ˝ Steady state of marginal value of collateral 0.237 K Steady state of capital 9.19 r/c Steady state of reserves over consumption 0.58
Note: The deep parameters are explained in Section 5. The steady-states have been solved by solving the set of simultaneous equations described in Section C of the Technical Appendix. The code is available on request.
all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, RT, is 6% per annum. The interbank rate, RIB, is 0.84% per annum which is close to the 1% per year average short-term real rate. The government bond rate, RB, is 2.1% per annum. Finally the collateralized external finance premium is 2% per annum which is in line with the average spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the US.18 The model is solved using the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) who also provide routines to derive the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to different shocks, to obtain asymptotic variance and covariances of the variables and to simulate the data.19 For the impulse response analysis and simulation exercise we consider the real and financial shocks described in Table 3, which reports the volatility and persistence parameters chosen for the calibration and simulation exercise. These are standard parameters in the literature.
18 The equations for the steady-states are listed in Section B of the Technical Appendix, available on request. The solution for the steady-states uses a nonlinear routine in Maple and the file is also available on request.
19 The log-linearized equations for the model are listed in Section C of the Technical Appendix. King and Watson’s MATLAB code is generalized in that for any model, we adapt three MATLAB files. The three files for the solution of our benchmark model gmrsys.m, gmrdrv.m and gmrcon.m are available on request. King and Watson’s package includes standardized auxiliary programs impkw.m to generate the impulse responses to different shocks to the endogenous variables and the program fdfkw.m to obtain the filtered autocovariances and the filtered second moments from the model solution. The program impkwsimu.m simulates the artificial series and allows to generate HP filtered data.
52 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
Table 3 Calibration of exogenous shocks.
Description Value
Persistence a1 Productivity 0.95 a2 Banking productivity 0.95 a3 Collateral shocks 0.9 Monetary policy 0.3 u Mark-up 0.74 ε Government debt 0.9 v Velocity 0.33 Liquidity 0.33
Volatility �a1 Productivity 0.72% �a2 Banking productivity 1.00% �a3 Collateral 1.00% � Monetary policy 0.82% �u Mark-up 0.11% �ε Government debt 1.00% �v Velocity 1.00% � Liquidity 1.00%
Chadha et al. (2008).
6. Model results: impulse response analysis
To understand the dynamics of this model, in this section we outline the impact of shocks to goods productivity, the policy rate and to an example of a financial sector shock. Figs. 5–8 plot the log deviation from steady state responses of employment in the goods sector, monitoring employment, real wages, the asset price, real consumption, inflation, real deposits, real loans, real reserves, the external finance premium, the reserve deposit ratio, the interest rate on bonds, the policy rate, the loan rate and the liquidity premium. For each set of impulse responses two lines are drawn, one (solid) corresponding to the model where interest is paid on reserves and banks choose to optimize over reserve and loans in their asset portfolio and one (dotted) corresponding to a fixed fractional reserve system.
To fix some ideas let us explain that a key role is played by the external finance premium as a regulator of demand and by reserves as a regulator for the supply of loans. For example, a shock that raises the value of collateral held by households will tend to increase the availability of loans. But at the same time the collateral shock will increase the demand for deposits and the amount of monitoring work that needs to be carried out by banks. This increase in the employment of monitoring workers will be reflected in higher real marginal costs of loans and so there will be some pressure on the external finance premium to rise. The actual path of the external finance premium will depend upon the relative importance of these two effects. The former financial accelerator and latter attenuator is well explored in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) but to which we add a further dimension. In our set-up, commercial banks use their reserves as a substitute for employing monitoring workers. If the external finance premium jumps in response to dominance in either the financial accelerator or attenuator effect and as a result of the signal from the policy rate, which provides a rate of return for reserves, commercial banks can substitute reserves and this acts to attenuate the fluctuations in the external finance premium and the liquidity premium; in this case monitoring costs are less sensitive to the shock and the marginal value of collateral, which determines the liquidity premium, becomes less important.
6.1. Endogenous reserves
Fig. 5 describes the effects of a shock to goods productivity. On impact a persistent shock to goods productivity raises consumption, and given the cash in advance constraint this will drive up the
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 53
5 10 15 20
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0 Employment Goods Sector
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Real Wages
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20
0.1
0.2
0.3
Asset Price
5 10 15 20
0.25
0.3
0.35
Real Consumption
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Inflation
% in
D e
vi a
tio n
s
5 10 15 20
0.25
0.3
0.35
Real Deposits
5 10 15 20
0.25
0.3
0.35
Real Loans
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
Real Reserves
5 10 15 20 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4 External Finance Premium
5 10 15 20 -0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Reserves-Deposit Ratio
5 10 15 20
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Bond Rate
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
Policy Rate
Quarters after shock 5 10 15 20
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Loan Rate
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
x 10 -3 Liquidity Premium
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Fig. 5. Impulse responses to productivity shock. Note: In Figs. 5–8 we report impulse responses of key variables under a bench- mark calibration of exogenous shocks and policy rates for a fixed fractional reserve system and for endogenous reserves. Please refer to Tables 2 and 3 for calibration values of parameters and shocks. The impulse responses show percentage deviation from steady state from period 1 when there is a 1% shock of magnitude to specific source of fluctuation.
5 10 15 20 0
0.5
1
Employment Goods Sector
5 10 15 20 0
0.5
1
Real Wages
5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20 0
0.5
1
Asset Price
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real Consumption
5 10 15 20 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Inflation
% in
D e
vi a
tio n
s
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real Deposits
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real Loans
5 10 15 20 -0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real Reserves
5 10 15 20
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
External Finance Premium
5 10 15 20 -0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0 Reserves-Deposit Ratio
5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
Bond Rate
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Policy Rate
Quarters after shock 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
Loan Rate
5 10 15 20
-10
-5
0 x 10
-3 Liquidity Premium
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Fig. 6. Impulse responses to positive collateral shock.
54 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0 Employment Goods Sector
5 10 15 20 -1
-0.5
0 Real Wages
5 10 15 20
-1.4
-1.2 -1
-0.8
-0.6 -0.4
-0.2
Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0 Asset Price
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0 Real Consumption
5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Inflation
% in
D e
vi a
tio n
s
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0 Real Deposits
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0 Real Loans
5 10 15 20 -0.5
0
0.5 Real Reserves
5 10 15 20 -1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
External Finance Premium
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
Reserves-Deposit Ratio
5 10 15 20
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Bond Rate
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Policy Rate
Quarters after shock 5 10 15 20
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
Loan Rate
5 10 15 20 -15
-10
-5
x 10 -3 Liquidity Premium
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Fig. 7. Impulse response to monetary policy shock.
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Employment Goods Sector
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Real Wages
5 10 15 20 -2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0 Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6 Asset Price
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Real Consumption
5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Inflation
% in
D e
vi a
tio n
s
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Real Deposits
5 10 15 20 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Real Loans
5 10 15 20 0
0.5
1
1.5
Real Reserves
5 10 15 20 -0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0 External Finance Premium
5 10 15 20 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Reserves-Deposit Ratio
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
Bond Rate
5 10 15 20 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Policy Rate
Quarters after shock 5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
Loan Rate
5 10 15 20 -15
-10
-5
0 x 10
-3 Liquidity Premium
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Fig. 8. Impulse response to liquidity shock.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 55
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Quarter
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio Inflation
Asset prices
EFP
Reserve-deposit ratio
Fig. 9. Simulation of two-year moving average series of HP filtered monetary variables. Note: Figs. 9 and 10 show the middle segment of a simulation of 10,000 data points from a standard calibration of this model. The simulated data are HP filtered (� = 1600).
demand for deposits. Deposits are a function of loans provided by the banking sector, which requires monitoring work from the fixed supply of labour and thus a switch from work in goods production to work in banks monitoring loans. The productivity shock also raises the marginal productivity of capital and hence increases the asset price. The increase in the value of collateral that the asset price represents is long-lived and so eventually reduces the need for more monitoring work. But nevertheless the exter- nal finance premium increases, initially because the marginal costs of loan production have risen with the level of monitoring work. When banks can choose their level of reserves directly, the fall in infla- tion brings down the policy rate and reduces the incentive to hold reserves compared to the returns from making loans and so monitoring employment rises. But once the policy rate starts to head back to its steady-state, reserves become more attractive and banks start to increase the reserve–deposit ratio, which leads to a shake-out in monitoring employment and a quicker return in the external finance premium to its base level. One important difference between the fixed reserve–deposit case and where reserves are endogenous is that in the longer run the persistent increase in wages, which are the same in the two sectors, means that there is an incentive for banks to hold reserves rather than employ monitoring workers and so the reserve–deposit ratio rises with the increase in economic activity.
Fig. 6 reports the effects of a shock to collateral, which increases the asset price. On impact, a positive shock to collateral that increases the efficiency of producing loans induces banks to switch from the use of monitoring work and also reduces the need to hold reserves; consumption and therefore deposits
56 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
Table 4 Impact on economy of endogenous reserves.
Reserve/Deposit (%) Benchmark calibration Dominant banking shocks
Fixed Endogenous Fixed Endogenous
S.D. Corr S.D. Corr S.D. Corr S.D. Corr
Consumption 1.52 1 1.52 1 11.71 1 5.37 1 Inflation 0.91 0.67 0.37 0.48 7.51 0.95 2.05 0.95 Employment in monitoring 2.78 −0.64 4.48 −0.80 17.6 −0.81 5.61 −0.55 Employment in the goods sector 2.49 0.91 2.37 0.91 19.4 0.99 8.78 0.99 Real wages 2.60 0.98 2.44 0.98 20.5 0.99 9.54 0.99 Bonds 1.28 0.14 1.28 0.06 1.28 0.01 1.28 0.01 Asset price 1.82 0.98 1.50 0.98 15.1 0.99 6.50 0.99 Real loans 1.40 0.77 0.79 0.71 11.70 0.99 5.81 0.97 Real reserves 1.40 −0.77 1.60 −0.82 11.70 −0.99 3.74 −0.06 Policy rate 1.83 0.14 1.45 0.23 14.91 0.52 5.27 0.63 Deposit rate 1.83 0.14 1.39 0.18 14.91 0.52 5.83 0.66 Loan rate 0.66 −0.10 0.90 −0.89 3.57 0.65 0.98 −0.23 Bond rate 0.65 −0.08 0.87 −0.89 3.73 0.67 0.93 −0.17 External finance premium 1.65 −0.20 1.90 −0.60 11.89 −0.45 5.57 −0.64 Liquidity premium 0.02 −0.55 0.04 −0.77 0.21 −0.71 0.11 −0.68
Note: S.D. denotes the asymptotic standard deviation of the relevant variables derived from the filtered second moments of the solution obtained from the model. Corr denotes the contemporaneous cross-correlation with consumption derived from the filtered autocovariance of the solution obtained from the model. The benchmark scenario corresponds to the shock parameters given in Table 3 while in the scenario where the banking shocks are dominant the shocks to collateral and to monitoring efficiency are 10 times as large as in the benchmark scenario.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Inflation
Loans
Fig. 10. Simulation of two-year moving average series of HP filtered key variables.
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 57
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio Inflation
Asset prices
EFP
Reserve-deposit ratio
Fig. 11. Simulation of two-year moving average series of HP filtered monetary variables under dominant banking shocks. Note: Figs. 11 and 12 show the middle segment of a simulation of 10,000 data points from a calibration where the standard deviation of banking shocks is 10 times higher than in the benchmark calibration. The simulated data are HP filtered (� = 1600).
increase. This also acts to increase the hours worked in goods production. The initial reduction in monitoring reduces the external finance premium and therefore increases the return on reserves with respect to the return on loans; hence reserves initially are lower but then start to increase as their return is higher. The main difference with the fixed reserve–deposit scenario is that when reserves are endogenous the reduction in real wages means that banks have the incentive to employ more monitoring work and economize on reserve holdings, so loans and deposits will expand. Given that deposits increase by more than reserves the reserve–deposit ratio falls more on impact when reserves are endogenous.
Fig. 7 reports the effects of a positive shock on the policy rate. On impact reserves are higher as their return (the policy rate) is higher than the opportunity cost represented by the return on loans and the penalty rate. Lower real loans and deposits through the cash in advance constraint lead to a reduction in consumption, in the employment in the goods sector, in real wages and in the price level. Given the higher level of reserves monitoring work initially falls. The fall in monitoring work coupled with lower real wages causes a fall in the external finance premium which in turn affects the benchmark rate and the loan rate which are also lower on impact. In the second stage when the policy rate falls in response to falling prices and consumption the situations reverts. Consumption starts rising alongside employment in the goods sector and real wages. Because of the higher level of consumption, deposits start to rise and this leads to an increase in the supply of loans which can now be produced replacing monitoring work to collateral whose price in the meantime has risen in response
58 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Endogenous Reserves-Deposits Ratio
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Quarter
L o
g -d
e vi
a tio
n in
s im
u la
tio n
Fixed Reserves-Deposits Ratio
Inflation
Loans
Fig. 12. Simulation of two-year moving average series of HP filtered key variables under dominant banking shocks.
to the lower capital-labour ratio. The main difference with the fixed reserve–deposit scenario is that when reserves are endogenous a shock on the policy rate, on impact, also increases the return on reserves. Initially banks have the incentive to increase their reserve holdings, except that in a second stage lower real wages induce banks to replace their reserve holdings with monitoring work, so loans and deposits expand. Given that reserves increase by more than deposits the reserve–deposit ratio is higher with endogenous reserves than with fractional reserves.
6.2. Bank liquidity
Fig. 8 shows the effect of a positive shock to the probability of a liquidity shortfall. What we can show is that rather than impacting on activity in a negative manner, if banks are able to increase reserves in response to such a shock, they can shed some of their loan production costs and mitigate the impact of a such a shock on the wider macroeconomy. Referring back to Fig. 4, if liquidity through reserves are available, rather than rationing loans with a higher external finance premium, they can substitute some reserves for loans to match the required level of deposits and thus shed some costly monitoring workers and help prevent the external finance premium from rising.
On impact banks choose to have higher reserves and this compresses loans, monitoring work and the external finance premium. The reduction in the level of monitoring work and the paral- lel increase in the employment level in the goods production sector has a positive effect on asset prices, real wages and consumption. Given the cash in advance constraint this leads to an increase in deposits. In a second phase the higher capital-labour ratio decreases the asset price and this drives
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 59
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 0
4
8
σ r π
σ r y
Standard Deviation of Banking Sector Shocks
R e
la tiv
e S
ta n
d a
rd D
e vi
a tio
n (O
u tp
u t a
n d
I n
fla tio
n )
Fig. 13. Macroeconomic volatility as a function of banking sector shocks in endogenous reserve–deposit ratio model. Note: On x-axis we allow various calibration of banking sector shocks (the monitoring productivity shock or collateral shock). �r
i , i = y,
� denotes relative standard deviation of output or inflation to the initial case with fractional reserves (banking shocks are not dominant).
up the amount of monitoring work in the banking sector and the external finance premium so both the loan rate and the riskless rate increase. With a lower employment level in the goods produc- tion sector, wages and consumption also fall. There is a temporary deflation and the policy rate drops. As the return on reserves is now lower than their opportunity cost, the reserve level falls and as it falls by more than deposits the reserve–deposit ratio also declines leading to an increase in gearing.
6.3. Welfare analysis
Table 4 shows the asymptotic standard deviation and the correlation with consumption from a simulation of the benchmark model under two cases: one corresponding to the shock parameters given in Table 3 and one where the shocks to collateral and to monitoring efficiency are 10 times as large under each of two scenarios, when reserves are endogenous and when there is a fixed reserve ratio. The simulation here is designed to capture what might happen in an economy when shocks to the bank technology function dominate those to the real economy. In the benchmark case, we find that inflation and employment in the goods sector are more stable and real wages exhibit slightly less volatility in the model with endogenous reserves at the cost of some small induced volatility in the loan rate, bond rate and the liquidity premium. But when banking shocks are dominant, the employment of endogenous reserves reduces markedly the standard deviation of all endogenous variables.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the middle segment, as an illustration, from a simulation of 10,000 data points, discarding the first 500 observations, of the benchmark model under two cases. The sim- ulated data are HP filtered (� = 1600). The top panel in both cases is the model with endogenous reserves and the lower panel with fixed fractional reserves. The EFP, asset prices and inflation are more volatile under fractional reserves. But we note that when banks can choose their optimal level of reserves, they vary positively with asset prices. These figures also shows that under simple fractional
60 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 0
4
8
12
16
20
σ r π
σ r y
Standard Deviation of Banking Sector Shocks
R e
la tiv
e S
ta n
d a
rd D
e vi
a tio
n (O
u tp
u t a
n d
I n
fla tio
n )
Fig. 14. Macroeconomic volatility as a function of banking sector shocks in fixed reserve–deposit ratio model. Note: On x-axis we allow various calibration of banking sector shocks (the monitoring productivity shock or collateral shock). �r
i , i = y, � denotes
relative standard deviation of output or inflation to the initial case with endogenous reserves (banking shocks are not dominant).
reserves both loans and inflation display more volatility than when banks have the ability to alter their reserves.
Figs. 11 and 12 replay Figs. 9 and 10 with heavily dominant shocks to loans supply. And we find that endogenous reserves do much to militate against the excessive fluctuations that would obtain when the reserve deposit ratio is fixed. The argument here is that reserves are accumulated when policy rate rises which act to reduce fluctuations in market risk premia and hence in activity and inflation. Finally, Figs. 13 and 14 compare the asymptotic standard deviation of output and inflation in an endogenous reserves model and one where fixed fractional reserves are maintained. The x-axis in both cases is the relative weight on shocks to monitoring and to collateral, which drive the supply of loans and when they increase welfare declines under a simple inflation targeting rule. But we show here that the range and scale of decline is significantly less when reserves are endogenous.
7. Conclusions
This paper is among the first of a new generation of micro-founded macroeconomic models to consider the implications of bank lending and interest rate spreads on macroeconomic behavior and hence on macro-prudential policy. To the model of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), we append shifts in velocity in the demand for money function (see Chadha et al., 2008) and also a liquidity shock emanating directly from the banking sector’s need to ensure that it holds sufficient reserves (liquid assets) to guard against a notional probability of shortfall in the ability to refinance is loanbook. We then find that an incentive to hold liquid assets attenuates the excessive increase in the external finance premium that would otherwise ensue. We also solve for commercial banks’ optimal levels of illiquid (loans) and liquid asset (reserves) holdings and for the government’s budget position by allowing two forms of debt liabilities to be issued: one-period debt to finance any excess in government expenditures over tax receipts and debt to finance the issuance of reserves. These innovations to a
J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62 61
more or less standard sticky price setting allow us to consider and speak on a number of important current policy issues.
We first examine the ability of this model economy to amplify and propagate macroeconomic shocks. Second, we consider the role of reserve accumulation in the commercial bank balance sheet and gauge the extent to which it acts to help stabilize this monetary economy – our key finding is that allowing commercial banks another way to adjust their assets (rather than just re-pricing loans), can help attenuate fluctuations. Third, we can measure directly the impact on the macroeconomy of a change in commercial banks’ optimal liquidity mix in their assets. In the simple case, increases (or decreases) in loans alone act like a demand shock and can lead to excessive fluctuations in the levels of household consumption but under endogenous reserves, banks can substitute liquidity for changes in the employment of monitoring workers, which limits the variance in loan costs and acts to mitigate the impact on demand. Naturally we do not consider all the possible channels for the transmission of monetary policy, as the model has no investment sector nor does it have an open economy, but it does help us understand the relationship between liquidity-constrained consumption and bank lending.
Over the past decade or so interest rate rules have regularly been shown to deliver stable outcomes in microfounded models, in spite of earlier concerns about their efficacy (see Sargent & Wallace, 1985; Smith, 1991) but the extension of these models with a banking sector leaves open the possibility the earlier generation of interest rate rules will turn out to be problematic, as we have discovered to some extent since the inception of the financial crisis of 2007. The addition of banks, credit and financial spreads in micro-founded macroeconomics is still in its infancy but we believe the contribution here is an important step. This model of loans supply to liquidity constrained consumers ultimately offers some rationale for commercial banks to have an incentive to hold liquid as well as illiquid assets and it would appear that holding such assets, which are sensitive to policy rates, will help stabilize a monetary economy. We have explored the role of paying interest on reserves in our model but it could be that other mechanisms to ensure procyclical liquidity provisioning may exist, perhaps related to cyclical minium requirements. What is clear is that such procyclical variation is preferable in our model to simply steady state targets.
And so we feel able to make some suggestions in light of the proposals for macroprudential liq- uidity arrangements. The question of commercial bank liquidity has often gone hand in glove, with proposals for additional capital adequacy, for example, from the Financial Stability Board. The main proposals from the G20 leaders involve increasing the quantum of capital and liquidity held by com- mercials banks over the business cycle, which will require agreement on measurement, standards and monitoring of standards. It seems unlikely thought that any quantity of capital or liquidity held in steady-state is likely to be sufficient to fund bank’s losses in the event of a financial collapse. So we maintain that more dynamic provisioning of liquidity over the business cycle is required. Our results on reserves suggests that they can be treated as an additional argument in the loans production tech- nology of commercial banks and so it can substitute for both the value of collateral and the costs of monitoring employment. Encouraging banks to increase reserves holdings in a boom acts to limit the expansion in loans and in a recession helps to prevent too rapid a fall and so will not only increase the efficacy of standard interest rate policy but also help prevent the excesses of financial intermediation. As an aside there does not seem to be a great deal of transparency about banks’ levels of liquidity, which perhaps should also be addressed. Let us also not forget that the financial crisis was triggered by a liquidity drought and so encouraging banks to hold reserves, especially at a business cycle peak by linking the return on reserves to policy rates, may ultimately prevent this kind of drought.
Acknowledgements
We thank Qi Sun at the CDMA at St Andrews and Jack Meaning at Kent for excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the SCE Conference in Paris and at the MMF/Bank of England conference on ‘Money and Macro Models’ in November 2007, the Bank for International Settlements, the Bundesbank, the 2009 Royal Economic Society and the Bank of Greece, as well as at the University of Birmingham, University of Cambridge, University of Kent, University of Oxford, University of York, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the FSA. We thank participants at these seminars for their helpful comments. In particular, we thank Peter Andrews, John Bluedorn,
62 J.S. Chadha, L. Corrado / Journal of Economics and Business 64 (2012) 37– 62
Steve Cecchetti, Harris Dellas, Andrew Fildaro, Christina Gerberding, Rafael Gerke, Charles Goodhart, Mar Gudmundsson, Sean Holly, Norbert Janssen, Thomas Laubach, Paul Levine, Richard Mash, Patrick Minford, Marcus Miller, Richhild Moessner, Benoit Mojon, Joe Pearlman, Peter Sinclair, Peter Spencer, George Tavlas, Mike Wickens and David Vines.
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Baltensperger, E. (1980). Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm. Journal of Monetary Economics, 6, 1–37. Basel III. (2010). International Framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs188.htm. Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1999). The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. In J. B.
Taylor, & M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of macroeconomics (Vol. 1C). North-Holland Publishing Company. Chadha, J. S., Corrado, L., & Holly, S. (2008). Reconsidering the role of money and credit in monetary policy making: A note. Cambridge
Working Papers in Economics CWPE 0852. Freeman, S., & Haslag, J. H. (1996). On the Optimality of interest-bearing reserves in economies of overlapping generations.
Economic Theory, 7(3), 557–565. Friedman, M. (1960). A program for monetary stability. New York: Fordham University Press. Goodfriend, M. (2002). Interest on reserves and monetary policy. Economic Policy Review, (May), 77–84. Goodfriend, M., & McCallum, B. T. (2007). Banking and interest rates in monetary policy analysis: A quantitative exploration.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1480–1507. Hall, R. (2002). Controlling the price level. Contributions to Macroeconomics, 2(1), 1038–1059. Article 5 King, R. G., & Watson, M. W. (1998). The solution of singular linear difference systems under rational expectations. International
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Senate. Meyer, L. H. (2001). Payment of interest on reserves, testimony before the financial services subcommittee on financial institu-
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- Macro-prudential policy on liquidity: What does a DSGE model tell us?
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Monetary analysis
- 2.1 Reserves and the flow of funds
- 2.1.1 The loan-deposit ratio and reserves
- 2.2 Reserves and the fiscal position
- 3 The general equilibrium monetary model
- 3.1 Households and the production sector
- 3.2 Banking sector
- 3.3 Consumption, monitoring work and asset prices
- 3.4 Market interest rates
- 4 Commercial banks asset management
- 5 Calibration
- 6 Model results: impulse response analysis
- 6.1 Endogenous reserves
- 6.2 Bank liquidity
- 6.3 Welfare analysis
- 7 Conclusions
- Acknowledgements
- References
1-s2.0-S0165176513004990-main.pdf
Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Dichotomy between macroprudential policy and monetary policy on credit and inflation Hyunduk Suh ∗ Korea Capital Market Institute, 143 Uisadang-daero, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul 150-974, South Korea
h i g h l i g h t s
• I lay out a simple New Keynesian model with credit between households. • I analyze impacts of monetary and macroprudential policy on credit and inflation. • I discover a dichotomy between two policies regarding their effects. • This dichotomy arises because each policy affects savers and borrowers differently.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 7 June 2013 Received in revised form 7 November 2013 Accepted 10 November 2013 Available online 16 November 2013
JEL classification: E44 E52 E59
Keywords: Macroprudential policy Monetary policy New Keynesian economics model
a b s t r a c t
This paper compares macroprudential policy and monetary policy using a simple New Keynesian model with credit. Macroprudential policy is effective in stabilizing credit with limited impact on inflation. Monetary policy stabilizes inflation, but is ‘too blunt’ for credit stabilization.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the impact of macroprudential policy and monetary policy on the dynamics of inflation and credit in a New Keynesian model. Macroprudential policy refers to a set of regulatory instruments, mainly imposed on financial institutions, to ex-ante limit the buildup of financial systemic risk. One important issue regarding macroprudential policy is its coordination with monetary policy. It focuses on how we should use these two policies to jointly achieve financial stability and existing mandates of monetary policy such as inflation and output gap stability. A recent debate between Woodford (2012) and Svensson (2012) formalizes this concern. Using his credit model (Curdia and Woodford, 2010), Woodford argues that financial stability is an important policy objective. It is because
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0165-1765/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.012
the quadratic policy loss function includes, along with inflation and output gap, the marginal utility gap between borrowers and savers that widens in financial crises. Even with macroprudential instruments, he argues, monetary policy should be used in response to credit conditions as long as macroprudential policy cannot provide a complete solution for financial stability. On the other hand, Svensson, based on the same policy loss function, favors separating monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Monetary policy should, in Svensson’s view, be used exclusively for inflation stabilization. He wants to use macroprudential policy for stabilizing financial markets as it has greater effects on leverage than monetary policy.
This paper uses a simple New Keynesian model with credit and solvency risk. I analyze how this class of models characterizes the effects of the two policies, a key piece of information for the policy coordination problem above. The result shows that there is a dichotomy between two policies. Monetary policy is effective in stabilizing inflation but too blunt as an instrument in stabilizing credit. Macroprudential policy is effective in stabilizing
H. Suh / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149 145
credit but plays a limited role in inflation dynamics. The ‘Taylor principle’ still applies independent of macroprudential policy, since the equilibrium is indeterminate unless the interest rate responds to inflation by more than one. This sharp separation between two policies arises from the different effects these policies have on saving and borrowing decisions. Suh (2012) shows that the optimal policy separates the aims of monetary and macroprudential policies in a medium size New Keynesian model featuring solvency risk in the type of Bernanke et al. (1999). In this paper, I show that my earlier result stems from the way monetary and macroprudential policies are characterized to influence savers and borrowers.
2. Model
There are patient and impatient households of the same population in the economy, who are distinguished by their time preferences as in Iacoviello (2005). Households who are more impatient about their future consumption eventually borrow in the steady-state, and patient households become savers. The representative saving household optimizes
max Cs,Ns,Ls
E0 ∞ t=0
(β t ϵ d t )
1
1 − σC C1−σCs,t −
ϕ
1 + σN N1+σNs,t
s.t Cs,t + Lst Pt
≤ Rst−1 Lst−1 Pt
+ wtNs,t + Divt , (1)
where Cs is consumption, Ns is the labor of saving households, Ls stands for savings that are lent to borrowing households, Rs is the nominal saving interest rate, P is the price level of final consumption goods, w is the real wage, and Div is the real dividend from the intermediate goods production firms and financial intermediaries. There is a preference shock, denoted by ϵdt , that affects the intertemporal consumption allocation decision. Borrowing households have a smaller future discount factor than saving households (βb < β), and their optimization problem is given by
max Cb,Nb,Lb
E0 ∞ t=0
(β t bϵ
d t )
1
1 − σC C1−σCb,t −
ϕ
1 + σN N1+σNb,t
s.t Cb,t + R b t−1
Lbt−1 Pt
≤ wtNb,t + Lbt Pt
+ Dftt , (2)
where Cb and Nb are consumption and labor of borrowing households, respectively, Lb is the debt of the borrower, and Rb is the nominal borrowing interest rate. Dftt is the borrowers’ windfall income from bad loans, which will be discussed later. In equilibrium, the amount of borrowers’ debt equals savings (Lbt = Lst). Credit (Lt) in this paper is defined by this lending between savers and borrowers.
The production sector follows a simple New Keynesian setup. Final consumption goods are obtained by aggregating intermediate goods using the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator. There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers denoted by i (i ∈ [0, 1]) facing monopolistic competition, and price rigidity in the type of Calvo (1983). They have linear production technology (Yi,t = atNi,t , Ni,t = Ni,s,t + Ni,b,t).
There is a stylized financial intermediary sector that channels credit between borrowers and savers. As in Curdia and Woodford (2010), there exists a cost of intermediation, Ωt , as some of the extended loans become bad loans. Intermediaries cannot predict which loan will go bad, but they can correctly predict the fraction of bad loans and associated cost. This cost is increasing in real debt (lt = Lt /Pt). If any loan goes bad, it is rewarded to borrowing households as a windfall income that is independent from their borrowing decision.
The saving and borrowing interest rates are affected by monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Monetary policy is given by a simple rule for the saving rate that reacts to inflation (Rst = R
sπ φπ t ), where φπ denotes the monetary policy
reaction to inflation. Macroprudential policy imposes a restriction on financial intermediation that countercyclically affects the borrowing decision. As in Dib (2010), Angelini et al. (2012), and Kannan et al. (2012), I assume that the regulatory authority implements macroprudential policy by countercyclically changing the degree of regulation, and financial intermediaries face a cost when they fail to meet the required regulation. For example, to curb credit expansion and protect the banking sector against systemic risk, the regulatory authority can require intermediaries to set aside a countercyclical capital buffer. Then there is a cost Ξt for intermediaries that do not comply with the regulation, that comes from an actual ban from the regulatory authority or an increase in reputation risk. It is assumed that the focus of macroprudential regulation is to ‘‘lean against the wind’’ by reacting to credit; thus this cost function is increasing in lt . The total cost of the intermediary Ψt includes the gross interest payment to saving households (Rstlt) and is assumed to be multiplicative in Ωt and Ξt . The functional form of Ωt , Ξt , and Ψt is given by
Ωt (lt ) = Ω0l ω t , Ξt (lt ) = Ξ0l
φL t ,
Ψt (lt ) = R s tlt · Ω(lt ) · Ξ (lt ).
(3)
In Eq. (3), ω and φL determine how strong the credit spread and macroprudential regulation respond to credit. Financial intermediaries choose lt to maximize profit (Πt ≡ Rbt lt − Ψt (lt )), while taking Rst and R
b t as given. Solving this profit maximization
yields
Rbt = (1 + ω + φL)Ω0Ξ0R s tl
ω+φL t . (4)
Eq. (4) shows that while monetary policy affects both the saving and the borrowing rate through Rst , macroprudential policy affects the credit cycle through its effects on Rbt .
1
The steady-state equilibrium conditions are described in the appendix. In particular, the household intertemporal consumption decision should satisfy the optimality conditions Rs = 1/β and Rb = 1/βb. It implies a positive steady-state interest rate spread, and Eq. (4) shows that there is an appropriate choice of Ω0 and Ξ0 that gives us the required spread associated with the steady-state credit 0 < l < ∞. Without this spread, borrowing households accumulate debt infinitely, since they can borrow at Rs which is lower than their time preference 1/βb.
Now I turn to the log-linearized equilibrium conditions of the economy around its steady-state. Consumption Euler equations for savers and borrowers, the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and the law of motion for credit form a set of linear difference equations in [Ĉs, Ĉb, π̂ , l̂], which characterizes the local equilibrium dynamics around the steady state.
σC Ĉs,t = Et σC Ĉs,t+1 − (R̂ s t − Et π̂t+1) + û
d t
= Et σC Ĉs,t+1 − (φπ π̂t − Et π̂t+1) + û d t
where ûdt ≡ ϵ̂ d t − Et ϵ̂
d t+1, (5)
σC Ĉb,t = Et σC Ĉb,t+1 − (R̂ b t − Et π̂t+1) + û
d t
= Et σC Ĉb,t+1 − (φπ π̂t + (ω + φL)l̂t − Et π̂t+1) + û d t . (6)
1 Another way to rationalize this effect is to assume a quantity restriction on intermediaries. For example, a cap on the bank capital ratio can have similar effects. This happens when financial intermediaries facing quantity restrictions choose to raise the interest rate rather than rationing credit.
146 H. Suh / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149
π̂t = βEt π̂t+1 + κm̂ct = βEt π̂t+1 + κ[(γsĈs,t + γbĈb,t ) − (1 + σN )ât ].
2 (7)
L Y l̂t −
RbL Y
(φπ π̂t−1 + (ω + φL)l̂t−1 − π̂t + l̂t−1)
= cbĈb,t − wNb Y
(ŵt + N̂b,t )
= χbĈb,t + χsĈs,t + χaât . 3 (8)
3. Model determinacy
Eqs. (5)–(8) can be expressed as G0 · EtXt+1 = G1 · Xt + ϵt where Xt = [Ĉs,t , Ĉb,t , π̂t , l̂t ]′. The determinacy of the system depends on generalized eigenvalues of G ≡ G−10 · G1. For the equilibrium solution to exist and to be unique and bounded, it is required that only one out of four eigenvalues has a radius smaller than one, since there are three unpredetermined variables (Cb, Cs, π) and one state variable (l) (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
Proposition. Consider nonnegative values of φπ , φL.4 Denote the eigenvalues of G matrix as λ, and its characteristic equation as P(λ) = |G − λI| = λ4 + A3λ3 + A2λ2 + A1λ + A0. Suppose (i) χsγb − χbγs < 0, (ii) Rb + χb
(L/Y )σC > 0. Then φπ > 1 is a necessary condition for
the equation P(λ) = 0 to have exactly one (real) root with a radius smaller than 1. Provided (i), (ii) and (iii) P(A0) > 0, φπ > 1 is also a sufficient condition.
The proof of this proposition is presented in the appendix. In this proposition, conditions (i)–(iii) are satisfied in a general range of parameter values. In particular, from the definition of parameters χs and χb, it follows that conditions (i) and (ii) hold in general. χs and χb stand for the increase in debt for a unit increase in savers’ or borrowers’ consumption that appears in the borrowers’ budget constraint. χs is always negative, for the increase in savers’ consumption reduces the borrowers’ debt as borrowers’ wage income increases. χb can be positive or negative but its absolute value should be small, for the increase in debt induced by the higher consumption of borrowers is offset by the higher wage income they receive.
Since conditions (i) and (ii) are independent of both monetary (φπ ) and macroprudential (φL) policy parameters, the necessity part of the proposition does not depend on macroprudential policy. It tells us that even with macroprudential policy, a determinacy result in a simple New Keynesian model known as the Taylor principle still holds. That is, the model does not have a unique bounded equilibrium unless φπ is greater than one, regardless of the value of φL. This result shows that the addition of macroprudential policy in this paper does not affect the role of monetary policy and its willingness to stabilize inflation for inflation determination.
4. How do monetary and macroprudential policies affect inflation and credit?
4.1. Forward-looking expressions: inflation and credit
This section derives forward-looking expressions for inflation and credit to study how their dynamics are affected by monetary and macroprudential policy parameters. To begin, define weighted
2 γs ≡ (nsσC + csσN ), γb ≡ (nbσC + cbσN ), cb ≡ Cb/C, cs ≡ Cs/C, ns ≡ Ns/N, nb ≡ Nb/N. 3 χb = cb −
wNb Y [(1 +
1 σN
)(nbσC + cbσN ) − σC σN
], χs = − wNb Y (1 +
1 σN
)(nsσC +
csσN ), χa = wNb Y (σN + 1).
4 There is a determinacy region where φπ ≪ 0 or φL < 0, but I rule out these cases as being of little economic interest.
output as ˆ̃Y t ≡ γsĈs,t + γbĈb,t . Then by combining Eqs. (5)–(7), we can write π̂t as
π̂t = βEt π̂t+1 + κ[(γsĈs,t + γbĈb,t ) − (1 + σN )ât ]
= βEt π̂t+1 + κ Et (γsĈs,t+1 + γbĈb,t+1) +
γ
σC (−φπ π̂t
+ Et π̂t+1 + û d t ) −
γb
σC (ω + φL)l̂t − (1 + σN )ât
=
1 1 + φπ κγ /σC
Et
×
∞ j=0
β + κγ /σC
1 + φπ κγ /σC
j κ
ˆ̃Y t+j+1 +
γ
σC ûdt+j − (1 + σN )ât+j
(a)
−
∞ j=0
β + κγ /σC
1 + φπ κγ /σC
j κγb
σC (ω + φL)l̂t+j
(b)
. (9)
According to (9), inflation is determined by the present value of future expected weighted outputs and exogenous shocks (enclosed by (a)), and financial frictions and macroprudential responses (enclosed by (b)). If the model is a simple New Keynesian model without a saver–borrower distinction, inflation would be completely explained by the future path of the output gap, which corresponds to part (a) in this model. It is observed that the monetary policy parameter (φπ ) affects inflation through the term
β+κγ /σC 1+φπ κγ /σC
, which serves to discount future variables. For example, a high value of φπ makes inflation less sensitive to the expected path of the output gap or credit. On the other hand, the effect of the macroprudential policy parameter (φL) on inflation is smaller, only captured by terms in (b) provided the effect of macroprudential
policy on future ˆ̃Y is limited. Moreover, (b) is scaled by γb, a weighted share of borrowers in the economy, implying that the effect of macroprudential policy on inflation is even smaller because it is a restriction applied only to borrowing households.
Similarly, a forward-looking expression for l̂t can be derived from (8),
l̂t = Et
∞ j=0
1
Rb(1 + ω + φL)
j −
φπ π̂t+j − π̂t+j+1
1 + ω + φL (a)
− χbĈb,t+j+1 + χsĈs,t+j+1 + χaât+j+1
(1 + ω + φL)(RbL/Y ) (b)
. (10)
In Eq. (10), the current level of credit depends negatively on the expected future path of the real interest rate (enclosed by (a)) and consumption net of labor income (enclosed by (b)). The macroprudential policy parameter (φL) appears in the discount factor 1
Rb(1+ω+φL) , where it influences l̂t . This explains that the role
φL plays in stabilizing credit dynamics.
4.2. Dynamics
This section shows the difference between macroprudential policy and monetary policy with respect to inflation and credit
H. Suh / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149 147
(a) Preference shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 1.5.
(b) Productivity shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 1.5.
Fig. 1. The effect of macroprudential policy parameter (φL) to credit.
(a) Preference shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 1.5.
(b) Productivity shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 1.5.
Fig. 2. Comparison between macroprudential policy and monetary policy reacting to credit.
dynamics. Parameters for preference, production, and exoge- nous process parameters are calibrated as β = 0.9922, βb = 0.9893, σc = 1, σN = 1, ω = 0.02, κ = 0.17, ρud = ρa = 0.8. In the steady state, the saving interest rate is 3.1%, the borrowing rate is 4.3% and the household debt to GDP ratio is 76.7%. Borrowing households supply 53% of total labor and consume 47% of total out- put. Monetary policy’s reaction to inflation is given by φπ = 1.5.
Figs. 1–3 show the impulse responses of inflation and credit to a preference shock (ûdt ) and a productivity shock (ât). Fig. 1 shows the effects of macroprudential policy with different policy reactions to credit (φL = 0, 0.05, 0.15). Fig. 1(a) shows that a positive preference shock increases inflation, but lowers the level of credit. Credit falls because monetary policy responding to higher inflation sets the interest rate higher. In Fig. 1(b), this channel produces the opposite dynamics given a positive productivity shock, as inflation falls and credit increases. In both panels, higher φL helps credit dynamics stabilize more quickly. The reason is that higher φL discounts the impact of the shocks on credit more heavily, as explained by Eq. (10). However, inflation dynamics
do not significantly vary across different values of φL. In Figs. 2 and 3, I compare macroprudential policy with a monetary policy rule that responds to credit. There are three different policy specifications. In the ‘Baseline’ case, there is no macroprudential policy (φL = 0) and monetary policy reacts only to inflation. In the ‘macroprudential policy’ case, macroprudential policy reacts to credit (φL = 0.1) and monetary policy reacts only to inflation. In the ‘monetary policy’ case, there is no macroprudential policy and monetary policy reacts to both inflation and credit. Monetary policy’s reaction to credit is modeled by introducing a new monetary policy rule, R̂st = φπ π̂t +φLL̂t (φL = 0.1). Fig. 2(a) and (b) show that macroprudential policy is more effective at stabilizing credit than monetary policy. Macroprudential policy stabilizes the dynamics of credit while leaving the dynamics of inflation virtually unchanged. Monetary policy’s reaction to credit does not stabilize the response of credit well, and it induces more volatile inflation dynamics. This result shows that an interest rate rule is ‘too blunt’ instrument to be used for credit stabilization in this New Keynesian model. In Fig. 3, I compare two policies under a stronger monetary
148 H. Suh / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149
(a) Preference shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 3.
(b) Productivity shock. Monetary policy reaction to inflation φπ = 3.
Fig. 3. Comparison between macroprudential policy and monetary policy reacting to credit.
response to inflation (φπ = 3). Similarly to Fig. 2, macroprudential policy stabilizes credit dynamics while leaving inflation dynamics unchanged. A monetary policy’s reaction to credit stabilizes credit, but the effect is weaker compared to macroprudential policy. Inflation dynamics are again more volatile when using monetary policy but the impact is mitigated by stronger φπ . To summarize, macroprudential policy is more effective than a monetary policy rule reacting to credit at controlling credit in this New Keynesian model. Not only is this type of monetary policy ineffective in controlling credit, but it also increases inflation volatility.
5. Conclusion
The model in this paper simplifies the structure of many macro- financial dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that have been used for studying monetary or macroprudential policy. (For example, Curdia and Woodford, 2010, and Kannan et al., 2012.) The key result of this paper is the relative advantages (and disadvantages) of macroprudential policy and monetary policy as instruments for stabilizing credit and inflation. This result stems from the way two policies differently influence saving and borrowing decisions in this New Keynesian model featuring solvency risk. This suggests that there is a need to explore macroprudential policies across a wider array of models. I leave this for future research.
Appendix A. Steady-state equilibrium
Let us normalize the size of labor so that Ns + Nb = 1 = Y . Also assume that the steady-state inflation π = 1. Then the steady- state of the economy can be described by the following equilibrium conditions:
Rs = 1/β, Rb = 1/βb = (1 + ω + φL)Ω0Ξ0R slω+φL , (A.1)
Cb 1 − Cb
−σC =
Nb
1 − Nb
σN , (A.2)
l = wNb + Dft − Cb
Rb − 1 , (A.3)
1 µ
= w, (A.4)
where µ is the steady-state markup taken by intermediate goods producers.
Appendix B. Proof of the proposition
P(λ) is given by
P(λ) = (Γ3 − λ)(1 − λ) (1 − λ)(1/β − λ) + (φπ − λ)
κ
β γ
+ (ω + φL)
(1 − λ)
−(1/β − λ)Γ1 −
κ
β γbΓ2
+ (φπ − λ)(χsγb − χbγs)
κ
βL/Y
.
= λ 4 + A3λ
3 + A2λ
2 + A1λ + A0, (γ = γs + γb) (B.1)
Γ1 = χb
L/Y +
κ
β γb
Rb +
χb + χs
L/Y
,
Γ2 =
φπ −
1 β
Rb +
χb + χs
L/Y
,
Γ3 = R b + (ω + φL)
Rb +
χb
L/Y
.
A3 = −(Γ3 + 2 + 1/β) − κγ /β,
A2 = Γ3(2 +
1 β
) + 1 + 2 β
+
κγ
β (Γ3 + φπ + 1) − Γ1(ω + φL),
A1 = −[(Γ3 + 1)/β + Γ3(1 + 1/β)] − [φπ (Γ3 + 1) + Γ3] κ
β γ
+ (ω + φL)
Γ2
κ
β γb + (1/β + 1)Γ1
− (χsγb − χbγs) κ
βL/Y
,
A0 = Γ3
1/β + φπ
κ
β γ
+ (ω + φL)
−
κ
β γbΓ2 −
Γ1
β
+ φπ (χsγb − χbγs) κ
βL/Y
.
1. Necessity. Suppose P(λ) = 0 has exactly one real root with a radius smaller than 1. Then P(1) · P(−1) < 0, since otherwise it has zero, two or four roots inside the unit circle. Next, to
H. Suh / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 144–149 149
.4)
P(−1) = (1 + Rb)2 2
1 +
1 β
+
φπ + 1 σC
κ
β γ
(a)
+ (ω + φL)
Rb +
χb
(L/Y )σc
2
2
1 +
1 β
+
φπ + 1 σC
κ
β γ
(b)
+ ω + φL
σC
−2
1 +
1 β
χb
L/Y − (1 + φπ )
κγb
β
Rb +
χb + χs
(L/Y )σC
− (φπ + 1)
κ
β
γbR
b + γ
χb
(L/Y )σC
(c)
. (B
Box I.
examine the signs of P(1) and P(−1), calculate A3 + A1 = (P(1) − P(−1))/2.
A3 + A1 = (1 + R b )
−2
1 +
1 β
−
κγ
βσC (φπ + 1)
+
ω + φL
σC
−
κγs
β Rb(1 + φπ ) −
κφπ
β
· γsχb − γbχs
(L/Y )σC −
2σC R
b +
χb
L/Y
1 +
1 β
< 0 ⇔ P(1) − P(−1) < 0. (B.2)
Since P(1) < P(−1), it follows that P(1) = ω+φL σC
· φπ −1
σC (χsγb −
χbγs) κ
βL/Y < 0. By assumption (i), ω+φL
σC (χsγb − χbγs)
κ βL/Y < 0
and φπ > 1. 2. Sufficiency. Suppose (i)–(iii). First note P(0) > 1. To see this,
write βP(0) as
βP(0) = Rb 1 +
φπ κγ
σC
+
ω + φL
σC
RbσC +
χb
L/Y
×
1 +
φπ κγ
σC
− κφπ
Rbγb +
χb
(L/Y )σC γ
−
χb
L/Y
= Rb
1 +
φπ κγ
σC
+
ω + φL
σC
× Rb(σC + φπ κγs) > 0. (B.3)
Next, we can show that P(−1) > 0. Eq. (B.4) is given in Box I. In Eq. (B.4), (a) is positive, and one can show that (b) + (c) > 0. Knowing P(−1) > 0, P(0) = A0 > 1, and provided P(A0) > 0, a sufficient condition for P(λ) = 0 to have exactly one real root
with a radius smaller than 1 is P(1) < 0, which holds if and only if φπ > 1. First, P(0) > 0, P(1) < 0, P(A0) > 0 guarantees that there is at least one root between 0 and 1, and at least one root between 1 and A0. Since P(−1) > 0, it is only possible that both of the other two roots have radii greater than 1 or smaller than 1. Suppose the other two roots have radii smaller than 1. Then there is only one root with a radius greater than 1 (denoted by λ1) that satisfies 1 < λ1 < A0. However, then the product of all roots (λ1λ2λ3λ4) becomes smaller than A0, a contradiction because λ1λ2λ3λ4 = A0. Therefore, the radii of the other two roots must be greater than 1, satisfying the Blanchard–Kahn condition.
References
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Dib, A., 2010. Capital requirement and financial frictions in banking: macroeco- nomic implications. Working Papers 10-26, Bank of Canada.
Dixit, A.K., Stiglitz, J.E., 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. Amer. Econ. Rev. 67 (3), 297–308.
Iacoviello, M., 2005. House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy in the business cycle. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95 (3), 739–764.
Kannan, P., Rabanal, P., Scott, A.M., 2012. Monetary and macroprudential policy rules in a model with house price booms. B.E. J. Macroecon. 12 (1), 16.
Suh, H., 2012. Macroprudential policy: its effects and relationship to monetary policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 12-28.
Svensson, L.E., 2012. Comment on Michael Woodford, ‘inflation targeting and financial stability’. Sver. Riksbank Econ. Rev. 2012, 1.
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- Dichotomy between macroprudential policy and monetary policy on credit and inflation
- Introduction
- Model
- Model determinacy
- How do monetary and macroprudential policies affect inflation and credit?
- Forward-looking expressions: inflation and credit
- Dynamics
- Conclusion
- Steady-state equilibrium
- Proof of the proposition
- References
1-s2.0-S0261560614001211-main.pdf
Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of International Money and Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jimf
Sudden floods, macroprudential regulation and stability in an open economy*
Pierre-Richard Ag�enor a, *, Koray Alper b, Luiz A. Pereira da Silva c
a University of Manchester, and Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research, United Kingdom b Central Bank of Turkey, Turkey c Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Available online 7 August 2014
JEL classification: E44 E51 F41
Keywords: Capital inflows Open-economy DSSGE models Macroprudential regulation Macroeconomic stability Financial stability
* We are grateful to an anonymous referee an Development Bank Seminar for Central Banks and the European Central Bank, for helpful comments expressed in this paper are our own. * Corresponding author.
E-mail address: pierre-richard.agenor@manche
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.07.007 0261-5606/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
a b s t r a c t
A dynamic stochastic model of a small open economy with a two- level banking intermediation structure, a risk-sensitive regulatory capital regime, and imperfect capital mobility is developed. Firms borrow from a domestic bank and the bank borrows on world capital markets, in both cases subject to a premium. A sudden flood in capital flows generates an expansion in credit and activity, as well as asset price pressures. Countercyclical capital regulation, in the form of a Basel III-type rule based on credit gaps, is effective at promoting macro stability (defined in terms of the volatility of a weighted average of inflation and output deviations) and financial stability (defined in terms of three measures based on asset prices, the credit-to-GDP ratio, and the ratio of bank foreign borrowing to GDP). However, because the gain in terms of reduced economic volatility exhibits diminishing returns, in practice a countercyclical regulatory capital rule may need to be supplemented by other, more targeted macroprudential instruments when shocks are large and persistent.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
d participants at the G20 Seminar in Rio de Janeiro, the Inter-American Ministries of Finance, and at seminars at the Central Bank of Brazil and
and discussions. Appendices A and B are available upon request. The views
ster.ac.uk (P.-R. Ag�enor).
.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 69
1. Introduction
The experience of the past two decades, including most recently the global financial turmoil triggered by the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States, has made painfully clear that abrupt reversals in short-term capital movements tend to exacerbate financial volatility and may lead to full-blown crises. Although misaligned domestic fundamentals (in the form of either overvalued exchange rates, excessive short-term foreign borrowing, or growing fiscal and current account imbalances) usually play an important role in financial crises, they have called attention to the inherent instability of international financial markets and the risks that cross-border financial transactions e facilitated by dramatic technological advances e can pose for countries with relatively fragile financial systems, weak regulatory and supervision structures, and policy regimes that lack flexibility.1
In this vein, the post-crisis global excess liquidity and large interest rate differentials caused by the expansionary monetary policies of reserve currency-issuing countries has brought to policy- makers in many middle-income countries e as well as in small industrial countries like Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland e the challenge of managing large amounts of capital inflows while preserving an independent monetary policy to keep macroeconomic and financial stability at home. Indeed, between early 2009 and mid 2011 “sudden floods” of private capital to Latin America led to rapid credit growth and monetary expansion (due to the difficulty and cost of pursuing sterilization policies), an expansion in economic activity, real exchange rate appreciation and widening current account deficits, and pressures on asset prices.2 In turn, these pressures raised concerns about asset price bubbles and financial fragility in many countries of the region.3
The scope for responding to the risk of macroeconomic and financial instability through monetary policy proved limited, because higher domestic interest rates vis-�a-vis zero interest floors pre- vailing in advanced economies would have exacerbated capital inflows. Other measures (such as direct taxes on fixed income and equity inflows, and foreign exchange market intervention) had some success but created other challenges related to the reaction of long-term investors vis-�a-vis the overall policy stance.
A key issue therefore is, and continues to be, to identify short-term policy responses that can help to mitigate the impact of external financial shocks, in an environment where the use of short-term policy rates has to balance internal and external stability objectives. This paper focuses on the role of macroprudential regulation in mitigating the macroeconomic and financial instability that may be associated with sudden floods in private capital, in particular foreign bank borrowing. We do so not because of the size of bank-related capital flowsdeven though these flows have accounted at times for a highly significant share of cross-border capital movements.4 Rather, it is because our goal is to highlight the role of banks in transmitting external shocks and the risk that capital flows, inter- mediated directly through the banking system, may lead to the formation of credit-fueled bubbles and foster financial instability. To conduct our analysis, we dwell on the closed-economy model with credit market imperfections described in Ag�enor et al. (2013). A key feature of that model is a direct link between house prices and credit growth, via the impact of housing wealth on collateral and interest rate spreads. We extend it in several directions. First, we consider an open economy where
1 See Ag�enor (2012) for an overview of the evidence. Terms-of-trade fluctuations can generate sizable output and employment effects, which may increase exchange rate volatility and exacerbate movements in short-term capital flows.
2 Episodes of large capital inflows in Latin America and elsewhere have not been systematically associated with upfront increases in inflation. A key reason is that in many cases the deflationary effect of the exchange rate appreciation associated with these inflows (especially when a large proportion of intermediate goods is imported) has been very pronounced. As discussed later, in our model this is an important aspect of the transmission channel of external shocks.
3 Under a flexible exchange rate, growing external deficits tend to bring about a currency depreciation, which may eventually lead to a realignment of relative prices and induce self-correcting movements in trade flows. However, sharp swings in capital flows make it more difficult for the central bank to strike a balance between its different objectives; in turn, this may lead to exchange rate volatility.
4 According to data by the Institute of International Finance for instance, in 2011 net inflows of private capital associated with commercial banks accounted for almost 26 percent of total net private inflows to Emerging Asia.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10070
capital is imperfectly mobile internationallydan assumption that accords well with the evidence for developing countries (see Ag�enor and Montiel (2015)). Domestic private borrowers face an upward- sloping supply curve of funds on world capital markets, and internalize the effect of capital market imperfections in making their portfolio decisions. Thus, unlike New Keynesian models of the type developed by Kollman (2001), Caputo et al. (2006), Adolfson et al. (2008, 2014), and others, the external risk premium depends on the individual's borrowing needs, not the economy's overall level of debt.5 As a result of these imperfections, the domestic bond rate continues to be determined by the equilibrium condition of the money market, instead of foreign interest rates (as implied by uncovered interest rate parity under perfect capital mobility). Second, we consider a managed float and imperfect pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to domestic prices. Both features are well supported by the evidence.
Third, banks borrow on world capital markets, and their borrowing decisions affect the terms at which they obtain funds. At the same time, domestic agents borrow only from domestic banks. These assumptions are in contrast to many contributions in the existing literature, where it is usually assumed that firms (or their owners, households) borrow directly on world capital markets subject to a binding constraint determined by their net worth.6 Most importantly, in our setting a sudden drop in the world risk-free interest rate induces banks to borrow more in foreign currency. This reduces their domestic borrowing from the central bank. Nevertheless, the inflow of foreign exchange is such that the monetary base expands, and this requires a lower bond rate to maintain equilibrium in the money market. The drop in the bond rate raises real estate prices, which increases the value of collateral that firms can pledge. Higher collateral values, in turn, are accompanied with a fall in the loan rate, thereby stimulating investment. Large inflows of private capital may therefore generate an economic boom that is magnified by a financial accelerator effect, through their impact on collateral values, banks' balance sheets, and loan pricing decisions.7
Fourth, as noted earlier, we consider the role of bank regulation as a policy to mitigate the adverse effects of sudden floods. In the model, countercyclical capital regulation takes the form of a Basel III-type rule, similar to the rule specified in Ag�enor et al. (2013). It has been argued that by raising capital re- quirements in a countercyclical way regulators could help to choke off asset price bubblesdsuch as the one that developed in the US housing marketdbefore vulnerabilities take hold and a crisis is triggered. We apply this idea to external financial shocks. In a way, countercyclical regulation aims to internalize potential trade-offs between the objectives of macroeconomic stability and financial stability. To measure financial stability we consider three alternative measures, based on the volatility of asset prices (house prices and the nominal exchange rate), domestic credit, and bank foreign borrowing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The pre- sentation of its closed-economy ingredients is kept as brief as possible, given that they are described at length in Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013). Instead, we focus on how the model presented here departs from those papers, especially with respect to the financial sector and the counter- cyclical regulatory rule. In addition, in order to focus on the issue at hand, we make three strategic modeling choicesdwe adopt reduced-form specifications with respect to the probability of repayment and the exchange rate pass-through effect, and we abstract from the (empirically important) fact that a fraction of consumers are liquidity constrained.8 The equilibrium is char- acterized in Section 3 and some key features of the steady state are discussed in Section 4. An illustrative calibration is presented in Section 5. The results of our base experiment, a temporary
5 The reason why the premium on foreign bond holdings is assumed to depend on the domestic households' (or the economy's) aggregate net foreign asset position is to ensure a well-defined steady-state. Alternatively, Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000) and others introduce transactions costs in the foreign sector, but they are also treated as given in the optimization process.
6 See for instance C�espedes et al. (2003, 2004), Cook (2004), Choi and Cook (2004), Elekdag et al. (2006, 2007), Guajardo (2008), and Leblebicioglu (2009).
7 Note that, in practice, nonbank firms have also benefited extensively from global excess liquidity conditions, which pose other complex problems of financial disintermediation, supervision, balance sheet imbalances and risks to financial instability. These issues are not considered in our paper but nevertheless create critical challenges to policymakers.
8 As noted later, accounting for the last feature would simply strengthen our main results.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 71
drop in the world (risk-free) interest rate, which translates into a sudden flood of private capital, are described in Section 6. Sensitivity tests, involving alternative assumptions about the degree of exchange-rate pass-through, the nature of the reserve accumulation rule, and the response of monetary policy to exchange rate movements, are reported in Section 7. Optimal regulatory policy is discussed in Section 8. The last section offers concluding remarks and discusses some potentially fruitful directions for future investigation.
2. The economy
We consider a small open economy populated by six categories of agents: a representative household, intermediate goods-producing (IG) firms, a homogeneous final good (FG) producer, a capital good (CG) producer, a financial intermediary (a bank, for short), the government, and the central bank, which also regulates the bank.9 The country produces a continuum of intermediate goods, which are imperfect substitutes to a continuum of imported intermediate goods. In line with the McCallum-Nelson approach, imports are not treated as finished consumer goods but rather as inter- mediate goods, which are used (together with domestic intermediate goods) in the production of the domestic final good. This approach is quite relevant for many middle-income countries.10 The final good is consumed by the household and the government, used for investment (subject to additional costs) by the CG producer, or exported. There is monopolistic competition in intermediate goods markets; each domestic intermediate good is produced by a single firm.
The household owns all domestic firms. It supplies labor, consumes, and holds domestic and foreign financial assets. It deposits funds in the bank at the beginning of the period and collects them (with interest) at the end of the period, after the goods market closes. It makes its housing stock available, without any direct charge, to the CG producer, which uses it as collateral against which it borrows from the bank to buy the final good for investment purposes, produce capital, and then rent it to IG pro- ducers. IG firms use labor and capital as production inputs, and adjust prices toward equilibrium markups over marginal costs of production.
The bank supplies credit to IG producers as well, who use it to finance their labor costs prior to the sale of output. The maturity period of both categories of bank loans and the maturity period of bank deposits is the same. In each period, loans are extended prior to activity (production or investment) and paid off at the end of the period. Its supply of loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate. To satisfy capital regulations, it issues domestic nominal debt, in line with the level of (risky) loans in its portfolio.11 It also borrows on world capital markets and from the central bank. At the end of each period, it repays with interest household deposits and the liquidity borrowed from the central bank, and redeems in full its domestic and foreign debt. All profits are then distributed, the bank is liquidated, and a new bank opens at the beginning of the next period.
The central bank supplies liquidity elastically to the commercial bank and alters its policy rate in response to deviations in output from its steady-state level and inflation deviations from target, as well as deviations in the growth rate of an indicator of financial stability. It does not engage in sterilization activities but it accumulates foreign-currency reserves based on a rule that depends on the volume of
9 The assumption of a single financial intermediary is made essentially to simplify notations. Our results would remain essentially the same if we were to assume instead monopolistic competition among a multitude of banks, and that in a symmetric equilibrium all banks behave identically. 10 In Brazil for instance, the average share of intermediate goods (including oil) in total imports amounted to 64 percent during 2006e09; for Turkey, it exceeded 68 percent for the same period. As noted by McCallum and Nelson (2000), an advantage of this approach is that it avoids the assumption (implied by the tradable-nontradable dichotomy) that export and import goods are perfectly substitutable in production. However, here the relevant price index for produced goods is not the same as the consumer price index. 11 This assumption is consistent with the evidence, which suggests that prior to the global financial crisis banks often met capital requirements by issuing “hybrid” securities that are more like debt than equity. In addition, even though the definition of capital was tightened under the new Basel III rules (only common stocks and retained earnings can count as Tier 1 capital, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)), there has been a shift in recent years toward allowing banks to hold capital not only in the form of core (Tier 1) equity but also in the form of loss-absorbing debt, such as contingent convertible bonds, which convert into equity once a bank's capital ratio falls below a certain threshold.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10072
imports and net foreign-currency liabilities of the private sector.12 Finally, capital mobility is imperfect.
2.1. Households
The objective of the representative household is to maximize.
Ut ¼ Et X∞ s¼0
b s
( C1�2
�1 tþs
1 � 2�1 þ hN lnð1 � NtþsÞ þ hx ln xtþs þ hH ln Htþs ) ; (1)
where Ct is consumption, Nt ¼ Z 1
0 Njtdj, the share of total time endowment (normalized to unity) spent
working, with Njt denoting the number of hours of labor provided to the intermediate-good producing firm j, xt a composite index of real monetary assets, Ht the stock of housing, b 2 (0,1) the subjective discount factor, 2 > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, Et the expectation operator conditional on the information available at the beginning of period t, and hN, hx, hH > 0. Housing services are taken to be proportional to their stock.
The composite monetary asset is generated by a geometric average of real cash balances, mPt , and real bank deposits, dt, both at the beginning of period t:
xt ¼ � mPt �n d1�nt ; (2)
where n 2 (0,1). End-of-period nominal wealth, At, is defined as.
At ¼ MPt þ Dt þ PHt Ht þ BPt þ EtBF;Pt þ Vt; (3) where, MPt ¼ PSt mPt is nominal cash holdings (with PSt denoting the price of final goods sold on the domestic market), Dt ¼ PSt dt nominal bank deposits, PHt the price of housing, Vt nominal holdings of bank debt, BPt (EtB
F;P t ) nominal holdings of one-period, noncontingent domestic (foreign) government
bonds, where Et is the nominal exchange rate (expressed as the domestic-currency price of foreign
currency) and BF;Pt the foreign-currency value of foreign assets. Domestic government bonds are held only at home.
The household enters period t with MPt�1 holdings of cash balances. It also collects principal plus interest on bank deposits at the rate contracted in t � 1, iDt�1, principal and interest payments on maturing domestic and foreign government bonds, at rates iBt�1 and i
F;P t�1 respectively, and principal and
interest payments on bank debt, at rate iVt�1. At the beginning of the period, the household chooses the levels of cash, deposits, bank debt,
housing services, the amounts of domestic and foreign bonds, and labor supply to IG producers, for which it receives factor payments of utNt, where ut ¼ Wt=PSt is the economy-wide real wage (with Wt denoting the nominal wage), measured in terms of the price of final goods sold domestically. At the end
of the period, it receives all the profits made by the IG firms, JIt ¼ Z 1
0 JIjtdj, the CG producer, J
K t , and the
bank, JBt , which is (as noted earlier) liquidated at the end of the period. 13
The household's end-of-period budget constraint is thus.
12 As documented by Aizenman and Glick (2009), even though the degree of sterilization (as measured by offset coefficients) has increased in recent years in many middle-income countries, it remains imperfectdespecially in Latin America. Note also that in thin and imperfect financial markets, sterilized intervention often drives up interest rates on the securities used for interventiondand this often results in even greater capital inflows. The policy is therefore not sustainable, in addition to being costly. 13 The FG firm makes zero profits.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 73
DMPt þ Dt þ � BPt þ EtBF;Pt
� þ PHt DHt þ Vt ¼ PSt ðutNt � TtÞ � PSt Ct þ
� 1 þ iDt�1
� Dt�1
þ � 1 þ iBt�1
� BPt�1 þ
� 1 þ iF;Pt�1
� EtB
F;P t�1
þ � 1 þ iVt�1
� Vt�1 þ JIt þ JKt þ JBt � QV
V2t 2
; (4)
where Tt denotes the real value of lump-sum taxes and the last term represents transactions costs associated with changes in holdings of bank debt, with QV > 0 denoting an adjustment cost param- eter.14 For simplicity, we assume that housing does not depreciate.
The rate of return on foreign bonds is defined as.
1 þ iF;Pt ¼ � 1 þ iWt
�� 1 � qF;Pt
� ; (5)
where iWt is the risk-free world interest rate and q F;P t an endogenous spread, defined as
q F;P t ¼
q F;P 0 2
BF;Pt ; (6)
where qF;P0 > 0. As discussed at length in Ag�enor (1997, 1998, 2006) this specification reflects the view
that the household is able to lend (or borrow, with BF;Pt < 0) more on world capital markets only at a lower (higher) rate of interest; the latter captures the existence of individual default risk.15 Our treat- ment differs substantially from the country risk specification often adopted in the open-economy New Keynesian literature; see, for instance, Benigno (2009), Lind�e et al. (2009), and Adolfson et al. (2008, 2014). In our specification, as in Benigno's, the premium is symmetric; households receive a lower (pay a higher) rate on their international savings (foreign debt). However, with country risk, the spread depends (positively) on the country's net foreign debt, or (negatively) on the economy's net foreign
assets, defined as NFAt ¼ RFt þ BF;Pt � L F;B t , where R
F t denotes central bank reserves and L
F;B t bank
borrowing. In our specification, qF;Pt depends only on individual (net) assets, B F;P t . Moreover, the
representative household in our setting internalizes the effect of its borrowing decisions on the pre- mium that it faces, rather than taking it as given as in models with country risk.
The risk-free world interest rate follows a first-order autoregressive process:
ln iWt ¼ rW ln iWt�1 þ xWt ; where rW 2 (0,1) and x
W t � Nð0; sxWÞ.
The household maximizes lifetime utility with respect to Ct, Nt, mPtþ1, dtþ1, B P t , B
F;P t , Ht, and Vt, taking
as given period-t � 1 variables as well as PHt , Pt, ut, domestic interest rates, iWt , profits, and Tt. Let 1 þ pStþ1 ¼ PStþ1=PSt and let lt denote the shadow price associated with constraint (4), that is, the marginal value of wealth. Maximizing (1) subject to (2)e(6) yields the following first-order conditions:
C�1=2t ¼ lt; (7)
Nt ¼ 1 � hNC
1=2 t
ut ; (8)
14 As in Markovic (2006) for instance, the adjustment cost is taken to be a deadweight loss for society. 15 A more general specification would be to specify the risk premium as a convex curve, with a binding constraint when BF;Pt is sufficiently high. However, this does not make much difference here, given that the model is solved in its log-linearized form. Adolfson et al. (2008, 2014) introduce the expected change in the exchange rate in the specification of the premium, but this is largely arbitrary.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10074
mPt ¼ hxnC
1=2 t
� 1 þ iBt
� iBt
; (9)
dt ¼ hxð1 � nÞC1=2t
� 1 þ iBt
� iBt � iDt
; (10)
hH
Ht ¼ lt
PHt PSt
! � bEt
" ltþ1
PHtþ1 PStþ1
!# ; (11)
�lt þ bEt ( ltþ1
1 þ iVt
1 þ pStþ1
!) � QVlt
Vt PSt
¼ 0; (12)
�lt þ bEt ( ltþ1
1 þ iBt
1 þ pStþ1
!) ¼ 0; (13)
1 þ iBt ¼ � 1 � qF;P0 B
F;P t
�� 1 þ iWt
� Et
� Etþ1 Et
� : (14)
These conditions are familiar except for (11), (12), and (14). Equation (11), combined with (7) and (13), yields the demand for housing as:
PHt Ht PSt
¼ ( 1 � Et
1 þ pHtþ1 1 þ iBt
!)�1" hH
ðCtÞ�1=2
# ; (15)
where 1 þ pHtþ1 ¼ PHtþ1=PHt . Combining (12) and (13) yields.
Vdt PSt
¼ Q�1V iVt � iBt 1 þ iBt
! ; (16)
which shows that the demand for bank debt depends positively on its rate of return and negatively on the domestic bond rate.
Equation (14) is an arbitrage condition, which equates the expected marginal rates of return on domestic and foreign assets under the assumption of imperfect world capital markets. It reflects the
fact that the marginal rate of return on foreign bonds falls with a marginal increase in BF;Pt , or equiv- alently that the marginal cost of borrowing abroad rises with a marginal increase in the amount borrowed. Condition (14) can therefore be rearranged to give holdings of foreign bonds as.
BF;Pt ¼ � 1 þ iWt
� EtðEtþ1=EtÞ �
� 1 þ iBt
� q F;P 0
� 1 þ iWt
� EtðEtþ1=EtÞ
; (17)
which shows that the optimal level of household holdings of foreign bonds is a function of the dif- ference between the world safe interest rate (adjusted for expected depreciation) and the domestic
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 75
bond rate. Perfect capital mobility prevails when qF;P0 /0, in which case 1 þ iBt ¼ ð1 þ iWt ÞEtðEtþ1=EtÞ, corresponding to the standard uncovered interest parity condition.
2.2. Domestic final good
The final-good producer imports a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods directly (without incurring distribution costs) from the rest of the world and combines them with a similar continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods to generate a domestic final good, which is sold both domestically (for consumption and investment) and abroad. The good is produced in quantity Yt using a CES technology:
Yt ¼ � LD
� YDt �ðh�1Þ=h
þ ð1 � LDÞ � YFt �ðh�1Þ=h�h=ðh�1Þ
; (18)
where LD 2 (0,1), YDt (Y F t ) a quantity index of domestic (imported) intermediate goods, and h > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between baskets of domestic and imported composite intermediate goods. These baskets are defined as
Yit ¼ 8< : Z 1
0
h Yijt iðqi�1Þ=qi
dj
9= ;
qi=ðqi�1Þ
; i ¼ D; F (19)
where qi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate domestic goods among themselves (i ¼ D), and imported goods among themselves (i ¼ F), and Yijt is the quantity of type-j intermediate good of category i (domestic or imported), for j 2 (0,1).16
The FG producer sells its output at a perfectly competitive price. Let PDjt denote the price of domestic
intermediate good j set by firm j, and PFjt the price of imported intermediate good j, in domestic cur-
rency. Cost minimization yields the demand functions for each variety of intermediate goods:
Yijt ¼ Pijt Pit
!�qi Yit; i ¼ D; F (20)
where PDt and P F t are price indices for domestic and imported intermediate goods, respectively:
Pit ¼ 8< : Z 1
0
� Pijt �1�qi
dj
9= ;
1=ð1�qiÞ
; i ¼ D; F (21)
Aggregating across firms yields the allocation of total demand between domestic and foreign in- termediate goods17:
YDt ¼ LhD PDt Pt
!�h Yt; Y
F t ¼ ð1 � LDÞh
PFt Pt
!�h Yt; (22)
where Pt is the implicit final output deflator (or final producer price), given by
16 For simplicity, the number of both domestic and imported intermediate goods is normalized to unity. 17 Combining Equation (22) yields YDt =Y
F t ¼ ½LD=ð1 � LDÞ�hðPDt =PFt Þ�h, which relates relative demands for intermediate goods
to relative prices.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10076
Pt ¼ � L
h D
� PDt �1�h
þ ð1 � LDÞh � PFt �1�h�1=ð1�hÞ
: (23)
To allow for imperfect exchange rate pass-through of import prices, we assume local currency price stickiness. Specifically, the domestic-currency price of imports of intermediate good j is taken to be determined through a simple partial adjustment mechanism.
PFjt ¼ � EtWP
F jt
�mF � PFjt�1
�1�mF ; (24)
where WPFjt is the foreign-currency price of good j and m F 2 (0,1) measures the speed of adjustment of
the domestic-currency price of imports to its “normal” value, EtWPFjt; there is complete pass-through
(that is, producer currency pricing) if and only if mF ¼ 1.18 For mF < 1, in the short term the domestic- currency price of imports will reflect only partially current fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate, whereas in the long term complete pass-through will occur.
To model the allocation of production of the final good between sales on the domestic market, YSt , and exports, Y
X t , we assume that the volume sold abroad depends only on the domestic-
currency price of exports of the final good, PXt , relative to the price of goods sold on the domes- tic market, PSt
19:
YXt ¼ YX0 PXt PSt
!8 ; (25)
where 8 > 0. The domestic-currency price of exports is given by.
PXt ¼ EtWPXt ; (26) where WPXt is the world price. Thus, exports are priced in the importers' currency, in line with the evidence for many developing countries.
The volume of goods sold on the domestic market is given by.
YSt ¼ Yt � YXt : (27)
2.3. Domestic intermediate goods
Each IG producer j 2 (0,1) combines labor and capital to produce a distinct, perishable good that is sold on a monopolistically competitive market:
YDjt ¼ N1�ajt Kajt; (28)
where Njt is the supply of labor by the representative household to firm j and a 2 (0,1).
18 Alternatively, to account for imperfect exchange rate pass-through, we could introduce a monopolistically competitive import goods sector and assume that domestic prices of imported intermediate goods are sticky �a la Calvo-Rotemberg. See for instance Smets and Wouters (2002), Caputo et al. (2006), Adolfson et al. (2008, 2014), Senay (2008), Lind�e et al. (2009), Pavasuthipaisit (2010), and Shi and Xu (2010). Given the focus of this study, the assumption that all importers follow a pure backward-looking pricing rule simplifies matters. 19 Thus, exports are (indirectly) produced by using imported goods in addition to domestically-produced intermediate goods; see Christiano et al. (2011) for an alternative approach. Note also that we abstract from foreign activity as a potential determinant.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 77
At the beginning of the period, each IG producer rents capital from the CG producer, at the net rate rKt . Capital rent is paid at the end of the period; however, wages must be paid in advance. To do so firm j borrows the amount LWjt from the bank.
20 The amount borrowed is therefore such that.
LWjt � PSt utNjt: (29)
Loans contracted for the purpose of financing working capital (which are short-term in nature) do not carry any risk, and are therefore made at a rate that reflects only the marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank, iRt , which we refer to as the refinance rate. Repayment of all loans occurs at the end of the period.
With (29) holding with equality, nominal production costs of firm j in period t, TCjt, are given by:
TCjt ¼ � 1 þ iRt
� PSt utNjt þ PSt rKt Kjt:
IG producers are competitive in factor markets. In standard fashion, cost minimization yields the optimal capital-labor ratio as:
Kjt Njt
¼ �
a
1 � a �24 � 1 þ iRt
� ut
rKt
3 5: cj (30)
The unit real marginal cost is thus, cj,
mct ¼ h�
1 þ iRt � ut
i1�a� rKt a
aað1 � aÞ1�a : (31)
As in Rotemberg (1982), domestic IG producers incur a real cost in adjusting prices, of the form
ðfI=2Þ½PDjt =ð~p D;GPDjt�1Þ � 1�
2YDt , where fI � 0 is the adjustment cost parameter (or, equivalently, the degree of price stickiness) and ~pD;G ¼ 1 þ ~pD is the gross steady-state inflation rate in the price of domestic intermediate goods. Each firm j chooses a sequence of prices so as to maximize the dis- counted real value of all its current and future real profits21:
n PDjtþs
o∞ s¼0
¼ argmaxEt X∞ s¼0
b s ltþs
JIjtþs PDtþs
! ; (32)
where JIjtþs denotes nominal profits at t, defined as
JIjt ¼ � PDjt � PDt mct
� YDjt �
fI
2
PDjt
~pD;GPDjt�1 � 1
!2 PDt Y
D t : (33)
Taking fmctþs; PDtþs; YDtþsg ∞ s¼0 as given, and using (20) with i ¼ D, the first-order condition for this
maximization problem is:
20 Firms do not have direct access to credit from foreign lenders, they borrow only from the domestic bank. This assumption is consistent with the evidence, which shows that firms in developing countries (except for the very large ones) depend pre- dominantly on domestic banks for most of their credit needs. 21 In standard fashion, IG firms (which are owned by households) are assumed to value future profits according to the household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10078
ð1 � q Þl PDjt !�qD
1 þ q l PDjt !�qD�1
mct � l f (
PDjt � 1 !
1 )
D t PDt P
D t
D t PDt P
D t
t I ~pD;GPDjt�1 ~p
D;GPDjt�1
þ bfIEt
8>< >:ltþ1
PDjtþ1 ~pD;GPDjt
� 1 !0B@ PDjtþ1
~pD;G � PDjt �2 1 CA YDtþ1
YDt
9>= >; ¼ 0;
(34)
which determines the adjustment process of the nominal price PDjt .
2.4. Production of capital
At the beginning of the period, the CG producer buys a gross amount It of the final good from the FG producer and combines it with the existing capital stock to produce new capital goods. Aggregate capital accumulates therefore as follows:
Ktþ1 ¼ It þ ð1 � dÞKt � QK 2
� Ktþ1 Kt
� 1 �2
Kt; (35)
where Kt ¼ Z 1
0 Kjtdj, d 2 (0,1) is a constant rate of depreciation, and QK > 0 is a parameter that
measures the magnitude of adjustment costs. Investment goods must be paid in advance; the CG producer must therefore borrow from the bank:
LIt ¼ PSt It: (36)
Repayment is uncertain and occurs with probability qt 2 (0,1). If loans are repaid in full, the total (interest-inclusive) cost of buying final goods for investment purposes is ð1 þ iLt ÞPSt It, where iLt is the lending rate. If there is default, which occurs with probability 1 � qt, the CG producer loses the collateral that it pledges to secure the loan; collateral is given by kPHt H, where k 2 (0,1) is defined as a share of the value of the housing stock, with H the exogenous stock of housing, which produces a proportional supply of services.22 Thus, expected repayment is qtð1 þ iLt ÞPSt It þ ð1 � qtÞkPHt H.
At the beginning of each period, the existing capital stock is then rented to IG producers, at the rate rKt . Subject to (35), the CG producer chooses the level of the capital stock Ktþ1 (taking the rental rate, the lending rate, the price of the final good, and the existing capital stock, as given) so as to maximize the value of the discounted stream of dividend payments to the household23:
fKtþsþ1g∞s¼0 ¼ argmax X∞ s¼0
Et
" b s ltþs
JKtþsþ1 PStþs
!# ; (37)
where Et½bsltþsðJKtþsþ1=PStþsÞ� denotes expected real profits at the end of period tþs (or beginning of period t þ s þ 1), defined as
Et
" b s ltþs
JKtþsþ1 PStþs
!# ¼ bsEt
( ltþs
" rKtþsKtþs �
" qtþs
� 1 þ iLtþs
� Itþs þ ð1 � qtþsÞk
PHtþs PStþs
! H
##) :
Using (13), the first-order condition for maximization yields.
22 An alternative assumption, as in Ag�enor et al. (2013), would be to assume that in case of default the capital seized by the bank is returned immediately and in its entirety to the household, who turns it back instantly to the CG-producing firm. As a result, the CG producer would not internalize the risk of default, that is, the possibility that it could lose the fraction of the housing stock that it used to secure bank loans. 23 Again, the CG producer is assumed to value future profits according to the household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 79
Etr K tþ1 ¼qt
� 1 þ iLt
� Et 1 þ QK
� Ktþ1 � 1
� 1 þ iBt
S � Et qtþ1
� 1 þ iLtþ1
�
(" Kt
# 1 þ ptþ1
!) (
� ( 1 � d þ QK
2
"� Ktþ2 Ktþ1
�2 � 1
#)) ;
(38)
which shows that the repayment probability affects the expected rate of return to capital, through its effect on expected repayment in both period t and period t þ 1.24
2.5. Commercial bank
At the beginning of each period t, the bank receives deposits Dt from the household. Funds are used for loans to the CG producer and domestic IG producers, which use them (as discussed earlier) to buy goods for investment purposes and pay for labor in advance. Thus, total lending, Lt, is equal to, using (29) and (36).
Lt ¼ Z 1
0 LWjt dj þ LIt ¼ PSt utNt þ PSt It; (39)
where Nt ¼ Z 1
0 Njtdj is aggregate demand for labor by IG producers.
The maturity period of loans to IG firms coincides with the maturity period of household deposits. Upon receiving these deposits, and given its capital requirements (which determines how much debt it
issues, Vt), total loans, Lt, and its foreign borrowing, L F;B t , the bank borrows from the central bank, L
C;B t , to
fund any shortfall. At the end of the period, it repays the central bank, at the interest rate, iRt . It also holds required reserves at the central bank, RRt.
25
The bank's balance sheet is thus.
Lt þ RRt ¼ Dt þ EtLF;Bt þ Vt þ L C;B t ; (40)
where
Vt ¼ VRt þ VEt ; (41) with VRt denoting capital requirements and V
E t excess capital.
Reserves held at the central bank do not pay interest. They are determined by:
RRt ¼ mRDt; (42) where mR 2 (0,1) is the reserve requirement ratio.
Let iF;Bt denote the cost of foreign borrowing, defined as.
1 þ iF;Bt ¼ � 1 þ iWt
�� 1 þ qF;Bt
� Et
� Etþ1 Et
� ; (43)
where iWt is again the risk-free world interest rate and q F;B t a risk premium, defined as
24 The model is part of a class of models in which collateral constraints ensure that borrowers repay their debts and which rule out, by design, the possibility of firm default in equilibrium. Equivalently, given collateral requirements, shocks are never “bad enough” to induce the CG producer to actually defaultdeven though ex ante both the CG producer and the bank factor it in choosing the optimal level of capital and in setting the loan rate, respectively. For an explicit analysis of the risk of default, in which idiosyncratic shocks affect productivity rather than the return on capital (as in Bernanke et al. (2000)), see Pesaran and Xu (2013). 25 The bank holds no domestic bonds. As discussed in the next section, in equilibrium it has no incentive to do so.
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e10080
q F;B t ¼
q F;B 0 LF;Bt ; (44)
2
where qF;B0 > 0. Thus, the premium that the bank faces on world capital markets depends on how much it borrows.26
Capital requirements are imposed only on risky loans to the CG producer:
VRt ¼ rtstLIt; (45) where rt 2 (0,1) is the overall capital ratio (defined later) and st the risk weight. In line with the foundation variant of the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach of Basel II (which remains essentially the same under Basel III), the risk weight is assumed to depend on the repayment probability of the CG producer27:
st ¼ � qt ~q
��fq ; (46)
where fq > 0. Thus, in the steady state, the risk weight is normalized to unity. The bank sets the deposit and lending rates, issues capital (in the form of one-period debt) to satisfy
prudential rules, and determines foreign borrowing and excess capital so as to maximize the present discounted value of its profits, while internalizing the effect of its borrowing decisions on the risk premium that it faces on world capital markets. Because the bank is liquidated and debt is redeemed at the end of each period, this maximization problem boils down to a static problem:
iDt ; i L t ; LF;Bt PSt
; VEt PSt
¼ argmaxEt JBtþ1 PSt
! ; (47)
where expected profits at the end of period t (or beginning of t þ 1) are defined as
Et
JBtþ1 PSt
! ¼ � 1 þ iRt
� LWt PSt
! þ qt
� 1 þ iLt
� LIt PSt
! þ ð1 � qtÞk
PHt PSt
! H þ mRdt �
� 1 þ iDt
� dt
� � 1 þ iRt
� LC;Bt PSt
! � � 1 þ iVt
� Vt PSt
! � � 1 þ iF;Bt
� EtLF;Bt PSt
! � gV
Vt PSt
! þ gVV
fE
VEt PSt
!fE ;
(48)
where gD, gL, gV > 0, gVV � 0, fE 2 (0,1).28 As noted earlier, the second term on the right-hand side of this expression, qtð1 þ iLt ÞLIt=PSt , represents expected repayment on loans to the CG producer if there is no default, whereas the third term represents what the bank expects to earn in case of default, that is, “effective” collateral, defined as a fraction of the marked-to-market value of the housing stock.
The fourth term, mRdt, represents the reserve requirements held at the central bank and returned to the bank at the end of the period, prior to its closure. The term ð1 þ iDt Þdt represents the value of de- posits (principal and interest) redeemed at the end of the period. Similarly, the term ð1 þ iVt ÞPS;�1t Vt represents the gross value of bank debt repaid at the end of the period, whereas ð1 þ iF;Bt ÞEtP
S;�1 t L
F;B t is
the domestic-currency value of the bank's repayment on foreign loans.
26 Alternatively, the premium could be specified as a function of the ratio of foreign borrowing to bank capital, LF;Bt =Vt. In practice, many middle-income countries impose maximum limits on a bank's foreign currency liabilities in terms of its core capital or net worth. 27 See Ag�enor et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion of this specification. Alternatively, under the Standardized approach, st could be taken to be a function of the output gap, if ratings are assumed to be procyclical. 28 The expectation Et is taken with respect to an implicit idiosyncratic shock to output of capital goods, which is unknown at the time the bank makes its pricing decisions.
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The linear term gVP S;�1 t Vt captures the cost associated with issuing bank debt, whereas the last
term, f�1E gVV ðP S;�1 t V
E t ÞfE , captures the view, discussed in Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013), that maintaining a
positive capital buffer generates benefitsdby signaling for instance that the bank's financial position is strong and thereby reducing the intensity of regulatory scrutiny.
Solving (47) subject to (36), (39) to (45), and (48) yields.
iDt ¼ � 1 þ 1
hD
��1� 1 � mR
� iRt ; (49)
1 þ iLt ¼ ð1 � rtstÞ
� 1 þ iRt
� þ rtst
h� 1 þ iVt
� þ gV
i � 1 þ h�1F
qt
; (50)
LF;Bt ¼ max 2 4 � 1 þ iRt
� � � 1 þ iWt
� EtðEtþ1=EtÞ
q F;B 0
� 1 þ iWt
� EtðEtþ1=EtÞ
; 0
3 5; (51)
VEt PSt
¼ (
gVV
iVt þ gV � iRt
)1=ð1�fEÞ ; (52)
where hD is the interest elasticity of the supply of deposits by households to the deposit rate and hF the interest elasticity of the CG producer demand for loans (or investment) to the lending rate.
Equation (49) shows that the equilibrium deposit rate is a markup over the refinance rate, adjusted (downward) for the implicit cost of holding reserve requirements. Equation (50) indicates that the lending rate depends negatively on the repayment probability, and positively on a weighted average of the marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank and the total cost of issuing debt for capital requirement purposes. Equation (51) states that foreign borrowing is decreasing in the premium- exclusive cost of borrowing abroad (adjusted for expected depreciation) and increasing in the cost of borrowing domestically from the central bank; there is no borrowing if the former increases the latter. Equation (52) shows that an increase in the direct or indirect cost of issuing debt (iVt or gV) reduces excess capital, whereas an increase in gVV raises the excess capital that the bank is willing to hold.
As in Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013), we adopt a reduced-form approach to model the repayment probability.29 Specifically, qt is taken to depend positively on the effective collateral-CG loan ratio (which mitigates moral hazard on the part of borrowers) and the cyclical position of the economy:
qt ¼ kPHt H LIt
!41� Yt ~Y
�42 ; (53)
with 41,42 > 0 and ~Y is the steady-state level of aggregate output. 30,31 Fig. 1 summarizes the links
between bank capital, the repayment probability, and the loan rate in the model.
29 Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) also rely on a reduced-form intermediation technology to define bank spreads. 30 In Ag�enor and Pereira da Silva (2014), the repayment probability is endogenously determined as part of the bank's opti- mization process. Specifically, they assume that the bank can affect the repayment probability on its loans by expending effort on selecting (ex ante) its borrowers; the higher the effort, the safer the loan. Assuming that the cost of screening depends (inversely) not only on the collateral-investment loan ratio but also on the cyclical position of the economy and the capital-loan ratio yields a specification similar to (53). 31 Note that we abstract from the monitoring incentive effect associated with bank capital, as discussed in Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013), given that it plays no substantive role in the present analysis.
Fig. 1. Bank capital, repayment probability and the lending rate.
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The balance sheet constraint (40), together with (42), can be used to determine residually borrowing from the central bank:
LC;Bt ¼ max h Lt � EtLF;Bt �
� 1 � mR
� Dt � Vt; 0
i : (54)
Finally, at the end of the period, the bank pays interest on deposits, and repays with interest loans received from the central bank and the debt that it issued. Because the bank closes down, there are no retained earnings; all profits are rebated lump-sum to the household.32
2.6. Central bank
The central bank's assets consists of international reserves, EtRFt , holdings of government bonds, B C t ,
and loans to commercial banks, LC;Bt . Its liabilities consists of cash, Mt, and required reserves, RRt. The balance sheet of the central bank is thus given by.
EtR F t þ BCt þ LC;Bt ¼ Mt þ RRt: (55)
Although the exchange rate is flexible, we assume that, as a result of standard trade considerations and a self-insurance motive against volatile capital flows, the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to adjust the actual foreign-currency value of its reserves so as to achieve a desired
value RF;Tt . This desired value is thus specified as a weighted average of imports of intermediate goods
and foreign liabilities of the private sector, LF;Bt � B F;P t :
RF;Tt ¼ � f R 1WP
F t Y
F t
�4F h f R 2
� LF;Bt � B
F;P t
�i1�4F ; (56)
where 4F 2 (0,1) and fR1; f R 2 > 0. Thus, in the particular case where 4
F ¼ 0 and fR2 ¼ 1, the central bank's objective is to maintain a zero stock of net foreign assets.
Actual reserves adjust according to a simple partial adjustment mechanism.
32 Recall that there is no default in equilibrium; the actual profits that are rebated to the household are obtained by setting the repayment probability equal to one on the right-hand side of (48). Note also that these profits are essentially rents for owning the bank, without putting any equity. This is consistent with our assumption that capital consists of debt rather than common stocks.
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RFt ¼ � RF;Tt
�4R� RFt�1
�1�4R ; (57)
where 4R 2 (0,1) is the speed of adjustment. Using (42), equation (55) yields the supply of base money as.
Mst ¼ EtRFt þ BCt þ LC;Bt � mRDt: (58)
Any income made by the central bank on its foreign reserves and from its loans to the commercial bank is transferred to the government at the end of each period. The effect of exchange rate fluctua- tions, however, are taken to be an off-balance-sheet item.
The central bank sets its policy rate, iRt , on the basis of an augmented Taylor-type policy rule:
iRt ¼ ciRt�1 þ ð1 � cÞ � ~r þ pSt þ ε1
� p S t � pS;T
� þ ε2 ln
� Yt ~Y
� þ ε3Dln Et
� þ εt; (59)
where ~r is the steady-state value of the real interest rate on bonds, pS,T � 0 the central bank's headline inflation target (in terms of the price of goods sold domestically), c 2 (0,1) a coefficient measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing, and ε1,ε2,ε3 > 0, and lnεt is a serially uncorrelated random shock with zero mean. Thus, in addition to reacting to output and inflation, the central bank also “leans against the wind” by raising (lowering) the policy rate when the nominal exchange rate depreciates (appreciates).
The overall capital ratio set by the central bank-cum-regulator consists of a minimum, deterministic component, rD, and a cyclical component, rCt :
rt ¼ rD þ rCt : (60)
In turn, the cyclical component is related to deviations of real credit for investment, lIt ¼ LIt=PSt , from its steady-state value:
r C t ¼ qC
lIt ~l I � 1
! ; (61)
where qC > 0. Thus, in line with the countercyclical capital buffer rule envisaged under Basel III (see Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)), the macroprudential rule considered here calls for a tightening of capital requirements when real credit exceeds its steady-state value.33
2.7. Government
The government purchases the final good and issues nominal riskless one-period bonds to finance its deficit; it does not borrow abroad. Its budget constraint is given by.
Bt ¼ � 1 þ iBt�1
� BPt�1 þ BCt�1 þ PSt ðGt � TtÞ � iRt�1L
C;B t�1 � i
W t�1EtR
F t�1; (62)
where Bt ¼ BCt þ BPt is the outstanding stock of government bonds, and Gt real government spending. The last two terms represent the interest income transferred by the central bank to the government.
Government purchases represent a fraction j 2 (0,1) of domestic sales of the final good:
Gt ¼ jYSt : (63)
33 All experiments reported later on were also conducted with an alternative rule in which countercyclical regulatory re- quirements depend on deviations of the investment credit-to-GDP ratio from its steady-state values; results are qualitatively similar to those discussed later and are omitted to save space.
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3. Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, firms producing intermediate goods are identical. Thus, Kjt ¼ Kt, Njt ¼ Nt, YDjt ¼ YDt , Pijt ¼ Pit, for all j 2 (0,1) and i ¼ D, F. All firms also produce the same output and prices are the same across firms.
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that sales on the domestic market be equal to aggregate demand, inclusive of price adjustment costs:
YSt ¼ Ct þ Gt þ It þ fI
2
� 1 þ pDt 1 þ ~pD
� 1 �2
PDt PSt
! YDt ; (64)
with the price of sales on the domestic market determined by rewriting the identity linking the value of output and the value of domestic sales and exports, PtYt ¼ PSt YSt þ PXt YXt , that is, using (27),
PSt ¼ PtYt � PXt YXt
Yt � YXt : (65)
Suppose that bank loans to IG firms and the capital producer are made only in the form of cash, and let MEt denote total cash holdings by these agents; thus, Lt ¼ MEt . The equilibrium condition of the market for cash is then given by.
Mst ¼ MPt þ Lt; (66) where Mst is defined in (58). Using (54) as well for L
C;B t implies that the equilibrium condition (66) can
be rewritten as
MPt þ Dt ¼ BCt þ Et � RFt � LF;Bt
� � Vt; (67)
which, after substituting (9) and (10) for MPt and Dt, can be solved for the equilibrium bond rate. The government balances its budget by adjusting lump-sum taxes, while keeping the overall stock
of bonds constant at B and the central bank also keeps its stock of bonds constant at B C . Private holdings
of domestic government bonds are thus constant at BP ¼ B � BC. Finally, the external budget constraint of the economy (or equivalently the equilibrium condition of
the market for foreign exchange), measured in foreign-currency terms, is given by34
WPXt Y X t � WPFt YFt þ iWt�1NFAt�1 þ q
F;P t�1B
F;P t�1 � q
F;B t�1L
F;B t�1 � DNFAt ¼ 0; (68)
where NFAt is the net foreign asset position of the economy, defined as
NFAt ¼ RFt þ BF;Pt � L F;B t : (69)
4. Steady state
The steady-state solution of the model is derived in Appendix A. Several of its key features are similar to those of the closed-economy models described in Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013), so we refer to those papers for a more detailed discussion.
34 Under a fixed exchange rate, Et ¼ E and condition (68) determines changes in official reserves, RFt . Equation (57) must therefore be dropped from the system. Under a flexible exchange rate, condition (68) determines implicitly the nominal ex- change rate.
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In brief, with a headline inflation target pS,T equal to zero, the steady-state inflation rate ~pS is also zero. In addition to standard results (the steady-state value of the marginal cost, for instance, is given by (qD � 1)/qD), the steady-state value of the repayment probability is.
~q ¼ k~P
H H
~L I
!41 ;
whereas steady-state interest rates are given by
~ıB ¼ ~ıR ¼ 1 b � 1 ¼ ~r;
~ıD ¼ � 1 þ 1
hD
��1� 1 � mR
� ~ıR;
and
~ıL ¼ ð1 � rÞb�1 þ r
h� 1 þ~ıV
þ gV
i � 1 þ h�1F
~q
� 1:
From these equations it can be shown that ~ıB >~ıD. We also have ~ıV >~ıB for QV > 0 (because holding
bank debt is subject to a cost), and thus ~ıV >~ıD. Equation (52) determines ~V E , which is positive given
that ~ıV >~ıR. From (46), ~s ¼ 1 (by construction) and from (45), the steady-state required capital-risky assets ratio, ~V
R =~L
I , is equal to ~r ¼ rD, given that from (61) ~rC ¼ 0.
To analyze the response of the economy to shocks, we log-linearize the model around a non- stochastic, zero-inflation steady state. The log-linearized equations are summarized in Appendix B.
5. Illustrative calibration
To calibrate the model we dwell extensively on Ag�enor and Alper (2012) and Ag�enor et al. (2012, 2013). We therefore refer to those studies for a detailed discussion of some of our choices. In addi- tion, for some of the parameters that are “new” or specific to this study, we consider alternative values in sensitivity tests. This is the case, in particular, for the degree of exchange rate pass-through, the weight attached to net private sector foreign liabilities in the reserve accumulation Equation (56), the coefficient of the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation in the monetary policy rule (59), and the sensitivity of countercyclical bank capital to credit gaps in (61).
Parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The discount factor b is set at 0.985, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 6 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 2, is 0.6, in line with estimates for middle-income countries (see Ag�enor and Montiel (2015)). The preference parameter for leisure, hN, is set at 4.5. This value is consistent with a share of time allocated to market work equal to 0.33 (corresponding to 8 h a day). The preference parameters for composite monetary assets, hx, and housing, hH, are set at the same low value, 0.02. The share parameter in the index of money holdings, n, which corresponds to the relative share of cash in narrow money, is set at 0.35.
The distribution parameter between domestic and imported intermediated goods in the production of the final good, LD, is set at 0.7, whereas h, the elasticity of substitution between baskets of domestic and imported composite intermediate goods, is set at 0.8. The first parameter, which can be approx- imated in practice by the share of nontraded goods in total GDP, reflects the fact that we consider an economy that is still relatively closed. The elasticities of substitution between intermediate domestic goods among themselves, qD, and imported goods among themselves, qF, are set equal to the same value,10. The pass-through parameter is set at mF ¼ 0.3; this is line with the average value estimated by
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Soto and Selaive (2003) for instance, for a group of 35 countries, and consistent with the recent evi- dence suggesting a decline in the strength of the pass-through effect in both industrial and developing countries. The price elasticity of exports, 8, is set equal to 0.7, a value consistent with a range of esti- mates for middle-income countries.
The share of capital in domestic output of intermediate goods, a, is set at 0.35. The adjustment cost parameter for prices of domestic intermediate goods, fI, is set at 74.5. The rate of depreciation of private capital, d, is set equal to 0.03. The adjustment cost for transforming the final good into investment, QK, is set at 14. With qD ¼ 10, the steady-state value of the markup rate in the intermediate goods sector, qD/ (qD �1), is equal to 11.1 percent.
For the parameters characterizing bank behavior, we assume that the effective collateral-loan ratio, k, is 0.2. The adjustment cost parameter for holdings of bank debt, QV, is set at 1.0, to capture relatively inefficient markets. The elasticity of the repayment probability is set at 41 ¼ 0.03 with respect to collateral and 42 ¼ 1.5 with respect to output deviations. The elasticity of the risk weight with respect to the repayment probability is set at 4q ¼ 1.25. The cost parameters gV and gVV are set at low values, 0.18, and 0.001, respectively. The parameter fE, which captures the benefit associated with capital buffers, is set to 0.5. Given the specification of the risk weight st in (46), its steady-state value is equal to unity. The deterministic component of the capital adequacy ratio, rDdand thus the overall capital ratio, given that rC ¼ 0 in the steady-statedis set at 0.08, which corresponds to the minimum value of the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets under the recent Basel agreements. We also calibrate the excess capital-risky assets ratio to be equal to 0.04. This implies that the steady-state ratio of total bank capital
Table 1 Benchmark calibration: key parameter values.
Parameter Value Description
Household b 0.985 Discount factor 2 0.6 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution hN 4.5 Preference parameter for leisure hx 0.02 Preference parameter for money holdings hH 0.02 Preference parameter for housing n 0.35 Share parameter in index of money holdings QV 1.0 Adjustment cost parameter, holdings of bank debt Production LD 0.7 distribution parameter, final good h 0.8 Elasticity of substitution, baskets of IG goods mF 0.3 Adjustment speed, imported intermediate goods 8 0.7 Price elasticity of exports qD,qF 10.0 Elasticity of demand, intermediate goods a 0.35 Share of capital, domestic intermediate goods fI 74.5 Adjustment cost parameter, IG prices D 0.03 Depreciation rate of capital QK 14 Adjustment cost parameter, investment Commercial Bank Κ 0.2 Effective collateral-loan ratio 41 0.03 Elasticity of repayment prob, collateral 42 1.5 Elasticity of repayment prob, cyclical output 4q 1.25 Elasticity of risk weight, prob of repayment gV 0.18 Cost of issuing bank capital gVV 0.001 Benefit of holding excess bank capital rD 0.08 Capital adequacy ratio (deterministic component) Central bank mR 0.1 Reserve requirement rate c 0.0 Degree of interest rate smoothing 4 R 0.2 Speed of adjustment to reserve target
ε1 2.5 Response of refinance rate to inflation deviations ε2 0.2 Response of refinance rate to cyclical output ε3 0.0 Response of refinance rate to nominal depreciation rW 0.8 Degree of persistence, shock to world risk-free rate
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to risky loans is set at about 12 percent (so that ~V E =~V
R ¼ 0:53), in line with the evidence reported in Ag�enor and Pereira da Silva (2010, 2012). Our calibration implies a total (corporate) credit-to-output ratio of about 60 percent, which is consistent with data for several middle-income countries. Param-
eter qF;B0 , which determines how the bank's foreign borrowing responds to the differential in the cost of domestic and foreign borrowing, is set at 0.16; this number implies that bank foreign liabilities represent about 10 percent (a reasonable number for many middle-income countries) of their total liabilities.
As noted earlier, the focus of our analysis in this paper is on capital flows associated with bank foreign borrowing, rather than portfolio flows associated with household asset allocation. To illustrate our results in the most transparent way, we assume that the intensity of credit market imperfections that domestic households face on world capital markets are such that the marginal effect of higher
private foreign borrowing on the risk premium, as measured by the parameter qF;P0 , is highdso high, in fact, that private holdings of foreign bonds are effectively zero. Formally, as can be inferred from (17),
this implies setting qF;P0 /∞. 35
The reserve requirement rate mR is set at 0.1. We abstract from persistence stemming from the central bank's policy response and set the smoothing parameter c ¼ 0. We also set ε1 ¼ 2.5 and ε2 ¼ 0.2, which are conventional values for Taylor-type rules for middle-income countries; the value of ε2, in particular, is consistent with the evidence reported for Chile by Caputo et al. (2006) and for several countries in Latin America by Moura and Carvalho (2010). We initially assume that the central bank does not respond to fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, and set therefore ε3 ¼ 0. We also assume initially that the central bank's foreign reserve target is set only in terms of trade considerations, so that 4 F ¼ 1, and set fR1 ¼ 2, to capture the view that the central bank targets a stock of reserves equal to 6
months of (intermediate) imports. The speed of adjustment of actual reserves to its target level, 4R, is set at 0.2. The parameter characterizing the countercyclical regulatory rule, qC, is initially set at 0. Finally, the degree of persistence of the shock to the world risk-free rate, rW, is set at 0.8, which implies a reasonably high degree of inertia.
6. Dynamics of a sudden flood
To illustrate the properties of the model in response to external shocks, we consider as a base experiment (with qC ¼ 0) a temporary drop in the world risk-free interest rate by 35 basis points at a quarterly rate, or about 141 basis points at an annual rate.36 The magnitude of the shock is thus large enough to illustrate the consequences of a sudden flood.
The results are summarized in Fig. 2, for 20 of the key variables of the model. The immediate effect of the shock is to lower the cost of borrowing abroad for the domestic bank. The bank's foreign lia- bilities therefore increase, with a matching inflow of capital, which leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In turn, the nominal appreciation lowers the domestic price of imported in- termediate goods and stimulates their demand as well as final good production, while at the same time raising the central bank's desired leveldand thus the actual stock, given partial adjustmentdof foreign reserves. In turn, the accumulation of foreign reserves tends to increase the monetary base.37 At the same time, the increase in foreign borrowing by the commercial bank reduces its domestic borrowing from the central bank, which tends to reduce the monetary base. The former effect dominates, implying an increase in the supply of cash. At the initial level of consumption, the nominal bond rate must therefore fall to increase the demand for cash and restore equilibrium in the currency market. At
35 This assumption is also consistent with a policy environment where the central bank imposes capital controlsdafter households have solved their optimization problemdand the cost of avoiding these controls is prohibitive. 36 See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Ma�ckowiak (2007) for evidence on the impact of monetary shocks in the United States on middle-income countries in East Asia and Latin America. 37 Because both the reserve target and bank foreign borrowing increase, the change in the net foreign asset position of the economy is in general ambiguous. Given our calibration, the increase in the latter dominates the increase in the former, implying that net foreign assets fall.
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the same time, the expected future increase in inflation means that the real bond rate also falls; this induces households to increase consumption today.
In addition to an intertemporal effect on consumption, the fall in the real bond rate also leads to an increase in the demand for housing, which tends to raise real estate prices. This raises the value of collateral that firms can pledge. Because the real loan rate falls initially, the demand for investment loans increasesdso much so that the collateral-loan ratio falls, which tends to reduce the repayment probability. But because output (relative to potential) increases, the net effect on the probability of repayment is positive. The nominal loan rate therefore falls. This effect is compounded by the drop in the policy rate, which reflects an initial fall in inflation (measured in terms of the price of domestic sales), itself related to the fact that, as noted earlier, the nominal appreciation tends to lower the domestic-currency price of imported intermediate goods. Thus, aggregate demand (spending on goods sold domestically) unambiguously increases on impact. In addition to the level effect on final output, there is also a composition effect: the appreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates translates into a drop in the share of final output allocated to exports, and an increase in the share sold domestically.
Over time, the increase in investment raises the capital stock, which tends to lower the rental rate of capital and to raise the marginal product of labor and therefore gross wages. The increase in current consumption raises the marginal utility of leisure and induces households to reduce their supply of labor, thereby magnifying the initial upward pressure on wages resulting from higher output and the increased demand for labor. However, the downward movement in the policy rate (the rate at which intermediate goods producers borrow to finance their working capital needs) is large enough to ensure that the effective wage rate falls. Indeed, as noted earlier the initial fall in domestic inflation tends to lower immediately the policy rate, despite the expansion in output. Because the rental rate of capital does not change on impact (due to the one-period lag in capital accumulation), marginal costs unambiguously fall in the first period. This tends to compound the downward effect on inflation (again, in terms of the price of goods sold on the domestic market) resulting from exchange rate appreciation, and thus the drop in the policy and loan rates. Over time, the reduction in the rental rate of capital induced by the boom in investment leads in a first phase to lower marginal costs, but the increase in the effective wage leads to higher inflation.
The fall in the bond rate tends to increase household demand for bank capital, thereby exerting downward pressure on the rate of return on bank debt. At the same time, there are two opposing forces on the supply of bank capital. On the one hand, the increase in risky investment loans increases capital requirements; on the other, the increase in the repayment probability lowers the risk weight attached to investment loans, which tends (together with an initial fall in prices) to lower capital requirements. The latter dominates and, as shown in Fig. 2, the net effect is an increase in required capital, which tends to increase the rate of return on bank capital. The net effect on the latter is thus in general ambiguous. In the case shown in the figure, the rate of return on bank capital falls.38 In turn, the reduction in the cost at which the bank issues capital magnifies the initial downward impact on the lending rate. The regulatory regime is thus procyclical. Finally, the gradual increase in the policy rate (the marginal cost of domestic borrowing for the bank) explains why foreign borrowing continues to increase beyond the first period and falls only gradually afterward (keeping the external risk premium high in the process), despite the fact that the drop in the world risk-free rate is only temporary.39
It is worth noting that because firms do not borrow directly abroad, the type of balance sheet effects often discussed in the literature on devaluations and financial crises (see Ag�enor and Montiel (2015)) are not present. The balance sheet effect, in this model, operates solely through changes in commercial bank liabilities: higher foreign borrowing feeds into the risk premium that the bank faces on world capital markets. As a result, the premium-inclusive cost of foreign borrowing (as defined in equation (44)) falls, but by less than the risk-free rate. Put differently, the fact that imperfections on world capital markets are internalized actually mitigate incentives to borrow abroad; they therefore play a stabi- lizing role.
38 The policy rate drops by about the same amount as the cost of bank capital, implying that the net effect on excess bank capital is relatively small. 39 Of course, the fact that the shock to the world risk-free rate displays persistence matters as well.
Fig. 2. Base Experiment: Temporary Drop in World Risk-Free Interest Rate. (Deviations from Steady State).
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The results of this experiment illustrate fairly well the fact that a sudden flood of foreign capital, induced by a drop in the risk-free rate of return on external assets, may generate a domestic boom characterized by increases in asset prices and aggregate demand, an expansion in output, and (over time) inflationary pressures. This occurs despite the fact that the nominal appreciation that accom- panies capital inflows may mitigate the initial impact on inflation, and the fact that higher bank borrowing abroad does not lead directly to more credit, as in some models where credit is supply- driven. Indeed, at the initial levels of credit and deposits, higher bank borrowing abroad leads sim- ply to less borrowing from the central bank. In turn, this affects the determination of the bond rate (through the equilibrium condition of the currency market), consumption, housing demand, and collateral values, which then feed into the repayment probability, the loan rate and the policy rate, thereby promoting investment.40 The expansionary mechanism is therefore indirect and depends crucially on bank pricing behavior.
40 With liquidity-constrained consumers, as for instance in Ag�enor et al. (2013), the expansion in consumption would be larger than recorded in this experiment.
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At the same time, the analysis shows that the regulatory regimedin addition to the stance of monetary policy, which in the present case includes not only the interest rate rule but also the reserve accumulation ruledalso matters in assessing the dynamics of sudden floods. Movements in the repayment probability feed into changes in risk weights, which in turn affect the cost of issuing capital and bank pricing decisions. Given our calibration, this feedback effect helps to magnify the initial shock; the regulatory regime is thus procyclical.41
7. Sensitivity analysis
To assess the sensitivity of the previous results, we consider several additional experiments: an increase in the degree of exchange rate pass-through, a greater weight attached to net private sector foreign liabilities in the reserve accumulation equation, and a monetary policy that “leans against the wind” by responding to changes in the nominal exchange rate. We will consider in the next section an additional sensitivity test, which involves giving a role to countercyclical capital regulation.
7.1. Degree of exchange-rate pass-through
We first consider an increase in the degree of exchange rate pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to the domestic-currency price of imported intermediate goods, mF, from 0.3 to 0.7. The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 3, together with the results of the benchmark experiment. On impact, a higher pass-through rate magnifies the downward effect of the initial nominal appreciation on the domestic-currency price of imports induced by capital inflows. As a result, the shift in demand toward imported intermediate goods is larger. This tends to amplify the increase in the desired and actual reserve levels, which in turn tends to expand the monetary base. However, the appreciation induces the bank to borrow more (compared to the benchmark case) on world capital markets; this reduces its borrowing from the central bank by more, which induces a larger contraction of the monetary base. The supply of cash therefore increases by more than before, and the nominal bond rate must fall by more to restore equilibrium in the currency market. Because initially prices do not change much, the bond rate falls by more than in the benchmark experiment, generating a larger increase in current household consumption as well. As a result, the expansion in final output is larger, thereby inducing a larger increase in the repayment probability and a larger drop in the loan rate, and thus a stronger positive effect on investment than in the benchmark case. Marginal costs fall by more because of the larger drop in the policy rate. The initial drop in inflation (measured in terms of the price of goods sold domestically) is thus larger than in the benchmark experiment. Overall, a higher pass-through rate magnifies the domestic effects of the shock and creates more volatility.
7.2. Speed of adjustment to foreign reserve target
We now consider an increase in the speed of adjustment of foreign-currency reserves to their target level, 4R, from the initial value 0.2 to 0.7. The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 4. Because bank foreign borrowing increases significantly initially, the assumption that the central bank adjusts its desired level of reserves to its target value at a faster rate implies its net foreign assets increase by more than in the benchmark case in the initial periods. The increase in the desired and actual reserve levels tend to expand the monetary base by more. The larger increase in money supply requires a larger drop in the nominal bond rate to restore equilibrium on the currency market. Consequently, the real bond rate increases by less, dampening the shift in household consumption across periods and mitigating the initial boom in private expenditure. As a result, final output expands by less than in the benchmark experiment. The drop in the loan rate is also dampened, implying that investment expands by less. Marginal costs tend to fall by less initially because the upward pressure on wages is now weaker and
41 Note also that the regulatory regime that we consider is (because of the endogeneity of the risk weight) more procyclical than a Basel I-type regime with a fixed risk weight, due to its direct link with the repayment probability. This is consistent with the conventional view, although we have discussed elsewhere a counterintuitive case (see Ag�enor et al. (2012)).
Fig. 3. Increase in the Degree of Exchange Rate Pass-through. (Deviations from Steady State).
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the central bank eases its policy stance. The initial increase in inflation is thus dampened compared to the benchmark case.
7.3. Response to exchange rate movements
Finally, we consider an increase in the parameter that captures the extent to which the central bank responds to nominal depreciation in setting its policy rate, ε3, from 0 to 0.5. This value is quite large compared to some of the estimates in the literature for middle-income countries; Caputo et al. (2006), for instance, estimated a value of about 0.15 for Chile. However, this is a useful case for illustrative purposes.
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 5. Because the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact, the direct implication is that the refinance rate falls by more than before. This, naturally enough, smoothes out the path of the exchange rate. But the drop in the loan rate (initially related to the drop in the policy rate) is now larger, and the initial expansion in investment is magnified. The larger initial fall in the policy rate implies that the increase in bank foreign borrowing is less significant, implying now (based on the reasoning outlined earlier) a larger drop in the nominal bond rate. As a
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result, consumption today increases initially by more than in the benchmark case. Because this also raises the marginal utility of leisure by more, the drop in labor supply is magnified, implying that the initial upward pressure on real wages is larger. As a result, the initial rise in the effective cost of labor (and thus marginal costs) is now more significant, despite the larger reduction in the cost of short-term borrowing for intermediate goods producers. By and large, attempts to mitigate exchange rate movements through changes in the policy rate create a trade-off: the nominal exchange rate is less volatile, but most of the other variables are more volatile initially.
8. Countercyclical regulation
As discussed in the introduction, a dilemma that policymakers in middle-income countries have faced in recent years is related to the that, if a central bank responds to a sudden flood in foreign capital
Fig. 4. Change in Speed of Adjustment to Reserve Target. (Deviations from Steady State).
Fig. 5. Positive Response of Policy Rate to Exchange Rate Depreciation. (Deviations from Steady State).
P.-R. Ag�enor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 48 (2014) 68e100 93
by raising interest rates to dampen credit expansion and counter inflationary pressures, it runs the risk of exacerbating inflows (because banks would borrow more abroad), which in turn would translate into more lending, higher domestic demand, and possibly higher inflationddespite the initial benefit of nominal appreciation on the domestic-currency price of imported goods. The question then is whether, in such conditions, other instruments can help to maintain economic stability. Specifically, we now turn to an examination of the potential role of countercyclical bank capital regulation in response to sudden floods. We begin by considering how a countercyclical regulatory rule affects the trans- mission process; we then consider how it can promote economic stability. We do so while keeping the interest rate rule the same as in the benchmark experiment, that is, without any response to exchange rate depreciation.
Consider an increase in the parameter characterizing the countercyclical regulatory rule, qC in (61), from an initial value of 0 to an arbitrary value of 5, for illustrative purposes. The outcome of this experiment is shown in Fig. 6. In line with the results in Ag�enor et al. (2013), despite inducing higher volatility in bank capital, the presence of the rule mitigates the investment boom. As noted earlier, the initial expansion in output and the increase in housing prices that accompanies the shock to the world
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risk-free rate tend to raise the repayment probability, which reduces the lending rate and stimulates borrowing for investment. However, the countercyclical rule, by imposing higher capital requirements, mitigates the initial drop in the cost of issuing debt by the bank, thereby dampening the initial expansionary effect on the loan rate associated with higher collateral values and a higher repayment probability. Indeed, Fig. 6 shows that the cost of bank capital drops by much less than in the benchmark case. Although bank capital is naturally more volatile, the loan rate and investment are less volatile. In that sense, therefore, the policy works as intended. Nevertheless, the figure also shows that the policy rate drops by more than in the baseline experiment, and that consumption and real house prices in- crease by more as well.
Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows. In the absence of the countercyclical regulatory rule, investment responds quite significantly to a change in the policy rate, through its effect on the loan rate. Thus, as aggregate demand (consumption and investment) responds rela- tively strongly to the policy rate, changes in that variable induced by any given inflation-inducing shock would not need to be very large. However, in the presence of a regulatory rule, and to the extent that the shock requires a higher capital adequacy ratio, the link between the policy rate and the loan rate is weakened. The reason is that the higher capital adequacy ratio raises the weight attached to the cost of issuing bank capital in the price-setting equation for the loan rate. As a result, investment (and therefore aggregate demand) becomes less reactive to changes in the policy ratedwhich would need now to react more significantly to an inflationary shock, inducing in the process a larger response in consumption.42 Indeed, in the case considered here, with the initial appreciation translating initially into lower inflation, the presence of the countercyclical regulatory rule implies that the policy rate needs to decline on impact by more than otherwise, and this eventually leads to a larger increase in consumption. This is because with a larger drop in the policy (and deposit) rate, and by implication lower bank deposits, borrowing from the central bank in- creases, and this brings a larger increase in the supply of cashdrequiring therefore a larger drop in the bond rate to equilibrate the currency market. In turn, this drop induces households to spend more today. By implication, the demand for housing services, and real house prices, would also increase. The rise in house prices (through its effect on the value of collateral) magnifies the in- crease in the repayment probability, thereby compounding the downward effect on the loan rate and offsetting somewhat the benefit associated with the countercyclical rule. The important point, however, is that the countercyclical regulatory rule, while making the loan rate and investment less volatile, may be associated not only with more volatile bank capital (as can be expected) but also increased volatility in consumption and asset pricesdand, by implication, other macroeconomic variables. So the net effect on aggregate volatility is in general indeterminate and depends on how it is measured.
This potential dynamic volatility trade-off has important implications for the effectiveness of countercyclical regulatory rules and how aggressive these policies should be. As in Ag�enor et al. (2013), suppose that the central bank is concerned with two objectives, macroeconomic stability and financial stability. The former is defined in terms of the weighted average of the coefficient of variation of de- viations in output (measured in terms of sales on the domestic market) and of inflation (also in terms of the price of sales on the domestic market), with weights of 0.3 and 0.7; thus, we consider a central bank more concerned with inflation than output.43 The latter objective is defined in terms of the coefficient of variation of three alternative indicators: a weighted average of nominal house prices and the nominal exchange rate, with equal weights of 0.5, divided by the price of goods sold on the domestic market; the credit-to-GDP ratio; and the ratio of bank foreign borrowing to GDP.44 Thus, the first
42 In principle for this effect to operate what is needed is an increase in strt, not only an increase in rt. For the shock considered here, this is indeed the case, even though st falls. Note also that, the endogeneity of st means that the impact of an increase in rt is mitigated, making the countercyclical rule less effective. 43 In turn, coefficients of variations are based on the asymptotic (unconditional) variances of the relevant variable. 44 We also used bank foreign borrowing scaled by exports, and the growth rate of bank foreign borrowing; results were similar to those reported here. Note also that the measures could be combined to yield a single indicator, although in that case the issue of which weighting scheme to adopt would arise. To avoid this issue, and to show that all three indicators behave in the same way, we have kept them separate.
Fig. 6. Positive Response in Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule. (Deviations from Steady State)
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measure involves a mix of both types of asset prices.45 In addition, we define a composite index of economic stability, calculated with two sets of weights: first with equal weight 0.5 to each objective of stability, and second with a weight of 0.7 for macroeconomic stability and 0.3 for financial stability.46
Figs. 7 and 8 show the behavior of our measures of (in)stability separately, and the index of eco- nomic stability, when the underlying shock is the same as described earlier (a temporary drop in the
45 In general, there are three main channels through exchange rate volatility could undermine financial stability. First, large currency movements could destabilize exchange rate expectations, causing abrupt changes in capital flows and inducing high volatility in local currency debt and equity markets. Second, currency depreciation could exacerbate currency mismatches (and thus undermine the creditworthiness) of domestic (bank and nonbank) borrowers with large foreign-currency debts. Third, large depreciations could be associated with a deterioration in external funding conditions during a crisis. In the present setting, the first two channels are the more relevant onesdalthough, in practice, the actual degree of currency mismatch depends on how far balance sheet exposures are hedged (through off-balance sheet positions) in derivatives markets. 46 We experimented with other weighting schemes as well but they did not make much difference in terms of the results; we do not report them to save space.
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world risk-free rate), and for values of qC varying between 0 and 10.47 The figure suggests that, given our calibration, there is actually no trade-off among policy objectives, regardless of the way financial stability is measured: a stronger response of regulatory capital to credit gaps leads to a reduction in both indicators of volatilitydat least up to a certain value. Indeed, the curves have a convex shape, which indicates that the marginal benefit of countercyclical capital regulation diminishes as it becomes more aggressive (roughly above qC ¼ 4 in the figure). A similar result holds for the index of economic stability; given our base calibration, the marginal contribution of the regulatory capital rule to eco- nomic stability is positive but decreases as the policy becomes more aggressive.
Intuitively, the reason for the convex relationship between volatility and the strength with which the countercyclical capital rule responds to real credit growth is as follows. As noted earlier, the countercyclical rule mitigates the drop in the loan rate, which tends to reduce volatility in that variable. At first, this effect is not large, because the cost of issuing capital enters with a relatively low composite coefficient, sr, in the loan rate-setting equation (see (50)). As qC increases, this coefficient also in- creases, thereby reducing volatility in the loan rate and investment. However, as the policy becomes more aggressive, it also generates more volatility in bank capital requirements, which then translate into higher volatility in the cost of issuing capital. At the same time, higher volatility in bank capital increases (as indicated earlier) volatility in the marginal value of wealth, consumption, and real house pricesdwhich, through higher volatility in the repayment probability, raises volatility in the loan rate. In turn, this leads to higher volatility in investment, aggregate demand, the policy rate, inflation (through marginal costs) and other macroeconomic variables, including foreign bank borrowing and the exchange rate.48 Put differently, in a setting where banks must indeed meet capital requirements by issuing costly debt, as is the case here, the ability of a countercyclical regulatory rule to mitigate macroeconomic and financial volatility may be limited beyond a certain point.
Of course, if bank capital was accumulated exclusively through retained earnings, rather than by issuing capital, the volatility induced by the “cost channel” of capital regulation would not operate. Nevertheless, The conclusion regarding the effectiveness of countercyclical regulatory rules would continue to hold in a “mixed” system where capital is built through both retained profits and capital issuancedthe only difference being that decreasing marginal returns (in terms of reduced volatility) would begin to appear at a higher value of qC.
The thrust of the analysis, therefore, is that to the extent that monetary policy has limited room for manoeuvre (given the nature of the shock that the economy faces), a countercyclical regulatory rule is a complementary instrument because it helps to improve outcomes relative to both macroeconomic and financial stability objectives. However, because the policy entails diminishing marginal returns, other, more targeted macroprudential tools (such as loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income limits, and reserve requirements) may well be needed in practice to mitigate macroeconomic and financial imbalances when external shocks are large and persistent.
9. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a dynamic stochastic model of a small open middle- income economy with a two-level banking intermediation structure, a risk-sensitive regulatory capital regime, and imperfect capital mobility, to study the role of countercyclical regulatory policy in response to capital flows associated with foreign bank borrowing. In the model firms borrow from domestic banks and banks borrow on world capital markets, in both cases subject to an endogenous premium. The central bank pursues a policy of reserve accumulation that depends on both trade and financial factors. In line with the approach proposed by McCallum and Nelson (2000), imports are not treated as finished consumer goods but rather as intermediate goods, which are used (together with domestic intermediate goods) in the production of the domestic final good. It was argued that this
47 The maximum value of 10 is rather arbitrary, but this is sufficient to illustrate our purpose. 48 Because increases in iVt reduce the demand for excess capital, when q
C is low changes in that variable absorb some of the fluctuations in capital requirements, thereby imparting greater inertia to total capital. However, as qC increases, and movements in the cost of issuing capital are magnified, this mitigating role of excess capital becomes weaker.
Fig. 7. Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule: Impact on Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Stability.
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approach is particularly relevant for middle-income countries, where trade in raw materials accounts for a very large share of imports.
A sudden flood in foreign capital, induced by a drop in the world risk-free interest rate, was shown to generate asset price pressures and an economic boom, the magnitude of which depends on bank pricing behavior and the nature of the prudential regulatory regime. We also considered the role of countercyclical capital regulation, taking the form of a Basel III-type rule, under the assumption that monetary policy is constrained by the nature of the shock, that is, the possibility that raising interest rates too aggressively entails the risk of exacerbating capital inflows. As noted in the introduction, this is a policy dilemma that many central banks in middle-income countries have confronted in recent years. The countercyclical regulatory rule was shown to be quite effectivedat least for the shock considereddat promoting both macroeconomic and financial stability, with the latter defined in terms of three alternative indicators based on volatility in asset prices (house prices and the nominal ex- change rate), the credit-to-GDP ratio, and the ratio of bank foreign borrowing to GDP. However, the marginal gain in terms of reduced volatility may exhibit diminishing returns beyond a certain pointdessentially because regulatory-induced volatility in capital requirements translates into vola- tility in lending and other macroeconomic and financial variables, including foreign bank borrowing and the exchange rate. In the end, a countercyclical capital regulatory rule that is too aggressive may do little to reduce the volatility of capital flows. These results suggest that in practice countercyclical capital buffers may need to be supplemented by other, more targeted, macroprudential instruments,
Fig. 8. Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule: Impact on Composite Index of Economic Stability.
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such as loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, when external shocks are large and persistent. More generally, our experiments illustrate well how the regulatory regime matters, given the monetary policy stance, in the transmission of sudden floods. Movements in repayment probabilities feed into changes in risk weights under the Basel II-type regime that we considered, thereby affecting the cost of issuing capital and bank pricing decisions.
A useful extension of the model would be to account for household borrowing from banks. Even though it remains low (in proportion of GDP) compared to industrial countries, this component of lending has increased significantly in middle-income countries like Brazil and Turkey in recent yearsdpartly as a result of domestic factors (notably the expansion of the middle class in Brazil) but also partly as a result of large capital inflows. In Turkey for instance, the expansion of domestic- currency loans has been closely associated with capital inflows. The reason for this is because foreign investors were very involved in swap agreements with long maturities. In these transactions, foreigners swapped their domestic currency holdings (bought in the first place from domestic resi- dents) with foreign exchange held by domestic banks. Foreigners get a fixed rate of return on domestic- currency assets during the duration of the agreement, with domestic banks earning LIBOR on their foreign exchange positions. Thus, domestic banks can hedge the currency and interest rate risk by means of these agreements. This allowed banks to extend credit in domestic currency at longer ma- turities, making mortgage loans more affordable for households. Capital inflows not only provided ample foreign exchange liquidity to banks but also the opportunity to transform these funds into longer-term domestic-currency loans. In addition, capital inflows also had an indirect effect on credit to
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households, through their effect on expected interest rates. Because of the perception that lower in- terest rates abroad and strong capital inflows would persist, domestic banks became convinced that domestic interest rates would not increase substantially over time. This prompted them to take more interest rate risk and resulted in a lengthening of loan maturitiesdthereby stimulating household demand for mortgages and magnifying the boom in credit and output.
Another useful extension of our analysis would be to analyze the role of restrictions on capital inflows, which continue to be used by several countries in Latin America and Asia. Capital controls, unlike prudential tools, typically involve discriminating between residents and non-residents. In general, the evidence on their benefits (especially for direct taxes on fixed income and equity inflows) is mixed and differs both across countries and over time. However, some empirical studies do suggest that capital controls can be effective, at least in the short term.49 A worthwhile exercise would therefore be to study in a full-blown DSGE model like ours how controls operate in a context where mitigating financial instability is also a key policy objective. Indeed, an important issue in this context is to identify which type of capital controls can be most effective to promote economic stability, and if so, under what conditions. Some types of controls (such as exposure limits on foreign-currency borrowing, reserve requirements on foreign-currency deposits in domestic banks, and so on) are tantamount to prudential measuresdwhich are especially important when inflows are intermediated through the regulated financial system. In the model, this could be accounted for by introducing a tax on foreign borrowing by domestic banks. We intend to pursue this line of investigation in the near future.
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- Sudden floods, macroprudential regulation and stability in an open economy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The economy
- 2.1 Households
- 2.2 Domestic final good
- 2.3 Domestic intermediate goods
- 2.4 Production of capital
- 2.5 Commercial bank
- 2.6 Central bank
- 2.7 Government
- 3 Equilibrium
- 4 Steady state
- 5 Illustrative calibration
- 6 Dynamics of a sudden flood
- 7 Sensitivity analysis
- 7.1 Degree of exchange-rate pass-through
- 7.2 Speed of adjustment to foreign reserve target
- 7.3 Response to exchange rate movements
- 8 Countercyclical regulation
- 9 Concluding remarks
- References
1-s2.0-S0261560614001636-main.pdf
Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of International Money and Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jimf
Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area
Michał Brzoza-Brzezina*, Marcin Kolasa, Krzysztof Makarski Narodowy Bank Polski and Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Available online 13 November 2014
JEL classification: E32 E44 E58
Keywords: Euro-area imbalances Macroprudential policy DSGE models Financial frictions
* Corresponding author. Narodowy Bank Polski, þ48 22 826 9935.
E-mail addresses: michal.brzoza-brzezina@nb [email protected] (K. Makarski).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.10.004 0261-5606/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
a b s t r a c t
Since its creation the euro area suffered from imbalances between its core and peripheral members. This paper checks whether macroprudential policy applied to the peripheral countries could contribute to providing more macroeconomic stability in this re- gion. To this end we build a two-economy macrofinancial model and simulate the effects of macroprudential policy (regulating the loan-to-value ratio) when the core and the periphery are exposed to asymmetric shocks. We find that macroprudential policy is able to substantially lower the amplitude of credit and output fluctu- ations in the periphery. However, for the policy to be effective, it should be decentralized. Very similar conclusions hold when welfare is considered as the optimality criterion.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the euro area was created, large imbalances have built up in some of its member countries. These imbalances concerned in particular the housing market. As can be seen from Fig. 1, residential investment in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, a group of euro area members that we will refer to as the periphery, nearly doubled from 1999 to 2006, while it stagnated in the rest (core) of the currency union. A qualitatively similar picture can be observed for mortgage loans and real house prices: while their growth was moderate in the core, they were booming in the periphery. These developments
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M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154138
contributed to substantial GDP growth differentials within the euro area, i.e. countries experiencing housing booms were growing at a relatively high pace. These trends reversed when the housing market bubble burst, leading to a sharp slowdown in the peripheral economies. A subsequent deterioration of fiscal revenues sparked tensions in the financial markets that spread over the whole Europe, severely undermining the stability of the banking system and even threatening a break-up of the common currency area.
It has been established in the literature that the main source of these asymmetric developments was a sharp fall in the periphery's interest rates following their euro area accession, combined with an easy access to cross-border borrowing as well as asymmetric shocks to housing market prices (see e.g. ECB, 2003; Honohan and Leddin, 2006; Blanchard, 2007; Andr�es et al., 2010).
Fig. 1. Stylized facts on imbalances in the euro area.
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Can such large imbalances be prevented or at least mitigated using standard macroeconomic policy instruments? Clearly, the common interest rate set by the ECB at the area-wide level hardly responds to asymmetric developments in the periphery and hence can provide no stabilization in face of country- specific shocks. Exchange rate devaluation, a solution used on several occasions in the pre-EMU period to re-align competitiveness within Europe, is also no longer an option once in the euro area. Finally, the fiscal policy is limited by well-known political economy constraints and implementation lags.
In this paper we check if appropriately designed macroprudential policy can provide more stability in the euro area periphery. To this end, we set up a two-country DSGE model with housing frictions in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005). In this model, borrowers face a binding collateral constraint, i.e. their debt cannot exceed a certain fraction of their housing stock. We assume that this fraction, called the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, is fully controlled by the macroprudential authority.
There are two reasons for choosing the LTV as our preferred macroprudential policy instrument. First, as already mentioned, imbalances in the euro area were, to a substantial extent, driven by de- velopments in the housing markets of the peripheral countries. From this perspective, the LTV ratio seems to be a natural candidate to prevent imbalances. Second, the recent EU bank capital regulations (CRD IV/CRR 2013), that also make some references to macroprudential tools, do not include LTV ratios in the EU-wide regulation and hence more discretion is allowed for their application for macro- prudential purposes. In particular, this makes their application on a country basis more likely compared to alternative instruments (e.g. capital buffers).1
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, LTV policy is able to substantially lower the amplitude of credit and output fluctuations in the periphery. Second, the largest gains from this policy originate from housing market and (common) monetary policy shocks, i.e. the types of disturbances that have been found important drivers of the observed divergences within the euro area. Third, decentralized macroprudential policy is much more successful than a common one. Our main findings are supported when, instead of output volatility, we use welfare maximization as our optimality cri- terion. Decentralized macroprudential policy is able to raise welfare in the periphery by more than its centralized variant.
Our paper is related to a growing literature looking at the performance of various macroprudential policy rules. Lambertini et al. (2013) consider a news driven model of the housing market and find that a countercyclical LTV rule responding to credit growth can stabilize the economy better than the in- terest rate. Funke and Paetz (2012) examine LTV rules in a New Keynesian model for Hong Kong and argue that a non-linear rule, responding only to very high changes in property prices, performs better than a standard Taylor-like one. Based on experiments with three macroeconomic models, Angelini et al. (2011) report substantial stabilization gains from a countercyclical rule introduced by the Basel III reform package. Christensen et al. (2011) develop a DSGE model with banks and bank capital, finding desirable stabilization properties of countercyclical bank leverage regulation in response to financial shocks and a lower efficiency of such a rule after technology shocks. Darracq-Pari�es et al. (2011) es- timate a DSGE model with financial frictions affecting both households and firms using the euro area data, concluding that a countercyclical bank capital regulation can provide a strong support to mac- roeconomic stabilization, but also lead to excessive volatility in bank balance sheets. Angeloni and Faia (2013) find that the best combination of monetary and macroprudential policies includes mildly countercyclical capital ratios and response of monetary policy to assets prices or bank leverage. However, none of the papers reviewed above discuss macroprudential policy in the context of a het- erogeneous monetary union. The paper that comes closest to ours is a recent contribution by Quint and Rabanal (2014), who build a DSGE model of the euro area and use it to analyze the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies.
1 In principle, one could be concerned that if the LTV rule in the periphery is applied independently from the core, agents might try to circumvent it. For instance, if borrowing conditions in one region become more stringent, its impatient households could try to borrow in the other region. This possibility is explicitly ruled out in our model. We motivate this assumption by the observation that mortgage lending is relatively hard to decouple from physical proximity of the bank and the borrower. This is confirmed by the very low share of cross-border loans to households in the euro area (less than 1% according to the 2014 ECB report “Financial Integration in Europe”), despite differences in local banking regulations.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the model and section three its calibration. Section four discusses the transmission mechanisms of the macroprudential policy in- strument. Our main quantitative results are presented in section five and some robustness checks are discussed in section six. Section seven concludes.
2. Model
We consider a two country DSGE model with collateral constraints modeled as in Iacoviello (2005). These two countries form a monetary union. We call one of them the core and the other the periphery. Measure u of agents reside in the periphery and u* ¼ 1 � u in the core. Both economies are populated by patient households (who save in equilibrium) and impatient households (who borrow in equilibrium), as well as producers of consumption goods, housing and intermediate goods. Union-wide monetary policy is conducted according toa Taylor rule, while macroprudential policy instruments can be adjusted at a country level. In this paper, we employ the following notational convention: variables without an asterisk refer to the periphery, while variables with an asterisk pertain to the core. Since both countries have a symmetric structure, we describe the problems of agents in the periphery only.
2.1. Households
In each economy there are two types of households indexed by i on a unit interval: patient i∈P ≡ [0,uP] and impatient i∈I ≡ (uP,1].
2 Hence, the measure of patient agents is uP, while that of impatient households is uI ¼ 1 � uP.
2.1.1. Patient households Patient households work nP,t, accumulate housing cP,t, consume cP,t and deposit savings in the
banking sector DP,t at the risk-free rate Rt. 3 We also assume that they own physical capital kP (fixed at
the aggregate level), which they rent to firms at the rate Rk,t, as well as all firms and banks in the economy, which pay them dividends PP,t.
Patient households maximize
UP;t ¼E0 (X∞
0
b t P
" eεu;t � cP;tðiÞ�xccP;t�1
�1�sc 1�sc
þeεu;t eεc;t Ac � cP;tðiÞ�xccP;t�1
�1�sc 1�sc
�An nP;tðiÞ1þsn 1þsn
#)
(1)
subject to the budget constraint
PtcP;t ið Þ þ Pc;t cP;t ið Þ � 1 � dc � �
cP;t�1 ið Þ � �
þ DP;t ið Þ � WP;t ið ÞnP;t ið Þ þ Rk;tkP ið Þ þ Rt�1DP;t�1 ið Þ þ PP;t ið Þ (2)
where Pt, Pc,t and WP,t are, respectively, the price of consumption goods, the price of housing and patient households' nominal wage. Moreover, bP denotes patient agents' discount rate, while Ac and An are the weights of housing and labor in utility. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi- tution in consumption is denoted by sc, that in housing by sc, while sn is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Housing stock depreciates at the rate dc. Consumption and housing services are subject to external habit persistence xc and xc, respectively. There are two preference shocks, both following independent AR(1) processes: intertemporal preference shock εu,t and housing preference shock εc,t.
2 We employ the following notational convention: all variables denoted with a subscript P or I are expressed per patient or impatient household, respectively, while all other variables are expressed per all households. For example, k denotes per capita capital and since only patient households own capital, capital per patient households is equal to kP ¼ k/uP.
3 We calibrate the model so that patient households save and never borrow. Therefore, to simplify notation, we eliminate loans (which they would not take anyway) from their budget constraint. Similarly, we do not include deposits in impatient households' budget constraint (4).
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2.1.2. Impatient households Impatient households optimize by choosing consumption cI,t, housing services cI,t and labor
supply nI,t. They maximize their lifetime utility function that is similar to that of patient house- holds. The only difference is that they discount the future utility flows more heavily (bI < bP), which makes them natural borrowers. Access to credit LI,t is subject to the following collateral constraint
RL;tLI;tðiÞ � mc;tEt � Pc;tþ1
�� 1 � dc
� cI;tðiÞ (3)
where mc,t is the LTV ratio set by the macroprudential authority, and RL,t is the interest rate on loans. The budget constraint of impatient households takes the following form
PtcI;t � i � þ Pc;t
� cI;t � i � � � 1 � dc
� cI;t�1
� i ��
þ RL;t�1LI;t�1 � i � � WI;t
� i � nI;t � i � þ LI;t
� i �
(4)
where WI,t denotes impatient households' nominal wage.
2.1.3. Labor market Both patient and impatient households supply monopolistically distinct labor services to
competitive aggregators, who transform them into homogenous labor input according to
nt ¼
2 664uPn
fn�1 fn P;t þ uIn
fn�1 fn I;t
3 775
fn fn�1
(5)
where 2 4Z 1 1mw
3 5 mw 2
4Z 1 1mw 3 5 mw
nP;t ¼ 0 nP;tðiÞ di ; nI;t ¼
0 nI;tðiÞ di (6)
In the above formulas, fn is the elasticity of substitution between labor supplied by the two types of households, while mw determines the elasticity of substitution between individual labor varieties.
We assume that wages for both types of households WP,t and WI,t are sticky. 4 In each period,
with probability 1 � qw, each household receives a Calvo signal to reoptimize her wages. Otherwise, wages are indexed according to pzw;t ¼ zwpt�1 þ ð1 � zwÞp, where pt ≡ Pt/Pt�1 and p denote inflation and its steady state level, respectively, while zw controls the degree of wage indexation to past inflation. We assume perfect risk sharing across households of the same type.5 As a result, wage stickiness does not create additional heterogeneity in consumption and housing choices between the agents.
2.2. Producers
In our economy there are several types of firms, all owned by patient households. Consumption and housing producers use intermediate goods to produce consumption and housing goods, respectively. Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers produce differentiated goods by employing capital and labor.
4 There are two reasons for including sticky wages in our model. First, wage stickiness helps us to match the moments implied by the model to the data as it makes impatient households' labor income, and hence consumption, more stable. Second, staggered wage adjustment has a potential to significantly affect welfare analysis (see Erceg et al., 2000), which we use as one of the criteria to evaluate alternative policies.
5 Perfect risk sharing implies that the budget constraints (2) and (4) implicitly include net payments from insurance against individual wage risk.
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2.2.1. Consumption good producers Perfectly competitive consumption good producers purchase domestic and foreign varieties of
differentiated intermediate goods cH(i) and cF(i) to produce a homogeneous good according to the following technology
ct ¼
0 BB@ð1 � hHÞ 1fc c
fc�1 fc F;t þ h
1 fc Hc
fc�1 fc H;t
1 CCA
fc fc�1
(7)
where
cH;t ¼ 0 @Z1
0
cH;tðiÞ 1 mdi
1 A
m
; cF;t ¼ 0 @Z1
0
cF;tðiÞ 1 mdi
1 A
m
(8)
In the formulas above, hH determines home bias in consumption, fn is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption goods, while m determines the elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate goods.
2.2.2. Housing producers In each period, perfectly competitive housing goods producers purchase undepreciated housing
from the previous period and produce new housing stock according to the following formula
ct ¼ ð1 � dÞct�1 þ εic;t � 1 � Sc
� ic;t
ic;t�1
�� ic;t (9)
where ic,t stands for housing investment, produced only with domestic intermediate inputs
ic;t ¼ 0 @Z1
0
ic;tðiÞ 1 mdi
1 A
m
(10)
and εic,t denotes an AR(1) housing investment specific technology shock. Housing investment
adjustment cost is given by Sc
� ic;t ic;t�1
� ¼ kc2
� ic;t ic;t�1
� 1 �2
, where kc > 0.
2.2.3. Intermediate goods producers Intermediate goods producers, indexed by i, combine labor and capital with the following
technology
cH;tðiÞ þ 1 � u u
c�H;tðiÞ þ ic;tðiÞ ¼ ztkðiÞantðiÞ1�a (11)
where zt denotes a productivity shock that follows an AR(1) process. They operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and set their prices according to the Calvo scheme. In each period, each producer i receives with probability 1 � q a signal to reoptimize her price. Otherwise, prices are indexed according to pz,t ¼ zpt�1 þ (1 � z)p, where z controls the degree of indexation to past inflation.
2.3. Banks
A continuum of monopolistically competitive banks indexed by j supply loans to impatient households, refinancing them by accepting deposits Dt from patient households at the rate Rt and borrowing the rest (or lending the surplus) ~D
� t in the foreign interbank market at the rate 9tR
� t . 6 A
representative bank in the periphery maximizes
6 The risks premium evolves according to 9t ¼ 1 þ x(exp(dt � d) � 1), where dt is the debt-to-GDP ratio of the periphery while d denotes its steady-state level. Perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign interbank market loans implies the following relationship: Rt ¼ 9tR�t . The risk premium is introduced only to render the model stationary. In our calibration, we set x to a very small value so that the difference between Rt and R�t is negligible.
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E0 bP uP;tþ1 P
h RL;tðjÞLtðjÞ � RtDtðjÞ � Stþ1rtR�t ~D�t ðjÞ
i (12)
� tþ1
subject to the flow of funds constraint
LtðjÞ ¼ DtðjÞ þ St ~D*t ðjÞ (13) and the demand for loans implied by the following DixiteStiglitz loan aggregator
uILI;t ¼ 2 4Z 1
0 LtðjÞ
1 mL dj
3 5 mL
(14)
where uP,t is marginal utility of patient households' real income.
2.4. Closing the model
2.4.1. GDP and balance of payments We define aggregate output (GDP) as
yt≡cH;t þ c�H;t 1 � u u
þ ic;t (15)
and the law of motion of the periphery's net foreign debt ~D � t can be written as
~D � t ¼ PF;tcF;t �
1 � u u
P�H;tc � H;t þ 9t�1R�t�1 ~D
� t�1 (16)
whereP�H;t and PF,t denotethe price of, respectively, exports and imports of the periphery. We also impose a standard set of market clearing conditions for the financial, housing, final goods and factor markets.
2.4.2. Monetary policy We assume that the monetary authority reacts to union-wide variables, i.e. it sets the policy rate
according to the following Taylor rule
R�t R�
¼ � R�t�1 R�
�g�R"�~pt ~p�
�g� p � ~yt ~y
�g�y#1�g�R eε
� R;t (17)
where ~yt≡uyt þ ð1 � uÞy�t ~pt≡ðptÞu
� p�t �1�u
Here, g�p and g � y control the strength of policy rate response to inflation and output, respectively,
while g�R controls the degree of interest rate smoothing. The variables without time subscripts denote their respective steady state values and ε�R;t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
2.4.3. Macroprudential policy The macroprudential authority sets the LTV ratio according to the following simple feedback rule7
mc;t mc
¼ � lt l
�gml pc;t pc
!gmp� yt y
�gmy (18)
7 Following the literature, we treat mc,t as a policy parameter. Some other papers treat it as exogenous stochastic process (Gerali et al., 2010) or make it dependent on productivity (Iacoviello and Pavan, 2013).
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In the formulas above, mc is the steady state LTV ratio, while gml, gml and gml determine the size of instrument reaction to percentage deviations of real loans, house prices and output, respectively, from their steady state values. Hence, the macroprudential authority's main concern is to stabilize the financial sector, with some weight also attached to macroeconomic stability.
The rule given by equation (18) assumes that the macroprudential authority in the periphery acts independently from that in the core. In some of simulations we also look at the common policy out- comes, in which case the LTV ratio is determined as follows
mc;t mc
¼ m�c;t m�c
¼ ~lt ~l
!gml ~pc;t ~pc
!gmp� ~yt ~y
�gmy (19)
where
~lt≡ult þ ð1 � uÞl�t ~pc;t≡upc;t þ ð1 � uÞp�c;t
which means that it responds to area-wide rather than to region-specific variables.
3. Calibration
3.1. Structural parameters
This paper's focus is on a small member of a currency union facing stabilization challenges due to asymmetric shocks. To keep the exposition transparent, in our calibration we abstract from any structural heterogeneity within the union. More specifically, the core and periphery are assumed to differ only in size and shock realizations.8 The calibrated values of structural parameters are sum- marized in Table 1. The unit of time is one quarter.
We set the relative size of the periphery to 10%, which roughly corresponds to the GDP share of Spain in the euro area. Thiscalibration alsoimplies thatthe core is very muchlike aclosed economy,followinga self-oriented monetary policy. The share of home-made goods in the periphery's consumption basket is set to 0.7, consistently with the average import content of private consumption estimated in Bussiere et al. (2013) for the euro area member states. Correcting this figure for the relative country size as in Sutherland (2005) implies the import share in the core's consumption of 0.03.
Households' preferences, production technology, as well as labor and product market real rigidities are calibrated in line with the literature. The elasticity of the residential investment adjustment cost is set to 30. This value is substantially larger than estimated by Lombardo and McAdam (2012), but proved crucial in matching the relative volatility of residential investment. While calibrating nominal rigidities, we follow closely Christoffel et al. (2008). The monetary policy feedback rule is also parametrized consistently with estimated DSGE models for the euro area.
Several parameters are calibrated to match a few key steady state ratios, reported in Table 3, using the euro area 1995e2011 averages as targets.9 These include the housing and labor weights in utility, the housing stock depreciation rate, the relative size of impatient agents, the physical capital stock, transfers from patient to impatient households and markups in financial intermediation.
3.2. Stochastic properties
Business cycle fluctuations in our model monetary union are driven by nine stochastic shocks. These include four pairs of region-specific shocks to productivity, preferences, relative housing preferences
8 The consequences of structural housing market heterogeneity within a monetary union are analyzed by Rubio (2014). 9 Data on interest rates and national accounts are taken from Eurostat. Consistently with the model setup, which abstracts
from government spending and business investment, as well as assumes balanced trade in the steady state, we define the empirical counterpart of output not as total GDP, but as the sum of private consumption and residential investment. Data on mortgage loans and housing stock come from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW).
Table 1 Calibration e parameters.
Parameter Value Description
bP, b � P 0.99 Discount factor, patient HHs
bI, b � I 0.975 Discount factor, impatient HHs
dc, d � c 0.01 Housing stock depreciation rate
uI, u�I 0.55 Share of impatient HHs Ac, A�c 2.43 Weight on housing in utility function An, A�n 225 Weight on labor in utility function sc, s�c 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption sc, s�c 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in housing sn, s�n 2 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply xc, x
� c 0.7 Degree of external habit formation in consumption
xc, x � c 0.7 Degree of external habit formation in housing
qw, q � w 0.75 Calvo probability for wages
zw, z � w 0.5 Indexation parameter for wages
mw, m�w 1.2 Steady state labor markup fn, f�n 6 Elasticity of substitution btw. patient and impatient labor t, t* 0.25 Real transfers from patient to impatient HHs m, m* 1.2 Steady state product markup qH, q
� F 0.9 Calvo probability for domestic prices
qF, q � H 0.75 Calvo probability for export prices
zH, zF, z � H, z
� F 0.5 Indexation parameter for prices
a, a* 0.3 Output elasticity with respect to physical capital k, k* 6.5 Physical capital stock per capita kc, k�c 30 Housing investment adjustment cost mL, m�L 1.0047 Loan markup mc, m�c 0.75 Steady state LTV ratio p, p* 1.005 Steady state inflation x 0.001 Elasticity of risk premium wrt. foreign debt gR 0.9 Interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule gp 2 Response to inflation in Taylor rule gy 0.15 Response to output in Taylor rule u 0.1 Share of periphery in monetary union hc 0.7 Share of domestic goods in consumption basket (periphery) h�c ¼ uð1�hcÞð1�uÞ 0.03 Share of imported goods in consumption basket (core) fc, f�c 1.5 Elasticity of substitution btw. home and foreign goods
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and housing investment technology, all modeled as first-order autoregressive processes, and one common monetary shock, assumed to be white noise. For simplicity, we assume that the inertia and volatility of shocks of a given type do not differ between the core and periphery. However, given the paper's focus on imbalances within a currency union, we assume that shocks are uncorrelated across the two regions. As a robustness check we allow shocks to be correlated.
Our calibration of the shock processes is summarized in Table 2. The aim was to match the standard moments of the euro area data and to be at the same time consistent with the empirical literature. As reported in Table 4, the model is successful in matching the volatilities of the main macro-categories, even though it somewhat underestimates the volatility of house prices and overestimates that of inflation and the mortgage interest rate. Except for loans and inflation, the inertia implied by our calibration is also broadly in line with the data. The model does a somewhat worse job at matching comovement between the main variables: it generates too little positive correlation of consumption with residential investment, real house prices and mortgage loans, while implying too negative cor- relation between consumption and the lending rate or inflation. Overall, given the model's simplicity and a relatively small number of shocks, its ability to match the key moments can be considered satisfactory.
As the last step of the model validation, we discuss the role it assigns to individual shocks in driving business cycle fluctuations. The variance decomposition results for the core are reported in Table 5. Due to its small size, shocks hitting the periphery do not have any significant effect on the rest of the monetary union. According to the model, consumption in the core is mainly driven by preference
Table 2 Calibration e stochastic shocks.
Parameter Value Description
rz, r�z 0.95 Productivity shock e autocorrelation sz, s�z 0.007 Productivity shock e standard deviation ru, r�u 0.99 Preference shock e autocorrelation su, s�u 0.016 Preference shock e standard deviation rc, r�c 0.99 Housing preference shock e autocorrelation sc, s�c 0.01 Housing preference shock e standard deviation ri, r�i 0.95 Investment specific shock e autocorrelation si, s�i 0.012 Investment specific shock e standard deviation sR 0.0011 Monetary shock e standard deviation
Table 3 Steady state ratios.
Steady state ratio Value
Import to output ratio (periphery) 0.27 Import to output ratio (core) 0.003 Residential investment to output ratio 0.094 Capital-output ratio (annual) 2.0 Hours worked 0.33 Housing wealth to output ratio (annual) 2.32 Debt to output ratio (annual) 0.75 Spread (annualized) 0.019 Relative consumption of impatient HHs 0.75
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shocks, with an important role of productivity shocks. The latter also drive a significant share of fluctuations in residential investment. However, it is the two housing market shocks (housing pref- erence and residential investment) that account for the bulk of movements in this variable. Housing market shocks are also important for loans, but the monetary policy shock explains more than 40 percent of their variance. Investment specific shocks are crucial in generating fluctuations in real house prices. Finally, productivity shocks account for the bulk of movements in inflation and the lending rate. We note that many of these implications are consistent with the VAR evidence reported in Musso et al. (2011). This concerns in particular the dominant role of housing market shocks in driving residential investment and real house prices.
Turning to the variance decomposition for the periphery (see Table 6), our model assigns a sub- stantial role to shocks originating abroad. This does not apply to residential investment, which is driven
Table 4 Moment matching e euro area.
Variable Standard dev. Autocorrelation Corr. With cons.
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption 2.25 2.23 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 Residential investment 6.97 6.98 0.97 0.99 0.81 0.20 Mortgage loans 5.51 5.51 0.98 0.85 0.89 0.28 Real house prices 3.94 3.14 0.98 0.94 0.65 0.27 Mortgage interest rate 0.30 0.42 0.98 0.96 �0.07 �0.71 Inflation 0.28 0.40 0.32 0.96 0.19 �0.57
Note: All variables are quarterly euro area aggregates for the period 1996e2011. Consumption is defined as real final con- sumption expenditure of households, residential investment is real gross fixed capital formation in dwellings, inflation is the quarterly change in HICP, while the mortgage interest rate is quarterly interest on housing loans to households. All these variables are taken from Eurostat. Real house prices are defined as residential property prices of new and existing houses and flats, while mortgage loans are defined as outstanding amounts of lending for house purchase. Both series come from the ECB SDW and are deflated by HICP. Trending variables (consumption, residential investment, mortgage loans and real house prices) are expressed as log-deviations from linear trends.
Table 5 Variance decomposition e core.
Variable y shock Productivity Preference Housing pref. Invest. specific Monetary
Consumption 16.4 71.2 1.5 2.3 8.5 Residential invest. 36.6 3.0 36.2 24.0 0.2 Mortgage loans 2.0 0.3 24.3 31.7 41.5 Real house prices 20.0 0.3 6.7 63.0 9.9 Mortg. interest rate 70.6 11.7 0.1 1.8 14.7 Inflation 66.4 27.1 0.1 0.5 4.8
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almost entirely by domestic disturbances. At the other extreme, domestic shocks explain very little of fluctuations in the periphery's inflation and credit cost.
4. Macroprudential policy transmission
In this section we briefly show how our macroprudential policy tool works. To this end, on Fig. 2 we present the impulse response functions to a shock to the macroprudential policy rule in the periphery (18). Just for the purpose of this illustration, we treat the LTV ratio as a purely exogenous AR(1) process with autocorrelation equal to 0.9. This choice is motivated by the fact that, in contrast to monetary policy rules, there is hardly any evidence on how macroprudential policymakers behave. Therefore, any specific parametrization of the feedback rule would be clearly arbitrary.
Let us now discuss the impulse responses. A negative shock to the LTV ratio implies a tightening of lending standards for impatient households. They have to cut back borrowing and hence reduce their consumption and housing stock. Lower demand for housing drives its price down, amplifying the initial shock as the value of collateral declines. As both consumption and residential investment decline, so does output. Since the periphery has a small weight in the common currency area, the interest rate barely moves and hence does not help much to stabilize the economy. Importantly, the effects of changes in the LTV ratio on inflation are very small so using this policy is unlikely to significantly change the monetary authority's ability to meet its traditional price stability objective.
Overall, macroprudential policy can significantly affect the volume of mortgage loans and, in consequence, also house prices and the level of economic activity. This makes it a potentially useful tool not only to stabilize the financial sector, but possibly also the real economy.
5. Effects of macroprudential policy
We are now ready to use our model to check whether macroprudential policy is able to improve the financial and macroeconomic situation in the peripheral economy facing asymmetric shocks. Unless stated otherwise, macroprudential policy is applied independently for the periphery, i.e the rule re- sponds to region-specific variables. This contrasts with the monetary policy setup, implemented by the common central bank, which reacts to area-wide output and inflation. Note that in our baseline calibration the peripheral economy is small (it constitutes only 10% of the currency area), and hence the common interest rate is almost completely determined by the developments in the foreign (core) economy.
Table 6 Variance decomposition e periphery.
Variable/shock Productivity Preference Housing pref. Invest. specific Foreign
Consumption 16.8 60.9 1.0 0.9 20.4 Residential invest. 24.8 6.7 33.8 28.9 5.8 Mortgage loans 4.7 1.6 25.7 21.5 46.5 Real house prices 4.0 3.4 8.4 53.6 30.6 Mortg. interest rate 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 98.5 Inflation 7.7 0.8 0.0 0.1 91.4
Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a macroprudential policy shock.
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154148
Our evaluation uses two independent optimality criteria. The first one is based on the ability of macroprudential policy to reduce both credit and output volatility in the periphery. This refers to the well documented practice of central banks to smooth the business cycle and ensure financial sector stability. The second criterion checks to what extent macroprudential policy can improve welfare of the periphery's households. In both cases, we optimize the parameters defining the LTV rule given by equation (18), holding its functional form fixed and making sure that the rule does not imply unre- alistically high volatility of the instrument. More precisely, the standard deviation of the LTV ratio is limited to 10%.
We start with the volatility criterion and present the effects of macroprudential policy in form of the efficient frontiers. These are obtained by plotting the standard deviations of credit and output under policies that choose the feedback coefficients in equation (18) such that they minimize the following loss function
lvarðltÞ þ ð1 � lÞvarðytÞ (20) for various l∈[0,1] and subject to constraint var(mc,t) � 0.12, where var(�) denotes the unconditional variance. When considering the outcomes of common macroprudential policy, i.e. setting the LTV ratios at the same level in both regions, these are obtained by solving a similar set of problems, except that the periphery's variables in equation (20) are replaced with the respective area-wide aggregates.
The dashed line in Fig. 3 shows the thus obtained output-credit volatility trade-off, together with outcomes available under alternative institutional setups, including common (solid line) or no (square mark) macroprudential policy. We also illustrate the workings of a more aggressive common monetary policy and no LTV adjustments (diamond mark), in which case the response of the interest rate in the Taylor rule g�p is increased from 2 to 3. The volatilities presented in the figure are normalized by the
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154 149
standard deviations of loans and output in the periphery under the assumption the periphery does not participate in the common currency area, i.e. runs independent monetary policy under a floating ex- change rate. In this benchmark case, depicted by the circle, the core and periphery's monetary author- ities follow self-oriented Taylor rules with a functional form and parametrization as in equation (17).
The main conclusions from these calculations are as follows. First, joining the monetary union raises the volatility of output by somewhat more than 10% and decreases that of loans by around 5%. This is clearly the consequence of fixing the exchange rate and replacing monetary policy that reacts to do- mestic developments with one that reacts (mainly) to foreign fluctuations.10 Second, substituting in- dependent monetary policy with independent macroprudential policy can help stabilizing the economy. In particular, even though this policy cannot bring the periphery to where it would be if it stayed out of the monetary union, appropriate adjustments of the LTV ratio can substantially decrease the volatility of both output and loans in this region. Actually, introducing such policy can virtually eliminate fluctuations in credit at no cost in terms of output variability while the maximum attainable decrease in the standard deviation of output without increasing that of loans amounts to about 5%. Third, the outcomes observed in the periphery if the LTV ratio is constrained to be the same in the whole monetary union (common macroprudential policy) are much less favorable for this region. In this case, even though so defined policy can potentially bring more stability to the periphery's financial and real sectors, the scale of feasible improvement is much lower compared to the independent policy outcomes. Fourth, the trade-off faced by the macroprudential authority is very steep in the output- credit volatility space. This means that, as one could expect, such policy is efficient at stabilizing credit market developments, but its ability to smooth fluctuations in real economic activity is rather limited. Finally, adjusting the common interest rate more aggressively is no substitute for macro- prudential policy. Even though some reduction in output volatility can be thus obtained, but only at a cost of destabilizing the credit market, and this arrangement is clearly dominated by independent macroprudential policy or some of outcomes available under its common variant.
Our second optimality measure is welfare. As before, we search for such a parametrization of the macroprudential policy rule given by equation (18) that maximizes social welfare. More precisely, the independently operating policy maker tries to maximize aggregate welfare defined as the uncondi- tional (ergodic) mean of (see e.g. Rubio, 2011; Lambertini et al., 2013)
uPð1 � bPÞUP;t þ uIð1 � bIÞUI;t (21) and computed using a second-order approximation to the model equilibrium conditions. In the case of common policy, the macroprudential authority maximizes the weighted average of (21) and its core counterpart, with weights given by the respective size of each region in the monetary union. Addi- tionally, in both cases, we look at the welfare implications of such defined optimal policy for each of the two household types in the periphery.
Table 7 presents the results. Welfare is presented in consumption equivalent units, defined as percent of lifetime consumption that the periphery's households would be willing to forgo to live with rather than without macroprudential policy. We find that appropriately designed independent LTV policy is able to improve aggregate welfare quite substantially. However, so defined optimal macro- prudential policy does not constitute a Pareto improvement as it is only impatient agents that benefit from this policy while the patient ones suffer welfare losses. The main reason for it is the link between borrowers and savers via the credit market. More specifically, whenever the macroprudential authority uses the LTV ratio to affect lending to impatient households, it necessarily affects the amount of de- posits that patient households hold.11 For instance, since income of both types of agents is positively
10 At this point, one thing should be made clear in order to avoid misinterpretation of the results. Our stochastic environment does not include shocks that directly affect the exchange rate (e.g. risk premium shocks) and that possibly disappear after adopting the common currency. For this reason, in our model, joining the union is unequivocally detrimental for output variability, while in real life the net outcome is ex ante unclear. 11 More precisely, this link is one-to-one in a closed economy and somewhat weakened in an open economy setup because of international capital flows, but still exists because of imperfect international financial markets (risk premium affecting cross- border borrowing costs) and non-zero size of the periphery relative to the core.
Fig. 3. Macroprudential policy trade-off in the periphery.
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154150
correlated, any attempt to smooth consumption of one group comes usually at a cost of destabilizing that of the other.
As regards the implications of this policy for the volatility of output and loans, which are the focus of our first evaluation criterion, we find that it somewhat decreases the former and virtually eliminates the latter. Moreover, the welfare maximizing policy leads to more stable house prices. These results indicate that this type of policy should mainly focus on stabilizing the credit and housing market. Turning to the consequences of common policy, the gains reaped by the periphery are positive, but much smaller and do not lead to a Pareto improvement. Importantly, area-wide macroprudential policy actually delivers little financial stability to the periphery as it decreases the volatility of credit in this region only by a relatively small amount.
Summing up the results obtained using both the volatility and welfare criteria, we can conclude that the macroprudential policy can bring more stability to the periphery or improve aggregate welfare. However, for these effects to be sizable, the policy must be decentralized, i.e. the instruments set at a country level. The intuition behind this result is an analogue to monetary policy: responding to area- wide aggregates essentially means ignoring fluctuations specific to the (small) periphery.
In order to get a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms, we run an additional experiment that checks whether decentralized macroprudential policy is able to trade off some shocks better than others. This is an important question in the debate on euro area imbalances, given the evidence that asymmetric interest rate or housing shocks played a major role in driving these
Table 7 Effects of welfare maximizing macroprudential policy on the periphery.
Independent Common
Welfare e total 0.20 0.04 Welfare e patient HHs �0.10 �0.04 Welfare e impatient HHs 0.39 0.10 Std. of output �0.14 �0.69 Std. of credit �100.0 �3.73 Std. of house prices �1.79 �0.78
Note: Welfare gains are presented in percent of lifetime consumption. The standard deviations are expressed as percent difference from the no macroprudential policy case.
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154 151
imbalances. To answer this question, we redo our calculations with one shock turned on at a time. While doing this, we concentrate on shocks specific to the peripheral economy. Fig. 4 presents the output-credit volatility trade-off (with each of the two variables normalized by their respective standard deviations in the case of no macroprudential policy). It is clear that frontiers for shocks related to the housing market (housing preference and investment specific) and to monetary policy have a smaller slope than those for productivity and preference shocks, meaning that large reductions in output volatility do not necessarily lead to financial instability. Moreover, for this group of shocks the potential improvement achievable by appropriate adjustments in the LTV ratio is much bigger, i.e. the frontiers lie further away from the no-policy outcome indicated by the square mark.
The picture (see Table 8) is similar if one takes aggregate welfare as the optimality criterion. Macroprudential policy can achieve the largest welfare gains when facing housing preference, interest rate and housing investment specific shocks. Overall, these findings strengthen our conclusion that macroprudential policy seems well designed to deal with the kind of asymmetries and imbalances that plague the euro area.
Fig. 4. Efficient policy frontiers for LTV policy in the periphery (shocks applied separately).
Table 8 Welfare effects of macroprudential policy on the periphery by shocks.
Productivity Housing Housing investment Monetary Intertemporal preference
Total 0.02 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.02 Patient HHs 0.02 �0.10 �0.03 �0.08 �0.02 Impatient HHs 0.02 0.36 0.10 0.16 0.05
Note: Welfare gains are presented in percent of lifetime consumption. Results are based on simulations run with only one respective shock at a time (the parameters of the shock as in the calibration).
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154152
6. Robustness check e correlated shocks
Our baseline assumption was that shocks in the core and periphery are uncorrelated. However, it has been documented in the literature that this correlation can be positive. For instance, Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) estimate a DSGE model for France, Germany and Italy and find cross-country correlations of productivity and preference shocks ranging from �0.03 to 0.19 and 0.17 to 0.31, respectively. Hence, as a robustness check, we repeat our most important results assuming conservatively that all shocks (except for the common monetary policy shock) have a correlation of 0.3 between the core and pe- riphery. Since, in the baseline model, this modification implies only small changes to the moments reported in Table 4, we decided not to recalibrate the model. Compared to our benchmark results, one should expect the gains from independent macroprudential policy to be smaller and those from its
Fig. 5. Macroprudential policy trade-off in the periphery (correlated shocks).
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154 153
common variant larger as, with correlated shocks, common policy actions driven mainly by de- velopments in the core should be also to some extent adequate for the periphery.
Fig. 5 presents the policy trade-offs in the case of correlated shocks for independent and common macroprudential policy. As before, the results are normalized against the case of no macroprudential policy and independent monetary policy. As it is clear from comparing Figs. 3 and 5, the general picture remains unchanged. In line with our expectations, both the loss from giving up monetary indepen- dence and the gain from adopting independent macroprudential policy become somewhat smaller. Interestingly, more aggressive common monetary policy now offers no alternative to macroprudential policy as it generates an increase in the volatility of both output and credit.
Similarly, while considering welfare gains from independent macroprudential policy, we find that allowing for moderate correlation of shocks between the core and periphery affects our conclusions very little (see Table 9).
7. Conclusions
In this paper we check whether macroprudential policy can contribute to stabilizing a monetary union hit by asymmetric shocks. Our question is directly motivated by the imbalances that have arisen since the creation of the euro area between its “core” and “peripheral” members. As documented in the literature, these imbalances were mainly driven by asymmetric interest rate adjustments and housing market developments.
To answer this question, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of two re- gions forming a monetary union and run a number of simulations, showing how the peripheral economy behaves under various policy assumptions. In particular, we test the working of macro- prudential policy oriented at regulating the loan-to-value ratio and check whether it can stabilize the economy when independent monetary policy is lost. Additionally, we consider the case of common macroprudential policy and show how it changes the outcome for the periphery. Finally, we test whether macroprudential policy is particularly efficient at stabilizing the economy hit by particular shocks.
Our findings are as follows. First, appropriate adjustments in the LTV ratio can substantially lower the volatility of credit and output in the periphery. Second, such policy is also able to raise households' welfare. However, it is not Pareto-efficient as it can raise either patient or impatient households' utility. Third, macroprudential policy is particularly efficient at trading-off monetary policy shocks and shocks related to the housing market. Since these disturbances are the usual suspects behind the asymmetric developments between the core and the periphery of the euro area, this conclusion strengthens our case for macroprudential policy as a stabilizing tool. However, this being our fourth conclusion, if macroprudential policy is to efficiently prevent desynchronization of business and financial cycles between the core and the periphery, it should be decentralized. The welfare analysis also points in this direction.
All in all, we find that macroprudential policy can potentially play an important role in preventing the emergence of imbalances between members of a monetary union, especially if it is applied on a decentralized basis.
Table 9 Effects of welfare maximizing macroprudential policy on the periphery (correlated vs. uncorrelated shocks).
Independent (uncorrelated shocks) Independent (correlated shocks)
Welfare e total 0.20 0.19 Welfare e patient HHs �0.10 �0.10 Welfare e impatient HHs 0.39 0.36 Std. of output �0.14 �0.40 Std. of credit �100.0 �97.9 Std. of house prices �1.79 �1.69
Note: Welfare gains are presented in percent of lifetime consumption. The standard deviations are expressed as percent dif- ference from the no macroprudential policy case.
M. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (2015) 137e154154
Acknowledgments
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Narodowy Bank Polski or the Warsaw School of Economics. This paper benefited from useful suggestions made by two anonymous referees. We would also like to thank Yusuf Soner Başkaya, Matthieu Bussiere, Tomasz Chmielewski, Zeno Enders, Bartosz Ma�ckowiak, Ryszard Kokoszczy�nski and Dominic Quint for helpful discussions. Comments received at the joint NBP/SNB seminar, NBP Summer Workshop, Central Bank Macroeconomic Modeling Workshop, DIW conference in Berlin, IES Economic Meeting in Prague, Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy, Banque de France e Deutsche Bundesbank Work- shop, Euroframe Conference, WGEM Workshop, CEF conference in Vancouver, EEA congress in Goth- enburg and RES conference in Manchester, as well as at the seminars at Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Warsaw School of Economics, are also gratefully acknowledged.
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- Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Model
- 2.1. Households
- 2.1.1. Patient households
- 2.1.2. Impatient households
- 2.1.3. Labor market
- 2.2. Producers
- 2.2.1. Consumption good producers
- 2.2.2. Housing producers
- 2.2.3. Intermediate goods producers
- 2.3. Banks
- 2.4. Closing the model
- 2.4.1. GDP and balance of payments
- 2.4.2. Monetary policy
- 2.4.3. Macroprudential policy
- 3. Calibration
- 3.1. Structural parameters
- 3.2. Stochastic properties
- 4. Macroprudential policy transmission
- 5. Effects of macroprudential policy
- 6. Robustness check – correlated shocks
- 7. Conclusions
- Acknowledgments
- References
1-s2.0-S0264999314002120-main.pdf
Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economic Modelling
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecmod
Macro effects of capital requirements and macroprudential policy
Q. Farooq Akram ⁎ Research Department, Norges Bank, Bankplassen 2, P.O. Box 1179 Sentrum, 0107 Oslo, Norway
⁎ Tel.: +47 22316692. E-mail address: [email protected].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.05.033 0264-9993/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Accepted 23 May 2014 Available online 2 July 2014
JEL classification: C52 C53 E52 G38
Keywords: Basel III Capital requirements Macroprudential policy
I investigate macro effects of higher bank capital requirements on the Norwegian economy and their use as a macroprudential policy instrument under Basel III. To this end, I develop a macroeconometric model where the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, asset prices and credit interact with each other and with the real econ- omy. The empirical results suggest that changes in capital requirements are primarily transmitted via lending rates to the other variables in the model. The proposed increases in capital requirements under Basel III are found to have significant effects especially on house prices and credit. I also derive optimal paths for the counter- cyclical capital buffer in response to various shocks. The buffer is found to equal its imposed ceiling of 2.5% in response to most of the shocks considered while its duration varies in the range of 1–12 quarters depending on the shock and its persistence.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1 Basel III also entails more stringent requirements for the level and the quality of a bank's
1. Introduction
I investigate macroeconomic effects of higher capital requirements on the Norwegian economy and their use as a macroprudential policy instrument. Macroprudential policy aims at promoting financial stabili- ty partly by e.g. managing growth in asset prices and credit. Excess growth in these variables over extended periods may be seen as a necessary condition for financial instability (e.g. Borio and Lowe, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). A number of studies have argued for time-varying capital require- ments to avoid destabilizing credit growth (e.g. Bank of England, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2011). I investigate in particular possible effects of the capital requirements recently proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which are referred to as Basel III (BCBS, 2010a). The new regulatory framework proposes a permanent increase in the common equity ratio of 2.5 percentage points (conservation buffer) and a systemic-risk dependent variation in the common equity ratio in the range of 0–2.5 percentage points
(countercyclical buffer).1 Furthermore, I shed light on the implementa- tion of the countercyclical capital buffer in response to various shocks with different persistence.
I employ a quarterly macroeconometric model of the Norwegian (mainland) economy to conduct the analyses. The model includes em- pirical relationships between several real and financial variables, includ- ing those between house prices and credit to households, and between banks' capital adequacy ratio and lending rates. The latter relationship is among the novel features of this model, as an explicit account of capital requirements in macroeconometric models is rare (see Angelini et al., 2011; BCBS, 2010b and the references therein). To my knowledge, this is the first such model based on Norwegian data. The model employed is essentially a smaller version of a model that has been maintained by
core capital. It also proposes restrictions on the maturity structure of banks' assets and liabilities to ensure sufficient liquidity and hedge against particularly large withdrawals of liabilities. These restrictions are formulated as two quantitative liquidity requirements: a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The liquidity coverage ra- tio concerns the required level of liquid assets a bank must have in order to be able to with- stand periods of stress in the markets for funding while the net stable funding ratio concerns the composition of sources of funding or the stability of the funding. These restrictions may have additional effects on banks' funding costs and thereby lending rates which are not accounted for in the following analyses. Basel III is expected to be phased in gradually over the period 2013–2019, see www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm for more details.
78 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
Norges Bank. However, it has been further developed, updated and adapted to conduct the analyses of interest to this paper.2
The literature on the design and effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools as well as the development of appropriate models for their investigation is still in its infancy. In general, there is a lack of theo- retically well founded models for policy analyses that account for key relationships between the financial economy and the real economy in a satisfactory way (see e.g. Galati and Moessner, 2013; Tovar, 2008 and the references therein). Obtaining precise estimates of how the economy would have performed or how it will perform under alternative capital requirements is inherently difficult. It is not possible to say whether and to what extent the model's param- eters will shift with new policy changes. However, I proceed under the assumption that the macroeconomic effects of changes in capital requirements will be comparable to those observed historically.
In the analysis of the countercyclical capital buffer as a macro prudential policy tool, the policymaker is assumed to minimize excessive fluctuations in aggregate credit growth while taking into account the effects of policy decisions on economic activity (cf. Haldane, 2012). I use aggregate credit growth as an indicator of systemic risk, for the sake of simplicity and because growth rates of credit and GDP are relatively more robust to data revisions than their levels (e.g. Edge and Meisenzahl, 2011; Orphanides and Norden, 2002). In response to a given shock, the policymaker is as- sumed to minimize the loss function by deciding on a future path for the countercyclical capital buffer. The path is defined by the size and duration of the countercyclical capital buffer. I derive such paths in response to various shocks for different degrees of persis- tence. I also investigate the sensitivity of such paths to the strength of the policymaker's concern for fluctuations in economic activity, and alternatively for fluctuations in the inflation rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empir- ical framework, while Section 3 employs the model to investigate the effects of increases in capital requirements on the Norwegian economy. In Section 4, capital requirements are used as a macro- prudential policy tool within the Basel III framework in response to various shocks. Section 5 contains the main conclusions. Finally, the appendices contain data definitions, model documentation and sensitivity analyses.
2. The empirical framework
I first develop a system of dynamic econometric equations for the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, house prices, credit to households and credit to (non-financial) firms to characterize their interaction with one another.3 This equation system is then integrated into a macroeconometric model briefly presented in Section 2.4. This model contains dynamic equations for a number of other financial and real economic variables including short-term interest rates, equity returns, the nominal effective exchange rate, inflation and output. It was not fea- sible to develop a closed system of dynamic equations for a relatively large number of variables of interest to investigate how changes in capital requirements may be transmitted to the economy. The macro econometric model is therefore composed of a few small equation systems as well as single equation models, while conditioning on variables such as oil prices, foreign interest rates and foreign GDP (see e.g. Bårdsen et al., 2005, ch. 2, for a discussion of blockwise composition of macroeconometric models). Efficient inference about the parameters of interest in a partial model requires, however, that the conditioning
2 The model used at Norges Bank is documented in Hammersland and Træe (2014) and is mainly based on Bårdsen et al. (2003, 2005).
3 Capital adequacy ratio is defined as the sum of common equity, hybrid equity and ad- ditional equity (Tier 2), divided by risk-weighted assets. I also made an attempt to develop econometric models of the main subcomponents of the capital adequacy ratio but without much success.
variables are weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of inter- est (Engle et al., 1983). Appendix B presents evidence of this with re- spect to key parameters in the (partial) system of dynamic equations for the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, house prices, credit to households and credit to firms.
2.1. Capital ratio, lending rates, house prices and credit
The system of dynamic econometric equations for the capital ade- quacy ratio, lending rates, house prices, credit to households and credit to firms has been developed in two steps using quarterly data over the period 1992 q4–2010 q4. First, long-run relationships between a given set of variables in levels were established by testing for cointegration between the variables. The variables in levels were found to be unit- root non-stationary. Upon finding evidence of cointegrating relation- ships between the variables, a Vector Equilibrium Correction Model (VECM) was formulated, estimated by FIML, tested and, if required, respecified to satisfy a number of statistical model diagnostic tests and economic intuition (cf. Hendry, 1995).
In the following, I first present the estimated long-run relation- ships and then the VECM in Table 1. Unless stated otherwise, variable names in small letters denote the natural log of the corresponding variables, while Greek letters without subscript t represent parame- ter values. Δ and Δ4 denote first- and fourth-difference operators, respectively.
2.2. Long-run relationships
The equilibrium value of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) may be decomposed into the minimum common equity ratio required by Basel regulations and the equilibrium value of other capital components including hybrid capital, Tier 2 capital and additional capital held by banks beyond that required by capital adequacy rules. Banks may choose to hold capital in addition to that required by regulations as a hedge against credit and liquidity risk (Booth et al., 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Peura and Keppo, 2006).
The actual ratio of capital adequacy may temporarily deviate from its equilibrium value owing to prevailing regulatory and market con- ditions as well as banks' response to them. Such a characterization of the capital adequacy ratio is consistent with its quarterly time series suggesting that CAR fluctuates around a fairly stable value over the sample period 1992 q4–2010 q4. The null hypothesis of a unit root in CAR is rejected by an augmented Dickey Fuller test at the 5% level of significance. The long-run relationship for capital adequacy ratio may be described as:
CARt ¼ κ þ ε1;t; ð1Þ
where κ represents the equilibrium value of CAR while ε1,t represents a zero mean stationary process. Accordingly, CARt deviates tempo- rarily from κ. I estimate κ by taking the sample average of CARt, which equals 12.5% (see Eq. (1)).
When modeling lending rates (iL), I assume that they reflect banks' funding costs in the long run, which depend on (short-term) money market rates (i) and costs of equity. The latter costs are assumed to de- pend on banks' return on equity and other possible costs of equity asso- ciated with e.g. issuing equity, monitoring and asymmetric information (e.g. Bolton and Freixas, 2006; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Jensen, 1986; Kashyap et al., 2008; Repullo and Suarez, 2000). The following long-run relationship for lending rates may be specified:
i L t ¼ 1−CARtð Þit þ CARt Δ4betð Þ þ γCARt þ α þ ε2;t: ð2Þ
This equation expresses that lending rates (per annum) reflect a weighted average of money market rates (i) and return on bank equity (Δ4be). The weights depend on the capital adequacy ratio, which is also
79Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
used to represent other possible costs of equity. α and ε2,t denote an intercept term and a stochastic error term, respectively.
However, access to quarterly data on return on bank equity is lim- ited in Norway, as only a few Norwegian banks are listed on the stock exchange. I therefore assume that excess return on bank equity (Δ4be − i) is proportional to excess return on the overall Oslo Stock Exchange (Δ4ose − i), consistent with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Accordingly, the long-run relationship for lending rates can be expressed as a function of the excess return on the overall Oslo Stock Exchange (Δ4ose − i):
i L t ¼ 1−CARtð Þit þ CARt it þ β Δ4oset−itð Þð Þ þ γCARt þ α þ ε3;t;
¼ it þ βCARt Δ4oset−itð Þ þ γCARt þ α þ ε3;t: ð3Þ
β can be interpreted as a measure of risk associated with bank equity and determines required return on bank equity in excess of the risk free rate together with excess return on the market portfolio. Argu- ably, the value of β declines with banks' capital ratio: the safer banks become, the less will equity holders demand in terms of required return on bank equity. The Modigliani–Miller theorem im- plies that required return on equity is invariant to firms' funding structure, i.e. the share of equity versus debt. Accordingly, an increase in the capital adequacy ratio will be fully outweighed by a decline in β leaving equity return unchanged. The evidence of such a negative relationship is inconclusive, in general. A few recent stud- ies suggesting a negative relationship include Hanson et al. (2011) and Miles et al. (2013).
For the sake of simplicity, however, I assume β to be invariant to changes in the capital adequacy ratio. I estimate the value of β to be 0.10 and that of γ to be 0.14 with asymptotic t-values equal to 3.93 and 11.10, respectively (see Table 1).4 The estimated value of β implies a pass-through of short-term money markets to lending rates equal to 0.90, which is comparable with estimates of short-term interest rate pass-through based on Norwegian micro data on banks' lending to households and firms (e.g. Raknerud and Vatne, 2011). Recursive estimates of β suggest that it has been stable over the sample period.
The empirical analysis suggests that credit to firms in real terms (crf–p) depends on real GDP (y) and real lending rates (iL − Δ4p) in the long run:
dcrf−p ¼ 2:16y−4:67 iL−Δ4p� �−12:67: ð4Þ Here, the income elasticity of real credit to firms is greater than one
and suggests that the ratio between real credit to firms and income (crf–p–y) increases with real GDP and falls with real interest rates. The long-run relationship may be interpreted as a combination of two sta- tionary terms. The relationship between the non-stationary variables real credit to firms and GDP is assumed to be stationary through cointegration, while real lending rates are assumed to be stationary by themselves. The long-run effect of real GDP on real credit to firms is close to the long-run effect of real GDP on aggregate real credit in Bårdsen et al., 2005, p. 212, 2, estimated on quarterly data over the period 1972 q4–2001 q1.
Credit to households in real terms (crh–p) has been found to depend on real GDP and real house prices (ph–p) in the long run (see Eq. (5)). I did not find evidence of a direct effect of real lending rates on credit to
4 Given that CAR, CAR(Δ4ose − i) and (iL − i) are assumed to be stationary variables, OLS estimators are no longer superconsistent. Hence, a possible neglect of short-run effects can lead to omitted variable bias if one employs OLS on Eq. (3). I therefore formulated an autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) model of iL using the variables entering Eq. (3) in ad- dition to three impulse dummies and derived the estimated model's static long-run solu- tion to obtain estimates of β and γ. Their asymptotic t-values are based on the algorithm by Bårdsen (1989) implemented in PcGive. The dynamic model of iL in Table 1 is a refor- mulation of the ADL model.
households in the long run, only an indirect effect through real house prices (see Eq. (6)).
dcrh−p ¼ 1:00y þ 1:00 ph−pð Þ þ 2:0: ð5Þ The long-run relationship for credit to households suggests that the
ratio between real credit to households and income (crh–p–y) depends on real house prices. Another interpretation of this relationship is that the (real) household-credit-to-value ratio (crh–ph) depends on real in- come. The long-run relationship is interpreted as a cointegrating rela- tionship between non-stationary real credit to households, GDP and house prices. The long-run effect of real house prices on real credit to households is equal to that in Jacobsen and Naug (2004) but somewhat different from that in Hammersland and Træe (2014) and Anundsen and Jansen (2013), where it is 0.9 and 0.76, respectively. The long-run relationships for credit to households in these studies are otherwise more elaborate than Eq. (5).
Finally, I find evidence of a long-run relationship between real house prices, real GDP and real lending rates:
dph−p ¼ 1:8y−3:8 iL−Δ4p� �−23:7: ð6Þ This long-run relationship may also be interpreted as a linear combi-
nation of two stationary terms: real house prices and real GDP through cointegration and real lending rates, which are assumed to be stationary (cf. Eq. (4)).5
2.3. Dynamic relationships
Table 1 presents a system of dynamic equations for the capital ade- quacy ratio, lending rate, house prices, credit to households and credit to (non-financial) firms. This system, formulated as a VECM, is based on the long-run relationships presented above. Initially, a rather general VECM was formulated by including several lagged difference terms and/ or levels of the variables included in the long-run relationships and other potentially relevant variables. I then simplified the general VECM by excluding most of the statistically insignificant variables from the model as well as those with counterintuitive signs and obtain- ed the VECM presented. Statistically insignificant variables that have been retained represent short-term effects of variables usually expected to be relevant. They have been retained to avoid a possible erroneous neglect of their effects. Diagnostic tests documenting the statistical adequacy of the general VECM and its final version presented in Table 1 are reported in Appendix B.
The (econometric) equation for the capital adequacy ratio suggests that it fluctuates around a fairly constant value over the sample period, which is estimated to be 12.5%. The capital adequacy ratio increases fol- lowing a decline in the actual capital adequacy ratio below its average value and decreases when it has been above the average value. One sim- plifying assumption is that a change in the long-run average value of the capital adequacy ratio would have the same effect on capital ratio ad- justment irrespective of whether it is due to a regulatory change or due to a change in banks' internal target affecting κ. Some evidence in the relevant literature suggests the speed of adjustment may be rela- tively lower in the former case (e.g. Ediz et al., 1998). Another simplify- ing assumption is that the speed of adjustment is symmetric around the average value and not dependent on the state of the economy. Arguably,
5 Previous econometric models of Norwegian real house prices include Jacobsen and Naug (2005) who find a long-run relationship between real house prices, real interest rates after tax, wage income, unemployment and housing stock on quarterly data for the period 1990 q2–2004 q1. Their estimates of the long-run effects of wage income and (af- ter-tax) real interest rates are 2.26 and −4.19, respectively. Anundsen and Jansen (2013) also include housing stock in the long-run relationship but find a long-run effect of house- holds' disposable income equal to 1.69. The sample period in the latter study is 1986 q2–2008 q4.
7 However, the observed relationship could be partly due to e.g. recessions contributing
Table 1 A VECM of the capital adeq. ratio, lending rate, house prices and credit.
ΔCARt ¼ − 0:19 −4:46ð Þ
CARt−1−κ½ � þ 0:01 4:07ð Þ
Δut−3− 0:04 −4:67ð Þ
Δyt−2
− 0:02 −2:16ð Þ
Δyt−3 þ 0:01 2:55ð Þ
Δ ose−pð Þt−3 þ 0:19 3:13ð Þ
ΔCARt−4
þ 0:02 6:13ð Þ
id93q4 þ 0:01 4:17ð Þ
id10q4 þ ε̂CAR;t; σ̂CAR ¼ 0:28%
ΔiLt ¼ − 0:36−12:10ð Þ i L−i−0:10CAR � Δ4ose−ið Þ
n o t−1
þ 0:42 18:30ð Þ
Δit
þ 0:05 9:94ð Þ
CARt−1 þ 0:02 14:60ð Þ
id98q3− 0:01 −3:84ð Þ
id03q3
− 0:01 −4:20ð Þ
id09q1 þ ε̂iL ;t; σ̂ iL ¼ 0:16%
Δ ph−pð Þt ¼ − 0:10−4:47ð Þ ph−pð Þ−1:8y þ 3:8 i L−Δ4p
� �n o t−1
− 1:20 −6:19ð Þ
ΔiLt
þ 0:06 3:26ð Þ
Δ ose−pð Þt þ 0:43 4:62ð Þ
Δ ph−pð Þt−1
þ 0:27 1:87ð Þ
Δ crh−pð Þt−2 þ 0:16 2:35ð Þ
Δ crf −pð Þt−2 þ 0:36 6:16ð Þ
q1− 2:37 −4:47ð Þ
þε̂ph;t; σ̂ph ¼ 2:3%
Δ crh−pð Þt ¼ − 0:01−2:69ð Þ crh−pð Þ− ph−pð Þ−yf gt−1 þ 0:072:15ð Þ Δ ph−pð Þt−1
− 0:25 −3:47ð Þ
Δ iL−Δ4p � �
t−2 − 0:31
−4:58ð Þ Δ iL−Δ4p � �
t−3
þ 0:52 6:97ð Þ
Δ crh−pð Þt−4 þ 0:06 10:20ð Þ
id94q2− 0:03 −4:18ð Þ
id95q2 þ 0:02 3:21ð Þ
þε̂crh;t; σ̂crh ¼ 0:88%
Δ crf −pð Þt ¼ − 0:08−4:84ð Þ crf−pð Þ−2:16y½ �t−1− 0:34−1:51ð Þ Δ i L−Δ4p
� � t−1
− 0:42 −4:46ð Þ
iL−Δ4p � �
t−4 þ 0:41
� 4:33Δ e þ pf −p
� � t þ 0:16
3:08ð Þ Δyt−2
þ 0:14 1:84ð Þ
Δ crf−pð Þt−4 þ 0:09 4:17ð Þ
id92q4 þ 0:11 6:35ð Þ
id00q3− 1:14 −4:70ð Þ
þε̂crf ;t; σ̂crf ¼ 1:77% Note: sample period: 1992 q4–2010 q4. Estimation method: FIML. Parentheses below the coefficient estimates include t-values. Estimates of sigma associated with each of the equa- tions are the standard errors of the corresponding residuals. See Appendix B for diagnostic tests.
80 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
it could be more demanding to raise equity in recessions than in expansions.
Business cycle fluctuations represented by lagged GDP growth rate (Δy) and unemployment rate (u) contribute to a higher capital adequa- cy ratio in downturns and a lower one in upturns.6 This is consistent with banks increasing their capital buffers to weather potential losses on e.g. loans to firms and households in (macroeconomic) downturns. Such a countercyclical response of the capital adequacy ratio may con- tribute, however, to reducing credit growth during economic recessions and increasing credit growth during expansions and thereby to an amplification of business cycles. Such procyclical implications of the re- lationship between the capital adequacy ratio and business cycle indica- tors are consistent with much previous evidence (e.g. Drumond, 2009). In this model, the procyclical implications are due to the positive rela- tionship between the capital adequacy ratio and lending rates (shown next) and the negative relationship between lending rates and economic activity. One of the main motivations for introducing a countercyclical capital buffer is to moderate the procyclicality of capital requirements
6 The presence of both (mainland) GDP and unemployment as indicators of economic activity in the CAR equation is consistent with the argument that mainland GDP may be an insufficient indicator of economic activity in Norway as petroleum production and in- ternational shipping are left out. Banks' capital adequacy ratios may however also be af- fected by changes in these sectors. The presence of unemployment together with output does not seem to be due to the omission of variables such as interest rates. For example, the null hypotheses that CAR does not respond to changes in lending interest rates (ΔiL) up to three lags have not been rejected at the standard levels of significance individually or jointly. In the latter case, the p-value was 0.65.
(BCBS, 2010a).7 The capital adequacy ratio reacts to changes in the real economy and stock returns with some lags. This may reflect that it takes time to adjust the capital adequacy ratio, especially increases through e.g. retained earnings and changes in banks' portfolios.
The equation for lending rates suggests that lending rates mainly follow money market rates in both the short run and the long run. Costs of capital requirements are found to affect lending rates in addition to money market interest rates.
The equation for house prices implies that they mainly follow vari- ables representing income, lending rates and credit to both households and firms. House prices and credit to households affect each other in the short run as well as in the long run. In the short run, they are also affect- ed by stock market returns (Δose), and changes in lending rates (ΔiL). Stock market returns as well as growth in credit to firms may reflect up- turns in business activity and hence higher demand for commercial property, which tends to be highly correlated with house prices. The effects of stock market returns could also reflect their wealth effects on house prices through higher demand for housing.
The equation for credit to households implies a short-run and long- run interaction between credit to households and house prices. House prices may have collateral effects on (real) credit to households. Credit also depends on income (represented by GDP) and changes in real lending rates (Δ(iL − Δ4p)). I did not find evidence of direct effects of changes in the capital adequacy ratio on credit to households. Hence, these effects seem to be transmitted through lending rates only.
To test explicitly for possible direct effects of changes in the capital adequacy ratio on credit to households, I included up to 4 lags of ΔCAR in the equation for credit to households jointly and individually and tested for their statistical significance. In all cases, I found statistically in- significant effects of changes in the capital adequacy ratio on credit to households using standard levels of significance. For example, in the test of the null hypothesis of no effects of the contemporaneous and lagged effects (up to 4) of ΔCAR in the credit to households equation, the Wald test gave a chi-square statistic (χ(5)) equal to 6.37 with a p-value of 0.27.8
As shown above, credit to (non-financial) firms reflects movements in GDP and real lending rates in the long run. In the short run, GDP growth and changes in the real lending rate and the real exchange rate (Δ(e + pf − p)) also affect credit growth to firms. The real lending rate has a relatively strong negative effect on credit to firms. As in the case of credit to households, changes in the capital adequacy ratio do not appear in the equation for credit to firms due to their statistically in- significant effects. For example, the null hypothesis of no contempora- neous and lagged effects (up to 4) of ΔCAR in the equation for credit to firms was not rejected at standard levels of significance. The outcome of the Wald test was a chi-square statistic equal to 5.65 with a p-value of 0.34.
There could be several explanations why a direct negative empirical relationship between capital adequacy ratio and credit to households and firms may not be observed even when such a relationship exists. First, higher capital requirements do not necessarily imply a reduction in lending as they can be met by retained earnings and shifts in banks'
to lower credit growth, which can reduce the volume of (risk-weighted) assets, and there- by lead to an increase in the equity ratio by lowering the denominator in the capital-to- risk-weighted-assets ratio (CAR). The latter explanation could be somewhat less relevant after the introduction of Basel II, as risk weights tend to increase during recessions, counteracting some of the effects of a reduction in assets owing to a fall in credit growth. Moreover, banks' equity also tends to decline in downturns due to reduced cash flows and higher loan defaults.
8 Another hypothesis of interest is that of a possible negative relationship between changes in the capital adequacy ratio and credit growth during downturns only. Accord- ingly, higher capital requirements can make banks lower their loan supply and thereby their assets to meet the regulatory capital ratio if it proves difficult to raise equity during downturns. There does not seem to be sufficient information in the data set used to firmly test this hypothesis, however.
Policy rate i
Lending rate iL
GDP Y
House prices PH
Exchange rate E
Unemployment U
Import price PM
Productivity Z
Equity prices OSE
Credit to households CRH
Credit to firms CRF
Wages (W) and
Prices (P)
Capital/RWA CAR
Fig. 1. Main linkages between the endogenous variables in the macroeconometric model. Two-way arrows between variables indicate direct interactions between them.
81Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
portfolios toward less risky forms of exposures. Authorities usually provide banks sufficient time to enable them to meet regulatory re- quirements at least partly through retained earnings or portfolio shifts. Second, a possible reduction in credit supply in response to higher cap- ital requirements may also be difficult to identify at the aggregate level as a reduction in credit supply by some banks can be outweighed by their more well-capitalized competitors. And third, the data set used could also lack sufficient information for detecting a possible negative relationship between credit to households and firms and capital re- quirements. The sample period (1992 q4–2010 q4) mainly covers a gradual shift from Basel I to Basel II from 2007 onwards. Basel I was adopted by Norway in early 1991 during the Norwegian banking crisis (1989–1992). Extending the sample backward to include the shift to Basel I is unlikely to be helpful in this regard as Basel I is not believed to have had any noticeable effect on banks' capital ratios and lending as they were already fulfilling the formal capital requirements (Kredittilsynet, 1993).
2.4. The macroeconometric model: an overview
To investigate the macroeconomic effects of changes in capital re- quirements, I include the VECM presented above in a macroeconometric model.9 In addition to the five-equation VECM, the macroeconometric model contains systems as well as single-equation dynamic models for ten financial and real variables (see Appendix C). These variables are returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange, the nominal effective exchange rate, import prices, aggregate demand, unemployment, productivity, wages, domestic consumer prices, core consumer price inflation and the short-term money market rate. The key monetary policy rate is rep- resented by the short-term money market rate, which is therefore modeled in accordance with a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Specifically,
9 This model builds on a macroeconometric model for the Norwegian economy that has been developed and applied in e.g. Bårdsen et al. (2003), Bårdsen et al. (2005) and Akram and Eitrheim (2008). The main difference with the models used in these studies is that the model used here characterizes the capital adequacy ratio and takes into account its effects on banks' lending rates and thereby on the rest of the economy. In addition, the current model has been somewhat respecified and reestimated on recent and revised data.
the short-term interest rate adjusts in response to deviations from the (core) inflation target, a measure of the unemployment gap and lagged short-term interest rate.10 Norway adopted a flexible inflation targeting regime in March 2001, under which explicit weight is attached to out- put stabilization while targeting inflation. Foreign GDP, a world stock price index (MSCI-World), foreign consumer prices and interest rates, crude oil prices, domestic government expenditures and electricity prices are all treated as exogenous variables.
The macroeconometric model characterizes a linear stable (economic) system where the effects of nominal shocks eventually die out. This applies to monetary policy as well as macroprudential policy shocks. Moreover, even permanent changes in banks' capital require- ments tend to have persistent but not permanent effects in the model. This is consistent with evidence based on long time series e.g. from the UK, where no clear relationship has been found between banks' equity ratios and economic growth (Miles et al., 2013).
A linear stable model may be considered more appropriate for ana- lyzing policy decisions aimed at promoting monetary policy and finan- cial stability in the normal course of policymaking than in situations of crisis or near-crisis. Non-linear models are required to model the latter situations.
Fig. 1 presents an overview of the macroeconometric model, sketching the main linkages between different endogenous variables in the model.
The different system and single-equation models constituting the macroeconometric model are largely econometrically well specified. Specifically, for most of the equations the null hypotheses of no autocor- relation, normally distributed residuals and no heteroscedasticity are not rejected at the standard levels of significance (see Appendix C for details).
The estimated parameters in most of the equations have been found to be stable in response to various policy and structural changes over the sample period (see Appendix D). Notably, only some parameter estimates in equations that have been directly affected by changes in policy have been found to vary over time. Other model equations appear
10 The use of the unemployment gap is motivated by relatively large uncertainty in real time measures of GDP gaps (cf. Orphanides and Norden, 2002).
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Common equity ratio
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Capital Adequacy Ratio
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Lending rate
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
House prices; ann. growth
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Credit to households
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Credit to firms
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Credit, Aggregate
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Mainland GDP
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Unemployment rate
-.025
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Wage inflation (annum)
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
CPI inflation (annum)
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Policy rate
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Nominal depreciation (annum)
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Real exchange rate
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Import prices; ann. growth
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Equity prices; ann. growth
Deviation
Fig. 2. Responses (+/− SE) to a one percentage point permanent increase in the common equity ratio when monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule. The implementation period is four quarters and the simulation period is of 32 quarters. The vertical axes denote values in percentage points for the common equity ratio, capital adequacy ratio, lending rate, key policy rate and unemployment rate. For the other variables, the vertical axes denote values in percent.
82 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
to be quite robust to these changes. Such a lack of evidence of significant parameter instability in the face of shifts in policy is in line with most empirical investigations on the importance of the Lucas critique (Ericsson and Iron, 1995; Leeper and Zha, 2003; Rudebusch, 2005).11
In particular, I have not found significant effects on the model's pa- rameters of changes in the regulatory regime in Norway. The regulatory changes could be associated with the move from Basel I to Basel II in 2007 and with the expectations of the gradual implementation of Basel III over the period 2013–2019. For example, Fig. 4 in Appendix D shows the relative stability of the estimates of key parameters in the equations for the capital adequacy ratio.
Although the parameter estimates of the model have been found to be invariant to actual and expected changes in the regulatory regime in- sample, changes in the parameters cannot be ruled out when Basel III is implemented. Therefore, more uncertainty may be associated with the effects of the policy analyses than indicated by the standard confidence intervals.
11 To what extent parameters of a reduced form econometric model vary with changes in policy mainly depends on three factors: (a) the importance of forward-looking expecta- tions, (b) the size of the policy shift, and (c) the responsiveness of the economy to the pol- icy shift (e.g. Rudebusch, 2005). In particular, up to a moderate degree of forward-looking expectations combined with relatively weak response of the economy to policy shifts may lead to negligible changes in reduced form parameters.
3. Macro effects of higher capital requirements
Regulatory proposals following the recent financial crisis have main- ly focused on the common equity to risk-weighted assets ratio. I con- duct response analyses by varying the minimum common equity ratio, which contributes to the steady state level of total capital, κ. A variation in any of the other components in the total capital held by banks would have identical effects in the model used, however, as constituents of κ enter the model symmetrically (see Table 1). This is a simplification as possible differences between the effects of various constituents of κ cannot be distinguished empirically here. While investigating the effects of a higher equity ratio, I assume that monetary policy will respond in line with the estimated Taylor-type rule (see Table 13 in Appendix C).
Fig. 2 plots responses of the modeled variables to a one percentage point permanent increase in the minimum common equity ratio imple- mented linearly over four quarters. The overall impression is that the in- crease in the common equity ratio affects the capital adequacy ratio and thereby the lending rate, which directly affects house prices, credit to households, credit to firms and aggregate demand. The initial negative responses of these variables are then amplified by their mutual interac- tions. There are no first-round effects on the other variables of the increase in the equity ratio, as they do not directly respond to lending rates. In particular, both the nominal exchange rate and equity returns
Table 2 Comparing the effects of higher equity with the MAG study.
1 pp over 8 qtrs After 18 qtrs After 32 qtrs
I. This study: Norwegian evidence Lending rate 14 {12, 16} 12 {10, 13} Credit −23 {−31, −16} −71 {−97, −45} GDP −7 {−11, −2} −10 {−20, −2}
II. MAG study: International evidence Lending rate 17 [5, 25] 15 [5, 26] Credit −140 [−360, −6] −190 [−360, −80] GDP −12 [−96, 39] −10 [−314, 3] GDP; std −12 [−96, 39] −10 [−314, 3] GDP; dsge −11 [−41, −1] −7 [−25, −2] GDP; rf −30 [−87, 18] −24 [−88, 2]
Note: the effects are measured in basis points. Panel I presents the means and the 68% con- fidence intervals (in curly brackets) of the effects of a 1 percentage point increase in the equity ratio on selected Norwegian variables 18 and 32 quarters after the start of implementing the equity increase. Panel II presents median estimates from the MAG study and the ranges of estimated effects across models defined by minimum and maxi- mum effects in hard brackets. The results reported come from Graph 1 and Tables 1 and 2 in BCBS (2010b). std denotes the standard approach where implications for lending rates are derived using an accounting approach and the implications for GDP are obtained by implementing the change in the lending rate in the national models; dsge denotes an integrated approach where a group of DSGE models with banks are used. Finally, rf refers to an integrated approach where a group of reduced-form models is used.
83Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
do not respond directly to the lending rate but to the short-term money market rate, which responds to changes in the inflation and unemploy- ment gaps. The second-round effects on the other variables may also be considered negligible because of relatively small direct effects on aggre- gate output and thereby on unemployment, productivity, wages, con- sumer prices and the nominal exchange rate. All of the variables respond as expected to the increase in the lending rate following a higher equity ratio.
In detail, the increase in the common equity ratio is for the most part transmitted (84%) to the capital adequacy ratio within a year after its full increase. The lending rate rises by at most 14 basis points, within 4.5 years since the start of the increase in the common equity ratio. House price growth per annum falls by about 25 basis points while cred- it to households and firms declines, by around 25 and 35 basis points, respectively, within 4.5 years. As a result, aggregate credit falls by around 28 basis points over the same time span. The effects on aggre- gate credit after eight years and beyond are at most −65 basis points. GDP falls at most by 9 basis points over the simulation horizon and by only 7 basis points after eight years. The unemployment rate increases by only a negligible amount. By simulating the model for a sufficiently long period, it can be shown that the real economic effects are reversed in the very long run.
The effects on the other macro variables are for the most part quite small. Notably, inflation and wage growth fall at most by 1 basis point, while the short-term money market rate, which represents the key pol- icy rate, falls by 2 basis points. The nominal exchange rate depreciates slightly due to the fall in the interest rate, but thereafter tends to appre- ciate because of the fall in the inflation rate. Equity returns increase somewhat due to the fall in the short-term interest rate.
The monetary policy rule serves to dampen the effects of higher cap- ital requirements in the model. If short-term interest rates had not fallen as prescribed by the estimated Taylor-type rule, the effects of changes in the common equity ratio on key macroeconomic variables such as real and nominal lending rates, credit to households, credit to firms and GDP would have been a few basis points greater (in absolute terms). The effects would also have been somewhat greater if capital require- ments had also been increased in Norway's trading partners, contribut- ing to a fall in foreign GDP and thereby in domestic GDP and other macroeconomic variables.
I have found the macroeconometric model and the main results to be generally invariant to changes in the sample period, which covers changes in the structure of the economy, the introduction of inflation targeting in 2001, the introduction of the Basel II framework in Norway in 2007 as well as the recent financial crisis and the accompany- ing changes in monetary policy and actual and/or expected changes in financial regulation (see Appendix D for details). In particular, re- sponses to higher capital requirements based on the macroeconometric model when estimated partly on data until the end of 2006 q4 are comparable to those based on the full sample estimation of the macroeconometric model (see Appendix D).
3.1. Comparison with international evidence
The regulatory response to the recent financial crisis has motivated a number of empirical studies on the possible effects of higher capital re- quirements on banks' funding costs, lending rates, credit and economic activity (e.g. Angelini et al., 2011; BCBS, 2010b; Elliott et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 2011; Miles et al., 2013; Slovik and Cournede, 2011). Their findings, however, are generally quite dependent on their approach and underlying assumptions. For the sake of brevity, I will only compare some of the results with those from the study by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG): BCBS (2010b). This study reports evidence based on 89 models for 15 advanced economies. The relatively large range of variation in estimated effects across these models, which is reported in Table 2, are likely to cover even estimated effects based on models not utilized by the MAG study.
To ease comparison with the MAG study, I implement a one percent- age point increase in capital requirements while letting the policy rate remain unresponsive to changes in inflation and economic activity. I also implement higher capital requirements gradually over eight quar- ters and study their effects after 18 and 32 quarters from the start of im- plementation; the 32nd quarter was the end point of the simulation period in the MAG study. As in the MAG study, I focus on the estimated response of lending rates, (aggregate) credit and GDP. Allowing for an implementation period of 16 quarters did not substantially affect the conclusion from the comparative analysis reported below. In some of the models employed in the MAG study, the length of the implementa- tion period seems to matter to a relatively larger extent.
Panel I of Table 2 presents estimated responses of the key variables, measured as deviations from the baseline paths in basis points together with their 68% confidence intervals (see Akram (2012) for more de- tails). Panel II of the table reports median estimates for the responses of key variables from the MAG study together with ranges of variation across models used. For GDP, I report median estimates and ranges based on all 89 models, and with models divided into three subgroups. The relatively wide ranges of estimated effects on the three key vari- ables reveal relatively large differences in the estimated effects across the models. I therefore compare the estimated effects of this study with the MAG's median effects on the three variables at selected periods.
The point estimates of this study are lower than the (MAG's) median estimates in Panel II at both the 18-quarters and 32-quarters horizons. The differences in the estimated effects are smaller in the long run than in the short run. That is, in the present study lending rates increase by 3 basis points less than the median estimates, irrespective of the ho- rizon. The effects on credit, however, are substantially smaller than the corresponding median estimates. For example, credit falls by 23 basis points 18 quarters after the start of implementation in the present model, while the median estimate is −140 basis points. After 32 quarters, credit falls by 71 basis points in this model, while the median estimate is −190 basis points. In the case of effects on GDP, it declines by 7 basis points at the horizon of 18 quarters, which is 5 basis points less than the median estimate at this horizon. At the horizon of 32 quarters, however, GDP declines by 10 basis points, which is equal to the median estimate of −10 basis points.
Note also that the responses of GDP estimated by this study are clos- er to the (MAG's) median estimates based on the standard approach
84 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
and DSGE models and differ substantially from those based on many of the reduced form models used in the MAG study. The latter models sug- gest substantially greater effects on GDP. The group of reduced form models includes a relatively large number of VAR models. Results com- parable to those based on VAR models have also been reported using a VAR model with identified shocks on Norwegian data (Jacobsen et al., 2011).
Statistically, however, in all but one case, estimates of this study are not significantly different from the median estimates at the standard levels of significance. Even the 68% confidence intervals presented in curly brackets (nearly) include the corresponding median estimates from the MAG study. One exception is the case of the estimated effect on aggregate credit after 18 quarters where neither the reported 68% confidence interval nor a 95% confidence interval would include the median estimates in Panel II. Another such exception is the case of the median of estimated effects on GDP implied by the reduced form models used by the MAG study.
3.2. Macro effects of Basel III
The Basel III framework entails a permanent 2.5 percentage point in- crease in the minimum common equity ratio (conservation buffer) and a systemic risk-dependent variation in the common equity ratio in the
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Common equity ratio
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Capital Adequacy Ratio
-.8
-.4
.0
.4
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Credit to households; ann. growth
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Credit to firms; ann. growth
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Unemployment rate
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Wage inflation (annum)
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Nominal depreciation (annum)
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Real exchange rate
Devia
Fig. 3. The effects of the countercyclical and conservation buffers under Basel III. Responses ( percentage points, when the conservation buffer has been raised immediately by 2.5 percenta simulation period is 36 quarters. The vertical axes denote values in percentage points for the com rate. For the other variables, the vertical axes denote values in percent.
range of 0–2.5 percentage points (countercyclical buffer). In the follow- ing, I investigate the effects of such general increases in the minimum common equity ratio. I assume an implementation period of eight quar- ters. Because the model is linear, the effects of a 2.5 percentage point higher equity ratio would be a multiple of those presented above for the case of a 1 percentage point increase in the equity ratio for the same implementation period.
Specifically, the introduction of the conservation buffer contributes to raising the nominal lending rate by about 35 basis points at most and to a fall in GDP by 24 basis points. House prices fall by 70 basis points, while credit to households and firms declines by 123 and 200 basis points at most, respectively, implying a fall in aggregate credit of 157 basis points. The effects of the higher equity requirement are mod- erated somewhat by a reduction in the key policy rate of up to 5 basis points in response to lower inflation and lower economic activity (higher unemployment gap).
Fig. 3 shows the effects in a scenario where the conservation buffer has been fully implemented and the countercyclical buffer is increased by its maximum value (2.5 percentage points) for two years. Thus, for two years the common equity ratio is 5 percentage points higher than it would have been in the absence of Basel III. I assume a symmetric im- plementation period for both the increase to the maximum value and the decrease to the minimum value (zero) for the countercyclical buffer.
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Lending rate
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
House prices; ann. growth
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Credit Growth, Aggregate
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Mainland GDP
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
CPI inflation (annum)
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Policy rate
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Import prices; ann. growth
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Equity prices; ann. growth
tion
+/−SE) to a gradual change over eight quarters of the common equity ratio of up to 2.5 ge points to a permanently higher level. Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule. The mon equity ratio, capital adequacy ratio, lending rate, key policy rate and unemployment
Table 3 Optimal δ and q in response to various shocks with different persistence.
v: ph crh crf ose y i
ϕ δ q δ q δ q δ q δ q δ q
0 2.5 2 2.5 4 0.5 1 0.5 1 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.1 2.5 2 2.5 4 0.5 1 1.0 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.2 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.5 1 1.0 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.3 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.5 1 1.0 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.4 2.5 2 2.5 5 1.5 1 1.5 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.5 2.5 3 2.5 6 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.5 4 2.5 6 0.6 2.5 3 2.5 6 2.0 1 2.5 1 2.5 5 2.5 6 0.7 2.5 4 2.5 7 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 6 2.5 7 0.8 2.5 6 2.5 9 2.5 3 2.5 2 2.5 7 2.5 9 0.9 2.5 8 2.5 12 2.5 5 2.5 3 2.5 10 2.5 9
Note: the top row indicates the shocked variables while the first column contains the
85Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
It is seen that lending rates increase by around 67 basis points while GDP falls by 44 basis points, at most. House price inflation falls by 113 basis points, while credit to households and firms falls by 210 and 360 basis points, at most, respectively. Hence, aggregate credit falls at most by about 280 basis points. As above, the effects of the relatively high capital requirements are moderated by the reduction in the key policy rate, which falls by up to 10 basis points in response to lower inflation and economic activity.
The effects of the temporary increase in the countercyclical capital buffer diminish over time, and the effects on the macroeconomic vari- ables converge toward those in the case of the higher conservation buff- er. Ultimately, however, even the effects of the higher conservation buffer die out due to the equilibrium correction properties of the model's equations and the monetary policy rule.
4. Implementing the countercyclical capital buffer
In the following, I investigate how much and for how long equity re- quirements should be changed in response to different shocks of a tran- sitory or persistent nature. I assume that a forward-looking macro prudential policymaker facing a certain shock will minimize the follow- ing loss function by choosing a path for the countercyclical capital buffer:
Lt ¼ Var CRgrð Þ þ λVar Ygrð Þ: ð7Þ
The loss function depends on the variance of growth in aggregate credit and output, Var(CRgr) and Var(Ygr). It is a reformulation of a quadratic loss function assuming that the discount factor is close to one (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Walsh, 2003). Subscript t indicates that the fluctuations in credit and output growth will depend on the properties of the given shock at time t, in addition to the model and the policy re- sponse.12 λ indicates the degree of concern for fluctuations in output growth relative to that for fluctuations in credit growth.
The policymaker aims to reduce systemic risk by stabilizing aggregate credit around its presumably sustainable value, while avoiding to some extent possible excess volatility in output growth (cf. Haldane, 2012). The objective function has been formulated in terms of annual rates of aggregate credit growth and (mainland) GDP growth instead of the aggregate credit-to-GDP ratio gap, which is implied by e.g. BCBS (2010a). The choice of growth rates over levels is due to substantially smaller data revisions to GDP growth relative to revisions of the level of GDP, in particular (e.g. Edge and Meisenzahl, 2011; Orphanides and Norden, 2002). Changes in the cap- ital buffer stabilize aggregate credit growth and other macro variables by reducing the procyclicality of the capital adequacy ratio and thereby of lending rates. I assume that the key policy rate follows the Taylor- type rule presented in Table 13, while macroprudential policy is con- ducted as outlined below.
I assume that in response to a given shock, the policymaker chooses a path for the countercyclical capital buffer by deciding simultaneously on the change in the capital requirement within a given range of 0–2.5% and on its duration. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the capital requirement is changed only when the shock appears in period t and remains effective for q quarters. That is, the capital requirement relative to a given fixed level (κt + 1 − κ) is changed by δ a[0,2.5] for q quarters:
κtþi−κ ¼ δ ; i ¼ 0; 1; 2; …q−1; ð8Þ
12 Such an analysis is, of course, a considerable simplification of the actual conduct of pol- icy as the economy is continuously buffeted by combinations of shocks that vary in mag- nitude and degree of persistence. However, the procedure can be easily adapted to a more realistic case by providing multiple new shocks to the model economy while taking into account the effects of the previous shocks.
¼ 0 ; i ¼ q; q þ 1; q þ 2; :::: ð9Þ
A given shock (εv) may follow an AR(1) process with the degree of persistence denoted by ϕ:
εv;tþi ¼ ϕεv;tþi−1 þ ηv;t; ð10Þ
where ϕ ∈ [0, 0.9]. Precisely, εv denotes the residual in the econometric equation of a variable v while ηv,t is an impulse shock implying a percentage point change in v.
To derive optimal paths for the buffer in response to different shocks, I expose the model to a specific shock with persistence ϕ and then min- imize the loss function (7) with respect to δ and q. When deriving values of the loss function, the value of λ has been set equal to 0.4. The optimal values of δ and q have been obtained by undertaking a grid search within the ranges 0–2.5, with step size 0.50 percentage point, and 1–16 quarters, with step size 1 quarter, respectively. In every case, the model has been simulated over a sufficiently long period for convergence to the steady state; in many cases, a period of 32 quarters was found to be more than sufficient.
Table 3 presents optimal additions in capital requirements, δ, and their duration, q, in response to different shocks with persistence values of 0–0.9 degrees. The following variables have been shocked in turn to (temporarily) increase their value by one percentage point: house prices, credit to households, credit to firms, return on equity and aggre- gate demand. In contrast, short-term money market rates have been shocked to obtain a reduction of one percentage point.
Table 3 suggests that optimal changes in capital requirements and their duration tend to increase with the degree of persistence of the shocks. This is especially the case for the duration of higher capital requirements. The optimal change in capital requirements is 2.5 percent- age points for most shocks, irrespective of their degrees of persistence. The exceptions to this pattern are shocks to credit to firms and return on equity. In these cases, the capital requirement increases gradually to 2.5 percentage points with increases in the degree of persistence.
Given that the upper boundary (2.5 percentage points) for changes in capital requirements has been selected (through simulations) for most of the shocks, only the duration of higher capital requirements in- creases when the persistence of shocks increases. Shocks to firm credit and return on equity reveal that the optimal change in capital require- ments increases with the degree of persistence without an accompany- ing change in its duration as long as the change is lower than the upper boundary. When in response to a shock, changes in capital
degree of persistence (ϕ) in the corresponding shocks (see Eq. (10)). The shocked variables increase initially by one percentage point, except the short term money market rate, which declines. Values of δ (in percentage points) and q (in quarters) minimize the loss function (7) for a given shock with a specified degree of persistence. The weight on the variance of the GDP growth gap in the loss function, i.e. λ, has been set equal to 0.4. The optimal values of δ and q have been obtained by simulating the macroeconometric model over 32 quarters.
Table 4 Alternative loss function: optimal δ and q when shocks of different persistence.
v: ph crh crf ose y i
ϕ δ q δ q δ q δ q δ q δ q
0 2.5 2 2.5 4 0.5 1 0.5 1 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.1 2.5 2 2.5 4 0.5 1 1.0 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.2 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.5 1 1.5 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.3 2.5 2 2.5 5 0.5 1 1.5 1 2.5 3 2.5 5 0.4 2.5 3 2.5 6 1.0 1 1.5 1 2.5 4 2.5 5 0.5 2.5 3 2.5 6 1.0 1 2.0 1 2.5 4 2.5 6 0.6 2.5 4 2.5 7 2.5 1 2.0 1 2.5 5 2.5 6 0.7 2.5 5 2.5 8 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 6 2.5 7 0.8 2.5 6 2.5 9 2.5 3 2.5 2 2.5 8 2.5 8 0.9 2.5 8 2.5 11 2.5 5 2.5 3 2.5 11 2.5 10
Note: optimal paths for countercyclical capital buffers under a loss function which is defined by the sum of the variances of the aggregate credit growth gap and the inflation gap. The top row indicates the shocked variables while the first column contains the degree of persistence (ϕ) in the corresponding shocks (see Eq. (10)). The shocked variables increase initially by one percentage point, except the short term money market rate which declines. Values of δ (in percentage points) and q (in quarters) minimize the loss function for a given shock with a specified degree of persistence.
86 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
requirements have reached the ceiling, duration increases with the de- gree of persistence.
There appears to be a non-linear relationship between the degree of persistence of shocks and the duration of higher capital requirements. The duration tends to increase gradually, if at all, with persistence in the range of 0–0.7, but rises with bigger steps to higher levels when the degree of persistence increases from 0.7. The duration is one to five quarters for various kinds of strictly transitory shocks (with ϕ =0), and still in the range of one to six quarters for degrees of persistence up to 0.5. In contrast, when the degree of persistence is 0.9, the duration varies in the relatively high range of eight to twelve quarters for shocks to house prices, credit to households, aggregate de- mand and short-term interest rates. The duration for shocks to return on equity and credit to firms increases to two and four quarters, respectively.
The next subsection indicates that the optimal paths of the counter- cyclical capital buffer in response to different shocks are quite robust to the parameter representing the policymaker's concern for output fluctuations, and even inflation volatility. This result owes mainly to the relatively strong correlation between the variances of credit growth, output growth and inflation under the set of shocks considered.
4.1. Optimal capital buffer paths and the loss function
Optimal choices of δ and q in response to different shocks and their properties presented in Table 3 are based on the assumption of λ = 0.4, where λ indicates the policymaker's concern for output stabilization while pursuing credit growth stabilization. To investigate how sensitive the optimal values of δ and q are to changes in the value of λ in the loss function, I have redone the analysis above with λ values equal to 0, 0.2, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. For λ = 0, minimizing the loss function amounts to min- imizing the variance of aggregate credit growth, while for λ = 1, mini- mizing the loss function equals the minimization of the sum of the variances of aggregate credit growth and GDP growth.
In brief, the variation of λ within the range of 0–1 does not gener- ally affect the optimal choices of δ and q in response to the different shocks considered.13 This is because of the relatively high correlation between the variance of aggregate credit growth and the variance of GDP growth in the cases of the shocks considered.14 Besides that, changes in capital requirements represented by δ and q have rela- tively small effects on the variance of GDP growth relative to the var- iance of aggregate credit growth (cf. Fig. 2). Therefore, changes in the variance of aggregate credit growth in response to different values of δ and q dominate the influence of changes in the variance of GDP growth on the loss function, even when the weight of the latter is 1.
In cases where an increase in the value of λ from 0 to 1 matters, δ and q change by only 0.5 percentage point and/or 1 quarter, respectively. Such exceptions to the general pattern are found in the cases of shocks to credit to firms, return on equity and GDP. In the latter case, λ = 1 entails a different δ-value than λb 1.15
If I instead assume that the decision maker is concerned about the variance of the inflation gap rather than that of the GDP growth gap while pursuing stabilization of the credit growth gap, the optimal values of the δ and q are also unaffected in most cases (see e.g. Table 4). In cases where they are affected, the values do not differ by more than one per- centage point and/or one quarter relative to the values presented in Table 3, where the loss function includes concern for fluctuations in
13 More details about the analysis in this section are presented in Akram (2012). 14 See also Olsen et al. (2003) for evidence on the strong relationship between output and credit in Norwegian data. 15 In the case of shocks to credit to firms, for degrees of persistence equal to 0.2 and 0.9, δ increases by 0.5 percentage point while duration increases by 1 quarter relative to values in Table 3. In the case of shocks to return on equity, q remains invariant but δ increases by 0.5 percentage point, when λ is reduced. That is, δ = 0.5 for λ ≥ 0.4, while δ = 1 for λ ≤ 0.2.
GDP growth. As above, the changes in the optimal values of δ and q occur mostly for shocks to credit to firms and return on equity. For other shocks, optimal values of δ do not change while the optimal values of duration may differ by one quarter from those presented in Tables 3.16
The relatively minor differences between the outcomes presented in Tables 3 and 4 are mainly due to the relatively strong correlation be- tween the variances of the aggregate credit growth gap and inflation gap for the shocks considered.
5. Conclusions
I have investigated the effects of higher bank capital requirements on key Norwegian macroeconomic variables and their implications for macroprudential policy under Basel III. To this end, I have further developed and updated a quarterly macroeconometric model of the Norwegian (mainland) economy. To shed light on the countercyclical capital buffer as a macroprudential policy instrument, it is assumed that the policymaker stabilizes aggregate credit growth while taking into account possible destabilizing effects on output growth. The policymaker is also assumed to respond to a given shock by choosing a path for the countercyclical capital buffer characterized by the size and duration of the countercyclical capital buffer. The following results may be highlighted:
First, higher capital requirements affect credit growth, house prices and other macroeconomic variables through their effects on lending rates. I do not find statistically significant direct effects of changes in capital requirements on credit to households and firms.
Second, the effects on credit growth and house prices are found to be of considerable size, especially when capital requirements are in- creased by as much as 2.5 percentage points or more. The effects on the other variables such as GDP and inflation are relatively modest. The macroeconomic effects could have been somewhat larger than those presented if one had taken into account possible
16 The optimal values in Table 4 are based on the assumption that the decision maker minimizes the variance of the aggregate credit growth gap while placing equal weight on the variance of the inflation gap. It can be shown that it is the replacement of the var- iance of the GDP growth gap with the variance of the inflation gap rather than the change in λ from 0.4 to 1 that accounts for the differences between Tables 3 and 4. Results based on a loss function defined by the sum of the variances of the credit growth gap, inflation gap and output growth gap were close to those in Table 3 or Table 4 and occasionally somewhere in-between those presented in these tables.
87Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
recessionary effects of a simultaneous imposition of capital require- ments in Norway's trading partners.
Third, the analysis of the countercyclical capital buffer in response to various shocks suggests that the buffer increases by 2.5 percentage points in response to most of the shocks considered, while its duration varies in the range of 1–12 quarters depending on the persistence of the shock.
And fourth, the size and duration of the countercyclical capital buffer in response to different shocks do not vary notably with the parameter representing the policymaker's concern for output stabilization while sta- bilizing aggregate credit growth. Accordingly, the countercyclical capital buffer that minimizes the variance of credit growth also minimizes a combination of the variances of credit growth and output growth. More- over, comparable results are obtained even when the variance of output growth in the loss function is replaced by the variance of the inflation gap. This outcome is primarily due to the relatively strong correlation be- tween credit growth, output growth and inflation in the model for the shocks considered, and the relatively stronger effects of changes in the capital buffer on credit growth compared to effects on output growth and inflation. It follows that stabilization of aggregate credit growth in re- sponse to selected shocks may not conflict with output stabilization or in- flation stabilization. It remains to be investigated, however, whether this outcome is supported by other models.
Finally, I would like to stress that the analyses presented in this paper are based on a number of heroic assumptions, particularly about the out-of-sample relevance of the model and results under a different regulatory framework. They should therefore be treated more cautious- ly than suggested by the confidence intervals and significance values presented in the paper.
Acknowledgment
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway). I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. I have also received useful comments from seminar participants at Norges Bank and University of Oslo, espe- cially Sigbjørn Atle Berg, Jin Cao, Bjørn Naug, Vegard Mokleiv Nygård, Ragnar Nymoen and Kasper Kragh-Sørensen.
Appendix A. Data
The primary source of most of the series is Statistics Norway. Unless another source is given, the time series have been extracted from the database HISTDATA maintained by Norges Bank. Variables as named in the database are noted in hard brackets [.] below. Where relevant, the base year is 1991 and the unit of measurement is millions of NOK. The mainland economy is defined as the total Norwegian economy ex- cluding oil and gas production and international shipping. In the text, except for interest rates, variable names in small letters are natural logs of the corresponding variables listed below. Impulse dummies are denoted as iyyqx, where e.g. i80q2 is 1 in 1980 q2 and 0 otherwise.
CG Public consumption in NOK million; [CO]. CRH Domestic credit to households. Stock in millions of NOK;
[KFC2H]. CRF Credit to non-financial firms, mainland Norway. Stock in mil-
lions of NOK; [KFC3EMN]. CR Aggregate credit: CRH + CRF. qj Seasonal dummy variable (centered) for the jth quarter. E Import-weighted nominal exchange rate relative to Norway's
44 main trading partners; [SI44]. CAR Capital adequacy ratio, i.e. capital to risk-weighted assets.
Capital consists of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, where Tier 1 capital is composed of common equity and hybrid equity
while Tier 2 capital is additional capital; [Netto ansvarlig kapital]. Source: ORBOF database.
i The 3-month effective nominal money market rate. NIBOR (ask); [RN3M].
idyyqx Impulse dummy for year yy and quarter (q) x. For example variable id80q2 is 1 in 1980 q2 and 0 otherwise.
if The 3 month effective nominal money market rate, euro area. EURIBOR; [RN3M_EURO].
iL Nominal lending rate; average of floating interest rates for bank loans (total); [RNBL].
IT A step dummy that is 0 before 2001 q1 and 1 afterwards. MSCIW MSCI-World share index; Source: Datastream. OILP Brent Blend crude oil prices in USD per barrel; [POILUSD]. OSE Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index; [OSEAX]. P Consumer price index; [PCPI]. PC Consumer price index adjusted for tax changes and excluding
energy products; [PCPIJAE]. PEL Electricity prices, subcomponent of CPI; [PCPIEL]. Pf Consumer price index for Norway's main trading partners (25
countries); [PCPI_F25]. PH House prices: in thousands of NOK per square meter; [PHN]. PM Deflator of total imports; [PB]. PX Producer price index for Norway's trading partners in foreign
currency, a proxy for deflator of export prices in foreign cur- rency; [PPIKONK].
PD1 Composite dummy for introduction and removal of direct price controls. 1 in 1971 q1, 1971 q2, 1976 q4, 1979 q1; −1 in 1975 q1, 1980 q1, 1981 q1, 1982 q1; and zero otherwise.
U Unemployment rate (registered); [URR]. W Wage income per hour, mainland Norway; [WILMN]. WD1 Composite dummy for wage freeze: 1 in 1979 q1, 1979 q2,
1988 q2 and 1988 q3. Y Real GDP for mainland Norway, measured in millions of NOK
at fixed market prices; [YMN]. Yf Gross domestic product index for Norway's 26 main trading
partners; [Y_F26]. Z Productivity: value added per man hour at factor costs for
mainland economy; [ZYF].
Appendix B. Diagnostic tests for the VECMs
Table 5 presents diagnostic tests for the unrestricted VECM and its final version in Table 1. Tests of their statistical properties suggest that they have been adequately specified. There is no violation of the standard assumptions regarding residuals of these equations, especially when I control for some outliers by using impulse dummies. In particu- lar, the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and normally distributed errors are not rejected at the standard levels of significance. Statistically, however, the final VECM with 39 parameters is rejected as a valid simplification of the unrestricted VECM with 190 parameters; the chi-square test (chi2(151)) of overidentifying restriction was rejected at the 1% level of significance. The reason is that I have left out some var- iables from the individual equations that were statistically significant but had counterintuitive signs and hence were difficult to interpret.
It is quite difficult, if not infeasible, to derive a closed econometric model of some size with interpretable long-run and short-run proper- ties from a data congruent VAR model. It is common to build up such a model piecewise and develop partial systems by conditioning on some of the variables and developing separate single equations or systems of equations for the conditioning variables (see e.g. Bårdsen et al., 2005, ch. 2 and Juselius, 2006, ch. 19). This way one can also model different parts of the large model on available subsamples. Sample sizes available for modeling different variables may not be the same for all variables that one would like to model jointly. One may also wish to develop models of some of the variables on specific sample periods covering the period of a relevant policy regime rather than on all
Table 6 Testing weak exogeneity.
Parameters in: ecm_CARt − 1 ecm_it − 1 L ecm_pht − 1 ecm_crht − 1 ecm_cret − 1
Weak exog of: F(1, 67) χ2(1) χ2(1) F(1, 58) F(1, 68)
Δoset 0.58 [0.45] 0.19 [0.66] 0.15 [0.70] 0.16 [0.69] 0.15 [0.70] Δet 0.92 [0.34] 2.46 [0.12] 0.55 [0.46] 2.74 [0.10] 0.77 [0.38] Δpt 2.97 [0.09] 0.00 [0.96] 0.04 [0.84] 0.00 [0.98] 0.06 [0.81] Δyt 0.64 [0.43] 0.04 [0.83] 0.12 [0.73] 1.67 [0.20] 0.47 [0.50] Δut 0.92 [0.34] 4.81 [0.03]⁎ 0.20 [0.66] 1.73 [0.19] 2.08 [0.15]
Note: test whether the equilibrium correction terms in the different equations of the final VECM enter the equations of variables listed in the first column. Test statistics of F and chi-square tests with p-values are presented in square brackets. The asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 7 Return on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Δose−ið Þt ¼ 0:47 0:086ð Þ
Δmsciw−ið Þt þ 0:42 0:083ð Þ
Δmsciw−ið Þt−1 þ 0:43
0:057ð Þ Δoilpt− 2:74
0:905ð Þ Δit þ ε̂ose;t
σ̂ose ¼ 0:070 Summary statistics
AR 1–5 F(5, 63) = 0.993 [0.429] ARCH 1–4: F(4, 64) = 0.117 [0.976] Hetero F(8, 63) = 4.681 [0.000]⁎⁎
Normality ϰ2 = 2.323 [0.313] RESET23 F(2, 66) = 6.577 [0.003]⁎⁎
Sample period 1992 q4–2010 q3 Estimation method OLS
Note: see Table 5 for information about the tests.
Table 5 Diagnostics for the unrestricted and restricted VECMs.
Single equation diagnostics ΔCARt Δit L Δ(ph − p)t Δ(crh − p)t Δ(crf − p)t I. Diagnostic tests for the unrestricted VECM AR 1–5: F(5, 32) 1.49 [0.22] 0.21 [0.95] 1.01 [0.43] 0.54 [0.75] 0.60 [0.70] ARCH 1–4: F(4, 65) 0.92 [0.46] 0.54 [0.71] 0.25 [0.91] 1.19 [0.33] 2.52 [0.05] Normality: χ2(10) 2.12 [0.35] 2.26 [0.32] 2.60 [0.27] 0.74 [0.69] 1.22 [0.54] Hetero: F(50,13) 0.66 [0.85] 1.03 [0.51] 0.68 [0.84] 0.80 [0.73] 0.41 [0.99] System diagnostics:
Vector AR 1–5: F(125, 34) 0.86 [0.73] Vector Normality: χ2(2) 7.31 [0.70] Vector RESET23: F(50, 99) 1.28 [0.15]
II. Diagnostic tests for the final VECM in Table 1 AR 1–5: F(5, 62) 0.70 [0.63] 1.00 [0.43] 10.21 [.00]⁎⁎ 2.37 [0.05] 1.43 [0.23] ARCH 1–4: F(4, 65) 0.84 [0.50] 1.69 [0.16] 1.99 [0.11] 0.48 [0.75] 0.52 [0.72] Normality: χ2(2) 0.15 [0.94] 4.44 [0.11] 4.88 [0.09] 2.92 [0.23] 0.58 [0.75] Hetero: F(6, 66) 0.93 [0.53] 2.41 [0.04]⁎ 0.88 [0.63] 1.039 [0.42] 0.67 [0.78] System diagnostics:
Vector AR 1–5: F(125,187) 0.90 [0.73] Vector Normality: χ2(10) 7.60 [0.67]
Note: AR 1–5 denotes an LM test of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to order 5 in the errors (Harvey, 1990). ARCH 1–4 is an LM test for the null hypothesis of unconditional homoscedasticity of errors against the alternative hypothesis of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity up to order 4 of errors (Engle, 1982). Hetero tests the null of unconditional homoscedasticity of errors against the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity, as proposed by White (1980). Normality tests the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors as sug- gested by Doornik and Hansen (1994). RESET23, a general regression specification test based on Ramsey (1969), tests the null of correct specification of the specified model by testing the significance of the second and third power of the fitted value of the left-hand-side variable. Vector AR 1–5, is a vector error autocorrelation test of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to order 5 of errors. Vector Normality and Vector RESET23 tests are the multivariate equivalent tests of the single equation normality test and regression specification test, respectively. p- values are presented in square brackets. An asterisk (⁎) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level, while two asterisks denote rejection at the 1% level. The estimation and tests of the VECMs and of the other models presented have been undertaken using the PcGive module of OxMetrics 6.20 (see www.doornik.com).
88 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
available data. However, the conditioning variables need to be weakly exogenous with respect to parameters of interest in the partial models for efficient estimation (Johansen, 1992).
Weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables for the parameters of the VECM would imply that these parameters can vary freely with respect to the parameters of the models for conditioning variables. Table 6 shows the results of testing weak exogeneity of equity prices (ose), nominal effective exchange rate (e), consumer prices (p), mainland GDP (y) and unemployment rate (u) with respect to the parameters defining the long-run relationships for capital adequacy ratio, lending interest rates, house prices, credit to households and credit to firms. One simultaneously tests for the weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables with respect to the coefficients determin- ing adjustment to deviations from the long-run relationships. Weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables with respect to the param- eters defining the long-run relationships and adjustment coefficients requires that the equilibrium-correction terms in the VECM do not enter the models of the conditioning variables (Johansen, 1992).
The corresponding null hypotheses of weak exogeneity are not rejected at the 5% level of significance in all but one case. The weak exogeneity of unemployment with respect to the parameters in the long-run relationship for lending rates is rejected at the 5% level; the p-value is 3%. The rejection of the weak exogeneity assumption is interpreted as suggesting loss of efficiency in modeling lending rates separately from the unemployment rate.
Appendix C. The macroeconometric model
In addition to the VECM for the capital adequacy ratio, lending rates, house prices, credit to households and credit to firms, the macroecono- metric model contains single equations and systems of econometric equations for a number of other variables. These are nominal equity returns, wages, consumer prices, labor productivity, nominal effective exchange rate, aggregate import prices, aggregate demand and unem- ployment rate. I also specify an econometric equation for core inflation
Table 8 A system of the nominal effective exchange rate and import prices.
Δet ¼ − 0:29 0:066ð Þ
� e− p−pf � ��
t−1 þ 0:51 0:207ð Þ
Δ4pt−1− 0:33 0:138ð Þ
i−if � �
t
− 2:17 0:714ð Þ
Δ i−if � �
t � IT− 0:009 0:002ð Þ
oilpt � IT þ 0:09
0:016ð Þ id08q4t þ 1:32þ
0:298ð Þ ε̂e;t
σ̂e ¼ 0:0150
Δpmt− 0:06 0:033ð Þ
pm− e þ pxð Þ � �
t−1 þ 0:56 0:135ð Þ
Δpxt þ 0:48 0:136ð Þ
Δpxt−1
þ 0:43 0:076ð Þ
Δet þ 0:30 0:074ð Þ
Δ w−pð Þ−z � �
t−1 þ 0:46 0:0817ð Þ
Δyt−1
− 0:03 0:006ð Þ
q1− 0:27 0:152ð Þ
þε̂pm;t σ̂pm ¼ 0:0111
Summary statistics
Vector AR 1–5 F(20, 98) = 0.74 [0.783] Vector Normality test Chi2(4) = 4.08 [0.395] Vector Hetero test F(63, 129) = 1.23 [0.166] Sample period 1994q2–2010q4 Estimation method FIML
Note: see Table 5 for information about the tests.
Table 9 A system of wages, consumer prices and labor productivity.
Δwt ¼ − 0:13 0:028ð Þ
− 0:59 0:054ð Þ
Δwt−1− 0:36 0:068ð Þ
Δwt−2− 0:15 0:064ð Þ
Δwt−3
− 0:13 0:038ð Þ
Δwt−4 þ 0:58 0:19ð Þ
Δpt−1 þ 0:46 0:115ð Þ
Δzt− 0:21 0:035ð Þ
w−p−z½ �t−1 − 0:026
0:005ð Þ ut−1 þ 0:066
0:011ð Þ q2 þ 0:13
0:020ð Þ q3 þ 0:044
0:016ð Þ WD1t
− 0:018 0:003ð Þ
WD2t
σ̂w ¼ 0:019
Δpt ¼ − 0:19 0:013ð Þ
Δ3pt−2 þ 0:098 0:013ð Þ
Δyt−1 þ 0:15 0:011ð Þ
Δ2 w−zð Þt− 0:07 0:015ð Þ
Δzt−3
þ 0:028 0:012ð Þ
Δpmt− 0:029 0:010ð Þ
p−0:78 w−zð Þ−0:22pm−0:72½ �t−1 þ 0:051
0:004ð Þ Δpelt− 0:020
0:002ð Þ q3 þ 0:012
0:004ð Þ id80q1− 0:017
0:004ð Þ PD1t
σ̂p ¼ 0:0046
Δzt ¼ 0:39 0:047ð Þ
Δzt−4 þ 0:26 0:035ð Þ
Δyt−4 þ 0:34 0:020ð Þ
Δ w−pð Þt − 0:22
0:048ð Þ z− 0:49 w−pð Þ þ 0:04u þ 0:0021t þ 3:171 � � �
t−1
þ 0:013 0:003ð Þ
q1 þ 0:02 0:004ð Þ
q3− 0:041 0:010ð Þ
id06q1
σ̂z ¼ 0:010
Summary statistics
Vector AR 1–5 F(45, 297) = 1.619 [0.011] Vector Normality test: Chi2(6) = 9.954 [0.127] Vector Hetero test: F(372, 361) = 1.657 [0.000]⁎⁎
Sample period: 1979 q2–2010 q4 Estimation method: FIML
Note: a system of three equations estimated by FIML using time series data over the period 1992q4–2010q4. See Table 5 for information about the tests.
Table 10 Core CPI inflation.
Δ4pct ¼ 0:9 0:176ð Þ
Δ4pt− 0:028 0:012ð Þ
Δpelt− 0:031 0:012ð Þ
Δpelt−1− 0:035 0:010ð Þ
Δpelt−2
− 0:038 0:012ð Þ
Δpelt−3− 0:019 0:012ð Þ
Δoilpt− 0:025 0:009ð Þ
Δoilpt−1
− 0:035 0:01ð Þ
Δoilpt−2− 0:033 0:011ð Þ
Δoilpt−3 þ 0:0043 0:003ð Þ
þε̂pc;t σ̂pc ¼ 0:0046
Summary statistics
AR 1–5 F(5, 12) = 4.562 [0.015]⁎
ARCH 1–4: F(5, 19) = 0.327 [0.856]
89Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
defined as consumer price inflation adjusted for energy prices, i.e. electricity and oil prices. Finally, the model includes an estimated Taylor-type interest rate equation representing monetary policy re- sponse. The various equations are briefly described in the following and presented in Tables 7–13.
Nominal equity returns based on the all share index of the Oslo Stock Exchange are modeled in the light of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by treating the Norwegian stock market portfolio as a single asset and the international stock market portfolio as the market portfo- lio. The model in Table 7 suggests that excess returns on the Norwegian stock market portfolio (Δose − i) move closely in line with excess returns on the international market portfolio. There is a strong negative relationship between changes in short-term interest rates and excess returns on the domestic stock market. In addition, an increase in oil prices has a positive effect on equity prices, and thereby on e.g. aggre- gate demand, credit growth and 'house prices (see Tables 1 and 11).
I model the nominal effective exchange rate (e) and aggregate import prices (pm) as a simultaneous equation system in order to take into account possible contemporaneous interdependence between them (see Table 8). The nominal effective exchange rate reflects the difference between domestic and foreign prices, a possible difference be- tween domestic and foreign interest rates and oil prices in the long run; a lower value of the exchange rate indicates appreciation. Accordingly, do- mestic prices become fully reflected in the nominal exchange rate in the long run. The nominal exchange rate reacts to correct deviations from the purchasing power parity relationship and thereby contributes to sta- bilizing the real exchange rate. In the short run, the nominal exchange rate appreciates when the interest rate and/or the interest rate differen- tial increases, ceteris paribus. Also, higher oil prices tend to appreciate the nominal exchange rate in the short run as well as in the long run. This is as expected given the relatively large volume of Norwegian petro- leum exports, which constitute more than half of Norwegian exports.
However, there is mixed evidence on a possible relationship be- tween oil prices and the Norwegian exchange rate when we use data from the stable exchange rate regime preceding the inflation targeting regime from 2001 q1 onwards (e.g. Akram, 2004; Hammersland and Træe, 2014). I have therefore let the log of oil prices enter the model from 2001q1 and onwards to better represent their effect on the nomi- nal exchange rate under the current regime.17
17 Log of oil prices (oilp) obtained a t-value of −2.41 when included in the exchange rate equation over the whole sample period, but a t-value of −4.26 when included from 2001 q1 onwards. In the former case, oil prices, which are integrated of order one, are not sta- tistically significant at the 5% level if one uses appropriate critical values from e.g. MacKinnon (1991).
There is a complete pass-through of the nominal exchange rate and foreign export prices (px) to aggregate import prices in the long run (see Table 8). The complete long-run exchange rate pass-through is consis- tent with Bache (2002) for import prices in Norwegian manufacturing. However, she finds a long-run elasticity of import prices with respect to foreign export prices equal to 1.35 and a negative long-run effect of the unemployment rate on import prices in line with Naug and Nymoen (1996). In contrast with these studies, cost-push variables such as higher growth in real wages relative to growth in labor produc- tivity (Δ(w − p − z)) and domestic economic activity (Δy) contribute to higher import prices in the short-run only. Such effects could be reflecting a procyclical mark-up on import costs, possibly owing to pricing-to-market behavior by exporters.
Wages (w), consumer prices (p) and labor productivity (z) are also modeled as a simultaneous equation system (see Table 9). Their short- and long-run relationships are comparable to those in e.g. Bårdsen et al. (2003). The wage equation suggests a partial pass-through of con- sumer price inflation to nominal wage growth in the short run. In each period, nominal wages also adjust toward their long-run relationship where there is a full pass-through of consumer prices and productivity.
Hetero test F(18, 8) = 0.744 [0.715] Normality ϰ2(2) = 0.603 [0.740] RESET23 F(2, 15) = 0.616 [0.553] Sample period 2001 q2–2007 q4 Estimation method OLS
Note: a technical equation for determining core inflation. See Table 5 for information about the tests.
Table 13 Interest rate rule for short-term money market rates.
it ¼ 1−0:69ð Þ 0:06 0:005ð Þ
þ 2:15 ð0:266Þ
Δ4pc−0:025ð Þt− 0:04 0:012ð Þ
log Ut 3:5
� ! þ 0:69
0:059ð Þ it−1 þ ε̂i;t
σ̂i ¼ 0:0029
Summary statistics
AR 1–3 F(3, 20) = 4.117 [0.020]⁎
ARCH 1–3: F(3, 21) = 0.484 [0.697] Hetero F(6, 20) = 1.182 [0.355] Normality ϰ2(2) = 2.999 [0.223] Sample period 2001 q2–2007 q4 Estimation method NLS
Note: see Table 5 for information about the tests.
Table 11 A single equation model of Norwegian (mainland) GDP.
Δyt ¼ − 0:52 0:088ð Þ
Δyt−1− 0:13 0:054ð Þ
y−yf � �
t−1 þ 0:18 0:062ð Þ
Δ e þ pf −p � �
t
− 0:04 0:096ð Þ
ðiL−Δ4pÞt−1 þ 0:58 0:058ð Þ
Δcgt þ 0:29 0:080ð Þ
Δcgt−1
þ 0:03 0:014ð Þ
Δ ose−pð Þt þ 0:041 0:013ð Þ
Δ ose−pð Þt−1 þ 0:13 0:049ð Þ
Δ ph−pð Þt−3 þ 0:29
0:102ð Þ Δ crh−pð Þt−3 þ 0:02
0:05ð Þ Δ crf−pð Þt−5
− 0:048 0:006ð Þ
q1− 0:052 0:007ð Þ
q2− 0:034 0:006ð Þ
q3 þ 1:03 0:45ð Þ
þε̂y;t σ̂y ¼ 0:0109
Summary statistics
AR 1–5 F(5, 56) = 2.464 [0.044] ARCH 1–4: F(4, 68) = 0.906 [0.466] Hetero F(25, 50) = 1.133 [0.345] Normality ϰ2(2) = 2.561 [0.278] RESET23 F(2, 59) = 1.405 [0.253] Sample period: 1991 q1–2009 q4 Estimation method: OLS
Note: see Table 5 for information about the tests.
90 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
However, the mark-up of real wages on productivity falls with the unemployment rate.
In the short run, consumer price inflation varies with changes in aggregate demand and to some extent nominal wage growth (see Table 9). In addition, it adjusts to correct deviations from the long-run relationship for consumer prices. In the long run, consumer prices re- flect a weighted average of domestic and imported costs, represented by unit labor costs and import prices.
The equation for labor productivity is rather rudimentary, as it is in- herently difficult to explain productivity growth. One interpretation of the equation derived is that the productivity level follows a determinis- tic trend as well as real wages in the long run, which also have positive short-run effects on productivity (cf. Bårdsen et al., 2003). A positive relationship between real wages and productivity is consistent with ef- ficiency wage models. The latter models can also explain positive effects of the unemployment rate. I also find that labor productivity tends to be procyclical in the short run as it tends to increase in booms and fall in recessions. This could be a reflection of labor hoarding in firms, which implies that output falls more than labor in downturns and increases more than employment in upturns.
The model of core inflation (Δpc) in Table 10 reflects its definition, which is CPI inflation adjusted for energy prices (i.e. electricity and oil prices) and indirect taxes.
Aggregate demand in the relatively open Norwegian economy fol- lows foreign GDP (yf), real exchange rate movements and real lending rates (see Table 11). Moreover, real equity returns and house prices, in particular, have effects on aggregate demand which may be interpreted as wealth effects. I also find effects on aggregate demand of credit to households and firms. There are also positive short-run effects on
Table 12 A single equation model of the registered unemployment rate.
Δut ¼ 0:31 0:064ð Þ
Δut−1 þ 0:42 0:070ð Þ
Δut−4− 0:039 0:015ð Þ
ut−1 þ 0:061 0:015ð Þ
� 0:64 0:232ð Þ
Δ2yt−1− 0:13 0:024ð Þ
Δ3 ose−pð Þt− 0:40 0:193ð Þ
Δcgt
þ 0:23 0:031ð Þ
q1 þ 0:14 0:024ð Þ
q3 þ ε̂u;t σ̂u ¼ 0:051
Summary statistics
AR 1–5 F(5, 95) = 1.028 [0.406] ARCH 1–4: F(4, 101) = 0.549 [0.700] Hetero F(14, 94) = 1.468 [0.139] Normality ϰ2(2) = 4.130 [0.127] RESET23 F(2, 98) = 3.384 [0.038]⁎
Sample period 1983 q4–2010 q4 Estimation method OLS
Note: see Table 5 for information about the tests.
aggregate demand of growth in government expenditures.18 The ag- gregate demand equation is largely comparable with that in Bårdsen et al. (2003). The main difference is in the role of government con- sumption, which here does not have a long-run effect on aggregate demand.
The (registered) unemployment rate follows output growth in the short run, as in the Okun's law relationship (see Table 12). In addition, it reverts slowly toward a constant rate (cf. Bårdsen et al., 2003). The unemployment rate also falls with higher real equity returns, which could be interpreted as an effect of current and/or expected higher earn- ings in financial and non-financial firms. An increase in government consumption also contributes to reducing the unemployment rate in the short run.
Finally, I let the short-term money market interest rate represent the key policy rate and model it as a Taylor-type interest rate rule with interest rate smoothing (see Table 13). The short-run rates respond to deviations between core inflation and the inflation target of 2.5%, and deviations from the natural unemployment rate, assumed to 3.5%. I use the unemployment gap instead of the output gap, which may be more prone to measurement errors than the unemployment rate. I in- clude one lag of the interest rate to take into account interest rate smoothing. When estimating the coefficient estimates, I also limited the sample period to the period of 2001 q2–2007 q4, as inflation targeting in Norway was formally introduced in March 2001 and to avoid influencing coefficient estimates with the turbulence in the money market rate during the recent financial crisis and the associated monetary policy actions.
Appendix D. Robustness to changes in the sample period?
I have tested the stability of each of the equations in the macro econometric model by estimating them recursively on increasingly larger data samples and examining estimates of their (main) parame- ters for changes. I have also conducted a number of break point tests (cf. Chow, 1960). In the latter tests, one looks for unusually large one- step or several-step ahead prediction errors after estimating the model each time. Such prediction errors can reflect shifts in parameter estimates.
Overall, I find parameter estimates in equations of variables that have not been directly affected by policy changes to be fairly stable over time. In particular, there is no evidence of changes in parameter estimates coinciding with the introduction of inflation targeting in 2001 and the introduction of the Basel II framework in 2007. Parameter
18 I have not found any significant direct effect of oil prices on aggregate demand (in the mainland economy). However, oil prices indirectly affect aggregate demand through their positive effects on equity prices and the nominal exchange rate. One reason for the ab- sence of direct oil price effects could be that the effects of oil prices are already taken into account by the government consumption variable. Norwegian oil revenues are invested abroad, while the return on the petroleum assets abroad is spent by the central govern- ment in accordance with a fiscal policy rule.
Δ CAR t −4 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.2
0.4 Δ CAR t −4 × +/-2SE ECM t −1 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
-0.2
-0.1
0.0 ECM t −1 × +/-2SE Δ ut −3 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.01
0.03 Δ ut −3 × +/-2SE
Δ y t −2 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
-0.075
-0.050
-0.025
0.000 Δ y
t −2 × +/-2SE Δ yt −3 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.00
0.05 Δ y
t −3 × +/-2SE Δ (ose −p )t −3 × +/-2SE
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.01
0.03 Δ (ose −p )t −3 × +/-2SE
Res 1Step +/−2 σ t
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.00
0.01 Res 1Step +/−2 σ t 1up CHOWs 5%
1997 2001 2005 2009
2
4 1up CHOWs 5% Nup CHOWs 5%
1997 2001 2005 2009
0.5
1.0 Nup CHOWs 5%
Fig. 4. Recursive OLS estimates (+/− 2SE) of main parameters in the equation for the capital adequacy ratio (see Table 1). The initial estimates are based on the sample period 1992 q4–1997 q1, which is extended by one observation at a time until the full sample 1992 q4–2010 q4 is used to obtain the final estimates. In the bottom panel: recursive one-step ahead prediction errors and recursive estimate of the standard errors of residuals, followed by plots of recursively obtained statistics of break point Chow tests scaled by their critical values at the 5% percent level. Values higher than one indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability at the 5% level of significance.
91Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
estimates in equations of variables that have been directly affected by regulations such as capital adequacy ratio also seem to be remarkably stable over time, even around the period of the regulatory changes.
For example, Fig. 4 shows recursive estimates for the main parame- ters in the equations for capital adequacy ratio (CAR). As shown in the
Constant × +/-2SE
2000 2005 2010
0
2
4 Constant × +/-2SE
(i −i f ) t × +/-2SE
2000 2005 2010
0.0
2.5 (i −i f )t × +/-2SE
o i l p t × I T × +/-2SE
2005 2010
-0.02
0.00
o i l p t × I T × +/-2SE
-0.
0.
0.
1up CHOWs 5%
2000 2005 2010
0.5
1.0
1.5 1up CHOWs 5%
Fig. 5. Panels 1–3 display recursive OLS estimates (+/− 2SE) of main parameters in the excha q2–1998 q1, which is extended by one observation at a time until the full sample 1994 q2–201 ahead prediction errors and recursive estimate of the standard errors of residuals. The bottom p critical values at the 5% percent level. Values higher than one indicate rejection of the null hypo fitted values of changes in the exchange rate over the sample period.
figure, the parameter estimates do not display significant changes over the sample periods; they are well within the 95% confidence bands over increasingly larger samples. The lack of evidence against the null hypothesis of parameter stability in the equation for capital ad- equacy ratio is notable given the introduction of Basel II in 2007 as well
(e −(pf −p )) t −1 × +/-2SE
2000 2005 2010
-0.5
0.0
(e −(pf −p )) t −1 × +/-2SE
Δ (i −i f ) t × I T × +/-2SE
2005 2010
0
10 Δ (i −i f )
t × I T × +/-2SE
1-step ahead residuals
2000 2005 2010
025
000
025 1-step ahead residuals
Δ e t
Fitted
1995 2000 2005 2010
0.0
0.1 Δ e
t Fitted
nge rate equation (see Table 8). The initial estimates are based on the sample period 1994 0 q4 is used to obtain the final estimates. The third panel also displays recursive one-step anel shows plots of recursively obtained statistics of break point Chow tests scaled by their thesis of parameter stability at the 5% level of significance. The final graph plots actual and
Δ i t × +/-2SE
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 0.3
0.4
0.5 Δ i
t × +/-2SE
C A R t −1 × +/-2SE
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
C A R t −1 × +/-2SE
E C M t −1 × +/-2SE
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
-0.4
-0.3
E C M t −1 × +/-2SE
R e s 1S t e p +/−2σ t
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
-0.005
0.000
0.005 R e s 1S t e p +/−2σ
t
1up CHOWs 5%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
2
4 1up CHOWs 5% Nup CHOWs 5%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0.5
1.0 Nup CHOWs 5%
Fig. 6. Recursive OLS estimates (+/− 2SE) of main parameters in the lending rate equation (see Table 1). The initial estimates are based on the sample period 1992 q4–1997 q1, which is extended by one observation at a time until the full sample 1992 q4–2010 q4 is used to obtain the final estimates. The middle panel displays recursive one-step ahead prediction errors and recursive estimate of the standard errors of residuals. The bottom panel shows plots of recursively obtained statistics of break point Chow tests scaled by their critical values at the 5% percent level. Values higher than one indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability at the 5% level of significance.
92 Q.F. Akram / Economic Modelling 42 (2014) 77–93
as the recent financial crisis. It is too early, however, to draw conclusions on the possible effects of the recent financial crisis on the parameter estimates of this equation. In our data set, there is just one relatively large increase in the capital adequacy ratio in 2010 q4 whose effect has been controlled for by including an impulse dummy in the equation for the capital adequacy ratio.
However, in equations of variables that have been directly affected by changes in policy, some parameter estimates display shifts in periods coinciding with the policy changes. This applies to equations for the nominal effective exchange rate, wages, consumer prices, the short- term interest rate and the lending rate. The parameter instabilities asso- ciated with policy changes have been reduced by using dummy variables for the relevant periods, or by discarding observations under previous policy regimes, to simplify the relevant equations.
In the nominal effective exchange rate equation, the effects of changes in the interest rate differential and oil prices become stronger after the formal move from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting in 2001 q1. This has been taken into account by a multiplicative step dummy (IT), which changes its value from zero to 1 in 2001 q1. Fig. 5 presents ev- idence on the stability of the nominal exchange rate equation over the sample period, which includes the recent financial crisis.
While the parameter estimates in the equations for wages and prices do not display any shift coinciding with the change in the monetary pol- icy regime, the wages and prices seem to be affected by the introduction and the subsequent removal of several wage and price freezes during the 1970s and the 1980s. I have controlled for their effects by dummy variables. The behavior of the short-term interest rate also changes around the time of the shift in the monetary policy regime. The Taylor-type interest rate rule has therefore been estimated using obser- vations from 2001 q1 onwards.
I have also found small but statistically significant changes in the co- efficient estimate associated with the short-term interest rate in the equation for the lending rate. The shifts seem to occur quite abruptly in the autumn of 2008 (see Fig. 6). The break point tests in the lower panel of the figure also indicate possible changes in the parameter
estimate from autumn 2008 onwards. The change in the pass-through of the short-term rates to the lending rate may be associated with the possible effects of the recent financial crisis on the money market and on the accompanying changes in monetary policy and regulatory policy proposals. The Norwegian money market was affected by the Lehman default in mid-September 2008 and the defaults in late September and October 2008 of two Icelandic banks, Glitnir and Kaupthing, respective- ly, which had branches in Norway.
Finally, I have examined to what extent the impulse responses of financial and real economic variables presented in Fig. 2 are influenced by data observations from the period since early 2007. To this end, I have reestimated the VECM presented in Table 1 using data only up to 2006 q4 and implemented it in the macroeconometric model. Akram (2012) shows that the responses are comparable to those presented in Fig. 2, which is based on the full sample.
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- Macro effects of capital requirements and macroprudential policy
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The empirical framework
- 2.1. Capital ratio, lending rates, house prices and credit
- 2.2. Long-run relationships
- 2.3. Dynamic relationships
- 2.4. The macroeconometric model: an overview
- 3. Macro effects of higher capital requirements
- 3.1. Comparison with international evidence
- 3.2. Macro effects of Basel III
- 4. Implementing the countercyclical capital buffer
- 4.1. Optimal capital buffer paths and the loss function
- 5. Conclusions
- Acknowledgment
- Appendix A. Data
- Appendix B. Diagnostic tests for the VECMs
- Appendix C. The macroeconometric model
- Appendix D. Robustness to changes in the sample period?
- References
1-s2.0-S0304393214000725-main.pdf
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53
http://d 0304-39
☆ Pre n Corr E-m
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jme
Testing macroprudential stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights$
Viral Acharya a,n, Robert Engle a, Diane Pierret a,b
a NYU Stern School of Business, Volatility Institute, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, United States b Université catholique de Louvain, ISBA, 20 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 1 February 2014 Received in revised form 22 April 2014 Accepted 24 April 2014 Available online 9 May 2014
Keywords: Macroprudential regulation Stress test Systemic risk Risk-weighted assets
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.04.014 32/& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
pared for the Carnegie Rochester Conference esponding author. Tel.: þ1 212 998 0354. ail addresses: [email protected] (V. Ac
a b s t r a c t
We compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests, to that of a benchmark methodology — the “V-Lab stress test” — that employs only publicly available market data. We find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk-weighted assets, the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the V-Lab stress test, whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets. We show that the risk measures used in risk-weighted assets are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk, as they do not account for the “risk that risk will change.” Furthermore, the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk-weighted assets were no better than the rest when the European economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011.
& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, macroprudential stress tests have become a standard tool that regulators use to assess the resilience of financial systems. Macro stress tests have been designed to assist and facilitate macroprudential regulation, which essentially aims at preventing the costs of the financial sector's distress spreading to the real economy (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Hirtle et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010; Hanson et al., 2011). Acharya et al. (2010) argue that such spillovers from the financial sector to the real economy arise when the financial sector as a whole is undercapitalized, limiting its capacity to intermediate industrial firms’ functions. As part of the regulatory toolkit, macro stress tests should contain such (systemic risk) externalities by ensuring that the financial sector is sufficiently capitalized to continue financial intermediation in a severe economic downturn.
To simulate a severe economic downturn, regulators define a hypothetical stress scenario by specifying shocks to different macroeconomic and financial variables. The adverse scenario is translated into losses to assets on the balance sheet of banks using models that capture the sensitivity of banks’ exposures to the stress scenario. These losses are assumed to be first borne by equity capital. The required capitalization of a bank is assessed using measures (the capital ratios) of the financial performance of the bank after application of the stress test model.
The current approach to assessing capital requirements is strongly dependent on the regulatory capital ratios defined under Basel Accords. The capital ratio of a bank is usually defined as the ratio of a measure of its equity to a measure of its
on Public Policy, November 15–16, 2013.
harya), [email protected] (R. Engle), [email protected] (D. Pierret).
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 37
assets. A regulatory capital ratio usually employs book value of equity and risk-weighted assets, where individual asset holdings are multiplied by corresponding regulatory “risk weights.” The regulatory capital ratios in stress tests help regulators determine which banks fail the test under the stress scenario and what supervisory or recapitalization actions should be undertaken to address this failure.
An annual supervisory stress test of the financial sector in the United States has become a requirement with the implementation of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173) of 2010. Macroprudential stress tests have also been used by U.S. and European regulators to restore market confidence in financial sectors during an economic crisis. As a response to the recent financial crisis, the 2009 U.S. stress test led to a substantial recapitalization of the financial sector in the U.S. In Europe, the 2011 stress test also served as a crisis management tool during the European sovereign debt crisis. The European exercise lacked credibility in this role (Greenlaw et al., 2012), however, due largely to the absence of a clear recapitalization plan for banks failing the stress test.
An alternative approach for measuring the financial performance of a bank under stress is presented in Acharya et al. (2010, 2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2011). The proposed measure (SRISK) represents the expected amount of capital an institution would need to raise during an economic crisis to restore a target capital ratio. The crisis or stress scenario is defined by a 40% drop in the market equity index over six months. In these market conditions, SRISK is based on the assumption that the book value of the debt of the bank will remain constant, while its market capitalization will decrease by its expected six-month return conditional on the stress scenario, estimated from a bivariate model of the bank and the market returns. As the stress is on the market value of equity, this methodology — called “V-Lab stress test” — can be viewed as a mark-to-market stress test. The results of this benchmark for macroprudential stress tests are updated weekly on the Volatility Laboratory (V-Lab) website.1
The V-Lab stress tests have the advantage that they are inexpensive and non-invasive, as they require only publicly available data. They can show time series variations in financial sector capitalization. However, they do not show anything on financial institutions that are not traded and they do not reveal information on the weaknesses of financial institutions. The regulatory stress tests have large supervisory data requirements that provide sensitive information and are expensive to collect, analyze and maintain. The creation of scenarios for the tests is essentially a surprise to the sector as otherwise it will distort investment decisions. Thus the time series of regulatory stress tests is unlikely to reveal changes in bank capitalization. Fortunately, regulators can use more than one measure of financial health and it is our goal in this research to show the relationships between the outcomes and the benefits of combining these approaches.
In this paper, we compare the outcomes of stress tests performed by U.S. and European regulators to this benchmark methodology. Stress tests usually disclose two types of performance measures: the projected losses of a bank under the stress scenario and its required capitalization (measured by a capital ratio or a capital shortfall estimate) once these losses are taken into account. In addition, the average risk weight of a bank (the ratio of its risk-weighted assets to total assets) in the supervisory stress test is considered as a measure of the bank's asset risk under the stress scenario. We compare this risk measure with a market measure of asset risk implied by the V-Lab methodology, in particular to the “V-Lab risk weight,” which assumes that banks whose market capitalization is predicted to shrink the most in the V-Lab scenario are the riskiest. The V-Lab risk weight is calculated in a top-down manner at the level of the entire bank, rather than bottom-up (i.e., asset by asset), as in the Basel risk-weighted approach.
Our comparisons reveal the following interesting results. First, the required capitalization in the V-Lab stress test appears always to be larger than in regulatory stress tests, but this contrast appears to be extreme in Europe, reflecting the low number of banks failing the supervisory stress test. As regulatory stress tests and the V-Lab stress tests identify vulnerable banks in a period of economic stress, the ranking of bank vulnerability in the scenarios should, however, be closely related even if the magnitude of the vulnerability is greater in the V-Lab stress test. Similarly, regulatory stress tests and V-Lab stress tests should identify vulnerable banks when there is a realized period of stress. We illustrate this using the 2011 European stress test, which was followed by a global downturn. For this stress test, we compare the outcomes of the regulatory stress test and the V-Lab stress test to realized outcomes of banks during the six months following the stress test disclosure.
We find that the average regulatory risk weight of stress tests is uncorrelated with the V-Lab risk weight. In the 2011 European stress test, the average risk weight of European banks appears completely unconnected with their actual risk (measured by their realized volatility) during the six months following the disclosure of the results of the stress test. Furthermore, we show that Basel risk standards provide no incentives for banks to diversify as regulatory risk weights (derived in a bottom-up manner) ignore the subadditivity feature of portfolio risk. As a result, banks have an incentive to concentrate their holdings on low risk-weight assets and hence to diversify less.2 The underestimation of risk weights in turn leads to excessive leverage when there is no regulatory constraint on the leverage ratio.
Second, we consider an alternative definition of capital adequacy in stress tests based on the simple leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of book equity to total (un-weighted) assets. When capital adequacy is a function of risk-weighted assets in regulatory stress tests, the ranking of financial institutions by capital shortfalls deviates considerably from rankings using
1 http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/. 2 Empirical evidence that European banks took advantage of regulatory risk weights by concentrating on zero-risk weight sovereign debt exposures of
the southern European periphery can be found in Acharya and Steffen (2013).
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–5338
the V-Lab market price-based approach. However, when stress tests rely on total assets to indicate capital requirements, the bank rankings are similar to the V-Lab rankings.
Overall, the findings indicate that stress tests would be more effective if capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets were supplemented by requirements based on total assets and market risks. A risk-based capital requirement is not sufficient as there is “risk that risk will change” (Engle, 2009), for example, the risk of an increase in risk over time of some currently safe asset class such as mortgages or sovereign bonds. In addition, risk weights are flawed measures of bank risks cross-sectionally as banks game their risk-weighted assets (cherry-pick on risky but low risk-weight assets) to meet regulatory capital requirements, which does not necessarily reduce economic leverage.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce macroprudential stress tests. We also present the alternative V-Lab methodology and discuss important differences with regulatory stress tests in Section 3. We compare the outcomes of regulatory stress tests and V-Lab in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Macroprudential stress tests
2.1. Why do we need macroprudential stress tests?
Crises occur when financial firms' balance sheets are hit by a common asset shock. The depreciation of the banks' asset values and credit risk concerns may lead creditors to refuse to continue to provide funding, forcing banks to sell assets to cover redemptions. When the only potential buyers of these assets are other financial firms also experiencing funding problems, assets will be sold at a fire sale that will further depress prices in the market. In the presence of fire sales, banks will need to sell even more of their assets to raise cash, thereby limiting the supply of credit available to the real economy.
Banks cannot achieve efficient outcomes privately because they do not bear the cost of (i) ex post bailouts of their insured deposit base, and (ii) externalities they impose on the rest of the economy (through fire sales and credit crunch) when the financial sector is undercapitalized (Acharya et al., 2010). Because of risk-shifting (banks shifting the downside risk of their investments to the lender) and the debt overhang problem (shareholders knowing that their money will go to the senior creditors in the event of default), banks will not build up the ex ante adequate capital buffers on their own.
Microprudential (bank level) and macroprudential (system level) regulations are needed to respectively address the costs financial firms impose on the system via channels (i) and (ii) above. As part of the regulatory toolkit, stress testing should ensure that the financial sector is adequately capitalized to protect taxpayers against (i) and limit the likelihood and the cost of (ii) under a wide range of possible scenarios. Macroprudential stress tests can help address this market failure by bringing the capitalization of the financial sector in line with market perceptions of risk.3 This should ensure the financial sector's access to short-term funding.
In this paper, we consider stress tests conducted on a U.S. and EU-wide level. These stress tests can be considered as macroprudential stress tests as opposed to microprudential stress tests conducted on a bank-level as a requirement under Pillar 2 of Basel II (Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)).4 More importantly, they can be considered as macroprudential stress tests because of their common goals of restoring market confidence in the financial sector and improving market discipline through more rigorous and transparent assessments of banks' risks.
2.2. How capital requirements are measured in a stress test?
The capital ratio of a bank is typically defined as the ratio of a measure of its capital to a measure of its assets. The measures of capital employed in regulatory ratios correspond to different qualities of capital based on their capacity to absorb asset losses in different states of the world; the Tier 1 Common capital (U.S.) and the Core Tier 1 capital (EU) correspond to the highest-quality category and are the closest to common shareholders equity.5 Measures of a bank's assets are usually its total assets (Tier 1 leverage ratio) or its risk-weighted assets, where different individual asset holdings or asset classes are multiplied by corresponding regulatory “risk weights.”
The required capitalization of a bank in “normal times” is defined by the required fraction of (risk-weighted) assets that has to be funded with high-quality capital. To measure the required capitalization “under stress,” stress tests rely on models that translate an adverse macroeconomic scenario into losses and revenues to assets on the balance sheet of banks. The difference between the projected losses and the projected revenues under the stress scenario usually results in a positive
3 Note that the paper focuses on addressing the issue of recapitalizing the financial sector when it is undercapitalized. However, too high capital requirements can also lead to socially inefficient outcomes as higher costs of equity capital reduce the profitability of investing in some assets, and can ultimately force banks to reduce lending to the real economy. Adequate capital levels should therefore ensure that banks internalize the externalities they impose on the real economy in a crisis, without limiting credit supply to the real economy.
4 Other macroprudential stress tests, not discussed here, were undertaken by national authorities (e.g., Ireland, UK, Spain) and by the International Monetary Fund.
5 See Section 225.8(e)(1)(i) of the capital plan rule for a definition of Tier 1 Common capital (U.S.). Definition of Core Tier 1 capital used in the EBA 2011 stress test can be found at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15932/Capital-definition-criteria_1.pdf.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 39
net loss (i.e., negative net income). This net loss is assumed to be first borne by equity. The resulting capital ratios help regulators determine which banks fail the test under the stress scenario and what supervisory or recapitalization actions are undertaken to address this failure.
2.3. US stress tests
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is responsible for conducting macroprudential stress tests in the U.S. A first stress test exercise called the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) was launched in 2009 as a response to the recent financial crisis. This program led to a substantial recapitalization of the U.S. financial system by forcing 10 bank holding companies to raise a $75 billion capital buffer. Its objective of recapitalizing the U.S. financial sector, as well as that the government would make available an additional capital buffer was clear from its announcement in February 2009.6
With the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, an annual supervisory stress test of the U.S. financial system became a requirement, and the Fed's capital plans rule of 2011 required all U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with consolidated assets of $50 billion or more to develop and submit capital plans to the Federal Reserve on an annual basis. As a result, the Federal Reserve has conducted stress tests as part of the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) since 2011.
In the Dodd–Frank Act stress tests, banks have to pass regulatory thresholds on four ratios each quarter of the stress scenario: a 4% Tier 1 Capital Ratio, a 8% Total Risk-based Capital Ratio, a 5% Tier 1 Common Capital Ratio, and a bank-specific7
3% or 4% Tier 1 Leverage Ratio.8 When a bank fails the test (obtains a capital ratio below the required threshold), the Federal Reserve can object to the bank's capital distribution plans. The Federal Reserve uses this authority to force banks to improve on some detected deficiencies due to the stress test.
2.4. EU stress tests
EU-wide stress tests were initiated by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in 2009 and 2010. The CEBS became the European Banking Authority (EBA) on January 1, 2011, which coordinated a new stress test the same year. In contrast to U.S. stress tests by the Federal Reserve, European stress tests are conducted in a bottom-up fashion: banks submit their stress test results to national supervisory authorities (NSAs) for review before NSAs submit to the EBA. For this reason, the EBA considers the EU-wide stress test exercise to be a microprudential stress test. These stress tests are, however, the outcome of a global macroeconomic scenario defined by the European Central Bank (ECB) and share the objective of an overall assessment of systemic risk in the EU financial system.
The European stress test disclosed in July 2011 was intended to serve as a confidence-building tool during the European sovereign debt crisis. However, the plans for banks failing the 5% Core Tier 1 capital ratio under the stress scenario were less clear compared to the announcement of the U.S. stress test in 2009. In March 2011, the EBA announced that it would be working with national authorities on remedial backstop measures for banks failing the stress scenario but never mentioned capital injections. Without appropriate recapitalization plans for the failing banks, regulators could not afford to make banks fail the test fearing an adverse reaction by markets on disclosure of the results. This lack of severity considerably undermined the credibility of the stress test9 and made it miss its goal of restoring confidence in the soundness of banks' balance sheets.
Evidence that the recapitalization needs of the European financial sector were not addressed with the stress test is EBA's launch in December 2011 of a separate recapitalization plan of the European financial sector called the “Capital exercise.” The Capital exercise is not a stress test but has been an additional tool to restore market confidence; it recommended creating an “exceptional and temporary capital buffer to address current market concerns over sovereign risk and other residual credit risk related to the current difficult market environment.” The estimated capital buffer of €115 billion (including €30 billion for Greek banks)10 was well above the €2:5 billion estimate of the stress test disclosed five months earlier.
6 See joint statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS, and the Federal Reserve, February 23, 2009 (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm).
7 “(…) 3% only for a BHC with a composite supervisory rating of “1” or that is subject to the Federal Reserve Board's market-risk rule.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2013a).
8 “The Tier 1 ratio is Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets; the total capital ratio is total regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 plus Tier 3) divided by risk-weighted assets; the leverage ratio is Tier 1 capital divided by average assets; and the Tier 1 common ratio is Tier 1 common capital (common equity minus Tier 1 deductions) divided by risk-weighted assets. All ratios are calculated using existing definitions of capital and risk-weighted assets. See 12 CFR part 225, Appendix A.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2011). The disclosed ratios are actual ratios before the stress scenario (actual), stressed ratios at the end of the stress scenario (projected) assuming all capital actions, and minimum ratios over the nine quarters of the stress scenario (min) assuming all capital actions or assuming no capital actions.
9 See Greenlaw et al. (2012) and “Europe stress tests undermined by indecision,” Financial Times, July 18, 2011. 10 Greek banks are treated separately in the EBA Capital exercise where their capital buffers are defined in order not to conflict with pre-agreed
arrangements under the EU/IMF program (European Banking Authority, 2011b).
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3. V-Lab stress test
3.1. An alternative to stress tests: V-Lab
In parallel to stress tests conducted by U.S. and European regulators, a team of researchers at New York University Stern School of Business developed an alternative methodology to measure the systemic risk of financial institutions purely based on publicly available information (Acharya et al., 2010, 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2011). An important innovation of this methodology is that systemic risk does not come from the unconditional failure of a bank, but more specifically from a bank's failure when the whole financial system is undercapitalized. If a bank fails in isolation, other financial firms will step in and take over its activities. However, in a period of aggregate stress where the whole financial sector is undercapitalized, financial firms cannot find the resources to take over other firms' activities; thus, failing banks impose negative externalities to the real economy.
In Acharya et al. (2012), the real systemic risk of a bank is defined as “the real social costs of a crisis per dollar of capital shortage � probability of a crisis � expected capital shortfall of the firm in a crisis,” where the last term is presented as a useful tool or a substitute for stress tests. Brownlees and Engle (2011) describe a method to derive the expected capital shortfall of a bank under the “V-Lab stress scenario” where the market equity index11 falls by 40% over six-month. This estimate of the capital shortfall of a bank (called SRISK) is a function of the size, the market leverage, and the stock return of the bank under the V-Lab stress scenario (called Long-Run Marginal Expected Shortfall or LRMES). The returns of the bank and the market index are estimated from a bivariate daily time series model, where volatilities are asymmetric GARCH processes and correlations follow a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model. The six-month returns of the bank and the market index are simulated many times based on the estimated dynamic volatilities and correlations, along with sampling from a joint distribution that allows for further dependence in the tails. LRMES is the average of the bank's returns across the simulation paths where the market index falls by 40% over a six-month time window.
Defining MV as today's market capitalization of a bank, LRMESnMV is the expected market cap loss that equity holders would face during the six-month crisis scenario described above. The capital shortfall of a bank i at time t (SRISKit) is then derived assuming that the book value of its debt (Dit) stays unchanged over the six-month scenario while its market cap falls by LRMESitnMVit:
SRISKit ¼ Et½kðDebtit þh þMVit þhÞ�MVit þhjRmt þh r �40%� ¼ kDebtit–ð1�kÞð1�LRMESitÞnMVit; ð1Þ
where k is the prudential capital ratio, and h is the scenario horizon (six months). The results of this methodology are available on the V-Lab website, where systemic risk rankings are updated weekly both globally and in the U.S.
V-Lab uses a prudential capital ratio k of 8% for U.S. banks and a milder k of 5.5% for European banks to account for the difference in market leverage due to different accounting standards in the two regions: EU banks report under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) whereas U.S. banks report under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAPs). Under U.S. GAAPs, banks are allowed to report their derivatives on a net basis. The netting of derivatives is most of the time not allowed under IFRS norms, leading to a substantial increase in the size of the balance sheet. Engle et al. (2014) indicate that the total assets of large U.S. banks would be between 40% and 60% larger under IFRS norms.
3.2. V-Lab vs. regulatory stress tests design
According to Borio et al. (2012), any stress test has four elements: the scenario, the risk exposures, the model, and the outcome. The scenario specifies the shocks that will be applied to bank data (risk exposures) using a specific model, and the resulting measures are the final outcome of the stress test.
3.2.1. Scenarios Stress test results are all conditional on the scenario definition. The scenarios of the Federal Reserve, the EBA and V-Lab
are different on several dimensions: they consider different factors, horizons, stress levels, and trajectories. The V-Lab scenario is the simplest one; it is a one-factor scenario featuring a 40% drop in equity prices over a six-month period. Other factors are considered endogenous to the market factor.
Stress tests scenarios are multi-factor scenarios and the principal challenge of the scenario design is coherence. The stresses applied on the multiple factors have to be consistent so that the joint outcome of the scenario is economically realistic. The challenge of coherence also grows as the number of factors increases. The 2009 U.S. stress test considered only three factors: real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and house prices. The 2012 U.S. stress scenario defined trajectories for 25 macroeconomic and financial factors, and additionally accounted for a global market shock on the six banks with the
11 The equity market index used to derive the LRMES is the S&P 500 when the bank is a U.S. bank, and the MSCI ACWI World ETF index when the bank is a European bank. Note that for European banks, the long run simulation is not yet implemented and LRMES is approximated by 1-exp(-18nMES), where MES is the expected daily return of the bank if the daily market return is less than �2%.
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largest trading activities. The number of factors in the European stress scenario developed by the ECB exceeds 70 factors. In addition, the ECB also considers a market stress scenario conditional on the macroeconomic scenario.
The V-Lab scenario horizon of six months is shorter than stress tests scenarios that typically last two years. The stress scenario of stress tests usually focuses on an adverse macroeconomic scenario defined as a deviation from a baseline scenario. U.S. stress scenarios tend to revert to a “normal” state of the world at the end of each scenario, unlike European stress scenarios that assume further deterioration of the economic situation the second year of the scenario. This is the reason why the Federal Reserve considers minimum ratios over the scenario horizon to determine which banks failed the stress test, while European stress tests consider ratios at the end of the stress scenario.
Relating to V-Lab's 40% equity market index decline over six months, the EBA stress scenario considers a fall of 10–20% in equity prices over two years. The 2012 U.S. stress scenario assumes a 50% drop in the Dow Jones total stock market index in the middle of the scenario (late 2012) but reverts to a higher level at the end of the scenario.
3.2.2. Data Stress tests conducted by U.S. and EU regulators use extended bank supervisory data. Bank holding companies in the U.S.
submit their data confidentially to the Federal Reserve using FR Y-14A forms. These forms contain detailed information on capital composition, loan and security portfolios, trading and counterparty exposures, and historical profit and loss (P&L) data. The reports additionally collect banks’ own projections of losses and revenues, as well as their estimates of exposure sensitivities to a set of risk factors specified by the Federal Reserve. In Europe, banks implement stress tests themselves and use their own data. The EBA encourages banks to use all the time series available on credit risk parameters and P&L figures for the application of the macro scenario.
Relating to EU and U.S. stress tests, V-Lab could be considered as a non-invasive stress test. V-Lab results are obtained from a reduced dataset of publicly available data including historical market prices, market capitalization, and leverage. Stress scenarios are generally applied to accounting data in supervisory stress tests, whereas V-Lab stress applies to the market value of equity. In that respect, V-Lab may be considered a mark-to-market stress test.
3.2.3. Strengths and weaknesses of V-Lab and regulatory stress tests The V-Lab stress test can be viewed as a non-invasive mark-to-market stress test. There are five key advantages and
limitations in using this approach relative to regulatory stress tests. First, market prices are believed to reflect market participants’ expectations on bank performance and are available in real time, allowing for real-time forward-looking measures of risk. Accounting data can only reflect past performance at reporting dates.
Second, a stress test based on market prices does not show anything on financial institutions that are not traded and they do not reveal information on the sources of weakness of financial institutions. Conversely, accounting data are available for a larger sample of banks and give important complementary information on the assets and liabilities composition of the bank.
Third, the consistency of stress test assessments across banks is challenged by the lack of uniformity of accounting data. Accounting rules are subject to different interpretations at the country and bank level. This is particularly challenging in the case of European stress tests, where large cross-border differences are observed by the EBA.
Fourth, a capital requirement based on market data would be difficult to implement in a regulatory context given the high volatility of market prices and its procyclicality, implying higher capital requirements in a downturn. The higher capital requirements in a credit crisis have the potential to worsen the crisis when banks cannot raise equity and have to sell more assets to restore their capital ratios. This observation makes SRISK only an adequate ex ante measure of the capital shortfall of a bank.
The last element that motivates the joint use of V-Lab and regulatory approaches to stress testing is linked to the scenario definition. A potential unintended consequence of applying a similar specific regulatory scenario and methodology repeatedly on banks is the risk of banks specializing at a particular stress scenario. Banks adjust their portfolios to appear less risky to one specific stress scenario, but this does not necessarily make them more robust to the next crisis (which could be very different from the stress test scenario). Comparing the stress test risk assessments to the V-Lab outcomes adds an additional discipline to stress testing as the V-Lab scenario (a 40% drop in a broad market index) encompasses a wider range of scenarios. By applying a one-factor scenario and a constant requirement rule in different states of the world, V-Lab is less subject to regulatory discretion. Its comparison with stress test outcomes highlights the role of discretionary rules in regulatory stress tests. It is therefore viewed as a macroprudential benchmark that regulators may be interested in using in the assessment of their own stress tests outcomes.
3.3. V-Lab vs. regulatory stress test risk measures
3.3.1. Concerns about Basel I and Basel II risk-weighted assets Risk-weighted assets (RWA) fall by 6.1% at the end of the U.S. stress scenario of 2012, while they increase by 14% under
the European stress scenario of 2011. Definitions of RWA are however not the same in U.S. and European stress tests; RWA are derived under Basel I in the U.S. (before 2013) and under Basel II in the EU. This leads to important differences in risk measures and stress test models. Risk weights are fixed for different asset categories under Basel I, whereas banks can use their own models to derive RWA under Basel II.
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Under Basel I, RWA are defined such that assets are assigned to four different asset categories with different static risk weights (0%, 20%, 50%, 100%). These four categories could be roughly described as exposures to sovereigns (0%), banks (20%), mortgages (50%), and corporates (100%). By definition, Basel I risk weights cannot reflect the risk evolution of different asset categories; they cannot reflect “the risk that risk will change” (Engle, 2009).
The problem of static risk weights is addressed in Basel II, where the risk weights of asset exposures can change over time according to banks' internal risk models. The capital requirement for credit risk in Basel II — the most important component of RWA — is defined in terms of exposures at default (EAD) and risk parameters. Risk parameters (probability of default and loss given default) are used to assign weights to each exposure. In the EBA 2011 stress test, the increase of RWA under the stress scenario comes from the credit risk component (around 80% of RWA); the changes are located in risk weights (stressed LGDs and PDs) since exposures are considered invariant under a static balance sheet assumption (the size of the balance sheet remains constant over the stress scenario). This is a major difference with the U.S. methodology, which assumes a dynamic evolution of the size of the balance sheet and fixed risk weights, even if credit rating migrations are allowed (assets can migrate to a higher risk-weight category under stress).12
Concerns on the robustness of Basel II risk weights were raised in Haldane (2012), given their degree of over- parametrization and the risk parameter estimates purely based on in-sample statistical fit over short historical samples. The use of banks' internal models to derive their risk parameters under the internal rating-based (IRB) approach of Basel II has also been criticized. First, Basel II was designed so that the use of banks' internal models would allow them to derive lower RWA in order to incentivize banks to update their risk management practices. LeLesle and Avramova (2012) indicate that this resulted in lower RWA under Basel II, and therefore lower capital charges than under Basel I, whereas the internal models did not necessarily imply lower risks. Second, concerns about the consistency of risk weights across banks are raised in Haldane (2012), LeLesle and Avramova (2012), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013a,b, European Banking Authority (2013), and Mariathasan and Merrouche (2013). The Basel Committee confirmed these concerns, indicating in their “Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme” (RCAP) that differences in risk weights (in the trading book) across banks reflect modeling choices and supervisory decisions rather than actual risk taking.13 Furthermore, Mariathasan and Merrouche (2013) attribute the decline in risk weights when banks switch to the IRB approach to strategic risk modeling, and that effect to be particularly important for weakly capitalized banks. Third, the internal models used to derive risk weights are completely opaque. Haldane (2012) indicates that risk weights are black boxes that investors do not understand or trust. These concerns have important implications for the European stress tests outcomes knowing that 59 of the 90 participating banks in the 2011 stress test are IRB banks (i.e., they use their own models to derive risk weights under the stress scenario).
We raise a further concern on Basel risk-weighted assets (both Basel I and Basel II definitions) as a measure of the overall bank risk. This concern comes from the observation that risk is not an additive concept. We show in Appendix C14 the weakness of Basel regulatory risk weights as an aggregate measure of bank risk where the bank is viewed as a portfolio of assets. The main observation is that the risk of a portfolio is always less than or equal to the sum of the risks of its components. The use of risk-weighted assets (derived in a bottom-up manner) ignores this portfolio feature of risk, thus there is no incentive from a regulatory perspective to diversify. The only case where this measure is appropriate is when all assets are perfectly correlated. Furthermore, we show that the bank's leverage is an inverse function of the risk weight of the optimal asset. If risk weights are not consistently estimated across asset classes, a bank will have the incentive to concentrate its holdings on the asset with the most underestimated risk weight. The underestimation of risk weights for an asset class can in turn lead to excessive leverage when there is no regulatory constraint on the leverage ratio. Consequently, banks will take excessive leverage if their risk weights are not adequately adjusted (i.e., remain static) to more severe economic conditions.
3.3.2. V-Lab risk weight Acharya et al. (2012) define the effective market risk weight to quasi-market assets corresponding to a SRISK of zero. In
this case, a bank is expected to be adequately capitalized to survive the V-Lab stress scenario. This constraint implies that its current market capitalization is above a fraction k of some “market risk-weighted” assets:
MV Z k
1�ð1�kÞLRMES MV þDebtð Þ: ð2Þ
Therefore, the V-Lab risk weight of the bank is
V � Lab risk weight ¼ ð1�ð1�kÞnLRMESÞ�1; ð3Þ and is comparable to the average regulatory risk weight of a bank defined by the ratio of its RWA to total assets. Banks whose market capitalization is predicted to shrink the most under the V-Lab scenario are the riskiest according to the V-Lab
12 The RWA methodology was however updated in the CCAR 2013 where the stressed RWA also included BHC's projections of a market risk component defined under the stricter Basel 2.5 market risk rule.
13 The RCAP of the banking book disclosed in July 2013 however indicates that three quarters of differences in banking book risk weights across banks are explained by differences in banks' exposures (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013a).
14 See the online supplementary materials at Elsevier’s website: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journalof-monetary-economics/.
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risk weight. This market-implied risk weight is calculated in a top-down manner at the level of the entire bank rather than bottom-up (i.e., asset by asset), as in the Basel risk-weighted approach.
4. Assessing the outcomes of macroprudential stress tests
Only three U.S. and two EU-wide macroprudential stress tests publicly disclosed a bank-level outcome of the stress test exercise: the SCAP 2009, the CCAR 2012, and the CCAR 2013 in the US; the CEBS 2010 and the EBA 2011 in the EU. These five macroprudential stress tests with bank level disclosure are the sample of stress tests we employ in this study.15
Stress tests usually disclose two types of performance measures: the projected losses of the bank under the stress scenario and its required capitalization (measured by a capital ratio or a capital shortfall estimate) once these losses are taken into account. These outcomes are summarized in Appendix A.
In the assessment of stress tests results, we consider a smaller sample of participating banks in stress tests that are also publicly traded and available in V-Lab. V-Lab reports the results of 18 of the 19 U.S. banks (all except Ally Financial Inc.) and close to 60% of the banks in European stress tests. We show the results of stress tests and V-Lab in Table 1.
Table 1 reveals the striking contrast in severity between stress tests and V-Lab results. The sum of projected market cap losses under V-Lab scenario are always more severe than stress test projected net losses. This contrast appears extreme in Europe where the sum of projected net losses is more than 10 times larger under the V-Lab scenario than the regulatory stress test in 2010 and almost 6 times larger in 2011. There is an important gap between the “Loss” and the “Net Loss” of European stress tests (difference between projected losses and projected revenues) due to the effect of projected revenues under the stress scenario. V-Lab losses appear closer to the amplitude of the “pure” losses of stress tests that do not include the stressed revenues. As a result, the disclosed capital shortfall estimates (based on risk-weighted assets) of European stress tests (resp. €0:2 billion in 2010 and €1:2 billion in 2011) appear extremely low compared to the corresponding SRISK (€796 billion and €886 billion), and reflect our discussion above concerning the different goals of European stress tests.
Although differences in the implied levels of required capitalization may arise from differences in the perceived costs and benefits of imposing higher or lower capital requirements, one would expect all effective stress tests to produce similar rankings across financial institutions at a point in time. As stress tests and V-Lab share the goal of identifying vulnerable banks in a period of stress, we try to understand how and why the rankings of banks’ performances diverge between these two exercises. The next sections consider the rankings of banks by their risk measures (Section 4.1) and required capitalization (Section 4.2). An analysis of the rank correlations of the projected losses of stress tests and the V-Lab losses is relegated to Appendix B.
4.1. Evaluating regulatory risk weights in stress tests
4.1.1. Stress tests vs. V-Lab risk weight As the V-Lab risk weight is conditional on a stress scenario, we compare it to the stressed average risk weights of stress
tests. In Fig. 1(a), we compare the projected Basel risk weight at the end of the 2011 EBA stress scenario with the V-Lab risk weight. These measures of risk have nothing in common; the rank correlation is negative (�0.238) and not significant at the 5% level. In the U.S., the V-Lab risk weight also appears uncorrelated with some approximation of the stressed risk weight of the 2009 stress test; the rank correlation is slightly negative (�0.011) and not significant at the 5% level.
Dexia and Crédit Agricole are among the riskiest banks according to the V-Lab risk weight and among the safest with the EBA risk weight; both banks have values above the 75% quantile of the V-Lab risk weight distribution and both appear below the 25% quantile of the EBA risk weight distribution. The EBA risk ranking is hard to rationalize given that three months after disclosure of the stress test, Dexia was the first bank to be bailed out in the context of the European sovereign crisis in October 2011. The bank was bailed out a second time in November 2012 and reported a net loss of €2:9 billion for 2012.16
Crédit Agricole also announced a net loss of €6:5 billion for 2012.17
Furthermore, we show in Fig. 1(b) that the rank correlation between stressed risk weights and stressed Tier 1 leverage ratios (the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets) in the 2011 European stress test is 0.62 and increases to 0.89 for the 15 largest banks. As a result, banks with low risk weights have the highest leverage. This illustrates well the perverse incentives created by risk weights and helps explain the portfolio decisions of many eurozone banks during the European sovereign debt crisis. Acharya and Steffen (2013) document that the increase of exposures to risky sovereign debt is partly explained by regulatory arbitrage; banks with higher risk weights increased their exposures to risky sovereign debt to reduce the cost of raising fresh capital, as these exposures have a zero capital requirement (zero-risk weight). To a large extent, it also helps explain the misguidance of stress tests about European banks risks. For example, Dexia was holding a portfolio of risky sovereign bonds of almost a third of its balance sheet, which were largely financed with short-term debt. Acharya and Steffen (2013) further show that this type of behavior was pervasive among eurozone banks. Therefore, the reliance on Basel
15 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2009, 2012, 2013b); European Banking Authority (2010, 2011a). 16 “Fresh Franco-Belgian bailout for Dexia,” Financial Times, November 8, 2012. “Dexia at “turning point” amid more losses,” Financial Times, February
21, 2013. 17 “Second year in red for Crédit Agricole,” Financial Times, February 20, 2013.
Table 1 V-Lab vs. stress tests: aggregate results. This table presents the aggregate outcome of the samples of common banks between V-Lab and regulatory stress tests. V-Lab output is available on the website vlab.stern.nyu.edu, under “NYU Stern Systemic Risk Rankings of U.S. Financials with Simulation” for U.S. banks (where k¼0.08 in Eq. (1)), and “NYU Stern Systemic Risk Rankings of World Financials without Simulation” for European banks (where k¼0.055 in Eq. (1)). V-Lab output (converted in euros for European banks) is downloaded on the last date before the scenario start date of each stress test exercise. V-Lab download date: 12/31/2008 (SCAP), 09/30/2011 (CCAR 2012), 09/28/2012 (CCAR 2013), 12/31/2009 (CEBS), 12/31/2010 (EBA), 09/30/2011 (EBA Capital exercise). V-Lab MV loss ¼ MVnLRMES, SRISK is the V-Lab's capital shortfall estimate defined in Eq. (1), V-Lab M�LVGRs is the ratio of market cap to quasi- market assets under V-Lab stress scenario (Eq. (5)). Stress tests ratios (T1CR for EBA and CCAR, T1R for CEBS) are cross-sectional averages at the end of the stress scenario in EU stress tests, and cross-sectional averages of min ratios over the stress scenario in U.S. stress tests (without the effect of BHCs planned capital actions). Stress tests losses are the sum of projected losses over the stress scenario and across banks. “Loss” (SCAP)¼Total Loss estimates, “Loss” (CCAR)¼Loan LossesþTrading and Counterparty LossesþRealized Losses on SecuritiesþOther Losses, “Loss” (CEBS and EBA)¼Impairment lossesþTrading losses.“Net Loss” (SCAP)¼max (0,Total Loss estimates�Resources Other Than Capital to Absorb Losses in the More Adverse Scenario), “Net Loss” (CCAR)¼max (0, �Projected Net Income before Taxes), “Net Loss” (CEBS)¼max (0, Loss�pre-impairment income after the adverse scenario), “Net Loss” (EBA)¼max (0, �Net profit after tax). In parentheses: number of banks failing the systemic risk criterion. In brackets: cross-sectional average ratio change with the stress scenario.
Sample Stress tests estimates V-Lab estimates
Shortfall Ratio Loss Net loss SRISK M�LVGRs MV loss
U.S. SCAP 2009 18 U.S. BHCs 63.1 $ bn (9) 590 $ bn 229 $ bn 674 $ bn (18) 2.39% 438 $ bn
[�4.82%] CCAR 2012 18 U.S. BHCs 7.55% (0) 529 $ bn 226 $ bn 669 $ bn (17) 3.54% 447 $ bn
[�3.34%] [�4.54%] CCAR 2013 17 U.S. BHCs 8.37% (0) 457 $ bn 197 $ bn 494 $ bn (14) 5.48% 525 $ bn
[�2.68%] [�5.36%] EU CEBS 2010 50 EU banks 0.2 EUR bn 8.98% (1) 425 EUR bn 39 EUR bn 796 EUR bn (48) 2.6% 399 EUR bn
[�1.38%] [�2.01%] EBA 2011 53 EU banks 1.2 EUR bn 7.98% (4) 381 EUR bn 70 EUR bn 886 EUR bn (51) 2.26% 402 EUR bn
[�1.02%] [�1.73%] EBA Capital 44 EU banks 72 EUR bn (22) 1061 EUR bn (42) 1.56% 336 EUR bn Exercise (excluding Greek banks) [�1.66%]
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static risk weights appears to have both misguided the recapitalization of the financial sector and incentivized the build up of risky sovereign debt exposures.
4.1.2. Forecasting risk during the European sovereign debt crisis Stress tests outcomes are estimates of bank performance conditional on a specific adverse macroeconomic scenario. As
such, stress test outcomes cannot be considered as forecasts. However, if the goal of a macro stress test is to make banks more robust to aggregate stress conditions, we would expect that stress test outcomes would identify the vulnerabilities of banks when there is aggregate stress. In other words, comparing stress test outcomes to realized outcomes in a crisis can help determine whether the stress test scenario was credible, as well as identify other deficiencies of the stress test that would prevent it from detecting the most obvious vulnerabilities of banks.
We compare the performance of the stress test risk weight and V-Lab risk weight to predict a realized measure of risk. Under Basel II definition, the risk weight of a particular asset class represents the unexpected loss (in percentage of exposure at default), that is not covered by provisions or revenues (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). This unexpected loss can be viewed as the difference between an extreme quantile of the loss distribution (the Value-at-Risk) and the expected loss of that particular asset; the regulatory risk weight is therefore a function of the volatility of the asset loss distribution. Based on this observation, we compare the different risk weight estimates to the ex-post six-month realized volatility defined by
RVi;t;W ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 1 W
∑ t þ1þW
t þ1 ðrit �rit;WÞ2
s ; ð4Þ
where W¼130 days (six months) and rit;W is the six-month forward average stock return of bank i at date t (the stress test's disclosure date). We focus on the EBA stress test disclosed on July 15, 2011 as it is the only stress test with bank-level disclosure followed by a global economic downturn. The realized returns in the last six months of 2011 of U.S. (S&P 500), European (EURO STOXX 50), and global (MSCI ACWI World) indices were �4.89%, �20.67%, and �13.47%, respectively. This outcome was less severe than the V-Lab scenario (40% decline in the World equity index) and is closer to the ECB scenario (15% decline in stock prices in the euro area).
High-risk banks would be expected to have highly volatile stock market returns in a realized crisis. Comparing the ranking of the six-month realized volatility of European banks' stock returns during this period to the ranking of EBA risk weights and V-Lab risk weights, we find a negative correlation (�0.140) with the EBA risk weight, whereas the correlation with the V-Lab risk weight (0.535) is positive and significant at the 1% level (in Table 2, Panel A). Similarly, Das and Sy (2012)
Fig. 1. Stress test risk weight vs. V-Lab risk weight and T1 leverage ratio. Projected regulatory risk weight at the end of the EBA 2011 stress scenario (horizontal axis) against V-Lab risk weight (a), and the projected Tier 1 leverage ratio at the end of the EBA 2011 stress scenario (b). V-Lab download date: 12/31/2010.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 45
find that risk-weighted assets cannot, in general, be used to predict market measures of risk. The absence of correlation between the stressed regulatory risk weights and the realized risk of banks during the European downturn shows furthermore that Basel risk weights were also misleading in the 2011 EBA stress test.
When comparing the risk measures against realized book measures we find that both the V-Lab risk weight and the EBA risk weights are negatively correlated to the future book performance of banks (measured by the net income divided by total assets, and the book equity return). The V-Lab risk weight does not seem to indicate the ranking of realized book performance in the wrong direction, in contrast to the regulatory risk weights when predicting realized market risk.
In Table 3, we show the estimates of different risk factors regressed on the realized volatility measure defined in (4). The effect of individual risk factors is reported in columns 2–4, where the impact of accounting-based vs. market-based risk measurement is accounted for by including the book-to-market ratio in each regression. In column 4, the EBA risk weight parameter is negative and not significant but becomes positive and significant at the 10% level when we control for the other
Table 2 Forecasting during the European sovereign debt crisis. This table presents the rank correlations of the EBA and V-Lab outcomes with the realized outcomes of banks after disclosure of the EBA stress test in July 2011 (p-values in parentheses). Panel A: rank correlations of the EBA stressed risk weight and V-Lab risk weight with the six-month realized volatility RVi;t;130 (Eq. (4)). Panel B: rank correlations of capital ratios with the 6-month realized return
(∑t þ131t þ1 lnðpit=pit �1Þ). EBA risk weight is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets at the end of the EBA stress scenario. V-Lab M�LVGRs is the ratio of market cap to quasi-market assets under V-Lab stress scenario (Eq. (5)). EBA T1CR is the ratio of Core Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets at the end of the EBA stress scenario. EBA T1LVGR is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets at the end of the EBA stress scenario. V-Lab output was downloaded before the disclosure date of the EBA stress test: 06/30/2011. Sample size: 15 (large), 38 (small), 53 (all).
Panel A: Rank correlations with 6-month realized volatility
Estimated risk measure Large Small All
V-Lab Risk weight (Eq. (3)) 0.554 0.561 0.535 (0.032) (0.000) (0.000)
EBA Risk weight, scenario end �0.111 �0.055 �0.140 (0.694) (0.742) (0.318)
Panel B: Rank correlations with 6-month realized return
Estimated capital ratio Large Small All
V-Lab M�LVGRs (Eq. (5)) 0.664 0.252 0.354 (0.007) (0.128) (0.014)
EBA T1CR, scenario end 0.518 0.224 0.293 (0.048) (0.176) (0.033)
EBA T1LVGR, scenario end 0.275 0.152 0.208 (0.321) (0.364) (0.136)
Table 3 Realized volatility regressions. Parameter estimates of cross-sectional regressions. Dependent variable: six-month realized volatility (Eq. (4)) after disclosure of the EBA stress test in July 2011. EBA T1LVGR is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets at the end of the EBA stress scenario; EBA risk weight is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets at the end of the EBA stress scenario. V-Lab download date: 06/30/2011. White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size: 53.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 4.39nn -0.12 6.34nn 5.34nn 1.70 0.12 (0.27) (1.82) (0.83) (0.88) (1.89) (1.90)
Book-to-market 0.03nn 0.03nn 0.03nn 0.03nn 0.03nn 0.04nn
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
V-Lab Risk weight (Eq. (3)) 2.50n 2.62nn 2.99nn
(0.96) (0.79) (0.78)
EBA T1LVGR, scenario end �39.99n �41.39n �62.44n (16.82) (19.02) (26.39)
EBA Risk weight, scenario end �1.75 3.56 (1.52) (2.08)
F-test 11.48nn 10.2nn 11.88nn 6.43nn 12.72nn 11.25nn
Adj. R2 (%) 16.78 26.14 29.50 17.28 40.34 44.10
n Statistical significance at the 5% level. nn Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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risk factors in column 6. This result suggests that regulatory risk weights add information on risk once we account for other more important risk factors like the V-Lab risk weight, and the Tier 1 leverage ratio. The improvement in terms of adjusted R2 is small (3.76%, columns 5 to 6), however, when the EBA risk weight is added to the regression.
4.2. Risk weights-based vs. leverage-based capital requirements
Regulatory ratios and shortfalls are expressed as a function of risk-weighted assets whereas V-Lab uses quasi-market assets. We consider in this section an alternative measure of the capital shortfall based on total assets.
Table 4 V-Lab vs. stress tests: rank correlations. This table presents the rank correlations of stress tests and V-Lab results. Panel A: rank correlations with V-Lab M�LVGRs, i.e., the ratio of market cap to quasi-market assets under the V-Lab stress scenario (Eq. (5)). Panel B: rank correlations with V-Lab's capital shortfall SRISK (Eq. (1)). T1CR is the Tier Common Capital Ratio (T1CR ¼ T1C=RWA); T1R is the Tier 1 capital Ratio (T1R ¼ T1=RWA); T1LVGR is the Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1LVGR ¼ T1=TotalAssets), where T1 is the Tier 1 capital, T1C is the Tier 1 Common (U.S.) or Core (EU) capital, and RWA are the risk-weighted assets. “min” stands for the minimum ratio over the nine quarters of the CCAR scenario or the minimum ratio over the two years of the 2011 EBA stress scenario, other ratios are ratios at the end of the stress scenario. Sample size: 18 (SCAP and CCAR 2012), 17 (CCAR 2013), 50 (CEBS), 53 (EBA), 44 (EBA Cap. Ex.).
Panel A: Rank correlations with V-Lab M-LVGRs
Stress tests projected ratios SCAP 2009 CCAR 2012 CCAR 2013 CEBS 2010 EBA 2011
T1R, scenario end 0.204 0.043 0.280n
T1CR, scenario end 0.242 0.282n
T1CRa, scenario end 0.453 0.546nn
T1LVGR, scenario end 0.576n 0.570nn
min T1CR 0.463 0.078 0.274n
min T1CRa 0.797nn 0.581n 0.530nn
min T1LVGR 0.684nn 0.561n 0.550nn
min T1LVGRa 0.846nn 0.877nn
Panel B: Rank correlations with V-Lab SRISK
Stress tests capital shortfalls SCAP 2009 CCAR 2012 CCAR 2013 CEBS 2010 EBA 2011 EBA Cap. Ex.
max(0, shortfall (RWA)) 0.507n �0.153 �0.273n 0.133 Shortfall (RWA) �0.791nn �0.790nn Shortfall (TA) 0.679nn
a indicates ratios based on stress tests results without the effect of capital actions and restructuring plans. V-Lab download date: 12/31/2008 (SCAP), 09/30/2011 (CCAR 2012), 09/28/2012 (CCAR 2013), 12/31/2009 (CEBS), 12/31/2010 (EBA), 09/30/2011 (EBA Capital exercise).
n Statistical significance at the 5% level. nn Statistical significance at the 1% level.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 47
4.2.1. Risk-based ratio, leverage ratio, and V-Lab ratio To facilitate the comparison with stress test ratios, we define the V-Lab market leverage ratio under stress (M�LVGRs) as
the ratio of market cap to quasi-market assets under the V-Lab stress scenario:
V � Lab M�LVGRs ¼ MVð1�LRMESÞ
MVð1�LRMESÞþDebt: ð5Þ
The rank correlations between this V-Lab ratio and the stress tests ratios are reported in Panel A of Table 4. For all stress tests, the correlations increase substantially when risk-weighted assets in stress tests ratios are replaced by total assets (defining a Tier 1 leverage ratio). The assessment of bank leverage using a Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1LVGR) defined as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total (un-weighted) assets is a recommendation of Basel III to supplement the risk-based regime (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Haldane (2012) shows that this ratio significantly predicts the failure of financial firms whereas the risk-based Core Tier 1 capital ratio (T1CR) does not. Our results show that this is also true in the context of macroprudential stress tests (i.e., that the stressed Tier 1 leverage ratio is more informative about banks’ risks than its risk-based counterpart).
The Tier 1 leverage ratio is one of the four ratios examined in Dodd–Frank Act stress tests. In 2012, two banks (Citigroup and MetLife) failed the leverage ratio under the stress scenario. In 2013, Goldman Sachs had the lowest stressed leverage ratio, followed by Morgan Stanley and J.P. Morgan; two banks (Ally Financial Inc. and American Express) failed to meet the recommended leverage ratio under stress when the effect of their original submissions of planned capital actions was considered. We build a Tier 1 leverage ratio for the European banks of the 2011 stress test and find that Deutsche Bank would have failed the stress test if the Basel III 3% leverage requirement had existed.
In Fig. 2, the correlation between the market leverage ratio under the V-Lab stress (M�LVGRs) and the stressed Tier 1 leverage ratios appears to be strong in the last U.S. and European stress tests (CCAR 2013 and EBA 2011). The rank correlation with the V-Lab ratio in Table 4 (Panel A) increases from 0.581 to 0.877 when risk-weighted assets, the denominator of capital ratios, are replaced by total assets in the CCAR 2013. We obtain similar results one year earlier (CCAR 2012), and in the European stress test of 2011.
Based on the assumption that the stress test outcomes should indicate the ranking of banks' financial performance during a period of stress, we compare different capital ratios in predicting the ranking of European banks by their realized stock returns during the six months following the disclosure of the 2011 EBA stress test (Table 2, Panel B). The correlations are not high as these are contingent predictions of stock market returns. If the market correctly anticipated the downturn, it should be nearly impossible to predict relative performance. The cross-sectional rank correlation for the V-Lab ratio is 0.335, for the Tier 1 leverage ratio, it is 0.208 and for the Core Tier 1 capital ratio it is 0.293. For this stress test, the weakness of financial institutions is somewhat better predicted when using the capital ratio relative to risk-weighted assets. The best measure in this case is the stressed leverage ratio from V-Lab.
Fig. 2. Stress tests Tier 1 leverage ratios vs. V-Lab market leverage ratio. The Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1LVGR) is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets. The V- Lab market leverage ratio (M�LVGRs) is the ratio of market cap to quasi-market assets under the V-Lab stress scenario (Eq. (5)). “Min” stands for the minimum ratio across the nine quarters of the U.S. stress scenario of 2013 (CCAR 2013). CCAR 2013 ratios do not consider the effect of planned capital actions and are disclosed in the Dodd–Frank Act stress test (DFAST 2013). EBA 2011 ratios are the projected ratios at the end of the stress scenario. (a) CCAR 2013 min T1 leverage ratio (without the effect of capital actions) vs. V-Lab market leverage ratio. V-Lab download date: 09/28/2012. (b) EBA 2011 stressed T1 leverage ratio vs. V-Lab market leverage ratio. V-Lab download date: 12/31/2010.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–5348
In Table 4 (Panel A), another source of difference between stress tests and V-Lab ratios comes from the information about capital plans that is included in stress tests outcomes but not in V-Lab. The impact of capital actions on ratios is negative in the CCAR since capital actions are capital distribution plans (submitted as part of the CCAR). Conversely, capital actions are capital raising plans in the SCAP and in European stress tests and have a positive impact on stress tests outcomes.18 For all stress tests, rank correlations with V-Lab measures increase when capital actions are ignored.
18 Capital actions in the CCAR 2012 include all proposed future capital distribution plans (issuance of capital instruments, dividends payments, and share repurchases) throughout the stress scenario. In the 2011 EBA, capital actions include issuance of common equity, government injections of capital, and conversion of lower-quality capital instruments into Core Tier 1 capital. The EBA additionally considers the effect of mandatory restructuring plans and the final outcomes only consider mandatory measures announced before disclosure. In the SCAP, the capital actions include the proposed capital actions
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 49
4.2.2. Stress tests capital shortfalls vs. SRISK: the European case In addition to the capital ratios, European stress tests also disclose capital shortfall estimates, defined by
Disclosed Capital Shortfall ¼ maxð0; ½k0nRWAS �CapitalS�Þ; ð6Þ
where k0 is the prudential capital ratio threshold used in the stress test (5% in the 2011 EBA), and RWAS and CapitalS are the risk-weighted assets and the capital level of a bank at the end of the stress scenario, respectively. This capital shortfall estimate is zero for most banks, reflecting our discussions above on the severity of the stress test (see Fig. 3(a)).
Most European banks actually end up with a capital excess at the end of the stress scenario when we remove the zero bound and derive the “absolute” capital shortfall (k0nRWAS �CapitalS). The rank correlation with SRISK (reported in Table 4, Panel B) is highly negative, significant, and is almost the same in the last two European stress tests (�0.791 in 2010 and �0.790 in 2011). Banks with the highest estimated capital shortfall in V-Lab are considered to be the safest and the most well capitalized in European stress tests. We show this result in Fig. 4(a) for the 2011 EBA stress test and obtain a similar pattern for the 2010 stress test.
Alternatively, we consider the capital shortfall estimates the EBA stress test would have produced if capital adequacy was measured by a simple leverage ratio. Fig. 4 shows how the rank correlation between SRISK and the capital shortfall of the 2011 EBA stress test rotates from highly negative (�0.790) to highly positive (0.679) when the EBA shortfall is written as a function of total assets (Fig. 4(b)) instead of risk-weighted assets (Fig. 4(a)). The leverage-based capital shortfall is given by
Capital ShortfallðTAÞ ¼ knTAS �CapitalS; ð7Þ
where k is the same prudential ratio used in V-Lab (5.5% for European banks) and TAS is the total assets of the bank at the end of the stress scenario. With this definition, the required capitalization of 53 EU banks would have increased from €1:2 billion to €390 billion.
The heterogeneity in size in the sample of European banks however plays a major role in this result. We may not want to completely remove the impact of the size19 from the analysis of capital shortfalls as size is a major factor contributing to the systemic importance of a bank. Size, by amplifying correlations, also shows how important discretionary rules on the final outcomes are. To attenuate the size effect, we also look at correlations on the subsamples of (very) large banks (with Core Tier 1 capital over €19 billion) and small banks. The 15 large banks include HSBC, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, etc. and are comparable to the 19 participating bank holding companies in the U.S. The negative correlation of the stress test risk-based capital shortfalls with SRISK is indeed very sensitive to size; the correlation decreases for small banks (�0.53 in the EBA 2011 stress test) and is not significant in the group of large banks. However, the rank correlation between the leverage-based stress test shortfalls (7) and SRISK remains high and significant at 1% in the small (0.634) and large bank (0.743) groups.
Five months after the disclosure of the stress tests results, the EBA disclosed alternative capital shortfall estimates in its Capital exercise in December 2011. The recommended capital buffer (the “overall shortfall”) is defined by
EBA overall shortfall ¼ maxð0; ½0:09nRWA�T1C�ÞþBuffSOV: ð8Þ
The overall shortfall is not the outcome of a stress test but is the result of three main drivers: the target 9% Core Tier 1 capital ratio (instead of 5%), the application of Basel 2.5 to derive risk-weighted assets (increasing the capital requirement for market risk), and an additional capital buffer (BuffSOV Z0) for eurozone sovereign debt exposures (one-third of the buffer).20 The rank correlation of SRISK with the EBA overall shortfall is positive (0.133) but not significant at 5%. The EBA corrected for the underestimated sovereign risk weights with the additional sovereign buffer but many top SRISK banks still end up with a capital shortfall of zero in the Capital exercise (see Fig. 3(b)).
Increasing the capital requirement rule (k0), as in the Capital exercise, has had a positive effect on rank correlations with V-Lab, although this correlation appears to only reflect the size of banks. If the capital requirement rule of the 2011 stress test (k0) in Eq. (6) had been increased from 5% to 9% of RWA, the correlation with SRISK would have been positive (0.418) and significant at the 1% level, although this result is not robust when controlling for size. More importantly, many banks like Dexia would still end up with an estimated capital excess with this definition, while having a positive capital shortfall with the leverage-based definition in Eq. (7). The strategy of increasing the capital requirement rule can indeed succeed at recapitalizing the financial sector (the required capitalization of 53 EU banks would have increased from €1:2 billion to €139 billion). It does not, however, solve the misallocation problem of capital shortfalls across banks due to the reliance on regulatory risk weights.
(footnote continued) and the effects of the results of the first quarter of 2009. The correlation between SRISK and the SCAP capital buffer also increases from 0.507 to 0.562 when capital actions are not included.
19 This is done in the analysis of ratios in Section 4.2.1. 20 European Banking Authority (2011b).
Fig. 3. EBA capital shortfalls vs. SRISK. (a) The capital shortfall estimates in the EBA stress test disclosed in July 2011 (Eq. (6)) vs. the capital shortfall estimates SRISK under V-Lab stress scenario (€ millions). V-Lab download date: 12/31/2010. (b) The “overall shortfall” estimates disclosed in the EBA Capital exercise in December 2011 (Eq. (8)) vs. the capital shortfall estimates SRISK under V-Lab stress scenario (€ millions). V-Lab download date: 09/30/2011.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–5350
5. Conclusion
Macroprudential stress tests conducted by U.S. and European regulators use the regulatory capital ratio — the ratio of equity capital to risk-weighted assets — as a measure of capital adequacy. Stress tests models translate an adverse macroeconomic scenario into asset losses on the balance sheet of banks. The resulting capital ratios are used by the regulator to determine which banks fail the test under the stress scenario and what supervisory or recapitalization actions should be undertaken to address this failure.
We compare the outcomes of these regulatory stress tests to an alternative approach to stress testing — the V-Lab stress test — that relies on publicly available market data. As the stress scenario is projected on the market capitalization of the bank, the V-Lab methodology could be viewed as a mark-to-market stress test.
Our comparisons reveal the following interesting results. First, the required capitalization in V-Lab stress test appears always to be larger than in regulatory stress tests, but this contrast appears to be extreme in Europe, reflecting the low number of banks failing the supervisory stress test (as the stress scenario was politically chosen to be weak). As regulatory
Fig. 4. EBA risk-based and leverage-based capital shortfalls vs. SRISK. (a) EBA 2011 stress test “absolute” risk-based capital shortfall/excess vs. capital shortfall estimate SRISK under V-Lab stress scenario (€ millions). V-Lab download date: 12/31/2010. (b) EBA 2011 stress test leverage-based shortfall (Eq. (7)) vs. SRISK (€ millions). V-Lab download date: 12/31/2010.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–53 51
stress tests and V-Lab share the goal of identifying vulnerable banks in a period of stress, the ranking of bank vulnerability in the scenarios should, however, be closely related even if the magnitude of the vulnerability is greater in the more severe V-Lab stress test.
We find that the average regulatory risk weight (the ratio of the bank's risk-weighted assets to total assets) of stress tests is uncorrelated with a market measure of asset risk implied by the V-Lab stress test (called V-Lab risk weight). In the 2011 European stress test, we show that the regulatory risk weights have no link with the realized risk of banks during the six months following the stress test disclosure. Risk weights tend to be informative only when we control for the V-Lab risk weight and the Tier 1 leverage ratio (ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets). Furthermore, Basel risk standards based on risk- weighted assets reduce the incentives for banks to diversify as they ignore the subadditivity feature of portfolio risk. As a result, banks have an incentive to concentrate their investments on low risk-weight assets, and the underestimation of risk weights automatically leads to excess leverage.
V. Acharya et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 65 (2014) 36–5352
Second, we consider an alternative definition of capital adequacy in stress tests based on the Tier 1 leverage ratio. When capital adequacy is a function of risk-weighted assets in regulatory stress tests, the ranking of financial institutions by capital shortfalls deviates considerably from the V-Lab ranking. However, rank correlations with the V-Lab stress test increase considerably when regulatory stress tests rely on total assets (i.e., consider a Tier 1 leverage ratio constraint) to indicate capital requirements.
Overall, the results indicate that stress tests would be more effective if capital requirements were measured differently from the current static risk-weighted approach. A capital requirement based on risk-weighted assets is not sufficient as regulatory risk weights do not reflect the “risk that risk will change.” To address this failure, we recommend that regulatory stress tests complement their assessment of bank and system risks by using leverage-based and market-based measures of risk. The paper therefore welcomes the new Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio, but the misguidance of the asset risk-return allocation is likely to be present in future stress tests as long as the reliance on static regulatory risk weights prevails under Basel III.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Deborah Lucas and participants at the November 2013 Carnegie Rochester Conference on Public Policy for helpful discussions. The authors would also like to thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (research, supervision), De Nederlandsche Bank, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Banque de France, Office of Financial Research, NYU Stern Finance, Luxembourg School of Finance, PRMIA, Risk Dynamics, Federal Reserve of Cleveland, Duisenberg School of Finance Central Bankers’ Conference, the Prudential Policy and Financial Stability team of the National Bank of Belgium, Katherine Waldock and Emil Siriwardane for helpful comments. The authors are grateful to supporters of the Volatility Institute of the Stern School at NYU for financial support that made this research possible. Thanks also go to the Sloan Foundation, the Banque de France, the University of New South Wales, the Université de Lausanne, Deutsche Bank, BlackRock, and the Michael Armellino Foundation.
Appendix. Supplementary materials
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco. 2014.04.014.
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- Testing macroprudential stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights
- Introduction
- Macroprudential stress tests
- Why do we need macroprudential stress tests?
- How capital requirements are measured in a stress test?
- US stress tests
- EU stress tests
- V-Lab stress test
- An alternative to stress tests: V-Lab
- V-Lab vs. regulatory stress tests design
- Scenarios
- Data
- Strengths and weaknesses of V-Lab and regulatory stress tests
- V-Lab vs. regulatory stress test risk measures
- Concerns about Basel I and Basel II risk-weighted assets
- V-Lab risk weight
- Assessing the outcomes of macroprudential stress tests
- Evaluating regulatory risk weights in stress tests
- Stress tests vs. V-Lab risk weight
- Forecasting risk during the European sovereign debt crisis
- Risk weights-based vs. leverage-based capital requirements
- Risk-based ratio, leverage ratio, and V-Lab ratio
- Stress tests capital shortfalls vs. SRISK: the European case
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
- Supplementary materials
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426612002038-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 3125–3132
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Systemic risk, macroprudential policy frameworks, monitoring financial systems and the evolution of capital adequacy
Bruce Arnold a, Claudio Borio b, Luci Ellis c, Fariborz Moshirian d,⇑ a Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Sydney, Australia b Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland c Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, Australia d Institute of Global Finance, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Available online 1 August 2012
JEL classifications: G15 G25
Keywords: Systemic risk Macroprudential polices Monitoring financial systems Capital adequacy
0378-4266/$ - see front matter � 2012 Elsevier B.V. A http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.023
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 2 93855859; fax: E-mail address: [email protected] (F. Mosh
a b s t r a c t
This paper analyses various issues that need to be tackled when promoting financial stability, reviewing the progress made in certain key areas and the remaining challenges. It explores the measurement of sys- temic risk and of individual institutions’ contribution to it. It discusses aspects of macroprudential frame- works, including how the countercyclical capital buffer envisaged in Basel III takes into account the properties of the financial cycle and the strengths and weaknesses of macro-stress tests. It analyses some of the challenges of how best to monitor financial systems and the broader economy in order to detect signs of vulnerability that might lead to future bouts of financial instability and of how to set prudential policy accordingly. And it discusses the evolution of capital adequacy standards and the new emphasis on liquidity standards in international regulation.
� 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction This paper begins with a discussion of systemic risk. It focuses
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of promoting financial stability through better regulation and super- vision of financial institutions. Key aspects of recent regulatory re- forms include measuring and regulating systemic risk, and designing macroprudential policies appropriately. This has been a focus of institutions such as the European Systemic Risk Board (in the EU) and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (in the US, as well as at the global level.
This paper comes at a time of significant policy reform, designed to respond to the increasingly interconnected nature of financial institutions and the lessons of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In recent years, the collapse of numerous financial institutions has imposed significant negative externalities on governments and the economy at large. This has increased the interest in mea- suring the riskiness of financial institutions and appropriately allo- cating risks (and costs) across them in order to account for the negative externalities associated with financial instability. Against this backdrop, there is a growing awareness of the need for a mac- roprudential approach to regulation and of a better management of the financial cycle. Systemic risk is of the essence here. The chal- lenges in implementing the resulting reforms should not be underestimated.
ll rights reserved.
+61 2 93854763. irian).
on concerns associated with systemically important institutions which, through their size and influence, might influence the stabil- ity of the financial system. It discusses recent advances in the mea- surement of systemic risk, the difficulties in implementing such measures across multiple, different markets, and the need to appropriately calibrate policies according to the risks posed by banks, so-called shadow banks, and other institutions across many jurisdictions.
The paper next situates financial institutions within the financial cycle, with an emphasis on macroprudential policies. It discusses the importance of the financial cycle within macroprudential frame- works and the usefulness (or otherwise) of macroprudential stress tests. Macroprudential factors can feed into the riskiness inherent in systemically important institutions, though of course institu- tion-specific factors such as risk appetite and business models mat- ter as well.
The following section discusses barriers that might arise in monitoring and regulating issues associated with systemic risk and macroprudential policies. The two main challenges are those associated with monitoring and analyzing risk, and those associated with practical policy making. The paper discusses the challenges in designing regulation appropriate to multiple jurisdic- tions, especially if these regulations are drawn too tightly in a rule- based fashion.
The paper goes onto analyze how understanding of adequate capital requirements has changed over time, thereby highlighting
3126 B. Arnold et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 3125–3132
one of the challenges involved in regulation: adapting to advances in financial markets and research. The paper focuses on the evolu- tion from the Basel I to the Basel III framework, the main lesson being that regulation must continually evolve in light of changes in our understanding of risk factors and in the risks that financial institutions face.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the recent developments on measuring systemic risk, including risks in large banks that could contribute to financial instability. Section 3 discusses the role of the financial cycle in shaping policy reforms. Section 4 highlights the difficulties in- volved in formulating policy and monitoring institutions, espe- cially in an international context. Section 5 reinforces the points raised in Section 4 by discussing how our understanding of risk and monitoring has changed over time. Section 6 concludes.
2. Systemic risk
Achieving macroeconomic stability requires the identification of systemic risk in the financial system and of the factors that are driving it. In his speech at the 13th conference of the ECB- CFS research network, Trichet (2010), President of the European Central Bank, defined systemic risk as financial instability ‘‘so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materi- ally’’. While there is no universally accepted definition, let alone an accepted measure to quantify this risk, there is a consensus that the regulatory and supervisory framework should have effective mechanisms to detect it and manage it.
1 Some other researchers (e.g. Liu and Staum (2010)) have also used interbank network for this purposes, albeit with complex linear programming techniques.
2.1. Measuring systemic risk
There are at least three major issues in the field of measuring systemic risk. The first issue is how to measure the drivers of sys- temic risk. Some recent studies have focused on individual mea- sures of systemic risk, which seek to predict how much the stocks of financial institutions fall in a major market downturn (the stress event). Acharya and Richardson (2009) and Acharya et al. (2010), and Acharya et al. (2012) lay the theoretical founda- tions of such an approach. In a downturn, financial institutions may fall short of capital, which can lead to a failure (and possible contagion) unless some other investor steps in. Governments usu- ally want to minimize the resulting cost to the taxpayer, which Acharya et al. (2012) show to be a function of size, leverage and expected equity losses during a crisis. While the first two compo- nents are easily available, econometric techniques may be neces- sary to predict the expected equity loss in a financial crisis. Acharya et al. (2012) propose a simple historical estimator. Brown- lees and Engle (2010) suggest a bivariate model of returns that uses asymmetric GARCH for volatility and an asymmetric DCC model for correlation. A third method eschews modeling the entire return process and only models the tail (as in De Jonghe (2010)).
These models have worked reasonably well in the United States, but might require enhancement for use in other markets. Brown- lees and Engle (2010) and Acharya et al. (2012) have shown that their signal worked well in predicting which US major banks would be severely affected in the 2007–2008 crisis. Their work is now being extended to other banks in Europe and in Asia. One of the challenges of researchers and institutions is to determine which, if any, of these signals about systemic risk in the US work in an international context over multiple crises while controlling for het- erogeneity in economic development, financial sector structure and regulations. For example, Griffin et al. (2010) show that stock prices in emerging markets may reflect less idiosyncratic informa- tion. Allen et al. (forthcoming) show that the structure of a
financial system (i.e. bank based versus market based) can influ- ence the time required to recover from an economic downturn, implying that financial-market-structure influences the nature of banking risk within a country. Thus, more research needs to be done to verify whether signals about systemic weakness in finan- cial firms are reliable from these markets.
Considerable work has been under way seeking to measure more precisely individual institutions’ contribution to overall sys- temic risk. Tarashev et al. (2010) propose the ‘Contribution Ap- proach’ (CA) method of attributing systemic risk to separate institutions. The model is based on Shapley values, a game-theo- retic concept initially applied to the measurement of the contribu- tion of an individual to the output of a group. The idea is to determine an institution’s incremental contribution to the overall level of systemic risk, and is general enough to apply to a wide variety of systemic risk measures (e.g., a system-wide Value at Risk or Expected Shortfall). Tarashev et al. (2010) highlight that key drivers of an institution’s contribution include its relative size, its probability of default, and its exposure to a common risk factor. They suggest that regulatory tools could be calibrated with respect to such contributions.
Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) build on the framework in Tarashev et al. (2010) to propose a ‘Generalized Contribution Ap- proach’ (GCA) to apportioning systemic risk, taking explicitly into account interbank networks, captured only implicitly through the exposures to common factors in the previous piece of work1 Specif- ically, Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) account for how a bank can propagate shocks throughout a system by assuming that if losses are large enough, counterparties will also fail along a kind of domino chain. Relatedly, Billio et al. (2012) propose ways to measure this interconnectedness, which could then feed into the analysis of risk-allocation.
Bisias et al. (2012) survey most of the issues related to systemic risk and analyze 31 quantitative measures of systemic risk. They discuss these issues from both a supervisory and a research per- spective. They also analyze the critical role of data in this process.
2.2. Banking crises and shadow banking
Another area of research that could be promoted is testing across multiple crises in different economic situations, because it is not always clear what triggers a financial crisis. In the theory on banking crises, several channels have been proposed including interconnectedness (Rochet and Tirole (1996)), liquidity spirals (Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009)) and macro-uncertainty (Chari and Jagannathan (1988)). Borio and Drehmann (2009) show that it is possible to create indicators, such as the increase in credit and asset prices that can help to detect the build-up of risk of fu- ture banking distress originating from a common source of pri- vate-sector excesses. In the recent crisis, US banks may have been affected because of large correlated holdings (Acharya and Richardson (2009) and Acharya et al. (2010)) but banks in the Euro-zone may have been impacted because of liquidity shortages (Diamond and Rajan (2005)), a combination of both or other fac- tors, as analyzed by Moshirian (2011). As research on systemic risk continues, one has to ensure that eventually the measures of sys- temic risk are robust to a variety of different channels that may have caused distress in financial institutions.
Furthermore, modern financial institutions have a complex net- work of contracts. During the 2007–2008 financial crisis, AIG, one of the largest insurance companies in the US, had to be rescued with $182.5 billion in loans. All the classic studies of financial
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crises, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b), have only focused on banks. However, future research should also advance the literature by considering systemic risk associated with major non-bank financial players: these institutions can also contribute to systemic risk but are often less regulated.
2.3. Non-bank activities, bank concentrations, and systemic risk
Another focus of financial market analysts and regulators in re- cent times has been the increasing reliance on non-interest income and non-deposit funding in banks. Demigurc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) empirically corroborate this change in the balance sheet and revenue sources of banks by examining 1334 banks in 101 countries leading up to the 2008 crisis. Anecdotal evidence in the recent financial crisis would suggest that banks with large invest- ment banking units (Citibank) or trading books generally were sig- nificantly affected in the recent crisis. This is backed up by financial theory, which has long shown the potential for moral hazard and increased likelihood of failure as a bank expands into other lines of business (Boyd et al. (1998).2 For example, Gennaioli et al. (2012) emphasize the risks that can arise in the presence of financial innovation in non-commercial bank activities. This is not to say that all investment banking operations in financial institutions are dam- aging, simply that an awareness of the potential risk associated with them is necessary.
Another important area of research has focused on whether competition in the banking sector should be increased, whether the size of large banks or the nature of their activities may have to be modified, and whether funding sources and activities should be regulated and corporate governance mechanisms altered. There is a need for more research to analyze how these factors influence systemic risk. There are conflicting views in the academic literature about how competition in the banking industry affects fragility. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that a more concentrated banking sector allows banks to charge higher interest rates, which raises the risk profile of borrowers and consequently their vulnerability to default. By contrast, Hellman et al. (2000) posit that a more con- centrated banking sector offers more stability: bank owners reduce risk because they want to earn monopoly profits and retain fran- chise value. Engle et al. (2012) investigate the relationship be- tween business activities chosen by large banks and the concentration of banks within a country. They find that banks in countries with low levels of concentration have higher levels of non-interest income. The non-interest income generating activities of these banks improved risk adjusted profitability before the 2007–2008 financial crisis, but caused a sharp decrease in profit- ability after the crisis. They find that non-interest income failed to provide diversification benefits for these banks during a finan- cial crisis because it was more exposed to systemic risk in this episode.
A closely related issue is that of ‘Systemically Important Banks’ (SIBs) and ‘Global Systemically Important Banks’ (G-SIBs). G-SIBs are banks that contribute a lot to systemic risk by virtue of their size, interconnectedness and/or other characteristics. A major con- cern is that the failure of a G-SIB can force a government to ‘bail out’ the institution, thereby imposing significant negative external- ities on the public. One approach is to draw on the research, such as that by Tarashev et al. (2010) and Drehmann and Tarashev (2011), to calibrate regulatory tools with respect to an institution’s marginal contribution to systemic risk. However, such an approach must necessarily work at a global level, requiring greater coordination amongst the institutions’ home countries. The capital
2 By contrast, Barth et al. (2004) find that countries that restrict the activities of banks are more prone to financial crisis.
surcharges adopted in Basel III seek to address these issues head- on.
3. The financial cycle: two lessons for macroprudential frameworks
Over the past two decades, the academic profession and policy- makers have had a ‘‘crash course’’ in financial crises. But it was the latest one, which broke out in 2007, that has done more than most to shape our understanding of financial instability. Not least, that crisis has dispelled the notion held in some quarters that financial crises with serious global financial and macroeconomic conse- quences could not occur in mature and highly sophisticated finan- cial systems. By striking at the very nerve-centers of the Western economy, it was bound to trigger a major rethink of analytical frameworks and policy.
The main analytical paradigm shift has been the rediscovery of the financial cycle as the factor that underlies severe financial cri- ses; that is, as the systematic factor hidden behind the myriad of idiosyncratic elements that tend to cloud our understanding of the processes involved. The main policy paradigm shift has been the strengthening of the macroprudential, or systemic, orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks; that is, the recognition that frameworks focused on seeking to ensure that individual insti- tutions are sound on a stand-alone basis, as prevailed in many jurisdictions, were flawed. It could miss the wood for the trees.
This section summarizes what we have learnt about the finan- cial cycle in recent years and derives two implications for macro- prudential policy frameworks. In doing so, it draws largely on BIS research.
Three takeaway messages are worth highlighting. First, when the focus in on banking crises, the financial cycle is best character- ized in terms of the behavior of private sector credit and property prices. Moreover, it is a medium-term phenomenon, with a dura- tion that extends well beyond traditional business cycles. Second, the countercyclical capital buffer envisaged in Basel III takes fully into account the properties of the financial cycle. Finally, contrary to what is often believed, macro-stress tests – a popular tool in the emerging macroprudential frameworks – are ill-suited as early warning devices, i.e. as tools to identify vulnerabilities during seemingly tranquil times. By contrast, if properly designed, they can be quite effective in crisis management and resolution.
3.1. Characterizing the financial cycle3
In what follows, the term ‘‘financial cycle’’ denotes those self- reinforcing fluctuations in perceptions and attitudes towards risk, financing constraints and asset prices that tend to amplify business fluctuations and that may lead to widespread financial distress and macroeconomic dislocations. These self-reinforcing fluctuations have also come to be known as the ‘‘procyclicality’’ of the financial system.
Empirical work suggests that the financial cycle, so defined, has five key properties.
First, the most parsimonious description of the financial cycle is in terms of the behavior of private-sector credit and property prices. Equity prices can be a distraction: they exhibit shorter cy- cles and tend to be more closely related to short-term fluctuations in GDP, which may leave the financial sector largely unscathed. This is most concretely illustrated by the experience of several countries in the 1987-early 1990s and in 2001–2008. In each case, the crash in equity prices and the accompanying slowdown in eco- nomic activity at the beginning of the period hardly made a dent in
3 This section draws, in particular, on Drehmann et al. (2012).
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the build-up of the financial cycle. Partly in response to the mone- tary easing that followed, the credit-to-GDP ratio and property prices continued to climb, only to collapse a few years further down the road, generating a financial crisis and a much larger drop in output. In fact, from a medium-term perspective, one could characterize the economic slowdowns that went hand-in-hand with the equity price crashes as ‘‘unfinished recessions’’.
Second, and generalizing the previous point, the financial cycle has a much lower frequency than the traditional business cycle. Since financial liberalization, the typical cycle length is of the order of 16–20 years. This compares with typical business cycle frequen- cies of up to 8 years. In other words, the financial cycle is a med- ium-term phenomenon.
Third, peaks in the financial cycle tend to coincide with episodes of financial distress. For example, in a sample of seven industrial countries4 examined in Drehmann et al. (2012), all post-financial liberalization financial cycle peaks are associated with either full- blown crises or serious financial strains.
Fourth, and conversely, few crises do not occur at such peaks. And these crises turn out to reflect exposures to financial cycles abroad. Obvious recent examples include the recent crises in Germany and Switzerland, in which banks incurred losses on their exposures to financial cycles rooted mainly in the United States and United Kingdom.
Fifth, it is possible to construct real-time indicators of banking crises that provide fairly reliable signals with quite a good lead – between 2 and 4 years, depending on the calibration (e.g., Borio and Drehmann (2009)). Not surprisingly, such indicators are based on (private-sector) credit-to-GDP and asset prices (especially prop- erty prices) jointly exceeding certain thresholds, which fall outside normal historical ranges. One can think of these indicators as prox- ies for the build-up of financial imbalances, and as tools that help policymakers distinguish sustainable from unsustainable booms. The indicators appear to perform also quite well out of sample.
Finally, the amplitude and length of the financial cycle are regime-dependent: they do not reflect by any means ‘‘natural con- stants’’. Arguably, three key factors support financial cycles: finan- cial liberalization, which weakens financing constraints; monetary policy frameworks focused on near-term inflation control, which can provide less resistance to the build-up of financial imbalances as long as inflation remains low and stable; and positive supply- side developments (e.g., the globalization of real economy), which provide fuel for the financial boom while at the same time putting downward pressure on inflation. It is not a coincidence, therefore, that financial cycles have doubled in length since financial liberal- ization in the early and mid-1980s and that they have been espe- cially virulent since the early 1990s.
3.2. Policy lesson: the countercyclical capital buffer5
The countercyclical capital buffer envisaged in Basel III takes fully on board the previous stylized facts (BCBS (2010a, 2010b), Caruana (2010)), The scheme is designed to build up buffers during the boom in the financial cycle and to draw them down as stress materializes. Its main goal is to protect banks from the bust of the cycle, thereby limiting the risk of banking crises. A collateral benefit is that it may also restrain the boom in the first place. How- ever, since capital is both cheap and plentiful during booms, this collateral benefit may prove to be elusive, at least for the typical size of the buffer contemplated in the scheme.
A constraint in the design of the scheme is that it should be sim- ple and easily understandable. Ideally, therefore, one would like to
4 The countries are Australia, Japan, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
5 This section draws, in particular, on Drehmann et al. (2011,2012).
have a single variable that could guide both the build-up and re- lease phases of the buffer. But is this really possible? The problem is that the best variable for the build-up phase would be the best leading indicator of banking distress. Policymakers and market participants should have sufficient time to build the system’s de- fenses. By contrast, the best variable for the release phase would be the best contemporaneous indicator of banking distress. The buffer should be usable as soon as strains emerge. But it is hard to imagine how the same variable could do both!
The design of the countercyclical buffer addresses this issue by distinguishing between the indicators for the two phases. For the build-up phase, the preferred reference guide described in the BCBS documents is the credit-to-GDP gap, i.e. the deviation of the ratio from a medium-term trend that is in fact consistent with the average length of the financial cycle noted above. For the re- lease phase, since it has not proved possible to identify any single variable that would work consistently across countries, the trigger is based on an evaluation that stress has materialized, which could be rely on variables such as credit spreads, and bank losses.
Two additional issues concerning the design of the buffer are especially important.
The first issue concerns the balance between rules and discre- tion. Ideally, rules are important as pre-commitment devices and to help the authorities resist the huge political economy pressures to refrain from taking restrictive action during booms. But the scheme is necessarily a simplification. Thus, for the build-up phase, the credit-to-GDP gap acts purely as a reference guide, as a starting point for a richer, far from mechanical assessment of the risks. The second issue concerns how to address cross-border exposures. There is an identification problem: what happens if losses are in- curred on exposures to financial cycles abroad? And there is a con- trol problem: how can national authorities offset the impact of international lending? This form of lending may take place directly from abroad or through domestic branches, which are often pri- marily under the jurisdiction of the home authorities, i.e. those where the headquarters of the transnational banks are located. Home authorities may have little incentive to take action because of a natural size asymmetry: typically, the exposures involved are small relative to the size of the transnational banks’ portfolios, but large relative to the host country’s financial system or GDP.
The scheme tackles these two problems head-on. To address the identification problem, the buffer is calculated in relation to the weighted average of the exposures of a bank to the various juris- dictions. For example, based on the credit-to-GDP gap indicator, German and Swiss banks with large exposures to the United States would have seen a significant increase in their capital buffer on those exposures ahead of the crisis. To address the control problem the scheme envisages cooperative (reciprocity) arrangements. It is the host authority that activates the buffer when signs of the build- up in risks emerge in its jurisdiction; and the home authorities can do more, but never less. All this implies a major shift in responsi- bility from home to host authorities. And it could work as a model of cross-border cooperation for a broader set of (macro-)prudential tools.
3.3. Policy lesson: macro-stress tests6
The nature of the financial cycle has important implications for what macro-stress tests can and cannot be expected to do. Given current technology, macro-stress tests are ill suited as early warn- ing devices. In fact, none flashed red ahead of the current crisis. That said, if properly designed, they can be quite effective as crisis
6 This section is based on Borio et al. (2012).
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management and resolution tools. The recent US experience prob- ably comes closest to the use of the tool in such a context.
There are basically two reasons why macro-stress tests are inef- fective as early warning devices: technical shortcomings and context.
The technical shortcomings relate to the fact that the current generation of models that underlie stress tests is unable to provide a realistic picture of the dynamics of financial distress. In particu- lar, the models and procedures cannot meaningfully capture the relevant non-linearities and feed-backs, both within the financial system and between the financial system and the macroeconomy. No matter how hard you shake the box, little falls out! This means that the action is shifted to the size of the ‘‘shocks’’, which end up being unreasonably large. More generally, the very structure of macro-stress tests in the antithesis of what financial instability is all about. The essence of financial instability is that normal-sized shocks cause the system to break down. An unstable financial sys- tem is a fragile system; it is not one that would break down only if hit by an extraordinarily large recession. The available empirical evidence strongly supports this point. Financial crises occur before output has contracted significantly and before asset prices (prop- erty) or credit growth have fallen significantly.
The context is what might be called the ‘‘paradox of financial instability’’: the system looks strongest precisely when it is most fragile. Credit growth and asset prices are unusually strong, lever- age measured at market prices artificially low, profits and asset quality especially healthy, risk premia and volatilities unusually low precisely when risk is highest. What looks like low risk is, in fact, a sign of aggressive risk-taking. In other words, if interpreted literally, these indicators show trouble far too late, only when the risk that has built up during the boom materializes. All this com- pounds the deficiencies in the models. Initial conditions look unusually good. And, psychologically, the context fuels the ‘‘this- time-is-different’’ syndrome (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a)), some- thing to which not even the authorities are immune.
The bottom line is that as early warning devices macro-stress tests are more likely to be part of the problem than of the solution. They risk lulling policymakers into a false sense of security. And they did so in spades ahead of the recent crisis.
For much the same reasons, macro-stress tests can do consider- ably better as crisis management and resolution tools. Now the deck is stacked in their favor, or at least not obviously against. The crisis has already erupted. As a result, vulnerabilities and non-linearities have revealed themselves, balance sheets are weak, banks are incurring losses or recording low profits, and hubris has given way to prudence. In addition, the shocks envisaged are not such unrealistic extrapolations of actual historical experience, as would be required to generate a severe crisis in a model for a juris- diction where no crisis has occurred for some time.
Macro-stress tests can then be helpful in identifying the need for additional capital to prevent unnecessary credit crunches and in sorting out strong from weak institutions to resolve them prop- erly. This can help to address the excess capacity in the industry generated during the preceding unsustainable boom.
That said, for macro-stress tests to work it is essential to design them correctly. This means having the will to shake the system hard. It means seeing them as complements, and never as substi- tutes, for a tough inspection of the value of banks’ assets. And it means having capital and liquidity backstops in place. These condi- tions are necessary to get meaningful results and to secure the credibility of the tests.
3.4. Summary
A better understanding of the financial cycle will help us devel- op better analytical models and better policies. Belatedly, progress
has been made. And, not uncharacteristically, policies have moved ahead of academic research: waiting was not an option. It is high time for research to catch up and move ahead of the curve (Borio (2011)). The field is there for the taking.
4. Challenges of monitoring and policy-making
This section considers the challenges associated both with mon- itoring financial systems and institutions and with constructing policy. Section 4.1 addresses the issue of monitoring. Section 4.2 considers challenges involved in policy-making.
4.1. Challenges of monitoring and analysis
When implementing this array of policy proposals, financial sta- bility policymakers have faced a number of practical challenges. First among these is how best to monitor financial systems and the broader economy to detect signs of vulnerabilities that might lead to future bouts of financial instability. Policymakers had argu- ably been held back in this regard because the canonical models used in mainstream macroeconomics in recent years have not been suitable guides for this work. The DSGE framework makes a number of micro-foundational assumptions that are singularly unhelpful in framing analysis in support of financial stability poli- cymaking. In particular, the default assumption of a representative agent makes it difficult to model the distributional issues that are so important when detecting vulnerabilities, and relaxing this assumption meaningfully can make the model intractable. The usual rationality assumption, of a particular definition of rational expectations where the agents have full information about the workings of the model, likewise tends to rule out crucial behaviors such as debt default and over-exuberance.
Instead, policymakers have looked to other parts of the litera- ture for guidance on alternative models that could help frame their monitoring and analysis. Three aspects of financial vulnerability have motivated a great deal of new research, as well as much of the post-crisis efforts to expand and enhance statistical collections (IMF, 2009).
� Leverage: As became clear during the crisis, the most leveraged banks and other players in the market are the most likely to become distressed. Some of the banks at the center of the crisis had increased their raw leverage significantly in the preceding years, often in ways that the Basel II risk-weighted capital adequacy rules would not detect. Work by Geanokoplos and his co-authors, among others, has emphasized the role of lever- age in creating and propagating distress amongst investors and holders of financial products. � Maturity transformation: Banks are in the business of transform-
ing maturity and taking on the attendant risks. In the years leading up to the crisis, however, a range of ‘shadow banks’ and market participants took on such risks without having either the capital or the access to central bank liquidity that have long been known to be necessary to avoid runs. Banks themselves also failed to allow for the possibility that funding markets could become disorderly, and some began to rely on repo markets and other very short-maturity funding. The role of liquidity and short-term funding has been emphasized in the work of Shin and his co-authors. � Interconnectedness: One good example of work in this area is the
rapidly developing financial stability literature that borrows from the theory of networks developed by researchers in other fields. The paper by Fukuda in this volume takes another view of interconnectedness, in this case between interbank money mar- kets located in different countries.
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Looking further back, four strands of older literature appear rel- evant for practical implementation of monitoring and policymak- ing to promote financial stability.7
The first is careful accounting of stock-flow imbalances in the style of Wynne Godley. This has been the backbone of traditional macro-financial analysis, focused on saving–investment behavior and its balance sheet counterparts, both of sectors and whole econ- omies. Analysis of the composition of household and business balance sheets, funding requirements of the financial sector and debt-servicing obligations all fall into this tradition, and are al- ready frequently seen in central banks’ financial stability reviews and similar publications.
The second older analytical tradition can be traced to the histor- icism of Kindleberger, and related to that, Minsky’s insight that sta- bility can breed future instability. The notion of a credit cycle, somehow separate from the business cycle, that builds up as risk-taking and asset prices rise, stems from Minsky’s work, although his taxonomy of borrowing phases is usually only implicit in more recent research. Policy-oriented analysis that belongs to this tradition includes monitoring of credit flows by purpose, with specific attention to debt-funded speculative asset purchases. Ana- lysts and policymakers in this tradition would need information on the fundamentals of different investment projects and asset mar- kets, to determine when ‘hedge’ finance has turned into the spec- ulative or Ponzi kind.
A third tradition focuses on governance, legal contract details and the scope for fraud. Galbraith (2009) has linked this perspective to the work of Galbraith senior; some others in this broad tradition include Akerlof and Stiglitz, including their work on default and asymmetric information. The paper by Aebi et al. (forthcoming) with its focus on governance, falls partly into this strand of re- search, as does much of the literature dissecting the specific failing in the US mortagage market in the lead-up to the housing bust there.
Aebi et al’s finding that corporate governance over risk manage- ment was the most important element of governance determining banks’ performance during the crisis points to the crucial role of risk appetite and risk-taking behavior as an indicator of vulnerabil- ities. Such a focus on behavior is another way of framing some of the boom-bust dynamics that form the basis of the Minsky–Kind- leberger tradition of literature; some more recent attempts to quantify risk-taking as a key dynamic and source of vulnerability in economic systems include Borio and Zhu (2008) and Altunbas et al. (2009). The paper by Klomp and de Haan in this volume sug- gests that prudential regulation and supervision does indeed affect risk-taking and thus the risk profile of banks, most significantly amongst the higher-risk banks.
Another signal of governance issues that might lead to vulnera- bilities and future financial disruption is rent-seeking. Rent-seek- ing is normally defined as using private information or other advantages to obtain a private gain, without adding any economic value. Such behavior thrives in complex, opaque markets or where there are long chains of agents between the ultimate principal and the underlying transaction; a perfect example of such an environ- ment is the structured finance market during the years leading up to the crisis. Rent-seeking is hard to quantify, but can often be identified through careful analysis of contract terms, and supervi- sory observation of market participants’ behavior and attitudes.
Two other, inter-related analytical perspectives in some senses bring the focus of attention back to the micro-level, on the behavior of individual agents, but without making the strong
7 The first three of these strands of literature were pointed out as being useful in Galbraith (2009). Several other authors (e.g. White, 2008) have emphasized the Minsky–Kindleberger tradition over alternatives.
assumptions of the mainstream DSGE literature. The first of these emphasizes the role of emergent behavior from the interaction of agents. Feedback effects pervade financial systems. These feedback effects include the effects of decisions by lenders or borrowers on their counterparties, by suppliers of credit on asset prices and thus owners of those assets (even when they are not customers of that lender), or by the creditors of a financial intermediary on that intermediaries’ borrowing customers in turn. In particular, lenders’ decisions can affect the economic situation of their borrower cus- tomers, which if it reaches a point of sufficient economic distress, can feed back onto the viability of those lenders. Examining the behavior of one institution in isolation, or of a representative agent, is therefore often not helpful in understanding or predicting out- comes at the level of the whole system, but neither is examining the system without considering interaction effects.
Since mainstream DSGE-type models become analytically intractable with multiple agent types, some researchers have turned instead to agent-based modeling (ABM): see Tesfatsion (2006) for a survey and Leijonhufvud (2006) for some reflections on the usefulness of this methodology in macroeconomics and financial stability analysis specifically. This strand of literature and techniques emphasizes emergent behavior the possibility of nonlinear phase transitions, for example between a ‘normal’ state and a distressed or ‘crisis’ state. An example of this nonlinearity might be seen in the extent of the collapse in world trade in late 2008, and slow subsequent recovery, compared with the faster recoveries from the shocks to trade arising from natural disasters in Japan and Thailand in 2011. Although it is not explicitly an ABM, the paper by Affinito (forthcoming) certainly puts relation- ships between different kinds of agents – in this case, banks and their customers – front and center.
The second strand of micro-level focus emphasizes less the interactions between the agents as the diversity amongst them. Losses on a segment of a leverage investor’s assets can lead to dis- tress and failure even while the ‘median’ asset performs well. Tra- ditional prudential stress-testing of every institution in an industry could be considered to fall into this stream of work, in a way that a stress-test based on macro-level variables does not. By examining results for individual banks or portfolios, supervisors and other policymakers can detect (cross-sectional) tail risk: vulnerabilities that are not apparent in macro-level data. Here some of the work of the actuarial profession may be brought to bear, particularly the parts of the risk-management literature focused on extreme va- lue theory (e.g., MacNeil et al. (2005) and other papers by these authors). While the mainstream finance literature has traditionally focused on pricing and thus the whole distribution of possible out- comes, the actuarial literature by definition has focused on ex- treme outcomes and model risk.
4.2. Challenges of practical policymaking
As analytical models improve, policymakers will increasingly face the question of whether and how they should respond if those models imply that risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system have risen. Possible responses range from issuing warnings – for example in financial stability reviews or speeches – to more expli- cit policy interventions such as controls on the property market. Normal prudential supervision clearly can be included in the set of possible interventions. Inappropriate mandates have con- strained supervisors in some countries from taking systemic issues into account – forcing them to take a purely ‘microprudential’ view as noted above. However, supervisors in at least several countries have shown a willingness to use the powers available to them in the interests of the stability of the whole system.
While some supervisors have long been successfully manipulat- ing microprudential tools for macroprudential reasons, designing
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macroprudential policy rules seems more problematic. In large part this is because of a lack of theoretical work that could be used to guide good practice. Policymakers find themselves relying on the experience of other countries, which might not be relevant to their own systems. There is very little theoretical or other compar- ative work on whether and where institutional differences can af- fect the optimal policy framework or setting for financial stability. In particular, there is nothing to suggest that ‘one size fits all’, and that there is one set of best practice that all countries should adopt.8
A further difficulty lies in the fact that the ultimate goals of the policy are still the usual macroeconomic ones of output and wel- fare. Financial stability matters because the lack of it imposes enor- mous costs to society through output losses and impaired economic functioning. Financial vulnerabilities, credit booms and asset price imbalances are intermediate targets, which only matter for policy because of what they imply for (future) output. In this sense, macroprudential policy targeting rules more closely resem- ble the monetary targeting regimes of the past than the more di- rect mapping of policy instrument to ultimate goal in modern inflation targeting. Attempts to specify macroprudential regimes and rules too tightly are therefore likely to result in the same issues of parameter instability that Goodhart’s (1984) Law implied for monetary targeting. All these considerations suggest that it would be imprudent to organize macroprudential policy around precise quantitative rules or targets.
9 (It should be noted however that there is one key difference between the minimum capital requirements and the minimum liquidity requirements. Banks are prohibited from operating if their capital falls below the minimum. However, the
5. Evolution of capital adequacy
Financial-sector regulation has been focused on the idea of cap- ital since the promulgation of the Basle Capital Accord (later reti- tled ‘‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards’’, and now referred to as Basel I). This focus has naturally shaped the research agenda over the last two decades. In turn, this research has given us insight into the workings of the financial cy- cle; sophisticated approaches to modeling a highly interconnected system of individual actors (an example of which is the work by Affinito (forthcoming)); and, at least in hindsight, how much capi- tal is actually required to cope with accumulated risk and unantic- ipated interaction effects.
We now seem to know a lot about capital and the banking sys- tem — so much so that we sometimes forget how little we knew 20 years ago. An introductory paragraph of Basel I noted the pur- pose of the accord, ‘‘to establish minimum levels of capital for inter- nationally active banks’’ (paragraph 7, emphasis in the original). So we knew that more capital was good (The inference was clear, though, that the then-current levels of capital might not have been good enough). We formed the consensus that capital requirements properly should be based on some measure of riskiness, rather than ‘‘the simpler gearing ratio approach’’ (paragraph 28).
What we learned in the next decade was that the original scope of the accord was too restrictive, and that the original methodology for quantifying risk was deficient. Basel I was supplemented by the 1996 Market Risk Amendment and superseded by Basel II: A Revised Framework, and so credit risk was joined by market risk, opera- tional risk, and a host of so-called Pillar-2 risks. Credit risk weights based on the obligor’s category type were replaced by weights based on the obligor’s creditworthiness. More importantly, Basel II opened the door to banks’ substituting their own models for assessing risk, developed and validated through their own
8 See for example the discussion of the EU takeover directive in Humphery-Jenner (2012b), the discussion of regulatory harmonization in Humphery-Jenner (2012a) and Weatherill (2012), and the discussion of banking risk and regulation in Klomp and de Haan (forthcoming).
empirical research efforts, but subject to independent supervisory evaluation.
From a research perspective, there is still work to be done in refining methodologies and quantifying risk, and in assessing the effectiveness of the various aspects of the capital-adequacy regime. Research of this kind is represented in studies such as Duan and Van Laereb (forthcoming) and Shi and Werkery (forthcoming). But if these are the issues that now concern regulators when cali- brating capital, just consider how far we have come from the start- ing point represented by Basel I.
The other area in which our knowledge has grown relates to the quality of capital. Due to ever greater creativity in the capital mar- kets, the number of capital (or capital-like) instruments prolifer- ated. As they did so, regulators felt compelled to make ever finer distinctions. The original simple split between core and supple- mental capital became more complex, with a third tier added and ‘‘innovative residual Tier 1 capital’’ and other non-intuitive categories somehow accommodated. Then the global financial cri- sis taught us that some capital is better than other capital, and lo Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. While Basel III is more complex than Basel I — as it needs to be, given the evolution of the capital market — the ‘‘going-concern/gone-concern’’ conceit represents a return to first principles.
In sum, we learned three lessons — more capital is good, the amount of capital should be commensurate with the relevant risks, and some capital is better than other capital — but it took us 20 years and a few false starts to do so.
In this light, consider the stablemate to the Basel III directive on capital: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, stan- dards and monitoring. In a phrase which echoes Basel I — even to the point of italicizing the same word — ‘‘the standards establish minimum levels of liquidity for internationally active banks’’ (par- agraph 6, emphasis in the original). What we know now about liquidity is what we knew two decades ago about capital: More is good.9
There are other parallels between Basel I-on-capital and Base- l III-on-liquidity. Like Basel I, the new accord on liquidity asserts that liquidity requirements properly should be based on a formal measure of liquidity risk. It will be interesting to see whether the Basel III metrics — the inflow and outflow rates and ASF and RSF factors — will someday be perceived as arbitrary, just as the Basel I risk weights are perceived today. And the new accord, like Basel I, distinguishes between good liquid assets and better liquid assets. It will also be interesting to see how well the classifications of Level 1 and Level 2 high-quality liquid assets hold up to the creativity of the capital markets. Research efforts like that underpinning the Klomp and de Haan (forthcoming) are a welcome start, so perhaps 20 years need not pass for our understanding of liquidity to catch up with our understanding of capital.
That said, the most important difference between our relative understandings is not in the details of the models or the fine print governing capital-market instruments. What has emerged over the past 20 years is an accepted narrative on capital, and in particular, of procyclicality. When times are good, our regulatory approach and supporting models allow credit to expand, but when times
buffer which the liquidity provisions create is intended to be used ‘‘in times of stress’’. (See the press release of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (the oversight body of the BCBS), http://www.bis.org/press/p120108.htm.) In this regard, the liquidity buffer is similar to the countercyclical capital buffer of the Basel III capital initiative. Like the capital buffer, though, the exact circumstances under which banks can use the liquidity buffer have not yet been specified).
3132 B. Arnold et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 3125–3132
are bad, the same mechanism causes credit to contract, with brutal consequences.
At present, the liquidity narrative has not yet been written. Twenty years ago, a policy initiative — regulating capital — sparked a generation of research. Today sees another policy initiative — regulating liquidity — once again opening up a fertile and as of yet largely unexplored field.
6. Conclusion
This paper has explored various issues that need to be tackled to promote greater financial stability – one of the great challenges of our time. It has highlighted that our understanding of financial instability has made considerable progress in several areas: in the measurement of systemic risk and of individual institutions contribution to it; in the properties of the financial cycle and pro- cyclicality; in the signals that point to the build-up of financial, at the level of both individual institutions and the system as a whole, and in the role that capital and liquidity play in making the system more resilient. To varying degrees, this progress is being translated into policy, as most clearly indicated by Basel III.
At the same time, there is still a lot we do not yet understand about systemic risk and about how best to design policy to address it. This will be a major challenge in the years ahead, for both researchers and policymakers.
Disclaimer
The views expressed by Bruce Arnold, Claudio Borio, Luci Ellis in this article are theirs and not necessarily those of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, the Bank for International Settle- ments and the Reserve Bank of Australia respectively. Fariborz Moshirian would like to acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council. He also would like to thank Mark Humphrey– Jenner for his editorial assistance and Sidharth Sahgal for his input on issues related to systemic risk.
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- Systemic risk, macroprudential policy frameworks, monitoring financial systems and the evolution of capital adequacy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Systemic risk
- 2.1 Measuring systemic risk
- 2.2 Banking crises and shadow banking
- 2.3 Non-bank activities, bank concentrations, and systemic risk
- 3 The financial cycle: two lessons for macroprudential frameworks
- 3.1 Characterizing the financial cycle3
- 3.2 Policy lesson: the countercyclical capital buffer5
- 3.3 Policy lesson: macro-stress tests6
- 3.4 Summary
- 4 Challenges of monitoring and policy-making
- 4.1 Challenges of monitoring and analysis
- 4.2 Challenges of practical policymaking
- 5 Evolution of capital adequacy
- 6 Conclusion
- Disclaimer
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426613002781-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Bank liquidity, the maturity ladder, and regulation
0378-4266/$ - see front matter � 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.008
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 20 5243539; fax: +31 20 5242526. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. de Haan), [email protected] (J.W.
van den End).
Leo de Haan ⇑, Jan Willem van den End De Nederlandsche Bank, Economics and Research Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 17 July 2012 Accepted 5 July 2013 Available online 12 July 2013
JEL classification: G21 G28 G32
Keywords: Banks Liquidity Regulation
We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Cover- age Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquid- ity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1 year.
� 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The crisis that plagues the financial system since 2007 is to some extent a liquidity crisis (Banque de France, 2008), caused by a collapse in confidence in the sustainability of the banks’ high leverage and maturity mismatches. Wholesale funding has almost completely dried up, in particular long-term funding, leading to an increase of the maturity mismatch. Banks responded to this by hoarding high-quality assets as a buffer against the maturity mis- match and rollover risks of short-term interbank borrowing (Ach- arya and Skeie, 2011).
To strengthen banks’ liquidity profiles, Basel III introduces the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The LCR prescribes that banks hold a sufficient level of high-quality assets against the net outflow of liquidity expected in stress conditions during a 30 days period. More specifically, a sufficiently high level of liquid assets should ensure that banks survive an acute stress scenario lasting for 1 month (BCBS, 2009).
Currently, it is foreseen that the LCR proposal will be imple- mented gradually between 2015 and 2019. So far, there is little empirical evidence on how banks have responded or will respond to such a LCR requirement. This raises the question of how the LCR relates to existing national supervisory liquidity rules, if any, and how the LCR relates to banks’ actual liquidity management. The
influence of liquidity regulation on bank behaviour may have wider consequences for the financial sector, financial markets and the real economy. Also from that perspective, insight into the interaction be- tween liquidity regulation and bank behaviour is useful.
This paper contributes to our understanding of how banks will react to the LCR by investigating banks’ actual liquidity management under the quantitative liquidity requirement that has been opera- tional in the Netherlands since 2003, which resembles the Basel III proposal. Under the Dutch liquidity regulation, a bank’s actual liquidity must exceed required liquidity, at horizons of both 1 week and 1 month. Actual liquidity is defined as the stock of liquid assets minus haircuts plus anticipated cash inflows weighted by the degree of liquidity. Required liquidity is defined as the anticipated calls on contingent liquidity lines, anticipated withdrawals of deposits, anticipated drying up of wholesale funding and derivative funding during a period of combined market and idiosyncratic stress. The Dutch liquidity requirement, the so-called Liquidity Balance (LB) rule, conceptually resembles the LCR under Basle III.
We examine banks’ liquidity management under the Dutch LB rule. Our sample contains 62 Dutch banks, taking account of nearly 99% of total assets of the Dutch banking sector, and our sample period is January 2004 to March 2010, after which the Dutch reg- ulatory system was changed.
Our contribution is the first to relate liquid asset holdings by banks to the full maturity ladder of future cash flows. The empiri- cal literature until now has not considered maturity transforma- tion as a determinant of banks’ liquid asset holdings. This seems striking as liquidity transformation, and the liquidity risk resulting
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3931
from it, is the primary reason for banks to hold liquid assets (Good- hart, 2008). To estimate our model, we use unique monthly data on liquid assets and liabilities and scheduled cash flows for maturities ranging from 1 month to beyond 1 year. In addition, we confront the estimated relationship with the relationships implied by Dutch and international liquidity rules, which link required liquid asset holdings to future cash flows for the coming month. Finally, we examine the effects of the crisis and bank characteristics, as well as their interaction, on liquidity management.
The paper is structured as follows. After a short literature re- view, we discuss the liquidity regulation that has been operative since 2003 in the Netherlands and compare the Dutch system with the proposed system under Basel III. Next, we present a model of banks’ liquidity management, according to which banks hold liquid assets as a buffer against maturity mismatch risk. After discussing the data, we estimate this model and subsequently examine how the estimated model relates to both Dutch regulation and regula- tion as proposed under Basel III. Then, we examine whether liquid- ity management was different before and during the crisis. Finally, we test how bank characteristics affect liquidity management, fol- lowed by the conclusion.
2. Literature review
Maturity mismatches are inherent to banks, owing to the trans- formation of liquid liabilities (e.g. deposits) into illiquid assets (e.g. long-term loans). This gives rise to market and funding liquidity risk, as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Market liquidity risk relates to the ability to convert assets into cash at a given price at short notice, while funding liquidity risk refers to the ability to raise cash to fund asset holdings. Rajan and Bird (2003) demon- strate that maturity transformation is inherent to banks and does not depend on implicit safety nets.
Aspachs et al. (2005) analyse the liquidity policy of 57 UK banks over the period 1985Q1 to 2003Q4 and find that the greater the po- tential support from the central bank in case of liquidity crises, the lower the liquidity buffer the banks hold (support is measured as the pseudo-probability of bail-out, based on the Fitch support rat- ing). Their result raises the issue that activation of the lender of last resort (LoLR) function encourages moral hazard. Mink (2011) argues that through facilitating maturity transformation, the lender of last resort gives banks an incentive to lever, diversify, and lower their lending standards. In the recent crisis, many banks, having insuffi- cient liquid assets as first line of defence, have become dependent on LoLR financing. Liquidity regulation aims to address this.
Bonner et al. (2013), using balance sheet data for 7000 banks from 24 OECD countries in 1998–2007, find that the main drivers of the observed variation in liquid reserves are banks’ business model and size, deposit holdings as well as the intensity of disclo- sure requirements.
Liquidity buffers also reduce the probability and severity of sys- temic liquidity stress. They can prevent negative externalities due to asset fire sales, deleveraging, liquidity hoarding and restriction of cred- it, which may arise if banks have liquidity problems. By this, liquidity buffers are complementary to capital buffers, in particular countercy- clical capital buffers as applied in Spain (Saurina, 2009). For that reason the social optimum for bank liquidity buffers usually lies higher than the private optimum (Acharya et al., 2009). However, in an extreme sit- uation characterised by dysfunctional markets and elevated levels of systemic risk, the liquidity requirement can become a binding con- straint that precipitates the undesirable externalities that the regu- lation seeks to mitigate (Van den End and Kruidhof, 2013).
Chadha and Corrado (2012), presenting a DSGE model where banks have an endogenous choice over holdings of liquid assets, show that the presence of incentives to increase liquid assets dur-
ing economic expansions and reduce such holdings during contrac- tions would be beneficial to the economy.
Schertler (2010), using quarterly data for 2000 German banks from 2000-III to 2008-IV, examines banks’ adjustment of securities holdings, loan repayments and long-term lending, respectively, in response to payment obligations in the coming month. She finds that most banks perform ‘asset-side accounting exchanges’ by reducing their new long-term loans when they need more liquid assets. Holl and Schertler’s (2009) model relates (changes in) liquid asset hold- ings of German savings banks to (sight) deposits and other short- term payment obligations, plus a number of controls. Using monthly data from July 2000 to December 2006, they find that German sav- ings banks hold more liquid assets than required by regulation espe- cially when they extend relatively few loans to non-banks.
Murta and Garcia (2010) estimate a model for excess reserve holdings for the aggregate of banks in the euro area, using daily data from April 2004 till December 2008. They use as explanatory variables: the spread (between Euribor and the minimum rate of MRO), the excess reserve holdings of the previous week, and a set of dummy variables capturing end-of-month and end-of-re- serve-maintenance-period effects as well as a crisis dummy. These authors find that precautionary liquidity buffers are motivated by financing costs and they do not find evidence that the crisis af- fected the demand for excess reserves.
It is quite striking that the empirical studies do not consider maturity transformation as a determinant of banks’ liquid asset holdings even though liquidity transformation, and the liquidity risk resulting from it, is the primary reason for banks to hold liquid assets (Goodhart, 2008). Maturity transformation is hard to mea- sure, however. Moreover, data on maturities of banks’ assets and liabilities is scarce. Deep and Schaefer (2004) proxy liquidity trans- formation by the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid as- sets as a percentage of total assets, which they call the liquidity transformation gap. Berger and Bouwman (2009), focusing on the extent to which banks transform illiquid assets into liquid liabili- ties, construct (four) liquidity creation measures, by classifying bank assets and liabilities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid, and weighting these together. Both studies do not use actual maturity data. To the best of our knowledge, the only study employing maturity data is Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), who show the development of the weighted average for the maturity of Italian bank assets and liabilities.
Our contribution is to estimate empirically a model relating li- quid asset holdings by banks to the full maturity ladder of future cash flows, using unique monthly data on maturity buckets ranging from 1 month to beyond 1 year. We confront the estimated empiri- cal relationship with the relationship implied by Dutch and interna- tional liquidity rules. Further, we examine the effects of the crisis and bank characteristics on banks’ liquidity management.
3. Liquidity regulation
3.1. Dutch regulation
In 2003, the Dutch banking regulator introduced a new quanti- tative liquidity supervisory system. According to this regulation, banks should have a so-called Liquidity Balance (LB) greater than or equal to zero at all times. The liquidity balance, LB, is defined as:
LB ¼ Available liquidity � Required liquidity
Required liquidity ð1Þ
where
Available liquidity ¼ Weighted stock of liquid assets þ Weighted cash inflow scheduled within the coming month ð2Þ
3932 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
and
Required liquidity ¼ Weighted stock of liquid liabilities þ Weighted cash outflow scheduled within the coming month ð3Þ
Hence, for the numerator of (1) we can write:
Weighted stock of liquid assets
� Weighted stock of liquid liabilities þ Weighted cash inflow scheduled within the coming month � Weighted cash outflow scheduled within the coming month
ð4Þ
The adjective ‘weighted’ refers to the fact that the items are weighted according to their liquidity and withdrawal rates. This will be explained below. First, we elucidate the nature of the items themselves. The stock of liquid assets consists of banks’ assets that can be turned into cash on short notice, such as liquid bonds and asset-backed securities. The stock of liquid liabilities consists of banks’ debt that can be called upon immediately, such as demand deposits without a fixed term. Cash inflows are receipts of pay- ments due within 1 month, for example, 1 month reverse repo transactions. Cash outflows scheduled within the coming month are payments that are due within 1 month, for example, 1-month time deposits.
Concerning the weightings applied, the regulator takes into ac- count both market and funding liquidity risks, by applying so- called regulatory weights on assets, liabilities, cash inflows and outflows. Liquid assets and cash inflows are weighted by their liquidity in times of stress. For example, asset-backed securities get a lower weight than high-quality bonds (or, stated differently, get a larger haircut). Thus, the regulator accounts for the risk that in case of financial stress, market liquidity may be so low that cer- tain assets can only be sold immediately at a loss. Liquid liabilities and cash outflows are also weighted to reflect the probability of withdrawal. In this way, the regulator accounts for differences in funding liquidity risk between, for example, retail deposits and wholesale deposits. The weights, dictated by the regulator, have been kept fixed during the sample period. The regulatory weights for all liquid assets, liabilities, and cash flows are given in Appendix A.1 To give some numerical examples: fixed-term savings deposits of households are weighted by a run-off rate of 20% and lower quality corporate bonds get a haircut of 20%. Banks know their liquidity po- sition vis-à-vis the regulatory requirements.
According to (4), LB can be written as a function of liquid assets, liabilities, cash flows and regulatory weights:
LBit ¼ X
j
aj � ASSET ijt � X
k
bk � LIABikt þ X
l
cM¼1l � INFLOW M¼1 ilt
� X
m
dM¼1m � OUTFLOW M¼1 imt ð5Þ
ASSETijt denotes j liquid asset items and LIABikt k liquid liability items for bank i at time t. Both are stock items without an agreed payment schedule. INFLOW M¼1ilt denotes l cash inflow items with maturities of 1 month and less and OUTFLOW M¼1imt m cash outflow items with maturities of 1 month and less (hence, suffix ‘M = 1’). Both are payments scheduled to take place within the coming month. aj; bk; cM¼1l ; d
M¼1 m are the respective regulatory weights,
which are constant over time. The regulator requires the banks to have a liquidity balance
greater than or equal to zero:
LBit P 0 ð6Þ
1 See Van den End and Tabbae (2012) for background information on these weights.
For our purposes, we rewrite the regulatory requirements in terms of the minimum required liquid asset holdings. To achieve this, we combine and rearrange Eqs. (5) and (6) and summarize over all j assets, k liabilities, l cash inflows and m cash outflows, to get the following expression for the minimum required holdings of liquid assets:
ARit ¼ b LB it Lit þ k
LB it I
M¼1 it þ l
LB it O
M¼1 it ð7Þ
where
ARit ¼ X
j
ASSET ijt; Lit ¼ X
k
LIABikt; Iit ¼ X
l
INFLOW M¼1ilt ;
Oit ¼ X
m
OUTFLOW M¼1imt ;
bLBit ¼ P
k bk � LIABiktP k LIABikt
�P j aj � ASSET ijtP
j ASSET ijt ; kLBit ¼
P l c
M¼1 l � INFLOW
M¼1 iltP
l INFLOW M¼1 ilt
,P j aj � ASSET ijtP
j ASSET ijt ;
lLBit ¼ P
j d M¼1 m � OUTFLOW
M¼1 imtP
mOUTFLOW M¼1 imt
,P j aj � ASSET ijtP
j ASSET ijt
(7) gives the minimum required liquid asset holdings ARit of bank i at time t, given the size and composition of liquid liabilities, cash in- flows and outflows up to 1 month, and given the regulatory weights. Coefficients bLBit ; k
LB it ; l
LB it are hypothetical, in that they relate
liquid liabilities, cash inflows and cash outflows to the stock of li- quid assets under the assumption that banks hold exactly the min- imum required levels of stock liquid assets at all times; no more, no less. In the remainder of this paper we will denote them as ‘regula- tory coefficients’. Note that these regulatory coefficients are ratios of weighted averages of the respective constant regulatory weights aj; bk; cM¼1l ; d
M¼1 m , with the relative shares of the different balance
sheet and cash flow items as weights. As the composition of balance sheet and cash flows may differ between banks and change over time, these regulatory coefficients vary over time t and across banks i as well.
3.2. Basel III
The new Basel III regulation foresees two ratios for monitoring bank liquidity: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Sta- ble Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR is defined as:
LCR ¼ Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Netcash outflows scheduled within 1 month ð8Þ
Using the same notation as for LB, the LCR can be written as:
LCRit ¼ P
j ej � ASSET ijtP k fk � LIABikt �
P mg
M¼1 l � INFLOW
M¼1 ilt þ
P m h
M¼1 m � OUTFLOW
M¼1 imt
ð9Þ
As mentioned in Section 3.1, LIABikt are stock items without an agreed payment schedule, such as demand deposits. By applying anticipated run-off rates fk to such items they are de facto trans- formed into cash outflows. The regulator requires the banks to have an LCR greater than or equal to 1 at all times:
LCRit P 1 ð10Þ
Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) and rearranging, we get the follow- ing expression for the minimum required holdings of liquid assets:
ARit ¼ b LCR it Lit þ k
LCR it I
M¼1 it þ l
LCR it O
M¼1 it ð11Þ
Thus, we now have two regulatory rules, (7) for Dutch regula- tion and (11) for Basel III, which are almost identical except for the coefficients (which are therefore equipped with suffixes ‘LB’ and ‘LCR’, respectively). This is because the regulatory weights
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3933
under the LCR may differ from those under the LB rule. For exam- ple, the composition of the stock of high-quality liquid assets is de- fined more narrowly under the LCR than under the LB (cf. the tables for LB and LCR, respectively, in Appendix A).
The 1 month horizon of the LCR (and the Dutch LB) is too short to cope with a prolonged liquidity crisis. This requires that banks match their maturity profile of assets and liabilities over the matu- rity ladder that goes beyond 1 month. This is taken into account in the NSFR, which establishes a minimum acceptable amount of sta- ble funding based on the liquidity characteristics of a bank’s assets and activities over a 1 year horizon.2 In the remainder of the paper, we focus on LCR and LB.
3.3. Dutch liquidity regulation in the euro area context
The Basel III framework – and its formalisation in European Directives – is a first attempt to create an international harmonised liquidity requirement. The Dutch supervisory liquidity require- ment has been a forerunner. The Dutch regulation dates from 2003, when the then existing system was revised to reflect the internationalization of the banking sector (the scope of the system was broadened to the consolidated group level) and the increased need to analyse short-term cash flows and off-balance-sheet items. The weights in the Dutch regulation that determine the actual and required liquidity of a bank are fixed values and reflect a mix of firm-specific and market wide considerations (DNB, 2003). They are based on best practices and values of haircuts on assets and run-off rates of liabilities typically used by the industry and rating agencies.
Liquidity requirements are intended as self-insurance for banks to liquidity shocks, next to the insurance provided by the interbank market. In the euro area interbank market, bank reserves that are originally provided by the Eurosystem of central banks through main and longer-term refinancing operations are reallocated. Dutch banks in particular have been dependent on this market gi- ven their domestic retail savings gap; in 2008 foreign counterpar- ties accounted for 80% of their interbank borrowing (Liedorp et al., 2010). Since the crisis the euro area interbank market has dried up and liquidity support by the central bank has become more impor- tant. The Eurosystem operates under a common monetary policy framework for regular refinancing operations conducted through open market transactions. Emergency liquidity assistance to illiq- uid but solvent banks is provided by national central banks which have some discretion on the modalities of this financing. While liquidity requirements are set by the supervisor, the central bank has a clear interest that liquidity buffers are a sufficient first line of defence against liquidity shocks to prevent banks to rely on the central bank too early.
4. Stock liquidity, maturity transformation, and the maturity ladder
Maturity transformation is risky, because it implies a maturity mismatch between the assets and the liabilities on the bank’s bal- ance sheet. This is the reason for a bank to hold a buffer stock of liquidity, i.e. high quality assets which can be sold or pledged immediately or at short notice.
In principle, the capacity for maturity transformation is greater when a bank holds a larger stock of liquid assets, since the funding pressure can be met by selling or pledging these assets. As Good- hart (2008, p. 43) states: ‘‘There is a trade-off between stock liquid-
2 For example, see López-Espinosa et al. (2012) whose findings that short-term wholesale funding emerges as the most relevant systemic factor support the Basel Committee’s proposal to introduce a net stable funding ratio.
ity and maturity transformation. What, perhaps, we need is a menu of relationships between stock liquidity and maturity transforma- tion, such as if maturity transformation is measured from 0 (no transformation) to infinite, and stock liquidity is measured as a percentage of assets (. . .)’’.
However, Goodhart (op. cit.) notes that there is an immediate problem: ‘‘this assumes that there is a single accepted scale of measurement, whether cardinal or ordinal, for both maturity transformation and stock liquidity, and this is not so.’’ He mentions that one way to look at maturity transformation is by means of maturity ladders, where one looks at the net cash flow positions of banks over differing horizons. He also sees some problems with this, though. To name one (Goodhart, op. cit.): ‘‘What does one do about retail deposits, demandable on sight but normally the most stable and reliable of all liabilities’’?
Yet, in the real world, banks do link their stock of liquid assets to maturity ladders. According to a survey conducted by the ECB (2002, p. 23–24), ‘‘some banks tie their cash flow limits to their stock of liquid assets, for example by imposing a minimum ratio between the two elements. Volume limits for individual maturity buckets are often interrelated: lower for short-term maturities and higher for long-term maturities.’’ This approach is also one of the several bank liquidity management techniques that are in use as discussed by Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic (2000, p. 167): ‘‘Liquid assets actually held can then be compared to the local currency value of the short-term mismatch in order to assess how much of the latter is in fact covered by a buffer stock of high- quality liquid assets.’’
The bank liquid assets management model of Baltensperger (1980), as expounded by Freixas and Rochet (2008, Section 8.2.1), illustrates the principle of the optimal liquid asset holdings for a bank. In this model, a bank allocates a given amount of deposits L between liquid assets A and illiquid credit C (see Balance sheet I in Fig. 1, panel A). The bank is subject to withdrawal risk of depos- its. The amount of withdrawals at the end of the period is a random variable eO. If deposits partly consist of time deposits with a matu- rity of one period, cash outflow eO may also consist of time deposits not being rolled over.
We can bring credit C to the right hand side of the balance sheet, and denote (L–C) ‘net liabilities’ (Balance sheet II in Fig. 1, panel B). If we assume that loans are scheduled to be repaid at the end of the period, we get the anticipated cash infloweI. Net cash flow is defined as cash inflow minus cash outflow: eZ ¼eI � eO, which is also random. The bank has an estimated density function of the cash flow fðeZÞ.
There is a liquidity shortfall if the realization Z of eZ exceeds the beginning-of-period level of liquid assets A. Such a shortfall makes certain costly adjustments necessary for the bank, such as emer- gency borrowing or selling of loans. These costs are assumed to be proportional to the size of the liquidity shortfall rp(Z � A), where rp is the ‘penalty rate’. The penalty rate will presumably also reflect the cost and ease of the liquidity provision from both the central bank and the interbank market.
Then, the expected cost of a liquidity shortfall is R L�C
A rpðZ � AÞ fðZÞdZ. The rate of return on credit (net of all costs including administration and information costs) rC is assumed to be higher than the interest rate r received on liquid assets. Then, the oppor- tunity cost of holding liquid assets is (rC � r)A.
Differentiating the cost of a liquidity shortfall with respect to li- quid asset holdings A yields �rp
RL�C A fðZÞdZ < 0. The optimal quan-
tity of liquid asset holdings for a bank will equate the marginal opportunity cost of liquid asset holdings, (rC � r), to their marginal ‘return’, i.e. the marginal reduction of the cost of a liquidity short- fall rp
RL�C A fðZÞdZ.
This is a general rule that is used widely. For instance, Chadha and Corrado (2012) apply the rule in their macroeconomic DSGE model, where the deviation of reserve requirements from
Fig. 1. Stylized bank balance sheet.
3934 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
steady-state is equal to the ratio of the cost of a liquidity shortfall to the opportunity cost of holding further deposits.
If we assume that loans are scheduled to be repaid at future dates t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t + n, we get a series of anticipated cash in- flows eI tþ1;eI tþ2; . . . ;eI tþn . Against these inflows are outflows resulting from deposit withdrawals eOtþ1; eOtþ2; . . . ; eOtþn. Together these fu- ture incoming and outgoing outflows make a maturity ladder of net cash flows eZ tþ1; eZ tþ2; . . . ; eZ tþn (Balance sheet III in Fig. 1, panel C).
According to Goodhart (2008), banks look at the maturity lad- der of future net cash flows when deciding on the amount of liquid assets to hold in the current period. Hence:
At ¼ fðeZ tþ1; eZ tþ2; . . . ; eZ tþnÞ ð12Þ In terms of the liquidity management model presented above,
the functional relationship between liquid asset holdings and fu- ture net cash flows f(.) reflects the probabilities and costs of future liquidity shortages relative to the opportunity cost of holding li- quid assets.
Following the above line of reasoning, we postulate the follow- ing benchmark model for the actual liquid asset holdings by banks:
Ait ¼ bi Lit þ X5 s¼1
dM¼si ðI M¼s it � O
M¼s it Þþ ai ð13Þ
where Ait is the stock of liquid assets of bank i at time t, I M¼s it the
scheduled future cash inflow with maturity s, and OM¼sit the sched- uled future cash outflow with maturity s, for bank i at time t. Hence, ðIM¼sit � O
M¼s it Þ stands for the scheduled future net cash flow with
maturity s. Maturity s in our model has five values for each of the five maturity buckets that are defined in the Dutch liquidity report:
M = 1: 1 month or less M = 2: Between 1 month and 3 months M = 3: Between 3 and 6 months M = 4: Between 6 and 12 months M = 5: Longer than 1 year
For example, ðIM¼1it � O M¼1 it Þ is the net cash flow scheduled to
take place within the coming month. Lit is the stock of liquid lia- bilities (such as demand deposits), the balance sheet item Good- hart (2008) did not know how to deal with. As it is demandable on sight and has no fixed maturity, it cannot be categorized into one of the maturity buckets. bi; d
M¼s i are bank-specific parameters,
incorporating the probabilities and costs of future liquidity short- ages relative to the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets; ai is a bank-specific intercept. Because we expect a bank to be willing to hold more liquid assets the more obligations it has, we assume bi P 0; d
M¼s i 6 0. As liquidity management may differ across banks
or bank groups, all parameters have suffix i. Parameters bi; d M¼s i
reflect the uncertainty with respect to the realization of the scheduled future cash flows. For example, if a bank considers the risk that deposits will be withdrawn and that future net cash outflows will turn out to be greater than anticipated to be rela- tively high, while the cost of liquidity shortages are likely to be substantial, it will probably choose greater values for bi and dM¼si (in absolute terms).
We also postulate two alternative specifications. In the first, we split net cash flows up to 1 month (M = 1) into cash in- flows and cash outflows. The reason to do this is that, as we have seen in Section 3, both under Dutch and Basel III liquidity regula- tions, future cash inflows and outflows with maturities within 1 month are treated separately. Hence, we write for the second model:
Ait ¼ bi Lit þ kiI M¼1 it þ liO
M¼1 it þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼si ðI M¼s it � O
M¼s it Þþ ai ð14Þ
where ki 6 0; li P 0. In the third model, we exclude net cash flows with maturities
longer than 1 month and drop the constant ai. In this way, we ob- tain a full analogy with the regulatory specifications (7) and (11), respectively:
Ait ¼ bi Lit þ kiI M¼1 it þ liO
M¼1 it ð15Þ
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3935
Note that Eq. (15) deals with actual liquid asset holdings, Ait, whereas (7) and (11) are equations for the minimum required liquid asset holdings, ARit . Hence, the coefficients in (15) do not have suffixes ‘LB’ or ‘LCR’ as they reflect liquidity management, not regulation.
Before we estimate these alternative models, we first discuss the data.
Fig. 2. Stock liquidity and scheduled future cash flows, aggregated over all banks (all series are fractions of total assets).
5. Data
We use monthly consolidated data on liquid assets, liabilities, cash inflows and outflows of Dutch banks over the period January 2004 to March 2010, the last month in which the Dutch regulatory system was left unchanged. This period encompasses both the pre- crisis and the crisis period. Our variables of interest are summa- rized and defined in Appendix B. All balance sheet variables have been scaled by total assets, to remove any trends.
The data source is De Nederlandsche Bank’s (DNB) prudential liquidity report (DNB, 2003). This data source contains end-of- month data on liquid assets, liabilities and cash flows for all Dutch banks (including branches and foreign branches) under supervision, with a detailed breakdown per balance sheet item. These data are unique for two reasons. First, there is information on the maturities of the expected cash inflows and outflows in case there is an under- lying payment schedule. The maturity buckets are as defined in Sec- tion 4: (1) 1 month or less, (2) between 1 month and 3 months, (3) between 3 and 6 months, (4) between 6 and 12 months, and (5) longer than 1 year. Second, there is detailed information on the reg- ulatory weights of all asset, liability and cash flow items.
Not every item is reported by every bank, since some banks do not have exposures in all categories. Also, the data is highly unbal- anced. For that reason, we use data of 62 banks out of a total of 107, for which data is mostly available for the whole sample period. Our sample of 62 banks accounts for 99% of total assets of all banks and consists of four types of banks. First, there is the ‘top-5’ group con- sisting of the five largest Dutch banks: ABN Amro, ING, Fortis, Rabo and SNS.3 These five banks take account of 85% of the Dutch banking sector’s total assets. The second group of 19 ‘other Dutch banks’ comprises a diverse group of medium-sized institutions. The rest of the sample consists of foreign banks: 19 ‘foreign subsidiaries’ form the third group, and 19 ‘foreign branches’ make up the fourth group. Foreign branches can rely on their mother bank for liquidity support and may therefore show very different behaviour. For instance, they may have less need for self-insurance by holding liquid asset buffers, since in stressed markets they can resort to liquidity lines provided by the mother bank (Heijmans, 2012).
Fig. 2 shows, for the aggregate of our sample, liquid assets, lia- bilities and future cash flows. Panel A shows the stocks of liquid as- sets and liabilities. The stock of liquid assets comprises mostly bonds, including asset-backed securities, eligible as collateral at the central bank. The stock of liquid liabilities comprises mostly (retail and wholesale) demand deposits without a fixed term. As it is demandable on sight and has no fixed maturity, it cannot be categorized into one of the maturity buckets. Therefore, we con- sider it to be stock liquidity on the liability side. An option could be to subtract the stock of liquid liabilities from the stock of liquid assets, so that a sort of ‘net stock liquidity position’ is obtained. However, we prefer to consider the stocks of liquidity assets and liabilities separately in our analysis, as this is also done by the reg- ulator who distinguishes between market liquidity and withdrawal risks. Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the cash inflows and cash outflows scheduled for the coming month, as well as their difference: the net cash flows for the coming month. Panel C of Fig. 2 shows the
3 In 2008, Fortis was merged into ABN-Amro and ceased to exist as a separate bank in the Netherlands.
net cash flow positions for maturities longer than 1 month: be- tween 1 and 3 months, 3 and 6 months, 6 and 12 months, and long- er than 1 year, respectively. Net cash flows for maturities until 1 year are mostly negative (however, note that this is for the aggre- gate of our sample of 62 banks), while the maturity bucket beyond 1 year is positive. This asymmetric distribution over short-term and long-term maturity buckets reflects banks’ maturity transfor- mation (funding short-term, lending long-term, implying that repayments, i.e. cash inflows, are received over a longer horizon). Negative mismatches appear to be greatest for maturities until 1 month and between 1 and 3 months.
Fig. 3 shows the Liquidity Balance (LB), aggregated for our sam- ple of Dutch banks. For all banks and bank types, there was a sur- plus during the whole sample period. The surplus of all banks taken together declined from 0.15 in 2004 to 0.06 in 2007 after which it increased until mid-2009, levelling off around the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. The liquidity surplus of the group of other Dutch banks is much higher and more volatile. This also holds for foreign subsidiaries. Foreign branches take a position in the middle (both are subject to the DNB liquidity regulation).
Fig. 4 shows the Dutch regulatory minimum required stock of liquid assets, AR, aggregated for our sample of 62 Dutch banks,
Fig. 3. Liquidity Balance, aggregated by bank type.
Fig. 4. Stock of liquid assets, aggregated over all banks (all series are fractions of total assets).
3936 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
and scaled by total assets. This ratio has been calculated using Eq. (7). We also include actual liquidity holdings into this figure, which is identical to the series depicted in the top panel of Fig. 2. The difference between the minimum required and actual liquidity holdings is also shown in the figure.4 It shows how banks managed to fulfil the regulatory liquidity requirements during the crisis that hit in the fall of 2007. Actual liquidity dropped during the first part of the crisis (August 2007–February 2009), but recov- ered after that. Required liquidity also dropped during the first part of the crisis, but even more quickly than actual liquidity, and more- over stayed at this lower level thereafter. The drop of required liquidity relates to the decline of short-term wholesale and repo funding. As a result, the difference between actual and required liquidity improved during the crisis. The sharp decrease in required stock liquidity was mostly obtained by a cut in wholesale lending and a flight into more liquid assets (De Haan and Van den End, forthcoming).5
Panel A of Table 1 presents the medians and standard deviations of the variables used in models (13)–(15). The median stock of li- quid assets is of similar magnitude for the different bank types: around 0.2–0.3 of total assets. The median stock of liquid liabilities
4 Its shape is similar to but different from that of the liquidity balance as shown in Fig. 3. The difference in shape has two reasons: (1) Scaling: Fig. 3 shows ratios of required liquidity, while Fig. 4 shows ratios of total assets; (2) Regulatory weighting of assets: Fig. 3 is after regulatory weighting, Fig. 4 before regulatory weighting.
5 For the German stock market, Rösch and Kaserer (2013) find evidence also corroborating the flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity hypothesis during times of crisis.
is around 0.4 for all banks except for the group of other Dutch banks (0.3). Standard deviations are relatively large for both liquid assets and liabilities. Median cash inflows and outflows scheduled within the coming month are larger for the top-5 banks than for the ‘other Dutch banks’. Median net cash flows for maturities be- yond 1 month are around zero, except for the maturity beyond 1 year, which is positive especially for the top-5 banks and the cat- egory of ‘other Dutch banks’.
6. Estimation results
In this section we present the estimates of the models pre- sented in Section 4. The empirical specifications of (13) and (14) are obtained by adding time effects st and residuals eit, so that the resulting equations are, respectively:
Ait ¼ bLit þ X5 s¼1
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þþ ai þ st þ eit ð16Þ
Ait ¼ bLit þ kM¼1 IM¼1it þ l M¼1 OM¼1it þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þþ ai þ st þ eit ð17Þ
All variables are scaled by total bank assets, so that they are stationary.6
In Eqs. (16) and (17), all coefficients are assumed to be equal across banks. However, as mentioned in Section 4, liquidity man- agement may differ between banks or bank groups. Therefore, we will proceed in two steps. First, we will estimate the models using the standard assumption of equal coefficients across all banks. Second, we will estimate the models for the different bank groups to be distinguished by bank type and bank characteristics.
Table 2 presents the estimation results for (16) and (17). These models explain the within variation of liquid asset holdings well, according to the within-R2 of around 0.78 and 0.83 for the whole sample. The model fit is better for Dutch banks (especially ‘other Dutch banks’, 0.99) than for foreign banks (especially foreign branches, 0.59). Many coefficients are significant and have the ex- pected signs. The coefficients of liquid liabilities and net cash flows for maturities longer than 1 month turn out to be robust to the inclusion of gross cash inflows and outflows within 1 month (17) instead of net cash flows within 1 month (16). Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we use Eq. (17), because this relates more closely to regulation which also looks at gross cash flows within 1 month.
Overall, the results indicate that banks hold a stock of liquid as- sets as a buffer against the stock of liquid liabilities. When banks have cash inflows in the coming month, they hold fewer liquid as- sets. However, on average, they do not fully reduce their liquid asset holdings when there is an inflow of cash scheduled within the com- ing month. Banks hold more liquid assets if 1-month cash outflows are higher. However, banks look at cash flows further than 1 month ahead. Net cash inflows of several maturities longer than 1 month are significant for various banks types. The top-5 banks seem to manage their stock liquidity with an eye on maturities between 3 and 12 months. Banks in the category of ‘other Dutch banks’ seem to look at maturities between 3 and 6 months and beyond 1 year. For foreign subsidiaries maturities between 1 and 3 and beyond 6 months are significant.7 Hence, only the ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries seem to look further than 1 year ahead. For both bank types the standard deviation of net cash inflows beyond 1 year is relatively high (see Table 1). As these banks face more fluctuating
6 The Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for all panels. Results are available on request.
7 Due to this heterogeneity in bank behavior across different bank types, none of the coefficients for net cash inflows beyond one month are statistically different from zero for the whole sample.
Table 1 Summary statistics.
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Mediana Standard deviation
Mediana Standard deviation
Mediana Standard deviation
Mediana Standard deviation
Mediana Standard deviation
Panel A Stock of liquid 0.249 1.301 0.299 0.145 0.216 2.062 0.258 0.979 0.229 0.529 assets (0.208)*** (0.280) (0.191)** (0.212)*** (0.168)**
Stock of liquid liabilities
0.398 1.534 0.393 0.175 0.295 1.301 0.441 0.992 0.409 2.219
(0.369)*** (0.367) (0.240) (0.430) (0.330)**
Cash inflow 0.167 0.766 0.249 0.146 0.108 1.322 0.240 0.268 0.129 0.273 <1 month (0.148)*** (0.260) (0.086)*** (0.238) (0.133) Cash outflow 0.143 1.120 0.351 0.187 0.065 1.983 0.231 0.251 0.102 0.249 <1 month (0.139) (0.325)*** (0.062) (0.234) (0.096) Net cash inflow 0.000 0.472 �0.061 0.082 0.006 0.822 0.002 0.150 0.000 0.152 <1 month (0.000)** (�0.051)*** (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)*** Net cash inflow 0.006 0.162 �0.035 0.029 0.000 0.171 0.035 0.151 0.010 0.178 1–<3 months (0.005) (�0.050)*** (0.000) (0.050)*** (0.010) Net cash inflow 0.000 0.064 �0.015 0.019 0.000 0.069 0.010 0.071 0.000 0.055 3–<6 months (0.000) (�0.022)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000)*** Net cash inflow 0.000 0.068 �0.010 0.025 0.000 0.071 0.014 0.072 0.000 0.065 6–<12 months (0.000)** (�0.021)*** (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)*** Net cash inflow 0.059 0.205 0.219 0.093 0.126 0.179 0.070 0.280 0.001 0.125 >12 months (0.048)* (0.195)** (0.129) (0.068) (0.002)
Panel B Equity ratio 0.061 0.166 0.032 0.012 0.067 0.204 0.078 0.113 0.032 0.181
(0.060) (0.031) (0.074)*** (0.078) (0.023)*
Z-score 49.438 113.444 118.724 96.136 61.019 164.035 52.032 72.172 20.472 69.870 (37.615)*** (96.060) (44.455)*** (49.394) (12.975)***
Retail deposits 0.000 0.243 0.171 0.093 0.067 0.316 0.002 0.215 0.000 0.148 (0.000) (0.186)*** 0.067) (0.015)** (0.000)
Retail demand deposits
0.000 0.217 0.147 0.084 0.037 0.304 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.138
(0.000) (0.131) (0.041)* (0.000) (0.000) Total number of
obs./banks 4631 62 375 5 1408 19 1425 19 1423 19
(1916) (155) (583) (589) (589)
Note: All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. a Values for the crisis period (from September 2007 onwards) within parentheses.
*** Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 1%. ** Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 5%. * Denote that medians differ significantly from pre-crisis values, with p-values equal to or less than 10%.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3937
inflows, they are likely to behave differently. Our findings are consis- tent with a survey finding of ECB (2002), that banks seldom look fur- ther ahead than 1 year for liquidity management purposes,8 which is confirmed by a more recent survey (ECB, 2008).
One might wonder whether the estimation results suffer from an endogeneity problem. The following economic arguments sug- gest that our independent variables are exogenous. The stock of li- quid liabilities consists mostly of retail demand deposits, which are notoriously sluggish and cannot easily be manipulated by the bank in the short run.9 The future cash inflows and outflows scheduled within the coming month are contractually fixed obligations with the bank’s debtors and creditors, respectively, and as such cannot be easily breached by the bank. The same holds for the future net cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month. Hence, our independent vari- ables seem to be exogenous in the bank’s decision process, in con- trast to the dependent variable, the stock of liquid assets, which
8 ECB (2002, p. 24): ‘‘Operational liquidity management typically focuses on periods from one day to between one and three months. (. . .) Strategic liquidity management focuses on periods up to one year (. . .). It is uncommon for banks to look further than one year ahead (. . .).’’
9 As mentioned before, Goodhart (2008) denotes retail deposits as ‘‘the most stable and reliable of all liabilities’’. Retail deposits are relatively stable (Schleifer and Vishny, 2010), also since they are insured by the government (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). Their ‘stickiness’ is also related to switching costs and the transaction services that retail depositors receive from banks (Kim et al., 2003).
consists of the stock of liquid bonds and asset-backed securities that can easily be adjusted by the bank.10
7. How does liquidity management relate to liquidity regulation?
In this section we investigate how banks’ liquidity management relates to bank liquidity regulation, both Dutch and Basel III. We proceed in three steps:
First, we estimate an empirical specification of the regulatory model (15), introduced in Section 4. Unlike models (16) and (17), we do not add fixed bank and time effects because we wish to approximate as closely as possible the regulatory model, lacking such elements. Hence, we specify:
Ait ¼ bLit þ kIM¼1it þ lO M¼1 it þ eit ð18Þ
The estimation results for (18) are presented in Table 3, under the heading ‘estimated’. These may differ from the corresponding coefficients in Table 2, as model (18) is specified differently from
10 Still, we did a robustness check with respect to the endogeneity problem. We ran an instrumental variables regression, instrumenting the stock of liquid liabilities, the 1-month cash inflow and the 1-month cash outflow by their lagged values plus all other model variables. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates (see Appendix C) remained more or less the same, indicating that the original estimates do not suffer from an endogeneity bias.
Table 2 Estimation results, for equations (16) and (17) (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17) Eq. (16) Eq. (17)
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.516** 0.436** 0.575*** 0.562*** 0.989*** 0.901*** 0.683*** 0.661*** 0.198*** 0.191***
(0.213) (0.171) (0.115) (0.093) (0.008) (0.083) (0.057) (0.067) (0.032) (0.033) Cash inflow �0.420*** �0.838** �0.912*** 0.128 �0.340* <1 month (0.157) (0.230) (0.092) (0.481) (0.172) Cash outflow 0.938*** 0.897*** 1.007*** �0.379 0.184 <1 month (0.072) (0.124) (0.008) (0.623) (0.143) Net cash inflow �1.299*** �0.908*** �1.016*** 0.310 �0.199 <1 month (0.143) (0.126) (0.009) (0.606) (0.160) Net cash inflow �0.087 �1.105 �0.163 �0.170 0.255 0.196 �1.876* �1.738* �0.527 �0.408 1–<3 months (0.745) (0.683) (0.201) (0.225) (0.200) (0.196) (1.031) (0.885) (0.343) (0.302) Net cash inflow �0.318 0.167 �0.677** �0.704*** �1.112*** �1.023*** 0.338 0.232 �0.091 �0.114 3–<6 months (0.375) (0.375) (0.187) (0.146) (0.130) (0.137) (0.543) (0.456) (0.112) (0.100) Net cash inflow �0.211 �0.292 �1.048** �1.056** �0.064 �0.054 �0.672** �0.693** �0.135 �0.092 6–<12 months (0.184) (0.180) (0.248) (0.236) (0.123) (0.109) (0.285) (0.292) (0.136) (0.129) Net cash inflow 0.010 �0.137 �0.112 �0.128 �0.623*** �0.602*** �0.312*** �0.288** �0.238 �0.218 >12 months (0.292) (0.190) (0.079) (0.116) (0.067) (0.068) (0.103) (0.116) (0.210) (0.184) R2-within 0.779 0.833 0.830 0.832 0.994 0.994 0.724 0.726 0.590 0.598 Number of obs. 4631 4631 375 375 1408 1408 1425 1425 1423 1423 Number of banks 62 62 5 5 19 19 19 19 19 19
Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses. All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
Table 3 Comparison of estimated coefficients (equation (18)) with means of calculated regulatory coefficients for the Liquidity Balance (LB) and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) – Equations (19) and (20), respectively.
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks
Estimated Eq. (18)
LB Eq. (19)
LCR Eq. (20)
Estimated Eq. (18)
LB Eq. (19)
LCR Eq. (20)
Estimated Eq. (18)
LB Eq. (19)
LCR Eq. (20)
Stock of liquid liabilities
0.633*** 0.236*** 0.904*** 0.477*** 0.316*** 0.471*** 0.871*** 0.236*** 0.604***
(0.071) (0.002) (0.061) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.026) (0.005) (0.035) Cash inflow �0.835*** �0.839*** �2.612*** �0.012 �0.994*** �0.641*** �0.862*** �0.899*** �1.405*** <1 month (0.077) (0.003) (0.285) (0.054) (0.002) (0.013) (0.038) (0.006) (0.117) Cash outflow 1.145*** 0.785*** 3.057*** 0.244*** 0.974*** 0.696*** 1.035*** 0.819*** 1.191***
<1 month (0.027) (0.004) (0.445) (0.037) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.040) Number of obs. 4145 4146 4146 375 375 375 1224 1225 1225 Number of banks 62 62 62 5 5 5 19 19 19
Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Estimated Eq. (18) LB Eq. (19) LCR Eq. (20) Estimated Eq. (18) LB Eq. (19) LCR Eq. (20)
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.851*** 0.196*** 1.241*** 0.316*** 0.296*** 0.980***
(0.077) (0.003) (0.169) (0.055) (0.006) (0.096) Cash inflow �0.902*** �0.831*** �5.246*** �0.225** �0.779*** �1.545*** <1 month (0.088) (0.005) (0.876) (0.105) (0.006) (0.095) Cash outflow 0.757*** 0.749*** 7.046*** 0.435*** 0.734*** 1.104***
<1 month (0.054) (0.006) (1.339) (0.078) (0.007) (0.037) Number of obs. 1375 1375 1375 1171 1171 1171 Number of banks 19 19 19 19 19 19
Note: The estimated coefficients are pooled estimates; robust standard errors within parentheses. LB and LCR coefficients are sample means of coefficients calculated using regulatory weights; standard errors (within parentheses) are the standard deviations of these sample means. *** Denote significance levels of 1%. ** Denote significance levels of 5%. �Denote significance levels of 10%.
3938 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
(16) and (17). Model (18) is an empirical representation of the relationship between the actual stock of liquid assets on the one hand and liquid liabilities and cash flows for the coming month on the other, disregarding cash flows beyond 1 month ahead as does regulation. Models (16) and (17), on the other hand, consider the full range of maturity buckets, both until 1 month and beyond.
Second, we compile ‘regulatory’ coefficients from the regulatory models (7) and (11) introduced in Section 3. We calculate the reg- ulatory coefficients for LB and LCR as follows. Assuming ARit ¼ Ait , the regulatory coefficients are defined as:
bLBit ¼ Ait � kLBit I
M¼1 it � lLBit O
M¼1 it
Lit ; kLBit ¼
Ait � bLBit Lit � lLBit O M¼1 it
IM¼1it ;
lLBit ¼ Ait � bLBit Lit � k
LB it I
M¼1 it
OM¼1it ð19Þ
bLCRit ¼ Ait � kLCRit I
M¼1 it � lLCRit O
M¼1 it
Lit ; kLCRit ¼
Ait � bLCRit Lit � lLCRit O M¼1 it
IM¼1it ;
lLCRit ¼ Ait � bLCRit Lit � k
LCR it I
M¼1 it
OM¼1it ð20Þ
Fig. 5. CDS, Euribor spread Dutch banks, and non-standard measures of the ECB (basis points and billions of euros, respectively).
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3939
The sample means of the calculated regulatory coefficients are presented in Table 3 with their standard errors and significance levels, under the headings ‘LB’ and ‘LCR’, respectively.
Third, we compare the estimated coefficients and the calculated regulatory coefficients to gain insight into the way banks’ liquidity management deviates from regulatory minimum standards. To facilitate this comparison, we align the number of observations used in the regressions with the number of observations available for the calculated regulatory coefficients, which is limited due to the occurrence of zero values for the denominators in (19) and (20). This means dropping 10% of the original sample, especially observations in the categories of ‘other Dutch banks’ (13%) and for- eign branches (18%).11
Let us first compare the estimated coefficients with the calcu- lated regulatory coefficients based on LB. The LB coefficient of li- quid liabilities is lower than the estimated one for all banks and all bank types. This means that banks, on average, hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required according to the LB rule, probably for precautionary reasons. This is especially the case for ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries. The pic- ture for the cash flow coefficients is more mixed. The LB coefficient of 1-month cash inflow is quite similar for all banks, ‘other Dutch banks’ and foreign subsidiaries. However, in absolute terms, it is greater than its estimated counterpart for the top-5 banks and the foreign branches. The LB coefficient of cash outflows scheduled within 1 month is larger than the estimated counterpart for the top-5 banks and for foreign branches, while it is smaller for ‘other Dutch banks’.
Next, we compare the estimated coefficients with the calculated regulatory coefficients based on LCR. When interpreting these coefficients, three things should be kept in mind. First, as men- tioned in Section 3, the definition of the stock of assets, adopted from the regulatory definitions under LB, is wider than under LCR, since the former includes asset-backed securities, such as RMBS. Second, LCR is not in operation yet. Therefore, the compar- ison with LCR coefficients is hypothetical because banks did not have to meet this rule at the time. The goal of the exercise is to as- sess whether and how actual liquidity management of Dutch banks deviated from the new Basel III liquidity standard. Third, the map- ping of the regulatory weights from LCR on the Dutch regulatory despatches is imperfect. Therefore, the LCR coefficients should be interpreted with caution. We observe that the estimated coeffi- cient of the stock of liquid liabilities is greater than the LCR coeffi- cient for ‘other Dutch banks’. This may be the result of the wider definition of liquid assets in the LB, which recognises asset-backed securities to some extent as liquid assets, while the LCR does not. The estimated and calculated regulatory coefficients are similar in magnitude (around 0.47) for the top-5 banks. For foreign banks, especially foreign branches, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is smaller than the LCR coefficient. Foreign banks are probably less inclined to hold liquid assets, since they usually can count on cash inflows from the parent bank when nec- essary. The LCR coefficients of 1-month cash inflows are larger in absolute terms than their estimated counterparts for all banks and bank types. The same holds for the LCR coefficients of 1-month cash outflows. The magnitudes of the LCR cash flow coefficients for foreign subsidiaries seem out of line, which may be due to the imperfect mapping of LB despatches to LCR rules. For that reason, we abstain from an economic interpretation of these differences.
11 The effect of the smaller sample selection on the estimated coefficients is negligible for ‘other Dutch banks’ but non-negligible for foreign branches. Using the original sample sizes, the coefficients of liquid liabilities, cash inflows and cash outflows were, respectively, 0.858, -0.851 and 1.036 for other Dutch banks and 0.224, -0.049 and 0.352 for foreign branches.
Finally, we compare the calculated regulatory coefficients of the LCR with those of the LB. The LCR coefficient of stock liquid liabil- ities is greater than the LB coefficient. Hence, under the LCR stan- dard, banks have to maintain a greater buffer of liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities. This can be explained by the stricter definition in the LCR of the stock of liquid assets that should cover the expected liquidity outflow. For the top-5 banks, this difference is relatively small, though. The implication for bank lending of the introduction of the LCR is beyond the scope of the present study, which deals with liquidity management and not with credit management. Berben et al. (2010) simulate the poten- tial impact of the LCR on lending by Dutch banks. They assume that banks will substitute loans to some extent for liquid assets, so that lending could fall by around 4% compared with the baseline level.
8. Liquidity management during the crisis
Our sample period can be split into a pre-crisis and a crisis period. The starting date of the crisis is set to August 2007, based on the sud- den rise of CDS and Euribor spreads for Dutch banks in that month (Fig. 5).12 Two months later, in October 2007, the ECB responded to the liquidity crisis with an increase of non-standard liquidity provid- ing measures (notably ‘Long Term Refinancing Operations’).
Table 1 gives median values for the crisis period, showing that the stock of liquid assets and the stock of liabilities were lower in the crisis than before. Cash inflows within 1 month also de- creased significantly during the crisis.
In this section, we examine how the crisis affected banks’ liquidity management in terms of their stock of liquid assets. For this, we re-specify (17) as follows:
Ait ¼ b1 Lit þ b2 Lit Ct þ k M¼1 1 I
M¼1 it þ k
M¼1 2 I
M¼1 it Ct þ l
M¼1 1 O
M¼1 it
þ lM¼12 O M¼1 it Ct þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þþ cCt þ ai þ st þ eit ð21Þ
where Ct is a dummy variable ‘Crisis’, which has value 1 from Au- gust 2007 to the end of the sample (March 2010) and 0 before.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. Our interest especially concerns the significance and magnitude of the interaction term coefficients, b2; k2; l2.
13 For all banks and the top-5 banks the coef- ficient of the stock of liquid liabilities interacted with Crisis, b2, is �0.137 and �0.133, respectively. For foreign branches it is statistically different from zero but small in economic terms (�0.043), while it is not significant for ‘other Dutch banks’ and
12 De Socio (2013) finds that, while credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread during the crisis.
13 Coefficient c is not interesting in itself, for Ct has only been added to facilitate sensible interpretation of the coefficients b2; k2; l2 (Brambor et al., 2006).
Table 4 Estimation results for equation (21), the effect of the crisis (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.493*** 0.654*** 0.910*** 0.653*** 0.223***
(0.177) (0.067) (0.074) (0.077) (0.034) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis �0.137** �0.133*** 0.012 0.181 �0.043***
(0.059) (0.016) (0.040) (0.219) (0.004) Cash inflow �0.475*** �0.904** �0.934*** 0.248 �0.408** <1 month (0.174) (0.229) (0.089) (0.532) (0.175) Cash inflow �0.077 0.219 0.148 �0.303 0.221* <1 month x Crisis (0.176) (0.167) (0.110) (0.208) (0.124) Cash outflow 0.947*** 0.956*** 1.016*** �0.447 0.250 <1 month (0.066) (0.118) (0.013) (0.592) (0.156) Cash outflow 0.092 �0.083 �0.093 0.241 �0.043 <1 month x Crisis (0.111) (0.127) (0.076) (0.209) (0.118) Net cash inflow �0.946 �0.255* 0.173 �1.768* �0.467 1–<3 months (0.606) (0.111) (0.148) (0.877) (0.282) Net cash inflow 0.068 �0.661*** �1.009*** 0.197 �0.193*
3–<6 months (0.331) (0.136) (0.113) (0.433) (0.096) Net cash inflow �0.301* �0.834** �0.084 �0.716** �0.124 6–<12 months (0.164) (0.223) (0.084) (0.308) (0.114) Net cash inflow �0.160 �0.130 �0.599*** �0.277** �0.220 >12 months (0.182) (0.094) (0.064) (0.131) (0.156) Crisis 0.233* 0.043 0.159 �0.184 �0.018
(0.133) (0.043) (0.096) (0.136) (0.068) R2 –within 0.843 0.850 0.994 0.727 0.627 Number of obs. 4631 375 1408 1425 1423 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19
Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Crisis is a dummy variable with value 1 in the period August 2007 to end of sample (March 2010) and 0 in the pre-crisis period January 2004 to July 2007. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
Table 5 Factors and factor loadings.
Factor 1: ‘Retail funding’
Factor 2: ‘Capitalization’
Equity ratio �0.126 0.400 Z-score 0.069 0.413 Retail deposits 0.955 0.046 Retail demand deposits 0.955 �0.022 Eigenvalue 1.843 0.333 Cumulative proportion of variance
explained 0.953 1.125
Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Factor loadings have been rotated using orthogonal Varimax. Factor loadings equal to or higher than 0.4 have been printed in bold.
3940 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
foreign affiliates. This means that especially large banks hold less li- quid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities during the crisis than before. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms of cash inflows and outflows with Crisis, k2 and l2 , are not significant for most banks, except k2 for foreign branches (but only at the 10% significance level).14
We conclude that the crisis seems to have affected liquidity management of the largest banks, in particular with regard to the stock of liquid liabilities. Banks hold less liquid assets against the stock of liquid liabilities during the crisis than before. This find- ing can be explained as follows. The stock of liquid liabilities con- sists mostly of retail demand deposits. Relative to total assets, their level was stable and even increased somewhat during the crisis (see, for the Netherlands, e.g. De Haan and Van den End, forthcom- ing, and for Europe ECB, 2009).15 This resulted in lower levels of li-
14 We also did the regression including the average CDS premium for the Dutch banking sector instead of the Crisis dummy. The results (available on request) were similar, but less significant.
15 In contrast, liabilities with fixed maturities that are not part of the liability stock, i.e. mostly wholesale debt, were reduced sharply, together with wholesale lending.
quid asset holdings, relative to retail demand deposits. Fig. 2 confirms this interpretation. During the first phase of the crisis (2007–2008), both liquid assets and liquid liabilities decreased, but assets more so than liabilities. In the following phase (2009–2010), both items recovered, but liabilities more than assets. Consequently, the stock of liquid assets decreased relative to the stock of liquid lia- bilities in the crisis.
Another explanation for the fact that banks hold less liquid as- sets during the crisis is that the crisis dummy captures not only a bank liquidity crisis, but also a period in which the ECB provided support through non-standard liquidity measures to alleviate the effects of the crisis. Hence, the coefficients of the crisis dummy not only capture the effects of the crisis but also the effects of the policy response to the crisis, which could have been an incen- tive for banks to hold less liquid buffers. Disentangling both effects would require bank-specific data on spreads and ECB support. Due to lack of such bank-specific data, this is left for future research.
9. Liquidity management and bank characteristics
In this section we examine whether liquidity management de- pends on bank characteristics, other than bank type. To limit the number of variables characterising banks, we apply factor analysis. Factor analysis aims at finding a ‘common factor’, xk, which is an unobservable, hypothetical variable that contributes to the vari- ance of several (at least two) observed variables, yj. The equation of the common factor model is (Mulaik, 1972):
yij ¼ Xq k¼1
xkjbkj þ eij; ð22Þ
where i denotes the observation. There are q common factors in this equation, which are conveniently assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. bkj is the regression coefficient for predicting observed variable j using the kth common factor. eij are residuals that are
Table 6 Estimation results for equation (24), interaction with retail funding (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.283* 0.506** 0.953*** 0.680*** �0.538 (0.167) (0.124) (0.076) (0.043) (0.543)
Stock of liquid liabilities x Retail funding �0.265* �0.236 �0.063* 0.034 �1.330 (0.145) (0.253) (0.035) (0.160) (1.039)
Cash inflow �0.206 �0.644* �0.976*** 0.105 �0.290 <1 month (0.205) (0.261) (0.083) (0.501) (0.210) Cash inflow 0.259 �0.048 �0.032 0.127 0.261 <1 month x Retail funding (0.227) (0.410) (0.056) (0.173) (0.201) Cash outflow 0.533** 0.764*** 0.991*** �0.349 �0.641 <1 month (0.227) (0.132) (0.047) (0.622) (0.545) Cash outflow �0.669** 0.067 �0.068 �0.034 �1.246 <1 month x Retail funding (0.273) (0.266) (0.070) (0.248) (0.980) Net cash inflow �1.278 �0.185 0.264 �1.747* �0.245 1–<3 months (0.825) (0.103) (0.239) (0.990) (0.271) Net cash inflow 0.083 �0.670** �1.035*** 0.241 �0.165 3–<6 months (0.396) (0.203) (0.129) (0.475) (0.138) Net cash inflow �0.292* �0.676** �0.058 �0.725** 0.053 6–<12 months (0.172) (0.231) (0.161) (0.343) (0.197) Net cash inflow �0.209 �0.271* �0.619*** �0.424*** �0.433 >12 months (0.194) (0.106) (0.084) (0.061) (0.256) Retail funding 0.345*** 0.136 0.059 �0.046 0.568
(0.111) (0.208) (0.051) (0.143) (0.351) R2 –within 0.755 0.764 0.992 0.711 0.606 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19
Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Retail funding is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
Table 7 Estimation results for equation (25), interaction with capitalization (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.561*** 0.556** 0.906*** 0.604*** 0.207**
(0.146) (0.149) (0.029) (0.079) (0.100) Stock of liquid liabilities x Capitalization �0.269** �0.004 �0.248** �0.391*** �0.085
(0.101) (0.115) (0.092) (0.095) (0.052) Cash inflow �0.811*** �0.583*** �0.962*** 0.085 �0.508*** <1 month (0.156) (0.119) (0.039) (0.501) (0.085) Cash inflow 0.562*** �0.488*** 0.344*** 0.715* �0.272 <1 month x Capitalization (0.159) (0.062) (0.100) (0.347) (0.306) Cash outflow 0.969*** 0.741*** 1.048*** �0.202 �0.002 <1 month (0.211) (0.054) (0.021) (0.527) (0.178) Cash outflow �0.018 0.552*** �0.038 0.134 �0.280 <1 month x Capitalization (0.184) (0.107) (0.027) (0.855) (0.224) Net cash inflow �0.705* �0.268* 0.040 �1.603* �0.315 1–<3 months (0.404) (0.106) (0.105) (0.842) (0.215) Net cash inflow �0.195 �0.639*** �0.937*** 0.313 �0.290 3–<6 months (0.242) (0.162) (0.163) (0.477) (0.179) Net cash inflow �0.192 �0.877** �0.041 �0.507** �0.121 6–<12 months (0.130) (0.211) (0.129) (0.213) (0.168) Net cash inflow �0.381*** �0.210 �0.677*** �0.407*** �0.423 >12 months (0.088) (0.139) (0.097) (0.064) (0.253) Capitalization 0.108 �0.089** 0.060 0.080 0.600
(0.090) (0.024) (0.079) (0.140) (0.359) R2 –within 0.831 0.791 0.994 0.719 0.639 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19
Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Capitalization is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3941
uncorrelated both with each other and with the common factors. In matrix notation it reads:
Y ¼ XB þ E: ð23Þ
B is the factor pattern, which lends itself to interpretation of the meanings of the common factors, as will become clear below.
From a larger set of variables we selected four variables (retail deposits, retail demand deposits, equity ratio and Z-score) that are available for all banks in our sample and for the whole sample period. Panel B of Table 1 gives their medians and standard devia- tions. The goal of factor analysis is to cluster variables into factors on the basis of correlations among variables and factors. Variables
Explanatory note: Dotted lines denote 95% confidence bands.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2 Coefficient of liquid liabilities
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0 Coefficient of 1-month cash inflow
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 Capitalization
Coefficient of 1-month cash outflow
Fig. 6. Coefficients, by bank capitalization (whole sample).
16 Using sample means for the three interacted right-hand side model variables (liquid liabilities, 1 month cash inflows and outflows), we calculate the liquidity ratio for different values of the equity ratio. The calculations show that when the equity ratio increases by 1 per cent of total assets, the liquidity ratio drops by 0.039 per cent of total assets.
3942 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
that are strongly correlated are formed into a first factor with the condition that this factor is not orthogonal to the second factor, and so on. To improve interpretation of the factor loadings that are obtained from the analysis, an orthogonal rotation is performed to obtain a simple structure so that the rotated factors become uncorrelated. This standard procedure in factor analysis reduces the problem of having too many variables loading on one factor or a variable showing significant loading on more than one factor. An analysis of the ‘eigenvalues’ of the factors and several significance tests help to decide on how many factors to retain. Consequently, applying factor analysis on our four variables, we obtain two ‘com- mon factors’ contributing substantially to the variance of these four variables and having economically interpretable and significant fac- tor loadings. The first factor has high loadings on retail deposits and
retail demand deposits, both scaled by total assets (Table 5). There- fore, we label factor 1 ‘Retail funding’. The second factor has high loadings on the equity ratio and the Z-score, a measure of distance to default. Hence, we label factor 2 ‘Capitalization’.
The conclusion from this factor analysis is that two types of banks can be distinguished: retail funded banks and well capitalized banks. We use this distinction when examining differences in liquid- ity management between bank types. Therefore, we add interaction terms for each of two factor variables, Rit for ‘Retail funding’, and Sit for ‘Capitalization’, respectively, to model (17). The specification of the two interaction models is as follows:
Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2Lit Rit þ k M¼1 1 I
M¼1 it þ k
M¼1 2 I
M¼1 it Rit þ l
M¼1 1 O
M¼1 it
þ lM¼12 O M¼1 it Rit þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þþ cRit þ ai þ st þ eit ð24Þ
Ait ¼ b1Lit þ b2Lit Sit þ k M¼1 1 I
M¼1 it þ k
M¼1 2 I
M¼1 it Sit þ l
M¼1 1 O
M¼1 it
þ lM¼12 O M¼1 it Sit þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þþ cSit þ ai þ st þ eit ð25Þ
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation results for (24) and (25), respectively. The interaction terms with ‘Retail funding’ are not statistically significant at conventional levels (disregarding the puzzling interaction with 1-month cash outflow for the whole sample which is not found in the underlying groups of bank types; Table 6). The interaction with the second factor, ‘Capitalization’, yields more significant results (Table 7). The negative sign of the coefficient of stock liquid liabilities interacted with this factor (for all banks: �0.269) suggests that banks that have more capital keep less liquid assets as a buffer against the stock of liquid liabil- ities. This is found for all bank groups, although for the top-5 and the foreign branches the effect is not significant. On the other hand, better capitalized banks reduce their liquid asset holdings by less against 1-month cash inflows (as implied by the positive sign of the interaction coefficient). Foreign branches and the top-5 banks are an exception again: better capitalized banks reduce their liquid assets by more, instead of less, against 1-month cash inflows (although this is not significant for foreign branches). Finally, the interaction with 1-month cash outflows is only significant and po- sitive for the top-5 banks.
For ease of interpretation, Fig. 6 shows, for the whole sample, the coefficients of liquid liabilities, 1-month cash inflows and 1-month cash outflows by degree of bank capitalization. Moving from left to right on the horizontal axis, i.e. from banks with lower capital towards banks with higher capital, liquid liabilities have a lower positive marginal effect on liquid asset holdings, while 1-month cash inflows have a less negative marginal effect. Capital- ization has no significant influence on the coefficient of the 1-month cash outflows. From this we conclude that banks that have more capital are less inclined to keep liquidity buffers against their liquid liabilities (possibly because better capitalized banks are less vulnerable to demand deposit run-offs), but are less inclined to reduce their buffers when expected inflows increase (possibly indicating more conservative liquidity management). The net effect of capitalization on liquid asset holdings is probably small.16
These results suggest an interaction between capital and liquid- ity buffers. Such an interaction has been recognized in simulation exercises (e.g., MAG, 2010; Barnhill and Schumacher, 2011). There
Table 8 Estimation results for equation (26), interaction with crisis and capitalization (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Stock of liquid liabilities 0.643*** 0.501** 0.929*** 0.542*** 0.258**
(0.072) (0.167) (0.023) (0.076) (0.113) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis �0.299*** 0.007 �0.029 0.214* �0.045
(0.063) (0.176) (0.031) (0.117) (0.070) Stock of liquid liabilities x Capitalization �0.326*** �0.727 �0.181*** �0.298*** �0.118*
(0.046) (0.674) (0.047) (0.086) (0.058) Stock of liquid liabilities x Crisis x Capitalization 0.214*** 0.849 �0.067 �0.646 0.044
(0.061) (0.742) (0.102) (0.492) (0.052) Cash inflow �0.885*** �0.453** �0.995*** 0.049 �0.630*** <1 month (0.149) (0.177) (0.031) (0.439) (0.163) Cash inflow 0.264** �0.047 0.164* �0.452** 0.235 <1 month x Crisis (0.130) (0.261) (0.091) (0.180) (0.251) Cash inflow 0.617*** 0.184 0.290*** 0.646** �0.320 <1 month x Capitalization (0.152) (0.680) (0.064) (0.247) (0.395) Cash inflow �0.083 �0.478 0.166 0.578 0.201 <1 month x Crisis x Capitalization (0.188) (0.542) (0.142) (0.546) (0.447) Cash outflow 0.990*** 0.686** 1.053*** �0.151 �0.009 <1 month (0.190) (0.125) (0.022) (0.362) (0.249) Cash outflow �0.209 0.040 �0.086 0.227 0.285 <1 month x Crisis (0.131) (0.152) (0.078) (0.182) (0.260) Cash outflow �0.035 0.290 �0.043 �0.289 �0.409 <1 month x Capitalization (0.169) (0.282) (0.027) (0.591) (0.278) Cash outflow 0.303* 0.240 �0.023 0.845 0.321 <1 month x Crisis x Capitalization (0.174) (0.201) (0.137) (0.616) (0.345) Net cash inflow �0.623** �0.282** �0.022 �1.434** �0.337 1–<3 months (0.311) (0.065) (0.065) (0.657) (0.217) Net cash inflow �0.242 �0.561** �0.975*** 0.321 �0.266** 3–<6 months (0.198) (0.148) (0.129) (0.378) (0.107) Net cash inflow �0.215 �0.626* �0.189* �0.502** �0.087 6–<12 months (0.138) (0.113) (0.093) (0.184) (0.161) Net cash inflow �0.388*** �0.210 �0.631*** �0.325*** �0.391 >12 months (0.085) (0.156) (0.089) (0.109) (0.209) Crisis 0.094*** 0.022 0.011 �0.109* �0.144
(0.028) (0.063) (0.014) (0.062) (0.088) Capitalization 0.024 0.174 0.040 0.167 0.708
(0.056) (0.237) (0.052) (0.105) (0.430) Crisis x Capitalization �0.031 �0.354 0.033 �0.013 �0.300
(0.048) (0.249) (0.029) (0.189) (0.247) R2 –within 0.852 0.818 0.995 0.728 0.673 Number of obs. 4213 375 1328 1316 1194 Number of banks 62 5 19 19 19
Note: Fixed bank effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Capitalization is an unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3943
are also studies, initiated by Diamond (1991), suggesting a link be- tween liquidity and solvency. Diamond argues that short-term debt exposes the firm to rollover risk, forcing the firm into liquida- tion even when it is solvent in the long run. Likewise, He and Xiong (2012) argue that short-term debt can lead to a run on the firm and undermine its credit quality, independently of the firm’s solvency position. Gauthier et al. (2010) and Schanz (2011), calibrating a variant of the Morris and Shin (2009) model, also reveal a link be- tween capital and liquidity ratios. Probit models, such as those estimated by Barrell et al. (2009) and Kato et al. (2011), imply some degree of substitutability between capital and liquidity ratios as well.
We finally re-estimate model (17) interacting with both the cri- sis dummy and the indicator of bank capitalization:
Ait ¼ b1 Lit þ b2Lit Ct þ b3 Lit Sit þ b4Lit Ct Sit þ k M¼1 1 I
M¼1 it þ k
M¼1 2 I
M¼1 it Ct
þ kM¼13 I M¼1 it Sit þ k
M¼1 4 I
M¼1 it Ct Sit þ l
M¼1 1 O
M¼1 it þ l
M¼1 2 O
M¼1 it Ct
þ lM¼13 O M¼1 it Sit þ l
M¼1 4 O
M¼1 it Ct Sit þ
X5 s¼2
dM¼sðIM¼sit � O M¼s it Þ
þ c1 Ct þ c2 Sit þ c3Ct Sit þ ai þ st þ eit ð26Þ
The estimation results are presented in Table 8. The double interaction terms, with both Crisis and Capitalization, are only statistically significant at conventional levels for the stock of li- quid liabilities for all banks (0.214). For ease of interpretation, Fig. 7 shows, for the whole sample, the coefficients of liquid lia- bilities, 1-month cash inflows and 1-month cash outflows by de- gree of bank capitalization, both before and during the crisis. The picture is similar to Fig. 6: moving from left to right on the hor- izontal axis, i.e. from banks with less capital towards banks with more capital, liquid liabilities have a lower positive marginal ef- fect on liquid asset holdings while 1-month cash inflows have a less negative marginal effect. However, the slopes of these lines differ for the pre-crisis and the crisis period, although only signif- icantly for liquid liabilities. For liquid liabilities, the negative slope is steeper before the crisis than during the crisis. Hence, the negative trade-off between holding liquid assets against lia- bilities and bank capitalization is weaker during the crisis. Possi- bly, the increased volatility of the deposit base in the crisis makes even the more solvent banks more cautious in managing their liquidity. For cash inflows and outflows, the lines are not signifi- cantly different from each other.
Pre-crisis with 95% confidence bands
Crisis with 95% confidence bands
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2 Coefficient of liquid liabilities
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4 Coefficient of 1-month cash inflow
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 Capitalization
Coefficient of 1-month cash outflow
Fig. 7. Coefficients, by crisis/pre-crisis period and bank capitalization (whole sample).
3944 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
10. Conclusions
This paper examines liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks, subject to the Dutch liquidity supervisory framework, in operation since 2003. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2010. The Dutch quantitative liquidity requirement, the so-called Liquidity Balance (LB), resembles the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) pro- posed under Basel III.
We find an empirical relationship between the stock of liquid as- sets and maturity transformation, measured by a maturity ladder. Banks keep liquid assets, mostly bonds, as a buffer against both the stock of liquid liabilities without a fixed term (i.e., mostly demand deposits), and against net cash outflows of different
maturities. This relationship is stronger for Dutch banks than for for- eign banks, especially foreign branches. Banks tend to decide how much liquid assets to hold by taking into account their future cash flows, mostly until 1 year ahead. When banks have cash inflows in the coming month, they hold fewer liquid assets. However, on aver- age, they do not fully reduce their liquid asset holdings when there is an inflow of cash within the coming month. This indicates prudent liquidity risk management. Banks hold more liquid assets when the 1-month cash outflows are higher. We find that only smaller Dutch banks (i.e. excluding the top-5) and foreign subsidiaries man- age their liquid assets with an eye on net cash flows beyond 1 year, which is consistent with the earlier survey finding of the ECB (2002) that banks seldom look further ahead than 1 year for liquidity man- agement purposes.
Confronting liquidity management with regulation, we find that banks, on average, hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required according to the Dutch LB rule. This is espe- cially the case for smaller Dutch banks and foreign subsidiaries.
For smaller Dutch banks, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is greater than the LCR coefficient, which may reflect the wider definition of liquid assets in the Dutch liquidity regulation. For the top-5 banks, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is similar in magnitude to the LCR coefficient. For foreign banks, especially foreign branches, the estimated coefficient of the stock of liquid liabilities is smaller than the LCR coefficient. Foreign branches are probably less inclined to hold liquid assets as they can usually count on cash inflows from the parent bank.
We find that the crisis period has negatively affected liquid asset holdings against liquid liabilities, especially for the top-5 banks. This reflects the fact that the level of retail demand deposits, which form a major part of the stock of liquid liabilities and which are sluggish, was relatively unaffected during the crisis. Another explanation could be that the extended liquidity support by the central bank might have been an incentive for banks to reduce their liquidity buffers.
Further, we find that more capitalized banks hold less liquid as- sets against their stocks of liquid liabilities. However, this effect of bank capitalization is smaller during the crisis period. These results suggest an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers, espe- cially during non-crisis times, which should be taken into account by regulators.
The liquidity management of banks in relation to the Dutch liquidity requirement, as analysed in this article, provides useful insights into the potential bank behavior under the LCR standard. It may guide regulators in the calibration of the new liquidity rule. First, regulators should be aware that the LCR will likely stimulate banks to hold more liquid assets against liquid liabilities than strictly required. Second, banks base their liquidity holdings on cash flows expected beyond 1 month. This implies that liquidity supervision should also have a longer horizon than just the 1 month horizon of the LCR. And third, the findings underscore that an integrated approach with regard to liquidity and capital regula- tion is advisable, given the interaction between capital and liquid- ity decisions by banks.
Acknowledgements
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not neces- sarily reflect official positions of DNB. We thank an anonymous referee, as well as Paul Baneke, Ryan Banerjee, Clemens Bonner, Ja- kob de Haan, Paul Hilbers, Giulia Iori, Hanne Meihuizen, Steven Ongena, Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski, Stefan Schmitz, Iman van Lelyveld, seminar participants at DNB, participants of the BOK/BIS/ IMF Conference on ‘Macrofinancial Linkages’ (Seoul, 2012) and the BCBS Research Task Force Workshop ‘Bank regulation and liquidity risk in a global financial system’ (Vienna, 2013) for comments and advice. Jack Bekooij and Franka Liedorp kindly provided data.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3945
Appendix A. Dutch LB regulatory weights
GROUP
ASSETSM
WEEK
MONTH
Banknotes/coins
100100
Receivables from central banks (including ecb)
1
1Demand deposits
100
100
1
2
Amounts receivable
M
100
100
1
3
Receivables in respect of
reverse repos
M100
100
1
4Receivables in the form of securities or tier 2 eligible assets
M
d*d*
Collection documents
1Available on demand
100
100
2
Receivable
M
100
100
Readily marketable debt instruments/ecb eligible assets
Issued by public authorities and central banks
2
1ECB tier 1 and tier 2 eligible assets
95**
95**
2
2ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited
85**
85**
2
3ECB tier 2 eligible assets, not deposited
85
85
2
4Other readily marketable debt instruments, Zone A
95
95
2
5Other readily marketable debt instruments, Zone B
70
70
Issued by credit institutions
21
ECB tier 1 eligible assets
90**
90**
2
2ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited
80**
80**
2
3Other debt instruments qualifying under the CAD (Capital Adequacy Directive)
90
90
2
4Other liquid debt instruments
70
70
Issued by other institutions
2
1ECB tier 1 eligible assets
90**
90**
2
2ECB tier 2 eligible assets, deposited
80**
80**
2
3Other debt instruments qualifying under the CAD (Capital Adequacy Directive)
90
90
2
4Other liquid debt instruments
70
70
Amounts receivable
Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report
3
1Demand deposits
50
100
3
2
Amounts receivable in respect
of securities transactions
M)100
100
3
Other amounts receivableM
100
90
Other credit institutions
3
1Demand deposits
50
100
3
2
Amounts receivable in respect
of securities transactions
M)100
100
3
3Other amounts receivable
M
100
90
Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)
GROUP
ASSETSM
WEEK
MONTH
Public authorities
31
Demand deposits
50
100
3
2
Amounts receivable in respect
of securities transactions
M)100
100
3
3Other amounts receivable
M
100
90
Other professional money market players
3
1Demand deposits
50
100
3
2
Amounts receivable in respect
of securities transactions
M)100
100
3
3Other amounts receivable
M
100
90
Other counterparties
1
Demand deposits0
0
2
Amounts receivable in respect
of securities transactions
M)100
90
4
3Other amounts receivable, including premature redemptions
M
5040
Receivables in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions
Reverse repo transactions (other than with central banks)
5
1Receivables in respect of bonds
M
100100
5
2Receivables in respect of shares
M
100100
Repo transactions (other than with central banks)
5
1Receivables in the form of bonds
M
90/d�/��90/d�/��
5
2Receivables in the form of shares
M
7070
Securities lending/borrowing transactions
5
1Securities stock on account of securities lending/borrrowing transactions
100
100
5
2Securities receivable on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions
M
100100
Other securities and gold
61
Other liquid shares
70
70
6
2
Unmarketable shares
0
0
2
3
Unmarketable bonds
M
100
100
4
Gold90
90
Official standby facilities
14
1Official standby facilities received
100
100
14
Receivables in respect of derivatives
M
******
Total
LIABILITIES
Moneys borrowed from central banks
7
1Overdrafts (payable within one week)
100
100
(continued on next page)
3946 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)
GROUP
ASSETSM
WEEK
MONTH
7
2Other amounts owed
M
100
100
Debt instruments issued by the bank itself
8
1Issued debt securities
M
100
100
8
2
Subordinated liabilities
M
100
100
Deposits and fixed-term loans
Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report
9
1Amounts owed in respect of securities transactions
M)
100100
9
2Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity
M
10090
Other credit institutions
91
Amounts owed in respect of
securities transactions
M)100
100
9
2Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity
M
10090
Other professional money market players
9
1Amounts owed in respect of securities transactions
M)
100100
9
2Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity – plus interest payable
M
10090
Other counterparties
1Amounts owed in respect of
securities transactions
M)100
100
10
2Deposits and other funding – fixed maturity – plus interest payable
M
5040
10
3Fixed-term savings deposits
M
20
20
Liabilities in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions
Repo transactions other than with central banks
11
1Amounts owed in respect of bonds
M
100100
11
2Amounts owed in respect of shares
M
100100
Reverse repo transactions other than with central banks
11
1Amounts owed in the form of bonds
M
100100
11
2Amounts owed in the form of shares
M
100100
Securities lending/borrowing transactions
11
1Negative securities stock on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions
100
100
11
2Securities to be delivered on account of securities lending/ borrowing transactions
M
100100
Credit balances and other moneys borrowed with an indefinite effective term
Dutch LB regulatory weights (continued)
GROUP
ASSETSM
WEEK
MONTH
Branches and banking subsidiaries not included in the report
12
1Current account balances and other demand deposits
50
100
12
Other credit institutions12
1
Balances on vostro accounts
of banks
5050
12
2Other demand deposits
50
100
Other professional money market players
12
1Demand deposits
50
100
Savings accounts
13
1Savings accounts without a fixed-term
2.5
10
Other
131
Demand deposits and other
liabilities
520
13
2Other amounts due and to be accounted for, including the balance of forward transactions and amounts due in respect of social and provident funds
5
20
Official standby facilities
141
Official standby facilities
granted
100100
Liabilities in respect of derivatives
14
1Known liabilities in respect of derivatives
M
******
14
2Unknown liabilities in respect of derivatives
***
***
Other contingent liabilities and irrevocable credit facilities
14
1Unused irrevocable credit facilities, including underwriting of issues
2.5
10
14
2Bills accepted
M
100
100
14
3
Credit-substitute guarantees
2.5
10
14
4
Non-credit-substitute
guarantees
1.255
14
5Other off-balance-sheet liabilities
1.25
5
Total
The values in columns WEEK and MONTH represent haircuts on assets and run-off rates of liabilities. For the liquidity test for the full month, a distinction is made between non- scheduled items and scheduled items. In contrast to non-scheduled items, sched- uled items are included on the basis of their possible or probable due dates. For the liquidity test for the first week, scheduled items are only included if they are explicitly taken into account in day-to-day liquidity management (treasury oper- ations). In the following table, scheduled items are indicated by the letter M. M = Scheduled item. M)= Settlement due within 1 week or open-ended, including first week or as scheduled. 90/d�/�� = 90% OR: less applicable discount (provided the method is consistently applied). * Less applicable discount. ** Either at stated percentage or at percentages applicable for ecb/escb collateral purposes. *** Calculated amount for the period concerned.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3947
A.1. Basel III LCR regulatory weights
Illustrative template for the liquidity coverage ratio
Item F
actor (to be multiplied against total amount)
T a
otal mount
With factor applied
Stock of high quality liquid assets
Cash 100%
Qualifying marketable
securities from sovereigns, central banks, public sector entities, and multi- lateral development banks
1
00%
Qualifying central bank receivables
1
00%
Domestic sovereign or central bank debt in domestic currency
1
00%
In addition, the Committee will gather data on the following instruments to analyse the impact of this standard on the financial sector
Qualifying corporate bonds rated AA or higher
8
0%
Qualifying corporate bonds rated A to AA
6
0%
Qualifying covered bonds rated AA or higher
8
0%
Qualifying covered bonds rated A- to AA-
6
0%
Total value of stock of highly liquid assets Cash outflows
Retail deposits
– Stable deposits Minimum 7.5%
– Less stable retail
deposits [additional categories to be determined by jurisdiction]
M
inimum 15%
Unsecured wholesale funding
– Stable, small
business customers M
inimum 7.5%
– Less stable, small business customers [additional categories to be determined by jurisdiction]
M
inimum 15%
– Non-financial corporates, no operational relationship
7
5%
Basel III LCR regulatory weights (continued)
Item F
actor (to be multiplied against total amount)
T a
otal mount
With factor applied
– Non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities with operational relationships
2 n o
5% of deposits eeded for perational purposes
– Other legal entity customers and sovereigns, central banks, and PSEs without operational relationships
1
00%
Secured funding
Funding from repo of
illiquid assets and securities lending/ borrowing transactions illiquid assets are lent out
1
00%
Additional requirements
Liabilities related to
derivative collateral calls related to a downgrade of up to 3-notches
1 w c c d
00% of collateral that ould be required to
over the contracts in ase of up to a 3-notch owngrade
Market valuation changes on derivatives transactions
A n [ b
mount should be ationally determined as relevant to specific anks]
Valuation changes on posted noncash or non-high quality sovereign debt collateral securing derivative transactions
2
0%
ABCP, SIVs, Conduits, etc
– Liabilities from
maturing ABCP, SIVs, SPVs, etc
1 a r
00% of maturing mounts and 100% of eturnable assets
Term Asset Backed Securities (including covered bonds)
1 a
00% of maturing mounts
Currently undrawn portion of committed credit and liquidity facilities to
– Retail clients 1
0% of outstanding lines
– Non-financial corporates; credit facilities
1 l
0% of outstanding ines
– Non-financial 1
00% of outstanding
(continued on next page)
3948 L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950
Basel III LCR regulatory weights (continued)
Item
Factor (to be multiplied against total amount)
Total amount
With factor applied
corporates; liquidity facilities
lines
– Other legal entity customers
100% of outstanding lines
Other contingent funding liabilities (such as guarantees, letters of credit, revocable credit and liquidity facilities etc.)
Determined by supervisors, specific to needs at certain banks
Planned outflows related to renewal or extension of new loans (retail or wholesale)
100%
Any other cash outflows (including planned derivative payables)
Total cash outflows
Cash InflowsAmounts receivable
from retail counterparties
100% of planned inflows from performing assets
Amounts receivable from wholesale counterparties
100% of planned inflows from performing wholesale customers
Receivables in respect of repo and reverse repo transactions backed by illiquid assets and securities lending/ borrowing transactions where illiquid assets are borrowed.
100%
Other cash inflows
Total cash inflowsNet cash outflows
(= Total cash outflows minus Total cash inflows)
Liquidity coverage ratio (= Total value of stock of high quality liquid assets/Net cash outflows)
Source: BCBS (2009).
Appendix B. Definition of variables
Variable
Definition
Cash inflow, different maturities
(Claims with fixed maturities + Claims on behalf of security transactions + Retail loans to households and corporates + Secured wholesale loans + Illiquid bonds + Claims on behalf of derivatives)/Total assets
Cash outflow, different maturities
(Liabilities related to refinancing operations to Central Bank due beyond 1 week + Issued securities + Wholesale fixed term deposits + Retail fixed term deposits + Secured wholesale borrowing + Liabilities on behalf of derivatives)/Total assets
Crisis
Dummy variable with value 1 for August 2007 to end of sample (March 2010), and value 0 before August 2007
ECB
ECB non-standard measures, asset puchases (i.e. outstanding amount of Securities Market Program, SMP) + outstandings of Long Term Refinancing operations (LTRO), in millions of euros
Equity ratio
Tier 1 equity/Total assetsRetail deposits
(Retail demand deposits + Retail fixed
term deposits)/Total assets
Retail demand
deposits
Retail demand deposits/Total assets
Retail funding
Unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis, with high factor loadings on Retail deposits/Total assets and Retail demand deposits/ Total assets. See Section 9.
Capitalization
Unobserved summary variable obtained by factor analysis, with high factor loadings on Tier 1 equity ratio and Z-score. See Section 9.
Stock of liquid assets
(Cash + Claims demandable on short notice + Liquid debt instruments eligible as ECB collateral + Other liquid debt instruments + Securities + Liquid stocks)/Total assets
Stock of liquid liabilities
(Liabilities related to refinancing operations to Central Bank due within 1 week + Wholesale demand deposits + Retail demand deposits + Off balance sheet liabilities)/Total assets
Z-score
Distance to default, measured as (Return on assets + Tier 1 equity ratio)/ Standard deviation of Return on assets over previous 36 months
Appendix C
Table C1.
Table C1 Estimation results for equation (17): comparison of original results from Table 2 with alternative 2SLS results (Dependent variable is stock of liquid assets).
Whole sample Of which: Top-5 banks Other Dutch banks Foreign subsidiaries Foreign branches
Original (Table 2)
2SLS Original (Table 2)
2SLS Original (Table 2)
2SLS Original (Table 2)
2SLS Original (Table 2)
2SLS
Stock of liquid liabilities
0.436** 0.451*** 0.562*** 0.559*** 0.901*** 0.897*** 0.661*** 0.681*** 0.191*** 0.172***
(0.171) (0.007) (0.093) (0.034) (0.083) (0.020) (0.067) (0.042) (0.033) (0.006) Cash inflow �0.420*** �0.510*** �0.838** �0.950*** �0.912*** �0.901*** 0.128 �0.232 �0.340* �0.563*** <1 month (0.157) (0.129) (0.230) (0.099) (0.092) (0.043) (0.481) (0.404) (0.172) (0.169) Cash outflow 0.938*** 0.984*** 0.897*** 0.956*** 1.007*** 0.999*** �0.379 �0.531* 0.184 0.159 <1 month (0.072) (0.087) (0.124) (0.065) (0.008) (0.034) (0.623) (0.320) (0.143) (0.153) Net cash inflow �1.105 �0.989*** �0.170 �0.120 0.196 0.173** �1.738* �1.326*** �0.408 �0.205* 1–<3 months (0.683) (0.152) (0.225) (0.117) (0.196) (0.085) (0.885) (0.283) (0.302) (0.119) Net cash inflow 0.167 0.149 �0.704*** �0.767*** �1.023*** �1.014*** 0.232 �0.007 �0.114 �0.149 3–<6 months (0.375) (0.133) (0.146) (0.161) (0.137) (0.071) (0.456) (0.291) (0.100) (0.129) Net cash inflow -0.292 �0.299*** �1.056** �1.071*** �0.054 �0.054 �0.693** �0.757*** �0.092 �0.028 6–<12 months (0.180) (0.112) (0.236) (0.134) (0.109) (0.062) (0.292) (0.198) (0.129) (0.121) Net cash inflow �0.137 �0.091 �0.128 �0.092* �0.602*** �0.602*** �0.288** �0.360*** �0.218 �0.215** >12 months (0.190) (0.062) (0.116) (0.048) (0.068) (0.035) (0.116) (0.100) (0.184) (0.086) R2-within 0.833 0.838 0.832 0.829 0.994 0.994 0.726 0.775 0.598 0.572 Number of obs. 4631 4569 375 370 1408 1389 1425 1406 1423 1404 Number of banks 62 62 5 5 19 19 19 19 19 19
Note: Two-way fixed bank and time effects regression. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, are given within parentheses; All variables have been scaled by total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. In the 2SLS regression, Stock liquid liabilities, Cash inflow < 1 month and Cash outflow < 1 month have been instru- mented, using their lagged values and all model variables as instruments. *** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 1%. ** Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 5%. * Denote that their p-values are less than or equal to 10%.
L. de Haan, J.W. van den End / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3930–3950 3949
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- Bank liquidity, the maturity ladder, and regulation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Literature review
- 3 Liquidity regulation
- 3.1 Dutch regulation
- 3.2 Basel III
- 3.3 Dutch liquidity regulation in the euro area context
- 4 Stock liquidity, maturity transformation, and the maturity ladder
- 5 Data
- 6 Estimation results
- 7 How does liquidity management relate to liquidity regulation?
- 8 Liquidity management during the crisis
- 9 Liquidity management and bank characteristics
- 10 Conclusions
- Acknowledgements
- Appendix A Dutch LB regulatory weights
- A.1 Basel III LCR regulatory weights
- Appendix B Definition of variables
- Appendix C
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426614000740-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Macroprudential and monetary policies: Implications for financial stability and welfare
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.012 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1159514768. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Rubio), jose.carrasco@
urjc.es (J.A. Carrasco-Gallego). 1 See, for instance, Abraham et al. (2008) and Duca et al. (2011).
Margarita Rubio a,⇑, José A. Carrasco-Gallego a,b a University of Nottingham, School of Economics, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK b Departamento de Economía Aplicada I, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, P. de los Artilleros, 28032 Madrid, Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 15 July 2013 Accepted 16 February 2014 Available online 6 March 2014
JEL classification: E32 E44 E58
Keywords: Macroprudential Monetary policy Welfare Financial stability Loan-to-value Kaldor–Hicks efficiency
a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we analyze the implications of macroprudential and monetary policies for business cycles, welfare, and financial stability. We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing and collateral constraints. A macroprudential rule for the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), which responds to credit growth, interacts with a traditional Taylor rule for monetary policy. We compute the optimal parameters of these rules both when monetary and macroprudential policies act in a coor- dinated and in a non-coordinated way. We find that both policies acting together unambiguously improves the stability of the system. In both cases, this interaction is welfare improving for the society, especially in the case of the non-coordinated game. There is though a trade-off between borrowers and savers. However, borrowers can compensate the saver’s welfare loss �a la Kaldor–Hicks to achieve a Par- eto-superior outcome.
� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
‘‘Normally, however, the policy rate is not the only available tool, and much better instruments are available for achieving and main- taining financial stability. Monetary policy should be the last line of defence of financial stability, not the first line.’’ Svensson (2012)
1. Introduction
The housing sector is key to understand how the recent finan- cial crisis developed and, therefore, crucial for designing recovery and prevention policies. The financial crisis was born in the hous- ing sector, grew in the financial sector and had its final conse- quences in the real sector. Financial innovations made the financial system increasingly complex and interconnected, leading to an expansion of systemic risk, especially through the mortgage market. In this context, when house prices collapsed, micro-pru- dential policies, those dedicated to prevent the risk from each com-
pany, had not managed to avoid the contagion to the real sector, and the crisis spread across the financial system to the real econ- omy. Then, a great recession affected the whole economy, causing a high level of unemployment. Thus, from a policy perspective, tra- ditional measures have not seemed to be sufficient to, first, avoid the crisis and, second, have a fast and effective recovery.
As a result, several institutions have implemented macropru- dential tools in order to explicitly promote the stability of the financial system in a global sense, not just focusing on individual companies. The goal of this kind of regulation is to avoid the trans- mission of financial shocks to the broader economy. Some exam- ples of macroprudential tools are asset-side tools (loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio caps), liquidity-based tools (coun- tercyclical liquidity requirements), or capital-based tools (counter- cyclical capital buffers, sectorial capital requirements or dynamic provisions).
The LTV requirement is a limit on the value of a loan relative to the underlying collateral (e.g. residential property). Several studies have pointed out that higher LTV ratios combined with higher risk mortgages contributed to the mortgage crisis.1 The LTV is nowa-
M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336 327
days described as one of the main macroprudential instruments to ‘‘mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage’’ by the European Systemic Risk Board.2 Within the EU, LTV limits are available in the national prudential framework of 16 Member States.3
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the implications of a macro- prudential LTV tool for business cycles, financial stability, and wel- fare, as well as its interaction with monetary policy. In order to do that, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which features a housing market.
The modelling framework consists of an economy composed of borrowers and savers. In particular, our model imposes a limit on borrowing, that is, loans need to be collateralized by a proportion of the value of the assets that the borrower owns. This proportion can be interpreted as an LTV. The macroprudential tool we propose is a rule that automatically reduces loan-to-values when there is a credit boom, therefore limiting the expansion of credit. We assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ra- tio, so that it responds to credit growth, in the spirit of the Basel III regulation which aims at avoiding episodes of excessive credit growth. The monetary policy literature has extensively shown that simple rules result in a good performance; therefore, it seems sen- sible to apply these kinds of rules to macroprudential supervision. This microfounded general equilibrium model allows us to explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy and the credit market. Furthermore, such a model can deal with wel- fare-related issues.
In the context of this model, we address several research ques- tions. First, we study the welfare gain for each agent and for the aggregate both for different levels of a static LTV and for different values of the reaction parameters of the macroprudential rule. In this way, we discuss the welfare trade-offs that may appear be- tween borrowers and savers. Second, we analyze the combination of monetary and macroprudential policy parameters that maxi- mize welfare when the macroprudential regulator and the central bank are coordinated and when they are not. Third, we discuss a Pareto-superior outcome to overcome this trade-off by a system of transfers �a la Kaldor–Hicks. Then, we study the dynamics of the model under the optimal parameters. Finally, we graphically convey our results to highlight the effects on macroeconomic and financial stability of introducing a new macroprudential policy based on the LTV ratio.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: Section 1.1 reviews the literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the welfare analysis. Section 4 computes the optimal parameter combination of the different policies in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated situation. It also develops a rule to obtain a Pare- to-superior outcome, presents results from simulations, and con- veys the results graphically to show the effects of the macroprudential policy on financial and macroeconomic stability. Section 5 concludes.
1.1. Related literature
Our paper fits into the literature that introduces a macropru- dential rule and studies its effects using a DSGE model. Other examples are, for instance, Antipa et al. (2010), who uses a DSGE model to show that macroprudential policies would have been effective in smoothing the past credit cycle and in reducing the intensity of the recession. Another example is Borio and Shim (2007), which emphasizes the complementary role of macropru- dential policy to monetary policy and its supportive function as a
2 See Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board (2013). 3 More world results are available in Lim et al. (2011).
4 Borio et al. (2001) also evaluated limits on the LTV. 5 See Borio and Shim (2007) for a distinction between rules and discretion in
calibrating the tools of macroprudential policy. 6 See Galati and Moessner (2013) for an extensive review.
built-in stabilizer. As well, N’Diaye (2009) shows that monetary policy can be supported by countercyclical prudential regulation. Angelini et al. (2012) uses a DSGE model with a banking sector and shows interactions between capital requirement ratios as a macroprudential tool and monetary policy; they find that macro- prudential policies are most helpful to counter financial shocks that lead the credit and asset price booms. We find in our paper that macroprudential policies moderate credit booms. Further- more, for housing demand shocks, the combination of the macro- prudential and the monetary policies manages to control credit without moderating the real effects of the boom.
Since there is an extensive consensus that the origin of the last crisis is related to real estate booms and busts, we have focused on the effects of a macroprudential tool that has to do with the hous- ing sector. However, while most papers in the field tend to analyze macroprudential policies through the lens of a countercyclical bank leverage rule (e.g. Angelini et al., 2012; Christensen et al, 2011), in our paper, we study how a key element of the real estate sector, namely the LTV, can serve as a macroprudential tool to im- prove financial stability.4 With a macroprudential orientation, Kan- nan et al. (2012) also examines a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values with a macropruden- tial instrument based on the LTV; they remark on the importance of identifying the source of the shock of the housing price boom when assessing policy optimality. Funke and Paetz (2012) considerers a non-linear version of a macroprudential rule for the LTV. Following this literature, we propose a macroprudential policy based on a Tay- lor-type automatic rule.5 By analogy with monetary policy, rule- based macroprudential tools – for example, automatic stabilizers – appear appealing (Goodhart, 2004).
One question that arises from the topic is what the objective of the macroprudential authority should be. In recent years, research on macroprudential issues has been wide and intense6 and there is an increasing consensus among academics and policy makers that ‘‘the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole’’ (Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board, 2013). In this way, Almeida et al. (2006) has studied the effect on the ampli- tude of the credit cycle results from the mitigating impact of more stringent LTV ratios on the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism. They find that when a positive income shock leads to an increase in hous- ing prices, the increase in borrowing is expected to be lower in coun- tries with lower LTV ratios. Gelain et al. (2013) evaluates different policy actions that might be used to dampen the resulting excess volatility, including a direct response to house-price growth or credit growth in the central bank’s interest rate rule, the imposition of a more restrictive loan-to-value ratio, and the use of a modified collat- eral constraint that takes into account the borrower’s wage income. We contribute to this line of research, finding that when we use the macroprudential policy based on the LTV, both the macroeconomy and the financial system become more stable. To illustrate that, we construct policy frontiers (Taylor curves) including not only the tra- ditional objectives of monetary policy but also the objective of the macroprudential regulator: financial stability. As a measure of finan- cial stability we propose the variability of borrowing. This three- dimensional policy frontier shows graphically that the macropru- dential policy unambiguously helps to achieve a more stable finan- cial and macroeconomic situation.
A central issue that we cover in our paper is the interaction be- tween monetary and macroprudential policies. There is no consen- sus on whether both policies should act in a coordinated or in a
328 M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
non-coordinated way. For instance, Bean et al. (2010), with a DSGE model adapted from Gertler and Karadi (2011), studies how the use of a macroprudential policy tool based on a lump-sum levy or subsidy on the banking sector might affect the conduct of mon- etary policy. Their results suggest that monetary and macropru- dential policies should be coordinated, since they are not merely substitutes, but they mention that the issue of coordination needs to be studied further. Beau et al. (2012) claims that it is preferable to have a combination of separate objectives for monetary and macroprudential policies, with monetary policy taking the macro- economic effects of macroprudential policy into account in choos- ing interest rates, that is, the non-coordinated case would be preferable. Angelini et al. (2012) studies the coordination issue in a context in which the macroprudential regulator uses capital requirements as a tool to achieve financial stability. They find that lack of cooperation between a macroprudential authority and a central bank may actually generate conflicting policies and, there- fore, cooperation is preferred. In our paper, we also distinguish be- tween the cases of coordination and non-coordination to try to shed some light on this issue. As argued by Svensson (2012), we find that the non-coordination game delivers higher social welfare and then is preferable. When each authority focuses on its own objective, they are more effective in minimizing both macroeco- nomic and financial variability.
Finally, measuring the potential welfare improvement of mac- roprudential policies has deserved the special attention of academ- ics. Some papers have found that the macroprudential reaction to exogenous shocks can make some people better off (typically bor- rowers), but not every type of household, or not in all cases. For in- stance, Lambertini et al. (2013) extends the Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model to incorporate news shocks and a macroprudential rule on the LTV. They find that an optimized LTV-ratio rule that re- sponds to credit growth is a Pareto-improving policy compared to the use of a constant LTV ratio. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) performes a welfare analysis in a DSGE model with borrowers and savers and determines that, although high LTV ratios have a di- rect positive effect on welfare through constraint relaxation, other indirect effects may dominate. Angelini et al. (2012) also discusses the issue and concludes that there is no regime that makes all agents better-off. They claim that the optimal (from a welfare per- spective) monetary and macroprudential policies may depend on which agent’s welfare is used as objective in the computation of the policies, and also on the type of shock considered. In our paper, we actively contribute to this discussion. We focus on highlighting the welfare trade-offs between agents in order to carefully charac- terize the conditions under which there is room for Pareto improvements. By analyzing welfare for a static LTV, we find an LTV threshold below which there is room for Pareto-improving solutions. However, for higher values the trade-off between bor- rowers and savers appears. Since a plausible value for the LTV tends to be higher than this value, we also observe this trade-off when calculating the optimal macroprudential rule. Thus, we pro- pose a system of transfers �a la Kaldor–Hicks in which borrowers would compensate savers so that they are indifferent between hav- ing the macroprudential policy or not. In this way, we obtain a Par- eto-superior outcome.7
2. Model setup
The modelling framework is a DSGE model with a housing mar- ket, following Iacoviello (2005). The model is solved by log-linear-
7 This is the first time that this criterion has been applied in the macroprudential context, albeit it is widely used in regulatory analysis in Law and Economics. See for instance Posner (2007).
izing the equilibrium equations around a well-defined steady state. The use of DSGE models for the study of macroprudential policies has some limitations and deserves some discussion. When using DSGE models for monetary policy evaluation, the dynamics of the model are matched with the monetary policy transmission mechanism found in the data. However, for macroprudential poli- cies, empirical applications are rare. Furthermore, the macropru- dential analysis often refers to the vulnerability of the financial system to exceptional events related to non-equilibrium, which cannot be captured by a DSGE model. At the same time, a drawback of DSGE models is that they are infinite horizon models and, there- fore, are not well suited to incorporate state contingency in a meaningful way. As a result, DSGE models have problems of mod- elling financial intermediation and frictions (Bean, 2009). However, regardless of these limitations, DSGE models are often used for macroprudential analysis since they count with other advantages: First, they can be compared with a benchmark in which there is only monetary policy. Second, they include many sources of shocks that can be used to check for different economic trajectories. More- over, they rely on general equilibrium analysis and are suitable for simulations to study the impact of new policy instruments. Also, calibrated parameters can be altered to test for alternative policy scenarios. And finally, since DSGE models are microfounded, they are suitable to study welfare issues.8
In our model, the economy features patient and impatient households, a final goods firm, and a central bank which conducts monetary policy. Households work and consume both consump- tion goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are sav- ers and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are credit constrained and need collateral to obtain loans. The representative firm con- verts household labor into the final good. The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates. The macroprudential authority sets the LTV following a Taylor-type rule.
2.1. Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consump- tion, housing and labor hours:
max Cs;t;Hs;t;Ns;t
E0 X1 t¼0
bts log Cs;t þ jt log Hs;t � ðNs;tÞ
g
g
� � ;
where bs 2 ð0; 1Þ is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs;t; Hs;t and Ns;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1=ðg � 1Þ is the la- bor supply elasticity, g > 0. jt represents the weight of housing in the utility function. We assume that log ðjtÞ¼ log ðjÞþ uJt , where uJt follows an autoregressive process. A shock to jt represents a shock to the marginal utility of housing.
Subject to the budget constraint:
Cs;t þ bt þ qtðHs;t � Hs;t�1Þ¼ Rt�1bt�1
pt þ ws;t Ns;t þ Ft; ð1Þ
where bt denotes bank deposits, Rt is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in units of consumption, and ws;t is the real wage rate. F t are lump-sum profits received from the firms. The first order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
1 Cs;t ¼ bs Et
Rt ptþ1 Cs;tþ1
� � ; ð2Þ
wst ¼ðNs;tÞ g�1Cs;t; ð3Þ
jt Hs;t ¼
1 Cs;t
qt � bsEt 1
Cs;tþ1 qtþ1: ð4Þ
8 See Brázdik et al. (2012) for further discussion.
M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336 329
Eq. (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for con- sumption. Eq. (4) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, benefits for consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Eq. (3) is the labor-supply condition.
2.2. Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
max Cb;t;Hb;t;Nb;t
E0 X1 t¼0
btb log Cb;t þ jt log Hb;t � ðNb;tÞ
g
g
� � ;
where bb 2 ð0; 1Þ is the impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
Cb;t þ Rt�1bt�1
pt þ qtðHb;t � Hb;t�1Þ¼ bt þ W b;t Nb;t; ð5Þ
Et Rt
ptþ1 bt ¼ kt Et qtþ1 Hb;t; ð6Þ
where bt denotes bank loans and Rt is the gross interest rate. kt can be interpreted as a loan-to-value ratio. The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. The first order conditions are as follows:
1 Cb;t ¼ bbEt
Rt ptþ1Cb;tþ1
� � þ kt Rt; ð7Þ
wb;t ¼ðNb;tÞ g�1Cb;t; ð8Þ
jt Hb;t ¼
1 Cb;t
qt � bbEt 1
Cb;tþ1 qtþ1
� � � kt kt Etðqtþ1ptþ1Þ; ð9Þ
where kt denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. 9 These
first order conditions can be interpreted analogously to those of savers.
2.3. Firms
2.3.1. Final goods producers There is a continuum of identical final goods producers that
operate under perfect competition and flexible prices. They aggre- gate intermediate goods according to the production function
Y t ¼ Z 1
0 Y tðzÞ
e�1 e dz
� � e e�1
; ð10Þ
where e > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The final good firm chooses Y tðzÞ to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Y tðzÞ¼ PtðzÞ
Pt
� ��e Y t: ð11Þ
The price index is then given by:
Pt ¼ Z 1
0 PtðzÞ
1�e dz � � 1
e�1
: ð12Þ
2.3.2. Intermediate goods producers The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive.
Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate goods are produced according to the production function:
Y tðzÞ¼ At Ns;tðzÞ aNb;tðzÞ
ð1�aÞ ; ð13Þ
where a 2 ½0; 1� measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.10 This Cobb–Douglas production function implies that labor
9 Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the collateral constraint holds with equality.
10 Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
11 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers therefore more experienced.
12 Symmetry across firms allows us to write the demands without the index z. 13 Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
efforts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes. This specification is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justified by the fact that savers are the managers of the firms and their wage is higher than that of the borrowers.11
At represents technology and it follows the following autore- gressive process:
log ðAtÞ¼ qA log ðAt�1Þþ uAt; ð14Þ
where qA is the autoregressive coefficient and uAt is a normally dis- tributed shock to technology. We normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
ws;t ¼ 1 Xt
a Y t
Ns;t ; ð15Þ
wb;t ¼ 1 Xt ð1 � aÞ
Y t Nb;t
; ð16Þ
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. 12
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An intermediate good producer sells its good at price PtðzÞ, and 1 � h;2 ½0; 1�, is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal re- set price P�tðzÞ solves: X1 k¼0 ðhbÞkEt Kt;k
P�tðzÞ Ptþk
� e=ðe � 1Þ
Xtþk
� � Y�tþkðzÞ
� � ¼ 0; ð17Þ
where e=ðe � 1Þ is the steady-state markup. The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt ¼ hP1�et�1 þð1 � hÞ P � t
� 1�eh i1=ð1�eÞ : ð18Þ
Using (17) and (18), and log-linearizing, we can obtain a stan- dard forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve p̂t ¼ bEtp̂tþ1 � wx̂t þ upt , that relates inflation positively to future inflation and negatively to the markup ðw �ð1 � hÞð1 � bhÞ=hÞ. upt is a normally distributed cost-push shock.13
2.4. Monetary policy
We consider a Taylor rule which responds to inflation and out- put growth:
Rt ¼ðRt�1Þ qððptÞ
ð1þ/RpÞðY t=Y t�1Þ /Ry RÞ
1�q eRt; ð19Þ
where 0 6 q � 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, /Rp P 0 and /
R y P 0 measure the response of interest rates
to current inflation and output growth, respectively. eRt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance r2e .
2.5. A macroprudential rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a fixed parameter which is not affected by economic conditions. However, we can think of reg- ulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent
,
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
LTV
W el
fa re
g ai
n (C
E )
Total Savers Borrowers
Fig. 1. Welfare gains from increasing the LTV ratio, everything else constant. Benchmark case: no macroprudential regulator.
330 M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
research on macroprudential policies has proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such as the growth rates of GDP, credits, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple illustration of how a mac- roprudential policy could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to credit growth, in the spirit of the Basel III reg- ulation which aims at avoiding episodes of excessive credit growth14:
kt ¼ kSS bt
bt�1
� ��/k b
; ð20Þ
where kSS is a steady state value for the loan-to-value ratio, and /kb P 0 measures the response of the loan-to-to value to the credit growth. This kind of rule would deliver a lower LTV ratio in booms, when there is excessive credit growth, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom derived from good economic conditions (and symmetrically for recessions).15
2.6. Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Y t ¼ Cs;t þ Cb;t: ð21Þ
The total supply of housing is fixed and it is normalized to unity:
Hs;t þ Hb;t ¼ 1: ð22Þ
3. Welfare
3.1. Welfare measure
To assess the normative implications of macroprudential and monetary policies, we numerically evaluate the welfare derived in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately.16 The individual welfare for sav- ers and borrowers, respectively, as follows:
W s;t � Et X1 m¼0
bms log Cs;tþm þ j log Hs;tþm � ðNs;tþmÞ
g
g
� � ; ð23Þ
W b;t � Et X1 m¼0
bmb log Cb;tþm þ j log Hb;tþm � ðNb;tþmÞ
g
g
� � : ð24Þ
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we define social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual welfare for the differ- ent types of households:
W t ¼ð1 � bsÞW s;t þð1 � bbÞW b;t: ð25Þ
14 See Kannan et al. (2012) for a similar specification. 15 The feasibility of implementing an LTV rule at a quarterly frequency may be
questionable in practice. However, as the Committee on the Global Financial System (2012) suggests, once the legal and operational infrastructure is in place, LTV changes can be implemented rather rapidly, given that many jurisdictions have ample experience with these tools at the practical level.
16 We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt- Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
Each agent’s welfare is weighted by her discount factor, respec- tively, so that all the groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
However, in order to make the results more intuitive, we pres- ent welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents. The con- sumption equivalent measure defines the constant fraction of consumption that households should give away in order to obtain the benefits of the macroprudential policy. A positive value means a welfare gain, that is, how much the consumer would be willing to pay to obtain the welfare improvement. Then, when there is a wel- fare gain, households would be willing to pay in consumption units for the measure to be implemented because it is welfare improv- ing. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the mac- roprudential policy is not active and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. The derivation of the welfare benefits in terms of consumption equivalent units is as follows:
CEs ¼ exp ð1 � bsÞ W MP s � W
� s
�h i � 1; ð26Þ
CEb ¼ exp ð1 � bbÞ W MP b � W
� b
�h i � 1; ð27Þ
where the superscripts in the welfare values denote the benchmark case when macroprudential policies are not introduced and the case in which they are, respectively.17
3.2. Welfare trade-offs
The literature typically finds that the macroprudential reaction to exogenous shocks can make some people better off (typically borrowers), but not every type of household, or not in all cases. This is why, welfare comparisons should not only be made on the basis of an ad hoc aggregate welfare function but disaggregat- ing welfare between agents, to highlight the trade-offs that may appear between them.
In this section, we first compute welfare for each individual and for the aggregate, when we have a static LTV. Then, we numerically evaluate welfare gains when we introduce a macroprudential rule, given the Taylor rule.
Fig. 1 presents welfare gains, in consumption equivalents, for different values of the LTV, when there is no macroprudential rule in place. Here, we observe that up to a threshold LTV value, there is
7 We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 -0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
phib
W el
fa re
g ai
n (C
E )
Total Savers Borrowers
Fig. 2. Welfare gains from introducing the macroprudential rule, given monetary policy (different values of the reaction parameter for borrowing).
M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336 331
room for Pareto optimal policies. However, starting from a value of 0.55, there is a trade-off between borrowers and savers in terms of welfare when we keep increasing the LTV. Large values of the LTV harm borrowers while savers benefit from the increase. Social wel- fare decreases. This result is in line with that of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), who performes a welfare analysis in a DSGE model with borrowers and savers and determined that although high LTV ratios have a direct positive effect on welfare through constraint relaxation, other indirect effects may dominate. Notice that k, the LTV ratio, is a parameter that strongly affects the collat- eral constraint. A small change in this parameter can cause very large changes in borrowing that can be excessive. Higher LTVs lead to higher consumption levels, because borrowing constraints are always binding: the more borrowers are offered, the more they take. But this in turn, as shown in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), changes relative prices. In particular, higher consumption levels imply higher interest rates. This could lead to a situation of overindebtedness in the sense that high repayments could offset the positive effects on constraint relaxation. Then, higher interest rates imply higher returns on saving for savers. Smith (2009) shows that these results do not rely on the specific assumptions of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009); even in the simplest model with borrowers, savers, and collateral constraints, this effect takes place.18
Fig. 2 shows the welfare gains from introducing a macropruden- tial tool in the economy, given the Taylor rule. We use a steady- state value of the LTV of 0.9, as in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello (2013). Therefore, we are in a region in which trade-offs should ap- pear. Leaving fixed monetary policy, we present welfare for a con- tinuum of values of the reaction parameters in the LTV rule, from a less to a more aggressive rule. The figure is very informative be- cause it shows welfare gains for each agent in the economy and for the aggregate. The conclusions we can obtain from the figure are the following: using both policy measures at the same time is unambiguously welfare enhancing, as we can observe from the solid line. We can see that welfare increases by more, the larger the response of the LTV to credit growth is, but up to a point at which welfare stops increasing. The figure also shows the trade- off between borrowers’ and savers’ welfare, illustrated by the dif-
18 Huggett (1997) also found a similar result, but in this case is the reduction in the precautionary motive for saving, driven by the looser borrowing constraints, wha leads to the increase in the interest rate.
19 Andres et al. (2013) find that optimal monetary policy may involve a trade-of between the stabilization of inflation, output gap, consumption gap and the distribution of the collateral asset between constrained and unconstrained
t
ference between the two dashed lines. Borrowers’ welfare in- creases with the introduction of the macroprudential rule because tightening the collateral constraint avoids situations of overindebt- edness in which debt repayments are a burden for them. Further- more, borrowers can benefit from more financial stability in the economy, as we will show later on. Notice that borrowers have a collateral constraint which is always binding and this does not al- low them to make consumption smoothing. They do not have an Euler equation to smooth consumption as savers do. A more stable financial system smooths their consumption path thus mitigating the negative effects of the collateral constraint. This welfare gain is at the expense of savers, who lose from having this measure in the economy, given that they are not financially constrained. How- ever, the borrower’s welfare gain compensates the loss of the sav- ers and globally, the measure is welfare increasing.
The next section performs an optimal policy analysis in order to assess which are the combination of values of the reaction param- eters which would maximize welfare and make policy recommen- dations on this issue.
4. Optimal policy analysis
4.1. Optimal parameters
In this section, we aim to find the optimal combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare. For this purpose, we consider three different cases. A benchmark case in which there is only a monetary authority that acts in the traditional way, using the interest rate as an instrument. Then, we include a macroprudential authority that introduces an extra instrument, the LTV ratio. We study the interaction between the two authorities from two per- spectives, when they act both in a coordinated and in a non-coor- dinated way.
The optimal policy analysis, in models with financial frictions, deserves some discussion. In the standard new Keynesian model, the central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and inflation to reduce the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. However, in models with collateral constraints, welfare analysis and the design of optimal policies in- volves a number of issues not considered in standard sticky-price models. In models with constrained individuals, there are two types of distortions: price rigidities and credit frictions. This cre- ates conflicts and trade-offs between borrowers and savers. Savers may prefer policies that reduce the price stickiness distortion. However, borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the pervasive effect of the collateral constraint is softened. Borrowers operate in a second-best situation. They consume according to the borrowing constraint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for consumption. Borrowers cannot smooth consumption by them- selves, but a more stable financial system would provide them a setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother. Therefore, in order to assess the optimality of policies, factors that help bor- rowers smooth their consumption should be included. Studies show that, in these kind of models, financial variables should be in- cluded in the loss function that the policy maker aims at minimizing.19
In the standard sticky-price model, the Taylor rule of the central bank is consistent with a loss function that includes the variability of inflation and output. In order to rationalize the Taylor rule of the macroprudential regulator, we follow Angelini et al. (2012) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also con-
consumers.
f
Table 1 Optimal macroprudential and monetary policy mix.
Benchmark Coordinated Non-coordinated
/k�b – 0.8 0.7
1 þ /R�p 16.1 1.3 1.7 /R�y 8.2 0.5 1
Social Welfare Gain – 0.024 0.041 Borrowers Welfare Gain – 0.22 0.31 Savers Welfare Gain – �0.16 �0.21 r2b 1.4308 1.1861 1.1767 r2p 0.2183 0.3481 0.3025 r2y 1.9113 1.7877 1.8087
2 Notice that here, we are considering that the central bank acts in a traditional
332 M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
tains financial variables, namely borrowing variability, as a proxy for financial stability. Then, there would be a loss function for the economy that would include not only the variability of output and inflation but also the variability of borrowing: L ¼ r2p þ kyr2y þ r2b where r
2 p; r
2 y and r
2 b are the variances of infla-
tion, output and borrowing. ky P 0, represents the relative weight of the central bank to the stabilization of output.20
If the central bank and the macroprudential regulator coordi- nate, they would aim at jointly minimizing the loss function each one with its own instrument. The problem becomes analogous to the Mundell’s assignment rule in which each arm of policy concen- trates on a single task, addressing the issue it cares most about, and making coordination of policy trivial.21 Following this line of argu- ment, we consider a case in which we jointly optimize the parame- ters of both rules.
However, Svensson (2012) argues that conducting monetary policy and financial stability policy in an integrated way may be inappropriate, since monetary policy and financial-stability policy are distinct and separate policies with different objectives and dif- ferent instruments. Tinbergen (1952) put forth what we now call the ‘Tinbergen principle,’ that policymakers need at least one inde- pendent policy instrument for each policy objective. Since the pol- icy interest rate is used by monetary policymakers to achieve the objective of price stability, at least one other instrument is required to achieve the additional objective of financial stability of macro- prudential policy. Svensson (2012) suggests that monetary policy should be in charge of price stability while macroprudential policy needs to address financial stability. He argues that monetary policy should be conducted taking the macroprudential policy into ac- count, and vice versa, as in a Nash equilibrium rather than a coor- dinated equilibrium. Therefore, we study a second case in which the central bank and the macroprudential regulator play a non- coordinated game. The central bank would find the optimal param- eters in its policy rule, taking the macroprudential regulator behav- ior as given. Similarly, the macroprudential authority would find the best response given monetary policy. The intersection of these two best responses would give us the Nash equilibrium.
In order to contribute to the discussion and evaluate the welfare gains of introducing macroprudential polices, we first compute the optimal parameters of the Taylor rule for monetary policy, assum- ing that there is no macroprudential regulator. Then, we compute the optimal monetary and macroprudential policies for the coordi- nated and the non-coordinated game.
Table 1 shows the optimal parameter values and the welfare gains in consumption equivalents, taking as a benchmark the situ- ation without macroprudential policy. We also present the implied volatilities.
20 This loss function would be consistent with studies that make a second-order approximation of the utility of individuals and find that it differs from the standard case by including financial variables.
21 See Mundell (1962).
As expected, when a macroprudential regulator does not exist, the central bank needs to act in a very aggressive way, given that it only counts with a single instrument to minimize the loss func- tion.22 We take this case as a benchmark, both for welfare and for macroeconomic and financial volatilities (presented in the first column).
The second column presents the case in which there is a macro- prudential regulator that acts in a coordinated way with the cen- tral bank. We see that adding this extra instrument produces a welfare gain in the economy. In this case, monetary policy does not need to be as aggressive as in the benchmark case because it counts with the help of the macroprudential policy. However, as al- ready pointed out, there is a trade-off between borrowers and sav- ers and, while borrowers are better-off, savers are not. Furthermore, if we compare the volatilities that this combination of policies generates, with respect to the benchmark case, we ob- serve that the standard deviation of borrowing decreases, which is what makes borrower’s welfare increase. In terms of the macro- economic volatilities, we see that the volatility of output decreases, but this comes at the expense of a higher inflation volatility.23 This higher inflation volatility contributes to a decrease in savers’ welfare.
Nevertheless, if both authorities act in a non-coordinated way, social welfare gains are even higher. As Svensson (2012) argues, letting each regulator focus on its own objective, leads to more effective results in reducing volatilities. In this case, monetary pol- icy acts in a more aggressive way, favoring the reduction of the vol- atility of inflation. The macroprudential authority reaction parameter does not need to be as high as in the previous case to obtain a lower standard deviation of borrowing. As usual, we also observe the same trade-off between borrowers and savers.
4.2. Pareto-superior outcomes
Results from optimal policy analysis show that trade-offs be- tween the two agents appear. However, if the welfare gain that borrowers obtain is large enough, there could be room for Pare- to-superior outcomes.
In order to do that, we apply the concept of Kaldor–Hicks effi- ciency, also known as Kaldor–Hicks criterion.24 Under this criterion, an outcome is considered more efficient if a Pareto-superior out- come can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those that are made better off to those that are made worse off so that all would end up no worse off than before. The Kaldor–Hicks cri- terion does not require the compensation actually being paid, merely that the possibility for compensation exists, and thus need not leave each at least as well off.
In our case, our measure for welfare presented in consumption equivalents is given by Eqs. (26) and (27). Since, there is a trade-off between savers and borrowers, introducing the macroprudential policy, both in coordination and non-coordination with monetary policy, produces CEb > 0 and CEs < 0.
Thus, a Kaldor–Hicks improvement to a obtain Pareto-superior outcome would be one in which:
CEb � eb P 0
and
CEs þ eb ¼ 0:
ay, we are excluding the possibility that financial variables enter in the Taylor rule r the central bank. For further discussion on interactions between different rules, e Kannan et al. (2012) or Rubio and Carrasco-Galllego (2013). 3 This result is consistent with other studies on macroprudential policies. See for stance, Mendicino et al. (2013). 4 See Scitovsky (1941).
2
w fo se
2
in 2
Table 2 Optimal macroprudential and monetary policy mix (Kaldor–Hicks improvement).
Benchmark Coordinated Non-coordinated
/k�b – 0.8 0.7
1 þ /R�p 16.1 1.3 1.7 /R�y 8.2 0.5 1
Social Welfare Gain – 0.024 0.041 Borrowers Welfare Gain – 0.06 0.10 Savers Welfare Gain – 0 0
Table 3 Parameter values.
bs :99 Discount factor for savers bb :98 Discount factor for borrowers j :1 Weight of housing in utility function g 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity k :9 Loan-to-value ratio a :64 Labor share for savers X 1:2 Steady-state markup h :75 Probability of not changing prices qA :9 Technology persistence qj :95 Housing demand shock persistence q :8 Interest-rate-smoothing parameter in Taylor rule
M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336 333
Then,
eb P 1 � exp ð1 � bsÞ W MP s � W
� s
�h i : ð28Þ
That is, a system of transfers in which the borrowers would compensate the savers with at least the amount they are losing, so that they are at least indifferent between having the macropru- dential policy or not. Then, the new outcome would be desirable for society and there would be no agent that would lose with the introduction of the new policy. Then, if Eq. (28) holds with equal- ity, the borrower compensates the saver with the exact welfare that she is losing. Then, in our case, after the compensations are made, the final result is presented in Table 2.
4.3. Impulse responses
In order to understand the dynamics of the model and how the LTV rule interacts with monetary policy, in this section, we simu- late the impulse responses of the model, using the optimized parameters we found in the previous section. We compare the benchmark (no macroprudential policy) with the case in which monetary and macroprudential policies coexist, both in a coordi- nated and in a non-coordinated game. We consider a technology shock and a housing demand shock.
The discount factor for savers, bs, is set to 0.99 so that the an- nual interest rate is 4% in steady state. The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98.25 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consis- tent with the US data. We set g ¼ 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1.26 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set kSS to 0.90, in line with the US data.
27 The labor income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005). For the Taylor rule, we consider the optimized parameters found in the previous section. For q we use 0.8, which also reflects a real- istic degree of interest rate smoothing.28
We assume that technology, At , follows an autoregressive pro- cess with 0.9 persistence and a normally distributed shock. We also assume that the weight of housing on the utility function is equal to its value in the steady state plus a shock which follows an auto- regressive process with 0.95 persistence.29 For the reactions param- eter in the LTV rule, we use the optimized parameters both for the coordination and non-coordination with monetary policy. Table 3 presents a summary of the parameter values used:
4.3.1. Technology shock Fig. 3 presents impulse responses to a 1% shock to technology.
Given the technology shock, output increases and inflation decreases.
In the benchmark case, when there is only monetary policy, the interest rate increases, while the LTV remains at its steady state. Since output is increasing, monetary policy reacts in a contractive way. Given the expansion in the economy, borrowing and housing demand increase, leading to an increase in house prices.
However, when the macroprudential rule interacts with mone- tary policy, the reaction of the interest rate is not as strong, given that the optimal parameters of the Taylor rule are lower. The LTV
25 Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We take the most conservative value.
26 Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (fo males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints these estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
27 See Iacoviello (2013). 28 As in McCallum (2001). 29 The persistence of the shocks is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and
Neri (2010).
r
ratio decreases to cut credit because borrowing is growing follow- ing the boom. Therefore, when the macroprudential rule is in place, borrowing does not increase as much as in the benchmark, and this mitigates the effects of the boom.
Concerning the difference between the coordinated and the non-coordinated case, the pattern of the impulse responses is very similar. Nevertheless, the non-coordinated case is always slightly closer to the benchmark. This is due to the fact that the reaction parameters in the Taylor rule are higher for the coordinated case and thus more similar to the benchmark.
Notice that, interestingly, when monetary and macroprudential policies coexist, the interest rate decreases, focusing on stabilizing inflation, while the LTV is cut, to reach the financial stability objec- tive. The decrease in the interest rate contributes to increase bor- rowing while the decrease in the LTV cuts it.
4.3.2. Housing demand shock In Fig. 4, we see the effects of a 25% housing demand shock. Gi-
ven the increase in demand, house prices increase as well. This di- rectly affects the collateral constraint and borrowers are able to borrow more out of their housing collateral, which is worth more now. The wealth effect permits them consume both more houses and consumption goods. The increase in house prices is, therefore, transmitted to the real economy and output increases.
The raise in output generates inflation and the Taylor rule re- sponds with a higher interest rate. This is particularly true in the benchmark case in which monetary policy is more aggressive. On impact, this higher interest rate also dampens the increase in the price of the house, especially for the benchmark for the same rea- sons. Therefore, the initial shock is mitigated in the case in which monetary is the only policy in action.
When the macroprudential and the monetary policy interact, the LTV decreases to moderate the credit boom. This is the reason why, in this case, borrowing does not increase as much as in the benchmark. However, as we have seen, the increase in the interest rate is not as strong as in the benchmark and therefore the effects on real output of this demand shock are more noticeable. In the case of this shock, the combination of the macroprudential and the monetary policies manage to control credit without moderat- ing the real effects of the boom.
0 5 10 0
0.5
1 Output
% de
v. S
S 0 5 10
0
0.5
1 Borrowing
0 5 10 −0.5
0
0.5
Inflation %
de v.
S S
0 5 10 0
0.5
1
House Prices
0 5 10 −0.2
0
0.2
Interest Rate
quarters
% de
v. S
S
0 5 10 −0.2
0
0.2
LTV
quarters
Benchmark Coordinated Macropru Non−coord Macropru
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to a technology shock. Optimized parameters.
0 5 10 0
0.05
0.1 Output
% de
v. S
S
0 5 10 0
2
4 Borrowing
0 5 10 −0.1
0
0.1 Inflation
% de
v. S
S
0 5 10 0.2
0.3
0.4 House Prices
0 5 10 0
0.05
0.1 Interest Rate
quarters
% de
v. S
S
0 5 10 −0.5
0
0.5 LTV
quarters
Benchmark Coordinated Macropru Non−coord Macropru
Fig. 4. Impulse responses to a housing demand shock. Optimized parameters.
334 M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
As in the previous case, and for the same reasons, the non-coor- dinated situation is closer to the benchmark.
0 See for instance Iacoviello (2005) that evaluates a Taylor rule responding to house rices with a policy frontier.
4.4. Financial and macroeconomic stability
Results from the optimal policy analysis have shown that the combination of macroprudential and monetary policies deliver a more stable financial and macroeconomic scenario. In order to show these results graphically, we plot an efficiency frontier that includes the three objectives that the policy makers aim at mini- mizing: variability of output, variability of inflation and variability of borrowing.
Policy analysis is usually done through policy frontiers, also known as Taylor curves or efficiency frontiers.30 This curve shows, given different parameters of the Taylor rule, the combination that delivers the lower output and inflation variability. Therefore, a Tay- lor curve which is closer to the origin would be more efficient. In or- der to include the objective of the macroprudential regulator, we present an extended Taylor curve in which we include the variability of borrowing, as a measure to capture financial stability.
We are aware that there is not a widely accepted definition of financial stability or systemic risk. Those are difficult concepts to
3
p
3 4
5 6
7 8
1.4
1.6
1.8
2 50
100
150
200
250
300
output varianceinflation variance
bo rr
ow in
g va
ria nc
e
Benchmark Coordinated Macropru Non−coord Macropru
Fig. 5. Three dimensional efficiency frontier.
M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336 335
define and to measure. Many definitions include the interactions between the financial and the real sector.31 In our model, we char- acterize the financial sector implicitly: borrowers take credits from savers and sign mortgages to buy houses, the asset of our model. Therefore, the financial system can be proxied by the amount of bor- rowing that takes place. Within this framework, we propose a mea- sure for financial stability: a low variability of borrowing. In this sense, a lower variance of borrowing would imply a more stable financial system: if the variance of borrowing is lower, credit is smoother. A more stable financial system contributes to a lower sys- temic risk. Our model fits this idea. Borrowers do not have an Euler equation that allows them to smooth their consumption, as savers do. If the variability of the borrowing is lower then borrowers can sign mortgages in a smoother way and also can achieve a more sta- ble consumption. The financial sector will be more stable and also the real sector. The economy can benefit from a more stable financial system and a lower systemic risk with a higher welfare, as we proved in previous sections. However, if the situation is the opposite and there is a high variability of borrowing, the financial system will be more unstable: with credit being more variable, consumption would also be more variable, the systemic risk will increase and, therefore, welfare will be lower.
Fig. 5 presents our augmented policy frontier which is three- dimensional, since it takes into account three policy objectives: output, inflation and financial stabilization. The first two corre- spond to the standard objectives of the central bank, while the third one would be the objective of the macroprudential regulator. As in previous cases, we are comparing the macroprudential (coor- dinated and non-coordinated) with the no macroprudential sce- nario (benchmark). Here, curves are preferable, the lower (less borrowing variance) and closer to the inflation and output variance origin (less inflation and output variability) they are. We see that when we take the three dimensions together, macroprudential and monetary policies interacting with each other manage to deli- ver a more stable scenario, which includes not only macroeco- nomic stability but also financial stability. These results represent a way to convey the findings in previous sections, that is, the introduction of the macroprudential policy is welfare enhancing because it is delivering a more stable system.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyze the impact of macroprudential and monetary policies on business cycles, welfare, and financial stabil-
31 See Galvão and Owyang (2013) for a discussion on the topic.
ity. In particular, we consider a macroprudential rule for the LTV ratio that responds to credit growth.
We compute the optimal parameters of the macroprudential and monetary rule both when monetary and macroprudential pol- icies act in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated way. We find that in both cases, this interaction is welfare improving for the society, especially in the case of the non-coordinated game. How- ever, there is a trade-off between the agents of the model and sav- ers lose from this new scenario. We find that by transfers �a la Kaldor–Hicks, so that borrowers can compensate the saver’s wel- fare loss, a Pareto-superior outcome can be obtained.
From a positive perspective, we show the dynamics of the mod- el under the optimal parameters that maximize welfare. We find that, given a positive technology or housing demand shock, the macroprudential authority would decrease the LTV to moderate the credit boom. In this way, it can achieve its ultimate goal: finan- cial stability.
We also show graphically, with a three dimensional policy fron- tier, that the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies unambiguously enhances the stability of the economic system.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the discussants and participants of IRE- BS Conference 2012, 2012 Dynare Conference, ReCapNet Confer- ence 2013, CEUS Workshop 2013, IFABS Conference 2013, and AREUEA session at the ASSA Meetings 2014; as well as the seminar participants at the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Central Bank of Luxembourg, the BBVA, and the University of Nottingham. Special thanks to Mat- teo Iacoviello, John Duca, William Dupor, Pau Rabanal, Carlos Tho- mas, Antonio Mele, Don Schlagenhauf, Daniel Fetter, Christopher Otrok, Rafael Repullo, Jagjit S. Chadha, and two anonymous refer- ees. All errors are our own. J. A. Carrasco-Gallego would also like to acknowledge the financial support of Universidad Rey Juan Car- los Fellowship for International Research Stays to visit the Univer- sity of Nottingham.
Appendix A. Main equations
1 Cs;t ¼ bs Et
Rt ptþ1 Cs;tþ1
� � ; ð29Þ
wst ¼ðNs;tÞ g�1Cs;t; ð30Þ
j Hs;t ¼
1 Cs;t
qt � b sEt
1 Cs;tþ1
qtþ1; ð31Þ
1 Cb;t ¼ bb Et
Rt ptþ1 Cb;tþ1
� � þ kt Rt; ð32Þ
wb;t ¼ðNb;tÞ g�1 Cb;t; ð33Þ
j Hb;t ¼
1 Cb;t
qt � b bEt
1 Cb;tþ1
qtþ1
� � � kbt kt Etðqtþ1ptþ1Þ; ð34Þ
Et Rt
ptþ1 bt ¼ kt Et qtþ1 Hb;t; ð35Þ
Cb;t þ qt Hb;t þ Rt�1 bt�1
pt ¼ qt Hb;t�1 þ wb;t Lb;t þ bt; ð36Þ
ws;t ¼ 1 Xt
a Y t
Ns;t ; ð37Þ
wb;t ¼ 1 Xt ð1 � aÞ
Y t Nb;t
; ð38Þ
336 M. Rubio, J.A. Carrasco-Gallego / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 326–336
p̂t ¼ bEtp̂tþ1 � wx̂t þ upt; ð39Þ
W s;t � Et X1 m¼0
bms log Cs;tþm þ j log Hs;tþm � ðNs;tþmÞ
g
g
� � ; ð40Þ
W b;t � Et X1 m¼0
bmb log Cb;tþm þ j log Hb;tþm � ðNb;tþmÞ
g
g
� � ; ð41Þ
W t ¼ð1 � bsÞW s;t þð1 � bbÞW b;t: ð42Þ
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- Macroprudential and monetary policies: Implications for financial stability and welfare
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related literature
- 2 Model setup
- 2.1 Savers
- 2.2 Borrowers
- 2.3 Firms
- 2.3.1 Final goods producers
- 2.3.2 Intermediate goods producers
- 2.4 Monetary policy
- 2.5 A macroprudential rule for the LTV
- 2.6 Equilibrium
- 3 Welfare
- 3.1 Welfare measure
- 3.2 Welfare trade-offs
- 4 Optimal policy analysis
- 4.1 Optimal parameters
- 4.2 Pareto-superior outcomes
- 4.3 Impulse responses
- 4.3.1 Technology shock
- 4.3.2 Housing demand shock
- 4.4 Financial and macroeconomic stability
- 5 Concluding remarks
- Acknowledgments
- Appendix A Main equations
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426614001307-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Bank pay caps, bank risk, and macroprudential regulation
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.004 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1 Oxford-Man Institute, University of Oxford, Associate Member and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Associate Member. ⇑ Tel.: +44 2476528098.
E-mail address: [email protected] URL: https://sites.google.com/site/thanassoulis/
2 For discussions of these interventions please see FSB (2009), Thanassoulis (2013b) and BCBS (2010).
John Thanassoulis ⇑ Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, United Kingdom1
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 13 June 2013 Accepted 4 April 2014 Available online 19 April 2014
JEL classification: G01 G21 G38
Keywords: Bank regulation Financial stability Bankers’ pay Bonus caps Capital conservation buffer
a b s t r a c t
This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possi- bility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regu- lation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.
� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The remuneration of bankers and executives in the financial sector is the focus of significant regulatory attention in the UK, EU and globally. Many are concerned that the level and structure of pay contributes to the riskiness of banks. This concern has inspired the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compen- sation Practices; the adoption by the European Union of the 1-to-1 Bonus Rule; and the adoption in Basel III of a Capital Conservation Buffer which prevents banks making some remuneration payments if their Tier 1 capital should fall below a specified level.2 The level of pay is indeed a significant cost for banks. Thanassoulis (2012, Figs. 1, 3, and IA.1) documents that for a substantial minority of financial institutions remuneration exceeds 30% of shareholder equity; while non-financial firms rarely pay this much. For some financial institutions pay as a proportion of shareholder equity is much higher – and sometimes in excess of 80% of shareholder equity.
This paper studies the impact of a cap on total remuneration for bankers in proportion to the risk weighted assets they control. Such a cap could be targeted, affecting some sectors, such as the wholesale side, and not others, such as the retail side. Thus the cap can work with existing regulatory attempts to treat wholesale and retail banking separately (the Independent Commission on Banking ring-fence in the UK for example).
The analysis demonstrates that a variable pay cap in proportion to assets leans against the competitive externality which drives pay up. Such a cap acts to lower aggregate remuneration. Hence banks will have increased resilience to shocks on the value of their assets due to their reduced cost base. This reduction in bank risk is achieved whilst increasing bank values.
In principle banks can always be made less risky by increasing their capital adequacy ratio. But by encouraging banks to meet such requirements by either avoiding lending risk or reducing lending, such a direct intervention has a cost. The intervention in the labour market for banks increases bank values and does not compromise lending. Further, to the extent that there is a broader desire to intervene in the labour market for bankers, it would be desirable if any such intervention had the effect of improving financial stability.
Basel III has determined, through the Capital Conservation Buffer, that banks’ incentives to pay out rather than retain earnings needs to be managed. Leading scholars have argued that the amount banks paid out in share buybacks and dividends was so large as
Table 1 Remuneration reduction expressed as a gain in Tier 1 ratio.
Reduction in aggregate bank remuneration 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Average equivalent increase in Tier 1 levels (basis points) 9 19 28 37 47 56
Notes: The table expresses the money saved by a hypothetical reduction in the aggregate pay bill expressed as the equivalent increase in Tier 1 equity. This is calculated by determining the dollar saving from a given percentage reduction in the total pay bill and dividing by the total risk weighted assets. Data from Bloomberg, see Footnote 3.
140 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
to materially inhibit real economy lending through the last financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2009). Thanassoulis (2012) docu- ments that the banks in this study typically paid out double the amount in remuneration than they did on share buybacks and div- idends, and the shareholder payments only grew to be comparable to remuneration during the last crisis. Thus if payments to share- holders became high enough to be a concern to the well functioning of the banking system, the aggregate wage bill is at this elevated level of note permanently. To determine more quantitatively the scale of the relevance of remuneration to financial stability let us suppose the total remuneration bill could be reduced by some per- centage. One can calculate how much of an increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio this reduction in remuneration would represent by comparing funds saved to total risk weighted assets. As remunera- tion falls during crisis periods I focus on crisis years to avoid mis- leading estimates of the importance of remuneration. Table 1 considers the remuneration paid in 2008 and 2009, during the last financial crisis, by the top 100 global banks ranked by asset value in 2011.3 If the total remuneration bill was cut by only 5%, then this would be equivalent to an average increase in Tier 1 equity levels of 9 basis points. If the remuneration bill could be cut by 20% then the equivalent increase in the Tier 1 ratio would be 37 basis points on average.
Table 1 demonstrates that lowering pay has only a modest effect on an average bank’s resilience. The average however hides wide variation amongst individual banks. Thus an intervention on pay would be targeted. It would make the banks with the most unsafe pay levels, safer. Fig. 1 displays the identity of the 20 banks (in the top 100) who would have been helped most by a 20% reduction in remuneration costs on their 2009 remuneration bill. Fig. 1 dem- onstrates that an intervention in the level of remuneration would have helped some major household names which were the focus of considerable regulatory attention during the crisis. For example, a 20% reduction in the remuneration bill in 2009 would have been equivalent to a Tier 1 increase at UBS of 1.5% (150 basis points), 1.3% for Credit Suisse, and over 0.8% for Deutsche Bank. These are signif- icant figures in the context of the Tier 1 requirements of Basel III. Thus an intervention which lowered market remuneration levels and increased bank values would have an arguably significant and targeted effect of lowering risk in the financial system.
In a market, such as the labour market for bankers’ services, competition to hire scarce talent leads to an externality. The mar- ket level of remuneration will be determined by the institution which is the marginal bidder for the banker. By bidding to hire a banker unsuccessfully, the marginal bidding bank drives up the market rate of pay in the financial sector. The bidding is a pecuni- ary externality: the banker gains, the employing bank loses. How- ever, in addition the employing bank’s fragility to market stress is increased by increases in its cost base. This lowers the value of the employing bank further. This latter competitive externality repre- sents a market failure. A bank failure makes other bank failures more likely, and in addition can have negative consequences for
3 The data sample is the top 100 listed institutions in Bloomberg by total assets in 2011 for which relevant data exists and whose activities include banking. Only group entities were included; public institutions such as central banks and development banks were excluded. Of the 100, a sample of 80 banks remain. The list includes the 31 Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions defined by FSB (2011).
both savers and borrowers. These further externalities magnify the importance of the market failure.
A cap on pay in proportion to assets impacts on the marginal bidding bank more than the employing bank. As pay in a given business line rises in proportion to the resources or assets being managed, in equilibrium the marginal bidding bank does not have a sufficiently large pot of assets to attract the banker, and so is unwilling to offer a large enough expected payment. The bank which succeeds in hiring the banker will be able to do so at a lower bonus rate as it adjusts the rate for the fact that it has a larger pot of assets, and/or is an otherwise more desirable place to work. A cap on the size of remuneration in relation to assets therefore impacts the ability of the marginal bidder to drive up pay. Hence the level of pay in the whole market is reduced.
As the proposed cap is on total remuneration, the measure allows the bank to structure pay in the manner it considers opti- mal. Risk sharing features, such as bonuses, can be fully preserved (Thanassoulis (2012)), as there is no requirement to force fixed wages up within the cap.
A cap on pay in proportion to assets will alter a bank’s asset allo- cation decisions. Within an individual business unit the manager would like to be assigned as large a fraction of the bank’s assets as possible as this would likely translate into the largest pay. This effect exists whether or not there is a cap, and forces banks to become focused on asset classes considered to be core so as to secure the talent they desire. A cap in proportion to assets is more binding on the marginal bidder than on the employing bank. Hence each bank will find that in its core business lines it is able to hire its staff more cheaply as the marginal bidders are impeded in their bidding. This allows the banks to row back on the specialisation that had been necessary with unconstrained bidding, and so bene- fit from increased diversification.
The cap could naturally also be a tool for macroprudential reg- ulation as it can be used to encourage the re-targeting of banks from some business lines to others. Suppose that a cap is imposed on bankers managing wholesale assets, and not for those managing assets on the retail side. Those banks which were the runners-up to employ the best wholesale bankers become less aggressive bidders due to the pay cap. This lowers the remuneration level of whole- sale bankers and allows the banks which specialised in wholesale banking to devote more of their assets to retail banking so as to benefit from diversification. Secondly some universal banks will be competing against other non-bank financial institutions which may be regulated under different rules. The presence of these insti- tutions outside the regulatory net strengthens the macroprudential tool. Regulated banks would be at a disadvantage in hiring the best traders or wholesale bankers. Hence the expected return banks would have from these wholesale activities would decline as the banks would be unable to hire the most sought-after traders. Thus banks would be even more incentivised to reassign assets at the margin from wholesale towards retail banking.
2. Literature review
The objective of this paper is to investigate the consequences of a regulatory pay cap on bank risk, bank value and bank asset allo- cation decisions. This work builds on Thanassoulis (2012) who
Fig. 1. Equivalent gain in Tier 1 ratio for the 20 most affected banks. Notes: The graph documents the impact of a 20% reduction in remuneration in the crisis year 2009. The reduction in the remuneration bill can be measured in terms of an increase in the Tier 1 ratio. The graph documents the impact of such a reduction in remuneration on the 20 most affected banks in the sample of the top 100 banks used in Table 1. These are banks which would gain most resilience if the remuneration level of bankers could have been reduced. Data from Bloomberg, see Footnote 3.
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 141
demonstrates the competitive externality operating though the labour market which drives up pay and so increases bank risk. In this study I extend the Thanassoulis (2012) framework to study the effects of a regulatory cap on total pay in proportion to assets. Further I extend the study to consider multiple asset classes, asset allocation, and macroprudential regulation. The model of a competitive labour market used here builds on the seminal contri- butions of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and of Edmans et al. (2009). Relative to these works I explicitly model the possibility of bank failure arising from poor asset realisations, and so am in a position to discuss bankers and their impact on financial stability.
As in Wagner (2009), if the size of the pool of assets should fall below some level, a default event occurs which results in extra costs for the bank. Wagner however does not investigate the sup- ply side competition for bankers and so is silent on banker pay in general. The aim of this paper is to understand how intervention in the labour market for bankers would alter bank risk.
There is little empirical evidence on the level of bankers’ pay and on bank risk. Cheng et al. (2010) is a notable exception which demonstrates that financial institutions which have a high level of aggregate pay, controlling for their size, are riskier on a suite of measures. A complementary finding is offered by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who demonstrate that bank CEO’s with the largest equity compensation were more likely to lead their banks to losses in the financial crisis. Other empirical research has in general focused on CEO pay and incentives whereas our focus here is on remuneration more widely.4
This analysis focuses on the aggregate level of risk which a bank would knowingly allow their bankers to take on rather than the risk choices of individual bankers. Other studies have focused on how competition between banks affects the shape of the remuner- ation contracts offered, and so individual bankers’ incentives to take risks. For example Thanassoulis (2013a) argues that competi- tion for bankers drives pay up and can lead to an industry using contracts which tolerate short-termism. This work provides a
4 See for example Llense (2010) on CEO pay for performance, and Edmans and Gabaix (2011) on the relative value of contract design versus hiring the optimal individual to be CEO.
rationale for forced deferral of pay conditional on results. By con- trast, Foster and Young (2010) argue that any variable pay can be gamed and can lead to risk being pushed into the tails. Raith (2003) considers firms competing, rather than banks, and endoge- nises the level of bonus to incentivise effort. He shows that firms with larger market shares increase the bonus incentives they offer. Benabou and Tirole (2013) consider competing firms using con- tracts to screen workers by ability: the high ability workers are given incentives to take excessive risks. Acharya et al. (2013) study the incentives a banker has to move institution to avoid their employer learning whether their performance was due to skill or luck. The insights in these works are complementary to the analy- sis here as none of these analyses explore the impact of pay caps on the labour market equilibrium.
3. The model
Suppose there are N banks who have assets in a given asset class of S1 > S2 > � � � > SN . Banks seek a banker who will maximise the expected returns from their assets. If the bank’s assets in this class should however shrink to be less than gS, for some g < 1, then the bank incurs some extra costs. The parameter g measures a required preservation rate on assets below which the bank, or its creditors, take actions which generate a cost to the bank. This captures, for example, the costs of forced asset sales to reimburse creditors, or increased costs of capital. I refer to the case in which assets fall below this critical level as a default event. I assume the bank’s costs in the case of a default event are proportional to the initial level of assets: kS. The functional form is chosen for tractability, but it is not a key assumption. The key assumption is that costs of a default event can arise if a banker shrinks the assets they are given to man- age sufficiently.
There are N bankers who can run this asset. They expect to grow the assets they manage by a factor of a1 > a2 > � � � > aN . Thus if banker i is employed by bank j then the expected assets of bank j at the end of the period will be ai � Sj. An expected asset growth fac- tor of ai ¼ 1 would imply that that banker i is only expected to maintain the dollar value of the assets he or she manages. I assume
Table 2 Proportion of remuneration received as bonus.
Total compensation bands 2008 2009
% Base salary % Bonus % Base salary % Bonus
£500 K to £1 mn 19 81 24 76 > £1 mn 9 91 11 89
Notes: Data reproduced from Financial Services Authority (2010, Table 1, Annex A3.8). The FSA required this information of UK staff for seven major international banking groups, and six major UK banking groups. The sample consists of 2800 staff comprising, the FSA estimate, 70% of ‘Code Staff’ in banks operating in the UK. That is staff whose activities can have a material impact on their employing bank. The table demonstrates that, given the flexibility, banks would choose to deliver the vast majority of pay in the form of bonuses.
142 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
that each banker’s distribution of realised asset growth factors are translations of each other so that bankers differ only in their skill. Hence the density of asset growth factors delivered by banker n can be written as fnðxÞ¼ ð1=anÞfðx=anÞ, where fð�Þ is a density with unit expectation implying that the expectation of fnð�Þ is an . Inte- grating we have the cumulative distribution of the asset growth factor given by FnðvÞ¼ Fðv=anÞ. The outside option in the labour market for bankers will be determined endogenously to this model. In addition the bankers have the option of leaving this labour market and, for example, moving to another industry or location. I normalise this outside option to zero. Finally bankers are assumed to be risk neutral. There is considerable evidence that bankers may actually be risk loving (see the evidence contained in Thanassoulis (2012)). However all that is required for the following analysis is that bankers are not too risk averse.
As the bank is an expected profit maximiser, the shape of the distribution of asset growth outcomes generated by the banker will only be important if the resultant asset levels are low enough to trigger a default event, leading to the extra costs described above. In any empirically relevant calibration of this model, default will be a low probability event. Hence the relevant probability will lie in the tail of Fn . I now follow Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Thanassoulis (2012) and use Extreme Value Theory to characterise the shape of a general distribution in its left tail. I assume that the asset growth factor generated by the bankers is bounded below by zero so that banks enjoy limited liability on their investments. In this case the left hand tail of the distribution of asset growth fac- tors can be approximated by
Fn vð Þ� G � v=anð Þ c ð1Þ
Extreme Value Theory would require G to be a slowly varying func- tion.5 I restrict to G > 0 being a constant. I require c P 1 so that the distribution function takes a convex shape.
I restrict bankers to be paid in bonuses which are proportional to the assets they control. Thanassoulis (2012, Proposition 1) dem- onstrates that banks, as modelled here, would prefer to pay fully in bonuses rather than using fixed wages as well as bonuses. Bonus pay allows banks to share some of the risk of poor asset realiza- tions with the bankers. This lowers the banks’ expected costs from the possibility of realizations which trigger a default event. Table 2 presents evidence from the UK corroborating that this all bonus restriction is a reasonable assumption, particularly for those earn- ing the largest amounts. More recent regulatory interventions have limited bonuses and required banks to pay staff using higher fixed wages.6 Table 2 shows that if banks are given the flexibility they would elect to pay staff overwhelmingly in the form of variable bonuses.
This is not an explicit model of moral hazard, though the out- come of such models is compatible with these assumptions. As
5 See Resnick (1987). A function GðvÞ is defined as being slowly varying at zero if limv!0 G tvð Þ=G vð Þ¼ 1 for any t > 0.
6 See Thanassoulis (2013b) for a discussion of the European 1-to-1 bonus regulation.
pay is delivered in the form of variable pay conditional on perfor- mance, managers are fully incentivised. The bonus rates delivered by this model would be in excess of any bonus rates required by an explicit model of incentives and moral hazard. Suppressing the subscripts momentarily, if a bank with assets S hires a banker of type a on bonus rate q then the banker expects to receive dollar remuneration of q � aS. The expected asset level of the bank at the end of the period, gross of the cost of any default event, is að1 � qÞS. Suppose the realisation of the asset growth factor is a. There is a default event if the realisation, að1 � qÞS < gS. Using (1), the probability of this is Fðg=ð1 � qÞÞ¼ G � g=að1 � qÞð Þc. Hence the expected value of the bank at the end of the period is EðVÞ where
E Vð Þ¼ a 1 � qð ÞS � kSG g
a 1 � qð Þ
� �c ð2Þ
Each bank will seek to maximise this expected value. A cap on the remuneration in proportion to assets is equivalent to setting a max- imum value for the bonus rate, q.
There is a competitive labour market for bankers. Banks bid against each other to hire a banker to run their assets. Each bank can offer a given banker a targeted bonus rate q which will be applied to the realized level of assets the banker manages. The offers are banker specific so that more able bankers can be offered more generous terms. The market is assumed to result in a Walr- asian equilibrium where an individual’s pay is set by the marginal bidder for their services. This can be modelled as the banks bidding for the bankers in a simultaneous ascending auction (see Thanassoulis (2012, 2013a)).
Finally I assume that the total size of each bank’s balance sheet is exogenous. The assumption that balance sheets are exogenous is equivalent to an assumption that the Board of a Bank would not decide to change their aggregate size and debt-to-equity ratio to allow an individual to be hired. Banks may well decide to alter their asset allocation decisions within the envelope of their chosen balance sheet size. We will explore this in detail below.7
3.1. Discussion of key assumptions
This model of banks competing for bankers is designed to be tractable and to allow the key competitive forces which determine pay levels to be clearly explained. Underlying the model are two key assumptions. The first is that the risk profile of the bank is decided by the Board and not the banker, thus bonus rates do not alter the tail risk of the institution. The second is that the bank pays out remuneration to the banker, even if the banker delivers a loss on the assets managed. This section will discuss each of these assumptions in turn.
7 It would in principle be possible for a bank to stay within its regulatory Tier 1 ratios, and yet grow assets, to increase pay, by leveraging up with safe assets. This can be managed here by appropriate risk weighting (Section 5.1). Further this more general weakness in the regulatory regime is already being addressed through the Leverage Ratio requirement in the Basel III framework.
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 143
The Board of any bank will determine a desired risk profile for their institution depending upon the return on equity they believe their investors demand. The Board will seek to impose this risk profile on the bank by using the corporate governance levers at their disposal. These levers include the ability to manage the Value at Risk (VaR) of individual bankers, often on a daily basis, and broader asset allocation and hedging decisions. This study assumes that these levers are sufficient to restrict the bankers to the desired risk profile. Banker skill is therefore solely expressed as the expected return given this shape of (tail) risk. If this risk control assumption is violated then payment levels and bonus rates are related to the risk profile of the institution. That is the tail risk F n would be a function either of the bonus rate q, or of the expected dollar remuneration.8 The dependence of tail risk on the remunera- tion would complicate the analysis offered here. When bidding to hire a banker a large bank would be able to offer a low bonus rate which, in the case of poor risk control, would lower the riskiness of the bank. However larger banks will secure the services of more talented bankers who have to be paid more, and this might raise the riskiness of the institutions. The effect of poor risk control would therefore be ambiguous for the solution of the model, even absent any bonus caps. However the externalities described in this paper would remain: the marginal bidder for a banker would increase the fragility of the employing bank by raising her costs. This effect would be exacerbated for larger banks if tail risk grows in remuner- ation levels, or may be mitigated if tail risk responds to bonus rates.
This study considers the impact of a cap on pay in proportion to the assets a banker manages, and this cap is expressed as a cap on the bonus rate payable. The intervention of a bonus rate cap stud- ied here lowers bonus rates and overall pay levels. Therefore if banks cannot fully control their tail risk then such an intervention would mitigate the adverse effects of the poor risk control (see Footnote 8). The lower bonus rates would reduce the incentive to take excessive risk, to conduct fraud, to be myopic and to churn across employers. Hence the analysis here understates the benefits of a bonus cap along all these avenues.
The second key assumption is that even if a bank should see its assets shrink enough to trigger the costs of a default event through, for example, forced asset sales, then the bank incurs a remunera- tion payment nonetheless. It might seem more realistic that a banker who returns a lower level of assets than she began with would not only not receive a bonus, but most likely lose her job. If so then one might conclude that remuneration payments would not add to a bank’s fragility, as when assets shrunk remuneration payments would automatically be suspended until the threat of a default event had passed. This reasoning is incomplete for a num- ber of a reasons. Firstly, it may be that a banker who shrinks assets loses her job, however consider the following thought experiment. A banker running assets of 100 makes a 20% loss in the first two quarters and so is dismissed. The bank will need an alternative banker to run these assets, suppose this replacement banker deliv- ers 10% growth in the remaining two quarters. This second banker would expect to be paid, and yet over the year assets have shrunk from 100 down to 100 � 80% � 110% ¼ 88, a reduction of 12%. Thus remuneration is payable even if one believes that in banking no failure is tolerated. Secondly, in reality a reduction in asset lev- els may well be due to bad luck and wider economic forces, rather than poor banker skill. Indeed bankers would invariably argue this
8 This may be because high bonuses are used to separate high ability from low ability bankers with the former incentivised to take excessive risks (Benabou and Tirole, 2013; Bannier et al., 2013); or it may be because bankers game bonus schemes through legitimate and illegitimate schemes (Foster and Young (2010)); or it may be because bonuses provide an incentive for bankers to take early risks and then jump to a new employer before their ability is revealed (Acharya et al. (2013)); or it may be because bonuses encourage bankers to push risks into the future so inducing myopia (Thanassoulis (2013a)).
to be the case. Thanassoulis (2012, Figure 2) demonstrates that bankers were paid very large sums on average in the recent past, even after delivering negative returns on equity. Finally, unless the bank formally enters bankruptcy protection, remuneration contracts have to be honoured. A bank may also wish to honour implicit rather than explicit commitments as any failure to do so would alter all employees’ expectations of their pay and lead either to demands to make implicit commitments explicit in contract terms, or lead to the departure of staff. Thus I conclude that the assumption that remuneration is payable even if a bank incurs the costs of a default event is appropriate.
4. The no intervention benchmark
The level of pay a banker enjoys in the market is set by the mar- ginal bidder for their services. A bank, in deciding how much to bid for a banker, trades off the cost of employing the banker as against the increase in value the banker generates, net of any changes to the expected costs of a default event, as compared to the next best hire. This section will determine the market rate of pay as a func- tion of fundamentals.
Lemma 1. The bank with the nth largest assets to be managed will hire the banker of the same rank n. Thus there will be positive assortative matching.
The lemma follows by showing that a bank recruiting a man- ager to manage a large pot of assets would be willing to outbid a bank which is recruiting a manager to oversee a smaller pot of assets. This is not immediate as we are in a setting of non-transfer- able utility. Greater pay for a banker increases the expected costs of default. This loss of value to the bank is not a gain to the banker. The bank recruiting for the smaller set of assets will bid for their first choice of banker up to the point where the extra value gener- ated on their assets as compared to the next best banker is just out- weighed by the extra costs incurred in remuneration to the banker. A bank recruiting for a larger set of assets would have the skill of the better banker applied to a larger pot of assets. In addition, increases in banker skill raise the expected asset growth and so lower the probability of a default event. As default costs are increasing in the size of the assets managed, the reduction in the expected costs from default is more substantial for the bank recruiting for a large pot of assets. Hence, for both reasons, the lar- ger bank would value the better banker more, and so the bank recruiting for the larger pot of assets would win in bidding for a given banker. It follows, by induction, that there will be positive assortative matching with bankers being assigned in equilibrium to banks according to their rank.
In this benchmark case bankers are indifferent to the identity of their employing bank and select their employer based on their expected pay. The analysis offered here is essentially unchanged if banks differ in non-financial ways. For example banks may not all offer an equally pleasant work environment, or banks may not all offer equally compelling long-term career prospects. Suppose that if a banker works at bank i, then bank specific differences raise the utility generated for the banker by a factor of si. Thus if the bonus rate were q then the banker’s expected utility at bank i would be 1 þ sið ÞqaSi. In this case it is as if the banker were man- aging utility adjusted assets of Ri ¼ 1 þ sið ÞSi. The banks could be re-ordered according to Rif g. We would then have positive assor- tative matching by utility adjusted asset size. The results in this paper would be unaffected by this change.
It follows that the marginal bidder for a banker of rank n is the bank of rank n þ 1. We are therefore in a position to solve for the market rate of remuneration for all of the bankers:
9 See for example ‘‘2013 NFL salary cap breakdown by team,’’ USA Today, available at http://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/sports/nfl/2013/09/13/2013-nfl-salary- cap-breakdown-by-team/2808245/.
10 For example, Bank for International Settlements (2001, Table 1.1, p34) document that in 1990 there were 8 M&A deals involving banks in one of the 13 countries studied with a value in excess of $1 bn, and the average value of these deals was $26.5 bn. Over the decade this activity grew, and by 1998 there were 58 M&A deals in that year with a value in excess of $1 bn, and the average value of these deals had risen to $431 bn.
11 For an example of merger becoming less profitable with a bonus cap consider a duopoly of banks. Merger (to monopoly) will have the merged bank hiring the best banker and offering a bonus at the normalised rate of 0. This is unaffected by a bonus cap. Pre-merger a bonus cap can increase the value of the larger bank, hence lowering the incentive to merge.
144 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
Proposition 2. The banker of rank i will be employed by bank i and will receive an expected payment of qi � aiSi where the bonus rate qi is given by:
qi ¼ XN
j¼iþ1
Sj Si
aj�1 � aj � �
ai ð3Þ
Proposition 2 follows by an inductive argument. The amount bank i needs to pay to secure the banker of rank i depends upon how much bank i þ 1, one down in the size league table, is willing to bid. This is the marginal bid which needs to be matched. The amount bank i þ 1 is willing to bid depends upon how much bank i þ 1 must pay for its banker, which in turn depends upon the bid- ding of bank i þ 2. Hence the market rate can be established by induction.
Having established the market rates of pay through Proposition 2 we can now interrogate the impact of regulatory interventions on the entire market.
5. Effect of a pay cap in proportion to (risk weighted) assets
Let us now consider a policy intervention which caps the pay of the individual running this asset class to no more than a proportion v of assets. As I have assumed good corporate governance of bank risk, the optimal bank risk profile which maximises returns is unchanged. So the Extreme Value approximation (1) continues to hold. Analysis of the new market equilibrium yields that such a regulatory intervention would have the following effects.
Proposition 3. Consider a mandatory cap on the remuneration of the banker equal to at most a bonus rate v as a proportion of assets.
1. The intervention lowers bank risk and raises bank values for all except the smallest banks.
2. The lower the remuneration cap as a proportion of assets, the greater the positive impact: higher bank values and lower bank risk.
3. The equilibrium allocation of bankers to banks is not affected, pre- serving allocative efficiency.
In the labour market, banks compete with each other to hire scarce talent. The market rate of pay for a banker will be deter- mined by the institution which is the marginal bidder for the bank- er’s services. By bidding to hire a banker unsuccessfully, poaching banks drive up the market rate. The bidding is a pecuniary exter- nality: the banker gains while the employing bank loses. However, there is also an increase to the employing bank’s fragility to stress, due to increases in its cost base. The larger cost base due to pay increases the probability of a destruction of assets beyond the required preservation level, and so increases the expected cost of this event. This lowers the value of the employing bank further and is a competitive externality. The cap works by leaning against this competitive externality.
The cap impacts the marginal bidder for any given banker more than the equilibrium employer. The remuneration enjoyed by a banker is set by the amount the marginal bidding bank is prepared to offer. Lemma 1 demonstrated that a larger bank would be will- ing to bid most, yielding positive assortative matching. It follows that the bank which succeeded in hiring a banker in equilibrium will have been able to do so at a lower rate as a proportion of the assets the banker will run. The preferred bank adjusts the rate it offers down for the fact that it offers the banker more resources and opportunities to make profits, and/or is a more desirable place to work.
A cap on pay in proportion to assets impacts the ability of the marginal bidder to drive up pay. This lowers the marginal bid
and so allows the employing bank to hire the banker they would do absent the cap, but at a lower level of remuneration. Hence the market rate of pay is reduced. This reduction in pay increases the value of the bank directly as they secure their equilibrium employee more cheaply. In addition the reduction in the remuner- ation payable lowers the bank’s fragility as less remuneration must be paid out when the banker’s realized results are poor. This reduc- tion in risk also raises the value of the bank.
As the employing bank now secures greater value from the banker they hire, in equilibrium, to run their business unit, the sur- plus the bank is willing to bid to hire marginally better bankers is reduced. The reduction in the competitive externality, and the cor- responding reduction in bank risk therefore propagates upwards through the labour market.
It follows from the logic of the intervention that the more severe the cap, the greater the impact on the marginal bidder, and so the greater is the gain for bank values, and the greater the reduction in bank risk.
As the cap applies to all banks in proportion to assets, it does not alter the matching of bankers to banks. No allocative ineffi- ciency is introduced into the system. However, the benefit requires macro not micro prudential regulation. No single entity can secure the risk reduction and value increasing benefits alone, as these arise from altering the value of the competing remuneration offers for any given banker.
The remuneration cap will lower market rates of pay for bank- ers. In principle one might therefore be concerned that this will lead to a departure of workers from finance to other industries. However education-adjusted wages enjoyed by workers in finance have out-stripped other industries since 1990 by a premium of between 50% and 250% for the highest paid employees (Philippon and Reshef (2012)). Thus I conclude that wages in finance could fall by some margin before the general equilibrium labour re-alloca- tion effect would become a problem.
Salary caps have been a feature of sports remuneration in the US. However these are different to the proposal outlined here. Sports salary caps are the same across all teams,9 while the inter- vention studied here links pay caps to the size of the assets managed. This link to bank size is critical in ensuring the cap targets the neg- ative externality created by the marginal bidder, and ensuring that the cap does not create a distortion in the allocation of talented bankers to banks.
Finally, it has been noted that the financial sector has under- gone a period of sustained consolidation and merger activity dating back to before the 1990s.10 This consolidation in the banking sector has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the size of the balance sheets of the largest banks (Morrison and Wilhelm (2008)). The model of the banking labour market we study here captures one rea- son bank mergers create value: the desire to grow the balance sheet to allow more talented bankers to be hired. The pay cap studied here does not necessarily strengthen this merger incentive. Whether it does so depends on the particular parameter values.11
13 However the risk weights offered in banking regulation are not a pure estimation of systematic risk (Iannotta and Pennacchi (2012)). The Basel rules allow national
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 145
5.1. Assets to be valued on a risk weighted basis
The analysis has explored the case of good corporate gover- nance under which the risk profile of the bank is set to maximise the bank’s value. To ensure the robustness of the regulatory pay cap, I now consider how a banker would seek to distort the value maximising risk profile of a bank if their objective was to maximise the money available for remuneration.
In this Section I will use the Pyle–Hart–Jaffee approach to model- ling the bank as a portfolio manager.12 Formally suppose a bank wishes to maximise the value generated from m securities with the returns on security j 2 1; . . . ; mf gdenoted ~rj
� � . If the bank selects allo-
cations in dollars of xj � �
then next period’s assets will be eS ¼ Pjxj~rj . These returns are assumed jointly normally distributed with vector of expected returns q and the variance-covariance matrix V. Hence
l ¼ E eS� ¼ X j
xjqj
r2 ¼ var eS� ¼ x; Vxh i The Pyle–Hart–Jaffee approach assumes that the value function of the bank can be decomposed into a function of only the first two moments of the returns distribution: U l; r2
� � . If the bank selects
the riskiness of her portfolio, as assumed here, then the first order condition of the bank’s optimisation problem would yield
@U @l
@l @xi þ @U @r2
@r2
@xi ¼ 0
This can be written in matrix notation as �kq þ Vx ¼ 0 where k ¼� @U=@lð Þ=2 @U=@r2
� � . Hence the bank would select an alloca-
tion of assets for the banker to manage proportional to V�1q. I now assume that the banker managing these assets must be
paid an amount W for past performance. Suppose that any cap on remuneration applies to the weighted sum of security values b; x D E
with vector of weights b. Thus the pay cap regulation implies
W 6 v � b; x D E
To analyse the scope for banker induced distortion, suppose that the banker can distort the risk profile of the bank, as long as he delivers a value of the objective U l; r2
� � of at least R. As the banker wishes
to maximise his pay, his optimisation problem becomes
max x1;...;xmf g
v � b; x D E
subject to R ¼ U x; q D E
; x; Vxh i �
ð4Þ
Proposition 4. The ratio of allocations to individual securities is unaffected by a pay cap if the cap weights securities proportionally to their expected returns (b parallel to the vector of expected returns q).
The banker will be tempted to alter the investment profile he targets if doing so can allow more to be paid under the cap whilst preserving the expected returns net of risk. Proposition 4 shows that this is not possible if the weights used to measure the quantity of assets are proportional to the expected returns on those assets. Hence if assets are weighted proportionally to expected returns, the assumptions of this analysis remain robust, even if the banker selects his investment strategy so as to maximise pay.
This analysis parallels that underlying the derivation of optimal risk weights in capital adequacy regulation (Rochet (1992)). In the standard CAPM framework, the expected return on a security rewards the investor for the security’s undiversifiable risk. Hence Proposition 4 captures that the weight accorded to a security in
12 The Pyle–Hart–Jaffee approach was proposed in Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974). The version used here is derived from Freixas and Rochet (2008, Section 8.4).
the pay cap should grow in that security’s systematic risk. Rochet (1992) argues that risk weights in capital adequacy requirements should be proportional to the expected returns to ensure that the bank will invest in an efficient portfolio of assets given the limited liability constraint. To the extent that the Basel risk weights capture systematic risk, they are a convenient approximation to this rule.13
6. Asset allocation responses to a pay cap
Banks invest in many asset classes. The banker managing an asset class can make greater profits from a larger pot of assets. Hence, even absent pay regulation, there exists an incentive to try to manage as many assets as possible. This implies that in the absence of any remuneration cap banks are under pressure to raise asset allocations to areas where they seek to hire the best bankers/ traders. This increased asset allocation has a cost however in terms of reduced diversification and excessive concentration.
This section will demonstrate that a remuneration cap does not strengthen this effect, but rather weakens this excessive concen- tration effect amongst evenly matched banks, and so creates an incentive for banks to re-assign assets so as to better diversify. The cap impacts the marginal bidder in any asset-class more than the equilibrium employer. It therefore hampers the extent to which a rival bank can drive up remuneration in any given asset class. This reduces the need to focus assets on a limited number of core areas, and so allows for greater gains from diversification.
I demonstrate these results through an extension of the model to allow for multiple asset classes.
6.1. Extension to a model of multiple assets
The diversification effect of bonus caps is at its strongest when the competing banks are close in size. Later in this Section I will dis- cuss the case of banks of very different size. To demonstrate this positive effect of bonus caps most simply, consider initially two banks each with equal total balance sheet size of T. Consider a model of two available asset classes, and within each asset class there are two bankers who could run either bank’s allocation to the asset class. The most able manager in each class has an expected growth factor of a, the next best hire has an expected growth factor of b < a. The bankers’ outside options continue to be normalised to zero. The asset level realisations in each asset class are assumed to be independent.
Each bank must decide how to split its balance sheet between the available asset classes, assigning S dollars to one asset class and T � S dollars to the other. To proxy for the benefits of diversi- fication parsimoniously I suppose that the banks gain value c � S T � Sð Þ on top of the assets realised within each asset class, with the parameter c a constant greater than zero. The specific functional form of diversification benefit is for convenience, the economic assumption is that diversification confers some benefits to the bank, and these benefits fall away if the bank withdraws from a given asset class. This assumption captures, for example, that the volatility of returns in the normal course of business are reduced which provides value for employee stock holders and any other investors who are not fully diversified; alternatively the assumption captures the effect of diminishing marginal returns to any given asset class as more and more of the balance sheet is used for that asset class. I model the banks as first simultaneously deciding their asset class allocations, and then competing to hire the bankers as in the benchmark model given above.
regulators some flexibility in selecting risk weights, and where analysis is conducted the risk weights are calculated to reflect the overall expected loss conditional on a default. The Basel risk weights will therefore be a good proxy for systematic risk only to the extent that systematic risk is correlated with overall risk.
146 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
6.2. Optimal asset allocation
Because of the symmetry of this initial problem I consider a symmetrical allocation. I therefore consider an allocation of assets in which each bank targets the best banker in a different asset class by putting S > T=2 into the targeted asset class, and T � S into the remainder. The expected value of a bank which secures the a-banker in its targeted class for a bonus of qa, and the b-banker in the other business line for a bonus of qb is given by
V S; T � Sð Þ¼ a 1 � qað ÞS � kSG g
a 1 � qað Þ
� �c þ c � S T � Sð Þ
þ b 1 � qb � �
T � Sð Þ� k T � Sð ÞG g
b 1 � qb � � !c ð5Þ
Eq. (5) captures the costs of a default event in any asset class. Such an event occurs if the assets under management in the class shrink to be less than g of their initial level. Under a pay cap we require qa; qb < v.
Proposition 5. As the cap on pay becomes more severe (v declines), banks re-balance their asset allocation in the direction of making their exposure more diversified and less asymmetric.
The asset allocation a bank makes is a trade off between giving the most assets to managers who can produce the highest return, set against the costs of over-specialisation. To understand the result it is perhaps easiest to consider the reverse, and suppose that a remuneration cap becomes less binding. As the remuneration cap is removed, each bank finds itself subject to more aggressive bid- ding for the best banker from the bank which is under-weight in that asset class. To continue to employ the a-banker in its targeted asset class, each bank must match the more aggressive bidding. This lowers the profits available from the asset class, and it increases the risk of a default event as well. If the bank now increases its asset allocation to its targeted area then it can lower the proportion of the realised assets used for remuneration. This increases the bank’s value from this asset class because its risk of a default event is reduced. Hence each bank responds to a relaxa- tion of the pay cap by focusing more on its target asset class in defence against the now more aggressive rival bank.
Running the process in reverse we see that as the remuneration cap becomes more severe, it is the institutions which are already most devoted to the class that are least handicapped. The cap is more binding on the marginal bidder in each asset class than on the equilibrium employer. It therefore follows that the leading institutions in the class are in a position to reduce their asset allo- cation as they can continue to employ the best staff with fewer assets, and stand to gain the diversification benefits by re-balanc- ing towards other asset classes.
Hence an effect of the pay cap intervention is that it reduces the pressure for similarly matched banks to excessively focus on their core areas, as would be necessary with unconstrained bidding. The cap instead creates a force for diversification amongst the banks. This beneficial effect becomes weaker as the banks become more asymmetric in size. To see this suppose that the two banks studied in this section become sufficiently asymmetric in size that the large bank can secure the a-banker in both asset classes. In this case one can show that the optimal asset allocation will be unaf- fected by the presence, or otherwise, of a bonus cap.14 The analysis
14 Both banks would split their balance sheets equally between the asset classes to maximise the diversification benefits. If the bonus cap is binding, then the smaller bank will bid at most a bonus rate of v. The larger bank would secure the a-banker in each asset class at a bonus rate of vT 2=T 1 where T 1 > T 2 denotes the size of the total balance sheet. The equilibrium bonus falls in the bonus cap as per Proposition 3.
in this case exactly parallels the single asset class analysis in Section 5. A bonus cap impacts the ability of the marginal bidder to drive up remuneration in both asset classes, allowing the larger bank to lower its risk and increase its value with no asset allocation distortion.
7. Pay Regulation for macroprudential objectives
A cap on remuneration in proportion to assets can be applied to some business lines and not to others. This section demonstrates how such partial application of pay regulation can be used to re- target banks’ activities to certain asset classes. Suppose, as an example, that for reasons outside of this model a regulator decided that there was insufficient lending to the real economy via banks.15
In this case a pay cap in proportion to assets applied to bankers working in wholesale banking, but not in retail banking, would alter the equilibrium asset allocation decisions so that all banks refocus assets away from wholesale and towards retail banking. Though a pay cap is an instance of microprudential regulation, the effect would be a macroprudential one as the resilience of all banks across the system is improved.
Further banks are in competition with other Financial Institu- tions, such as hedge funds, to secure bankers/traders, and these financial institutions who do not possess a banking license are often regulated under different rules. I will study the case of incomplete regulatory coverage in Section 7.2. The existence of financial institutions outside the regulatory net, rather than being a problem, can be used to further enhance the efficacy of pay-caps as a macroprudential tool.
7.1. A model of partially applied pay cap regulation
Once again consider the model of Section 6 of two asset classes and two bankers in each asset class with expected asset growth factors a > b. For expositional purposes, and in keeping with the motivating example, I will label the two asset classes r for retail and w for wholesale banking. However the analysis applies to any subdivision of banks’ activities. Generalising from Section 6, I move away from symmetry and consider two banks with balance sheets T r; T w. I restrict attention to the interesting case in which each bank secures just one of the a-bankers. Bank T r will specialise in the r asset class (e.g. retail banking). It devotes Sr dollars to retail banking, and T r � Sr dollars to the alternative asset-class: whole- sale banking. Similarly bank T w specialises in the w asset-class (e.g. wholesale banking), and so devotes Sw dollars to its asset class specialism (the w asset class). Bank T r assigns more dollars to the r asset class than the rival bank, and in this sense specialises in the r asset class (retail banking).
Each bank secures gains from diversification (as in Section 6) proxied by c � Sw T w � Swð Þ for the wholesale focused bank, and sim- ilarly for the retail focused bank.
The regulatory intervention I analyse here is a bonus rate cap v applied to remuneration on the w-asset class only. If this bonus cap is binding then it will affect the marginal bidding bank in the w-asset class. Hence the cap implies that bank r is restricted in the bonus rate it can offer to try and attract the a-wholesale banker. Bank r can offer the a-wholesale banker at most expected pay of v � a T r � Srð Þ given its asset allocation choice. The bonus rate paid by bank w for the wholesale banker will be below the cap (13). There is no cap on bonuses offered to bankers in the retail banking asset class.
I again model the banks as first simultaneously deciding their asset class allocations, and then competing to hire the bankers as
15 Insufficient lending in the UK to Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) has been a notable recent regulatory concern. See for example ‘‘Funding for Lending failure dismays BoE,’’ Financial Times, March 11, 2013.
Fig. 2. Best response asset allocation functions. Notes: The curve SwðSrÞ captures the best asset allocation response of the w focused bank on asset class w (wholesale banking), in response to the allocation Sr of the r focused bank to the r asset class (retail banking). The best response functions are strategic substitutes as the curves slope down. As the bonus rate cap v on wholesale banker remuneration is made more severe (v declines), the best response curve of the w bank is pulled down. The best response curve of the r bank is not affected as there is no cap on retail banker remuneration. Hence the equilibrium asset allocation to retail banking rises for both banks.
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 147
in the benchmark model given above. I restrict attention to the benefits of diversification large enough that
c > max 1 Sw ;
1 Sr
� � � k 2
G g a
� c c c þ 1ð Þv2 1 � vð Þcþ2
ð6Þ
This assumption delivers stability of the equilibrium allocation of assets between classes. The assumption is trivially satisfied if the banks are large enough.
We are now in a position to study the effect a partially applied pay cap has on the asset allocation decisions of the two banks. I denote the best asset allocation response of bank w to bank r as Sw Srð Þ and vice-versa. Thus if bank r assigns assets Sr to its specialism (the r asset-class, retail banking), and by implication assets T r � Sr to wholesale banking, then bank w’s best response is to assign Sw Srð Þ to its asset-class specialism (the w asset class, wholesale banking).
Lemma 6. The best asset allocation responses of each bank are strategic substitutes. Thus dSw Srð Þ=dSr < 0.
The result builds on the logic of Section 6 and demonstrates the strategic interaction between asset class allocation decisions. If bank r should increase its allocation to its asset-class specialism (r asset-class, retail banking), then by definition it is moving assets away from the other asset class: wholesale banking. The rival bank now faces a less aggressive bidder for the a-wholesale banker. As explained in Section 6 the wholesale focused bank can now benefit from increased diversification and so reduces its focus to wholesale banking. The wholesale focused bank therefore increases its alloca- tion to retail banking. As there is no bonus rate cap on remunera- tion to retail bankers, there is now a second round effect making bank w a more aggressive bidder for the a-retail banker. Therefore, to protect its profitability bank r optimally responds by further increasing its asset allocation to retail banking also.
Bonus caps applied to wholesale banking can kick-start this re- allocation process by inhibiting bank r from bidding up wholesale banker bonuses:
Proposition 7. If a bonus cap applying only to one asset class is made more severe, all banks increase their asset allocation to the alternative asset class. Hence if a bonus rate cap v applying only to wholesale banker remuneration is reduced, all banks increase their asset alloca- tion to retail banking.
A bonus rate cap applied to one asset-class affects the marginal bidder’s ability to drive up pay in this asset class. The retail-focused bank is the smaller bank in the wholesale banking asset class, and so it is the marginal bidder setting the remuneration level which the wholesale-focused bank needs to match. A bonus rate cap for bankers working in wholesale banking impedes the retail focused bank from bidding up the remuneration of wholesale bankers. This sets off the logic of Lemma 6. Namely the wholesale focused bank, facing less intense competition to hire the a-wholesale banker, is able to profit from diversification. Thus bank w, at the margin, moves some assets away from wholesale and towards retail bank- ing. This makes competition for the a-retail banker more intense, and as there is no bonus cap to protect it, this leads to the retail focused bank also repatriating some of its assets away from whole- sale and towards retail banking. This effect is depicted graphically in Fig. 2. Thus partially applied pay caps can be used to alter banks’ asset allocation decisions through the economic cycle.
7.2. Macroprudential effects with incomplete regulatory coverage
In this Section I expand the analysis above to demonstrate why, even with incomplete regulatory coverage, pay caps in proportion to assets applied partially across asset classes, can be used effec-
tively to alter the equilibrium allocation of banks’ assets. Consider therefore just one universal bank r active in both the r asset class (e.g. retail banking) and the w asset class (e.g. wholesale banking). The bank is once again regulated as to the remuneration it can pay to bankers who manage assets within its wholesale banking book. It is not regulated on payments to those managing retail banking assets. Thus the pay cap regulation continues to be partially applied.
Now replace the universal bank w analysed in the section above with a competing financial institution active only in the w asset class. I will refer to this institution, for the purposes of this exam- ple, as a hedge fund and label its assets in the class Sh . I assume this h institution sits outside of the regulatory net and so is exempt from the pay cap. (Otherwise the analysis above is trivially extended). This model simply captures that banks have multiple business units, and in some of the business units they will face riv- als who come under a different regulatory regime. The benefits of diversification for bank r are again proxied by c � SrðT r � SrÞ if bank r assigns Sr dollars to the retail banking book. In both asset classes there continue to be two bankers with expected growth factors a > b. (Only one retail banker will be required – hence the a-retail banker will be secured by bank r.)
The case of interest is where, absent any cap, the bank would secure the better executive to run its wholesale business unit. Such a bank is one which is vulnerable to the introduction of a remuner- ation cap which applies to it, but not its rival. To this end I restrict attention to the case in which
Sh < T r 2 �
1 2c
a � b þ kG g b
� �c �
g a
� c �� � ð7Þ
This parameter restriction ensures that, absent any cap, the bank would secure the a-banker for its wholesale banking book.
First I determine an upper bound on the size of the retail bank- ing book in the absence of any regulation capping pay.
Lemma 8. In the absence of a remuneration cap the bank will secure the a-banker to run the wholesale banking book. The bank will set its retail banking book strictly smaller than Syr where
Syr ¼ T r 2 þ
1 2c
a � b þ kG g b
� �c �
g a
� c �� �
Table 3 Numbers of employees targeted by intervention on top 20% of earners.
20% Of employees in 2009
UBS 13,047 Credit Suisse 9520 Morgan Stanley 12,278 Deutsche Bank 15,411 Goldman Sachs 6500 Citigroup 53,060
Notes: The table documents the numbers of employees which would have to be captured by an intervention if it were targeted at the top 20% of earners in the named banks in 2009. The data is drawn from Bloomberg and the dataset is that used in Table 1 and Fig. 1. The banks displayed are a selection of household names drawn from the top 20 banks documented in Fig. 1.
148 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
The economics of Lemma 8 are readily explained. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the bank only succeeds in hiring the b-banker to run the wholesale banking book. Under this assumption the value of the bank can be determined by adapting (5) as:
W r Srð Þ¼ aSr � kSr G g a
� c |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
from retail book
þb T r � Srð Þ� k T r � Srð ÞG g b
� �c þ c � Sr T r � Srð Þ ð8Þ
Eq. (8) follows as both bankers will receive a normalised bonus rate of zero. This value function is concave in the allocation of assets to the retail banking book, Sr . Hence there is an optimal allocation given by the first order condition. This asset allocation is sufficiently large that the bank would have more assets in its wholesale banking book than the hedge fund, given assumption (7). This delivers the desired contradiction as the bank will outbid the hedge fund and so secure the a-banker for its wholesale activities (Lemma 1).
It follows that, absent pay cap regulation, bank r will outbid the hedge fund and hire the a-wholesale banker. As bank r must com- pete with the hedge fund to secure the wholesale banker, the a- wholesale banker receives higher remuneration than the a-retail banker does. Thus, to protect its profitability the retail bank diverts assets to wholesale banking, shrinking its retail banking book. This is not straightforward to show as the interaction between pay lev- els and bank default risk is not linear. Nevertheless it can be dem- onstrated that we have an upper bound on the retail banking book in the absence of pay cap regulation, and this upper bound is given in Lemma 8.
Proposition 9. If the bank is subject to a sufficiently severe cap on remuneration for the wholesale banking book then the bank will re- allocate more assets to retail banking and reduce the size of its wholesale banking book.
Proposition 9 considers a regulation which is sufficiently severe that the bank loses the best wholesale banker to the hedge fund. In this setting the bank can secure bankers, but in wholesale banking they are not the very best ones. As a result the expected growth factor available from wholesale banking assets falls slightly, to the lower level of b. The bank would now conduct its asset alloca- tion decision as in the proof of Lemma 8 under the assumption that it will secure the b-bankers for the wholesale banking book, and so the optimal asset allocation can be found. At the asset allocation stage the bank will choose, at the margin, to divert funds away from the wholesale banking book and towards the retail banking book as the returns from wholesale banking have diminished as a result of the partially applied pay cap regulation. Proposition 9 captures that the incomplete regulatory coverage of remuneration regulation can be turned to the regulator’s advantage. The ability to use pay cap regulation as a macroprudential tool survives in the presence of a porous regulatory net.
8. Conclusion
A variable cap on remuneration in proportion to risk weighted assets lowers bank risk and raises bank values. Such a cap impacts on the marginal bidder for a banker more than on the employing bank. The implication is that the market rate of pay for bankers declines, and so banks become less fragile as their cost base is pulled down. By addressing a negative externality in the labour market for bankers, the intervention also has the effect of dampen- ing the pressure banks are under to focus resources on given asset classes so as to secure better bankers. And the pay cap can be used to achieve macroprudential objectives through the cycle as it can be structured to encourage banks to refocus towards a subset of asset
classes (e.g. retail banking) if desired by a regulator. Finally, by using appropriate risk weights, bankers’ incentives to abuse any weakness in corporate governance failings to grow pay is mitigated.
Consider therefore a regulatory intervention which capped total bank remuneration summed over wholesale bankers proportional to each bank’s risk-weighted wholesale banking assets. Regulation at the aggregate level is easier and less costly to implement than per person caps. And yet such a cap will likely be implemented by senior management on rank-and-file hiring decisions as a top down rule. This is because the numbers of employees involved would make micro-managing deviations from a general rule impractical (see Table 3). Hence a cap at the bank level tackles the externality described at the individual banker level, and likely generates the consequences for bank values and bank risk studied here.
As a benchmark calculation let us suppose that remuneration in banks adhered to a commonly experienced 80:20 rule (Sanders (1988)) so that the 20% best paid bankers secure 80% of the remu- neration. If the pay of these best paid executives could be lowered by a quarter then this would equate to a 20% reduction in the over- all remuneration bill, the effect of which was graphed in Fig. 1. Such a reduction in 2009 would have been equivalent, in safety terms, to an increase in the Tier 1 ratio of over 150 basis points for the most affected institution (UBS).
The logic, described in this analysis, of the negative externality banks exert on each other through the labour market exists in all industries. Thus one might wonder if a similar pay cap regulation would be advisable in other industries beyond finance. I do not seek to take a stand on this question. However I note that the ratio- nale for intervening beyond finance is weaker for at least two rea- sons. Firstly the finance industry is special as compared to other areas of business due to the negative externalities it exposes soci- ety to when financial firms fail. These impacts on society are not formally part of this model and so this study does not offer a jus- tification that pay caps in banking are worthwhile. I purely note that the case for pay caps in proportion to assets is likely to be rel- atively stronger in banking than in other industries. Secondly, the financial sector has a larger remuneration bill as a proportion of shareholder equity than other industries. It therefore follows that the gain from a pay cap in terms of bank risk reduction is corre- spondingly greater than it would be in other industries.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editor Ike Mathur, and an anonymous referee for detailed comments which have greatly improved this paper. I would further like to thank Sam Harrington, Su-Lian Ho, Victoria Saporta, Matthew Willison, and the other members of the Prudential Policy Division at the Bank of England for helpful discussions. I would also like to thank the Bank of England for their hospitality whilst I was undertaking this research. Finally I am grateful to audiences at the Financial Globalization and Sustainable Finance Conference, Cape Town, the IFS School of Finance, the CFA
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 149
Belgium, the CFA London, the Atlanta Fed, WBS University of War- wick, University of Zurich, and Christ Church, Oxford University. This work does not reflect the view of the Bank of England or any other named individuals. Any errors remain my own.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider banks i and i � 1 and bankers j and j � 1. We wish to show that the bank with the larger pot of assets in this business unit will secure the better banker. Suppose the outside option of banker j is u. If bank i hires banker j at a bonus rate qi;j then the bonus must satisfy ajqi;jSi ¼ u. Hence bank i’s expected utility would be, from (2):
V ij ¼ aj 1 � qi;j � �
Si � kSiG g
aj 1 � qi;j � � !c ð9Þ
Hence bank i is willing to bid up to a bonus of qi;j�1 for banker j � 1 where:
V ij ¼ aj�1 1 � qi;j�1 � �
Si � kSi G g
aj�1 1 � qi;j�1 � � !c ð10Þ
Setting (9) equal to (10), this has solution aj�1 1 � qi;j�1 � �
¼ aj 1 � qi;j � �
. The maximum bid that bank i will make for banker j � 1 is therefore
qi;j�1 ¼ 1 � aj=aj�1 � �
1 � qi;j � �
ð11Þ
The same working determines the maximum that bank i � 1 is will- ing to bid for banker j � 1 as qi�1;j�1 ¼ 1 � aj=aj�1
� � 1 � u= ajSi�1
� �� � .
The lemma follows by demonstrating that bank i � 1 is willing to bid to higher levels of utility for banker j � 1:
aj�1Si�1qi�1;j�1 � aj�1 Siqi;j�1 ¼ aj�1 Si�1 � aj Si�1 þ u � � aj�1 Si � aj Si þ u �
¼ aj�1 � aj � �
Si�1 � Sið Þ > 0
The inequality follows as, by assumption, Si�1 > Si and aj�1 > aj. It follows that we have positive assortative matching. h
Proof of Proposition 2. Bank i þ 1 will be willing to bid for the banker of rank i a bonus qiþ1;i given by (11) as qiþ1;i ¼ 1 �ðaiþ1=aiÞð1 � qiþ1Þ. This is the marginal bid for banker i. Hence bank i will match the marginal bidder:
ai qi Si ¼ ai qiþ1;i Siþ1 ¼ ai � aiþ1ð ÞSiþ1 þ aiþ1 qiþ1Siþ1 ð12Þ
It follows, by induction that ai Si qi ¼ PN
j¼iþ1 Sj aj�1 � aj � �
þ SNaN qN . The ultimate outside option of leaving the industry for all the bank- ers is normalised to 0 which yields qN ¼ 0. The result follows. h
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show that a bank will pay a lower bonus rate to the banker they hire than they would bid for a better banker. This follows from (11) as qi;i�1 � qi ¼ 1 � qið Þ 1 � ai=ai�1ð Þ > 0. Hence a cap will be binding on a bank’s
bidding for better staff. Suppose that the cap affects the bidding of bank j for the better
banker j � 1 for the subset of banks j 2 M. If bank j 2 M then the bid for banker j � 1 is a bonus qj;j�1 ¼ v as the cap is binding. Hence bank j � 1 will secure banker j � 1 at a bonus such that it matches the utility offered by bank j : aj�1Sjv ¼ aj�1Sj�1qj�1, yielding
qj�1 ¼ v Sj=Sj�1 � �
< v ð13Þ
If instead a bank ranked j were competing against a bank unaffected by the cap, then the required bonus will also be unaffected by the cap, and is given by (12).
We can now determine the equilibrium bonus paid by any bank i. Let bank m be the bank with the greatest assets, conditional on being smaller than bank i’s, which is affected by the cap. Thus m 2 M and m > i. From (12) we have
ai Si qi ¼ Xm�1
j¼iþ1 Sj aj�1 � aj � �
þ am�1 qm�1Sm�1
¼ Xm�1
j¼iþ1 Sj aj�1 � aj � �
þ am�1vSm by ð13Þ ð14Þ
As the cap is binding on bank m by assumption, we have
v < quncappedm�1 . Hence the bonus paid by bank i declines as a result of the cap. The risk of a bank incurring a default event is G g=a 1 � qð Þð Þc. As the bonus q declines this probability also declines. The value of the bank rises by inspection of (2). Hence we have the first result.
We now turn to the second result. We wish to show that the bonus payable by bank i declines as the cap, v, falls. Suppose first that a reduction in the cap v does not alter the identify of the highest rank bank, with assets in this business line smaller than i, which is affected by the cap. If so the bonus bank i pays is given by (14). This moves monotonically with v delivering the result. Suppose now the cap is so stringent that it affects more banks. Thus suppose the identity of the highest rank bank, with assets smaller than i, which is affected by the cap becomes bank ~m where i < ~m < m. The bonus payable by bank i can therefore be written, from (12) as
ai Si qi ¼ X~m�1
j¼iþ1 Sj aj�1 � aj � �
þ a ~m�1 q ~m�1S ~m�1
The proof now follows by observing that the bonus bank ~m � 1 pays declines as a result of the cap now affecting bank ~m. This follows as the bid of bank ~m for banker ~m � 1 is reduced by the cap. Hence the bonus paid by i again moves monotonically in v. This delivers the result.
Finally, as the cap applies to all banks, the positive assortative matching result of Lemma 1 is unaffected. There is no re-ranking of the banks and so the allocation of bankers to banks is unaffected. h
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the maximisation problem (4) for-
mulate the Lagrangian L¼ v � b; x D E
þ g U x; q D E
; x; Vxh i �
� R h i
with Lagrange multiplier g. The first order condition then yields an expression for the optimal allocation x�:
vb þ g @U @l
q þ 2 @U @r2
Vx� �
¼ 0
Hence we have
x� ¼ �1
2g @U=@r2ð Þ V�1 g
@U @l
q þ vb � �
The direction of the vector x� varies in the cap v unless b is propor- tional to q yielding the result. h
Proof of Proposition 5. First we note that both banks choosing exactly the same allocation in all asset classes so that they set S ¼ T=2 is not an equilibrium. As the banks are equal in size, com- petition for the a-banker would push their expected pay up to the point where both banks were indifferent between the a and b banker. Thus it would be as if both hired b-bankers. This is dominated by one bank moving e of their balance sheet to one of the business lines. They would then secure some benefit from an a-banker which increases their profit.
150 J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151
The bank with the smaller asset allocation in any given class will have T � S in the asset class. If the cap on remuneration is binding v < 1 � b=að Þ then the bonus is limited and so the bid is capped at expected remuneration of av T � Sð Þ. Hence the bank with the larger pot of assets secures the a-banker by offering a bonus rate of q ¼ v T � Sð Þ=S. The bank with a smaller pot of assets in any given class will recruit the b-banker for a bonus of 0 as the outside option is normalised to 0.
To identify the optimal asset allocation S we must ensure there is no incentive to unilaterally deviate to a different allocation eS. Denote the value from such a deviation by V eS; T � S� where the second argument captures the rival’s weight in the asset class. From (5):
V eS; T � S� ¼ a 1 � v T � SeS �eS � keSG g
a 1 � v T�SeS �
0 BB@
1 CCA
c
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} ið Þ
þ ceS T �eS� þ b T �eS� � k T �eS� G g b
� �c ð15Þ
We first establish that the value function, (15) is concave in the asset allocation eS. This follows if the term ið Þ is convex in eS. To test this define h eS� by h eS� :¼ g
a � av T�SeS This is a hyperbola in eS. Consider the arm in which eS > v T � Sð Þ which is the relevant one as eS > T � S. This curve is positive, down- wards sloping and convex. Now consider f eS� ¼ eS h eS� h ic. As c P 1 a sufficient condition for this curve to be convex is if
0 < 2h0 eS� þeSh00 eS� ¼ �2gv T � Sð Þ a ~S � v T � Sð Þ � 2 þeS 2gv T � Sð Þ
a eS � v T � Sð Þ� 3 () 0 < 2g v T � Sð Þ½ �2 which is true:
Thus the objective function of the bank is concave and so has a unique maximand given by the first order condition. Hence an equilibrium is achieved when @V=@eS evaluated at eS ¼ S equals zero. This gives: @V
@eS S; T � Sð Þ¼ 0 ¼ a þ c T � 2Sð Þ� b þ kG gb � �c
� kG g
a 1 � v T�SS � !c 1 � c v T�SS
1 � v T�SS �( ) ð16Þ
This defines the equilibrium level of assets in the two business units, S and T � S, implicitly as a function of v.
We wish to determine the change in the asset allocation to the over-weight asset in equilibrium. We have @V S vð Þ; T � S vð Þð Þ= @eS � 0 which defines S as a function of v. We therefore have 0 ¼
@ 2 V
@eS@v þ dSdv @ 2V S; T � Sð Þ @eS@eS �@
2V S; T � Sð Þ @eS@ T � Sð Þ
( ) By algebraic manipulation of (16), @2 V @eS@v. > 0.16 Due to the concavity of the value function with respect to eS, we have that
16 The result follows if ga 1�vð Þ � c
1 � c v1�v n o
is decreasing in v. Differentiating with respect to v yields
c g
a 1 � vð Þ
� �c v 1 � v
� cv
1 � vð Þ2
" #
And multiplying through by 1 � vð Þ2 confirms that the derivative is negative.
@ 2 V @eS@eS. < 0. By the same logic as for @2 V=@eS@v we have @
2 V @eS@ T � Sð Þ. > 0. Combining we have determined that dS=dv > 0, so the result is proved. h
Proof of Lemma 6. I will prove the result for bank w, the result for bank r follows analogously. Bank r is subject to a bonus cap of v in its bidding for the a-wholesale banker. This yields expected remu- neration of av T r � Srð Þ. Hence bank w secures the a-wholesale banker by offering a bonus rate of q ¼ v T r � Srð Þ=Sw. Hence from (5) the value of bank w is:
V w Sw; T r �Srð Þ¼a 1�v T r �Sr
Sw
� Sw �kSwG
g
a 1�v Tr�SrSw h i
0 @
1 Ac
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} ið Þ
þb T w �Swð Þ�k T w �Swð ÞG g b
� �c þcSw T w �Swð Þ ð17Þ
By the proof of Proposition 5 the value function V w Sw; T r � Srð Þ is concave in the asset allocation Sw. Hence the best response of bank w is given by the first order condition, @V w=@Sw ¼ 0. Analogously to (16):
0 ¼ a � b þ c T w � 2Swð Þþ kG g b
� �c
� kG g a
� c 1 1 � v T r�SrSw h i
0 @
1 Acþ1 1 � c þ 1ð Þv T r � Sr
Sw
� � ð18Þ
I now show that the best response curve, Sw Srð Þ is downwards slop- ing to yield the required result. Taking differentials we have
@
@S2w V w Sw; T r � Srð Þ
dSw dSr �
@
@Sw@ T r � Srð Þ V w Sw; T r � Srð Þ¼ 0
Due to the concavity of the value function with respect to Sw,
@ 2 V @S2w .
< 0. By algebraic manipulation one can confirm that
@ 2 V w @Sw@ T r � Srð Þ= > 0 which implies that dSw Srð Þ=dSr < 0 as
required. h
Proof of Proposition 7. Lemma 6 shows that the asset allocation decisions are strategic substitutes. We first show that decreasing the bonus cap v pushes the reaction function of bank w down. Taking differentials, @
@S2w V w
dSw dv þ
@2
@Sw@v V w ¼ 0. By concavity
@
@S2w V w < 0, and @
2
@Sw@v V w > 0 from the proof of Proposition 5 (using
Footnote 16). Hence dSw=dv > 0 as required. As the bonus cap does not apply to retail banking, the reaction function of bank r; Sr Swð Þ is unaffected by v.
Reducing v will push the intersection of the reaction curves towards greater retail banking assets if the equilibrium is stable (Tirole (1988)) so that �1 < dSi Sj
� � =dSi < 0 for all i – j. This can be
confirmed by explicit differentiation of (18):
0¼�2c dSw Srð Þ
dSr �kG
g a
� c c cþ1ð Þ
1
1�v T r�SrSw h icþ2 v2 T r �Srð Þ2S3w
dSw Srð Þ dSr
�kG g a
� c c cþ1ð Þ
1
1�v T r�SrSw h icþ2 v2 T r �SrS2w
Simplifying, for c large enough we guarantee that dSw Srð Þ=dSr > �1. In particular a sufficient condition for the result to hold is (6) using the fact that T i � Si < Sj for i–j by construction. The proof that dSr Swð Þ=dSw > �1 is analogous. Hence we have the desired result. h
J. Thanassoulis / Journal of Banking & Finance 48 (2014) 139–151 151
Proof of Lemma 8. First we demonstrate that the bank would secure the better wholesale banker. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the bank selects T r � Sr < Sh assets for its wholesale banking book. In this case the value of the bank is given by (8). This is con- cave in Sr . The first order condition for this expression would set Sr ¼ Syr . Hence bank r would have assets T r � S
y r in its wholesale
banking book. But this is in excess of the hedge fund’s assets, Sh by (7). Hence we have a contradiction and so the bank must prefer an asset allocation to wholesale banking which was sufficient to secure the better banker.
With no remuneration caps the banker would be paid a bonus rate of 1 � b=að Þ Sh= T r � Srð Þð Þ, which follows from (12). Bank r’s expected value is then, adapting (17):
V r Sr ; Shð Þ¼ a 1 � 1 � b=a½ � Sh
T r � Sr
� � T r � Srð Þ
� k T r � Srð ÞG g
a 1 � 1 � b=a½ � ShT r�Sr �
0 @
1 Ac
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} ið Þ
þaSr
� kSr G g a
� c þ c � Sr T r � Srð Þ ð19Þ
This is concave in Sr if ið Þ is convex, which is true by the method of proof of Proposition 5. Hence the objective function of the bank is concave and so has a unique maximand given by the first order con- dition. The first order condition with respect to Sr delivers
d dSr
V r Sr ; Shð Þ¼ kG g
a 1 � 1 � b=a½ � ShT r�Sr �
0 @
1 Ac
� 1 � c 1
1 � 1 � b=a½ � ShT r�Sr � 1 � b=a½ � Sh
T r � Sr
2 4
3 5
� kG g a
� c þ c � T r � 2Srð Þ
Algebraic manipulations deliver that ddSr V r S y r ; Sh
� < 0 using (7).
Hence the optimal size of the wholesale banking book is greater than T r � Syr , and so the assets devoted to retail are below S
y r , yield-
ing the result. h
Proof of Proposition 9. The hedge fund is willing to bid up to a bonus given by (11) as qh;1 ¼ 1 � b=a. Hence the hedge fund would be willing to offer the a-banker an expected utility of up to aqh;1 Sh ¼ a � bð ÞSh. To hire the better executive the bank needs to match this remuneration. This occurs if aqr T r � Srð Þ P a � bð ÞSh . If the remuneration cap is binding on the bank then the better executive can only be hired if T r � Sr P 1 � b=að Þ Sh=vð Þ. Suppose the cap is sufficiently severe that the wholesale banking book is optimally below this level.17 In this case the bank cannot outbid
17 This is true in the limit as v tends to 0. Therefore there is a range of bonus caps for which it is true by continuity.
the hedge fund. The bank will therefore secure the b-banker to run its banking book. In this case the bank’s value is given by (8). Opti- mising this value over the asset allocation, the optimal wholesale banking book size is then given as Syr . The wholesale banking book has shrunk and the banking book grown by comparison with the bound in Lemma 8. h
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- Bank pay caps, bank risk, and macroprudential regulation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Literature review
- 3 The model
- 3.1 Discussion of key assumptions
- 4 The no intervention benchmark
- 5 Effect of a pay cap in proportion to (risk weighted) assets
- 5.1 Assets to be valued on a risk weighted basis
- 6 Asset allocation responses to a pay cap
- 6.1 Extension to a model of multiple assets
- 6.2 Optimal asset allocation
- 7 Pay Regulation for macroprudential objectives
- 7.1 A model of partially applied pay cap regulation
- 7.2 Macroprudential effects with incomplete regulatory coverage
- 8 Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- Appendix A Omitted Proofs
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426614002222-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Can interest rates really control house prices? Effectiveness and implications for macroprudential policy
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.012 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Private Bag 11-222, Palmerston North 4442, New Zealand. Tel.: +64 6 356 9099x84038; fax: +64 6 3505660.
E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Tripe).
1 Although their study looks at different aspects of the New Zealand market to those raised in this paper, Grimes and Aitken (2010) also af importance of house price dynamics.
Song Shi a, Jyh-Bang Jou b, David Tripe a,⇑ a School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand b Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University, Taiwan
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 31 October 2013 Accepted 13 June 2014 Available online 28 June 2014
JEL classification: E52 E58 G21 R21
Keywords: Housing market House price bubbles Monetary policy Mortgage lending rates
a b s t r a c t
This paper investigates how changes in the central bank policy and retail mortgage rates affected real housing prices in New Zealand during the period 1999–2009. We find that real interest rates are signif- icantly and positively related to real housing prices, indicating that increases in the policy rate may not be effective in depressing real housing prices. By testing interest rates, we also find some evidence of hous- ing price bubbles. Our findings suggest that the central bank could have limited housing price bubbles if it had started to intervene in the housing market prior to 2003. Our results set international exemplars for using policy rates or macroprudential tools to cool the housing market, where the extent of policy rate adjustments is limited by internal or external economic factors.
� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
House price levels are one of the big economic issues of the 21st century. There was strong growth in house prices from 2000 through to the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08. This was not just a United States phenomenon, with strong house price growth and subsequent busts also observed in countries such as Ireland and Spain. Rapid growth in house prices was also seen in New Zealand (Bollard and Smith, 2006), where real interest rates were positively correlated with real house price growth, in contrast with the expected negative relationship.
House prices may affect not only the economy as a whole, but also the banking system. Houses often form an important part of household asset portfolios, with this particularly the case in New Zealand where housing represented 74% of gross household assets at the end of 2012. Rising house prices may create a wealth effect which may encourage households to increase spending, resulting in inflationary pressures and macroeconomic instability (Crowe
et al., 2013).1 Lending on housing accounted for 56% of New Zealand total credit as at the end of 2012, which would mean that losses on housing lending could have a negative impact on bank solvency. These sorts of effects have been observed internationally, in such countries as the United States, Ireland and Spain in the aftermath of the GFC (Crowe et al., 2013), and there is a fear that another round of house price rises could lead to a recurrence of previous problems with bank solvency.
Previous research has pointed out that monetary policy can impact on housing prices (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 2007; Shiller, 2006). The extent of any change and the time it takes for the change to have an effect is a more problematic issue, how- ever. What is the impact of policy rates on real mortgage rates, and how do these real mortgage rates impact on house prices? Are interest rates, as Crowe et al. (2013) suggest, a blunt instrument which may engender undesirable outcomes in other parts of the economy? These are among the important questions in debates occurring in a number of countries as house prices are again increasing, as the effects of the GFC abate, leading to discussion
housing firm the
Fig. 1. Prices and interest rates – Auckland City, April 1999–December 2009.
16 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
of the potential role for macroprudential policies. The concern of regulators and policy-makers in this situation is that a house price boom might be followed by a bust, undermining bank safety and soundness. Consequently, if a boom can be prevented by appropri- ate intervention, we might also be able to avoid subsequent damage to the banking sector.
The focus of this paper is New Zealand, which saw rapid growth in house prices during the period 2001–2007, accompanied by a very substantial increase in total lending on residential mortgages. At the same time, we saw continuing increases in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)’s Official Cash Rate (OCR), with general pass-through to the interest rates paid by mortgage borrowers. Fig. 1 shows the relationship between the OCR, mortgage rates and real house price growth in Auckland City (New Zealand’s largest) between 1999 and 2009.
The effect of the GFC on New Zealand house prices was rela- tively mild (nominal price reductions of 10–15%, on average, after one year of the GFC), with losses now recovered in most parts of the country.2 More significant price increases are now occurring in some parts of the country, which has engendered concern by the RBNZ that the country might be in for another housing price boom as in the mid-2000s, setting the banks up for another bust, which might be aggravated by relatively high levels of household indebtedness.
The RBNZ’s response to this has been to implement loan-to- value ratio restrictions as a macroprudential policy tool, on the basis that it does not want to increase interest rates because of the effect that might have on the value of the New Zealand dollar and thus on the competitiveness of the export sector (New Zealand has a long history of current account deficits in the balance of pay- ments). There is also a question as to how effective interest rates would be as a means of restraining sharply rising house prices, or more generally, how strong the impact of interest rates is on house prices. For example, Taylor (2007, 2009) argued that low interest rates contributed to a boom and bust in the USA,3 while Glaeser et al. (2010) found that decreases in interest rates could only explain 20% of the increases in real house prices.
In this article, using the present value model described by Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b), we show that the impact of real interest rate changes on the real housing price is positive. The effects of interest rates on housing prices can, however, be further
2 See Hunt (2013) for more review of the relevant history. 3 See also McDonald and Stokes (2013), who show a negative relationship between
short term interest rates in the United States (the Fed funds rate) and nominal house prices.
complicated by mortgage borrowers’ hedging activities in choosing between fixed and floating rate loans, in anticipation of OCR move- ments, and we also investigate this issue.
The New Zealand environment and the RBNZ’s policy actions make it a particularly interesting market for studying the effective- ness of interest rate policy. In the next section we look at monetary policy and interest rates in New Zealand in more detail, and at how they interact with each other and with the housing market. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and outlines the econometric tools used. Section 4 describes the data while Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 outlines policy recommen- dations and concludes.
2. New Zealand interest rates
The RBNZ’s monetary policy mandate is an inflation target, currently specified as a range of 1 to 3%. The key policy rate is the OCR, which defines what banks earn if they deposit funds over- night or pay if they borrow from the RBNZ. Any borrowings are on a repo basis, with a spread of 50 basis points between the borrow- ing and lending rates. The OCR thus sets a benchmark for interbank overnight borrowing and the short end of the yield curve, with market rates for longer maturities being impacted by standard factors that influence the yield curve.
The OCR is reviewed 8 times a year, although on one occasion (19 September 2001), it was changed at other than a scheduled review date. Following any OCR review, the dates for which are scheduled a year or more in advance, there should be no further change for another 6 to 7 weeks. Overnight market rates should thus remain close to the OCR until the next scheduled review. The inflation targeting approach means that the OCR should be higher when inflation is higher, and real interest rates should be less variable than nominal interest rates. The highest nominal rate reached for the OCR was 8.25% between 26 July 2007 and 24 July 2008, while its lowest level has been 2.5% between 30 April 2009 and 10 June 2010, and again from 10 March 2011 until an increase on 13 March 2014.
Longer term money market rates also move in response to the OCR, although the yield curve was negatively sloping between 2004 and 2009. This reflected expectations that the RBNZ would ease short-term interest rates in response to easing inflation pressures (an outcome that was delayed, at least in part, because of booming house prices). Longer term rates fell significantly after the middle of 2008.
New Zealand borrowers have choices as to lending interest rates. They can borrow at floating rates, which can be changed at relatively short notice (one month or less), or they can fix the inter- est rate on their mortgage borrowing for a period between six months and five years.4 Floating rate borrowers can switch to fixed rates at any time, but fixed rate borrowers can only change their arrangements at the end of the period for which they have taken a fixed rate, unless they pay an early repayment penalty (generally calculated on the basis of interest rate differentials). One of the con- sequences of the use of fixed rate loans is a delay between changes in market rates and what borrowers actually pay, dampening the effect of monetary policy changes on household spending capacity.
Actual rates charged to retail mortgage borrowers for different periods to repricing generally track movements in the underlying money market rates. Tripe et al. (2005) found that, since the adop- tion of the OCR approach in 1999, key lending rates had become more responsive to changes in underlying wholesale rates, and the RBNZ monetary policy could thus be described as having
4 As in the USA mortgage market, mortgage loans in New Zealand can be for 25 or 30 years, but the usual maximum term for a fixed interest rate is 5 years.
7 There was, however, some recognition of a potential easing of credit standards, as instanced by comments in Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2007), pp. 25–26.
8
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 17
become more efficient. Liu et al. (2008) found that the introduction of the OCR increased the pass-through to floating rates, but not to fixed mortgage rates.
This has been confirmed in exploratory data analysis under- taken as part of this research, where we find stronger correlations between short-term mortgage rates and the OCR than for longer term rates. Further analysis using Granger causality tests uncov- ered bi-directional relationships,5 which might reflect the keen competition between banks. Announced changes in the OCR often provide banks with the reason to adjust their retail interest rates in response to changes in underlying funding costs.6 On the other hand, banks might change shorter fixed term mortgage lending rates prior to an OCR announcement because they anticipate a policy change or have to respond to the actions of other lenders changing their mortgage rates. The relationship with longer term rates is likely to be an indication of the way long-term rates predict future shorter- term rates. This suggests that the yield curve is acting as a relatively reliable predictor of future rates. If the OCR did not respond to changes in other interest rates, it is likely that we would regard the implementation of monetary policy as somewhat erratic.
No prior research has looked at how either real New Zealand money market or retail rates impact on house prices. Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating this issue.
3. Estimation strategies and the empirical models
3.1. Present value model
This paper follows the present value model to investigate how the real rental rate and the real interest rate affect the real housing price. Shiller (2006) argued that house prices should be equal to the present discounted value of future rents. A linear present value model with a constant discount rate is thus written as follows:
Pt ¼ Et Xn i¼1
Dtþi ð1 þ RÞi
" # þ Et
Xn i¼1
Ptþn ð1 þ RÞn
" # ð1Þ
where Pt is the current asset price at time t, Dt is the dividend or cash flow at time t and R is the constant expected discount rate. On the right-hand side of Eq. (1), the first term is called the funda- mental value, and the second term the rational price bubble. When n is sufficiently large, the second term will converge to zero. The well-known Gordon growth model is accordingly set as follows:
Pt ¼ ð1 þ GÞDt
R � G ð2Þ
where G is the constant growth rate of cash flows and is less than R. When G is zero, Eq. (2) becomes:
Pt ¼ Dt R
ð3Þ
This formula is widely used in the valuation of income producing properties. The term R is referred as the capitalisation rate or invest- ment yield in real estate. The model implies that house prices are positively related to rental rates, but negatively related to the household’s discount rate.
The assumption of a constant expected discount rate R is analytically convenient, but inconsistent with the variation in investors’ expected rates of return over time. It is logical to infer that time-varying discount rates are closely linked to the retail mortgage rates prevailing in the housing market. Other caveats for successfully applying Eq. (3) are that R must reflect future rental growth, real interest rates and the housing premium.
5 Results are available from the authors on request. 6 See Tripe et al. (2005) and Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
In contrast with the literature, Eq. (3) disregards two sets of fac- tors. The first is demand fundamentals such as employment and income (Campbell et al., 2009; Wheaton and Nechayev, 2008), and net immigration (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009); the second is credit market terms such as the loan-to-value ratio and approval rates (Glaeser et al., 2010). While data on credit market terms exists in the USA, detailed information on these is not generally published by banks in New Zealand.7 Furthermore, the impacts of these terms on housing prices are inconclusive. While Khandani et al. (2009) and Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) find that they play a pivotal role, Glaeser et al. (2010) find that they are minor factors. We follow Campbell et al. (2009) in adding other economic variables to Eq. (3) to better forecast real interest rates, rental growth and the housing premium.
However, a recent UK study by Tse et al. (2014) suggests that house prices could be fractionally integrated, i.e. house prices are stationary processes with long memory. This is important because if house prices are indeed fractionally integrated we need to mod- ify our estimation strategy. We test this possibility of fractional integration by applying the Zivot and Andrews, 1992 unit root tests and the ARFIMA (0,d,0) fractional integration test to our New Zealand data set.8 Using the former test, we find that log real house prices are non-stationary with potential structural breaks. In addition, using the latter test with potential breaks, we find that first differencing of house prices is not over-differenced. Finally, we also find that when both house prices and rents are fractionally differ- enced, there is almost no difference between the two time series. Thus we specify our estimation models in the first-order difference form. The results of the ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root test are attached in Appendix 1.
Taking the first-order difference and logarithm of Eq. (3), adding macroeconomic conditions and location differences, we obtain:9
Dpi;t ¼ c0 þ Xl k¼1
akDpi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
bkDdi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
kkDmi;t�k
þ Xl k¼0
Wk Xi;t�k þ ui Ri;t þ di Bi;t þ X11 j¼1
/j Sj þ mit ð4Þ
where c0 is a constant, i refers to different cities, t denotes the time period, l is the number of lags, pi,t, di,t and mi,t are log real prices, log real rents and real mortgage rates, respectively, X is a vector of economic variables, Ri,t denotes the percentage change of ratio of floating rate loans to overall mortgage loans, Bi,t denotes the poten- tial structural break as indicated from the Zivot-Andrews unit root tests, Sj denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables (Sj = 1 for month j, and Sj = 0 otherwise), vit is the white noise, and D denotes the first difference or percentage change.
The economic variables include the log consumer confidence index, unemployment rate and real household lending. All vari- ables are measured in the first difference or percentage change. The consumer confidence index is used to control for the impact of consumer confidence on housing market activities. Unemploy- ment rate and real household lending variables are measured on the percentage change basis. The unemployment rate is used to control for labour market conditions, while the variable for real household lending is used to control for available credit in the housing market.
The optimum lag number l is identified by the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criterion, which is considered to be superior for
The results are available from the authors on request. 9 Our specification contrasts with those of Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) and Igan
and Loungani (2012), neither of which includes any lagged price difference variable in Eq. (4).
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
.32
.36
.40
.44
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
OCR Ratio of the value of floating loan to overall mortgage loan
Fig. 2. OCR movements and the ratio of the value of floating loan to overall mortgage loan, Apr. 1999–Dec. 2009.
18 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
sample size over 120 (see, for example, Khim and Liew, 2004). Following the method suggested by Vahid and Engle (1993) in choosing the order of the VAR system, we estimate different lengths in levels and select the one with the smallest HQ criterion. The optimum lag length in levels as indicated by the HQ criterion is two, and we thus take one lag for Eq. (4). A similar lag length selec- tion is used in Leung et al. (2013) in their study of the effect of international commodity prices on housing prices in New Zealand and Australia. The structural break is taken at September 2007 across all models.10
The above estimation equation could potentially be improved by using a vector error correction model (VECM) to study the long-run relationship of interest rates and housing prices, but two problems arise. The first is that the OCR regime has only been in place since April 1999, making long-run analysis problematic. The second is that the VECM estimations of the long-run relation- ship between the variables are not stable because estimated long-run relationships change dramatically for different locali- ties.11 To overcome these two problems, we use pooled OLS to explore the relationships between the variables. The Chow (1960) test indicates that the data are poolable with a common intercept and the same slopes across different cities.12
3.2. Hedging effect of mortgage rate changes
We further explore mortgage choice and its impact on housing prices as we believe that the choices between fixed and floating rate loans have important policy implications. If more borrowers choose fixed rates, changes in floating mortgage rates will have less direct impact on housing prices. Fig. 2 shows the ratio of the value of floating rate to overall mortgage loans over time. Since the RBNZ introduced the OCR in 1999, the proportion of floating rate loans by value fell from 40% to 12.5% in 2007. However, with reductions in the OCR since 2008, floating rates have become more attractive to borrowers. The value of floating rate loans relative to total loans exceeded 25% by the end of 2009, and 50% by March 2011.
There is, however, a problem in using the OLS to estimate Eq. (4). Follain (1990) notes that mortgage choice (floating vs. fixed) is an endogenous variable, correlated with other factors such as expectations of future interest rate changes, so that Rt and vit in Eq. (4) might be correlated. To accommodate this, we use the differential between the 5 years fixed and floating mortgage rates as an instrumental variable (IV) in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to estimate Eq. (4). Our models are thus specified as follows:
The first stage:
Ri;t ¼ c0 þ Xl k¼1
akDpi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
bkDdi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
kkDmi;t�k
þ Xl k¼0
Wk Xi;t�k þ ui Ii;t þ diBt þ X11 j¼1
/j Sj þ git ð5Þ
The second stage:
10 The Zivot-Andrews unit root tests generally indicate that structural breaks occurred between September 2007 and March 2008. Having regard to the narrow range of dates, we adopt a common break for all markets of September 2007. This immediately followed the events of August 2007 which have been commonly identified as the start of the GFC, and are also broadly consistent with the turnaround in housing confidence data indicated by the ASB Bank survey. The results are robust for using different possible structural breaks, such as March 2008.
11 The results of the VECM estimations are available from the authors on request. 12 The results of Chow (1960) and Wald tests are available from the authors on
request.
Dpi;t ¼ c0 þ Xl k¼1
akDpi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
bkDdi;t�k þ Xl k¼0
kkDmi;t�k
þ Xl k¼0
Wk Xi;t�k þ ui R̂i;t þ di Bi;t þ X11 j¼1
/j Sj þ lit ð5 0Þ
where R̂i;t is the estimated value of Ri,t in Eq. (5). The instrumental variable (Ii,t) is believed to be correlated with
Ri,t but is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term vi,t in Eq. (4). This is likely to be the case as differences between the 5 year fixed and floating rates will most affect households’ mortgage choice, as measured by the percentage change in the ratio of floating rate loans to overall mortgage loans (measured by value). A higher positive interest rate differential between the 5 year fixed and floating rates (i.e. fixed rates are higher than the floating rate) will push more people onto a floating rate and vice versa.13 On the other hand, the interest rate differential between the 5 year fixed and floating rates should have minimal influence on housing price changes (i.e. households seldom buy or sell houses based on the interest rate differentials between floating and fixed rate mortgages). Thus the interest rate differential would not be expected to be correlated with the error term vi,t.
3.3. Rational expectations and bubbles
We also test for bubbles in the housing market, as the existence of a bubble could impact on the effectiveness of the policy rates. Under rational expectations (Lucas and Sargent, 1981) households will use all past information up to time period t to approximate house price growth at time t + 1. Following this strategy, we first estimate Eq. (5) and (50) using all past information up to time t, then use the estimated coefficients and t + 1 information to fore- cast the house price change Dpt+1. In this process, rational expecta- tions of house prices are developed from a mixture of current and past fundamental information. Similar estimation strategies were used by Clayton (1996) to derive a rational expectations model for housing price volatility, forecasting rents and other market fundamental data based on the time series properties of the data. He assumed that rents follow an AR(4) process and used the Box–Jenkins technique to forecast other exogenous variables such as net immigration and the stock of newly completed but unoccu- pied homes. His conclusions were thus sensitive to these in-sample
13 The heteroskedasticity-robust t test in the reduced form regression shows that the ratio of floating rate loan to overall mortgage value is indeed an endogenous variable.
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 19
results. In this study, we follow a more general approach to forecast the expected house price change Dpt+1, which can be written as:
Ei;tþ1½Dpi;tþ1�¼ ĉi;t þâi;t Dpi;t þ X1 k¼0
b̂ki;t Ddi;tþ1�k þ X1 k¼0
k̂ki;t Dmi;tþ1�k
þ Xl k¼0
Ŵki;t Xi;tþ1�k þûi;t Rtþ1 þd̂i;t Btþ1þ X11 j¼1
/̂ji;t Si;tþ1 þxi;t ð6Þ
where Ei,t+1[Dpi,t+1] is the expected next period house price change for city i using information of other variables at both time period t and t + 1, ‘‘^)’’ denotes the estimated values using 2SLS as specified in Eqs. (5) and (50) and xi,t is the idiosyncratic effect associated with the individual city.
In Eq. (6) the expected house price change not only depends on changes of variables at both times t and t + 1, but also on changes of parameter estimates (coefficients) at t�1 and t. In other words, households’ discount rates are not only linked to mortgage rate changes, but also to changes in coefficients of other variables. The difference between the actual and expected price change is:
�i;tþ1 ¼ Dpi;tþ1 � Ei;tþ1½Dpi;tþ1� ð7Þ
We examine the distribution and time series properties of �i;tþi to find whether housing price bubbles exist. Our hypothesis is that if households are rational with varying discount rates, �i;tþ1 must be small and its distribution should be close to normal. If a rational bubble exists, it will generate a set of small positive �i;tþ1 over time, followed by a large negative excess return at the time of the crash (e.g., Blanchard and Watson, 1982). The distribution of �i;tþ1for this type of bubble will therefore be leptokurtic. One concern of this estimation strategy for bubbles is that current price information may contain a ‘‘bubble’’ component, thus undermining testing for a bubble in subsequent periods. Nevertheless, the trend of �i;tþ1will provide indications for the existence of a bubble, to which the pol- icy rate (or some macroprudential policy tool) might be directed.
For comparison, we also estimate housing price misalignment assuming that the relationship between households’ discount rates and other variables are constant. A similar approach is used by Igan and Loungani (2012) in estimating global housing cycles. They first modelled housing price changes in terms of changes in fundamen- tal variables in a base period, and then used the parameter esti- mates to forecast future house prices. Later they use the gap between actual house prices and their predicted values as an indi- cation for a price ‘‘bubble.’’ However, this approach is of limited use for several reasons. First, the estimation model must be com- plete. Second, the chosen base period is arbitrary as prices must be at their fundamental levels, i.e., prices are not overvalued or undervalued during the base period. Finally, the relationship
Table 1 Number of dwellings and sales in the major cities in New Zealand, Jan. 1994–Dec. 2009.
Number of Sales North Shore City Waitakere City Auckland City Man
Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Dwe
1 17,155 15,155 35,581 19,4 2 11,294 10,929 18,136 13,1 3 6,105 5,891 8,028 6,66 4 2,396 2,357 2,962 2,73 5 790 838 949 899 6 209 232 228 309 7 60 51 74 98 8 8 11 11 24 9 3 5 3 12 P10 3 4 0 3 Total 38,023 35,473 65,972 43,3 Percentage⁄ 54.88% 57.28% 46.07% 55.0
* The percentages include multiple sales.
among variables for determining households’ discount rates are assumed to be the same in the future, i.e., parameter estimates obtained in the base period will not change over time.
4. Data description
This research utilised a rich data set of 528,601 freehold (fee simple) open market transactions of detached or semi-detached houses for six cities in New Zealand between 1994 and 2009. House price movements for the selected cities were estimated directly, using the repeated sales method at monthly intervals, from transaction data, which was unique and not publicly available. The transaction data was supplied by Quotable Value (QV), the official database for all property transactions in New Zealand. The six cities are Auckland, North Shore, Waitakere, Manukau (all of which are now part of an expanded Auckland super-city), Wellington and Christchurch, which are chosen because they accounted for more than 50% of New Zealand housing stock and sales volume.
It is important to consider sample sizes when measuring local house price movements using the Case and Shiller, 1987 weighted repeated sale (WRS) method. As this method uses only repeated sales for index construction, the index is more prone to sample selection bias than other methods that use all transaction data. Previous work indicates that frequently traded houses (sold more than twice within a period) are more likely to be ‘‘starter’’ houses or houses for opportunistic buyers (Clapp and Giaccotto, 1992; Haurin and Hendershott, 1991). Previous studies also indicate that the repeat sales index is prone to a systematic downward revision due to lagged sales (Clapham et al., 2006). To minimise these prob- lems, we measure local house price indices over an extended time period from 1994 to 2009. Table 1 shows the distribution of house sales and numbers of dwellings, both of which indicate that we have sufficient repeated sales, minimizing sample selection bias. Note that we use real house prices, defined as nominal house prices adjusted by the CPI (Consumers Price Index).
QV also produces a house price index, but on a quarterly basis. The QV index is based on the Sale Price Appraisal Ratio (SPAR) method, which takes the ratios of current sale prices over their pre- vious assessed values to construct an index. Compared with the quarterly index, our monthly price index unsmooths price move- ments and increases the number of observations in the time series. Monthly analysis also allows us to make more effective use of New Zealand interest rate data.
As the repeat sales method is vulnerable to outliers (Meese and Wallace, 1997), we use prior knowledge to eliminate multiple sales where the second sale price is less than 0.7 or more than 2.5 times the first sale price. Moreover, since the QV data includes building consent information for all except for Auckland City, we can
ukau City Wellington City Christchurch City Total
llings Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Sales
71 13,030 33,098 133,490 133,490 33 8,061 20,915 82,468 164,936 2 3,950 10,943 41,579 124,737 3 1,428 4,524 16,400 65,600
446 1,529 5,451 27,255 71 417 1,466 8,796 12 100 395 2,765 2 18 74 592 0 3 26 234 1 4 15 196
44 27,001 71,551 281,364 528,601 8% 51.74% 53.74% 52.56% 74.75%
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
8.0
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
North Shore City
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
8.2
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Waitakere City
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
8.2
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Auckland City
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
8.0
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Manukau City
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
8.2
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Wellington City
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Christchurch City
Fig. 3. Log real house price indices measured by the weighted repeated sales method.
Table 2 Summary statistics of raw data.
Variables Description Date Mean SD Max Min Obs Intervals
Price index North Shore 1994–2009 1907 598 2998 1000 192 Monthly Waitakere 1994–2009 1983 611 3104 985 192 Monthly Auckland 1994–2009 2181 746 3522 1000 192 Monthly Manukau 1994–2009 1890 564 2975 1000 192 Monthly Wellington 1994–2009 1943 694 3221 1000 192 Monthly Christchurch 1994–2009 1660 569 2697 1000 192 Monthly
Rent index North Shore 1994–2009 1391 248 1875 958 192 Monthly Waitakere 1994–2009 1404 204 1750 1000 192 Monthly Auckland 1994–2009 1433 218 1840 1000 192 Monthly Manukau 1994–2009 1350 205 1773 1000 192 Monthly Wellington 1994–2009 1410 276 2130 957 192 Monthly Christchurch 1994–2009 1334 271 1889 1000 192 Monthly
Interest (%) Floating 1994–2009 8.73 1.53 11.50 6.20 192 Monthly 6 months 1999–2009 7.45 1.21 9.93 5.52 129 Monthly 1 year 1999–2009 7.54 1.10 9.90 5.64 129 Monthly 2 years 1999–2009 7.71 0.86 9.63 5.94 129 Monthly 3 years 1999–2009 7.88 0.72 9.61 6.13 129 Monthly 4 years 1999–2009 8.01 0.65 9.56 6.42 129 Monthly 5 years 1999–2009 8.06 0.62 9.50 6.52 129 Monthly
OCR (%) 1999–2009 5.98 1.48 8.25 2.50 129 Monthly Consumer confidence index 1994–2009 115.19 9.86 130.90 81.70 64 Quarterly Unemployment rate (%) 1994–2009 2.37 0.82 5.10 1.00 64 Quarterly Household lending ($millions) 1998–2009 103,000 38,833 167,942 53,614 139 Monthly Ratio of floating rate loan to overall mortgage values 1998–2009 0.29 0.11 0.43 0.12 139 Monthly CPI index 1994–2009 904 95 1095 758 64 Quarterly
Both price and rent indices start from 1000 from January 1994. Household lending is in million New Zealand dollars. The CPI index is set at 1000 in June 2006. The consumer confidence index starts 100 from the second quarter of 2012.
20 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
eliminate pair sales where quality has changed, thus minimizing the constant quality problem faced by the repeat sales method.14
In total, we exclude 15% to 24% of initial pair sales from estimation of the final index, depending on local housing markets. We ended our data set in 2009 because it was the latest year for which we held
14 Building consent data is collected for revaluation purposes only where QV is the valuation service provider for the Council. This is not the case for Auckland City.
a complete sale data set, prior to the establishment of the Auckland super-city. Our repeated sales price indices for the six cities are presented in Fig. 3.
We obtain monthly rental data for detached or semi-detached houses from the Tenancy Services Division of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)15 in New Zealand.
15 Previously the Department of Building and Housing.
Table 3 The results of the two-stage least squares pool regression for housing prices and retail mortgage rates, April 1999–December 2009.
Floating 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
c0 �0.012⁄⁄⁄ �0.012⁄⁄⁄ �0.011⁄⁄⁄ �0.012⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dpi,t (�1) �0.248⁄⁄⁄ �0.263⁄⁄⁄ �0.271⁄⁄⁄ �0.277⁄⁄⁄ �0.276⁄⁄⁄ �0.274⁄⁄⁄ �0.274⁄⁄⁄ (0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Ddi,t 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Ddi,t (�1) 0.051⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄ 0.046⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄ (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dmt 1.724 ⁄⁄⁄ 1.489⁄⁄⁄ 1.901⁄⁄⁄ 1.661⁄⁄⁄ 1.794⁄⁄⁄ 1.728⁄⁄⁄ 1.715⁄⁄⁄
(0.542) (0.446) (0.434) (0.382) (0.385) (0.395) (0.386) Dmt (�1) 0.005 0.035 �0.298 �0.017 �0.035 0.076 0.130
(0.348) (0.301) (0.288) (0.242) (0.248) (0.249) (0.254) Et 0.002 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Et (�1) �0.011⁄⁄ �0.008⁄⁄ �0.011⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Ct 1.624
⁄⁄⁄ 1.629⁄⁄⁄ 1.286⁄⁄⁄ 1.286⁄⁄⁄ 1.218⁄⁄⁄ 1.330⁄⁄⁄ 1.361⁄⁄⁄
(0.406) (0.384) (0.362) (0.357) (0.354) (0.355) (0.358) Ct (�1) 0.412 0.309 0.445 0.417 0.493 0.422 0.412
(0.385) (0.369) (0.355) (0.352) (0.351) (0.350) (0.352) DCCIt 0.061
⁄ 0.067⁄ 0.061⁄ 0.076⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄ 0.069⁄⁄ 0.065⁄⁄
(0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) DCCIt(�1) 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.012
(0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) Rt 0.377
⁄⁄⁄ 0.342⁄⁄⁄ 0.269⁄⁄⁄ 0.258⁄⁄⁄ 0.253⁄⁄⁄ 0.265⁄⁄⁄ 0.270⁄⁄⁄
(0.095) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) (0.061) (0.063) Bt �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.011⁄⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) Seasonal controlled yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Observations 768 762 762 762 762 762 762
The dependant variable is the log difference of real house prices. The results are estimated using the two stage-least squares method in a pool regression of 6 cities. The instrumental variable (Ii,t) is the interest rate differential between the 5 years fixed rate and floating rate. Results are reported for 7 mortgage rates respectively using the following models: The first stage:
Ri;t ¼ c0 þ Pl
k¼1akDpi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0bkDdi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0kkDmi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0Wk Xi;t�k þ ui Ii;t þ di Bt þ P11
j¼1 /j Sj þ git (5). The second stage:
Dpi;t ¼ c0 þ Pl
k¼1akDpi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0bkDdi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0kkDmi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0Wk Xi;t�k þ ui R̂i;t þ di Bi;t þ P11 j¼1
/j Sj þ lit (5 0)
where Ri,t refers to the percentage change of the ratio of floating rate loans to overall value of mortgage loans, R̂i;t istheestimatedvalueof Ri;t , in Eq. (5) c0 is constant, i refers to different cities, t denotes the time period and D denotes the first order difference or percentage change. pi,t, di,t and mi,t are log real prices, log real rents and real mortgage rates, respectively, Xi,t represents the list of economic variables including the percentage change of unemployment rate (Et), the percentage change of real house lending (Ct) and consumer confidence index (CCIt). Bi,t refers to the structural break, Sj denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables, and ei,t is white noise. The results are robust to period heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Period SUR) test. Standard errors in parenthesis; Statistical significance:
* <0.10. ** <0.05.
*** <0.01.
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 21
Under the Residential Tenancies Act, all tenancy bonds must be lodged with the MBIE within 23 working days from the start of the tenancy. The bonds normally amount to two or three weeks of rent payable under the tenancy. The DBH rental data is transaction based and very comprehensive in recording market rents for all new resi- dential tenancies.
For each local housing market, we use the monthly median rent, which is usually for a 3-bedroom house. We use rental data for houses to proxy the user cost or ‘‘imputed rent’’ of owning for the following reasons. First, we are unable to observe the true user cost of owning a house. Even though we could estimate it (Hendershott and Slemrod, 1983; Himmelberg et al., 2005), we would inevitably introduce measurement errors. Second, the pro- portion of rental housing in the New Zealand housing stock is large and increasing over time. By 2004 rental housing comprised around 30% of the national housing stock.16 Thirdly, private sector rental houses and owner-occupied houses tend to substitute for each other, and their prices do not differ substantially. The survey by
16 Although New Zealand has traditionally had a high rate of home ownership, this rate declined between 1996 and 2006. Analysis of census data from Statistics New Zealand shows that in 1996, 70.7% of households owned their dwellings, but it fell to 67.8% in 2001 and 66.8% in 2006.
Hargreaves and Shi (2005) shows that on average rental house prices lie between the open-market median and lower quartile house prices.17
Finally, we obtain the OCR, retail residential mortgage lending rates and values of outstanding mortgage loans from the RBNZ. We use a monthly average OCR. Retail interest rates include float- ing (or adjustable) rates, and rates fixed for 6 months, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years. For the whole period of this study, fixed rate loans accounted for the majority by value of all housing loans. We also use real interest rates, which are defined as nominal interest rates adjusted by the CPI.
For the period from 1999 to 2009, for mortgage loans, we use data for household lending from the RBNZ’s data table C5. Unem- ployment rate data comes from Statistics New Zealand. Consumer confidence index data were obtained from McDermott Miller, as part of a long-run data series that they provide for the Westpac Bank Economics team. Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 2.
17 Where the proportion of rental properties is high, rental houses are not restricted to less expensive suburbs. In fact, rental housing has increased across all established suburbs across all New Zealand cities.
Table 4 Summarised statistics of forecast errors for monthly house price changes, 2002–2009.
Floating 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
North Shore City Mean �0.003 �0.003 �0.002 �0.001 �0.002 �0.002 �0.002 Median �0.006 �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 Maximum 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.064 0.068 0.066 0.067 Minimum �0.094 �0.075 �0.057 �0.041 �0.040 �0.041 �0.042 Std. Dev. 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 Skewness �0.489 �0.004 0.391 0.833 0.805 0.778 0.838 Kurtosis 5.173 4.218 3.856 4.274 4.495 4.185 4.485 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Waitakere City Mean �0.004 �0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Median �0.004 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.002 Maximum 0.044 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.044 0.045 Minimum �0.087 �0.049 �0.050 �0.044 �0.046 �0.046 �0.047 Std. Dev. 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 Skewness �0.940 0.151 0.077 0.136 0.229 0.207 0.262 Kurtosis 5.036 3.149 3.465 3.250 3.249 3.179 3.376 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Auckland City Mean �0.004 �0.002 �0.003 �0.002 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 Median �0.002 0.000 �0.002 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 Maximum 0.048 0.046 0.057 0.060 0.053 0.051 0.051 Minimum �0.100 �0.068 �0.077 �0.068 �0.074 �0.071 �0.073 Std. Dev. 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 Skewness �0.816 �0.294 �0.329 �0.075 �0.277 �0.278 �0.342 Kurtosis 4.888 3.254 3.619 3.409 3.876 3.792 4.047 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Manukau City Mean 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 Median �0.001 0.003 �0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 Maximum 0.060 0.050 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.047 Minimum �0.041 �0.046 �0.054 �0.042 �0.041 �0.040 �0.041 Std. Dev. 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 Skewness 0.201 �0.018 �0.083 0.078 0.073 0.094 0.104 Kurtosis 3.008 2.445 2.836 2.759 2.782 2.734 2.817 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Wellington City Mean 0.000 0.000 �0.002 �0.002 �0.002 �0.002 �0.002 Median �0.002 �0.003 �0.002 �0.003 �0.002 �0.002 �0.003 Maximum 0.075 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.081 0.081 Minimum �0.046 �0.044 �0.049 �0.051 �0.049 �0.049 �0.050 Std. Dev. 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 Skewness 0.391 0.536 0.452 0.482 0.550 0.532 0.532 Kurtosis 3.458 3.727 3.838 3.989 4.137 4.085 4.095 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Christchurch City Mean �0.005 �0.001 �0.002 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 �0.001 Median �0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 �0.001 Maximum 0.087 0.046 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.049 Minimum �0.137 �0.070 �0.087 �0.048 �0.035 �0.033 �0.036 Std. Dev. 0.033 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 Skewness �1.482 �0.237 �0.495 0.117 0.289 0.374 0.341 Kurtosis 8.207 3.346 4.106 2.679 2.553 2.677 2.679 Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Forecast errors �i;tþ1 are estimated using the following equation: �i;tþ1 ¼ Dpi;tþ1½Dpi; t þ 1� where Dpi,t+1 is the actual monthly house price change for the ith city at time t + 1 and Ei,t+1[Dpi,t+1] refers to the forecasted monthly house price change for the ith city for time t + 1. To calculate the forecasting value of Ei,t+1[Dpi,t+1], information up to the time t is used in the following two�stage least squares model stated below Table 3. The estimation is rolling over the studied period, which lasted from January 2003 to December 2009.
18 The more money that goes into the housing market, the higher housing prices will be. On the other hand, higher interest rates should dampen the demand for mortgage loans. However, we face the problem of identifying causation, as it could be either that higher house prices cause increases in housing lending or that increased housing lending leads to higher house prices.
22 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
5. Empirical results
5.1. Housing prices and retail mortgage rates
Table 3 reports the relationship between house prices and mortgage rates based on the 2SLS model specified in Eqs. (5) and (50). The results generally support our hypothesis that changes in the unemployment rate are negatively related to changes in house prices, while changes in rents, consumer confidence and housing
lending are positively related to changes in house prices.18 It also shows that the current period house price growth is negatively cor- related with the last period house price changes, which indicates that we should include the lagged house price change in the model.
Table 5a Number of positive and negative forecast errors – floating rate.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Overall
North Shore City + 5 2 2 3 7 6 10 35 � 7 10 10 9 5 6 2 49
Waitakere City + 5 2 4 4 7 5 10 37 � 7 10 8 8 5 7 2 47
Auckland City + 3 1 6 5 8 5 10 38 � 9 11 6 7 4 7 2 46
Manukau City + 3 2 7 4 6 8 9 39 � 9 10 5 8 6 4 3 45
Wellington City + 6 4 7 5 2 4 9 37 � 6 8 5 7 10 8 3 47
Christchurch City + 5 3 4 4 5 7 9 37 � 7 9 8 8 7 5 3 47
The table presents the number of positive and negative forecast errors based on the floating mortgage rate for each year from 2003 to 2009. The forecast errors are obtained from the results of Table 4 for the floating rate.
Table 5b Number of positive and negative forecast errors – 5 year fixed rate.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Overall
North Shore City + 6 1 2 3 7 5 9 33 � 6 11 10 9 5 7 3 51
Waitakere City + 4 0 7 3 8 5 11 38 � 8 12 5 9 4 7 1 46
Auckland City + 5 1 5 5 9 4 10 39 � 7 11 7 7 3 8 2 45
Manukau City + 4 5 7 4 8 7 9 44 � 8 7 5 8 4 5 3 40
Wellington City + 4 5 8 5 2 5 9 38 � 8 7 4 7 10 7 3 46
Christchurch City + 4 3 5 4 7 8 10 41 � 8 9 7 8 5 4 2 43
The table presents the number of positive and negative forecast errors based on the 5 year fixed mortgage rate for each year from 2003 to 2009. The forecast errors are obtained from the results of Table 4 for the 5 year fixed rate.
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 23
However, our results show a strong positive relationship between interest rates and house price growth for both floating and fixed rates (significant at the 1% level), once household mortgage choices are controlled for.19 For example, a one percent- age point increase in real floating rate (column 1 in Table 3) will result in 1.72% increase in real house prices. The results indicate that households’ real discount rates have a positive effect on real housing prices, which differs significantly from other housing markets worldwide. Amongst all mortgage rates, 1 and 3 years real fixed-rates show a relatively large impact on housing prices. However, the effects are not substantially different between the floating and fixed rate mortgages, which could be due to the rela- tively short fixed interest rate period up to a maximum of 5 years in New Zealand. Our findings are in line with recent work on the
19 The OLS regression results are included in Appendix 2. Compared to the 2SLS model used in this study, it clearly shows the importance to include the household’s mortgage choice in the model. The interest rates (mt), consumer confidence (CCIt), mortgage choice (Rt) and structural break (Bt) all become significance at the 0.01 level in the 2SLS model.
USA market by Miles (2014), who found the long term rate highly significant for housing while the short term fed funds rate was not (although the relationship was negative, rather than positive as in our case).
Our findings may reflect the shape of the yield curve, the mix of fixed and floating rate lending, and the average size of fixed and floating rate loans. During the potential bubble period (2004 to 2006), the yield curve was consistently negatively sloping, with longer term fixed rates consistently cheaper than floating rates. This meant that borrowers who wanted significant amounts of debt were often encouraged to take on fixed-rate loans, both to reduce immediate debt servicing costs, and to reduce their expo- sure to the risk of future interest rate increases. We thus saw an increase in the relative proportion of fixed rate lending, while the size of the average fixed rate loan (between $115,000 and $130,000 between 2004 and 2006) was much larger than the size of the average floating rate loan (between $50,000 and $55,000 over the same period). Borrowers with floating rate loans were likely to be less concerned about the effects of interest rate changes
Table 6 Estimated price gaps.
Floating (%) 6 months (%) 1 year (%) 2 years (%) 3 years (%) 4 years (%) 5 years (%)
North Shore City 2005 25 25 25 25 25 25 24 2006 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 2007 35 35 35 35 35 34 35 2008 33 32 31 30 31 31 31 2009 34 33 32 31 32 32 33
Waitakere City 2005 26 27 28 28 27 27 27 2006 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 2007 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 2008 38 34 32 33 33 33 33 2009 38 33 31 31 32 32 32
Auckland City 2005 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 2006 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 2007 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 2008 31 27 29 27 26 25 25 2009 34 28 31 28 27 27 27
Manukau City 2005 21 22 21 20 21 21 21 2006 26 28 27 26 26 26 26 2007 33 34 34 33 33 33 33 2008 32 31 32 29 28 28 28 2009 31 29 31 28 27 27 27
Wellington City 2005 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2006 26 26 27 26 26 26 26 2007 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 2008 30 30 32 31 31 31 31 2009 32 32 34 33 33 33 33
Christchurch City 2005 40 35 35 35 35 35 35 2006 47 40 40 39 39 39 39 2007 51 44 44 44 43 43 43 2008 56 43 43 41 41 41 41 2009 64 44 44 41 41 41 41
The table presents the estimated price gaps between the actual house prices and predicted house prices in percentage terms with respect to different mortgage rates, based on the house price levels during 1999 and 2002. The estimation procedure is similar to that in Igan and Loungani (2012). Using the parameter estimates obtained in the 2SLS during 1999 and 2002, we forecast future price changes from January 2003 up to December 2009. Setting the price index in December 2002 at 100, we convert the price changes to price levels (indices). The forecast price indices are then compared to the actual price indices to calculate price gaps in percentage terms.
20 To show the reliability of our prediction, we plot those actual and estimated price changes over time in Appendix 3. The results show that the predicted price changes are closely in line with the actual price changes except for 2003 and during the global financial crisis in 2007/2008. For some cities, the predicted price changes in 2003 may not be reliable due to the short base time period for forecasting.
21 By contrast, Hunt (2013) suggests that macroprudential tools might have been employed by the RBNZ from around 2005 on.
24 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
as their smaller amount of debt meant that the impact was going to be relatively small. Serious borrowing was undertaken at fixed rates, and even though fixed rates increased through this period, it was not enough to discourage borrowers, who perceived that property prices would continue to increase.
5.2. Looking for bubbles
We also test whether the time series properties of �i;tþ1 in Eq. (7) exhibit a pattern of bubbles. To estimate �i;tþ1, we first calculate the coefficients of Eq. (50) using data from April 1999 to December 2002, and we then calculate �i;tþ1 for January 2003 based on the coefficients estimated up to December 2002. To calculate �i;tþ1 for February 2003, we re-estimate the coefficients of Eq. (50) using all information from April 1999 to January 2003, and so on. We cal- culate the residual term �i;tþ1 for each of the six cities and seven mortgage rates, a total of 42 time series of �i;tþ1 from January 2003 to December 2009. The length of base period chosen for the estimation is somewhat arbitrary. If it is too short, the first few periods’ estimated �i;tþ1 will not be reliable, whereas if it is too long, we will end up with fewer observations for analysis. Table 4 provides results for those estimated �i;tþ1.
Table 4 shows that the forecasting errors �i;tþ1 for most cities and mortgage rates are negative and close to zero. This is some- what surprising given the rapid increase in housing prices during the period studied. Results for kurtosis, confirming that distribu-
tions, except for Manukau City, are generally leptokurtic, provide some evidence for bubbles.20 A possible explanation is that the ‘‘bubble’’ might have started earlier than 2003, and would therefore not be fully observed in the analysis. To explore the price evaluating process, we break the summarised forecasting errors �i;tþ1 down into different time periods, to help us see how house prices evolve.
Table 5a shows the numbers of positive and negative forecast- ing errors in each calendar year from 2003 to 2009, based on the floating mortgage rate. The results show that house price appreci- ation slowed during 2004 to 2006, picked up in 2007 before the global financial crisis, slowed in 2008 and rapidly picked up in 2009. Similar patterns are observed to varying degrees across all cities. The results are consistent with the actual house price move- ments shown in Fig. 3, which suggest that if a bubble existed, it might have started prior to 2003.21 The findings provide strong evi- dence that the best time for the policy rate to impact on the housing market (pre-empting the bubble) was prior to 2003. From 2004 to 2006, the housing market seemed to reach a new equilibrium at
Appendix 1 The ADF unit root tests.
Variables Level (constant)
Level (constant & trend)
1st Difference (constant)
1st Difference (constant)
1st Difference (constant)
HQ criterion HQ criterion HQ criterion SIC criterion AIC criterion
Log real house prices North Shore �1.123 �2.056 �2.956⁄⁄ �2.956⁄⁄ �2.956⁄⁄ Waitakere �0.894 �2.044 �3.077⁄⁄ �3.967⁄⁄⁄ �3.077⁄⁄ Auckland �1.217 �1.248 �4.213⁄⁄⁄ �4.213⁄⁄⁄ �3.466⁄⁄⁄ Manukau �1.015 �2.170 �2.924⁄⁄ �12.587⁄⁄⁄ �2.924⁄⁄ Wellington �0.705 �2.068 �3.191⁄⁄ �14.278⁄⁄⁄ �3.191⁄⁄ Christchurch �0.924 �1.979 �2.696⁄ �3.509⁄⁄⁄ �2.696⁄
Log real rents North Shore �0.873 �1.463 �14.857⁄⁄⁄ �14.857⁄⁄⁄ �4.908⁄⁄⁄ Waitakere �1.157 �1.771 �21.771⁄⁄⁄ �21.771⁄⁄⁄ �21.771⁄⁄⁄ Auckland �1.989 �2.427 �20.040⁄⁄⁄ �20.040⁄⁄⁄ �20.040⁄⁄⁄ Manukau �1.007 �3.745⁄⁄ �10.291⁄⁄⁄ �10.291⁄⁄⁄ �10.291⁄⁄⁄ Wellington 0.797 �5.654⁄⁄⁄ �3.582⁄⁄⁄ �11.817⁄⁄⁄ �3.582⁄⁄⁄
Christchurch �1.347 �2.405 �2.003 �11.822⁄⁄⁄ �2.003 Real mortgage rates
Floating �2.270 �1.958 �4.601⁄⁄⁄ �4.601⁄⁄⁄ �4.775⁄⁄⁄ 6 months �2.303 �2.094 �5.166⁄⁄⁄ �7.793⁄⁄⁄ �5.166⁄⁄⁄ 1 year �2.461 �2.360 �5.377⁄⁄⁄ �7.510⁄⁄⁄ �5.377⁄⁄⁄ 2 years �2.501 �2.458 �8.821⁄⁄⁄ �8.821⁄⁄⁄ �6.331⁄⁄⁄ 3 years �2.763⁄ �2.765 �9.208⁄⁄⁄ �9.208⁄⁄⁄ �6.545⁄⁄⁄ 4 years �2.798⁄⁄ �2.831 �9.314⁄⁄⁄ �9.314⁄⁄⁄ �6.873⁄⁄⁄
5 years �2.749 �2.759 �9.632⁄⁄⁄ �9.632⁄⁄⁄ �9.632⁄⁄⁄ Real OCR �1.943 �1.677 �4.345⁄⁄⁄ �4.345⁄⁄⁄ �4.345⁄⁄⁄ Log consumer confidence index �2.575 �2.723 �3.232⁄⁄ �4.290⁄⁄⁄ �3.232⁄⁄ Unemployment rate �4.411⁄⁄⁄ �4.766⁄⁄⁄ �3.646⁄⁄⁄ �3.646⁄⁄⁄ �3.646⁄⁄⁄ Real household lending �0.372 �2.248 �2.691⁄ �2.691⁄ �2.691⁄ Ratio of floating rate mortgage
loans �1.038 �0.051 �4.417⁄⁄⁄ �4.417⁄⁄⁄ �4.417⁄⁄⁄
The maximum lag length is set at 12. For the unemployment rate, the results are based on the percentage change not the 1st difference of unemployment rate. Similar percentage measurements are also taken to the real household lending and ratio of floating rate mortgage loans variables. All other variables are taken at 1st difference in this study. Sample is between 1999m4 and 2009m12. Statistical significance:
* <0.10. ** <0.05.
*** <0.01.
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 25
the high level. In 2007/2008, the market started to adjust downward due to the global financial crisis, but it has recovered since 2009. Table 5b shows the results based on the 5 year fixed mortgage rate, which largely confirm the results in Table 5a.
We also compare our approach to that suggested by Igan and Loungani (2012) to estimate the price gap in levels. For compari- son, we choose the same base period from April 1999 to December 2002 to estimate Eqs. (5) and (50). Using the parameter estimates obtained in Eq. (50), we forecast future price changes from January 2003 up to December 2009 for each city. Setting the price index in December 2002 at 100, we convert the price changes to price levels (indices). The forecast price indices are then compared to the actual price indices to calculate price gaps.
Table 6 shows the estimated price gaps relative to the actual price indices, in percentages based on different mortgage rates. For example, as indicated by the floating rate (column 1), real house prices in North Shore City were about 25% higher in 2005, 29% in 2006, 35% in 2007, 33% in 2008 and 34% in 2009. Overall, house prices in Christchurch City appreciated the most, followed by Auckland City and Wellington City. The gaps between the forecast and actual prices indicate moderate price misalignments during 2005 and 2009. However, the results are subject to the base period chosen for the comparison, with rapid house price appreciation having occurred prior to 2003, leading us to believe the RBNZ should have intervened earlier.
6. Policy implications and conclusions
This paper has investigated how changes in the policy rate and retail mortgage rates affect real housing prices in New Zealand during 1999–2009. We find that real fixed interest rates do not
have the expected negative effect on real housing prices, after controlling for household mortgage choices and other economic conditions such as the effect of real rental rates, unemployment rates, consumer confidence and housing credit. Thus, increases in the policy rate did not depress real housing prices during 1999–2009.
We also find that both the quantity of housing lending and the mix of fixed and floating rate lending matter, with the latter also impacted by the slope of the yield curve. This is not easy for govern- ments or the RBNZ to control – intervention at the long end of the yield curve would make the implementation of monetary policy a much more complicated and expensive exercise. Against such a background, use of macroprudential policies to mitigate some of the excesses of housing prices may be a more attractive option.
Acceptance of findings that the connection between the policy rate (or short term rate) and housing prices could be positive in a bubble environment has important policy implications. Glaeser et al. (2010) argue that decreases in the real interest rate could only explain 20% of increases in the real housing price, if one allows the interest rate to be mean reverting. Dokko et al. (2011) also follow this argument. Looking at 17 OECD countries, they find that decreases in policy rates in these countries were not the main reason for housing price inflation during the mid-2000s. Miles (2014) also finds that monetary policy rates do not necessarily have a strong impact on house prices, while Crowe et al. (2013) also argue that monetary policy tools are inclined to be ineffective at dealing with house prices, unless increases in policy rates are particularly large.
Given that fixed mortgage rates have a larger impact on house prices than the floating rate, and households can choose between floating and fixed mortgage rates, we suggest that policy makers should consider macro-prudential tools such as increasing down
26 S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28
payment levels or capping loan-to-value ratios to influence the housing market, particularly when the policy rate is directed at inflation targeting while the national economy is exposed to global factors. This issue is particularly important for New Zealand, where interest rate increases are constrained by other national and global economic factors, such that an upward movement in the policy rate, while other countries’ interest rates are relatively low, would adversely impact the country’s balance of payments current account.
Our bubble tests under rational expectations show some but less severe incidence of housing bubbles during the last decade, even though real interest rates were positively correlated to real house price changes. This raises several questions. One possibility is that the housing price ‘‘bubble’’ in New Zealand might have soft landed during the GFC period in 2007/2008. High price levels after 2005 compared to the base period prices from 1999 to 2002 may be simply suggesting that house price levels moved from a low value regime to a high value regime, reflecting households’ chang- ing discount rates. Labour income is taxed at 33% (the highest bracket), but there is no housing capital gains tax in New Zealand. This might affect households’ expectation of return from owning. While a capital gains tax may be a tool to prevent a bubble, it is dif- ficult to implement in practice, as demonstrated by the failure of 8 tax working groups and inquiries (established by successive gov- ernments) between 1967 and 2010 to lead to any such tax being enacted (Huang and Elliffe, 2011). A key further question for policy makers is whether they really want house prices to fall.
Appendix 2 The OLS regression results.
Floating 6 months 1 year
c0 �0.010⁄⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) Dpi,t (�1) �0.263⁄⁄⁄ �0.262⁄⁄⁄ �0.267⁄⁄⁄
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) Ddi,t 0.035
⁄⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄⁄ 0.035⁄⁄⁄
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Ddi,t (�1) 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.059⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Dmt �0.026 0.044 0.678⁄⁄
(0.315) (0.294) (0.312) Dmt (�1) �0.602⁄⁄ �0.258 �0.323
(0.271) (0.260) (0.268) Et �0.005 �0.004 �0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Et (�1) �0.007⁄⁄ �0.007⁄⁄ �0.010⁄⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Ct 1.168
⁄⁄⁄ 1.253⁄⁄⁄ 1.103⁄⁄⁄
(0.333) (0.331) (0.334) Ct (�1) 0.207 0.149 0.246
(0.324) (0.323) (0.327) DCCIt 0.041 0.042 0.042
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) DCCIt(�1) 0.056⁄ 0.057⁄ 0.053⁄
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) Rt �0.025 �0.008 0.012
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) B8t �0.002 �0.002 �0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Seasonal controlled Yes Yes Yes Observations 774 762 762 �R2 0.229 0.226 0.230
The dependant variable is log difference of real house price. The results are estimated us The OLS model is defined as follows: Dpi;t ¼ c0 þ
Pl k¼1akDpi;t�k þ
Pl k¼0bkDdi;t�k þ
Pl k¼0k
to different cities, t denotes the time period and D denotes the first order difference or pe rates, respectively, Xi,t represents the list of economic variables including the percentage and consumer confidence index (CCIt). Ri,t is the percentage change of the ratio of floatin denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables, and ei,t is white noise. The results are ro the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from April 1999 to December 2009. Statis
* <0.10. ** <0.05.
*** <0.01.
One of the limitations in this research is the relatively short per- iod studied. This means that we have not seen as much variation in economic conditions as would be desirable to provide more robustness to our bubble test. Could there have been some special factors which might have contributed to our potentially surprising results? The other side of this is that there is scope for further research with the passage of time, so that we can observe whether households’ future expectations for housing are rational against a background of greater diversity in both external and internal eco- nomic outcomes.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank attendees at seminars at Massey University, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the 2012 New Zealand Finance Colloquium and the 2013 Conference of the New Zealand Association of Economists for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks are also due to McDermott Miller for provision of consumer confidence index data and ASB Bank for housing confidence data. The authors also thank Andrea Bennett, Faruk Balli and Hatice Ozer-Balli for their assistance.
The authors also thank the editor and an anonymous referee for comments which have allowed us to significantly improve the paper.
Appendix A.
See Appendix 1, 2 and 3
2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
�0.010⁄⁄⁄ 80.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) �0.269⁄⁄⁄ �0.268⁄⁄⁄ �0.266⁄⁄⁄ �0.267⁄⁄⁄ (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.034 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 0.054⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 0.604⁄⁄ 0.689⁄⁄ 0.514⁄⁄ 0.567⁄⁄
(0.268) (0.273) (0.273) (0.266) �0.025 �0.146 �0.074 �0.079 (0.227) (0.233) (0.231) (0.233) �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 �0.004 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) �0.010⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ �0.009⁄⁄⁄ (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 1.140⁄⁄⁄ 1.100⁄⁄⁄ 1.172⁄⁄⁄ 1.157⁄⁄⁄
(0.333) (0.333) (0.331) (0.332) 0.186 0.254 0.189 0.205 (0.326) (0.327) (0.325) (0.326) 0.049 0.050 0.047 0.046 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 0.043 0.040 0.046 0.046 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.017 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) �0.003 �0.003 �0.003⁄ �0.003⁄ (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Yes Yes Yes Yes 762 762 762 762 0.230 0.231 0.229 0.230
ing the OLS model in a pool regression of 6 cities as a comparison to the 2sls model.
kDmi;t�k þ Pl
k¼0Wk Xi;t�k þ ui Ri;t þ di Bi;t þ P11
j¼1 /j Sj þ eit where c0 is constant, i refers rcentage change. pi,t, di,t and mi,t are log real prices, log real rents and real mortgage change of unemployment rate (Et), the percentage change of real house lending (Ct) g rate loans to overall value of mortgage loans, Bi,t refers to the structural break, Sj
bust to period heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Period SUR) test. �R2 denotes tical significance:
Panel A: Floating rate
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual house price changes Predicted house price changes
North Shore
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Waitakere
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual house price changes Predicted house price changes
Auckland
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Manukau
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Wellington
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Christchurch
Panel B: 5 years fixed rate
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
North Shore
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Waitakere
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Auckland
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Manukau
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Wellington
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actural house price changes Predicted house price changes
Christchurch
Appendix 3. Actual house price changes and predicted house price changes, 2003m1 to 2009m12.
S. Shi et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) 15–28 27
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- Can interest rates really control house prices? Effectiveness and implications for macroprudential policy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 New Zealand interest rates
- 3 Estimation strategies and the empirical models
- 3.1 Present value model
- 3.2 Hedging effect of mortgage rate changes
- 3.3 Rational expectations and bubbles
- 4 Data description
- 5 Empirical results
- 5.1 Housing prices and retail mortgage rates
- 5.2 Looking for bubbles
- 6 Policy implications and conclusions
- Acknowledgments
- Appendix A.
- References
1-s2.0-S0378426614002295-main.pdf
Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j b f
Reputation, risk-taking, and macroprudential policy q
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.014 0378-4266/� 2014 The Bank of England. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
q The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of England. We thank Piergiorgio Alessandri, Andrew Haldane, Sujit Kapadia, Roland Meeks, Victoria Saporta, Jochen Schanz, Nikola Tarashev, Bent Vale, Wolf Wagner, Tony Yates and seminar participants at the Bank of England, the EFA 2011 meetings, the ESCB Riksbank day ahead conference, and the Labex-Refi 2013 Paris conference for useful comments and suggestions. All errors remain those of the authors. ⇑ Corresponding author at: Bank of England, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44
2076013938. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Aikman), Benjamin.
[email protected] (B. Nelson), [email protected] (M. Tanaka).
1 See inter alia CGFS (2010), CGFS (2012), IMF (2011), Bank of England (201 (2012), Aikman et al. (2013), Hanson et al. (2011) and Goodhart et al. (201
2 BCBS (2010); see also Bank of England (2013). The countercyclical capi has recently been applied by the Swiss and Norwegian authorities to inc resilience of their respective banking systems in the face of housing credit bo SNB (2013) and Norges Bank (2013)).
David Aikman, Benjamin Nelson, Misa Tanaka ⇑ Bank of England, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 10 September 2013 Accepted 11 June 2014 Available online 26 June 2014
JEL classification: G01 G38 E6
Keywords: Macroprudential policy Credit booms Bank capital regulation
a b s t r a c t
This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.
� 2014 The Bank of England. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A ‘sound’ banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conven- tional and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.
-John Maynard Keynes
Interest in the application of macroprudential tools to safeguard financial stability has increased markedly since the global financial crisis. The severity of the economic contraction that followed the crisis has stimulated a substantial body of research and policy work seeking to articulate how macroprudential tools—that is, cap- ital and liquidity requirements on leveraged financial intermediar- ies and loan-to-value and margin restrictions on leveraged
borrowers—could be used in the upswing to restrain the factors that lead to systemic risk.1 The most prominent example of this approach to date is the countercyclical capital buffer, introduced by the Basel III framework, whereby risk-based capital requirements are to be raised above normal levels during periods of excessive credit growth.2
While central banks have made significant strides in recent years in their efforts to operationalize macroprudential tools, economists are some way off formulating an accepted set of theoretical foundations for using macroprudential tools in this way. The development of such a theory is an urgent task. To paraphrase Michael Woodford in his tome on the foundations of monetary policy, Interest and Prices (Woodford, 2003): a theory of macroprudential policy is necessary in order for central banks to know how to act systematically in a way that can serve their financial stability objectives; it is also necessary in order for them to communicate those systemic commitments to the public.
This paper attempts to outline the beginnings of such a theory. To do so, we set out a simple model of the credit cycle based on strategic complementarities in risk-taking by banks. Our focus throughout is on the application of higher capital requirements
1), BCBS 1). tal buffer rease the oms (see
5 See Morris and Shin (2014) for a recent application of a model based on similar foundations to study the over-reaction of asset prices to shifts in monetary policy stance.
D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439 429
in the upswing of the credit cycle; that is, the time series dimen- sion of systemic risk rather than cross section issues related to the too-big-to-fail problem (Borio and Crockett, 2000). In addition to maximising profits, bankers, in our model, are assumed to care about the stock or labour market’s perception of their abilities, as in Rajan (1994). We assume that banks’ portfolio choices are not visible to the market, so that inferences over bankers’ ability are based on their current profitability. Bankers are able to manipulate their profitability in the short run by investing in high-risk projects, which succeed with some probability, but have negative expected net present value.
A key feature of this model is that the incentive to gamble by investing in high-risk, negative expected return projects goes up when macroeconomic fundamentals strengthen. This is because those bankers with genuine high ability are more likely to earn strong returns when fundamentals improve. The stigma attached to reporting weak returns therefore increases, creating powerful incentives for low-ability bankers to take on additional risk in a desperate, but ultimately futile attempt to ‘‘gamble for reputa- tion’’.3 A banker’s incentive to gamble also goes up with the propor- tion of other bankers who gamble. Playing safe and reporting low returns in such an environment encourages the market to assess the bank as having low ability. Under perfect information, the presence of such strategic complementarity typically gives rise to multiple equilibria. We use the global games modelling framework, in which bankers have incomplete information about economic fundamentals, to analyse the unique equilibrium in this model.4 At a macroeconomic level, the implication is a socially inefficient credit boom as banks collectively undertake excessively risky investments.
The main contribution of our paper is to study the optimal setting of macroprudential capital requirements within this framework. When the policymaker raises capital requirements systemically across the banking system, this increases banks’ fund- ing costs with two resulting effects: first, being a blunt tool, it reduces the profitability of all banks, even those that have chosen not to gamble, which all else equal reduces welfare; second, it makes it more costly for banks to finance the negative net present value gamble, reducing its attractiveness. Optimal policy balances this trade-off by equating these costs and benefits at the margin.
We find three noteworthy results. First, optimal macropruden- tial policy is countercyclical: welfare-maximising capital require- ments are high when macroeconomic fundamentals are strong and low when fundamentals are weak. The rationale follows from the result, described above, that gambling incentives are stronger in a boom; given this, the policymaker optimally hikes capital requirements, even though this imposes higher costs on gamblers and non-gamblers alike. Second, the countercyclical nature of optimal policy holds only up to a point: when fundamentals are either very strong—such that there are overwhelming incentives to gamble—or very weak—such that gambling is extremely unat- tractive—it is optimal for the countercyclical capital buffer to be switched off as it has little impact on gambling incentives. Given this limitation, our analysis emphasises the importance of develop- ing additional macroprudential tools that can target more directly the source of excessive risk-taking, to support the role played by the countercyclical capital buffer. Third, the impact of a hike in capital requirements on risk-taking behaviour may be dispropor- tionate to its direct effect on banks’ funding costs. In particular, if strategic complementarities are strong, then risk-taking incentives will be tempered significantly by a rise in capital requirements,
3 The cover story of The Banker magazine in May 2006, at the height of the most recent credit bubble, sums up this dynamic perfectly: it was titled ‘‘Keeping up with the Goldmans’’.
4 See Morris and Shin (2003) for a discussion of the theory of global games, and Morris and Shin (2000) for applications to macroeconomics.
even if the direct effect on funding costs is small. This result will be of interest to policymakers, given the need to better understand the macroprudential transmission mechanism.
The key friction in our model is an agency conflict between bank managers and investors, driven by managers’ concern for their reputations in the market, which manifests itself as a concern for relative performance.5 Such agency conflicts have been studied extensively for mutual fund companies, where there appear to be significant incentives to avoid generating returns that are lower than ones’ competitors, particularly for young, small funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Relative performance considerations are likely to apply with just as much force in the banking sector. Compensation, promotion and dismissal, as well as their ability to secure another job, may be implicitly or explicitly linked to their performance rela- tive to others in the industry.6 Moreover, there is a greater likelihood that policymakers’ will bail out banks when they fail together—due to their concerns about systemic risk associated with multiple bank failures—and this may give bankers the incentive to avoid failure by gambling when other banks are also gambling.7
A quote by Paul Tucker, a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, paints a vivid picture of the potency of the collection action dynamic we emphasise in this paper:
During that upswing. . .there is a potent collective action problem in getting off the dance floor. Not a few senior market participants felt from at least 2006 that financial risk was underpriced, and that conditions in, for example, the leveraged loan market were silly. But they also had no conviction about when, or indeed whether for sure, the music had to stop, and so feared individually that stepping away from the dance ‘‘too early’’ would crystallise business risk, as the dance would simply go on without them and their franchise would be undermined as customers migrated to their competitors.
-Tucker (2009)
Our paper is related to a number of existing papers which ana- lyse the impact of strategic interdependence on banks’ risk-taking incentives, including Acharya (2009), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008). Our main contribution to this theoretical literature is to characterise optimal countercyclical regulation within a frame- work that offers a plausible account of one of the determinants of procyclicality in risk-taking. The underlying distortion we model—a procyclical, non-pecuniary externality (reputational con- cerns)—closely follows Rajan (1994) in particular, but see also Gorton and He (2008), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Froot et al. (1992), Thakor (2006). This rationale is related to, but distinct from, those articulated by Bianchi (2010) and Lorenzoni (2008), who suggest that countercyclical capital requirements—or higher risk weights on assets with higher correlation with macroeconomic shocks—could be desirable if private agents’ failure to internalise the pecuniary cost of increasing leverage on ex post asset prices and others’ collateral constraints leads to ex ante overborrowing. It is also distinct from macroeconomic rationales that emphasise the hedging benefits derived from the issuance of outside equity by banks in general equilibrium, as in Gertler et al. (2011).
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the basic set-up of the model, in which banks receive noisy signals about the
6 Holmstrom (1982) argues that relative performance evaluation is useful if agents face some common uncertainty, such that other agents’ performance reveals information about an agent’s unobservable choices that cannot be inferred from his or her own measured performance. Relative performance evaluation appears to be a significant factor in executive compensation in the financial sector (see Murphy, 1999).
7 For example, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) and Farhi and Tirole (2012).
1 – α low ability
α high ability
f(θ)
1 – f(θ)
1 – λ
λ
RH
RL
l gamble
1 – l safe
(RL – ck) + rL
b
1 – b
2(RH – ck) + rH
(RL – ck) + rL
– 2ck + rD
2(RH – ck) + rH invest
can not invest
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
RL
RL
Fig. 1. Timing of the game.
430 D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
macroeconomic fundamentals in deciding whether to gamble for reputation or not. The analytical solution in this section helps us to illustrate how countercyclical capital buffers affect banks’ incentives to gamble and hence the credit cycle. Section 3 characterises optimal capital requirements within this set-up. Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
The set-up of the model is summarised in Fig. 1. We begin by describing the investment opportunities banks face, together with the underlying structure of the environment that determines a bank’s ability. Based on this structure, we then describe how the market comes to an assessment of a bank’s ability based on its realised returns, which determines the consequences of different investment strategies for reputation. We then describe how equilibrium is determined in the game.
9 The role of this assumption is to ensure that low returns signal low ability. This, in turn, provides the temptation to gamble to avoid reputational stigma. To see this, suppose lambda were equal to one, such that both high and low ability banks had equal access to the gambling technology. Low returns would then provide no signal of ability. Now suppose lambda were instead equal to zero. In this case, no low ability types gamble and all would receive low returns. In this world, getting low returns therefore becomes a strong signal of low ability. Although the signal from low returns
2.1. Set-up
The model extends over three dates, t = 0,1,2. There is a contin- uum of ex ante identical banks of unit mass, indexed by i 2 [0,1]. At t = 0, each bank draws its ability type, which it observes privately. A bank draws high ability with probability a 2 (0,1) and low ability with probability 1 � a. Having drawn their types, banks invest in a risky asset. They raise one unit of funds, of which k 2 (0,1) is equity and 1 � k is debt. The cost of debt is normalised to zero.8 Equity costs c > 0 per unit to raise, so the bank’s total cost of funds is ck. We treat k as a capital requirement determined by policy, and inves- tigate its optimal setting below.
The first period investment technology generates two discrete returns: a high return RH and a low return RL. The values taken by RH and RL are common knowledge, but banks’ specific realiza- tions are not. High ability banks are assumed to be better at search- ing for and screening projects than low ability banks. In particular, we assume that, with probability f(h) 2 (0,1) high ability banks
8 This assumption is consistent with the implicit presence of deposit insurance; it is also consistent with an expectation that bank debt-holders will be bailed out.
pick a project that yields a high return RH. The variable h indexes macroeconomic fundamentals. We assume @f(h)/@h > 0: better fundamentals imply good projects are more prevalent, so that high ability types have a better chance of picking high return projects. High-ability banks pick a low return project with probability 1 � f(h), yielding an initial return equal to RL < RH. Low ability banks, by contrast, are consistently bad at screening projects: for simplicity, we assume that these banks always end up picking projects that yield a low return RL at t = 1. Returns at date 1 are observed privately by banks.
Some banks have the opportunity to invest again following the realisation of date 1 returns. All high ability banks are assumed to be able to do so. A high ability bank that initially picked a high return project can simply roll over the same well-established project to generate net profits at t = 2 of:
2ðRH � ckÞ ð1Þ
By contrast, low ability banks are capable of identifying reinvestment opportunities at t = 1 only with probability k 2 (0,1).9 Those that cannot invest make low, but positive net profits at date t = 2 of:
RL � ck ð2Þ The remaining set—high ability banks that initially picked low return projects and low ability banks with reinvestment opportuni- ties—face a choice at t = 1, and it is this choice that we analyse. These banks can either play safe, in which case they do not invest a second time and realise final date returns given by (2), or they can gamble. With probability b 2 (0,1), a gamble will succeed in generating final date high returns given by (1). But with probability
is imperfect, this generates an incentive to avoid realising low returns, and therefore an incentive to gamble. In Section A.2 of the Appendix, we prove that lambda must be below a critical value in order for there to be strategic complementarities to gambling in this set-up.
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
r(θ,l)
0.66
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
r(θ,l)
D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439 431
1 � b, the gamble will fail, generating a ‘disaster’ outcome10 yielding zero gross returns and net profits at t = 2 of:
�2ck ð3Þ
We assume b < (RL + ck)/2RH, such that gambling, and the concom- itant expansion of credit that it involves, is inefficient (ie its expected return is less than that of playing safe).
2.2. Endogenous reputation
The market observes banks’ reported returns at date 2, which it uses to update its assessment of bankers’ reputations. Reputation is a private non-pecuniary cost borne by the banker in period t = 2, reflecting the market’s assessment of her ability. Specifically, a banker’s reputation is assumed to be proportional to her probabil- ity of being assessed as low ability given observed date 2 profits; the higher the probability of being assessed as low ability, the lower the reputational benefit associated with a particular invest- ment strategy. If we let rj be the reputational benefit associated with date 2 profit outturn j = {D, L, H}, we can write this relation- ship as:
rj ¼ Pr½low ability j returns� ��PLj ��
The conditional probabilities PLj are derived endogenously using Bayes’ rule, as we show in the Appendix. Here we note that, in gen- eral, they will depend on (a) the market’s perception of the aggre- gate state h and (b) the proportion of banks in the aggregate choosing to gamble, which we denote by l 2 (0,1). For the moment, we treat l as an exogenous parameter; we describe its endogenous determination in Lemma 2 below. In what follows, we write rj as a function of h and l to recognise this dependence between individual reputation and these aggregate variables.
Each banker maximises her expected utility, given by the sum of the date 2 expected returns and the expected reputational benefit. Regardless of her type, a banker’s expected utility from choosing to gamble at t = 1 is therefore:
V gamble ¼ bf2ðRH � ckÞþ rHðh; lÞgþð1 � bÞð�2ck þ rDðh; lÞÞ ð4Þ
while the expected utility from playing safe is:
V safe ¼ðRL � ckÞþ rLðh; lÞ ð5Þ
We can therefore write the marginal expected return to gambling as:
Vðh; lÞ� V gamble � V safe ¼ 2bRH � RL � ck þ rðh; lÞ ð6Þ
where
rðh; lÞ� brHðh; lÞþð1 � bÞrDðh; lÞ� rLðh; lÞ
captures the expected reputational benefit when gambling relative to playing safe. In the region of the parameter space we study, this benefit r(h, l) is increasing in both macroeconomic fundamentals, h, and in the proportion of gambling banks, l, as we describe in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. There exist critical levels of the gambling success proba- bility b and the probability of low types being able to invest in t = 1, �k, such that
(a) @rðh;lÞ @h
> 0 for b > b;
10 The disastrous second-period returns of banks whose gambles fail could, in part, be thought of as reflecting an asset fire-sale. For instance, the returns of successful gamblers could be modelled as a decreasing function of the number of gamblers who fail, to reflect the fire-sale externality. As we will see in Lemma 2, the number of gamblers will tend to rise when the state of the economy improves. To the extent that fire-sale spillovers are foreseen, this would tend to reduce somewhat the incentive to gamble in the upswing.
(b) @rðh;lÞ @l > 0 for k <
�k.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. h
The first result states that the marginal reputational benefit of gambling is increasing in fundamentals, provided that the probability of a successful gamble b is not too low. Intuitively, as fundamentals improve, a greater proportion of the high ability banks will generate high profits. In this situation, a decision not to gamble by expanding credit to new borrowers at t = 1 is more likely to be interpreted as a signal of low ability and thereby incur a reputational cost. So, as long as the probability of a successful gamble is not too low, bankers’ incentives to do so rise as fundamentals improve (see Fig. 2, right-hand side panel).
The second result states that the marginal reputational benefit of gambling is increasing in the proportion of other banks choosing to do so, provided the fraction of low ability banks that are able to is not too high (see Fig. 2, left-hand side panel). To understand this result, suppose few banks choose to gamble. Posting low returns would then contain little information on type, as the set of non- gamblers will contain both low ability types and high ability types whose initial investments failed. Contrast that with a situation where most of the banks that are able to gamble choose to do so. Now, posting low returns carries a strong signal of low ability as high ability banks will either achieve high returns or disastrous returns. It can be better to gamble to avoid this stigma, even at the risk of generating disastrous returns. A key implication of part (b) of Lemma 1 then is that there are strategic complementarities in gambling. If one bank chooses to gamble, it creates strong incentives for others to follow suit.
2.3. Information structure and equilibrium
Next we describe how equilibrium in the game is determined. We suppose there is a public signal h that is observed by all banks at t = 1 containing information about fundamentals, namely:
h �Nðy; s2Þ
where the public signal has mean y and precision s�2. In addition, each bank is assumed to observe a private signal about fundamentals:
xi ¼ h þ ei
0 0.5 1
0.65
l -2 -1 0 1 2
0.64
θ
Fig. 2. The reputation function r(h, l): numerical example Notes: This example for r(h, l) is calculated using b = 0.75, k = 0.1, a = 0.5 and f(h ) = 0.1 + (0.9 � 0.1)(1 + exp ( � h ))�1.
432 D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
where the idiosyncratic noise ei �Nð0; r2Þ is distributed indepen- dently across banks, i 2 [0,1].
With this information structure, bank i’s posterior belief over expected fundamentals is:
hi ¼ r2y þ s2 xi r2 þ s2
with standard deviation p
[r2s2/(r2 + s2)] (see eg DeGroot (1970)). Suppose that banks play cut-off strategies, such that they opt to
gamble if their posterior beliefs exceed a critical threshold h⁄ and play safe otherwise. We can write this strategy s(hi) as:
sðhiÞ¼ fgamble if hi P h�; safe if hi < h�g
It turns out that we can partition the domain of the fundamentals into three regions. When fundamentals are really strong, gambling always dominates even when no other banks choose to do so. The threshold �h defining this region is given by:
Vð�h; 0Þ¼ 0 () 2bRH þ rð�h; 0Þ¼ RL þ ck
Similarly, when fundamentals are really weak, playing safe always dominates even when all other banks gamble. The threshold h defining this region of the fundamentals is given by:
Vðh; 1Þ¼ 0 () 2bRH þ rðh; 1Þ¼ RL þ ck
In the intermediate region, h 6 hi 6 �h, there is the possibility of mul- tiple equilibria. With the information structure above, however, it can be shown that there exists a unique equilibrium in the game of incomplete information for sufficiently precise private signals. That is:
Lemma 2 (Morris and Shin (2002)): There exists a unique threshold equilibrium cut-off in the gambling game such that banks gamble for hi > h
⁄ and play safe otherwise, when private information is sufficiently precise (r is sufficiently small), where the threshold h⁄
solves:
RL � 2bRH þ ck ¼ Z 1
h0¼�1
/ ffiffiffiffi q p
h0 � � ffiffiffiffi q p r h0 þ h�; l�ðh�; h�Þð Þdh0
l�ðh�; h�Þ¼ 1 � U ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ ð7Þ
where ffiffiffi c p � rs2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2þs2
2s2þr2
q ; ffiffiffiffi q p �
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2þs2 r2 s2
q , and where /(.) and U(.) are the
standard normal pdf and cdf respectively.
11 Capital requirements here act as an imperfect substitute for a lack of private sector monitoring of banks’ risk taking. In particular, if funding costs could be made contingent on a bank’s risk choices ex ante, then depositors could ensure that banks avoid negative net present value gambles.
12 There is significant uncertainty over the strength of the policy multiplier from a
Proof. See Appendix A.3. h
Lemma 2 establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium in banks’ gambling game, which is characterised by a cut-off for banks’ posterior beliefs about fundamentals, given by h⁄, such that a bank gambles for hi > h
⁄ and plays safe otherwise.
2.3. Properties of the equilibrium
Having established the existence of this cut-off, we are able to show:
Lemma 3. The gambling threshold h⁄ is:
change in macroprudential capital requirements on to the price and quantity of credit, and estimates of the size of this multiplier vary significantly. In 2010, the official sector produced an assessment, under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, that a permanent 1 percentage point
(a) decreasing in expected fundamentals y, @h⁄/@y < 0. (b) increasing in the capital ratio k, @h⁄/@k > 0;
increase in required capital ratios, implemented over two years, would lead to a 15.3 basis point increase in credit spreads (Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010). But other studies that use microeconomic data on bank reactions to capital requirement changes find much larger effects. Aiyar et al. (2014), for instance, find that a 1 percentage point increase in capital requirements reduces loan supply by about 7 per cent. See also Giese et al. (2013).
13 Appendix A.6 contains details of the calibration used to construct the example.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. h
The intuition for these results is as follows. First, higher expected fundamentals increase the marginal reputational benefit of gambling. This is because better fundamentals imply that more
high ability banks generate high returns, which in turn means that posting low returns is a better signal of low ability. Hence, banks’ incentive to gamble to avoid being labelled as ‘low ability’ becomes stronger as fundamentals improve. The result is that a lower posterior threshold belief about fundamentals is required to induce gambling rather than playing safe.
The second part of Lemma 3 indicates how the incentive to gamble is affected by a change in the capital requirement. Gambling requires the bank to raise additional funds to finance its expansion of credit. As capital requirements increase, the cost of financing the gamble relative to playing safe also goes up. This reduces banks’ incentive to gamble and hence increases the gambling threshold h�.11
A corollary of this second result, which will be of interest to policymakers, is that the impact of a hike in capital requirements on risk-taking behaviour may be disproportionate to its direct effect on banks’ funding costs. In particular, if strategic comple- mentarities are strong, then the gambling threshold h⁄ will increase a lot—tempering risk taking incentives significantly— when capital requirements are hiked, even if the direct effect on funding costs is small.12 To see this analytically, consider a simpli- fied example in which the reputation function r(h, l) takes a linear form, such that r(h, l) = r0 + rhh + rll, for positive constants r0,rh and rl. The coefficients rh and rl govern the effects that fundamentals and the proportion of gamblers have on the incentives for risk-tak- ing, respectively. The latter (rl) governs the strategic effect that other banks’ gambling has on a given bank’s incentives to gamble too. In particular, as rl ? 0, the strategic incentive to gamble disappears. In this linear case, the threshold for gambling is given implicitly by:
rhh � ¼ rlU
ffiffiffi c p ðh� � yÞð Þ�ð2bRH � RL � ckÞ�ðr0 þ rlÞ
(see Appendix A.4.2), which has a unique solution when private sig- nals are sufficiently precise relative to the public signal.
It is apparent that a change in capital requirements alters the threshold according to:
dh�
dk ¼
c rh � rl
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p ðh� � yÞ
� � > 0 where the sign of the inequality follows from the sufficient condi- tion for uniqueness, which guarantees that the denominator is posi- tive, as in Lemma 2. A rise in capital requirements raises the gambling threshold by an amount that is proportional to the cost of capital, c. In the absence of strategic effects (rl ? 0), the marginal impact is c/rh, ie the cost of capital scaled by the reputational incen- tives implied by fundamentals alone. As rl grows, however, strategic complementarities heighten the impact that a given change in cap- ital requirements has on the incentive to gamble. This point is illus- trated in a numerical example shown in Fig. 3, which depicts the impact of the capital requirement on the gambling threshold under different degrees of strategic complementarity.13 This extra kick
Fig. 3. Relationship between capital requirement and gambling threshold for different degrees of strategic complementarity Notes: See Appendix A.6 for calibration details.
D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439 433
from capital requirements is at its strongest when the gambling threshold is in the vicinity of expected fundamentals, h⁄ffi y.
3. The policymaker’s problem
We now turn to the problem of a policymaker who wishes to set the capital requirement k to maximise the efficiency of the banking systems’ investment decisions.
3.1. Set-up
The policymaker cares only about the efficiency of bank’s port- folio choices, and places no value on the non-pecuniary reputa- tional consequences of those choices. She has access to the same public information as does the private sector, namely h �Nðy; s2Þ. Conditional on this information, the policymaker solves:
maxkWðk; yÞ� afðyÞ� 2ðRH � ckÞþð1 � aÞð1 � kÞ�ðRL � ckÞ þfð1 � aÞk þ a½1 � fðyÞ�g� Pðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
subject to equilibrium condition (7) determining h⁄(k,y), and where
Pðh�ðk;yÞ;kÞ�Prðh P h�Þ½2bðRH �ckÞ�ð1�bÞ2ck�þ½1�Prðh P h�Þ�ðRL �ckÞ ¼ðRL �ckÞ�Prðh P h�ÞðRLþck�2bRHÞ
The first two terms of the policymaker’s objective function capture the expected payoffs of the af(y) high ability banks that generate high returns and the (1 � a)(1 � k) low ability banks that generate low returns. The third term captures the expected payoffs of the (1 � a)k low ability banks and the a [1 � f(y)] high ability banks that face a choice at t = 1 over whether to gamble or whether to play safe. The term P(h⁄,k) captures these banks’ expected payoffs, which comprise a return to gambling, with probability Pr (h P h⁄), and a return to playing safe, with probability 1 � Pr (h P h⁄). The policymaker solves this problem subject to the private sector’s equilibrium condition (7), which determines the cut-off h⁄ and which, as shown in Lemma 3, varies with the policy instrument k and expected fundamentals y.
3.2. Optimal policy
Consider first the impact of the policy instrument on those banks that have the opportunity to gamble at t = 1, whose expected returns are captured by the term P(h⁄(k,y),k). The derivative of this term with respect to the capital requirement is:
dPðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ dk
¼�ð1 þ Prðh P h�ÞÞc
� @Prðh P h�Þ
@h� @h�
@k ðRL þ ck � 2bRHÞ
There are two effects of a higher capital requirement on this pool of banks. First, for a given probability of gambling, these banks’ net returns fall by c, the marginal cost of funding their investments with a now higher capital ratio. Second, an increase in the capital requirement will tend to reduce the likelihood of gambling. To the extent that @PrðhPh
�Þ @h�
@h�
@k < 0, ie that higher requirements do reduce collective incentives to gamble, and to the extent that gambling is inefficient (RL + ck � 2bRH > 0), there is scope therefore for a higher capital requirement to raise gambling banks’ returns. We focus on this case, where dPðh
�ðk;yÞ;kÞ dk > 0 8k 2 ½0; 1�, below.
It turns out that the impact of the policy instrument on gam- bling is non-linear and depends on the state of fundamentals. In the limit, Pr (h P h⁄(k,y)) ? 1 as y ? 1, such that very strong fun- damentals rule out any possibility of discouraging gambling. Sim- ilarly, Pr (h P h⁄(k,y)) ? 0 as y ? �1, such that very weak fundamentals make gambling so unattractive that no bank would choose to gamble even if capital ratios were set to zero. It follows that fundamentals y must lie in some intermediate range in order for the policymaker to face the possibility of engineering a welfare- enhancing hike in capital requirements. This result implies that situations can arise in which applying the countercyclical capital buffer alone is not a cost-effective way of deterring gambling. Given this limitation, our analysis emphasises the importance of developing additional macroprudential tools to support the role played by the countercyclical capital buffer.
For the remainder of the discussion, we limit our attention to the case in which y 2 ½y; �y�, where y and �y denote the lower and upper limits for fundamentals below and above which the capital requirement has no traction on the incentive to gamble. Note that, for y 2 (�1,y] and for y 2 ½�y;1Þ, aggregate welfare is decreasing in k; in these cases the regulator would optimally set k⁄ = 0, minimis- ing banks’ costs.
The policymaker’s first-order condition @Wðk � ;yÞ
@k ¼ 0 for an inte- rior k⁄2 [0,1] can be written as:
dPðh�ðk�; yÞ; k�Þ dk
¼ 2afðyÞc þð1 � aÞð1 � kÞc ð1 � aÞk þ a½1 � fðyÞ�
ð8Þ
At an optimum, the capital requirement will be set so that the indi- rect marginal net benefit of reducing gambling incentives for the (1 � a)k + a[1 � f(y)] banks that face that option is equated to the direct marginal costs of higher funding costs for the remaining banks that do not. This equation implicitly defines the policy- maker’s optimum k⁄ for y 2 ½y; �y�. We summarise this in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. For it to be feasible that a nonzero capital require- ment maximises aggregate welfare, Wðk; yÞ, it must be that (a) gambling is inefficient (RL + ck � 2bRH > 0) and (b) fundamentals (y) are neither so strong nor so weak that the policymaker can feasibly influence banks’ incentive to gamble.
3.3. Cyclicality of the optimal capital ratio
Next we ask how the optimal capital requirement varies with the level of fundamentals y. Observe that the right-hand side of Eq. (8), the policymaker’s first-order condition, is increasing in fundamentals y, by @f(y)/@y > 0. A change in y therefore alters the optimal capital ratio, and must do so in such a way that ensures:
d dy
dPðh�ðk�; yÞ; k�Þ dk
> 0
434 D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
In the Appendix, we show that this implies:
Proposition 2. The optimal capital ratio rises with fundamentals @k⁄/@y > 0 when gambling is inefficient (b < (RL + ck)/2RH ) and when the cut-off satisfies h⁄(k⁄,y ) < y.
Fig. 4. Policymaker objective function as capital requirements vary and as fundamentals improve. Notes: See Appendix A.6 for calibration details.
Fig. 5. Optimal capital requirement as a function of fundamentals for different degrees of strategic complementarity.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. h
This result implies that capital requirements should lean against the cycle in a countercyclical manner in order to maximise welfare. The intuition is as follows. As fundamentals improve, a greater proportion of high ability banks generate high returns from their t = 0 investments, leaving fewer high-ability types in the pool of banks that enter date 1 with low returns. The market knows this, and assigns a higher probability to a bank being low ability if it posts low returns. To avoid this reputational cost, banks are incen- tivised to gamble. When this is socially inefficient, the policymaker has an incentive to try to prevent this gambling. She does so by hiking capital requirements, seeking to raise the threshold above which gambling occurs, and thereby offsetting the reduction in the threshold that improved fundamentals brought about; this turns out to be optimal even though it raises funding costs for all banks, high and low ability alike. Thus when concerns for reputa- tion generate inefficient swings in banks’ portfolio choices, which encourage gambling in upswings, the policymaker should opti- mally conduct countercyclical macroprudential policy that leans against private incentives.
We illustrate this result in two ways. First, Fig. 4 plots the policymaker’s welfare function against the capital requirement for a simple numerical example, as used above to compute Fig. 3, and as detailed in Appendix A.6. The non-monotonic form of the welfare function reflects two effects. First, the downward-sloping segments reflect that impact of higher capital requirements in reducing banks’ returns, implicitly treating these as social costs that the policymaker would like to avoid. Second, the welfare function increases over some range as higher capital requirements discourage gambling. Since gambling is inefficient, this raises welfare. The peaks of the welfare functions, illustrated by the dot and the cross in Fig. 4, strike the optimal trade-off between impos- ing costs on banks and reducing gambling incentives.
The dashed curve in Fig. 4 shows the impact of heightened fun- damentals on the policymaker’s objective, relative to baseline. The welfare function shifts upwards on account of the higher probabil- ity that banks achieve high returns in the first stage of the game. That raises welfare for any level of capital requirements. Second, the welfare function shifts rightwards with improved fundamen- tals, which reflects the heightened gambling incentives faced by banks that fail to achieve high returns initially. And since more gambling reduces aggregate payoffs, the policymaker chooses a higher capital requirement than under the baseline case (cross versus dot).
Fig. 5 generalises this picture by plotting the optimal capital requirement against the level of fundamentals—the optimal policy rule. Consistent with Fig. 4, higher fundamentals initially call for higher capital requirements. But, as discussed above, there comes a point where the optimal capital requirement falls back to zero. To see why this is, consider again the welfare function shown in Fig. 4. As fundamentals improve, the welfare function shifts to the right. Eventually, the local maximum indicated by the dots in the figure falls below the level of welfare achieved by a zero capital requirement. Intuitively, with very strong fundamentals, the few banks that do gamble do not reduce the aggregate payoff by very much, and with very strong fundamentals, the vast majority of high ability banks are making high returns on their initial invest- ments rather than gambling for reputation.
We next consider how the optimal policy rule varies with the strength of strategic complementarity in the model. To do this, as in Fig. 3, we scale the coefficient on l in the reputation function by +/�20 per cent relative to the baseline calibration. Two points stand out. First, with stronger strategic complementarities, a lower capital requirement is needed to strike the right trade-off between discouraging gambling and reducing aggregate returns; the opti- mal policy rule therefore shifts downwards in Fig. 5. Second, when complementarity is stronger, the optimal capital requirement remains positive for a larger range of fundamentals—the circles (weaker complementarity) drop to zero before either the crosses (baseline) or the points (stronger complementarity). So stronger complementarity extends the range of fundamentals over which the capital requirement is optimally countercyclical.
It should be noted that these results on the optimality of coun- tercyclical capital requirements have been derived in a static model. We are therefore forced to abstract from many important dimensions of countercyclical macroprudential policy that would only become evident in a dynamic setting. To give one example, in a dynamic model where lending decisions are multi-period, the expected future path of the capital requirement is likely to
D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439 435
have a powerful effect on lending decisions today. In such a setting, a credible commitment to punish risky lending booms should they materialise with higher future capital requirements may be suffi- cient to stabilise the economy.
3.4. The ‘signalling’ channel of macroprudential policy
Our model also implies that @h⁄/@y < 0, so the macroprudential policy authority can influence the risk-taking incentive of banks not only directly by changing the capital requirement, but also indi- rectly through public announcement of fundamentals, y. Suppose that banks do not observe the economic fundamental, y directly, but they learn this from the publication of macroprudential policy authority’s assessment, such as its reports on financial stability. If so, presentation of clear evidence that fundamentals are deteriorat- ing can itself act as a powerful tool for deterring risk-taking, as banks coordinate towards the ‘low risk’ equilibrium. However, this tool is a double-edged sword: for the same reason, an announcement by the macroprudential policy authority that fundamentals are benign could potentially ignite excessive risk-taking, as it encourages banks to coordinate towards the ‘gambling’ equilibrium.
4. Concluding remarks
We have offered this analysis as a contribution to the nascent literature on the transmission mechanism of countercyclical capi- tal requirements. We show that countercyclical capital adequacy requirements can be used to achieve socially optimal outcomes. When high-ability banks perform increasingly well on average, as they do when fundamentals improve, low-ability banks have an incentive to gamble in order to safeguard their reputations. Opti- mal macroprudential policy works against this incentive by raising the cost of gambling through higher capital requirements as funda- mentals improve.
Our model is built around a deliberately simple account of banks’ lending decisions to allow us to solve it analytically and build intuition. It could be extended along several dimensions. One interesting avenue of future research would be to embed the model in a dynamic setting, where banks extend credit over several periods and bankers face a choice over whether to gamble today or at some future date. Steiner (2008), for example, presents a model of a dynamic global game that consists of a series of simple static global games, such as the one in our paper. Agents’ actions influ- ence both their current pay-off and their ability to participate in future projects. One intriguing feature of Steiner’s model is that if the likelihood of coordination tomorrow is low, perhaps because economic fundamentals are expected to deteriorate or because capital requirements are expected to be hiked, then the incentive to take a risky action today goes up.
A second potentially interesting topic for future research would be to consider whether coordination failures of the type modelled here could also serve as a rationale for relaxing capital require- ments in a crisis. The issues raised here are more complex than in the expansion phase of the cycle. A crisis, by definition, is an epi- sode where asset prices are falling, funding constraints are tighten- ing and leveraged financial intermediaries are being forced to sell assets at dislocated prices. There is a concern that a relaxation of the countercyclical capital buffer simply risks ‘‘pushing on a string’’. At the same time, if credit availability is impaired, then the mar- ginal macroeconomic impact of relaxing loan supply is likely to be unusually large, raising the prospect of a positive feedback loop running from a relaxation of the buffer to better macroeconomic performance to lower solvency risk on bank balance sheets.
A third potential avenue to explore in future research would be to consider the possibility that not all banks are equal in the
reputational spillovers they create. Because of its perceived prestige, the externality created by Goldman Sachs posting a 20 per cent return on equity, say, might just be greater than that of other banks. There are parallels here with the literature on influen- tial nodes in social networks (Kempe et al., 2005).
Appendix A
A.1. Derivation of reputations
We use Pij to denote the probability of being assessed to have ability i = H, L given returns j = H, L, D. Generically:
Pij ¼ Pi\j Pj
where Pi\j denotes the joint probability of i and j, and Pj denotes the unconditional probability of j. We have
PH ¼ afðhÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�lb þð1 � aÞklb
PL ¼ð1 � aÞð1 � kÞþð1 � aÞkð1 � lÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�ð1 � lÞ
PD ¼fð1 � aÞk þ a½1 � fðhÞ�glð1 � bÞ
and
PL\H ¼ð1 � aÞklb
PL\L ¼ð1 � aÞ½ð1 � kÞþ kð1 � lÞ�
PL\D ¼ð1 � aÞklð1 � bÞ
Then:
PLHðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞklb
afðhÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�lb þð1 � aÞklb
PLLðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞ½ð1 � kÞþ kð1 � lÞ�
ð1 � aÞð1 � kÞþð1 � aÞkð1 � lÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�ð1 � lÞ
PLDðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞklð1 � bÞ
fð1 � aÞk þ a½1 � fðhÞ�glð1 � bÞ
where we make the dependence of Pij on h and l clear by writing Pij(h, l). We take rj � � PLj (the reputational payoff of returning j = {high, low, disaster} returns is decreasing in the probability of being assessed as low ability conditional on j returns), and so:
rðh; lÞ� brH þð1 � bÞrD � rL ¼�bPLHðh; lÞ�ð1 � bÞPLDðh; lÞþ PLLðh; lÞ
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
From the expressions above, we have that:
@rðh; lÞ @h
¼�b @PLHðh; lÞ
@h �ð1 � bÞ
@PLDðh; lÞ @h
þ @PLLðh; lÞ
@h
where:
@PLHðh;lÞ @h
¼ �PLH
afðhÞþa½1�fðhÞ�lbþð1�aÞklb að1�lbÞ
@fðhÞ @h
< 0
@PLDðh;lÞ @h
¼ �PLD
fð1�aÞkþa½1�fðhÞ�glð1�bÞ lð1�bÞð�aÞ
@fðhÞ @h
¼ PLD
fð1�aÞkþa½1�fðhÞ�g a @fðhÞ @h
> 0
@PLLðh;lÞ @h
¼ �PLL
ð1�aÞð1�kÞþð1�aÞkð1�lÞþa½1�fðhÞ�ð1�lÞ ð�að1�lÞÞ
@fðhÞ @h
¼ PLLað1�lÞ
ð1�aÞð1�kÞþð1�aÞkð1�lÞþa½1�fðhÞ�ð1�lÞ @fðhÞ @h
> 0
As a result,
436 D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
@rðh; lÞ @h
> 0
if
�b @PLHðh; lÞ
@h þ @PLLðh; lÞ
@h > ð1 � bÞ
@PLDðh; lÞ @h
As b ? 1, we have
PLHjb!1 afðhÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�l þð1 � aÞkl
að1 � lÞ @fðhÞ @h þ @PLLðh; lÞ
@h > 0
where
PLHjb!1 ¼ ð1 � aÞkl
afðhÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�l þð1 � aÞkl > 0
As a result, for b > b, where b solves
�b @PLHðh; lÞ
@h þ @PLLðh; lÞ
@h ¼ð1 � bÞ
@PLDðh; lÞ @h
we have @r(h, l)/@h > 0. As fundamentals improve, the probability of being assessed as low ability on reporting low returns relative to gambling for the chance for high returns, is higher, for a sufficiently high probability of the risky gamble paying off.
By a similar token,
@rðh; lÞ @l
¼�b @PLHðh; lÞ
@l �ð1 � bÞ
@PLDðh; lÞ @l
þ @PLLðh; lÞ
@l
where
@PLHðh; lÞ @l
> 0
since rearranging PLH(h, l) gives:
PLHðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞk
afðhÞ lb þ a½1 � fðhÞ�þð1 � aÞk
so:
@PLHðh; lÞ @l
¼ �PLH
afðhÞ lb þ a½1 � fðhÞ�þð1 � aÞk
afðhÞ bl �1
l > 0
and
@PLDðh; lÞ @l
¼ 0
since simplifying PLD(h, l) gives:
PLDðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞk
ð1 � aÞk þ a½1 � fðhÞ�
and
@PLLðh; lÞ @l
> 0
since PLL(h, l) can be written:
PLLðh; lÞ¼ 1
1 þ a1�a 1�l 1�kl ½1 � fðhÞ�
so
@PLLðh; lÞ @l
¼� PLL
1 þ a1�a 1�l 1�kl ½1 � fðhÞ�
a 1 � a
½1 � fðhÞ� @
@l 1 � l
1 � kl
where
@
@l 1 � l
1 � kl ¼�
1 1 � kl
1 � k 1 � kl
< 0
Therefore @r(h, l)/@l > 0 if
a 1�a ½1 � fðhÞ�
1 þ a1�a 1�l 1�kl ½1 � fðhÞ�
� �2 11 � kl 1 � k 1 � kl
> ð1 � aÞk
afðhÞ lb þ a½1 � fðhÞ�þð1 � aÞk
� �2 afðhÞl 1 l
When k ? 0, this is always satisfied since a
1�a ½1 � fðhÞ� 1 þ a1�að1 � lÞ½1 � fðhÞ� � �2 > 0 When k ? 1, however, @rðh;lÞ
@l < 0 as can be observed by inspecting the inequality above. It follows that there exists a �k such that for k < �k, @r(h, l)/@l > 0. When the probability of low ability types entering the pool of banks that face the option to gamble, the reputational cost of playing safe is increasing in the proportion of banks that gamble. For example, when k = 0, all low ability types generate low returns. In this case, gambling for high returns is sufficient to signal high ability, as no low ability banks ever face this option.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2: unique equilibrium in gambling game
Given signal xi, bank i expects the proportion of banks that gam- ble satisfies:
l� � E½ljxi� ¼ E Z
j2 0;1½ � 1ðj gamblesjxiÞ
" # dj
where 1(.) is the indicator function taking value of unity when the condition (.) is satisfied. Under threshold strategies:
E½ljxi� ¼ Z
j2½0;1� E½hj P h�jxi�dj
where hj is j’s posterior:
hj ¼ r2 y þ s2ðh þ ejÞ
r2 þ s2
By independence of noise across bankers, we have then:
E½ljxi� ¼ Pr ðxjjxiÞ P r2
s2 ðh� � yÞþ h�
�
Use that
xjjxi ¼ðhjxiÞþ ej �N hi; r2s2
r2 þ s2
� þN 0; r2
� �
¼N hi; 2r2s2 þ r4
r2 þ s2
� Therefore:
l�ðhi; h�Þ¼ 1 � U r2 s2 h
� � yð Þþðh� � hiÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2r2 s2þr4
r2þs2
q 0 B@
1 CA
The expected gain to gambling rather than playing safe for bank i is then:
Vðhi; h�Þ¼ Z 1
h¼�1 2bRH � RL � ck þ rðh; l
�ðhi; h�ÞÞdFðhÞ
where F (.) is the posterior distribution for h, given signal xi:
FðhÞ¼N hi; r2s2
r2 þ s2
�
Using this:
V hi;h �ð Þ¼2bRH�RL�ckþ
Z 1 h¼�1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2s2
r2þs2
s /
h�hiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2 s2 r2þs2
q 0 B@
1 CAr h;l�ðhi;h�Þð Þdh
D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439 437
or using the change of variables h0 = h � hi:
V hi; h �ð Þ¼ 2bRH � RL � ck þ
Z 1 h0¼�1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2s2
r2 þs2
s /
h0ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2 s2 r2þs2
q 0 B@
1 CAr h0 þ hi; l�ðhi; h�Þð Þdh0
To show uniqueness, we need to show that this expression is increasing in hi and that Vðh�; h�Þ ¼ 0 has a unique solution. To show the first, note that l⁄(hi,h
⁄) is increasing in hi by the properties of the normal cdf, and therefore that rðh0 þ hi; l
�ðh0 þ hiÞÞ is increasing in hi under the conditions stated in Lemma 1. To show the second, we have that:
V h�;h�ð Þ¼ 2bRH �RL �ckþ Z 1
h0¼�1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2s2
r2 þs2
s /
h0ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2 s2 r2þs2
q 0 B@
1 CAr h0 þh�;l�ðh�;h�Þð Þdh0
in which
l�ðh�; h�Þ¼ 1 � U ffiffiffi c p ðh� � yÞð Þ
where ffiffiffi c p � rs2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2þs2
2s2þr2
q , so
@l�ðh�; h�Þ @h�
¼� ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ < 0
(a higher threshold implies a smaller fraction of gamblers for a given mean fundamentals y) and
@l�ðh�; h�Þ @y
¼ ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ > 0
(higher mean fundamentals y implies a larger fraction of gamblers). Then:
@Vðh�;h�Þ @h�
¼ Z 1
h0¼�1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2s2
r2 þs2
s /
h0ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2 s2 r2þs2
q 0 B@
1 CA@rð:Þ
@h 1�
@rð:Þ @l @rð:Þ @h
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h��yð Þð Þ " #
dh0
The expression in square brackets is positive if:
1 > @rð:Þ @l @rð:Þ @h
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ
The normal pdf reaches a maximum of 1/ p
(2p), so:
c < @rð:Þ @h @rð:Þ @l
!2 2p
is sufficient for uniqueness – i.e. private signals must be sufficiently precise relative to public information. The equilibrium threshold then solves:
RL � 2bRH þ ck ¼ Z 1
h0¼�1
/ ffiffiffiffi q p
h0 � � ffiffiffiffi q p r h0 þ h�; l�ðh�; h�Þð Þdh0
l�ðh�; h�Þ¼ 1 � U ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ
where ffiffiffi c p � rs2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2þs2
2s2þr2
q and where
ffiffiffiffi q p �
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi r2þs2 r2 s2
q .
A.4. Proof of Lemma 3: comparative statics on the threshold h⁄
A.4.1. Comparative statics Part (a): Improvement in fundamentals. If mean fundamentals improve, the equilibrium condition
gives:
0 ¼ Z 1
h0¼�1
@rð:Þ @h�
@h�
@y þ @rð:Þ @l�
@l�ð:Þ @y þ @l�ð:Þ @h�
@h�
@y
�� /
ffiffiffiffi q p
h0 � � ffiffiffiffi q p dh0
such that:
@h�
@y ¼
�@rð:Þ @l�
@l�ð:Þ @y
@rð:Þ @h�
1 � @rð:Þ @l� @rð:Þ @h�
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þ � ��
The numerator is negative by @rð:Þ @l�
@l�ð:Þ @y > 0. The condition sufficient
for uniqueness guarantees that the term in square brackets is posi- tive, such that by @rð:Þ
@h� > 0, we have that
@h�
@y < 0
or that an improvement in mean fundamentals lowers the thresh- old for gambling to occur.
Part (b): Change in capital ratio. Raising capital requirements means:
@h�
@k ¼
cR1 h0¼�1
@rð:Þ @h�
1 � @rð:Þ @l� @rð:Þ @h�
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þ � �� / ffiffiffiqp h0ð Þffiffiffi
q p dh0
which is positive under the condition sufficient for uniqueness (which guarantees that the term in square brackets is positive).
A.4.2. The linear example Here we derive an expression for the threshold and for the com-
parative statics in the special case of a linear reputation function. First, we approximate the reputation function with r(h, l) r0 + rh- h + rll, for positive constants r0,rh,rl. This gives the marginal return to gambling as:
2bRH � RL � ck þ r0 þ rhh þ rllð Þ
As above (see Section A.3), at the threshold posterior, the expected fraction of gamblers is l�ðh�; h�Þ ¼ 1 � U
ffiffiffi c p ðh� � yÞ
� � . Using this,
together with the fact that at the threshold, the marginal return to gambling must be equal to zero for banks to be indifferent between gambling and playing safe, the threshold solves:
rhh � ¼ rlU
ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þð Þ� 2bRH � RL � ckð Þ�ðr0 þ rlÞ
As in Section A.3, the threshold is unique if the slope of the left- hand side exceeds that of the right-hand side, or:
rh > rl ffiffiffi c p
/ð ffiffiffi c p ðh� � yÞÞ
Since the normal pdf reaches a maximum of 1= ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2p p
, a sufficient
condition for uniqueness is c < 2pðrh=rlÞ 2 . Recall thatffiffiffi
c p � rs2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ðr2 þ s2Þ=ð2s2 þ r2Þ
p , so this condition places a restriction
on private relative to public noise, as above. What is the effect of a change in mean fundamentals, y?
dh�
dy ¼�
rl ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þ � �
rh � rl ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þ � � < 0
where the inequality follows from the sufficient condition for uniqueness, under which the denominator is positive.
The effect of a change in capital requirements is:
dh�
dk ¼
c rh � rl
ffiffiffi c p
/ ffiffiffi c p
h� � yð Þ � � > 0
A.5. Proposition 2: Cyclicality of optimum capital ratio
The first-order condition is
dWðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ dk
¼�2afðyÞc �ð1 � aÞð1 � kÞc
þ ð1 � aÞk þ a 1 � fðyÞ½ �f g dPðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
dk
which is set to zero at the optimum, implying k⁄ solves:
dPðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ dk
¼ 2afðyÞc þð1 � aÞð1 � kÞc ð1 � aÞk þ a 1 � fðyÞ½ �
ðA-1Þ
Table A.1 Parameter values for numerical example.
Parameter Value
RL 1.02 RH 1.10 a 0.98 c 1.05 b 0.05 k0 0.10 (h0; h1Þ (0.00,0.70)
438 D. Aikman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 428–439
The left-hand side of this expression is the marginal impact of the capital ratio on the gamblers’ payoffs. Condition A-1 implies that it is positive at the optimum: by reducing inefficient gambling, aggregate payoffs rise. But this imposes some positive costs on the remaining banks, captured by the right-hand side of A-1. Note that the right-hand side of A-1 is increasing in y by @f(y)/@y > 0. Therefore at the optimum as y rises the optimal k must change in such a way that the left-hand side also increases in y in order to maintain an optimal setting of k (ie in order for first-order condition A-1 to continue to hold). That is, we must have:
d dy
dPðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ dk
> 0
We can write this as:
d dy
dPðh�ðk;yÞ;kÞ dk
¼ @
2Pðh�ðk;yÞ;kÞ @k@h�
@h�
@y
þ @
2P h�ðk;yÞ;kð Þ @k@h�
@h�
@k @k @y þ @
2Pðh�ðk;yÞ;kÞ @k@k
@k @y
!
which says that the effect of a rise in fundamentals on the marginal effect of k on gamblers’ payoffs depends on (a) the effect of changed fundamentals on the cut-off, and (b) the response of the policy- maker’s instrument to this change that is brought about to ensure that the policymaker continues to optimise. Intuitively, if improved fundamentals lead to more gambling (ie lower the threshold), the policymaker may respond by raising the capital ratio in order to resist the inefficient increase in gambling incentives. Following this logic, since @ h⁄/@y < 0, sufficient conditions for @ k⁄/@y > 0 are that:
@ 2Pðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
@k@h� > 0
@ 2Pðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
@k@k > 0
since then ddy dPðh�ðk;yÞ;kÞ
dk > 0 – which must be the case – only if @k/ @y > 0. We have that
dPð:Þ dk
¼ @Pðh�; kÞ
@h� @h�
@k þ @P h�; kð Þ
@k
¼ @Prðh P h�Þ
@h� ð2bRH � ck � RLÞ
@h�
@k � 1 þ Pr h P h�ð Þ½ �c
Note that for the regulator with prior h �Nðy; s2Þ,
Pr h P h�ð Þ¼ 1 � U h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
�
so
@Pr h P h�ð Þ @h�
¼� 1 s
/ h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
� < 0
giving
@Pð:Þ @k
¼� 1 s
/ h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
� 2bRH � ck � RLð Þ
@h�
@k
� 2 � U h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
�� c
Then:
@ 2Pðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
@k@h� ¼�
1 s @/ h
�ðk;yÞ�y s
� � @h�
2bRH � ck � RLð Þ @h�
@k
þ 1 s
/ h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
� c
Sufficient conditions for this expression to be positive are (a) gam- bling is inefficient (2bRH � ck � RL < 0) and (b) h⁄(k,y) < y, since then
@/ h �ðk;yÞ�y
s
� � =@h� > 0, guarantee that the first term is positive.
Similarly:
@ 2Pðh�ðk; yÞ; kÞ
@k@k ¼�
1 s
@/ h �ðk;yÞ�y
s
� � @h�
@h�
@k 2bRH � ck � RLð Þ
@h�
@k
þ 1 s
/ h�ðk; yÞ� y
s
� @h�
@k c > 0
under the same conditions.
A.6. Details of the numerical example
In the text we use a simple numerical example to illustrate some of the properties of the model. This example is constructed as follows. First, we let k ? 0. In this case, the reputation function described in A.1 r(h, l) = � bPLH(h, l) � (1 � b)PLD (h, l) + PLL(h, l) becomes:
rðh; lÞ¼ PLLðh; lÞ¼ ð1 � aÞ
ð1 � aÞþ a½1 � fðhÞ�ð1 � lÞ
Since low ability banks never obtain a chance to gamble when k ? 0, the market would never infer low ability conditional on achieving high returns or disastrous returns (ie PLH = PLD = 0). But there is a chance that high ability banks that do not gamble and report low are mistaken for low ability banks, which hurts those banks’ reputations. When k ? 0, r(h, l) is clearly increasing in both h and l, since f0(h) > 0.
Second, we linearly approximate r(h, l) around ĥ ¼ 0; l̂ ¼ 1=2, such that r(h,l) r0 + rhh + rll, as in A.4.2 above. Using an initial cap- ital ratio k0 = 0.1, we then compute the threshold h
⁄ using the parameter values described in Table A.1 together with a functional form for f(h) = h0 + (h1 � h0)(1 + exph)�1.
To compute Fig. 3, we scaled the coefficient in the reputation function controlling the strategic effect, rl, by +/�20% relative to the baseline.
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- Reputation, risk-taking, and macroprudential policy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Model
- 2.1 Set-up
- 2.2 Endogenous reputation
- 2.3 Information structure and equilibrium
- 2.3 Properties of the equilibrium
- 3 The policymaker’s problem
- 3.1 Set-up
- 3.2 Optimal policy
- 3.3 Cyclicality of the optimal capital ratio
- 3.4 The ‘signalling’ channel of macroprudential policy
- 4 Concluding remarks
- Appendix A
- A.1 Derivation of reputations
- A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
- A.3 Proof of Lemma 2: unique equilibrium in gambling game
- A.4 Proof?of Lemma 3: comparative statics on the
- A.4.1 Comparative statics
- A.4.2 The linear example
- A.5 Proposition 2: Cyclicality of optimum capital ratio
- A.6 Details of the numerical example
- References
1-s2.0-S1042957313000351-main.pdf
J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
J. Finan. Intermediation
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j fi
Incentives and financial crises: Microfounded macroprudential regulation q
1042-9573/$ - see front matter � 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2013.08.004
q The views expressed in the article are those of the author only and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of I much indebted to M. Quagliariello for useful contributions to a former version of the paper. I thank conference partic the ‘‘Systemic Risk, Basel III, Financial Stability and Regulation’’ Conference, Sydney 28–29 June 2011 and the ‘‘Futur Management’’ Conference, Helsinki 22–23 September 2011 for many useful discussions. I also thank V. Acharya, A. Carta, N. Cetorelli, A. Gerali, M. Rocco, J.E. Stiglitz, N. Trachter and three anonymous referees for very valuable feedb
E-mail address: [email protected]
Giovanni di Iasio Banca d’Italia, via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Available online 30 August 2013
Keywords: Macroprudential regulation Asset prices Value-at-Risk Financial crises Leverage Basel III
a b s t r a c t
We provide a micro-based rationale for macroprudential capital regulation of financial intermediaries (banks) by developing a model in which bankers can privately undertake a costly effort and reduce the probability of adverse shocks to their asset hold- ings that force liquidation (deterioration risk). A decline in the fun- damental risk of assets ameliorates funding conditions, boosting the banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets. In principle, a higher continuation value would improve incentives to put effort. However, the rise in asset demand and prices also increases the payoff in liquidation, eventually reducing the equilibrium optimal effort. Poor incentives impose socially inefficient liquidation and can be corrected through a regulatory capital requirement. We show that the requirement should be high when fundamental risk is low. Therefore, the model suggests a theoretical foundation for macroprudential regulation and the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III.
� 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With the unfolding of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007, many analysts and policy-makers acknowledged the existence of several flaws in the regulatory environment. Microprudential regulatory frameworks, by focusing on the soundness of financial institutions taken in isolation and
taly. I am ipants at e of Risk Attar, F.
ack.
628 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
disregarding the effects of macroeconomic variables and exposures to common risk factors, were iden- tified among the culprits of the crisis (Borio, 2008). In this scenario, a new macroprudential orientation of financial regulation has been a key direction of the G20 reform roadmap. General macroprudential principles have been transposed to the global regulatory framework by the Basel Committee. While the system-wide perspective cannot be circumscribed to it, most of the policy measures have focused on procyclicality. In particular, the Committee introduced countercyclical capital buffers above mini- mum capital requirements that banks are required to build-up in buoyant economic conditions. How- ever, the debate on the functioning of macroprudential tools is still lively and answers to relevant questions are not yet conclusive. Indeed, some jurisdictions – including the EU – decided to go beyond the Basel countercyclical toolkit, introducing further and different macroprudential instruments. Above all, a general agreement on the underlying market failure and distortions that increase the like- lihood and the severity of financial crises is still lacking.
This paper builds a simple theoretical setup to (i) examine the mutual interaction between mi- cro and macro-variables to improve our understanding of the financial cycle and (ii) frame the macroprudential regulation of financial intermediaries as an effective policy tool to curb socially inefficient risk-taking. The model shows that the procyclicality of financial systems (Adrian and Shin, 2010b; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, for a survey see Panetta et al., 2009) may well be responsible for the distortion of incentives of managers of financial firms (henceforth, for the sake of brevity, bankers). The banker can reduce the probability of adverse shocks to asset holdings (deterioration risk) that force liquidation, by seeking sound risk management strategies (monitor- ing) that have a private cost. In good times, i.e. when the fundamental risk of assets is low and/ or balance sheets are robust, banks face easy funding conditions. The large balance sheet capacity boosts asset demand and prices. The equilibrium market price of assets positively affects the payoff of the banker in the event of liquidation. Therefore, it emerges as a key driver of incentives and determines the overall deterioration risk in the economy. A distortion of incentives in good times is the building block of our model. We further expand the baseline framework and show that the distortion of incentives may generate a financial crisis, with plunging asset prices and a credit crunch. The rational expectation of buoyant asset prices fosters asset quality deterioration that ultimately forces many banks to liquidate at the same time. Our argument has direct policy impli- cations in terms of financial regulation. These are the key questions and the main results of the paper:
Asset prices and risk-taking. Is there a specific role for asset prices in the build-up of risks along the expanding phase of the cycle? Fundamentals (e.g. funding conditions) and balance sheet variables of the leveraged financial sector determine the price of risky assets. In good times, the large balance-sheet capacity of banks boost the demand and the price of assets, so increasing the banker’s income in liquidation and reducing the optimal effort in monitoring. One implication is that endogenous deterioration risk is high when the exogenous fundamental risk of assets is low.
Regulation and the cycle. New macroprudential rules envisage cycle-dependent capital regulation. Why should capital requirements evolve along the business cycle? Deterioration risk eventually imposes socially inefficient liquidation that can be corrected with a capital requirement that aligns bankers’ incentives. The equilibrium capital requirement is macroprudential in nature as it consid- ers the effects of macro variables on micro-behavior and is higher in good times. As a byproduct, microprudential rules that disregard those effects would perform poorly. In this sense, the model provides theoretical underpinnings to the countercyclical capital buffer presented in the Basel III proposal.
The rationale of macroprudential regulation. A passive capital buffer accumulation in good times or an active countercyclical policy?1 We are of the view that the cycle is endogenous to the behavior of financial institutions (Borio et al., 2001). Our model explicitly illustrates how financial firms take
1 The most pragmatic view advises one not to exaggerate the potential of macroprudential tools: they should only aim at ensuring that financial intermediaries accumulate sufficient resources in good times (when they are cheap and when risk is underestimated) that can be run-down in bad times with few or no repercussions on financial stability (for a survey, see Galati and Moessner, 2010).
G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638 629
decisions based on the incentives, including those posed by capital regulation that, thus, represents an effective tool to reduce a class of distortions in the expanding phase of the cycle. The forces that lead to the upswing may carry the seeds of the subsequent downswing. In that respect, we are aligned with the spirit of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.
1.1. Relationships with the literature
Our work is closely related to recent research that is expanding the established literature on financial accelerators (Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) have a model of a mutually reinforcing mechanism between funding and market liquidity. Easy funding liquidity boosts intermediaries’ ability to take risky positions. These conditions, by increasing the market liquidity of assets, lead to a further easing of funding conditions. Geanakoplos (2010) builds a theory of the leverage cycle: supply and demand of funds determine both the price (interest rate) and the quantity (margin) in equilibrium. Variations in leverage give rise to asset price booms. Eventually, bad news or changes in the mood of traders induce massive de-leveraging and disruptive adjustments. Adrian and Shin (2010a) reconsider the role of the balance sheet of financial intermediaries as a key driver of the financial cycle and of the pricing of risk. Adrian and Shin (2010b) provide substantial empirical evidence of the leverage cycle and show how marked-to-market balance sheets can induce boom-bust cycles: favorable funding conditions im- prove financial intermediaries’ ability to expand their balance sheets and adjust leverage. A greater demand for assets amplifies the first-round effects in a spiral of increasing prices, more robust marked-to-market balance sheets and thinner haircuts. With respect to this literature, one original contribution of our paper is that it explains why the cumulative process of higher prices and stron- ger balance sheet may come to an end. During the boom, high asset prices progressively distort bankers’ incentives, with monitoring becoming less and less attractive. This is detrimental to the long-term value of investment (high deterioration risk). When this type of risk materializes, massive liquidation triggers the negative spiral of fire sales, lower prices, weaker balance sheets. A close rela- tionship emerges between funding conditions and solvency (in our very stylized model, affected by banker effort choice): extremely favorable funding conditions may generate solvency problems when incentives to exert costly activities that preserve the value of assets are jeopardized. Our model is an attempt to derive equilibrium market liquidity as the combined effect of fundamentals and bankers’ incentives.
The second stream of contributions regards credit booms and the role of regulation in preventing (or not) them. There is extensive literature on the presence of credit cycles and their impact on the stability of the banking sector (Rajan, 1994). An expanding empirical literature is certifying the underestimation of risk exposures during booms; intermediaries tend to relax selection criteria of borrowers and monitoring procedures (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2009; Jiménez and Saurina, 2006). We are also interested in the link between lending behavior and the structure of incentives posed by capital regulation. On the one hand, the link between capital and incentives has been extensively explored (Allen et al., 2011; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) analyze the determinants of credit booms and note that risk-based capital requirements may strengthen banks’ incentives to screening activities. Holmström and Tirole (1997) finds a role for capital in providing bankers with incentives to exert costly mon- itoring activities. On the macroprudential regulation side, the theoretical grounding is often ‘‘externality-based’’ and relies mainly on negative exogenous shocks and amplification mechanisms due, for instance, to contagion and interconnectedness (Allen and Gale, 2000; Caballero and Simsek, 2009) or to fire sales (Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). In this line, Lorenzoni (2008) has a model with atomistic bankers that do not take into account the general equilibrium effect of asset sales on prices in a crisis triggered by an adverse aggregate shock, whose effects are magnified by inefficient ex-ante over-borrowing. In Section 4 we elaborate on the baseline model and present a framework in which bankers take (socially inefficient) deterioration risk that exposes them to a random aggregate shock that, eventually, has systemic effects in terms of plunging asset prices and credit crunch.
Table 1 Bank’s balance sheet at t = 0.
Assets Liabilities
1 � e, Debt 1, Project
e, Equity
630 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
2. The model
2.1. Basic setup
We do not use a fully-fledged dynamic model, but its two periods simplification. Agents. There are two types of agent: market investors and bankers. Agents do not discount future
cash flows. Investors are in a large number, are perfectly competitive and passively purchase bank debt. The generic banker is protected by limited liability, runs a bank that enters at t = 0 with a given balance sheet (Table 1) and operates under a Value-at-Risk constraint (VaR, see below). The banking system is made up of a continuum of mass K < 1 of banks, heterogenous with respect to their initial equity e 2 [em, eM]. For the sake of simplicity, we take eM � em � K.
At t = 0, each bank holds one project (legacy asset) that is financed with equity e and with debt 1 � e.
Assets and fundamental risk. Each and every project in the economy needs one unit of initial invest- ment and pays at t = 2 a positive random amount ~w, with expected value q > 1 and support [q � z, q + z]. The realizations ~w are independent across assets and banks. We refer to q and z as the fundamental expected value and risk of assets, respectively. The value of the asset at t = 2 is always positive (q � z > 0) but the net value is negative in some states (q � z � 1 < 0).
Moral hazard and deterioration risk. At t = 0 the banker decides whether to expand the balance sheet at t = 1 (being active), or inactive. Being active implies a deterioration risk: in the case of deterioration, the initial project needs a reinvestment c at t = 1 to effectively pay ~w at t = 2. If no reinvestment is made, the value of the project inevitably plunges to 0. The shock is large enough that a distressed bank will always liquidate the legacy asset and exit the economy (see Section 2.2). The banker affects the probability of deterioration. The active banker can choose between high effort (behave) and low effort (shirk, misbehave). The probability of deterioration is zero if the banker exerts high effort. However, high effort has a private cost B for the banker. Low effort implies a positive probability 1 � p of dete- rioration. Inactive bankers do not run any deterioration risk and take the net value of their initial asset.2
At t = 1, active non-distressed banks receive additional investment opportunities. New projects are available in the economy and can be financed: banks can issue additional debt and purchase new as- sets. New projects are in a fixed supply S, they payoff at t = 2 and share the same stochastic structure as initial projects. Let p denote the t = 1 market-clearing price of assets.3 In general, p P 1, otherwise the project cannot be initiated as it requires one unit of investment, and p 6 q, or else the bank is not willing to purchase it.
Market for assets. At t = 1, the market for assets opens. Distressed banks liquidate their initial assets. Active non-distressed banks issue new debt and expand the balance sheet. They are indifferent be- tween purchasing a new project at the price p or a deteriorated project from a distressed bank at
2 The timing and the structure are aimed at capturing the idea that financial institutions that manage more actively their balance sheets can be a source of financial fragility, in line with recent episodes in the US broker-dealer sector and with a recent stream of economic literature (e.g. several contributions by T. Adrian, H.S. Shin and coauthors). Under buoyant market conditions, market- based financial intermediaries (active banks, in the model), and notably so those that perform market-making activities, may ‘‘care less’’ about the quality of their assets as positions can be opened/closed easily and quickly in the market.
3 It represents how the expected return q is shared between the banker, who takes q–p, and the borrower, i.e. the seller of the asset, who takes p � 1. As borrowers play a completely passive role, we do not introduce them explicitly in the model.
Fig. 1. The timing of events in the model.
G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638 631
the liquidation price p � c (the two assets have identical expected payoffs). The liquidation income of the banker is l(p) = max(p � c � 1;0). Inactive banks do not participate in the market (see Fig. 1).
2.2. The VaR and the demand for assets
In this section, we derive the amount of assets x that a (non-distressed) bank with equity e is able to purchase at t = 1. It represents a key determinant of the banker’s payoff (see Section 2.3). We follow Adrian and Shin (2010a) by assuming that the bank operates under a VaR constraint so that its de- mand for assets depends on its equity position and on the fundamental value and risk of assets. In gen- eral, the VaR stipulates that the bank’s equity is large enough to keep the default probability below some benchmark level. With no loss of generality, we impose the benchmark default level to be zero.
The bank is required to meet the VaR at all dates. This has three implications. First, at t = 0 the equi- ty of the banker must be high enough:
4 Wit quantit
q � z > 1 � em: ð1Þ
The left hand side is the worst-case value of the bank assets. The right hand side represents the amount the (least capitalized) bank must repay at t = 2. Condition (1) guarantees that the debt of all banks at t = 0 is fundamental risk-free.
The second implication is that the bank is forced to liquidate the asset and exit the economy at t = 1 when the deterioration shock is large enough, that is when
q � z < 1 � eM þ c: ð2Þ
The right hand side of condition (2) is the debt that the (most capitalized) bank must repay when it raises the additional c to withstand the reinvestment cost. Indeed, in principle, the distressed bank has two options at t = 1: to raise the amount c from market investors and bring the initial project to completion or to liquidate the asset and exit the economy. Condition (2) guarantees that the bank must liquidate, obtaining the amount p � c from the sale.4
Finally, and most importantly, the VaR limits the amount of assets that the bank can purchase at t = 1, as the minimum possible value of the bank’s assets (q � z)(x + 1) must not be lower than the va- lue of the bank’s debt, that is 1 � e + px. The VaR constraint can be re-written as
e �f½p �ðq � zÞ�x þ½1 �ðq � zÞ�g P 0: ð3Þ
where the expression in curly brackets represents the worst-case loss. Solving for x, the asset demand of a bank with equity e is
x 6 e � 1 þ q � z
p � q þ z : ð4Þ
The demand is increasing in equity e and in the fundamental value of assets q and decreasing in price p and in risk z.
h liquidation, after repaying the debt, the bank obtains p � c � (1 � e) with certainty. With the reinvestment, the latter y decreases to q � z � (1 � e + c) as, by construction, p P 1 > q � z.
632 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
The VaR assumption can be interpreted as a borrowing constraint imposed to the bank by market investors who are willing to purchase only collateralized debt. In the secured funding interpretation, q is the value of the collateral and z is the haircut that fully protects investors from variations of the value of the collateral. For this reason, we sometimes refer to good fundamentals as buoyant funding conditions for banks. A zero benchmark default level in the VaR interpretation is equivalent to a full collateralization requirement in the secured funding interpretation. Trivially, partial collateralization translates into VaR constraints with some positive benchmark default probability. We can relax the full collateralization assumption without affecting our qualitative results.
2.3. The problem of the banker
The banker chooses the action to maximize her expected payoff. The three actions are stay inactive, be active with high effort or be active with low effort. The expected payoff when inactive:
5 Acc some p se and w
EðUIÞ¼ q � 1: ð5Þ
where q � 1 is the expected net value of the initial asset. The expected payoff from high effort:
EðUHÞ¼ ðq � pÞx þðq � 1Þ� B; ð6Þ
where q � p and q � 1 are the expected net value of new and initial projects, respectively. B is the private cost of high effort. The expected payoff from low effort:
EðULÞ¼ p½ðq � pÞx þðq � 1Þ�þð1 � pÞlðpÞ; ð7Þ
where, as before, 1 � p is the probability of deterioration.
Assumption 1. The degree of moral hazard is high enough:
p 1 � p
B > q � 1:
Assumption 1 relates the moral hazard problem to the payoff from inactivity. The left hand side is the degree of moral hazard, increasing in the effort cost and in the survival probability p. To make things interesting, we assume that the moral hazard problem is severe so that some bankers prefer low effort. The actions of bankers in the economy crucially affect the market equilibrium at t = 1. In the next sections we examine the solution without moral hazard (B = 0) as a benchmark case, the equi- librium with moral hazard without regulation and, finally, the solution with a regulator that imposes a capital requirement designed to prevent equilibrium shirking.
2.4. Asset prices and moral hazard
In Adrian and Shin (2010a), leveraged financial institutions’ demand for assets generates an ampli- fied response of asset prices to shocks to fundamentals. For the sake of comparability, we first briefly derive the solution without the moral hazard problem, i.e. we take B = 0 as a benchmark case.
No moral hazard. Trivially, when there is no effort cost, all bankers prefer high effort. E(UH) is always increasing in x, so the condition (4) holds with the equality. Equating demand and supply of assets, the market-clearing condition can be expressed as
Z eM em
e � 1 þ q � z pFB � q þ z
de ¼ S: ð8Þ
The left-hand side is the aggregate demand for assets, increasing in the balance-sheet capacity of banks.5 As one would expect, good fundamentals (high q � z) and a robust balance sheet of the leveraged
ording to condition (1), all banks can participate to the market for assets. Note that when the latter condition is not met, oorly capitalized banks would be required to downsize the balance sheet to meet the VaR. This event is not interesting per
ould not alter the qualitative results of the model.
G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638 633
financial sector (large eM and em) boost asset prices. From Eq. (8), following a positive shock to funda- mentals, the equilibrium price should respond more than proportionally to restore the equality between demand and supply.
Moral hazard without regulation. When high effort is costly (B > 0), a moral hazard problem may emerge and the banker may try to save on effort cost, jeopardizing the expected net value of their ini- tial project. Let pUR be the equilibrium price in the solution without regulation. Using Eqs. (6) and (7), for an active banker, the condition of preferring high effort to low effort can be written as a condition on the demand x:
EðUHÞ P EðULÞ() x P 1
q � pUR B
1 � p �ðq � 1Þþ lðpURÞ
� � : ð9Þ
According to expression (4), that still holds with the equality, it is possible to express condition (9) in terms of the equity:
e P eUR � pUR � q þ z
q � pUR B
1 � p �ðq � 1Þþ lðpURÞ
� � þ 1 � q þ z: ð10Þ
The equity has a disciplinary effect on the effort choice. The higher the initial equity (the lower the leverage), the larger the balance-sheet capacity and the continuation/charter value of the bank, and the higher the cost of the deterioration shock and liquidation in terms of expected payoff. For the same reason, the cut-off eUR is decreasing in q and increasing in z, as good fundamentals boost the charter value of the bank. Similarly, comparing Eqs. (5) and (7), the condition of preferring low effort to inac- tivity is:
e P eUR0 � pUR � q þ z
q � pUR � 1 � p
p ½q � 1 � lðpURÞ�þ 1 � q þ z: ð11Þ
Combining conditions (10) and (11), a positive mass of bankers exert low effort if
eUR � eUR0 � pUR � q þ z
q � pUR B
1 � p �
1 p ½q � 1 � lðpURÞ�
� � > 0: ð12Þ
Proposition 1. The solution without regulation is characterized by equilibrium shirking.
Proof. We can manipulate condition (12):
p 1 � p
B �ðq � 1Þþ lðpURÞ P p
1 � p B �ðq � 1Þ > 0
where in the first inequality, we use l(pUR) = max[0, pUR � c � 1]. The last inequality holds according to Assumption (1). Hence, eUR > eUR0 . h
A higher liquidation income, driven by a buoyant asset clearing price, makes the condition for the existence of equilibrium shirking even weaker. With the cut-offs eUR0 and e
UR, the market clearing con- dition is:
p Z eUR
eUR 0
e � 1 þ q � z pUR � q þ z
de þ Z eM
eUR
e � 1 þ q � z pUR � q þ z
de ¼ S þð1 � pÞ eUR � eUR0 � �
: ð13Þ
The first term on the left-hand side is the demand for assets from bankers that seek low effort and survive (no deterioration). The second one is the demand from bankers that exert high effort. The aggregate demand is decreasing with pUR partly because high asset prices, curbing the expected return of effort, induce some bankers to shift from high to low effort. The right-hand side is the supply of new assets S plus assets in liquidation from distressed banks, non-decreasing with pUR. Eq. (13) shows the key mechanism of the distortion of incentives in good times. In the terminology of Adrian and Shin (2010a), robust equity positions and good fundamentals boost the balance-sheet capacity of banks.
Fig. 2. Incentives and the capital requirement.
634 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
The demand pressure on asset prices reduces the price of the fundamental risk, namely the difference q � pUR between the expected payoff from the risky asset and its price. However, in our model, asset prices exert an equilibrium feedback effect on effort choice and deterioration risk: the possibility to liquidate assets at a high price decreases the return of effort. In other terms, a low price of the funda- mental risk reduces the cost, in terms of banker expected payoff, of the deterioration risk-taking. At the equilibrium, the adjusting variables in Eq. (13) are the market clearing price and the mass of bank- ers that prefer low effort. In the next section we discuss the implications of low effort and analyze the role of a regulatory authority in curbing shirking incentives.
3. Incentives and regulation
Absent regulation, some bankers prefer low effort (Proposition 1). This strategy is detrimental in terms of efficiency as it increases the expected cost of the investment on the initial project. The ex- pected value of the initial project of a behaving banker is q � 1 and the one of a shirking banker is q � 1 � (1 � p)c, where c is the reinvestment cost; (1 � p)c is a pure deadweight loss. According to this consideration, we examine the case in which a regulatory authority is delegated to preserve incen- tives, forcing bankers that are expected to exert low effort to remain inactive.
Moral hazard with regulation. From condition (10), the capital requirement eR that rules out low ef- fort in equilibrium is
6 Sim
Finally, at t = 1.
eR ¼ pR � q þ z
q � pR B
1 � p �ðq � 1Þþ lðpRÞ
� � þ 1 � q þ z; ð14Þ
where pR is the associated equilibrium price that satisfies the market clearing condition:
Z eM
eR
e � 1 þ q � z pR � q þ z
de ¼ S: ð15Þ
Fig. 2 is a simplified representation of the incentives and payoffs of bankers and describes how the capital requirement would affect risk-taking. Bankers with initial equity e P eR can be active as they are expected to exert high effort. Bankers with e 6 eR0 voluntarily decide not to expand their balance sheet and stay inactive.6
The regulatory intervention affects the equilibrium. The market clearing price is a function of the capital requirement eR that determines the mass of active banks. The capital requirement of Eq. (14) is
ilarly to Eq. (11), we have
e P eR0 � pR � q þ z
q � pR � 1 � p
p ½q � 1 � lðpRÞ�þ 1 � q þ z:
bankers with e 2 ðeR0 ; eRÞ are affected by the authority’s intervention and are forbidden to participate to the asset market
Table 2 Probabilities of deterioration for a shirking banker.
No deterioration Deterioration
No crisis (prob = 1 ��) p 1 � p Crisis (prob = �) 0 1
G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638 635
monotonically increasing in pR. Moreover, the left-hand side of Eq. (15) is monotonically decreasing in eR and in pR. Therefore, in the plane (eR, pR), there exists a unique crossing between the curves de- scribed by the two equations. Eq. (14) captures the effect of prices on incentives: the higher the price, the worse the incentives, the higher the capital requirement. Eq. (15) reflects the effect of the capital requirement on the market clearing price: the higher eR, the lower the aggregate demand for assets, the lower pR.
Macroprudential regulation. In Section 2.4, without regulation, low effort may be attractive for some bankers, implying inefficient reinvestment costs. The role of the regulatory authority is to set a capital requirement that prevents bankers that are expected to exert low effort from partici- pating in the market for assets. This policy is macroprudential in nature as it explicitly accounts for a clear role of a macro variable, namely asset prices, in determining the appropriate level for the policy instrument. We show that the capital requirement should be tightened when market conditions are buoyant.
Proposition 2. The capital requirement eR is countercyclical.
Proof. A simple comparative statics exercise can be carried out, assuming a shock to the fundamental risk of assets, z.7 For this purpose, consider the behavior of the marginal banker with equity eRz , the latter being the equilibrium capital requirement when the risk is at level z. Assume an infinitesimal decline of size Dz. In the case where the authority does not adjust the capital requirement, the new equilibrium will be such that:
� The new market clearing asset price pRz�Dz increases above pRz . Indeed, ceteris paribus, the balance- sheet capacity of banks increases, putting a positive pressure on prices. In this case, from Eq. (15), the price variation is larger than Dz.8
� A positive mass of bankers seek low effort. Ceteris paribus, the higher individual demand must be counterbalanced by some bankers that exert low effort in equilibrium.9
The new equilibrium exhibits a combination of the previous two effects. Indeed, higher asset prices would eventually jeopardize incentives, decreasing the net value of effort. Therefore, the marginal banker with equity eRz would switch from high to low effort. h
This result suggests that the regulatory authority should increase the capital requirement to pre- vent shirking at the equilibrium. In particular, the difference a � eRz�Dz � eRz > 0 can be interpreted as the countecyclical capital buffer envisaged in the Basel III Accord. Regulation should thus ensure that incentives are reinforced in favorable conditions via higher capital requirements, which take the form of macroprudential add-ons. Appendix A briefly discusses the case of a microprudential authority that sets the capital requirement disregarding the equilibrium effect of asset prices on incentives. In our framework, this policy is unfit to challenge the source of inefficiency.
7 Similar results can be obtained with other types of shocks. 8 Note that the amplified response in asset prices is particularly significant when banks’ balance sheets are especially robust. 9 In particular, the lower the deterioration probability 1 � p, the larger the mass of shirking bankers required to compensate for
the lower fundamental risk. The latter represents an additional procyclical amplification mechanism, as the deterioration probability is expected to be low in good times.
636 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
4. Financial crises
In this section we modify our baseline framework and suggest a simple theoretical interpretation of systemic crises characterized by widespread liquidation, plunging asset prices and credit crunch.
The key change is the introduction of a random aggregate deterioration shock. Table 2 shows the new probability structure of the deterioration shock. With a probability 1 ��, the economy operates in a normal mode (no crisis). In this case, as before, low effort exposes bankers to a positive probability of deterioration (1 � p) and deterioration shocks are independently distributed across shirking bank- ers. On the other hand, with a probability �, the system operates in a crisis mode and all (if any) shirk- ing bankers would be simultaneously hit by the deterioration shock.
Define
Aðp; eÞ� ðq � pÞ e � 1 þ q � z
p � q þ z þ q � 1:
The solution without regulation is characterized by the set of Eqs. (16)–(19):
ð1 ��ÞAðpnc; eASÞþ�Aðpc; eASÞ� B ¼ð1 ��Þ½pAðpnc; eASÞþð1 � pÞlðpncÞ�þ�lðpcÞ! eAS ð16Þ ð1 ��Þ½pAðpnc; eAS0 Þþð1 � pÞlðp
ncÞ�þ�lðpcÞ¼ q � 1 ! eAS0 ð17Þ
The left (right) hand side of Eq. (16) is the payoff from high (low) effort and eAS the associated cut- off of the equity. Similarly, in Eq. (17) the payoff from low effort is compared to the one from being inactive and eAS0 the cut-off. The price in a crisis is p
c = max[1, p � c � 1] where p is derived from equation
Z eM eAS
e � 1 þ q � z p � q þ z
de ¼ S þ eAS � eAS0 � �
: ð18Þ
Note that in a crisis all shirking bankers eAS � eAS0 � �
liquidate and, trivially, the more widespread the deterioration risk, the lower pc and/or the higher the likelihood of a credit crunch, namely an equilib- rium with pc = 1 and a fraction of the total S + 1 projects of the economy not brought to completion. The market clearing price in the no-crisis state is pnc = max[1, p � c � 1] where p solves
p Z eAS
eAS 0
e � 1 þ q � z p � q þ z
de þ Z eM
eAS
e � 1 þ q � z p � q þ z
de ¼ S þð1 � pÞ eAS � eAS0 � �
: ð19Þ
When eAS0 < e AS and pnc > 1, the equilibrium price in a crisis is lower than pnc. The random aggregate
shock increases the expected return of effort for two reasons. First, in a crisis, the low clearing price boosts the payoff of surviving bankers that can considerably expand the balance sheet. Second, the banker liquidation income in the crisis is particularly low, negatively affecting the payoff from low effort.
Assumption 2. The degree of moral hazard is high enough:
ð1 ��Þp 1 �ð1 ��Þp
B > q � 1:
Assumption 2 is the extension to the new environment of Assumption 1 and considers that, with the random aggregate shock, the surviving probability is (1 ��)p.
Proposition 3. The solution without regulation and with the random aggregate shock is characterized by equilibrium shirking.
Proof. Assume there is not equilibrium shirking, that is eAS 6 eAS0 . Then, by construction, p̂ � pnc ¼ pc . Substituting into Eqs. (16) and (17), with simple algebra we obtain the expressions for the two cut- offs:
G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638 637
eAS ¼ p̂ � q þ z
q � p̂ B
1 �ð1 ��Þp �ðq � 1Þþ lðp̂Þ
� � þ 1 � q þ z ð20Þ
eAS0 ¼ p̂ � q þ z
q � p̂ 1 �ð1 ��Þp ð1 ��Þp
½q � 1 � lðp̂Þ� � �
þ 1 � q þ z: ð21Þ
Comparing the latter two equations:
eAS 6 eAS0 iff B 6 1 �ð1 ��Þp ð1 ��Þp
½q � 1 � lðp̂Þ�: ð22Þ
The latter condition is never met. Indeed, according to Assumption 2:
B > 1 �ð1 ��Þp ð1 ��Þp
ðq � 1Þ P 1 �ð1 ��Þp ð1 ��Þp
½q � 1 � lðp̂Þ�; ð23Þ
where, in the last inequality, we use lðp̂Þ P 0. h Equilibrium shirking creates a role for a regulatory intervention. The capital requirement is an
effective policy tool to reduce (eliminate, in our simplified framework) the likelihood and the severity of financial crises generated by perverse incentives and asset quality deterioration that expose the system to aggregate shocks.
5. Conclusions
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, a lively debate on the cyclicality of financial regula- tion and the possible options for mitigating it took place among policymakers, regulators and the industry. The outcome has been a call for a macroprudential approach to regulation. However, the dis- cussion has been largely on the policy side, while the theoretical underpinnings of macroprudential devices have generally been neglected. In this paper, we set up an incentive model in which the finan- cial sector faces a capital regulation that ultimately affects its aggregate leverage and equilibrium as- set prices. The objective of capital regulation is to ensure that bankers put effort into their risk management activities, thus limiting the probability of a deterioration in the quality of the asset side of their balance sheets. Incentives are affected by both micro-(fundamentals) and macro-(market) variables. Our aim is not to set up a general framework for banking regulation as we concentrate only on one aspect of it. Nonetheless, the model sheds some light on how microprudential rules (those that disregard the feedback effect of macro variables on incentives) may create the wrong kind of incen- tives through the cycle.
While the model is extremely simplified, the mechanism it envisages is fully consistent with devel- opments before and during the financial crisis. There are two important policy implications of our re- sults. First, banks sow the seeds for future problems in good times. A macroprudential approach is necessary to align incentives through the business cycle. Our results thus provide theoretical support for the Basel III countercyclical buffer and for the introduction of further macroprudential instru- ments. Second, effective macroprudential policies should not only targeted to the accumulation of buf- fers to be used when, somehow exogenously, ‘‘bad times come’’. Rather, they stand as effective policy tools to correct a class of distortions associated with the mutually reinforcing interaction between lev- eraged institutions’ balance-sheet positions, increasing asset prices and incentives to provide sound risk management. Alternative policy tools could directly and indirectly tackle our issue of incentive distortion. For instance, short-term interest rates are important in influencing the size of market- based financial intermediary balance sheet and may constitute a complementary policy tool. We leave these questions open for future research.
Appendix A. Microprudential regulation
For the sake of our discussion, it is interesting to analyze the implications of a regulatory policy re- gime that neglects the equilibrium effect of asset prices on incentives. In this sense, we label this re- gime microprudential. Assume an exogenous drop Dz in the fundamental risk of asset z and, as an
638 G. di Iasio / J. Finan. Intermediation 22 (2013) 627–638
illustrative example, consider as a starting point the equilibrium solution of Eqs. (14) and (15). The capital requirement is eRz and the equilibrium price is p
R z . In our definition of microprudential regula-
tory regime, the authority focuses solely on the incentives of each individual banker taken in isolation. In other terms, in setting the new requirement, the authority would disregard the effect of the equi- librium price on incentives (it takes the asset price as fixed at the pre-shock level, pRz ). Interestingly, the requirement emicroz�Dz would be lower than e
R z : under benevolent funding conditions, the authority ex-
pects bankers’ incentives to be more easily aligned. In this specific case, the microprudential regula- tory requirement is:
emicroz�Dz ¼ pRz � q þðz � DzÞ
q � pRz B
1 � p �ðq � 1Þþ lðpRzÞ
� � þ 1 � q þðz � DzÞ
with emicroz�Dz < e R z < e
R z�Dz:
ð24Þ
The left inequality of (24) follows from the definition of eRz . The countercyclicality of macropruden- tial capital requirements eR discussed in Section 3 explains the right inequality.
While the microprudential capital requirement used in our model is extremely simplified and very far from actual prudential rules, it still has some interesting features that make it consistent with the Basel II fundamental risk-sensitive regulation. In particular, the time-dynamics are similar, with the minimum capital requirement being lower in good times – as ‘‘point-in-time’’ fundamental risk is moderate – and high in bad times. In other words, our model is able to replicate Basel II cyclicality, although via different drivers. In this respect, we label Basel II regulation microprudential in the sense that it disregards the feedback effect that macro variables (asset prices) exert on banks’ behavior.
References
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- Incentives and financial crises: Microfounded macroprudential regulation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Relationships with the literature
- 2 The model
- 2.1 Basic setup
- 2.2 The VaR and the demand for assets
- 2.3 The problem of the banker
- 2.4 Asset prices and moral hazard
- 3 Incentives and regulation
- 4 Financial crises
- 5 Conclusions
- Appendix A Microprudential regulation
- References
1-s2.0-S1572308909000059-main.pdf
Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Financial Stability
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j f s t a b i l
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation
Viral V. Acharya a,b,c,∗
a London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom b Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th St., Suite 9-84, New York, NY 10012, United States c CEPR, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 30 January 2009 Accepted 2 February 2009 Available online 14 February 2009
JEL classification: G21 G28 G38 E58 D62
Keywords: Systemic risk Crisis Risk-shifting Capital adequacy Bank regulation
a b s t r a c t
Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increas- ing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggre- gate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. General overview
A financial crisis is “systemic” in nature if many banks fail together, or if one bank’s failure propagates as a contagion causing the failure of many banks. At the heart of bank regulation is a deep-seated
∗ Correspondence address: Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th St., Suite 9-84, New York, NY 10012, United States. Tel.: +1 212 998 0354; fax: +1 212 995 4256.
E-mail address: [email protected].
1572-3089/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2009.02.001
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 225
concern that social and economic costs of such systemic crises are large. It is thus broadly understood that the goal of prudential regulation should be to ensure the financial stability of the system as a whole, i.e., of an institution not only individually but also as a part of the overall financial system.1
Different reform proposals such as the ones by the Bank of International Settlements (1999) have been made with the objective of improving bank regulation, and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, many more proposals will come to the fore. A central issue is to examine these proposals under a common theoretical framework that formalizes the (often implicit) objective of ensuring efficient levels of systemic failure risk. This paper seeks to fill this important gap in the literature.
The standard theoretical approach to the design of bank regulation considers a “representative” bank and its response to particular regulatory mechanisms such as taxes, closure policy, capital requirements, etc. Such partial equilibrium approach has a serious shortcoming from the standpoint of understanding sources of, and addressing, inefficient systemic risk. In particular, it ignores that in general equilibrium, each bank’s investment choice has an externality on the payoffs of other banks and thus on their investment choices. Consequently, banks can be viewed as playing a strategic Nash game in responding to financial externalities and regulatory mechanisms. Recognizing this shortcom- ing of representative bank models, this paper develops a unified framework with multiple banks to study the essential properties of prudential bank regulation that takes into account both individual and systemic bank failure risk.
Our analysis has two features: one positive and one normative. The positive feature of the analysis provides a precise definition and an equilibrium characterization of systemic risk. Unlike most of the extant literature on systemic risk (see Section 2) that has focused on bank liability structures, we define systemic risk as the joint failure risk arising from the correlation of returns on asset side of bank balance sheets. Moreover, we give a characterization of conditions under which in equilibrium, banks prefer an inefficiently high correlation of asset returns (“herd”), giving rise to systemic or aggregate risk.
The normative feature of the analysis involves the design of optimal regulation to mitigate inefficient systemic risk. To this end, we first demonstrate that the design of regulatory mechanisms, such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements, based only on individual bank risk could be suboptimal in a multiple bank context, and may well have the unintended effect of accentuating systemic risk. Next, we show that optimal regulation should be “collective” in nature and should involve the joint failure risk of banks as well as their individual failure risk. In particular, (i) bank closure policy should exhibit little forbearance upon joint bank failures and conduct bank sales upon individual bank failures, and (ii) capital adequacy requirements should be increasing in the correlation of risks across banks as well as in individual risks.
1.2. Model overview
In our model, banks have access to deposits that take the form of a simple debt contract. Upon borrowing, banks invest in risky and safe assets. In addition, they choose the “industry” in which they undertake risky investments. The choice of industry by different banks determines the correlation of their portfolio returns. Systemic risk arises as an endogenous consequence when in equilibrium, banks prefer to lend to similar industries.2
Since deposit contract is not explicitly contingent on bank characteristics, the depositor losses resulting from bank failures are not internalized by the bankowners. This externality generates a role for regulation. The regulator in our model is a central bank whose objective is to maximize the sum of the welfare of the bankowners and the depositors net of any social costs of financial distress.
1 For example, Stephen G. Cecchetti, former Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mentioned in his remarks at a symposium on the future of financial systems, “The need to protect consumers gives rise to prudential regulation whose main focus is on the failure of the individual firm. . . The second basic justification for regulation is to reduce systemic risk. In this capacity, the regulator really functions as the risk manager for the financial system as a whole.” (Cecchetti, 1999).
2 In practice, joint failure risk may be determined by a more complex pattern of inter-bank loans, derivatives, and other transactions.
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In this setting with multiple banks, when one bank fails, there are two conflicting effects on other banks. First, there is a reduction in the aggregate supply of funds (deposits) in the economy, and hence, in aggregate investment. This results in a recessionary spillover (a negative externality) to the surviving banks through an increase in the market-clearing rate for deposits, that reduces the profitability of banks.3 Second, surviving banks have a strategic benefit (a positive externality) from the failure of other banks due to an increase in scale or an expansion, resulting from the migration of depositors from the failed banks to the surviving banks, or, due to strategic gains from acquisition of failed banks’ assets and business.
Over a robust set of parameters, the negative externality effect exceeds the positive externality effect, in which case banks find it optimal to increase the probability of surviving together, and thus failing together, by choosing asset portfolios with greater correlation of returns. This would arise, e.g., if (i) the reduction in aggregate investment is substantial upon a bank’s failure, i.e., banks are ‘large’; or (ii) the depositors of the failed bank do not migrate to the surviving banks, i.e., banks are ‘essential’; or (iii) other banks cannot benefit from acquiring the business facilities of the failed bank, i.e., banks are ‘unique’ or anti-trust regulations prevent such acquisitions. The preference for high correlation arises as a joint consequence of the limited liability of the banks’ equityholders and the nature of the externalities described above. This equilibrium characterization of systemic risk is the first contribution of the paper. We call such behavior as systemic risk-shifting since it can be viewed as a multi-agent counterpart of the risk-shifting phenomenon studied in corporate finance by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and in credit rationing by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
In the first-best allocation, however, different banks undertake investments in assets with lower correlation of returns. This is because losses to depositors, and to the economy, from a joint failure exceed those from individual failures. In individual bank failures, depositors of the failed bank migrate to surviving banks and intermediation role played by the failed bank is not fully impaired. However, such a possibility does not exist in a joint failure and there is a greater reduction in aggregate investment compared to states of individual bank failures.
The central bank attempts to mitigate systemic and individual risk-shifting incentives of bankown- ers through its design of bank closure policy and capital requirements. Our second contribution is to illustrate the design of bank closure policies that takes into account the collective investment policies of banks. We model the closure policy as a bail out of the failed bank with a dilution of bankowners’ equity claim, greater dilution implying a less forbearing closure policy. A bank bail out eliminates the financial externalities discussed above but also induces moral hazard depending upon the extent of for- bearance exercised. The optimal ex ante closure policy is shown to be “collective” in nature: it exhibits lower forbearance towards bankowners upon joint failure than upon individual failure. The costs of nationalizing a large number of banks however may render such a policy suboptimal from an ex post standpoint, i.e., time-inconsistent and hence, lacking in commitment. The resulting (implicit) “too- many-to-fail” guarantee, where bankowners anticipate greater forbearance upon joint failure than in individual failure, accentuates systemic risk by inducing banks to make correlated investments so as to extract greater regulatory subsidies.
Further, a “myopic” closure policy that does not take into account the collective response of banks and hence, does not distinguish between forbearance in individual and joint failures, also fails to mit- igate systemic risk-shifting behavior. It is strictly dominated by collective regulation that counteracts any residual systemic moral hazard induced through “too-many-to-fail” guarantee, by conducting bank sales (possibly subsidized) upon failure of individual banks. This increases the charter value of banks, in a relative sense, in the states where they survive but other banks fail, in turn, inducing a preference for lower correlation.4
Our third important contribution concerns the design of capital adequacy regulation. The current BIS capital requirement is a function only of a bank’s individual risk and does not penalize banks for
3 Diamond and Rajan (2005) have a somewhat similar general equilibrium effect, wherein a bank that receives liquidity shock is forced to sell assets due to hardness of deposit contracts, but in the process reduces aggregate liquidity available to other banks, causing a rise in their costs of borrowing and reduction in value. This can possibly lead to a contagion.
4 It is also possible that a myopic closure policy that provides too-many-to-fail guarantee is the only sub-game perfect outcome unless the regulator can commit to a time-inconsistent closure policy, as argued by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008b).
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 227
holding asset portfolios with high correlation of returns. We show that under such a structure, each bank may optimally reduce its individual failure risk, but systemic risk arising from high correlation remains unaffected. To remedy this, we propose a “correlation-based” capital adequacy requirement that is increasing, not only in the individual risk of a bank, but is also increasing in the correlation of a bank’s asset portfolio returns with that of other banks in the economy. We propose an intuitively appealing implementation by considering a portfolio theory interpretation. The risks undertaken by banks can be decomposed into exposures to “general” risk factors and “idiosyncratic” components. For any given level of individual bank risk, correlation-based regulation would encourage banks to take idiosyncratic risks by charging a higher capital requirement against exposure to general risk factors.
Many financial institutions already employ a collective approach to capital budgeting (see Section 2) and regulators have also acknowledged the role of intra-bank correlations by proposing a long- term shift towards portfolio models for credit risk measurement (BIS, 1999). The proposed reforms of the BIS regulation appears however to have focused too much on the portfolio risk of each bank and ignored the inter-bank correlation effects for diversification of the economy-wide banking portfolio. Given the attention being devoted to possible reforms of the capital adequacy regulation and lender- of-last-resort policies, we believe our advocacy of collective regulation of systemic risk is particularly germane.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the model setup for the multiple-bank economy. Section 4 characterizes the systemic risk- shifting phenomenon in the intermediated economy. Section 5 considers the design of bank closure policies and Section 6 looks at the design of capital adequacy requirements. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of possible avenues for related research and the relevance of our results for other economic phenomena. Appendix A contains certain regularity assumptions and Appendix B contains proofs. The Addendum contains appendices from the unabridged version, Acharya (2001), referred to in the text.
2. Related literature
A discussion of the seminal papers in banking regulation can be found in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), and Freixas and Rochet (1997).
There is a burgeoning literature on models of contagion among banks: Rochet and Tirole (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Freixas and Parigi (1998), Freixas et al. (1999), and Allen and Gale (2000c), to cite a few. The primary focus of these studies is on characterizing the sources of contagion and financial fragility. These studies examine the liability structure of banks, whereas in our model systemic risk arises from a high correlation of returns on the asset side of their balance sheets.
In an incomplete markets model based on private information about agents’ idiosyncratic endow- ments, Rampini (1999) defines systemic risk as default correlation. In his model, a substantial correlation of default arises to enable risk-sharing when an aggregate shock is low. This approach is different from ours since its focus is on optimal systemic risk from a risk-sharing standpoint and not on systemic risk that is suboptimal and that is an outcome of the collective risk-shifting incentives inherent in a multi-bank financial system.
Our general approach of considering the interaction of investment choices across banks has the flavor of the approach adopted by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and Rajan (1994). Maksimovic and Zechner study the endogenous choice of riskiness of cashflows and debt levels in an “industry equilibrium”. Shleifer and Vishny focus on a “market equilibrium” where the liquidation value of a firm depends on the health of its peers. Rajan’s paper is about bank lending policies and is somewhat more related.
Rajan models the information externality across two banks where reputational concerns and short- termism induce banks to continue to lend to negative NPV projects. He derives a theory of expansionary (or liberal) and contractionary (or tight) bank credit policies which influence, and are influenced by other banks and conditions of borrowers. However, his model does not examine the issue of whether banks lend to different industries or to similar industries. Further, the source of agency problem in his model is the short-term nature of managerial decisions, whereas in our model it is the bankowners’ limited liability.
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The importance of taking into account “covariances” of agents, in addition to their “variances”, has been underlined by Froot and Stein (1998). They propose the need for centralized capital allocation within a financial institution. They criticize the RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) based approach which attends only to the individual risk of each line of business or lending activity. They suggest that bank-wide risk considerations must enter into the setting of hurdle rates in capital budgeting. Thus, in their setup too, the optimal design consists of a “central planner” who pools information across the different activities within a financial institution. Empirical evidence supporting such capital budgeting is provided by James (1996) in the case study of Bank of America.
Our analysis and proposal of the collective regulation of banks is closest in spirit to that of Froot and Stein. However, there are important differences. Froot and Stein focus on undertaking of multiple projects or activities, but do not model agency issues that may drive the preference for correlation of returns across projects. Instead, we model these agency issues explicitly as arising from the limited liability of bank’s equityholders. Second, Froot and Stein study the problem of a single institution, i.e., they are concerned with intra-bank correlations. Our motivation instead is based on inter-bank correlations.
3. Model
We build a multi-period general equilibrium model with many agents, viz. banks and depositors, and many markets, viz. markets for safe and risky assets, and market for deposits. In order to study systemic risk and its prudential regulation, the model incorporates (i) the likelihood of default by banks on deposits; (ii) financial externalities from failure of one bank on other banks; (iii) regulatory incentives; and (iv) the interaction of these features. The model builds upon the Allen and Gale (2000a) model of bubbles and crises which is a one-period, single-investor model of risk-shifting. A schematic of the model is presented in Fig. 1.
Banks and depositors: There are two periods and three dates t = 0, 1, 2 with a single consumption good at each date. The economy consists of two banking “sectors,” possibly heterogeneous. The two banking sectors, which can be interpreted as being geographically separated, are denoted as ‘A’ and ‘B’. All variables in sector A are indexed by A. First, we describe a single banking sector. In sector i, i ∈ {A, B}, there is
(i) a single bank, owned by risk-neutral intermediaries (referred to as bankowners or equityholders), who have no wealth of their own; and
(ii) a continuum of risk-neutral depositors, with Dit > 0 units of good to invest at t = 0, 1.
Depositors have no investment opportunities, and hence lend their goods to banks. For simplicity, the bankowners and the depositors are assumed to have no time-preference. The deposits are assumed inelastic with no secondary trading, i.e., we rule out any revelation of information about the bank’s risk through deposit prices. The only deposit contract allowed is the simple debt contract with no conditioning of the deposit rate on the size of the deposit or on asset returns.5 Since deposits can- not be conditioned on their size, banks can borrow as much as they like at the going rate of (gross) interest, denoted as rDt , t = 0, 1. The banks are assumed to be price-takers when they borrow deposits since our model is an abstraction of an economy with a large number of banks accessing the deposit market even though, for ease of exposition, we have chosen to focus on the interaction of just two banks.6
In each period, the banks can invest in a “safe” asset and a “risky” asset, and also determine the “industry” in which they make the risky investments.
5 There are conditions such as costly state verification as in Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985) which justify such a simple debt contract. Alternately, the costs to the depositors of enforcing contracts where returns are explicitly contingent are too high.
6 Appendix B in the unabridged version, Acharya (2001), analyzes a version of the model with a continuum of banks and develops qualitatively similar results.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 229
Fig. 1. Time-line and investment choices of banks. Note that the deposit market is not included in the diagram. Each bank borrows deposits from its sector in a competitive deposit market. The size of the deposit pool in the two sectors is DA and DB , respectively.
Safe asset: The safe asset is common to both banking sectors, and is available for investment only to the banks, not to depositors.7 It pays a fixed gross return rSt at t + 1 on a unit of investment at t = 0, 1. We interpret the safe asset as capital goods leased to the corporate sector (or riskless corpo- rate debt). Competition in market for capital goods ensures that the rate of return on the safe asset is the marginal product of capital. We assume a neo-classical, diminishing returns-to-scale produc- tion technology f (x), f ′(x) > 0, f ′′(x) < 0, f ′(0) = ∞, f ′(∞) = 0, ∀x > 0. The equilibrium rate of interest is given by rSt = f ′(xt ), xt being the total investment in the safe asset at date t from both banking sectors.
Risky asset: The risky asset is to be interpreted as loans to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs holding the risky asset (a claim to their business profits) supply it to the bank in exchange for goods. Unlike the safe asset, these loans are information sensitive and each bank has a monopoly over the entrepreneurs in its sector to whom it lends. Relationships based on informational monopoly as in Rajan (1992) justify such an assumption. The supply of the risky asset in a sector is thus determined by the amount of risky investment by the corresponding bank. A particular risky asset is a portfolio of constituent loans that produce a given level of risk and return as described below.
For bank i, the risky asset gives a random gross return Rit at t + 1 on one unit of investment at t = 0, 1 that is distributed over the support [0, Rmax]. The bank in sector i picks a risky asset (a portfolio)
7 The assumption that depositors have no access to the safe asset is made purely for expositional ease. In extension (1) in Appendix D of the unabridged version, Acharya (2001), we relax this assumption and show that our results remain unchanged. Footnote 13 discusses this point in some detail.
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that gives a return Rit ∼ hi(·; �), from a family of distributions Hi, indexed by the risk parameter �, � ∈ [�min, �max]. The bank selects �it , the riskiness of the asset, and in addition, it chooses the scale of investment in this portfolio. The risky asset technology, Hi, is assumed to be identical in both the periods and short sales are not allowed.8
There are no direct linkages between the two sectors, i.e., no inter-bank contracts. However, the risky asset technologies for the two banking sectors may be correlated. The likelihood of joint default of the banks is determined by the individual risk of each bank’s investment as well as by the “correlation” of their investments, the latter being denoted as �t .
Choice of industry: In each period, the risky investments in sector i can be made to two types of industries, say, “manufacturing” and “farming”. Information costs of investing in both industries are assumed to be exorbitantly high so that each bank invests in only one industry.9 The correlation of returns on the risky investments when both banks invest in manufacturing or when both banks invest in farming, denoted as �h, is higher than the correlation of returns when the banks invest in different industries, denoted as �l , i.e., �h > �l .
Within an industry, the banks can pick the scale and the risk level of the investment as described above. This is tantamount to assuming that the choice of risk and industry is over a space rich enough such that any combination of risk and correlation is feasible. Finally, we make certain regularity assumptions on the risky technologies and their correlations.
Regularity assumptions on the risky technology: In words, we want the portfolios of the two banks to satisfy the following: ceteris paribus,
(i) increasing a bank’s risk increases its likelihood of failure and expected losses in failure; (ii) increasing a bank’s risk increases the likelihood of joint failure and expected losses in joint failure;
and (iii) increasing the correlation across banks increases the likelihood of joint failure and expected losses
in joint failure.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to a family of mean-preserving spreads.10
These assumptions are formally stated in Appendix A. Costs of investing in the risky asset: We assume that there is a non-pecuniary cost of investing
in the risky asset. We want to introduce costs in a way that restricts the size of individual portfolios (diminishing returns-to-scale) and at the same time ensures that banks make positive expected profits. These could be thought of as costs of loan initiation, monitoring, administration, etc. There are ways of dealing with pecuniary costs with some difficulty, but we choose to model these as non-pecuniary. This leads to a simple analysis and lets us illustrate our results in a succinct manner. The cost function, c(x), when the amount of risky investment is x, satisfies the neo-classical assumptions: c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′(x) > 0, and c′′(x) > 0, ∀x > 0. This cost technology is identical for both the sectors.
Possible states at t = 1: To keep the analysis simple, we assume that all profits of the bankowners from first period, if any, are paid out as dividends or consumed, and all returns on the first period deposits are consumed by the depositors.11 Since the banks make risky investments at t = 0, they may fail to pay the depositors their promised rate of return in some states at t = 1. Upon such failure, the banks are closed. The possibility of bail outs and bank sales will be admitted to the model at a later stage. Depending on the survival or the failure of the two banks, there are four states possible at t = 1 (see Fig. 2):
8 Note that such a risk choice arises naturally from a portfolio allocation between imperfectly correlated loan returns that are otherwise identical. The scale of investment determines the ‘size’ of the portfolio, and the riskiness of investment determines the ‘relative weights’ of the loans in the portfolio.
9 Allowing banks to invest in many industries adds an interesting dimension to our results. It gives rise to a hitherto ignored tradeoff between “focus” and “diversification” in the banking industry, from a systemic risk standpoint, and is discussed in Section 6.3.
10 The analysis can be carried out without any qualitative difference if the expected return is assumed to be non-decreasing and concave in risk (�).
11 The reason as to why relaxing this assumption does not affect the qualitative nature of our results is discussed in extension (3) of Appendix D of the unabridged version, Acharya (2001).
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 231
Fig. 2. States of the economy at t = 1. This figure illustrates the four kinds of states possible at t = 1, viz., “ss”, “sf”, “fs”, and “ff”. Ri denotes the realized return on risky investments of bank i, i ∈ {A, B}. Rci is the threshold level of return on risky investments of bank i below which it ‘defaults’. An increase in correlation of risky assets across banks increases the likelihood of the off-diagonal states, “ss” and “ff”, and decreases the likelihood of the diagonal states, “sf” and “fs”.
(1) Both banks survive (state “ss”): In this case, the depositors in sector i lend their goods, Di1, to bank i; and the costs of risky investments for each bank are given by c(x).
(2) Bank A survives but bank B fails (state “sf”): In this case, • a fraction s, s ∈ [0, 1), of the depositors from sector B migrates to bank A so that its deposit pool
is enlarged to DA1 + s · DB1. The remaining fraction, 1 − s, has no investment opportunities and simply holds its deposits in the form of the consumption good till t = 2. The parameter s < 1 implies that not all depositors from the failed sector are able to access the surviving bank. Hence, the aggregate level of deposits with banks is lower in state “sf” than in state “ss.” It will be shown that higher s will imply a smaller recessionary spillover from the failed sector to the surviving sector.
• The costs to the surviving bank A of investing in the risky asset are reduced to ˛ · c(x), where ˛ ∈ [˛min, 1], ˛min > 0. This captures the possibility that the surviving bank may have a strategic benefit from acquisition of loan facilities of the failed bank which make its lending operations more efficient, and as a result, may “expand”.12 A higher value of ˛ implies a lower strategic benefit.
(3) Bank A fails but bank B survives (state “fs”): This is symmetric to state “sf.” (4) Both banks fail (state “ff”): There is no investment in the economy in any assets and the depositors
in both sectors simply hold their consumption good till t = 2.
12 Such a benefit may arise due to various reasons in practice and could have also been modeled as an improvement in the return on the risky asset (or “asset quality”) for the surviving bank. Alternately, in some states of the world, the surviving bank may be capacity-constrained and may “expand” upon receipt of additional deposits (as would be the case if there were economies of scale up to some capacity).
232 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Thus, the second period in our model can be treated as a repetition of the first period, with the two important differences outlined in state “sf” (and “fs”) above. These differences enable us to model the negative externality (through the recessionary spillover parameter s) or the positive externality (through the strategic benefit parameter ˛) of one bank’s failure on the welfare of the other bank.
These, in turn, will be shown to determine the incentives of the bankowners to undertake correlated or uncorrelated investments at t = 0. At that point, more general interpretations of these externalities will be provided.
Payoffs to bankowners and depositors: At time t = 0 and at t = 1, bank i (if it has survived) makes the following investment choices:
(i) the amount of safe investment, XSit ; (ii) the amount of risky investment, XRit ;
(iii) the level of risk of the risky asset, �it ; and (iv) the industry in which risky investments are made, Iit .
The banks’ choice of industries determines the correlation of their investments, �t . In each period, all depositors are treated symmetrically. When the return on the risky asset is low,
the bank cannot pay the promised return rDt to the depositors and, as a result, it defaults or fails. Let the critical return on the risky asset below which bank i defaults at t + 1 be denoted as Rc
it . In what
follows, we drop the time subscript t and specialize it later. Rc
i is given by the condition rS XSi + Rci XRi = rD(XSi + XRi), so that
Rc i
= rD + (rD − rS ) · XSi XRi
. (3.1)
When the realized return on the risky asset, Ri, exceeds R c i , the dividends to bank i are rS XSi + RiXRi −
rD(XSi + XRi). For Ri < Rci , the bank gets nothing. Let the cost technology be c(·). Then, the current period expected payoff of the bankowners, denoted as vi(rD, rS , �i, XSi, XRi), and that of all the depositors that lend to bank i, denoted as ui(rD, rS , �i, XSi, XRi), are respectively:
vi(·) = ∫ Rmax
Rc i
[rS XSi + RXRi − rD(XSi + XRi)]hi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi), (3.2)
ui(·) = ∫ Rmax
Rc i
rD(XSi + XRi)hi(R; �i) dR + ∫ Rc
i
0
(rS XSi + RXRi) hi(R; �i) dR. (3.3)
Note that (rD, rS , �i, XSi, XRi) are determined in equilibrium and in general vary across times t = 0, 1 and across the different states at t = 1. The total amount of deposits borrowed by bank i is denoted as D̂it and it takes on different values depending upon t and the state (at t = 1).
We assume that D̂it is high enough (or c(·) is convex enough) to ensure that the choice of XRit is smaller than D̂it .
First-period payoffs: The critical return, Rc i0
, the expected payoff of bank i, vss i0
(·), and the expected payoff of the depositors who lend to bank i (depositors of sector i), uss
i0 (·), are given by Eqs. (3.1)–(3.3).
Under the symmetric equilibrium, D̂i ≡ Di0. Second-period payoffs in state “ss”: This state occurs when Ri0 > R
c i0
, ∀i ∈ {A, B}. In this state, Rc i1
, vss i1
(·), and uss
i1 (·), are given by (3.1)–(3.3), respectively, and again, D̂i ≡ Di1.
Second-period payoffs in state “sf”: This state occurs when RA0 > R c A0 and RB0 < R
c B0, i.e., bank A
survives but bank B fails. For bank A, the investment choice is identical to that of the first period except that its deposit pool is DA1 + sDB1, and its cost technology is lowered to ˛ · c(·). Thus, RcA1, v
sf A1(·), and
u sf A1(·), are given by (3.1)–(3.3), respectively, c(XRA) being replaced by ˛ · c(XRA), and D̂A ≡ DA1 + sDB1.
Note that usf A1(·) is the expected payoff of depositors who lend to bank A, viz. depositors of sector A
plus the fraction s of the depositors of sector B that migrate. usf B1, the expected payoff of the remaining
fraction (1 − s) of the depositors of sector B who do not migrate, is (1 − s)DB1, since they simply store their consumption goods. Finally, vsf
B1 ≡ 0.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 233
Second-period payoffs in state “fs”: This state is symmetric to the state “sf.” Second-period payoffs in state “ff”: This occurs when RA0 < R
c A0 and RB0 < R
c B0, i.e., both banks fail.
In this state, there is no investment and vff i1
≡ 0, uff i1
≡ Di1, ∀i ∈ {A, B}. Note that the likelihood of survival of bank A (union of states “ss” and “sf”) depends upon the
realization of RA0 only, whereas the likelihood of survival of both banks (state “ss”) depends upon the joint realization of RA0 and RB0.
4. Systemic risk-shifting in the intermediated economy
We demonstrate a systemic risk-shifting phenomenon where both banks undertake correlated investments by investing in similar industries at t = 0. In the presence of standard debt contract, there is risk-shifting at collective level in addition to the risk-shifting behavior at individual bank level. This collective behavior aggravates joint failure risk in the economy.
4.1. Equilibrium in the intermediated economy
We solve the equilibrium by backwards induction, i.e., by first solving the bank’s investment prob- lem in different states at t = 1, and then solving the bank’s investment problem at t = 0.
Equilibrium in the state “sf” at t = 1: The only relevant investment problem in this state arises for bank A. The investment problem of the bank is
max�A ,XSA ,XRA ,IA v sf A1(rD, rS , �A, XSA, XRA) where (4.1)
vsf A1(·) =
∫ Rmax Rc
A
[(rS − rD)XSA + (R − rD)XRA]hA(R; �A) dR − ˛ · c(XRA), and (4.2)
RcA = rD + (rD − rS ) · XSA XRA
. (4.3)
In equilibrium, market-clearing for the safe asset requires rS = f ′(XSA), and the budget constraint requires XSA + XRA = D̂A = DA + sDB. We have dropped the time subscript (t = 1) from the variables to reduce notational burden.
Since the choice of IA does not affect the choice of �A, XSA, and XRA, v sf A1 is independent of IA, and
thus, the choice of industry is irrelevant. We show first that in equilibrium, rD must equal rS . Consider for given �A, the choice of XSA. For
rD > rS , R c A
is increasing in XSA and v sf A1 is decreasing in XSA. It follows that for rD > rS , XSA = 0 so that
the bank has no demand for the safe asset. But in equilibrium, rS = f ′(XSA) = f ′(0) = ∞, a contradiction. On the other hand, for rD < rS , R
c A
is decreasing in XSA and v sf A1 is increasing in XSA so that XSA = ∞, i.e.,
the bank has an infinite demand for the safe asset, and either the budget constraint or the short-sales constraint (XRA ≥ 0) is violated. Thus, rD = rS in equilibrium and we will denote it simply as r.
Incorporating this, we get Rc A
= r, and using the budget constraint, XSA = D̂A − XRA,
vsf A1(r, �A, XRA) =
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)XRA hA(R; �A) dR − ˛ · c(XRA). (4.4)
Given r and �A, the optimal risky investment, XRA(r, �A), is given by the first order condition:∫ Rmax r
(R − r)hA(R; �A) dR = ˛ · c′(XRA), (4.5)
where LHS represents the expected marginal gain to the bank and RHS represents the marginal cost of an additional unit of risky investment. This can be rewritten as
R̄ − ˛ · c′(XRA) = r − ∫ r
0
(r − R)hA(R; �A) dR. (4.6)
234 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Assuming R̄ > c′(D̂A) guarantees an interior solution, XRA(r, �A) ∈ (0, D̂A). Next, let �̂A(r) = arg max�A v
sf A1(r, �A, XRA(r, �A)),andX̂RA(r) = XRA(r, �̂A(r)). Then, equilibrium at t = 1 in the state “sf,”
denoted as (rsf1 , � sf A
, X sf RA
), is determined by the fixed-point (market-clearing condition for the safe asset):
r sf 1 = f
′[DA + sDB − X̂RA(rsf1 )]. (4.7)
It is easy to show (Lemma A.1 in the appendix) that the equilibrium, (rsf1 , � sf A
, X sf RA
), exists and
� sf A
≡ �max. Since the bank does not bear the cost of a low return on its investments, its payoff is truncated. This convexity of its payoff leads to a preference for risk. This is the classic problem of “risk- shifting” or “asset-substitution” by borrowers, studied in corporate finance by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and in credit-rationing by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Note that with a positive level of risky investment, there is default whenever the realized return on the risky asset is smaller than r, and hence, the expected rate of return on deposits is smaller than r, the promised rate of return.13
Finally, denote the maximized objective function as V sf A1 ≡ v
sf A1(r
sf 1 , �
sf A
, X sf RA
). This represents the con- tinuation value of the equityholders at t = 1 in state “sf” and will also be called the bank’s charter-value. The state “fs” is symmetric to the state “sf” and its equilibrium (rfs1 , �
fs B
, X fs RB
) satisfies the counterpart of Lemma A.1.
Equilibrium in the state “ss” at t = 1: In this case, the investment problem of both the banks needs to be solved. A little thought reveals that as in the case of state “sf,” the choice of industry in which the banks make their investments is irrelevant. This can be seen formally by examining the expression for vss
i1 in the model section. It follows that each bank’s problem is similar to the investment problem
of bank A in state “sf” studied above. The equilibrium is denoted as (rss1 , � ss A
, X ss RA
, �ss B
, X ss RB
). The only differences between determining the equilibrium in state “ss” and in state “sf” are the following:
(i) vss i1
replaces vsf i1
in Eq. (4.1);
(ii) there is no migration of deposits, i.e., D̂i = Di, so s = 0 in the budget-constraint; (iii) there is no reduction in the costs of investing in the risky asset, so ˛ = 1 in the first order condition
(4.6) to determine XRi(r, �i); and finally, (iv) the equilibrium safe asset return is the fixed-point: rss1 = f ′
[∑ i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
ss 1 )
] .
With these modifications, we can show that the equilibrium, (rss1 , � ss A
, X ss RA
, �ss B
, X ss RB
), exists and �ss i
≡ �max, ∀i ∈ {A, B} (as in Lemma A.1).
We denote the maximized objective function of bank i, its charter-value in state “ss,” as V ss i1
= vss
i1 (rss1 , �
ss i
, X ss Ri
). The nature of externality at t = 1: Whether bank i benefits or is hurt by the failure of bank j at t = 1
depends on the difference in charter-values, V sf i1
− V ss i1
. When this difference is less than zero, there is a negative externality of bank j’s failure on bank i, whereas when this difference is greater than zero, there
13 If the depositors could invest directly in the safe asset and hence charged a rate rD > rS that takes into account the likelihood of default, our results remain unaffected. This is because the safe investments currently made by the banks would be made by the depositors instead and the banks would intermediate only the risky investments. Importantly, the deposit rate rD would move in tandem with rS . To see this, note that in equilibrium, rD (for given rS , XR , and �) would solve the fixed-point equation:
rS = rD · ∫ Rmax
rD
h(R; �) dR + ∫ rD
0
Rh(R; �) dR.
The first term is the return on deposits in case of no default, and the second term is the return on deposits upon default. This generalization is considered in Appendix D of the unabridged version, Acharya (2001). What drives our model is risk-shifting which arises (ex post) in any model with a standard debt contract, so long as the rate charged on the contract (ex ante) is not contingent.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 235
is a positive externality.14 This depends crucially on the two parameters that affect the charter-value in state “sf”:
(i) s ∈ [0, 1), the recessionary spillover parameter; and (ii) ˛ ∈ [˛min, 1], ˛min > 0, the strategic benefit parameter.
On the one hand, when bank j fails, since only a part of the depositors migrate (s < 1), there is a reduction in the overall investment in the economy. This raises the equilibrium return on the safe asset which is also the promised return on the deposits, increasing the cost of borrowing for the surviving bank i. This constitutes a recessionary spillover to bank i when bank j fails.15
On the other hand, when bank j fails, bank i “expands”. This is because, bank i is able to acquire some of the “human capital” of bank j, such as lending desks, loan administration facilities, etc. which reduce its costs of loan initiation from c(·) to ˛ · c(·), ˛ < 1. This, in turn, implies that bank i invests more in the risky technology, which makes it more profitable. This constitutes a strategic benefit to bank i when bank j fails.
The recessionary spillover is decreasing in s, whereas the strategic benefit is decreasing in ˛. These parameters, s and ˛, are to be treated as exogenous parameters of the economy or its current state. When the recessionary spillover dominates, i.e., when s is ‘small’ and ˛ is ‘large’, the overall externality is negative. On the other hand, when the strategic benefit dominates, i.e., when s is ‘large’ and ˛ is ‘small’, the externality is positive. These intuitions are formalized below and lead to a key result in our theory of systemic risk.
Lemma 1. The charter-value at t = 1 in the state “sf”, V sf i1
, is (i) increasing in s for a given ˛; and (ii) decreasing in ˛ for a given s.
Proposition 1 (Nature of externality). The sign of the externality, V sf i1
− V ss i1
, is characterized by the following:
(i) For a given ˛, ∃ a critical level, sc (˛), such that V sf i1
− V ss i1
< 0, ∀s < sc (˛) (negative externality), and V
sf i1
− V ss i1
> 0, ∀s > sc (˛) (positive externality). Further, sc (˛) is increasing in ˛. (ii) For a given s, ∃ a critical level, ˛c (s), such that V sf
i1 − V ss
i1 < 0, ∀˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality), and
V sf i1
− V ss i1
> 0, ∀˛ < ˛c (s) (positive externality). Further, ˛c (s) is increasing in s.16
This proposition implies that the two-dimensional space [0, 1] × [˛min, 1] is divided by a curve C into two regions, such that the region to the north-west of C supports a negative externality of a bank’s failure on the surviving bank, and the region to the south-east of C supports a positive externality (see Fig. 3). The equilibrium at t = 0 is characterized next.
Equilibrium at t = 0: The investment choice of each bank at t = 0 anticipates the states at t = 1 and the charter-values in those states. In particular, unlike the investment choice at t = 1, the choice of industry by each bank is relevant. This choice determines the likelihood of the states at t = 1 (“ss”,“sf”,“fs”,“ff”), and hence, the magnitude of the externality of a bank’s failure on the other bank. Further, this choice affects only the correlation of the asset returns of the two banks,
14 Note that we have used the state “sf” to mean ‘when i survives and j fails’. Strictly speaking, the relevant difference is V sf A1
− V ss A1
for bank A, and V fs B1
− V ss B1
. However, switching from “sf” for bank A to “fs” for bank B, introduces unnecessary notational burden.
Instead, we will simply use V sf i1
, ∀i ∈ {A, B}. 15 This effect is much akin to the “liquidity” effect of a monetary shock, empirically documented in business-cycle literature.
This effect will arise also due to the fact that failure of a bank leads to reduction in aggregate depositor wealth, even if there were a perfect migration of depositors. In our model, real rates of interest rise in “recession,” i.e., upon a reduction in total depositor wealth. In the business-cycle evidence, nominal rates of interest rise upon a reduction in growth of M1 (see, Cooley and Hansen, “Money and the Business Cycle,” in Cooley, 1995).
16 The critical levels may coincide with the boundaries of the parameter space (see Appendix B).
236 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Fig. 3. Recessionary spillover, strategic benefit, and the nature of externality. This figure illustrates the nature of the externality of one bank’s failure on the health of the other bank in various regions of (s, ˛) space. Note that s is the fraction of depositors that migrate from the failed bank to the surviving bank; and ˛ is the proportional factor by which the costs of the surviving bank decrease upon other bank’s failure. When s is small and ˛ is large, the recessionary spillover dominates the strategic benefit. This happens in the north-west region of the space which is thus characterized by negative externality. On the other hand, when s is large and ˛ is small, the strategic benefit dominates the recessionary spillover. This happens in the south-east region of the space which is thus characterized by positive externality. For a given ˛′ , the critical level sc (˛′ ) is such that there is negative externality for all s < sc (˛′ ).
�. Thus, we can translate the choice of industries into a preference of the banks for low correla- tion (�l ) or high correlation (�h).
17 Thus, in equilibrium, when the banks prefer a low correlation, �l , one of them invests in “manufacturing” and the other in “farming”, whereas when they pre- fer a high correlation, �h, either both of them invest in “manufacturing” or both of them invest in “farming”.
Since the externality at t = 1 induces a dependence of one bank’s investment choice on the invest- ment choice of the other, we need to enrich the notion of equilibrium by a Nash equilibrium of the two banks’ investment choices. In what follows, all time subscripts for t = 0 are omitted and the time subscripts for t = 1 are explicitly employed.
The strategy of bank i is denoted as ˝i = (�i, XRi, �i) ∈ [�min, �max] × [0, Di) × {�l , �h}. The best- response of bank i to bank j’s strategy is denoted as ˝i(˝j ). The equilibrium of the economy at t = 0, (r∗
D , r∗
S , ˝∗
A , ˝∗
B ), satisfies the following:
(i) ˝∗ A
and ˝∗ B
constitute a Nash equilibrium: ˝A(˝ ∗ B ) = ˝∗
A and ˝B(˝∗A) = ˝∗B;
(ii) the banks prefer the same correlation: �∗ A
= �∗ B
(to be denoted as �∗); and (iii) the market for the safe asset clears: r∗
S = f ′
(∑ i Di −
∑ i X∗
Ri
) .
17 Indeed, we have chosen two industries only for simplicity. The translation of choice of industry into the preference for correlation is robust in a richer model with greater number of industries.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 237
For simplicity, since it makes no difference to the analysis, we incorporate below the equilibrium budget constraint, XSi + XRi = Di, directly into bank i’s maximization problem. Then, for given rD, rS , and ˝j , bank i’s best-response, ˝i(˝j ), is determined by the solution to the following maximization problem:
max�i ,XRi ,�i vi0(rD, rS , �i, XRi) + V ss i1 · Pr[Ri > R
c i , Rj > R
c j ] + V sf
i1 · Pr[Ri > Rci , Rj < R
c j ] (4.8)
where
vi0(rD, rS , �i, XRi) = ∫ Rmax
Rc i
[(rS − rD)Di + (R − rS )XRi]hi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi), (4.9)
Rc i
= rD + (rD − rS ) · (
Di XRi
− 1 )
. (4.10)
As before rD = rS in equilibrium, denoted as r. This implies that Rci = r, ∀i ∈ {A, B}. Incorporating these equilibrium requirements and the identity Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r] = Pr[Ri < r] − Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], the maximization problem above can be rewritten as
max�i ,XRi ,�i
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) + V ssi1 · Pr[Ri > r]
+ (V sf i1
− V ss i1 ) · Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r]. (4.11)
Consider the best-response of bank i. For given r and �i, the first-order condition w.r.t. XRi, the amount of risky investment, can be expressed as
R̄ − c′(XRi) = r − ∫ r
0
(r − R)hi(R; �i) dR. (4.12)
Assuming R̄ > c′(Di) guarantees an interior solution, XRi(r, �i) ∈ (0, Di). Given XRi(r, �i) and a cor- relation �, inspection of the maximand in (4.11) reveals that the best-response for the level of risk can be denoted as �̂i(r, �j ). Given these best-responses, we examine the choice of �, the preference of the banks for correlation of returns on their risky investments, that is central to our theory of systemic risk. The convexity of the bankowners’ payoff interacts with the nature of the externality (positive or negative) and endogenously determines whether the banks choose the same industry at t = 0, i.e., “standardize” or “syndicate”, or choose different industries, i.e., “specialize” or “differenti- ate”.
The objective function in Eq. (4.11) reveals that correlation affects only the externality term, (V sf i1
− V ss
i1 ) · Pr[Ri > r, Ri < r]. In particular, it affects only Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r], the probability of state “sf,” which
is decreasing in � (Assumption 5, Appendix A). Thus, when the externality of bank j’s failure is negative (V sf
i1 < V ss
i1 ), bank i has a preference for as high a correlation as possible. To see this in a diagram, notice
that in Fig. 4, if (V sf i1
− V ss i1
) < 0 then bank i prefers state “ss” over state “sf” (and does not care for states
“fs” and “ff” due to limited liability). On the other hand, when the externality is positive (V sf i1
> V ss i1
), bank i has a preference for as low a correlation as possible. The following lemma is a consequence of Proposition 1 and formalizes this discussion.
Lemma 2. The choice of correlation by bank i, �i, is (i) �h, for s < s c (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality);
and (ii) �l , for s > s c (˛) or ˛ < ˛c (s) (positive externality).
Thus, in the case of negative externality, i.e., when the recessionary spillover dominates, for any levels of risk, �i and �j , bank i has a preference to survive when bank j survives (and thus, fail when bank j fails). If the banks are symmetric in all respects (which we assume henceforth for simplicity), then bank j’s preference for correlation, �j , satisfies the same property. Thus, each bank prefers more correlation
238 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Fig. 4. Nature of externality and choice of correlation. This figure illustrates the interaction of (i) the limited liability of banks, and (ii) the nature of externality of failure of one bank on the health of the other bank, and how this interaction determines their preference to undertake risky investments with a high correlation of returns. For bank A, the externality from the failure of bank B is given by the term V sf
A1 − V ss
A1 . When V sf
A1 < V ss
A1 , the externality is negative, and bank A prefers state “ss” over state “sf”,
in turn implying that it prefers a high correlation of returns with bank B. Similarly, when V sf A1
> V ss A1
, the externality is positive, and bank A prefers state “sf” over state “ss”, in turn implying that it prefers a low correlation of returns with bank B.
with the other bank to less. In the case of positive externality, the strategic benefit dominates and each bank prefers a low correlation with the other bank.18
Proposition 2 (Intermediated equilibrium). The equilibrium of the intermediated economy at t = 0, [r∗, ˝∗
A , ˝∗
B ], exists and is characterized by the following properties:
(i) at high charter-values (V ss i1
, V sf i1
), an interior solution �∗ i
∈ [�min, �max) exists, ∀i. At low charter-values, �∗
i ≡ �max∀i;
(ii) for s < sc (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality), both banks choose to be as highly correlated as possible, i.e., �∗
i = �∗
j = �h, whereas for s > sc (˛) or ˛ < ˛c (s) (positive externality), both banks choose to be as
little correlated as possible, i.e., �∗ i
= �∗ j
= �l .
A crucial factor that drives the preference for high correlation in the case of negative externality is the limited liability of banks. Traditional corporate finance has focused on risk-shifting at the level of a single firm in the presence of standard debt contract and limited liability. Our result shows that in the case of multiple firms (in our model, banks), if in addition to limited liability there is a negative externality of default of one firm on the profitability of others, then the firms collectively increase the
18 In practice, strategic benefit may be small if banks are ‘large’ so that anti-trust restrictions prevent the acquisition of other bank’s facilities (˛ ≈ 1) and/or opening of new branches and ATMs in the failed bank’s “sector” of operation (s ≈ 0). In addition, ‘uniqueness’ of bank assets (for example, due to information asymmetry and resulting bank-client relationships), would increase the bite of the negative externality.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 239
aggregate risk by undertaking highly correlated investments. We thus call this phenomenon systemic risk-shifting.
In systemic risk-shifting, the banks can afford to increase the value of their equity by being highly correlated precisely because the cost of doing so (which is an increase in the likelihood of joint failure) is not borne by the banks. Given their limited liability, bankowners have no preference between failing individually or failing together, however they have a preference for surviving together in the case of negative externality.
An outcome of systemic risk-shifting is that the aggregate banking portfolio looks highly con- centrated or poorly diversified. To demonstrate that this is indeed a risk-shifting phenomenon and is suboptimal for social welfare, we need to show that the first-best investment choices in the centralized economy imply a lower level of correlation in equilibrium. We do this next.
4.2. The first-best: equilibrium in the aligned economy
The “central bank” in our model is effectively the central planner of the economy. Its objective is to maximize the sum of the welfare of bankowners and depositors, net of any costs of financial distress. This objective is taken to capture “the safety and soundness of the financial sector,” as regulation often claims.19 Thus, unlike what would be appropriate in single-bank models, the central bank is potentially concerned not only about individual bank failures but also about joint failures.
We assume that the deadweight costs of bank failures are proportional to the extent of risky invest- ment, XR, the proportionality factor being ı(r, R) > 0, where r is the promised return on deposits and R is the realization of risky return in failure (R < r). Such costs arise from legal and administrative fees in work-outs, delayed recovery on defaulted assets, disruption of the payments system, allocation inefficiencies following crises, financing constraints for viable firms, etc.20
Finally, note that in general, the central bank may put greater weight on the welfare of the depositors and on the deadweight costs than on the welfare of bank’s equityholders. This affects both the extent of deviation between the first-best and the intermediated case, and the exact level of optimal regulation, but not their qualitative nature. Hence, we assume that it weighs all three equally. For simplicity, we also assume that the central bank puts equal weight on the two sectors in its objective function.
Equilibrium at t = 1: In the first-best, the banks aligned with the central bank coordinate and jointly pick their investment choices, [� ≡ (�A, �B), X R ≡ (XRA, XRB), �] to solve:
max�,X R ,� ∑
i
[ vi1(r, �i, XRi) + ui1(r, �i, XRi) −
∫ r 0
ı(r, R)XRihi(R; �i) dR
] . (4.13)
The budget constraint XSi + XRi = D̂i, ∀i, is already incorporated in the specification above. Also, we have made use of the fact rD = rS (as in the intermediated economy), denoted simply as r. Further, as before, the choice of correlation � is irrelevant at t = 1.
Let us consider the state “ss.” vss i1
and uss i1
are as defined in Section 3. Since vi1 + ui1 = rD̂i + (R̄ − r)XRi − c(XRi), the first order condition w.r.t. XRi can be expressed as
R̄ − c′(XRi) = r + ∫ r
0
ı(r, R)hi(R; �i) dR. (4.14)
Once again, our assumptions guarantee a unique solution, XRi(r, �i). Comparison with response of the bank in the intermediated economy (Eq. (4.6)) reveals that the aligned bank takes into account both the welfare of the depositors as well as the costs of bank failure.
19 For example, see Cecchetti (1999). The question as to why do we need a central bank is fascinating and remains open, see Goodhart (1987) for a discussion. We focus on the central bank’s role in the maintenance of financial stability, as sug- gested by these studies, and provide a rationale for bank regulation based on systemic and individual risk-shifting incentives of bankowners.
20 Sprague (1986), James (1991), and Saunders (2000) document that such direct bankruptcy costs range from 4 to 10% of book liabilities (or assets) and are much greater than those in corporate bankruptcies. There may also be real costs associated with financial distress.
240 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
With mean-preserving spreads, additional risk only leads to a greater likelihood of failure, implying lower welfare of depositors and greater expected costs of failure. Since these are internalized by the aligned bank, it always prefers the lowest level of risk, �̂i(r) = �min, ∀r. Let X̂Ri(r) = XRi(r, �min). Then, equilibrium is obtained by the market-clearing condition for the safe asset which yields the fixed-point: rss1 = f ′
[∑ i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
ss 1 )
] .
As in Lemma A.1, the equilibrium [rss1 , � ss = (�min, �min), X ssR = (X̂RA(rss1 ), X̂RB(rss1 ))] exists. We denote
the expected payoffs in equilibrium of bank i and the depositors that lend to bank i as V ss i1
= vss
i1 (rss1 , �min, X
ss Ri
) and Uss i1
= uss i1
(rss1 , �min, X ss Ri
), respectively.
The equilibrium in state “sf” (and “fs”) is derived similarly: in the budget constraint, XSA + XRA = D̂A = DA + sDB; and the cost function for bank A is reduced to ˛ · c(·). This gives the equilibrium [rsf1 , �
sf A
= �min, X̂RA(r
sf 1 )], where r
sf 1 = f ′[DA + sDB − X̂RA(r
sf 1 )]. We denote the expected payoffs in equilibrium of
bank A and the depositors that lend to bank A as V sf A1 = v
sf A1(r
sf 1 , �min, X
sf RA
) and Usf A1 = u
sf A1(r
sf 1 , �min, X
sf RA
),
respectively. Note that V sf B1 = 0 and U
sf B1 = (1 − s)DB. Let
W j 1 =
∑ i
[ V
j i1
+ Uj i1
− ∫ r
0
ı(r, R)X j Ri
hi(R; �min) dR
] , (4.15)
where i ∈ {A, B}, j ∈ {ss, sf, fs, ff }. Then, the following lemma captures the intuitive result that the welfare losses from bank failures are “systemic” in nature, i.e., the failure of both sectors leads to greater losses than the failures of only one of the sectors.21
Lemma 3 (Systemic costs of failure). ∀s ∈ [0, 1] and ∀˛ ∈ (˛min, 1], (W ss1 − W sf 1 ) + (W ss1 − W
fs 1 ) < (W
ss 1 −
W ff 1 ), i.e., W
ss 1 + W
ff 1 < W
sf 1 + W
fs 1 .
Taking the state “ss” as the benchmark, the total welfare loss in single bank failure states, “sf” and “fs,” is given by (W ss1 − W
sf 1 ) + (W ss1 − W
fs 1 ). This is smaller than the loss incurred in the joint failure
state “ff” which is (W ss1 − W ff 1 ). The intuition is as follows. If only one of the banks fails, the deposits
from the distressed sector migrate to the surviving sector. The ability to migrate increases the welfare of the depositors. Further, if ˛ < 1, the charter-value of the surviving bank may increase as well. On the other hand, in the case of a joint failure, there is no investment and all depositors in the economy simply store their goods.
Equilibrium at t = 0: The aligned banks coordinate their investment choices to solve:
max�,X R ,� ∑
i
[ vi0(r, �i, XRi) + ui0(r, �i, XRi) −
∫ r 0
ı(r, R)XRihi(R; �i) dR
]
+ W ss1 · Pr[RA > r, RB > r] + W sf 1 · Pr[RA > r, RB < r] + W
fs 1 · Pr[RA < r, RB > r]
+ W ff1 · Pr[RA < r, RB < r]. (4.16)
In equilibrium, r = f ′ (∑
i Di −
∑ i XRi
) .
As before, with mean-preserving spreads, it is suboptimal to undertake any risk �̂i(r) = �min, ∀r, and X̂Ri(r) = XRi(r, �min) (given by Eq. (4.14)). The equilibrium in the aligned economy at t = 0, [ro, �o ≡ (�min, �min), X
o R = (X̂RA(ro), X̂RB(ro)), �o], is given by the fixed-point: ro = f ′
[∑ i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
o) ] .
The only investment choice to be determined is that of the correlation, �o. Intuitively, increasing the correlation across banks is harmful if the costs of doing so are systemic in nature. Lemma 3 implies that the aligned banks choose to be as little correlated as possible, i.e., �o = �l , since increasing the correlation increases the likelihood of joint failure (Assumption 4) and in turn, increases the social
21 The lemma is always true for s < sc (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s), the case of negative externality, as required in our results. It holds more generally ∀s, ˛ whenever the level of deposits, Di , is sufficiently high (Appendix B).
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 241
costs. In other words, a “diversified” aggregate banking portfolio where the constituent bank invest- ments are as little correlated as possible minimizes the likelihood of joint failure and is preferred to a “concentrated” one.
Proposition 3 (First-best: aligned equilibrium). The equilibrium of the aligned economy, [ro, �o, X oR, �
o], exists and is characterized by the following properties:
(i) The aligned banks pick the lowest level of risk, i.e., �o i
= �min, ∀i. (ii) The aligned banks pick the lowest level of correlation, i.e., �o = �l .
4.3. Individual and systemic risk-shifting
The analysis so far leads to the important result that in the intermediated economy with multiple- banks, there is risk-shifting at both the individual level (through a higher � and XR) and also at the collective level (through a higher �).
From Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 (Individual risk-shifting). Comparing the intermediated and the first-best equilibria, ∀t, r∗ > ro, �∗
i > �o
i , and X∗
Ri > X o
Ri , ∀i.
The intermediated economy is characterized by a greater choice of riskiness of the risky asset, a greater investment in the risky asset, and a higher rate of interest on deposits, compared to their first- best counterparts. It follows from Assumption 2 that the likelihood of default and expected losses upon failure are greater in the intermediated economy due to two effects: a direct effect from a greater risk choice, and an indirect, endogenous effect of greater investment in the risky asset giving rise to a higher borrowing rate in equilibrium. Further, the endogenous effect is especially perverse: an increase in the risky investment by each bank increases borrowing rate for all banks. Next is Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 (Systemic risk-shifting). There is systemic risk-shifting through a preference for higher cor- relation in the intermediated equilibrium, i.e., �∗ = �h > �o = �l for s < sc (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality).
From Assumptions 3 and 4, the likelihood of joint failure and expected costs from joint failures are higher in the intermediated economy due to individual risk-shifting, as well as due to systemic risk- shifting. In particular, if we consider the intermediated and the aligned economies at the same levels of risk, �i and �j , and at the same rate of interest, r, these measures would be higher in the intermediated economy purely due to a higher correlation of assets (whenever there is a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the other bank). The effect is only exacerbated by the fact that �∗
i > �o
i , ∀i ∈ {A, B},
and r∗ > ro, as well. Discussion on the negative externality: A word about our choice of model for the negative externality
or the recessionary spillover is in order here. In reality, systemic risk in the financial sector arises due to a variety of factors: (i) In extension (2) in Appendix D in Acharya (2001), the reduction in aggregate depositor wealth upon bank failures accentuates the spillover even if it is assumed that depositor migration to surviving banks is perfect. (ii) There are network externalities from bank services such as the payments and settlements system. These may be disrupted upon bank failures.22 (iii) The failure of a few big banks could hamper the orderly functioning of the markets for inter-bank loans, over- the-counter derivative contracts, etc. that connect banks and financial institutions.23 (iv) Asymmetric information about the positions that different banks hold may give rise to information externalities
22 Cecchetti (1999) observes, “(financial systems are characterized by) what are now termed network externalities: the overall value that arises from an individual’s participation in a particular network is greater than the individual’s private value because an additional party in the network raises everyone else’s utility. Many of the products provided by financial intermediaries share these characteristics. Payments and settlement services are a clear example: they display both scale economies and network externalities.”
23 In recent crises, markets for securities trading (e.g., mortgage-backed securities in 1994, 1998, 2007–2009) shut down following the insolvency of large institutions, adversely affecting those with a “franchise” in those markets.
242 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
(as in Rajan, 1994). For example, the cost of capital for a bank could rise if it is deemed less healthy upon a failure of its peers (as in Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008a).
In the situations described above, the financial sector is “healthier” when most banks survive since the failure of one bank translates into a reduced profitability of the other banks. This effect is endoge- nous in our model. The common safe asset across the two sectors, the imperfect migration of deposits upon one bank’s failure, and their effect on the cost of borrowing deposits for the surviving bank, generate the negative externality in general equilibrium in a parsimonious way. While the imperfect migration can be justified on the basis of “distance” across sectors either based on geographical loca- tion or based on a richer segmentation between banks and depositors, it could also be considered as a “metaphor” for a variety of ex post spillovers that would also generate endogenous systemic risk ex ante.
5. Design of bank closure policies
In the previous section, we showed that risk-shifting arises at individual and collective levels because deposit contracts that are conditional upon observable bank characteristics cannot be writ- ten. This creates a “missing market.” (as discussed in Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987). The central bank can design mechanisms to overcome the inefficiencies arising due to this “missing market”. However, we show below that lack of judicious regulation could also induce such risk-shifting behavior. We will focus on the bank closure policy adopted by the central bank (the regulator), which is the ex post mechanism employed to manage financial crisis. We model the closure policy as a bail out of the bank with a possible dilution of equityholders’ claim upon bail out. The rationale for this modeling choice is the following.
In a bail out, the central bank covers the shortfall to the depositors, and the bank is not closed. The closure of a bank entails ex post costs in the form of a loss of its charter-value and the welfare losses to its depositors. If the opportunity cost to the central bank of the funds needed to cover the shortfall is smaller than these costs of bank closures, it is ex post optimal to bail out the failed bank always. We assume this to be the case. This insurance however has a negative feedback effect on the ex ante risk choice of the bankowners. The resulting moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking implies that the ex post optimal policy of bailing out always will, in general, fail to be ex ante optimal.
To counteract this moral hazard, the central bank upon bail out subjects the bankowners to a “dilution” by acquiring warrants or by nationalizing the bank.24 Thus, we assume that upon bail out, the bankowners retain only a fraction ˇ of their equity claim, where 0 ≤ ˇ ≤ 1. The remaining fraction, 1 − ˇ, is taken over by the central bank. Thus, ˇ = 1 is interpreted as complete forbearance towards the bank; 0 < ˇ < 1 as the central bank holding a partial equity stake in the bank; and ˇ = 0 as a complete nationalization of the bank.25
The moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking by a single bank is well-understood. Hence, we focus only on the moral hazard arising in the form of collective risk-taking. We assume that there is no equity capital in the bank (the bankowners are wealth-constrained), the bankowners do not (or cannot) issue outside equity, and no capital adequacy regulation is in place.26 Note that since a bank is never closed upon failure, all externality effects considered in Section 4.1 arising either due to a spillover or due to strategic benefit are eliminated. The charter-values are thus identical in all states at t = 1 and in particular, equal to those in the state “ss”. Hence, we refer to it simply as V1. This enables
24 Alternately, the central bank could employ a mixed strategy where a bank is bailed out with some probability p, 0 < p < 1. This is often referred to as “constructive ambiguity” (e.g., Freixas, 1999). Such policies are however time-inconsistent, as Mailath and Mester (1994) note. Further, there is vast evidence that upon a bank’s survival, equityholders lose a significant stake in the bank either to an acquiring bank or to the assisting government, as documented by Sprague (1986) and by Dewatripont and Tirole (1993).
25 Note that, the central bank may impose penalties as well through firing of managers, CEO’s, and even the Board. Limited liability will however bind and such penalties are limited to the losses resulting to the incumbent managers upon severance of their contract. An earlier draft allowed for penalties that could be contingent on extent of bank failure and found that allowing for them is not very crucial to our results.
26 A detailed study of the joint design of bank closure policies and capital adequacy requirements is undertaken in Acharya (2003) which also contains relevant references on the topic.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 243
us to focus exclusively on the effect of the bank closure policy on the correlation preference of banks. Finally, we make the natural assumption that bail outs are more costly in joint failures than in individual failures, for example, due to a convex cost of funds faced by the central bank. It is straightforward to show (as in the proof of Proposition 3) that this induces a preference for low correlation across bank asset returns in the social first-best, i.e., �o = �l .
5.1. Systemic moral hazard
Consider a bank closure policy consisting of a bail out of a bank upon failure with a dilution function given as (ˇfs
i , ˇ
ff i
). Thus upon bail out, bank i retains ˇfs i
fraction of its equity when it fails but bank j
survives (state “fs”), and it retains ˇff i
fraction of its equity both banks fail (state “ff”). We call such a
closure policy as “collective” in nature if ˇfs i
/= ˇff i
, since in this case bank i’s payoff is affected by whether bank j survives or fails. On the other hand, we say that the closure policy is “myopic” in nature, i.e., if ˇ
fs i
= ˇff i
. We examine the correlation preference of the banks under such closure policies. The objective function of bank i facing the closure policy is given as
max�i ,XRi ,�i
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) + Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r]
+ ˇfs i
Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r] + ˇffi Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r]. (5.1)
Substituting Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r] = Pr[Ri < r] − Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], we can rewrite this as
max�i ,XRi ,�i
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) + Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r]
+ ˇfs i
Vi1 · Pr [Ri < r] + (ˇffi − ˇ fs i
)Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r]. (5.2)
Denote the equilibrium correlation induced by the closure policy as �ˇ. Then, the following impor- tant result is a consequence of Eq. (5.2) and Assumption 4.
Proposition 4 (Systemic moral hazard). A collective closure policy that exhibits greater forbearance in the joint failure state compared to the individual welfare state induces systemic risk-shifting, i.e., if ˇff
i > ˇ
fs i
, then �ˇ = �h > �o = �l . On the other hand, a collective closure policy that exhibits less forbearance in the joint failure state compared to the individual welfare state eliminates systemic risk-shifting, i.e., if ˇff
i < ˇ
fs i
, then �ˇ = �o = �l .
Intuitively, since the costs of bank bail outs are systemic in nature, prudential regulation should reward banks less in such states and cause them to internalize these costs. Importantly, the proposition shows that implicit or explicit government guarantees can have a perverse feedback effect on systemic risk. The insurance to a group of banks or financial institutions in the form of greater forbearance in joint failure provides them an incentive to be highly correlated. This increases the ex ante likelihood of such a joint failure and generates systemic moral hazard. A subtle but a fundamental point revealed by this result is the following: while the absolute level of forbearance affects the moral hazard that manifests as individual risk-shifting, it is the relative levels of forbearance in the individual and the joint failure states that affect the moral hazard that manifests as systemic risk-shifting. “Too-many-to- fail” and systemic risk: In practice, systemic failures can thus be quite problematic. It may be difficult to implement the ex ante optimal policy: it may be impossible to nationalize a large number of banks to produce a greater dilution in joint failure states. Similarly, the replacement of top-level personnel and boards that would impose severe penalties in the joint failure states may be infeasible due to labor market constraints if such penalties are required for many institutions simultaneously. Further, since welfare losses to the depositors (and thus to the economy at large) are greater in the joint failure state, the group of failed banks may have greater bargaining power with the central bank and may be able to
244 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
renegotiate a bail out with weaker terms.27 This implicit “too-many-to-fail” guarantee renders the ex ante optimal policy time-inconsistent and hence, lacking in commitment. It may thus play a significant role in sustaining systemic risk across banks as their equilibrium response to extract greater regulatory subsidies.28
Another immediate implication of Eq. (5.2) is the following. Under a myopic closure policy (ˇfs i
= ˇ
ff i
), there is no dependence of each bank’s welfare on the joint characteristics of banks’ portfolios, and the choice of correlation is indeterminate. Thus, such a policy has a shortcoming in the multiple- bank economy: it fails to cause a bank to internalize the costs of systemic distress. As a result, if banks choose to be correlated due to other reasons, e.g., synergies from sharing information as is used to motivate loan syndications, then the myopic rescue policy does not penalize them for such correlation.
Proposition 5 (Suboptimality of myopic closure policy). Under a myopic closure policy, i.e., if ˇfs i
= ˇff i
, the equilibrium correlation of banks’ asset returns, �ˇ, is indeterminate. Under the worst case, �ˇ = �h and the systemic risk-shifting remains completely unmitigated.
This justifies the use of the term myopic for such designs. While the term “myopic” usually gives the connotation of short-termism or single-period focus in inter-temporal problems, we employ this term in its broader meaning of being “short-sighted”. Alternately, such designs could be called “nar- row” in scope or “micro” as different from “broad” or “macro”.29 To see that the optimal collective design is not myopic (in general), consider a myopic policy (ˇf , ˇf ). Let the choice of bank i’s risk under this policy be �. Consider a collective policy (ˇfs, ˇff ), where ˇfs = ˇf + ı, and ˇff = ˇf − �, with ı, � > 0. It follows that the correlation choice induced by this policy is �l (Proposition 4). From Eq. (5.1), given any � > 0, we can find a ı > 0 such that under the policy (ˇfs, ˇff ), bank i’s choice of risk is again �. The dilution factors are only transfers between the banks and the cen- tral bank. Thus, for any myopic policy, there exists a collective policy with ˇff < ˇfs that dominates it.
To end this section, we consider a regulatory policy that creates “value” for banks when they survive and others fail. We show that such a policy can be effectively used to reduce the bite of implicit “too-many-to-fail” guarantee and in turn, to mitigate systemic risk.
5.2. The incentive role of bank sales
Let us augment the collective closure policy to (ˇfs i
, ˇ sf i
, ˇ ff i
), ˇsf i
being the proportion of bank i’s charter-value that is awarded to it in the state where it survives but the bank j fails (state “sf”). Under this policy, Bank i picks (�i, XRi, �i) to maximize∫ Rmax
r
(R − r)XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) + Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r] + ˇfsi Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r]
+ ˇsf i
Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r] + ˇffi Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r]. (5.3)
27 Bongini et al. (1999) study the political economy of the distress of East Asian banks during the crisis of late 1990s and document the difficulty faced by the regulators in managing multiple bank failures.
28 The author thanks Enrico Perotti for suggesting the nice, intuitive term: “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b) develop a more exhaustive analysis of too-many-to-fail and the associated time-inconsistency in bank closure regulation.
29 There is another sense in which the myopic closure policy is suboptimal. In the intermediated equilibrium, systemic risk- shifting arises only if s < sc (˛), the case of negative externality (Proposition 1). In the case of positive externality, i.e., when s > sc (˛), banks in fact prefer a low correlation of asset returns even in the absence of any regulation. Thus unconditional bail outs with a myopic closure policy are dominated by a policy of conditional bail outs, i.e., bail out only if the bank’s failure imposes a negative externality on the rest of the system, else simply close the bank. This gives a justification for “too-big-to-fail” kind of guarantee from an ex ante standpoint, in addition to the conventional ex post argument.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 245
Substituting Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r] = Pr[Ri < r] − Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], we can rewrite this as∫ Rmax r
(R − r)XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) + Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r] + ˇfsi Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r]
+ ˇsf i
Vi1 · Pr[Ri > r] + (ˇffi − ˇ fs i
− ˇsf i
)Vi1 · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r]. (5.4)
Thus, a necessary and a sufficient condition to induce low correlation is that ˇff i
< ˇ fs i
+ ˇsf i
. It is
not necessary for the closure policy to have ˇfs i
> ˇ ff i
, if ˇsf i
is sufficiently high. In words, the perverse feedback effect of a “too-many-to-fail” bail out policy can be mitigated if the banks gain a large strategic benefit, measured by ˇsf
i , when other banks fail and they survive.30 Such strategic benefit may accrue
to banks by acquiring, partly or fully, the failed banks. Bank sales, known in the U.S. as “purchase and assumption,” are commonly employed by the receiver of the failed banks in many countries, including the U.S. and Norway (see, James, 1991 and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). Since many countries do not have the market or the tradition of conducting bank sales, it may be a good policy directive for their regulators to encourage the development of such a market.
While the simple structure of our model prevents us from undertaking a thorough study of other implications of conducting bank sales, such as the creation of monopolies and a change in the organi- zational structure of the banking industry, it points to a hitherto neglected incentive effect of including bank sales in the closure policy of a central bank.31 Bank sales increase the charter-value of banks pre- cisely in those states where they survive and other banks fail. This reduces the preference amongst banks to be highly correlated in order to extract rents from closure policies that are not sufficiently stringent upon joint failures. In fact, the central banks may find it optimal to transfer value to the surviving banks via subsidized sales, i.e., sales that occur at lower than the fair value of the failed banks.
6. Design of capital adequacy regulation
As discussed in the previous section, optimal closure policy designs may be difficult to implement as they are time-inconsistent. Hence, we examine the ex ante mechanism, viz. the capital requirements. We first discuss the suboptimality of myopic capital adequacy that is based only a bank’s own risk, and next show that the optimal capital adequacy also takes into account the joint risk of banks, in particular, their correlation.
Consider the economy as described in Section 3. We continue to assume that there is no closure policy in place. Each bank’s equityholders are wealth-constrained and have no capital of their own. As a result, any bank capital must be raised in the form of outside equity, which corresponds to Tier 1 capital required by the current regulation.32 For simplicity, we assume that depositors and capital providers are different agents in the economy, consistent with a “segmented markets” explanation.33
Raising such equity is privately costly since it dilutes the claim of existing equityholders if they are required to pay a higher than fair, expected rate of return on equity. These costs (transfers) arise due to (i) informed trading in capital markets, (ii) asymmetric information of the equityholders, and/or (iii)
30 Assuming symmetric banks, the restriction is that ˇfs i
+ ˇsf i
≤ 1, the remaining equity stake, 1 − ˇfs i
− ˇsf i
, being taken up by the central bank in a partial nationalization.
31 It is often argued that from a policy standpoint, there is no difference between a bail out and a sale. Sprague (1986) claims, “In practice, the effect of a sale or a bail out is virtually the same. . . In either instance, the management is out. Then what is the problem? It simply is. . . Bail out is a bad word.” This argument is flawed since it ignores that a sale creates value for the surviving banks whereas a bail out does not and this in turn, gives incentive to banks to be uncorrelated. Ignoring this mitigating effect of bank sales on systemic risk-shifting incentive leads to the “myopic” conclusion that their net effect is identical to that of bail outs.
32 See BIS (1988, 1996) for details on the regulatory specification of what qualifies as bank capital. 33 Gorton and Winton (1999), and Diamond and Rajan (2000), consider the effect of requiring bank capital on the extent of
deposits that the banks can raise.
246 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
manager-shareholder conflicts.34 We can extend the model of Section 3 to endogenize such costs. For simplicity however, we take the net dilution cost of outside equity for each bank to be simply �(K ), where K is the amount of outside equity issued, �′(K ) > 0 and �′′(K ) > 0.
The budget-constraint for bank i is now given by XSi + XRi = Di + Ki. There is default whenever rXSi + RiXRi < rDi, i.e., whenever Ri is below the threshold Rci = r · (1 − (Ki/XRi)) ≤ r. The “buffer” role of capital is thus to act as an ex ante liability of the bankowners and lower the threshold return below which the bank defaults. Incorporating this lower threshold, the value of old equityholders of bank i given the investment choices of both banks and their respective levels of outside capital, is the following where Rc
j = r · (1 − (Kj /XRj )):
V old i
(·) = ∫ Rmax
Rc i
(R − Rc i )XRihi(R; �i) dR − c(XRi) − �(Ki) + V ssi1 · Pr[Ri > R
c i ]
+ (V sf i1
− V ss i1 ) · Pr[Ri > R
c i , Rj < R
c j ]. (6.1)
6.1. Suboptimality of myopic capital adequacy
Consider a capital adequacy regulation of the form, Ki(·), which is independent of the correlation across the banks’ assets. We call such a scheme as “myopic” since it is not based on the joint character- istics of banks’ investments. Note that, in general, Ki(·) may depend on �i and XRi (depending upon the contracting possibilities). Crucially, Ki(·) does not depend on � in a myopic design. When such a scheme is employed in the multiple bank context, the collective incentives of the banks remain unaffected.
To see this, note that when banks face a myopic capital requirement, their objective function in Eq. (6.1) is qualitatively similar to that in Eq. (4.11), with the threshold point of failure driven down from r to Rc
i . The case of interest is one where Rc
i > 0, i.e., Ki < XRi, since the participation constraint
of the bankowners will bind in general. In other words, the case where Ki = XRi would require 100% bank capital which is unrealistic because the accompanying dilution cost would drive the bankowners out of banking activity. With Rc
i > 0, the form of the externality term (V sf
i1 − V ss
i1 ) · Pr[Ri > Rci , Rj < R
c j ],
which affects the preference for correlation amongst banks, is essentially unchanged. It was shown (Proposition 1) that the recessionary spillover from the failure of one bank on
the health of the surviving bank dominates the strategic benefit of the surviving bank (V sf i1
< V ss i1
), whenever s < sc (˛) or alternately, ˛ > ˛c (s). In these cases, there is a systemic risk-shifting in the intermediated economy, i.e., �∗ = �h. It follows that myopic capital adequacy regulation does a poor job of mitigating the systemic risk-shifting incentive, even if it succeeds in mitigating the individual risk-shifting incentive.35
Proposition 6 (Suboptimality of myopic capital adequacy). Under any myopic capital adequacy regula- tion, systemic risk-shifting is left unmitigated, i.e., banks choose to be highly correlated whenever s < sc (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality).
A subtle point is in order. A myopic capital adequacy can be interpreted as a value-at-risk constraint since the level of bank capital essentially determines the likelihood of bank failure. A feasible option for the regulators, one that is currently employed, is to increase the confidence level employed in cal- culating value-at-risk, increase capital charge, lower the threshold point of bank failure, and in turn, reduce the magnitude of systemic risk-shifting effect. However, this also has a perverse side effect:
34 Empirical evidence on underpricing costs of outside equity can be found in Lee et al. (1996). Theoretical justifications for dilution cost of outside equity have been provided by Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Rock (1986). Alternative explanations based on manager-shareholder agency costs are employed in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), Froot et al. (1993), and Froot and Stein (1998).
35 Note that strictly speaking, the charter-values, V sf i1
and V ss i1
, will also be affected by capital requirements. In fact, reduction of future values may lead banks to increase risk today. This perverse feedback effect must be taken into account in the optimal design, but is not the focus of our argument.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 247
the bankowners who suffer huge dilution costs of additional capital may respond by underinvest- ing, transforming “capital crunch” into a “credit crunch”. The optimal capital adequacy regulation is correlation-based and strictly dominates any myopic scheme.
6.2. Correlation-based capital adequacy
A “correlation-based” (or “collective”) capital adequacy scheme is one where the capital require- ment is explicitly contingent on inter-bank correlations. In other words, it is of the form Ki(·, �). Before we proceed to show how such a scheme can mitigate systemic risk-shifting, two things deserve men- tion. First, in general, design of such a scheme should be undertaken in conjunction with all other observables that the scheme is contingent on. For example, the current capital requirements depend on size (XR) and a measure of riskiness (�) of the assets. The complete design Ki(�, XR, �) was undertaken in an earlier draft.
Second, a fundamental question is whether such contingent contracts are feasible in the first place. Such contracts are infeasible from the point of view of depositors due to multiplicity of monitoring costs and/or lack of coordination. The regulator, a “delegated monitor” of sorts who represents the deposi- tors, can however write and enforce more sophisticated contracts, e.g., via capital adequacy schemes. Our goal is to prescribe as a normative rule what is the optimal contract, with the understanding that inter-bank correlations are at least partially observable and contractible by the regulators. The issue of robustness of the optimal contract to imprecise measurement and asymmetric information between banks and regulators is an interesting issue for future research.
We show next that Ki(·, �) can be structured so that the banks facing such a scheme respond by undertaking investments in assets with a low correlation of returns.
Proposition 7 (Correlation-based capital adequacy). Under a capital adequacy scheme, Ki(·, �), that is increasing sufficiently steeply in �, banks choose to be as little correlated as possible. Thus, systemic risk- shifting is completely mitigated. A necessary and a sufficient condition is that for given investment choices (�i, XRi), i ∈ {A, B},
dKi d�
· {
�′ i (Ki) − �V ·
dRc i
dKi · d
dRc i
Pr[Ri > R c i , Rj < R
c j ]
} > �V · d
d� Pr[Ri > R
c i , Rj < R
c j ], (6.2)
where �V = V sf i1
− V ss i1
, and Rc i
= r · (1 − (Ki/XRi)). Note that the LHS above is the marginal cost to bank i from increasing its correlation with bank j,
and the RHS is the marginal benefit. In the case of negative externality (when systemic risk-shifting occurs), �V < 0. By Assumption 5, Pr[Ri > R
c i , Rj < R
c j ] is decreasing in �. Thus, under our maintained
assumption that the issuance of capital is privately costly to the bank (so that the term inside {·} in LHS above is positive), it is necessary that (dKi/d�) > 0. The intuition is clear: the negative externality in state “sf” which induces in banks a preference for the state “ss” is counteracted by a higher cost of capital that banks must incur if they increase the probability of state “ss” by being highly correlated. The magnitude of the capital charge or “penalty” for increasing correlation depends upon the negative externality endogenous to the general equilibrium. The resulting collective design mitigates systemic risk-shifting and strictly improves upon the myopic design.
This illustrates a fundamental point: in one principal, many agent problems with externalities across agents, the optimal mechanism in general will offer payoffs to agents that are dependent on the heterogeneity of agents and on the actions of other agents. The correlation-based scheme, Ki(·, �), has both these features. It depends on the joint action of the banks (�). In addition, the extent of dependence is related to the precise nature of investment opportunities available to the banks (Hi).
6.3. Discussion: implications for current regulation
Attempts at collective regulation so far have mainly been ex post, and have manifested either as temporary position limits on investments in the industry (or counterparty) that caused the systemic event or as an increase in capital charge for such investments. No systematic attempt has been made
248 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
however, to anticipate and contain the extent of systemic risk ex ante.36 The following discussion provides an intuitively appealing implementation of our proposal.
Portfolio theory interpretation: Regulation has encouraged banks to consider the portfolio effects of their activities (trading, lending, etc.) while measuring their enterprise-wide risk. The recommenda- tion is based on the concern that returns on different activities may be correlated and simply adding up their risks may understate the true risk of the portfolio. This recognition of intra-bank correlations for market risk (BIS, 1996) and for credit risk (BIS, 1999) has however not been extended from within the banks to the economy at large, where a similar consideration arises due to inter-bank correla- tions. Regulating the risk of each bank affects the variance terms in the inter-bank covariances but leaves the contribution from the correlation terms unaffected. Optimal regulation takes account of both contributions.
This portfolio interpretation suggests that we can decompose the risk of each bank into two com- ponents: (i) exposures to “general” factors such as interest rate, foreign exchange rate, industry, etc., and (ii) exposures to idiosyncratic or a “specific” factors, e.g., as suggested by Arbitrage-Pricing Theory. Prudential regulation should require that banks hold greater capital against general risks than against specific risks for the same level of risk. This would give incentives to the banks to be less correlated and thus reduce systemic risk.
Portfolio compositions vs. summary statistics: Over the last decade, bank-wide risk management has moved towards the value-at-risk approach where each bank aggregates its risk and reports a single summary statistic. While such a number may be sufficient to regulate the individual risk of a bank, it is clearly insufficient to compute the value-at-risk of the aggregate banking portfolio. It is paramount for the operation of correlation-based capital adequacy that the banks report not just their value- at-risk numbers but also their portfolio compositions. The exposures of each bank’s portfolio to the general risks can be supplied to the regulator who can consolidate these exposures across banks and determine the collective risk capital charge for each bank, in addition to the individual risk contribu- tions. While detailed consolidation may be costly due to current lack of standardization in reporting, a simpler approach via the general and specific risk decomposition may suffice. Consolidation can also provide “macro-prudential indicators” that can be employed in setting aggregate position limits, i.e., constraints of the form that the consolidated exposure across all banks to a general factor (e.g., aggregate industry concentration) not exceed a limit.37
Centralized capital budgeting: The collective “pricing” of risks is in fact operational within the finan- cial sector. Each bank allocates capital to an activity taking into account its contribution to the overall risk of the bank’s portfolio. James (1996) while discussing the implementation of RAROC at Bank of America, states that “the amount of capital allocated varies with the contribution of the project to the overall volatility of earnings.” Similarly, sophisticated banks calculate the counterparty credit charge on their derivative transactions based on a portfolio pricing approach. A trading desk doing transac- tions sends relevant information to a central group that aggregates the counterparty risks of different transactions and in return provides the desk with a credit charge number to be applied to the deriva- tive’s price. Our visualization of the central bank calculating the capital charge for the individual banks is not much different than its micro incarnations listed above.
Focused vs. diversified banks: Consider two types of economies with two industries and two banks in each. In economy A, banks are “focused” and invest in different industries. The industries are imper- fectly correlated and hence, neither of the banks achieves possible diversification. In economy B, each
36 It seems that financial regulators had recognized the importance of inter-bank correlations. On 21 September 2000, Andrew Crockett, General Manager and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum at BIS, made the following suggestions for ‘marrying the micro- and the macro- dimensions of financial stability’: “More often than not, episodes of financial distress arise from the exposure of groups of institutions to common risk factors. Unless the authorities take into account the impact of the collective behavior of institutions on economic outcomes, they may fail to monitor risks and take remedial action appropriately.”
37 Such limits could have helped prevent some recent crises, such as (i) the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, where almost all large investment houses had significant exposures to a single counterpary—LTCM (exceeding a billion dollars in some cases); a consolidation of real-estate lending from the call reports of banks could have also forewarned of the New England banking crisis in the early 1990s, and (ii) the crisis of 2007–2009 where ex post it turned out that banks had in fact not transferred enough risks of the mortgage-backed assets, and indirectly thus of housing sector, but instead retained big chunks on their balance sheets (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009).
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 249
bank invests in both industries and is thus “diversified”. In economy A, the individual risk of each bank is higher due to lack of diversification, however the joint failure risk is lower. On the other hand, in economy B, the individual risk of each bank is lower, but both banks are perfectly correlated and always fail together. This illustrates the tradeoff between focus and diversification. Diversified banks are attractive since the risk of each bank is reduced, but this is achieved at the cost of an increase in systemic risk. This tradeoff determines an optimal level of focus for the banking industry.38
Effect of competition on systemic risk: A related point is with regards to encouraging competition in the banking sector. Many authors (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000b, and the references therein) have argued that increase in competition amongst banks may lead to greater risk-shifting incentives for the banks. Our analysis shows that this effect may be especially perverse since encouraging competition may also increase the correlation of banks’ portfolio returns as they all invest in similar sectors. The costs of resulting financial instability must be weighed against the efficiency gains arising from greater competition.39
7. Conclusion
We have developed a positive theory of systemic risk and a normative theory of its prudential regu- lation in a multi-period general equilibrium model with many banks and depositors that incorporates (i) the likelihood of default by banks on deposits; (ii) financial externalities from failure of one bank on other banks; (iii) regulatory incentives; and (iv) the interaction of these features. Several applications of our analysis and results are immediate.40
A result such as ours where the optimal mechanism for an agent depends on the characteristics and actions of other agents is to be expected in general in any model with heterogeneous agents and some externality. It applies to many economic phenomena where agents undertake similar strategies and modes of behavior. Our analysis suggests that examining the complementarities of agents’ actions and the underlying agency problems may be a fruitful direction towards explaining the collective behavior of agents as their equilibrium response.
The most relevant application seems to be in delegated portfolio management. The bonus schemes of traders in banks are often implicitly based on group performance. Losses to a single desk could generate lower compensation for all other traders. This is a negative externality of the failure of one trader on the profitability of others. Given their limited liability, the traders have an incentive to undertake trading strategies such that they survive together and fail together rather than see their profits subsidize the failure of others. Enterprise-wide risk-management and capital budgeting that is based on correlations across desks should be designed jointly with the incentive schemes of different desks to mitigate such behavior.
We have modeled systemic risk through the choice of correlation across assets of different banks. Systemic risk can also arise due to inter-bank contracts. Our analysis implies that regulating each bank’s risk cannot capture fully the risks that could propagate through a nexus of contracts. This propagation is of particular concern in banking given the opaqueness of banks’ assets and investments. The effect of regulation on the endogenous choice of inter-bank contracts deserves careful scrutiny. In addition, we believe that characterizing systemic risk as an equilibrium response of the financial intermediaries is a crucial step towards building a model of systemic risk in the traditional general equilibrium setups.
38 It is a little appreciated statistical fact that pooling of risks increases the likelihood of joint survival and joint failure, as Shaffer (1994) notes. In fact, there is a strong sense in which a certain level of “focus” is always optimal. If all banks have low but positive risk of failure and are perfectly correlated, then the probability of joint failure equals the probability of individual failure independent of the number of banks. On the other hand, if banks are imperfectly correlated, the probability of joint failure converges to zero for sufficiently large number of banks. This is particularly relevant since the regulators have recognized that most investment houses today hold virtually identical balance sheets and the failure of one would in most cases be the same event as the failure of most of them. The author is pursuing an extension of this model where this tradeoff is formalized by explicitly modeling general and specific risk factors.
39 The author thanks Qiang Dai for bringing this point to his attention. 40 In particular, additional details about how to empirically implement a capital requirement that is based on joint failure risk
of banks is presented in Acharya et al. (2009).
250 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
Acknowledgements
This paper is an essay from my PhD dissertation. I have benefited from encouragement and guidance of Yakov Amihud, Douglas Gale, Marty Gruber, Kose John, Anthony Saunders, Marti Subrahmanyam, and Rangarajan Sundaram. I am especially indebted to Rangarajan Sundaram for introducing me to the topic, to Douglas Gale for many insightful discussions, and to Ken Garbade and Anthony Saunders for detailed comments on an earlier draft. In addition, I am grateful to Franklin Allen, Edward Altman, Allen Berger, Mitchell Berlin, Alberto Bisin, Menachem Brenner, Steve Brown, Qiang Dai, Darrell Duffie, Nikunj Kapadia, Simi Kedia, Anthony Lynch, Vojislav Maksimovic, Paolo Pasquariello, Enrico Perotti, Alex Shapiro, William Silber, Philip Strahan, Martin Summer, Suresh Sundaresan, Narayanan Vaghul, Lawrence White, my colleagues in the doctoral program, and seminar participants at Bank of Interna- tional Settlements (BIS), Baruch College, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Inter-University Student Conference Series at University of Pennsylvania, Lehman Brothers Fellowship Presentation, and Stern School of Business - NYU, for their comments and suggestions. I also acknowledge the help of Mickey Bhatia and Blythe Masters of J.P. Morgan; Lev Borodovsky of Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) and CSFB; and, Erik Larson and Mitch Stengel of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for enriching my understanding of the various institutions of bank regulation. All errors remain my own.
Appendix A. Regularity assumptions on risky technology
Bank i picks a risky portfolio that gives a return R ∼ hi(·; �), from a family of distributions Hi, indexed by the “risk” parameter �.
Assumption 1 (Mean-preserving spreads). The expected return, ∫ Rmax
0 Rhi(R; �) dR, is constant ∀� and
is denoted as R̄.
Assumptions 2–5 are assumed to hold over the relevant range of r for the analysis.
Assumption 2 (Increasing risk of default). The family of risky portfolios Hi is ordered by risk parameter �, � ∈ [�min, �max], in the sense of ‘increasing risk of default’:
(i) likelihood of failure, ∫ r
0 hi(R; �) dR, is increasing and convex in �; and
(ii) expected losses in failure, ∫ r
0 (r − R)hi(R; �) dR, are increasing and convex in �.
We will assume continuity of these functions and their derivatives. A family of “mean-preserving spreads” in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.41
The “correlation” of the risky portfolios is denoted as � ∈ {�l , �h}. Assumption 3 (Increasing risk of joint default). Given � and �j , the distributions Ri ∼ hi(·; �i) and Rj ∼ hj (·; �j ) satisfy the following properties:
(i) likelihood of joint failure, Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], is increasing and convex in �i; and (ii) expected losses upon joint failure, E[(r − Ri) · 1{Ri <r,Rj <r}], are increasing and convex in �i.
An analogous assumption is made with respect to �j for given � and �i. Note that 1{F} is the indicator function, equal to 1 when the event F occurs, and 0 otherwise. Assumption 4 (Correlation increases risk of joint default). Given �i and �j , the distributions Ri ∼ hi(·; �i) and Rj ∼ hj (·; �j ) satisfy the following properties:
41 It is possible for mean-preserving spreads not to increase the likelihood of default and expected losses in default, but they cannot decrease these measures.
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 251
(i) likelihood of joint failure, Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], is increasing in �; and (ii) expected losses upon joint failure, E[(r − Ri) · 1{Ri <r,Rj <r}], are increasing in �.
Assumption 4 and the assumption that the choice of industries (in effect, �) does not affect the choice of risk (�) imply the following which is stated as Assumption 5.
Assumption 5. Pr[Ri < r, Rj > r] = Pr[Ri < r] − Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r], is decreasing in �.
Appendix B. Proofs
Lemma A.1. The equilibrium, (rsf1 , � sf A
, X sf RA
), exists with �sf A
≡ �max. Since XRA(r, �A), given by Eq. (4.6), is optimal for given r and �A, it follows from
Eq. (4.4) that (d/d�A)v sf A1(r, �A, XRA(r, �A)) = XRA(r, �A) · (d/d�A)
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)hA(R; �A) dR = XRA(r, �A) · (d/d�A)
∫ r 0
(r − R)hA(R; �A) dR > 0 where the last equality follows the identity ∫ Rmax
r (R − r)h(R; �A)dR =
R̄ − r − ∫ r
0 (R − r)hA(R; �A) dR, and the last inequality follows Assumption 2. This holds for any �A,
hence �̂A(r) = �max, ∀r. The equilibrium is given by the fixed-point: rsf1 = f ′[DA + sDB − X̂RA(r sf 1 )] where
X̂RA(r) = XRA(r, �max). Assuming XRA(r, �) ∈ (0, DA + sDB), ∀r, �, this fixed point exists by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (Sundaram, 1996). �
Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, let i = A. We prove first that V sf A1 increases in s for given
˛. Denote X̂RA(r) = XRA(r, �max), V sfA1(r) = ∫ Rmax
r (R − r)X̂RA(r)h(R; �max) dR − ˛ · c(X̂RA(r)), rsf1 = f ′[DA +
sDB − X̂RA(rsf1 )] (the fixed-point), and V sf A1 = V
sf A1(r
sf 1 ).
(i) (dX̂R(r)/dr) < 0: Differentiating Eq. (4.6) w.r.t. r yields −˛ · c′′(X̂RA(r)) · (dX̂R(r)/dr) = 1 − (d/dr)
∫ r 0
(r − R)hA(R; �max) dR > 0 by chain-rule. The convexity of c(·) implies that (dX̂R(r)/dr) < 0.
(ii) (dV sf A1(r)/dr) < 0: Differentiating V
sf A1(r) w.r.t. r yields (dV
sf A1(r)/dr) = X̂RA(r) · (d/dr)
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)hA(R; �max) dR = X̂RA(r) · (d/dr)[R̄ − r −
∫ r 0
(r − R)hA(R; �max) dR] < 0 by chain-rule. (iii) (drsf1 /ds) < 0: This follows the fixed-point equation for r
sf 1 and the concavity of f (·).
(iv) Thus, (dV sf A1/ds) = (dV
sf A1(r)/dr) · (dr
sf 1 /ds) > 0, for given ˛.
The second part that V sf A1 decreases in ˛ for a given s can be proved similarly along these
steps: (i) (dX̂R(r)/d˛) < 0. (ii) (dr sf 1 /d˛) > 0. (iii) Thus, (dV
sf A1/d˛) = (dV
sf A1(r)/dr) · (dr
sf 1 /d˛) < 0, for
given s. �
Proposition 1. Consider first the cut-off sc (˛). We will denote the charter-value in the state “sf” by the parameters, s and ˛, as V sf
i1 (s, ˛). Consider ˛ = 1 for illustration.
(i) V sf i1
(1, 1) > V ss i1
. With ˛ = 1, the objective function of bank i is the same in state “sf” and “ss,” the only difference being in the return on safe asset. With s = 1, we must have rss1 > r
sf 1 . Other-
wise, rsf1 < f ′ [∑
i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
sf 1 )
] < f ′
[∑ i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
ss 1 )
] = rss1 , a contradiction, where the first
inequality follows the concavity of f (·), and the second inequality follows from dX̂Ri(r)/dr < 0 (proof of Lemma 1). Since, dV sf
i1 /dr < 0 (proof of Lemma 1), it follows that for ˛ = 1, V sf
i1 (1, 1) > V ss
i1 .
(ii) V sf i1
(0, 1) < V ss i1
. This is because with s = 0, rsf1 > rss1 . Else, r sf 1 = f ′[DA − X̂Ri(r
sf 1 )] <
f ′ [∑
i Di −
∑ i X̂Ri(r
ss 1 )
] = rss1 , a contradiction. The claim now follows the result dV
sf i1
/dr < 0.
Since V sf i1
(s, 1) is increasing in s (Lemma 1), it follows that ∃sc (1) ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀s < sc (1), V
sf i1
< V ss i1
(negative externality), and ∀s > sc (1), V sf i1
> V ss i1
(positive externality).
252 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
(iii) The existence of sc (˛) for any ˛ follows similarly. If V sf i1
(0, ˛min) < V ss i1
as well, then ∀˛, sc (˛) ∈ (0, 1). Else, there is a threshold ¯̨ > ˛min, such that ∀˛ > ¯̨ , sc (˛) ∈ (0, 1), else sc (˛) ≡ 0, i.e., the externality is always positive for ˛ < ¯̨ (sufficiently high strategic benefit).
(iv) V sf i1
(s, ˛) is decreasing in ˛ (Lemma 1). Consider ˛′ > ˛. Then, V ss i1
≤ V sf i1
(sc (˛), ˛) < V sf i1
(sc (˛), ˛′). It follows now that sc (˛′) ≥ sc (˛), so that sc (˛) is increasing in ˛.
To prove the analogous result for cut-off ˛c (s), we proceed exactly as above. Under the assump- tion that V sf
i1 (0, ˛min) < V
ss i1
, it can be shown that ∃s, s̄, 0 < s < s̄ < 1, such that (i) ∀s < s, ˛c (s) = ˛min (the externality is always negative for sufficiently high recessionary spillover), (ii) ∀s > s̄, ˛c (s) = 1 (the externality is always positive for sufficiently low recessionary spillover), and (iii) ∀s, s < s < s̄, ˛c (s) ∈ (˛min, 1) so that V sfi1 < V
ss i1
for ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality), and V sf i1
> V ss i1
for ˛ < ˛c (s) (positive externality). The details of the proof are omitted here. �
Next, we prove two lemmas for the intermediated economy, to be used in latter proofs.
Lemma A.2. The amount of risky investment, XRi(r, �i), is increasing in risk, �i. Differentiating Eq. (4.12) w.r.t. �i yields c
′′(XRi) · (dXRi/d�i) = (d/d�i) ∫ r
0 (r − R)hi(R; �i) dR. From
Assumption 2 and the convexity of c(·), it follows that (dXRi(r, �i)/d�i) > 0. � Lemma A.3. The choice of risk by bank i, �̂i(r, �j ), is (i) increasing in �j for s < s
c (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality); and (ii) decreasing in �j for s > s
c (˛) or ˛ < ˛c (s) (positive externality). Further, �̂i(r, �j ) is decreasing in s (for a given ˛) and increasing in ˛ (for a given s).
Differentiating the maximand in Eq. (4.11) w.r.t. �i at XRi(r, �i) (given by Eq. (4.12)), we get
XRi(r, �i) · d
d�i
∫ Rmax r
(R − r)hi(R; �i) dR + V ssi1 · d
d�i Pr[Ri > r] + (V sfi1 − V
ss i1 ) ·
d d�i
Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r].
The effect of �j on �̂i(r, �j ) depends upon the last term, whose sign depends upon the nature of the externality. From Assumption 3, Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r] is increasing in �j∀�i, and decreasing in �i∀�j . From Proposition 1, when s < sc (˛) or ˛ > ˛c (s) (negative externality), we obtain V sf
i1 < V ss
i1 . It follows that
in this case, �̂i(r, �j ) is increasing in �j . The result for the positive externality case follows analogously.
Finally, �̂i(r, �j ) is decreasing in s (for given ˛) and increasing in ˛ (for given s) since (i) V sf i1
is the only
term in the derivative above that depends on s and ˛, and (ii) from Lemma 1, V sf i1
is increasing in s (for given ˛) and decreasing in ˛ (for given s). �
Proposition 2. We prove both parts of the proposition for the best-responses, next demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium, and then the results carry over to the equilibrium best-responses.
For the best-responses: (i) Part 1. The derivative w.r.t. �i in Lemma A.3 can be rewritten as
XRi(r, �i) · d
d�i
∫ r 0
(r − R)hi(R; �i) dR + V ssi1 · d
d�i Pr[Ri > r, Rj > r] + V sfi1 ·
d d�i
Pr[Ri > r, Rj < r].
The first term, the preference for higher risk due to truncated first-period payoff, is positive by Assumption 2 whereas the next two terms, the risk-reducing effect of the second period charter-values, are negative by Assumption 3. Thus, at low charter-values V ss
i1 and V sf
i1 , the first term dominates implying
�̂i(r, �j ) ≡ �max, whereas at high charter-values, we obtain an interior solution �̂i(r, �j ) ∈ [0, �max). (ii) Part 2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.
Next, we demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium. Consider the Nash equilibrium of the two banks for a given level of r. Both banks are price-takers. Thus, their best-responses are obtained as ˝i(r, ˝j ) = [�̂i(r, �j ), X̂Ri(r, �j ), �i]. From Lemma 2, we have �i = �h for s < sc (˛) and �i = �l for s > sc (˛). Further, Lemmas A.2–A.3 imply that ∀s, ˛, X̂Ri(r, �j ) and �̂i(r, �j ) are monotone and continuous in �j .
It follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem that a Nash equilibrium given by the investment choices, ˝∗
i (r) and ˝∗
j (r), exists ∀r, with �∗
i = �∗
j . In equilibrium, market-clearing for the safe asset
determines its return r = f ′ [∑
i Di0 −
∑ i X∗
Ri (r)
] . Thus, we define a map r̂(r) = f ′
[∑ i Di0 −
∑ i X∗
Ri (r)
] .
V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255 253
Under an additional technical condition that guarantees interior solution for X∗ Ri
, the fixed-point r∗
exists by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. �
Lemma 3. The proof requires several steps: Let
(i) W̄1(r, s, ˛) ≡ 2 · [(R̄ − r)X̂R(r) − ˛ · c(X̂R(r)) + (1 + r)D1 − ∫ r
0 ı(r, R)X̂R(r)h(R; �min) dR + (r − 1)sD1],
where X̂R(r) = XR(r, �min), given by Eq. (4.14) for a given value of ˛. Then, some algebra reveals that W ss1 + W
ff 1 = W̄1(rss1 , 0, 1), and W
sf 1 + W
fs 1 = W̄1(r
sf 1 , s, ˛), s ∈ [0, 1), ˛ ∈ [˛min, 1]. Note that we
have assumed symmetry of the states “sf” and “fs.” (ii) For D1 sufficiently high, (d/dr)W̄1(r, s, ˛) > 0. Differentiating (i) w.r.t. r yields
d dr
W̄1(r, s, ˛) = 2 · [
(1 + s)D1 − X̂R(r) (
1 + d dr
∫ r 0
ı(r, R)h(R; �min) dR
)] ,
which is greater than zero ∀s if X̂R(r) ∈ (0, D1), as is assumed throughout the paper. (iii) Let s = 0. In this case, rsf1 = f ′[D1 − X̂R(r
sf 1 )] (for given ˛) and r
ss 1 = f ′[2(D1 − X̂R(rss1 ))] (with ˛ = 1).
We have rss1 < r sf 1 (as in the proof of Proposition 1). It follows that W̄1(r
ss 1 , 0, 1) < W̄1(r
sf 1 , 0, ˛)
from (ii) and the fact that W̄1(r, s, ˛) is decreasing in ˛ (can be verified easily). (iv) In the extreme, let s = 1. In this case, rsf1 = f ′[2D1 − X̂R(r
sf 1 )] (for given ˛) so that r
sf 1 < r
ss 1 . Thus,
it is important now to consider the overall effect of s on W̄1(·). We can write W̄1(rss1 , 0, 1) − W̄1(r
sf 1 , s, ˛) = [W̄1(rss1 , 0, 1) − W̄1(r
sf 1 , 0, ˛)] + [W̄1(r
sf 1 , 0, ˛) − W̄1(r
sf 1 , s, ˛)].
The second term above equals −2 · (1 + rsf1 ) · sD1 < 0. This captures the loss to the depositors in the joint failure state. The first term is negative whenever rsf1 > r
ss 1 , the case of negative externality.
However, it need not be negative when s is large as it implies rsf1 < r ss 1 . However, as D1 increases, the
difference between rsf1 and r ss 1 becomes smaller (since f (·) is concave) so that the first term becomes
less positive and the second term becomes more negative. Thus, for the case of negative externality or more generally when D1 is sufficiently high, we can assure that ∀s, W̄1(rss1 , 0, 1) < W̄1(r
sf 1 , s, ˛), i.e.,
W ss1 + W ff 1 < W
sf 1 + W
fs 1 , as required. The requirement that D1 be sufficiently high becomes weaker as
˛ decreases since the first term above decreases in ˛. �
Proposition 3. First, we rewrite the expected continuation value of the economy as
W ss1 +(W sf 1 − W
ss 1 ) · Pr[Ri>r, Rj <r]+(W
fs 1 −W
ss 1 ) · Pr[Ri<r, Rj >r]+(W
ff 1 − W
ss 1 ) · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r],
in turn rewritten as
W ss1 +(W sf 1 −W
ss 1 ) · Pr[Rj <r]+(W
fs 1 −W
ss 1 ) · Pr[Ri<r]+(W
ff 1 + W
ss 1 −W
sf 1 − W
fs 1 ) · Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r].
From Lemma 3, we have W sf1 − W ss1 < 0, W fs 1 − W ss1 < 0, and also W
ff 1 + W ss1 − W
sf 1 − W
fs 1 < 0.
Consider the maximization problem of the aligned banks (Eq. (4.16)). Increasing �i and �j given the best-response XRi(r, �i) (Eq. (4.14)) increases (i) the costs of distress through ı(r, R) term (Assump- tion 2), and (ii) the losses in continuation welfare of the economy through Pr[Ri < r], Pr[Rj < r], and Pr[Ri < r, Rj < r] terms (Assumptions 2 and 3). Thus, the best-response of aligned bank is �̂i(r, �j ) = �min, ∀r, �j , ∀i. Further, the correlation � affects only the joint failure term in the representation above which is negative. It follows now from Assumption 4 that � = �l .
Next, we show that the equilibrium exists. Denote X̂Ri(r) = XRi(r, �̂i(r, �j )) = XRi(r, �min), with XRi(r, �i) as in Eq. (4.14). Market clearing for the safe asset in equilibrium requires r = f ′
[∑ i Di0 −
∑ i XRi(r, �min)
] . The fixed point, ro, exists as in the proof of Proposition 2, yielding the
equilibrium [ro, �o = (�min, �min), X oR = (X̂RA(ro), X̂RB(ro)), �o = �l ]. � Corollary 1. Compare the first order conditions in the intermediated and the aligned case, Eqs. (4.12) and (4.14), respectively. Since c′(·) > 0, we have X∗
Ri (r, �i) > X
o Ri
(r, �i), where we have used the super-
254 V.V. Acharya / Journal of Financial Stability 5 (2009) 224–255
scripts ∗ and o for the intermediated and the aligned case, respectively. Since �o i
= �min, and �∗i > �min, it follows that X̂ o
Ri (r) = X o
Ri (r, �o
i ) < X∗
Ri (r, �o
i ) < X∗
Ri (r, �∗
i ) = X̂∗
Ri (r), where the last inequality follows
from Lemma A.2. At equilibrium, r∗ = f ′ [∑
i Di0 −
∑ i X̂∗
Ri (r∗)
] , and ro = f ′
[∑ i Di0 −
∑ i X̂ o
Ri (ro)
] .
Suppose that ro > r∗. Then, ro < f ′ [∑
i Di0 −
∑ i X̂ o
Ri (ro)
] < f ′
[∑ i Di0 −
∑ i X̂ o
Ri (r∗)
] <
f ′ [∑
i Di0 −
∑ i X̂∗
Ri (r∗)
] = r∗, a contradiction. The last inequality follows from the observation
that X̂∗ Ri
(r) (and also X̂ o Ri
(r)) is decreasing in r, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1. Hence, we must have ro < r∗, which in turn implies X o
Ri < X∗
Ri in equilibrium. �
Proposition 7. The banks prefer low correlation of asset returns to high iff their value net of the dilu- tion cost of capital, V old
i (·), is decreasing in �. In other words, we need (d/d�)V old
i (·) < 0. Differentiating
Eq. (6.1) w.r.t. � and using the chain-rule, this is equivalent to requiring
−�′ i (Ki) ·
dKi d�
+ (V sf i1
− V ss i1 ) ·
{ d
d� Pr[Ri > R
c i , Rj < R
c j ] + d
dRc i
Pr[Ri > R c i , Rj < R
c j ] ·
dRc i
dKi · dKi
d�
}
be < 0. Note that Rc i
= r · (1 − (Ki/XRi)), so that (dRci /dKi) = −(1/XRi) · r. The equation above can be rearranged to obtain the necessary and the sufficient condition as stated in Proposition 7. �
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265–293.
- A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation
- Introduction
- General overview
- Model overview
- Related literature
- Model
- Systemic risk-shifting in the intermediated economy
- Equilibrium in the intermediated economy
- The first-best: equilibrium in the aligned economy
- Individual and systemic risk-shifting
- Design of bank closure policies
- Systemic moral hazard
- The incentive role of bank sales
- Design of capital adequacy regulation
- Suboptimality of myopic capital adequacy
- Correlation-based capital adequacy
- Discussion: implications for current regulation
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- Regularity assumptions on risky technology
- Proofs
- References
1-s2.0-S1572308910000306-main.pdf
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Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Financial Stability
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j f s t a b i l
ow well do aggregate prudential ratios identify banking system problems?
artin Čihák a,∗, Klaus Schaeck b,1
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 700, 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20431, USA Bangor Business School, University of Wales, Hen Goleg, College Road, Bangor, LL572DG, UK
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history: eceived 18 April 2008 eceived in revised form 26 March 2010 ccepted 26 March 2010 vailable online 3 April 2010
EL classification:
a b s t r a c t
Aggregate prudential ratios have become a mainstay of financial stability analysis. But how reliable are these indicators when it comes to distinguishing between strong and weak banking systems? We address this issue by analyzing the performance of aggregate prudential ratios in systemic banking crises, drawing upon a large cross-country dataset. We caution against sole reliance on these indicators, and advocate supplementing them with other tools and techniques. Nonetheless, our findings offer evidence that some of the ratios can help identify systemic banking problems.
44 21 28
eywords: inancial soundness indicators
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
o d o a g r o
r n i ratios aiming to measure soundness of banks and their corporate and household counterparts (Sundararajan et al., 2002).5
anking crises acroprudential analysis
. Introduction
Reflecting the high costs of banking crises,2 banking sector sta- ility has received increased attention in policy discussions in the ast two decades. The debate acquired a new level of urgency when anking systems around the world experienced major disruptions
n 2007–2009. An important question in those discussions is how to measure
trengths and weaknesses of banking systems, so that problems t the systemic level can be properly identified and addressed. he monitoring and analysis of systemic stability often employs ggregate prudential ratios, such as the banking system capital dequacy ratio (CAR), nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total loans,
nd return on assets in the banking system. Surveys of financial tability reports published by central banks find that virtually all uch reports use aggregate prudential ratios in their financial sta- ility assessment (Čihák, 2006; Oosterloo et al., 2007).3 The use
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 202 623 8931; fax: +1 202 589 8931. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Čihák), [email protected]
K. Schaeck). 1 Tel.: +44 1248 38 8540; fax: +44 1248 38 3228. 2 According to Hoggarth et al. (2002), banking crises have on average been asso-
iated with output losses equivalent to 15–20% of annual GDP. 3 The surveys also indicate wide variation in the usage of the data (with only a inority of the reports providing the data in a comprehensive table) and in the
c
c q u
l s (
( n w
572-3089/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. oi:10.1016/j.jfs.2010.03.001
f such ratios, though less ubiquitous, is also common in aca- emic articles on financial stability, including those in the Journal f Financial Stability.4 For example, Sorge and Virolainen (2006) pproximate banking sector soundness in Finland by the (aggre- ate) ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans, and estimate the elationship between this variable and a set of macroeconomic and ther explanatory variables.
Reflecting on the perceived importance of aggregate prudential atios, substantial efforts have been devoted on national and inter- ational levels to define and compile so-called financial soundness
ndicators (FSIs). These FSIs are a subset of aggregate prudential
But what do the aggregate prudential indicators actually indi- ate? In particular, are these FSIs able to identify instabilities
overage of individual indicators (with capital adequacy ratios being the most fre- uently used, and indicators of sensitivity to market risk being the least commonly sed). 4 In a full-text ScienceDirect search of academic articles on financial stability pub-
ished in 2004–2008 (including those from the Journal of Financial Stability), 54% of uch articles contained at least one reference to aggregate prudential indicators excluding theoretical articles and other items without empirical content).
5 Appendix A provides an overview of the FSIs. International Monetary Fund 2004) provides the detailed FSI definitions. Cross-country data from a coordi- ated compilation exercise by the IMF and national authorities are available at ww.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/cce/index.htm.
Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 131
o q 1 e i n o b g t i i o
b d c o s
t a o
2
c n u i D
u T a t o f o t
v e a i r fi t
c o e D e b i s a
l B c
Table 1 Key descriptive statistics of the sample.
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Min Max
Core set Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
15.02 6.13 −5.0 65.7
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans
8.34 7.84 0.3 37.9
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital
35.43 53.37 −15.3 422.6
Return on equity 15.57 13.72 −78.6 114.8 Encouraged set
Capital to assets 8.87 4.47 2.0 49.7 Total debt to equity
74.85 47.03 0.4 416.2
Return on equity 9.35 9.52 −18.7 54.1
l l t p
t s q r r s d D 1 D o i a t D d i r r w c o
b d t
M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of
f banking systems? In this paper, we attempt to answer these uestions. Drawing upon a set of aggregate prudential ratios for 00 developed and developing economies, we present the first conometric analysis of the applicability of these ratios for the dentification of banking problems. We employ parametric and onparametric techniques to establish the extent to which a set f aggregate prudential ratios is able to explain the emergence of a anking crisis. Our paper is the first that systematically uses aggre- ate prudential ratios to examine whether they are beneficial for he identification of banking crises. Also, unlike most of the exist- ng early warning system literature, the models presented here nclude indicators that capture information about the soundness f the nonfinancial sector.
To preview our results, we find that certain indicators, such as anks’ return on equity and corporate leverage, are useful for the etection of banking system vulnerabilities. We also find that the ontemporaneous capital adequacy ratio and the contemporane- us ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans provide warning ignals for systemic banking problems.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the litera- ure on models of banking crises. Section 3 describes the dataset, nd performs an initial analysis. Section 4 presents the method- logical approach and the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
. Models of banking crises: literature survey
A substantial body of literature exists on models of banking rises. However, its findings are far from conclusive, highlighting a eed for further research. Also, the literature has so far made little se of aggregate prudential ratios such as the FSIs. The following
s a brief overview of the models (for details, see Breuer, 2004 or avis and Karim, 2008).6
The so-called first-generation models (e.g., Miskhin, 1978) draw pon the experience of the Great Depression in the United States. hey hypothesize that a dire macroeconomic setting adversely ffects banks’ borrowers and subsequently impacts upon the banks hemselves, setting off bank runs that ultimately lead to the closure f financial institutions. Calomiris and Mason (1997), using data rom the 1932 Chicago bank panic, analyze contagion effects on ther institutions that arise from deposit withdrawals. However, hey do not find that such contagion effects lead to insolvency.
Second-generation models focus on depositor behavior and iew banking crises as self-fulfilling prophecies or “sunspot” vents. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) contend that banking crises re unrelated to the business cycle. Rather, sudden shifts in depos- tors’ expectations can trigger a crisis. By contrast, Gorton (1988) ejects the randomness of bank runs. Using long-term U.S. data, he nds a systematic association between bank runs and recessions hat cause depositors to change their perception of risk.
Third-generation models underscore the role of boom and bust ycles in the economy. Gavin and Hausmann (1996) is an example f this type of model. Their findings were corroborated by oth- rs, such as Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and etragiache (1998), the European Central Bank (2005), and Wong t al. (forthcoming). Contrary to the second-generation models,
anking problems are modeled as arising on the asset side of the
nstitutions. During economic upswings, banks engage in exces- ive lending against collateral such as real estate and equities that ppreciate in value, facilitating a lending boom. A bust results in col-
6 Most of the papers reviewed in this section belong to the early warning systems iterature, which focuses on crisis prediction. However, some of the papers, such as arth et al. (2004), are intended to test hypotheses about the correlates of financial rises, and provide an ex-post assessment.
a t m c o
t o o s
apsing asset prices, leading financial institutions to scale back their ending. Ultimately, this translates into an economic slowdown hat increases borrower default rates. Third-generation models use redetermined (lagged) macro variables as leading indicators.
Fourth-generation models extend the earlier literature by iden- ifying the features of the institutional environment that set the tage for the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, which subse- uently give rise to banking problems. These models accentuate the oles of bureaucracy, protection of shareholder and creditor rights, ule of law and contract enforcement, sophistication of supervi- ory and regulatory frameworks, incentive schemes created by eposit insurance, and of the socioeconomic environment (see, e.g., emirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hutchinson and McDill, 999; Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000; Hutchinson, 2002; Buch and eLong, 2008). Evidence for the impact of the institutional setting n the probability of observing systemic events in banking systems s, however, mixed. While the generous design of deposit insur- nce schemes tends to destabilize banking systems, in particular if he political setting is insufficiently developed (Demirgüç-Kunt and etragiache, 2005), Barth et al. (2004), drawing upon a World Bank atabase for bank regulation and supervision, fall short of provid-
ng statistically significant evidence for the hypothesis that a strong egulatory environment bolsters financial soundness. More recent esearch by Das et al. (2004) finds some evidence that countries ith a higher quality of financial sector policies are better able to
ontain the effects of macroeconomic pressures on the overall level f stress in the financial system.
A rapidly growing body of literature has focused on market- ased indicators, such as the distance to default or the subordinated ebt spread, as early warning indicators for banking problems on he micro level (e.g., Gropp et al., 2004). An advantage of this pproach is that it builds upon forward looking information, con- ained in market prices. Its key disadvantage is its reliance on
arket prices derived from liquid markets. This limits its appli- ability to banking systems for which such information cannot be btained.
Overall, no clear agreement has yet been reached in the litera- ure on models and indicators for systemic banking problems. One f the remaining issues to be addressed relates to the development
f a commonly agreed set of indicators for the build-up of banking ystem vulnerabilities.
132 M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
Table 2 Banking crises since 1994.
Economy Crisis Economy Crisis
Argentina 1995, 2001–2004 Latvia 1995–1996 Armenia 1994–1996 Lithuania 1995–1996 Azerbaijan 1995–1996 Malaysia 1997–2001 Bangladesh 1994–1996 Mexico 1994–2000 Bolivia 1994–2004 Mozambique 1994–2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994–2004 Nicaragua 1994–2004 Brazil 1994–1999 Nigeria 1994–1995 Bulgaria 1996–1997 Paraguay 1995–2000 Cameroon 1995–1998 Philippines 1998–2002 China 1994–2004 Poland 1994–1995 Colombia 1999–2000 Romania 1994–1996 Costa Rica 1994–1997 Russian Federation 1995, 1998–1999 Croatia 1998 Sierra Leone 1994–1996 Czech Republic 1996 Slovak Rep. 1994–1995 Ecuador 1995–2004 Slovenia 1994 Estonia 1994–1995 Sweden 1994 Finland 1994 Thailand 1997–2004 Ghana 1997–2004 Tunisia 1994–1995 Hungary 1994–1995 Turkey 1994, 2000–2004 India 1994 Uganda 1994–1997 Indonesia 1994–1995, 1997–2004 Ukraine 1997–1998 Italy 1994–1995 United Kingdom 2007– Jamaica 1996–2000 United States 2007– Japan 1994–2004 Uruguay 2002–2004 Kenya 1994–1995 Venezuela 1994–1997 Korea, Rep. of 1997–2002 Zambia 1995 Kyrgyz Rep. 1994–2002 Zimbabwe 1995–1996
N of the V indic
3
3
v 1 o i c s v a c m
w f I o e f
m c t f c T ( p
b k
•
•
t t S p t sources for the time horizon for which the banking ratios are available. In total, 54 countries experienced episodes of banking problems during that time (Table 2).
ote: An observation is classified as a crisis if it is identified as such in at least one alencia (2008). Included are only crises in countries for which financial soundness
. Review of the data
.1. Dataset
The dataset for this study includes FSIs and other explanatory ariables (Appendix B) for 100 economies (Appendix C) between 994 and 2007. To draw upon a sufficiently large dataset, we focus n the core FSIs (on regulatory capital, asset quality, and profitabil- ty of deposit-taking institutions) and two FSIs for the nonbank orporate sector (profitability and leverage). The choice of this sub- et is driven by availability considerations (only for the utilized ariables a sufficient number of observations was recorded) as well s by multicollinearity issues (variables that capture the same risk ategory are too closely correlated to be included all in the same odel). The data on the aggregate prudential ratios used in this study
ere collected during IMF missions. Some countries still deviate rom the definitions in the Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness ndicators (IMF, 2004) because adjusting to the Guide’s method- logy takes time. Nonetheless, the IMF mission teams strived to nsure that the indicators are consistent with the definitions put orth in the Guide.
Our FSI data are available from 1994 onwards, as the IMF issions started to include FSIs only recently. The data for most
ountries end in 2007, since the data in a number of coun- ries are available with a substantial lag. The data have annual requency (some countries provide also quarterly FSIs, but cross- ountry comparable data are available on an annual basis only). he descriptive statistics of the prudential ratios used in this study
Table 1) indicate a substantial degree of variability in the sam- le.
For the dependent variable (i.e., whether there was a systemic anking crisis in a given country in a given year), we utilize two ey data sources:
i t
following two databases: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Laeven and ators are available (Appendix C).
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) provide a recent survey of systemic banking crises, and report 77 systemic banking crises in 1980–2002. To classify a crisis as systemic, they require that at least one of the following conditions be met: (i) nonperforming assets exceed 10% of total banking system assets; (ii) the cost of the rescue operation was at least 2% of GDP; (iii) banking sector problems resulted in large scale nationalizations of banks; or (iv) extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the authorities. Laeven and Valencia (2008) is an update of a much-used crisis database by Caprio et al. (2005) that offers an overview of sys- temic and nonsystemic banking problems since the 1970s. The authors define systemic banking crises as episodes during which much or all bank capital was exhausted—as compared to non- systemic banking crises, i.e., episodes of banking problems of a smaller magnitude. Using these criteria, they identify 124 sys- temic banking crises in 95 countries from the early 1970s up to 2007.
If an economy is identified as experiencing a crisis in a cer- ain year in at least one of the above two databases, we classify he observation as a crisis; otherwise, it is classified as non-crisis.7
ince availability of aggregate prudential ratios constrains our sam- le to the period 1994–2007, we disregard banking problems prior o 1994 and only report the crisis episodes identified in the two
7 As a robustness test, we have required an observation to be identified as crisis n both databases to classify it as a crisis. Given the similarities of the two databases, his does not have a material impact on our results.
M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 133
Fig. 1. Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (3-year time window surrounding the crisis date).
Fig. 2. Capital to assets (3-year time window surrounding the crisis date).
Fig. 3. Nonperforming loans to total gross loans (3-year time window surrounding the crisis date).
134 M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
Fig. 4. Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital (3-year time window surrounding the crisis date).
e window surrounding the crisis date).
3
t c r l i d c o
i p I s t b i t d v
Fig. 5. Return on equity (3-year tim
.2. Behavior of financial soundness indicators during crises
Prior to undertaking a rigorous econometric analysis, it is useful o inspect visually how selected banking ratios evolve in times of rises. In this section, we present the development of five of these atios 3 years before and 3 years after the crisis. However, this pre- iminary inspection of the dataset does not account for differences n countries’ regulatory and supervisory environments, since these iagrams cannot capture the nature and structure of the individual ountries’ financial systems, their supervision and their monetary perations.
The evolution of regulatory capital/risk-weighted assets, cap- tal/assets, nonperforming loans/total gross loans, NPLs net of rovisions to capital and return on equity is plotted in Figs. 1–5.
ncluded are crisis episodes as identified in Table 2, given that a ufficient number of observations per country are available to draw hese diagrams. The horizontal axis records the number of years
efore and after the crisis and the vertical axis records the level
n percent of the FSI under consideration. The solid line represents he mean for all the crisis countries available and the dotted lines enote plus/minus one standard deviation. Fig. 6 contrasts mean alues and standard deviations of three of the selected ratios with Fig. 6. Crisis versus non-crisis countries.
M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Finan
Table 3 Differences of means between crisis and non-crisis countries.
Crisis countries (mean)
Non-crisis countries (mean)
t-test
Capital/risk-weighted assets
15.96 14.55 2.63***
Capital/assets 10.18 8.01 5.33***
Nonperforming loans/total loans
11.96 7.37 7.00***
Return on equity (banks)
12.50 15.33 5.56***
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to
45.40 36.54 0.99
N s
n e
c b t t r t
s i u a l
r i a i
e n c t
N n p w
t T c a “ r s i
c r t i t m v e p s i i f
o w c p
a p i t tries for these variables (Table 3). For four of the five variables
capital
otes: The table reports t-tests (absolute values) for the equality of means for elected prudential ratios. *** Significance on the 1% level.
on-crisis countries (defined as those that had no crisis over the ntire sample period).
Fig. 1 illustrates that the cross-country variation of regulatory apital dips slightly at the time of the crisis. However, it cannot e inferred that the capital adequacy ratio sends a strong signal in he run up to a banking crisis. In the aftermath of a crisis, regula- ory capital increases, which is due to the frequently higher capital equirements in the period after an episode of financial turmoil and he shoring up of reserves in financial institutions.
In contrast to the CAR, the capital to asset ratio increases con- iderably in the period prior to the crisis. This may be because nstitutions are building up capital buffers in anticipation of reg- latory pressure to increase reserves against asset malfunction. An lternative explanation is that high income results from cyclically arge increases in retained earnings.
The ratio of NPLs to total gross loans behaves intuitively. The ise prior to a crisis implies deteriorating asset quality in financial nstitutions. When a crisis fully materializes, nonperforming loans re fully recognized with a time lag and the level decreases again n subsequent years. This pattern is fully aligned with theory.
Similar to the previous chart, Fig. 4 further supports the hypoth-
sis that NPLs are an appropriate indicator for asset quality. NPLs et of provisions to capital increase in the run up to a crisis, indi- ating that financial systems recognize poor asset quality; it seems o also indicate that provisioning lags behind the recognition of
u l t i
Fig. 7. Type I/Type II error for capital a
cial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 135
PLs before crises, which may affect, inter alia, perceptions of vul- erability. A further increase follows after the onset of a systemic roblem. Both plots show large degrees of variation in the data, hich suggests that these measures are very ‘noisy’ in character.
Fig. 5 depicts that banks’ return on equity remains fairly stable in he period immediately prior to the crisis and declines afterwards. he lack of any deterioration of return on equity at the time of a risis may be due to the increased risk taking behavior of bank man- gers as they become aware of impending problems. They might gamble for resurrection” at that time and boost profits in the short un by undertaking risky investments. Only after the onset of a cri- is, the ratio declines considerably, indicating substantial problems n banking systems.
Fig. 6 highlights the differences in the banking ratios between risis and non-crisis countries. It appears counterintuitive that egulatory capital and capital to assets are higher in crisis coun- ries than in non-crisis countries. However, this may be due to ncreased pressure in these countries to shore up capital reserves o absorb losses. Moreover, more volatile markets or more risky
arkets are encouraged by the Basel Committee on Banking Super- ision to consider higher levels of capital. Alternatively, developing conomies may consider higher levels of capital adequacy to under- in adherence to the Basel standard or to compensate for a weaker upervisory and regulatory environment. Finally, banks operating n high risk countries can restrain their lending activities by lend- ng only to governments and other low risk borrowers. All these actors are possible explanations for this finding.
The higher ratio of NPLs to total gross loans and the higher level f NPLs net of provisions to capital in crisis countries are aligned ith theory, and so is the lower ratio of return on equity in crisis
ountries in comparison to economies that did not suffer banking roblems.
In sum, visual inspection of the behavior of the banking ratios round the crisis date suggests that some key ratios are appro- riate candidates for the identification of banking problems. The
nferences from the visual inspection are confirmed when we use -tests for the equality of means between crisis and non-crisis coun-
nder investigation we observe significant differences at the 1% evel. In particular, deteriorating asset quality as proxied by the wo variables that capture NPLs is a good precursor for deteriorat- ng banking system soundness. As our preliminary analysis does
dequacy to risk-weighted assets.
136 M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
error
n t s
3
w p a
t e t a d
Fig. 8. Type I/Type II
ot consider the relationship between different banking ratios, we urn to econometric models to account for this problem in our ubsequent discussion.
.3. Nonparametric tests
To motivate the econometric analysis in the following section, e utilize several nonparametric tests for the selected aggregate rudential ratios. Nonparametric tests do not impose distributional ssumptions upon the data, and the inferences drawn from such
e o
d d
Fig. 9. Type I/Type II error for nonperfo
for capital to assets.
ests are therefore considered more robust than parametric mod- ls (such as logit models). An additional benefit is the ability of he nonparametric tests to illustrate the classification accuracy of ggregate prudential ratios over different threshold levels. Their rawback is the difficulty of analyzing the interaction among differ-
nt indicators and the environment in which financial institutions perate.
We acknowledge that benchmarks for such aggregate bank level ata may vary across different countries and that hardly any evi- ence exists in the literature regarding critical threshold levels for
rming loans to total gross loans.
M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 137
rform
c r n t r t
o d a s w p
h c i a m
t a
g b 9 b t i
o b c t
Fig. 10. Type I/Type II error for nonpe
ertain indicators, such as the CAR or NPL ratio. Nevertheless, we egard the following exposition as useful to illustrate the discrimi- ative power of the selected ratios, since the supportive results for he benefit of some of the indicators obtained from the economet- ic analysis are (at least partially) confirmed by the nonparametric ests.
Figs. 7–11 plot Type I and Type II Error classification accuracy ver different cutoff levels for each indicator. The solid line in the iagrams represents Type I Errors, the erroneous classification of crisis as an episode of no banking problems. If an indicator pos-
esses strong discriminative power, the area under the two curves ill be small, while a large area indicates poor discriminative ower.
Fig. 7 illustrates that the capital adequacy ratio alone does not
ave strong discriminative power. The area underneath the two urves is sizeable, suggesting that capital adequacy is at best weakly ndicative of the build-up of banking problems. For instance, with cutoff level of 14%, more than 50% of the observations would be isclassified. Also, the chart leads to a question whether the (arbi-
i r
s l
Fig. 11. Return on e
ing loans net of provisions to capital.
rary chosen) capital adequacy minimum of 8% is sufficient and ppropriate for both macro- and microprudential analysis.
Fig. 8 provides a similar picture for the capital to asset ratio, sug- esting that it is also only of limited benefit for the discrimination etween sound and unsound banking systems. At a cutoff level of %, only 40% of the crises are correctly classified. However, as this roader measure of the capital buffer increases, the misclassifica- ion decreases considerably, indicating some discriminative power n the capital to assets ratio.
Compared with the two measures for capital adequacy, the ratio f NPLs to total loans (Fig. 9) has more power to discriminate etween sound and unsound banking systems. For example, at a utoff point of 3%, 94% of all crises are correctly classified, although his low cutoff point gives rise to a Type II Error of 66%. This result
ndicates that the ratio is still a rather ‘noisy’ indicator, and solely elying on one indicator ought to be avoided.
The ratio of NPLs net of provisions to capital (Fig. 10) has a lightly lower discriminative power than the ratio of NPLs to total oans. For example, at a cutoff level of 10%, more than 66% of crises
quity (banks).
1 Finan
a m f
c t c a
r w w F C n i p v m s h
F c a m l o m
u t o b b d e a fi e f
4
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38 M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of
re correctly classified whereas 73% of non-crisis observations are isclassified as crisis episodes. Again, this underscores that proxies
or asset quality are ‘noisy’ indicators. Banks’ return on equity (Fig. 11) has a substantially higher dis-
riminative power, indicated by the relatively small area under the wo curves. For example, at a cutoff point of 12%, 64% of crises are orrectly classified, with a relatively low percentage of 35% false larms (Type II Errors).
The above discussion underscores that analyzing individual atios in isolation does not allow distinguishing precisely between eak systems and strong ones. However, the results improve when e analyze combinations of the ratios. To illustrate this point,
ig. 12 plots the CAR against the ratio of NPLs to total gross loans. risis episodes are expected to be clustered in the shaded area in the orthwest region. Indeed, a number of the crisis observations are
ndeed located in the shaded area, although others are widely dis- ersed in the diagram. This suggests that these two commonly used ariables do have some justification for being used in the assess- ent of banking system vulnerabilities; however, some banking
ystems experienced episodes of turmoil despite having relatively igh reported CARs.
The above findings are reiterated for other combinations of the SIs, such as the combination of CAR with NPLs net of provisions to apital (Fig. 13). Some crisis observations are located in the shaded rea, but others are again widely dispersed. This suggests that a ore rigorous econometric analysis may be needed. In particu-
ar, the aggregate prudential ratios may have to be combined with ther variables, such as those capturing the institutional environ- ent in which banks operate. In sum, the figures indicate that aggregate prudential ratios are
seful for discriminating between sound and unsound banking sys- ems. The results from the nonparametric tests indicate that return n equity (banks), and NPLs to total loans are indicative of the uild-up of banking vulnerabilities, but measures for the capital uffer to absorb losses do not seem to be good candidates for the iscrimination between sound and fragile banking systems. How- ver, as underscored in the introduction to this section, we caution gainst solely relying on these indicators without considering the nancial system and the surrounding regulatory and supervisory nvironment because nonparametric tests cannot account for these actors.
. Econometric analysis
We test the applicability of the subset of banking ratios for the dentification of banking crises using a multivariate logit model or a pooled dataset of 100 economies (listed in Appendix C) in 994–2007.8 The probability of observing a banking crisis in econ- my i in year t is modeled as a function of a set of prudential ratios, enoted FSIi,t , and a set of macroeconomic and other control vari- bles, denoted Controli,t :
i,t = f (FSIi,t , Controli,t ). (1)
Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), we estimate he logit model without the inclusion of a country fixed effect to lso include countries that never experienced a banking crisis. The
8 In Čihák and Schaeck (2007), we present also a duration model that reiterates he finding from the logit model that bank return on equity on the aggregate level s a strong indicator for increased vulnerability of the banking system. The findings rom the duration model provide evidence for positive relationship between banks’ eturn on equity and the timing of systemic crises.
a s b t q c t a t b
cial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
stimated log-likelihood function is
nL = ∑
t=1...T
∑
i=1...n {P(i, t) ln[F (ˇ′X(i, t))]
+ (1 − P(i, t)) ln[1 − F (ˇ′X(i, t))], (2) here P(i, t) characterizes the banking crisis dummy variable
equal to 1 if there is a crisis, and 0 otherwise), ˇ denotes the ector of coefficients, and X describes the vector of explanatory ariables. For the logit regressions presented below, we report arginal effects calculated at the sample mean. This reflects that
he magnitude of the change in the probability of a crisis depends n the initial values of all the independent variables and their coef- cients. Presenting marginal effects therefore better illustrates the conomic significance of the relation between the explanatory vari- bles and the crisis-probability. All regressions are estimated with obust standard errors.
We focus on a subset of prudential ratios, for two reasons. First, nly a limited set of ratios is available on a comparable basis for ll economies in the sampling period. Second, many ratios aim o capture similar risk categories. For example, asset quality can e captured by the ratio of NPLs to total gross loans or by other ariables, such as the ratio of NPLs net of provisions to capital. ncluding them in a regression equation simultaneously gives rise o collinearity problems. Based on these considerations, we limit he subsequent exposition to a set of three FSIs from the core set nd two FSIs from the encouraged set.
Table 4 reports the regression results for various specifica- ions of the logit model for the pooled dataset. Specification I is a arsimonious set up that only includes commonly utilized macroe- onomic variables; the rest of the specifications also includes rudential ratios. Specifications II–V and X–XI employ contempora- eous prudential ratios whereas we lag the ratios in specifications I–IX by one period to test sensitivity to lag structures. Specifi- ations I, IV, V, and VIII–X include credit to the private sector and redit growth. Specifications X and XI are estimated on a subsample hat excludes the observations for 1994 and 1995 (to assess robust- ess with respect to sample selection). Specification XII shows the esult when we drop advanced economies.
The results suggest that several prudential ratios provide accu- ate signals for the probability of observing systemic banking roblems and are therefore beneficial for macroprudential anal- sis. Both the contemporaneous and the lagged ratio of capital to isk-weighted assets consistently show the anticipated negative ign across the various specifications. The contemporaneous ratio nters significantly (at the 10% level) in specifications III and V, here the two proxies for the corporate sector are included in
he equation. However, capital adequacy is sensitive to the lag tructure because lagging this variable by one period renders it nsignificant. We also find that declining asset quality, reflected n increases of nonperforming loans to total loans, is indicative f impending banking turmoil at the 10% level in specifications II nd III. However, this ratio is only significant when included as a ontemporaneous variable. In contemporaneous specifications IV nd V, where the two additional macroeconomic control variables re included, the ratio of NPLs to total loans is close to the 10% ignificance level (p-values 10.5% and 11%). Lagging the variable y one period renders it insignificant as illustrated in Specifica- ions VII–IX. This may be due to the fact that deteriorating asset uality is only appropriately accounted for by banks when the
risis materializes. In contrast, return on equity (banks) enters at he 1% level throughout all specifications where prudential ratios re incorporated, irrespective of the lag structure. This indicates hat deteriorating profitability is a good predictor for a systemic anking crisis. These results are consistent with those reported by
M .Č
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6 (2
0 1
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3 0
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1 3
9 Table 4 Logit regression results.
Variable and expected sign
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Constant −0.8691*** −1.2475*** −1.2822*** −1.2369*** −1.2629*** −1.1221*** −1.1699*** −1.1090*** −1.1452*** −1.2685*** −1.2854*** −1.1036*** (0.1049) (0.1394) (0.1432) (0.1403) (0.1445) (0.1376) (0.1420) (0.1393) (0.1443) (0.1487) (0.1492) (0.1382)
GDP growth (real)
− 0.0003 −4.41E−05 −0.0004 0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0014) M2/reserves + 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0013** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0014***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) Real
interest rate
+ 0.0000 0.0001 1.60E−05 0.0001 6.88E−06 3.03E−05 −2.50E−05 2.34E−05 −3.93E−05 7.23E−06
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Inflation + 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) GDP per
capita (real)
− −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Fiscal bal-
ance/GDP − −2.62E−13 −9.53E−13 −3.48E−12 1.21E−13 −2.56E−12 −1.63E−12 −3.99E−12 −8.16E−13 −3.52E−12 −2.13E−12
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Credit to
the private sector
+ −1.99E−05 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −2.61E−05 −0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) Credit
growth (real)
+ −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Capital/risk- weighted assets
− −0.0004 −0.0005* −0.0004 −0.0005* −0.0005* −0.0005* −0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) NPLs/total
loans + 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005* 0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Return on
equity (banks)
− −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Return on
equity (corpo- rates)
− 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Debt/equity
(corpo- rates)
+ 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
1 4
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Table 4 (Continued )
Variable and expected sign
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Capital/risk- weighted assetst − 1
− −2.02E−05 −0.0001 −2.71E−05 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) NPLs/total
loanst − 1 + 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Return on
equity (banks)t − 1
− −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007*** −0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00020 Return on
equity (corporates)t − 1
− 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) Debt/equity
(corporates)t − 1 + 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Type I Error (%)
12.17 23.48 26.52 23.04 26.09 13.04 14.35 13.48 15.22 27.12 27.25 24.18
Type II Error (%)
60.35 43.91 40.58 44.14 42.41 54.02 47.36 53.56 47.24 45.71 45.78 44.92
�2 74.64*** 93.19*** 107.22*** 93.94*** 108.30*** 84.09*** 96.93*** 84.96*** 98.20*** 108.92*** 109.04*** 109.38***
Akaike’s Informa- tion Criterion
0.9740 0.9599 0.9499 0.9619 0.9525 0.9672 0.9592 0.9701 0.9617 0.9313 0.9308 0.9302
McFadden R2
0.0661 0.0826 0.0951 0.0833 0.0960 0.0746 0.0859 0.0753 0.0871 0.1192 0.1185 0.1189
All the logit regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, reported in parentheses. The dependent variable takes on the value one if a crisis is observed and zero otherwise. An economy is defined to be in a crisis if it is classified as such in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) or Laeven and Valencia (2008). Specification I only includes macroeconomic variables commonly used in the early warning systems literature. Specifications II–V and X–XI add contemporaneous prudential ratios, whereas in specifications VI–IX the prudential ratios are lagged by one period. Specifications I, IV, V, and VIII–X include credit to the private sector and credit growth. Specifications X and XI are estimated on a subsample that excludes the observations for 1994 and 1995. Specification XII is estimated on a subsample excluding advanced economies, as defined in IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
* Significance on the 10% level. ** Significance on the 5% level.
*** Significance on the 1% level.
M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 141
tal gr
t t p a o t s
c a w i s e a p G l a c p B e c
r i
t a ( r w a u
R
t t i
m t c l t A p t a
E m w t w t c u t
Fig. 12. Nonperforming loans to to
he European Central Bank (2005). Whereas return on equity in he corporate sector does not provide any indication of banking roblems, corporate leverage as proxied by the debt/equity ratio lways enters positively at the 1% level in both the contemporane- us and the lagged model specifications. This underpins the view hat increasing corporate debt is a robust precursor for banking ystem fragility.
Among the control variables, we find a consistently signifi- ant and positive relationship between the probability of crisis nd the ratio of M2 to reserves.9 This is aligned with the early arning system literature, reiterating that exposure to sudden cap-
tal outflows foreshadows the deteriorating soundness of banking ystems. Another consistently significant variable is the level of conomic development, approximated by GDP per capita. We find negative relationship between the level of development and the robability of suffering a crisis. In other words, countries with lower DP per capita are more likely to run into systemic banking prob-
ems. This may be due to a relatively lower quality of governance rrangements and the weaker institutional framework in those ountries. Indeed, we obtain similar results when we replace GDP er capita by the regulatory quality variable produced by the World ank as part of the governance indicators database, derived from xtensive global surveys of views of a large number of enterprises,
itizens and expert survey respondents.10
Contrary to some previous studies, we do not find significant elationships between banking system fragility on one hand and nflation, real interest rates, credit growth, and real GDP growth on
9 The early warning systems literature tends to use the ratio of M2 to reserves o approximate the risk of destabilizing foreign exchange outflows (see, e.g., Davis nd Karim, 2008). An alternative is to replace M2 in the numerator by a narrow more specific) indicator of debt exposure, namely short-term debt. We re-run the egressions with short-term debt, defined as all debt to nonresidents falling due ithin 12 months (Appendix B) instead of M2, and obtained similar results (positive
nd significant coefficients, at the same significance level). The results are available pon request. 10 The dataset is available at www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. esults available upon request.
t t i f t c o
g t m
v
oss loans versus capital adequacy.
he other hand.11 Similarly, fiscal balance in percent of GDP shows he expected negative sign across all specifications, but it is also nsignificant.
We assess performance of the logit regressions based on the odel �2 and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). The values for
he �2 statistic suggest that the null hypothesis that all the slope oefficients are equal to zero can be rejected at the 1% significance evel for all model specifications. The AIC is a model selection statis- ic that penalizes for adding regressors; the model with the lowest IC is preferred. Based on the AIC, specifications III (for the full sam- le), XI (for the subsample excluding the early years), and XII (for he subsample excluding advanced economies) perform best; they ll include selected prudential ratios.
Classification accuracy can be evaluated using Type I and Type II rrors. A Type I Error occurs if a crisis episode is not captured by the odel, whereas a Type II Error is the misclassification of a country ith a sound banking system as a crisis country. We employ a neu-
ral cutoff probability of 0.209 that equals the frequency of years ith banking crises in the sample for the estimation procedure. In
erms of Type I Error, the models classify between 12% and 27% of all risis observations incorrectly. The number of false alarms reaches p to 60% in the models that exclude prudential ratios. When con- emporaneous prudential ratios are included, this figure declines o less than 41% in specification III, which is according to the AIC he most appropriate model setup for the full sample. Overall, the n-sample performance of the model is far from perfect, but satis- actory, and compares well with the early warning literature (see he survey in Davis and Karim, 2008). This underscores the fact that onsideration of prudential ratios is beneficial for the identification f systemic banking problems.
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 will provide a testing round for out-of-sample performance of the model. It is clear at his point that the reported aggregate prudential ratios missed the
ark in the case of the U.S. banking system (identified as being
11 We also experimented with different lag structures for the real credit growth ariable. The results are not affected and the variable itself remains insignificant.
142 M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of Financial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144
to ca
i t i i i m p p 2
e t e l
r i s
5
m i t I o
n l u m d b b
I r
i c b i fi l f r d r
t i s t t t t t ( f t c s fi c
A
t E A
Fig. 13. NPLs net of provisions
n “crisis” since 2007 by Laeven and Valencia, 2008), although he ratios would perform better if they included the structured nvestment vehicles (SIVs) and other parts of the “shadow bank- ng system.” The model would likely have provided some useful ndication in other cases (e.g., Iceland, Latvia, and several emerging
arket economies), although a formal analysis of out-of-sample erformance is difficult given that the crisis is still ongoing and the ublicly available crisis databases have not been updated beyond 007.
To provide a further robustness test of the results, we re- stimated all the model specifications using first differences rather han levels. The results (available upon request) confirm the infer- nces drawn from the specifications where the variables enter in evels.
In sum, the logit probability model suggests that prudential atios are of benefit for macroprudential analysis. Of primary mportance is the ratio of return on equity of banks, which is a trong indicator of the build-up of banking vulnerabilities.
. Conclusion
Aggregate prudential ratios are often used to describe develop- ents in banking system soundness. In this paper, we analyze the
nformation content of those indicators, and specifically, whether hey help in identifying banking crises in a broad set of countries. n doing so, we contribute to the literature aiming to explain the ccurrence of banking crises.
Our findings underscore that aggregate prudential indicators eed be interpreted with care. Such indicators may disguise prob-
ems in individual banks or groups of banks. Also, these ratios are sually based on regulatory data, which are backward looking, and ay not capture sensitivity to future shocks. Moreover, some of the
ata may be subject to smoothing. Bank resolutions may take place
efore allowing the problems to be reflected in the data, and some anks may even engage in “creative accounting” in difficult times.
Nonetheless, our analysis does yield some interesting results. n particular, it suggests that a number of the aggregate prudential atios (especially those that aim to capture asset quality) behave
J f R i T
pital versus capital adequacy.
n an intuitive way in crisis countries, and that some of the ratios an be useful for identifying weak banking systems. In particular, ank return on equity and (non-bank) corporate leverage are good
ndicators for the build-up of systemic banking problems. We also nd some evidence that the contemporaneous ratio of NPLs to total
oans and the contemporaneous capital adequacy ratio are useful or the identification of banking turmoil. Moreover, our results cor- oborate the hypothesis that banking problems tend to occur in less eveloped economies vulnerable to sudden capital outflows. This esult is in line with the work by Davis and Stone (2004).
In sum, the available data are supportive of the hypothesis hat aggregate prudential ratios provide signals for the build-up of mbalances in banking systems. Aggregate prudential ratios offer ome benefit to the macroprudential analyst. However, close atten- ion needs to be paid to the construction of these ratios to ensure hat all the relevant exposures are included (and not excluded, as in he above-mentioned case of the “shadow banking system”). Even hen, the ratios need to be used jointly with other tools, both quanti- ative (e.g., stress tests or market-based indicators) and qualitative e.g., assessment of the supervisory, regulatory, and institutional ramework for the financial sector). Market-based and other quan- itative indicators can provide information on the probability of a risis, and stress tests can help quantify the impact of such a cri- is. The qualitative information can be used to assess the ability of nancial institutions and supervisors to mitigate the impacts of a risis.
cknowledgements
We thank two anonymous referees, Iftekhar Hasan (the edi- or), Ken Jones, late Mark Swinburne, Robert Corker, Sean Craig, nrica Detragiache, Daniel Hardy, Richard Podpiera, Roland Straub, madou Sy, Kal Wajid, Rita Babihuga, Alfredo Leone, Armida San
ose, and Andreas Georgiou. We also received valuable feedback rom conference and seminar participants at the FDIC Federal eserve Bank of Cleveland Conference on “Identifying and Resolv-
ng Financial Crises”, and at the International Monetary Fund. Kalin intchev’s work on data collection is highly appreciated.
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M. Čihák, K. Schaeck / Journal of
ppendix A. Financial soundness indicators
Core set Deposit-taking institutions
Capital adequacy Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets Regulatory tier I capital to risk-weighted assets Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital
Asset quality Nonperforming loans to total gross loans Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans
Earnings and profitability Return on assets Return on equity Interest margin to gross income Noninterest expenses to gross income
Liquidity Liquid assets to total assets Liquid assets to short-term liabilities
Sensitivity to market risk Net open position in foreign exchange to capital
Encouraged set Deposit-taking institutions Capital to assets
Large exposures to capital Geographical distribution of loans to total loans Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital Trading income to total income Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses Spread between reference lending and deposit rates Spread between highest and lowest interbank rate Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans Foreign currency-denominated loans to total loans Foreign currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities Net open position in equities to capital
Other financial corporations Assets to total financial system assets Assets to GDP
Nonfinancial corporations sector Total debt to equity Return on equity Earnings to interest and principal expenses Net foreign exchange exposure to equity Number of applications for protection from creditors
Households Household debt to GDP Household debt service and principal payments to income
Market liquidity Average bid-ask spread in the securities market Average daily turnover ratio in the securities market
Real estate markets Real estate prices Residential real estate loans to total loans Commercial real estate loans to total loans
ource: International Monetary Fund (2004). b
cial Stability 6 (2010) 130–144 143
ppendix B. Explanatory variables
Variable Definition Source
GDP growth Year-on-year change in real GDP (in %)
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
M2 to reserves Ratio of broad money to official foreign exchange reserves
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Short-term debt to reserves All debt to nonresidents falling due within 12 months, divided by official foreign exchange reserves
International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
Real interest rate Real interest rate (%) World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Inflation Rate of change of GDP deflator (%)
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
GDP to capita GDP per capita (constant 2000, in USD)
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Fiscal surplus to GDP Ratio of government surplus in percent of GDP
World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Credit to the private sector Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector
International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
Credit growth Year-on-year change in real credit (%)
International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
Regulatory quality indexa An index of regulatory quality based on a World Bank survey of views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents.
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
Capital adequacy ratiob Total regulatory capital in the banking system, in percent of aggregate risk-weighted assets in the system
IMF staff reports (International Monetary Fund)
Nonperforming loans to total gross loansb
Nonperforming loans, percent of total gross loans in the banking system
IMF staff reports (International Monetary Fund)
Return on equity (banks)b Aggregated returns as percent of aggregated equity, for banks
IMF staff reports (International Monetary Fund)
Return on equity (corporates)b , c
Aggregated returns as percent of aggregated equity, for corporates
Corporate Vulnerability Database (International Monetary Fund)
Debt to equity (corporates)b , c
Aggregated debt as percent aggregated equity, for corporates
Corporate Vulnerability Database (International Monetary Fund)
a See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp for details. b For a detailed description, see International Monetary Fund (2004). c The corporate sector data are available for publicly listed corporations. To
ccount for cross-country differences in equity market depth, the data are weighted
y stock market capitalization to GDP.
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ppendix C. Composition of the sample
The sample used in this paper covers the following jurisdictions: Angola Kyrgyz Republic Argentina Latvia Armenia Lebanon Australia Lithuania Austria Luxembourg Azerbaijan Madagascar Bangladesh Malaysia Belarus Malta Belgium Mexico Bolivia Moldova Bosnia and Herzegovina Morocco Botswana Mozambique Brazil New Zealand Bulgaria Nicaragua Cameroon Nigeria Canada Norway Chile Pakistan China Panama Colombia Paraguay Costa Rica Peru Croatia Philippines Czech Republic Poland Denmark Portugal Dominican Republic Romania Ecuador Russia Egypt Saudi Arabia El Salvador Senegal Estonia Sierra Leone Finland Singapore France Slovak Republic Gabon Slovenia Germany South Africa Ghana Spain Greece Sri Lanka Honduras Sweden Hong Kong SAR Switzerland Hungary Taiwan Iceland Thailand India Tunisia Indonesia Netherlands, the Ireland Turkey Israel Uganda Italy Ukraine Jamaica United Arab Emirates Japan United Kingdom Jordan United States Kazakhstan Uruguay Kenya Venezuela Korea, Republic of Zambia Kuwait Zimbabwe
ote: The list of crisis episodes as used in this paper is presented in Table 2.
eferences
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nternational Monetary Fund, 2004. Compilation guide on Financial Soundness Indicators, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2004/guide/index.htm. IMF, Washington.
aeven, L., Valencia, F., 2008. Systemic banking crises: a new database. IMF Working Paper 08/224. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
iskhin, F., 1978. The household balance sheet and the Great Depression. Journal of Economic History 38, 918–937.
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undararajan, V., Enoch, C., San José, A., Hilbers, P., Krueger, R., Moretti, M., Slack, G., 2002. Financial Soundness Indicators: analytical aspects and country practices. IMF Occasional Paper No. 212. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
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- How well do aggregate prudential ratios identify banking system problems?
- Introduction
- Models of banking crises: literature survey
- Review of the data
- Dataset
- Behavior of financial soundness indicators during crises
- Nonparametric tests
- Econometric analysis
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- Financial soundness indicators
- Explanatory variables
- Composition of the sample
- References
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Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Financial Stability
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j f s t a b i l
acroprudential stress testing of credit risk: A practical approach or policy makers�
aniel Buncic a,1, Martin Melecky b,c,∗
Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University of St. Gallen, Bodanstrasse 6, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland Financial and Private Sector Development Europe and Central Asia, World Bank Group, Mail Stop H4-410, Washington, DC, USA Department of Economics, Technical University of Ostrava, Sokolska 33, Ostrava, Czech Republic
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history: eceived 24 August 2011 eceived in revised form 10 April 2012 ccepted 12 November 2012 vailable online 4 December 2012
EL classification: 28 58
a b s t r a c t
Drawing on the lessons from the global financial crisis and especially from its impact on the banking systems of Eastern Europe, the paper proposes a new practical approach to macroprudential stress testing. The proposed approach incorporates: (i) macroeconomic stress scenarios generated from both a country specific statistical model and historical cross-country crises experience; (ii) indirect credit risk due to foreign currency exposures of unhedged borrowers; (iii) varying underwriting practices across banks and their asset classes based on their relative aggressiveness of lending; (iv) higher correlations between the probability of default and the loss given default during stress periods; (v) a negative effect of lending concentration and residual loan maturity on unexpected losses; and (vi) the use of an economic risk
21
eywords: acroprudential supervision
tress test ndividual bank data
weighted capital adequacy ratio as the relevant outcome indicator to measure the resilience of banks to materializing credit risk. The authors apply the proposed approach to a set of Eastern European banks and discuss the results.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
t c t t a o
t
astern Europe
. Introduction
The financial crisis has revealed the need for better macropru- ential oversight and a more appropriate policy response. It is idely accepted in the literature that the contribution of financial
ector stability and its maintenance are vital for economic growth. ny disruptions to the functioning of the financial sector due to xcessive exposures to risk and financial deleveraging are known to
e detrimental to economic growth, resulting in reduced incomes, reater income inequality, reduced employment levels and social nrest. With every financial crisis or disruption of the functioning of
� We would like to thank, without implications, Martin Čihák, Joaquin Gutierrez, aría Soledad Martínez Pería, two anonymous referees and Iftekhar Hasan (the
ditor) for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The views and pinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the World ank or its Executive Directors. ∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 202 473 1924.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Buncic), [email protected] (M. Melecky).
URLs: http://www.danielbuncic.com (D. Buncic), http://www.mmelecky.ic.cz M. Melecky).
1 Tel.: +41 71 224 2604.
t p t s c p d p e g d p g f 2
572-3089/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2012.11.003
he financial system, confidence in such a system and its potential ontribution to economic growth can decline. Vigilant pruden- ial monitoring of financial systems that supports informed and imely policy decisions on supervisory interventions and appropri- te changes in financial regulation are therefore an important task f any supervisory institution.
The main tool of macroprudential monitoring is regular stress esting of the financial system. Stress testing is particularly impor- ant during periods of benign conditions when the memory of ast detrimental events has faded out. The development, institu- ionalization and regular application of stress tests forces financial ector specialists, supervisors and policy makers not to forget past rises and thus enhances macroprudential monitoring and crisis reparedness. Despite the widely recognized importance of con- ucting stress tests, there appears to be a consensus among macro- rudential practitioners that stress tests were not informative nough and did not enforce an adequate policy response prior to the lobal financial crisis (Haldane, 2009; Čihák, 2007; Turner, 2009; e Larosiére, 2009; Sorge, 2004; Galati and Moessner, 2011). This
artial failure of stress tests has led to the development of a new eneration of stress testing models based on the lessons learned rom the recent crisis (Foglia, 2009; Swinburne, 2007; Breuer et al., 009; Schechtman and Gaglianone, 2012; Huang et al., 2012).
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It is important that both key macroprudential and micropru- ential aspects are appropriately incorporated when constructing acroprudential stress tests. This being said, it has to be empha-
ized that macroprudential stress tests need to capture different eatures than standard microprudential stress tests which are com-
only applied to individual banks. The reason for this is that acroprudential stress tests need to be explicitly linked to chang-
ng macroeconomic conditions. They also need to be tractable and asily understood by policy makers who have to be able to detect he main risks to the banking system at various levels of aggrega- ion, i.e., at the individual bank level, the bank group level and at he system level, in order to serve as a useful tool for policy analysis nd as a unifying framework for policy debate.
Recent history has shown that credit risk is at the heart of sol- ency problems in the banking sector, manifesting itself largely hrough balance sheet and cash flow solvency problems of banks.2
he objective of this study is to design a credit risk stress testing ethodology that can be used for macroprudential monitoring and hich reflects on the impact of the global financial crisis on the
anking systems of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was arguably ne of the most heavily affected regions by the spillovers from he global financial crisis (World Bank, 2008). This paper thus evelops and illustrates with an empirical application a compre- ensive stress-testing framework of credit risk that is flexible, yet till tractable enough to be useful for practical macroprudential onitoring and informative for policy decision-making. The flex-
bility of the approach is particularly appealing as it allows the tress tester to further develop or replace individual components s modeling technology and data become available. Our proposed pproach also introduces, with the use of simple functional forms, ew credit risk penalties that incorporate microprudential as well s macroprudential risks, which have often been neglected in exist- ng stress-testing methodologies.
The proposed stress testing methodology produces outcome ndicators that account for systemic as well as idiosyncratic eco- omic risks at the level of an individual bank and the banking sector. his is accomplished by integrating the following components into he proposed stress testing methodology. First, we explicitly link on-performing loans to changing macroeconomic conditions by stimating the elasticities of non-performing loans to a set of key acroeconomic variables. This captures the systemic transmis-
ion from the macroeconomy to the performance of bank credit ortfolios. Second, we construct macroeconomic Stress scenarios
n two different ways, where one is based on a country specific acroeconomic model, and the other is computed from historical acroeconomic data of countries that have experienced financial
rises in the past. Third, we allow the sensitivity of credit risk o changing macroeconomic conditions to increase during crisis imes. Fourth, we approximate the underwriting standards of indi- idual banks by the aggressiveness of their lending in the individual sset classes at the peak of the most recent credit cycle or during the ost recent credit boom period, and penalize banks that grew their
sset class faster than the average bank. Fifth, we employ a bank nd asset class specific penalty linked to the share of unhedged for- ign currency lending. Sixth, we build on the results of the study by oody’s (2010) and allow the correlation between the probability
f default and the loss given default to increase in times of stress. eventh, we account for a bank’s lending concentration within indi- idual asset classes in the computation of the bank and asset class
2 This should not, however, diminish the importance of appropriately integrating tress tests for any of the idiosyncratic risks that banks face in their operations in ddition to credit risks. In that regard, the interplay between credit risk and liquidity isk is especially important.
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pecific capital charges.3 These seven components are combined to onstruct a more relevant outcome indicator for measuring bank esilience to macroeconomic as well as bank specific shocks.
Some of the early stress testing approaches which were ntended for use by policy makers, as, for example, that of Čihák 2007), are fundamentally financial simulations where no formal inks to the macroeconomy are established. These approaches are till being used by many institutions, especially in emerging mar- et economies, as they are tractable and easily understood by policy akers compared to some of the more data intensive and complex
rameworks. In the latter frameworks, the mechanics underlying he model are hidden away and the intuition about the links to and nfluences from the macroeconomy is non-transparent or unavail- ble. Currently, there exists a substantial interest in connecting he macroeconomy to the financial sector more formally. This has ed practitioners to use regression techniques to more explicitly ink non-performing loans, loan loss provisions or probabilities f defaults to macroeconomic fundamentals (Sorge, 2004; Foglia, 009).
The effect of macroeconomic variables on bank losses has also een analyzed by means of loss distribution simulations, where he joint loss distribution of banks is constructed with Copulas (see asurto and Goodhart, 2009; OeNB, 2010, among others). Others, uch as De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2010) estimate factor models to tudy the systemic effects of financial stresses. The estimated mod- ls are subsequently used for forecasting purposes and to provide arly warning signs of possible future financial crises.
Another stream of policy research has focused on accounting or feedback effects from the financial sector to the real econ- my. This is implemented by designing structural macroeconomic odels (and more recently Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
ium models) where a financial sector is explicitly incorporated nto the model to capture the systemic effects that the finan- ial sector has on the real economy. The implementation of these odels, nonetheless, comes at the cost of having a higher level
f aggregation so that the risk profiles of individual banks and heir heterogeneous behavior are not studied (Kumhof et al., 2010; hristiano et al., 2010).
While retaining tractability, our methodology attempts to mprove on existing approaches in the literature by linking the nancial sector explicitly to the macroeconomy and accounting for oth systemic risk factors due to changing macroeconomic con- itions as well as for idiosyncratic risk factors due to the diverse
ending practices and risk profiles of individual banks. It should e emphasized that each component of the proposed stress test-
ng framework presently constitutes a separate research agenda n the literature. The objective of the proposed methodology is hus not to improve on current frontier models of the individual omponents, but rather to provide policy makers and practition- rs with an integrated, flexible and policy relevant tool that can e readily implemented. We illustrate the usefulness of the pro- osed methodology for policy decision making with an empirical pplication to a set of Eastern European banks and an ensuing dis- ussion of the results in regards to their potential implications for upervisors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 ives a conceptual outline of the proposed stress testing method-
logy. Section 3 discusses the generation of the macroeconomic cenarios. Section 4 shows how that the systemic and idiosyncratic isk factors are constructed. Section 5 describes the computation
3 We handle the effect of maturity transformations on capital charges similarly o the approach in Basel II and leave the individualized computation of the average
aturity of liabilities (funding) for future research.
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f credit risk exposures and exposures at default. Section 6 dis- usses the main stress test outcome indicators. Section 7 contains n empirical application of the proposed methodology using data of astern European banks. We also conduct a brief sensitivity analysis nd discuss how to implement the proposed methodology under imited data availability. Section 8 concludes the study.
. Conceptual outline of the proposed stress testing pproach
We begin by providing a conceptual overview of the main egments of the proposed macroprudential stress testing method- logy, which we summarize visually in a flow diagram depicted in ig. 1. The first segment of the stress testing methodology consists f the construction of three macroeconomic scenarios. These are as ollows:
(i) Through-the-cycle (TTC) scenario, (ii) Baseline Point-in-Time (PIT) scenario, and iii) Stress scenario.
The purpose of the TTC scenario is to quantify the equilibrium r the steady state of the economy. The baseline PIT scenario cap- ures the predicted macroeconomic developments under normal conomic conditions covering the time interval of the stress test- ng period which is typically one year and corresponds in principle o mean or consensus point forecasts over that interval. The Stress cenario is constructed from two different approaches: the first one s a model based, country-specific Stress scenario, where we use ime series data to estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model o construct one year ahead forecast densities. For a given macro- conomic variable of interest, we then use either the upper or the ower 1% tail value of the forecast densities, whichever corresponds o the adverse scenario, as a Stress scenario. The second, model-free pproach uses a panel of cross-country data that includes histori- al periods of financial crises. This effectively approximates a “real orld” Stress scenario that captures the actual crisis experience of
large number of countries world wide.4 In Section 3 we discuss he construction of all three scenarios in more detail.
The second segment contains a mapping from each macro- conomic scenario to non-performing loans (NPLs) and then to robabilities of default (PDs).5 This mapping has two parts. The first art uses the elasticity estimates of NPLs to a set of macroecono- ic variables of interest to compute a predicted change in NPLs. The
econd part uses the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition and he existing proportion of foreign currency (FX) denominated loans o relate exchange rate movements to changes in NPLs stemming rom unhedged FX exposures of borrowers. Any risks arising from uch unhedged exposures to exchange rate movements are hereby aptured as indirect credit risk. It is further assumed that implied
hanges in NPLs due to changing macroeconomic conditions move roportionally to changes in PDs under each of the three macro- conomic scenarios that we consider. Increases in PDs are taken
4 Note that this approach partly addresses the proposal of Breuer et al. (2009) to shock” banks from alternative “angles” since the sensitivity of the loss distribution f the banking system varies with different macroeconomic shocks. So here we ffectively employ two different ways to shock the banking system. Čihák (2007) akes a similar argument for reverse-engineering a shock scenario back from a
esired outcome for the system, such as undercapitalization of a certain percentage f banks. 5 Note here that NPLs are measured as ratios and are computed as the share of on-performing loans in total loans. Throughout the text we will simply refer to this atio as NPLs.
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o be proportionally distributed across the asset class specific PDs nder each scenario.6
Evidence from the global financial crisis has shown that dur- ng periods of financial distress the sensitivity of credit risk to hanging macroeconomic conditions increases substantially. This bservation has been emphasized previously in the literature by, mong others, Drehmann and Manning. (2004), Virolainen (2004), lves (2005), Pesaran et al. (2006), Peura and Jokivuolle (2004), nd Bangia et al. (2002). We address this effect practically by sing short-term multipliers from the estimated NPL regression o approximate the mapping to NPLs in the PIT scenario (i.e., dur- ng normal times) and long-term multipliers in the Stress scenarios. his effectively introduces a non-linearity into the response of NPLs o the macroeconomic variables.
The third segment constructs bank-specific PDs and LGDs for ach asset class. This is done by taking the aggregate PDs and eighting them by a bank and asset-class specific penalty func-
ion that is designed to approximate the relative underwriting tandards of banks. The penalty function compares each individ- al bank’s credit growth to the average credit growth of the entire anking system at the peak of the most recent credit cycle or the
atest positive credit growth. The idea here is to approximate the bad vintage effect” that arises due to weaker underwriting stan- ards during credit booms by the relative aggressiveness of a bank’s
ending in each asset class.7 The bank and asset class specific PDs re then linked to LGDs by means of a correlation parameter. We ollow the approach outlined in Moody’s (2010) to calibrate this orrelation parameter to be larger during stress times than during ormal times.
The fourth segment constructs the exposures at default (EADs) or each bank using the asset class categories of Basel II. In principle, i) an on-balance sheet and (ii) an off-balance sheet exposure. Off- alance sheet exposures include items such as pre-approved limits or credit cards, overdrafts and credit lines. In some countries, these xposures are published as part of the Pillar III regulatory informa- ion disclosure for each bank and asset class and could therefore be ublicly available.
In the fifth segment, the capital charge equation of Basel II is sed to compute bank and asset class specific risk weights which
ncorporate an adjustment term for maturity mismatches based on he average residual maturity of a bank’s asset class. Additionally, e include a penalty function to individualize asset performance
orrelations for each bank and asset class, based on the relative oncentration of a bank’s lending within that asset class. For this, e use the share of the ten largest borrowers in the asset class or the erfindahl–Hirschman (HH) index as a measure of concentration.8
e further condition the maturity transformation adjustment term n the average maturity of a bank’s liabilities.
In the fifth segment we also compute a number of outcome indi- ators of interest. These include the difference between Loan Loss eserves (LLR) and Expected Losses (EL) as a share of regulatory apital, which is an indicator of the scale of potential underprovi- ioning, along with the number of underprovisioned banks in the
anking system and the absolute amount of missing provisions in he system. Further, we construct the effective capital buffer as the atio of the regulatory capital adjusted for the difference between
6 Details regarding which asset classes we consider are provided later on in Sec- ion 4.1.
7 For instance, during the last credit boom, most Eastern European countries expe- ienced their fastest credit growth in 2007. Therefore, we use the growth in annual redit from 2006 to 2007 in each asset class to construct the bank specific penalty ater on in the empirical application in Section 7.
8 One can also use the regional and/or sectoral concentration of bank lending in hat asset class as an alternative measure.
350 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
ts of t
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Fig. 1. Conceptual overview of the main segmen
rofits, loan loss reserves and expected losses to the risk weighted ssets that account for the aggregate macroeconomic and bank pecific economic risks that we consider.
. Construction of macroeconomic scenarios
When constructing a macroeconomic scenario, it is important hat a point of reference is established that corresponds to the long- un equilibrium or steady-state of the economic system of interest. n what follows, the through-the-cycle concept provides such a ref- rence point, where the steady-state is represented by the average alue of the macroeconomic variables over a typical business or redit cycle.9 This concept and its relationship to the Point-in-Time nd stress concepts is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The left panel of Fig. 2 shows the TTC, PIT and Stress scenar- os in the context of a general business or credit cycle. Notice that he abnormal part of the business cycle (red line), which should e covered by capital buffers, causes the long right tail in the loss istribution that is shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. Because of the kewness of the loss distribution, the expected loss (EL) over the usiness cycle is located to the right of the mode of the loss distribu- ion. Expected losses thus correspond economically to the loan loss eserves which should be built up during the upside, and depleted uring the downside of a regular business cycle. Loan loss reserves, onetheless, are generally not intended to be used for hedging the nexpected losses (UL) in the downside of an abnormally severe usiness cycle. For this purpose, capital buffers should be available nd used.
We will first outline how the macroeconomic scenarios can be onstructed before we describe how these macroeconomic scenar- os are translated into the risk factors that are shown in the flow
hart of Fig. 1. We should emphasis here that the macroeconomic cenarios that we consider are constructed as a joint event includ- ng all macroeconomic variables. For example, the Stress Scenario
9 We use the terms credit cycle and business cycle interchangeably in the escription of the methodology, although they clearly do not need to be the same onceptually or empirically. Nonetheless, the terminology and the notion of a down- urn (trough), an upturn (peak) and other related terms are also commonly used n the business cycle literature. For this reason we do not explicitly differentiate etween the two.
c o i t f t a b m
s
he macroprudential stress testing methodology.
ased on international experience described in Section 3.3 consid- rs as a stress event all macroeconomic variables (jointly) taking on he values that are reported in the second last column of Table 3.
.1. TTC and PIT scenarios
Through-the-cycle (TTC) values of the macroeconomic variables f interest can be constructed in a number of different ways. The implest way is to use the arithmetic mean computed from histor- cal data. When this strategy is followed, care needs to be taken hat the average is calculated over a sufficiently long horizon, cov- ring preferably several business cycles, including normal as well s abnormal ones. It is particularly important to account for struc- ural breaks and transitional convergence when these averages re computed for emerging market economies, as it is likely that teady-state values have changed over time. This can be achieved y employing statistical methods that are robust to structural hanges and outliers. It may also be appropriate to consult expert udgment when dealing with substantial transitional or structural hanges.
Another way to compute TTC values would be to use the uncon- itional means implied by a statistical model of the macroeconomy. he benefit of using this approach is the flexibility of being able o include structural shifts and dummy variables in the model if eeded. Nonetheless, if the data span is too short, the cost of this pproach is a decline in the precision of the estimated parameters eeded to construct the unconditional means.
Point-in-Time (PIT) values can also be obtained in a number of ifferent ways. One possibility is to use consensus forecasts for the ext four quarters from the relevant national authorities such as the entral bank and the national statistical agency or any other private r public agencies that compute such forecasts at the country level, ncluding the Economic Intelligence Unit, the International Mone- ary Fund, the World Bank and other IFIs. If more than one such orecast is available and deemed relevant, one can simply compute he average over the different individual forecasts that are avail- ble. Alternatively, it is possible to get the PIT values from a model
ased forecast such as from a VAR model or any other structural odel that is available for this purpose. The Stress scenario can be seen as a special case of the PIT
cenario and could thus be generated from the tail value of the
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 351
ontex
p t 1 e v e t a c e a l fi a s i e p s
3
f t r e E
S B d t I b t o v s
i h p a l
u c t o
c c t f t b t
( (
e w p w d i
Fig. 2. TTC, PIT and stress concepts in the c
rojection densities from an estimated theoretical or purely statis- ical model. The appropriate tail value could be, for example, the % adverse percentile of the forecast distributions of the macro- conomic variables, as opposed to the mean or median forecast alues used in the baseline PIT scenario. Such an approach would nsures that empirical links among the macroeconomic variables hat form the Stress scenario are preserved. We suggest to use such
model based approach in Section 3.2.10 Nonetheless, there exist riticisms in the literature that mainstream macroeconomic mod- ls have rather strong equilibrating properties that preclude the dequate analysis of large and sustained departures from the equi- ibrium (steady state), such as those that commonly characterize nancial crises. For instance, Čihák and Schaeck (2010) argue for
non-parametric approach in the calibration of relevant Stress cenarios. We propose a non-parametric approach in this spirit n Section 3.3, which is based on historical cross-country crises xperience. Overall, we acknowledge the benefits of using both arametric (model-based) and non-parametric (model-free) Stress cenarios and employ both in our proposed methodology.
.2. Country-specific stress scenario
A country-specific Stress scenario can in principle be generated rom any statistical or macroeconomic model that is available for he economy of interest. The complexity of such a model could
ange from something simple such as a VAR model, to a structural conometric model or a fully fledged Dynamic Stochastic General quilibrium (DSGE) model.11 The model that is used should be set
10 Another, computationally more demanding way of constructing a model-based tress scenario that we do not elaborate on in this study is the one proposed by reuer et al. (2009). Breuer et al. (2009) suggest to specify a loss function that epends on macroeconomic variables of interest and then perform a “search” for he combination of adverse scenarios for the variables that produces the largest loss. n our setting the loss could be defined as the absolute financial loss for the entire anking system that is analyzed. However one needs to put plausibility bounds on he macroeconomic variables before performing the search for the worst possible utcome based on the loss function. The resulting values of the macroeconomic ariables that lead to the worst possible outcome are then considered as a Stress cenario. 11 As an example, a simple small scale New Keynesian model for an open economy s estimated in Buncic and Melecky (2008). The use of DSGE models in stress testing as been criticized after the global financial crisis due to their strong equilibrating roperties which, as many argue, make them unsuitable for simulating the on-set nd studying the adjustment process after a major stress to the economy. Neverthe- ess, there are arguments in favor of using some formal (structural) macroeconomic
s s n t
3
a
m o w
v A f u
t of a business cycle and the value at risk.
p in such a way that multiple step-ahead point and density fore- asts can be readily computed. The lower (or upper) tail value of he forecast density can then be viewed as a model based adverse r Stress scenario.12
Our suggestion is to use a simple VAR model to construct the ountry-specific Stress scenario as a viable alternative to more omplex structural models. The minimal VAR that is needed in he stress test should contain the four macroeconomic variables or which the NPL elasticities are estimated (see Section 4.2), as hese represent the transmission channel from the economy to the anking system. The four required macroeconomic variables are he following:
(i) real GDP growth, (ii) CPI inflation, iii) a lending rate and iv) the change in the nominal exchange rate.
Since many macroeconomic variables can be quite volatile in merging economies, it is beneficial to use year-on-year changes hen constructing the growth rates rather than annualized (multi- lied by four) quarter-on-quarter changes. This is the approach that e follow later on in the empirical section of the paper. A concise escription of how a VAR based forecast density can be constructed
s given in Appendix A.1. As discussed earlier, the model based Stress scenario, notwith-
tanding its benefits, is susceptible to the assumed parametric tructure that is imposed on the data. We thus also propose an alter- ative non-parametric approach to construct the Stress scenario in he next section.
.3. Stress scenario based on international experience
There can exist circumstances when it is not possible or accept- ble to employ a model based Stress scenario, due either to the
odels to facilitate policy discussions between, for example, regulators and banks n the appropriate choice of magnitudes of the stresses to be applied and how these ill most likely be transmitted through the financial system and the economy.
12 Whether it is the upper or lower tail value depends on the macroeconomic ariable for which the stress value is constructed. This will become clear later on. lso, if the forecasts of the model are based on simulation techniques so that draws
rom the forecast density are available, then one can simply look at the lower (or pper) percentile values as corresponding stress values.
3 f Finan
l c t a n h s c (
l B w m o e W t a e n c s i
q n S n m a H t r m i a
t c w t i f s m g s
a t t p a a r o i
r t y t
(
t a c t t p t l o i t g
f i ( t t a e t c t “
4
i w t d c T m t S a i 2 J p p w
52 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
ack of available data to formulate a sufficiently adequate statisti- al model, or due to a less favorable view of statistical models inside he policy environment in general. With this in mind, we propose n alternative model-free approach, which we label “Stress Inter- ational” (or Stress Int. for short). This approach looks at the actual istorical evidence of countries that experienced a financial cri- is in the past. Crisis periods are identified using the banking and urrency crises dating database compiled by Laeven and Valencia 2008).13
Given the crisis dates, we extract real GDP growth, CPI inflation, ending rates and changes in the exchange rate from the World ank and the IMF’s IFS databases for the countries (and years) that ent through a financial crisis, and then look at the values of these acroeconomic variables during the crisis years. There are a total
f 161 countries, covering crisis periods dating back as far as the arly 1970s and including the most recent global financial crisis. e are interested in obtaining a representative scenario that cap-
ures the changes in the macroeconomic variables of interest for typical crisis year based on the actual historical cross-country xperience.14 Because of this, we do not take the minimum values or the accumulated sums over a range of years surrounding the risis as is done in Laeven and Valencia (2008), but rather use the ingle year values of the four macroeconomic variables of interest n the particular year that is identified as a crisis.
Note that two types of crises from Laeven and Valencia (2008) ualify as a financial crisis in the construction of our Stress sce- ario based on the historical cross-country experience. These are ystematic Banking Crises and Currency Crises. The Stress Int. sce- ario considers both.15 We compute the average response of the acroeconomic variables during the crisis years, where the aver-
ge is taken over all the countries that experienced a financial crisis. owever, since the database includes a large number of countries,
here exist instances where some of the macroeconomic variables espond to the financial crisis in an economically counterintuitive anner, making it necessary to introduce some additional censor-
ng rules to ensure that only economically meaningful responses re measured.
The following censoring rules were applied. Firstly, we arrange he data so that all crisis years are collected in a vector for each ountry that has gone through a financial crisis. We then look at the orst response in terms of GDP growth for each country by taking
he minimum value over the different crises years. Ideally the min- mum over the crises years should give us the worst case response or each country as actually experienced historically during a cri- is period. Secondly, we take out countries for which the selected
inimum values were positive, that is, when the change in GDP
rowth during the crisis years was greater than zero. This is neces- ary to avoid the inclusion of a country experience that contradicts
13 There exist other methods to classify financial crises in the literature. Also, the nnual dating and resulting zero/one indicators can be appropriately normalized o pay more attention to the month of the year in which the event occurred for he purpose of a regression analysis. An analogous approach can be adopted for the urpose of an even study. Namely, one can calculate the effect of the crises having ligned the crisis dates on a given month rather than a year and then calculate the nnual effect over the subsequent 12 months. We leave this fine-tuning for future esearch given that currently no adequate data are available. We address the issue f counterintuitive crisis outcomes, such as positive GDP growth in a crisis year, by mposing censoring rules in our calculations where such outcomes are discarded. 14 We do not use the crises summary statistics such as output loss and minimum eal GDP growth that Laeven and Valencia (2008) calculate. The reason for this is hat these statistics are computed over a time window of at least 3 years and up to 5 ears around the crisis years. Laeven and Valencia (2008) thus effectively measure he overall cost of the crisis in terms of real GDP growth. 15 Note that these two are often interconnected and referred to as twin crises Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 1999).
t P
a t o a b “
b B t w a T t d c
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
he definition of a systemic financial crisis.16 Thirdly, we employ n outlier robust method to compute the average response of the ountries that have experienced a financial crisis by computing rimmed means. The trimmed means are calculated in such a way hat only the data points that fall within the 2.5th and the 97.5th ercentile are included in the computation. This ensures that only he center of the empirical data, where 95% of the probability mass ies, is included in the averaging. The influence of extreme values n the average response is thus effectively eliminated. The censor- ng rules applied to CPI inflation, the lending rate and changes in he exchange rate are analogous to the ones applied to real GDP rowth.
One last requirement that is imposed is that for each country a ull set of macroeconomic Stress scenarios needs to be present. That s, we require data for each of the four macroeconomic variables real GDP growth, CPI inflation, the lending rate and the change in he exchange rate) to be available for the trimmed mean response o be computed. If, for instance, data on lending rates are not vailable for a particular country, while the remaining three macro- conomic variables are present, then this scenario, and potentially he country itself, is excluded from the calculation of the average risis response. The resulting model free Stress scenario based on he historical cross-country crisis experience is reported under the Stress Int.” heading in Table 3 in Section 7.
. Linking macroeconomic scenarios to credit risk factors
We link the macroeconomic variables to the credit risk factors n two stages. In the first stage, the TTC macroeconomic scenario
hich corresponds to the steady-state reference point is linked o the reference TTC probabilities of default (PDs) and loss given efault (LGDs). Then, the baseline PIT and Stress scenarios, which haracterize the different levels of departure from the steady-state TC scenario, are linked to NPLs and to PDs. We use short-term ultipliers from a fitted dynamic NPL regression to approximate
he mapping in normal times and use long-term multipliers in tress scenarios. Empirical evidence suggests that credit risk factors re much more sensitive to changing macroeconomic conditions n crisis times than in normal times (Drehmann and Manning., 004; Virolainen, 2004; Alves, 2005; Pesaran et al., 2006; Peura and okivuolle, 2004; Bangia et al., 2002). We further assume that the rojected changes in NPLs under the PIT and Stress scenarios are roportional to the changes in PDs in the PIT and Stress scenarios, here the reference points are again the TTC PDs. This completes
he mapping from the macroeconomic scenarios to the aggregate Ds, which represents the systemic component of credit risk.
In the second stage (see Section 4.6), we let the aggregate PDs be ffected by idiosyncratic factors derived from the risk characteris- ics of each individual bank. We augment the aggregate PDs based n an assessment of each individual bank’s risks. This is achieved by
dding bank and asset class specific penalty functions that penalize anks which grew their credit portfolios at a faster rate than the average” of the banking system.
16 To provide an example of such a scenario, consider Lebanon which is identified y the Laeven and Valencia (2008) database to have gone through a Systematic anking and Currency Crisis in 1990. However, (annual) real GDP growth from 1989 o 1991 was −42%, 26% and 38%, respectively for these three years. So GDP growth as an astonishing 26% and 38% for the years from 1990 to 1991 (the year of the crisis
nd the following year) while GDP growth was negative before the financial crisis. his example of the actual historical experience of Lebanon is clearly an exception hat does not follow the typical scenario of a deep downturn in economic activity uring a financial crisis. Including such a country experience in the Stress scenario onstruction would thus not be very informative.
f Finan
i a l r s l d s t c b
4
v c q d c c t t o G
2 S o r n Q
a a W S m c t m f c d
4
e r a a
t F a h f o
B C
a
d e
N
T l a i t c t d r t r v m s t v
i e a e l r c m t o s o c s e d
w income effect of a local currency depreciation and focus solely on approximating the balance sheet (or indirect credit risk) effect on unhedged FX borrowings.23 Indirect credit risk due to unhedged FX
across countries remains a challenge that has been also recognized by international policy makers and plans for greater harmonization in the near future are being discussed in the international fora.
20 Estimating the NPL regression on a relatively short time sample covering a period during which a country could have gone through major structural changes
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
Additionally, if data on foreign currency (FX) denominated lend- ng at the bank level are available, we impose a penalty for above verage FX lending at the individual bank as well as the asset class evel. We assume that LGDs are correlated with PDs where the cor- elation is specified to be stronger in crisis times (Stress scenario) o that the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions is trans- ated, through the PDs and LGDs correlation, from probabilities of efault to losses given default (Altman et al., 2002). We also con- ider the concentration of bank lending in each asset class as well as he average time-to-maturity in the individual asset classes in the omputation of the effective PDs and therefore the effective capital uffer (see Section 6).
.1. TTC macroeconomic scenarios, PDs and LGDs
The purpose behind using the TTC values of the macroeconomic ariables and the TTC PDs and LGDs is to ensure that the cost of redit for banks in the steady-state of the macroeconomy is ade- uately accounted for. Most developing countries lack adequate ata describing historical aggregate PDs and LGDs over a suffi- iently long time period that includes a number of business/credit ycles. We thus suggest to use the TTC PDs and LGDs constructed by he Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) of the Bank for Interna- ional Settlements (BIS) (BIS, 2006). Table 1 shows the magnitudes f the constructed TTC PDs and LGDs for banks belonging to CEBS roup 1, CEBS Group 2 and non-G10 Group 2 countries.17
The reason why we show entries for CEBS and non-G10 Group countries18 here is that the empirical application presented in ection 7 uses data for a group of Eastern European banks. Most f the banks in Eastern European countries are either national or egional banks, or subsidiaries of foreign banks, rather than inter- ational banks. Entries for G10 countries are also provided in the IS5 study and can be retrieved as required.
The main point of reference in our proposed stress testing pproach is the steady-state of the macroeconomy which is associ- ted with the equilibrium through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs and LGDs. e then model departures from this steady-state under the PIT and
tress scenarios using a mapping that relates the changes in overall acroeconomic conditions to the changes in credit risk factors as
aptured by the PDs and LGDs. This is implemented by estimating he elasticities of NPLs with respect to the four main macroecono-
ic variables of interest. This systemic component of credit risk actors is discussed in the next section. The role of individual bank haracteristics, i.e., the idiosyncratic component of risk factors, is escribed in Section 4.6.
.2. Estimating the NPL elasticities
We obtain estimates of the elasticities of NPLs to the four macro- conomic variables of interest by means of a dynamic panel data
egression, using a panel of 54 high and middle income countries nd controlling for the degree of development, financial deepening, nd dollarization (euroization).19 The sample consists of annual
17 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) non-G10 countries hat provided data for the QIS5 study include Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, inland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Poland, and Portugal. Banks that re classified as Group 2 banks are smaller relative to Group 1 banks and do not ave any significant international activities. To be classified as a Group 1 bank, the
ollowing three criteria need to be satisfied: (i) the bank has a Tier 1 capital in excess f D 3 billion, (ii) the bank is diversified and (iii) the bank is active internationally. 18 This group includes the historical experience of developing countries such as razil, Chile, India, Indonesia, and Peru, and of some former transition economies of entral and Eastern Europe. 19 The list of countries that was used in the computation can be obtained from the uthors upon request. One has to point out that the comparability of data on NPLs
i t o a d o i u t 2 e
p
C
t c
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 353
ata over the period from 1994 to 2004.20 The parameters are stimated from the following model:
PLt+1,n = c + �NPLt,n + ˇ1�yt+1,n + ˇ2�t+1,n + ˇ3rt+1,n + ˇ4�et+1,n + ˇ5Zt+1,n + εt+1,n. (1)
he variable NPLt+1,n is measured as the ratio of non-performing oans to total loans.21 The variables �yt+1,n, �t+1,n, rt+1,n and �et+1,n re real GDP growth, CPI inflation, the lending rate and the change n the nominal US dollar exchange rate for country n at time period
+ 1. Zt+1,n is a vector of variables, comprising the log of GDP per apita (constant 2000 US dollars), the credit to GDP ratio, and he share of FX loans in total loans, that control for the degree of evelopment, financial deepening, and dollarization (euroization), espectively. The model is estimated on an unbalanced panel using he GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991).22 The results are eported in Table 2. Since none of the control variables in the Zt+1,n ector are statistically significant in influencing the conditional ean of NPLs and the effect of the nominal exchange rate is also
tatistically negligible, we only report the regression estimates of he main macroeconomic variables of interest, which are also the ariables that we work with empirically hereafter.
The insignificance of the exchange rate comes from the fact that n normal times a local currency depreciation has a positive income ffect which increases the external competitiveness, net exports, nd thereby also the repayment capacity of borrowers in an open conomy. During times of financial crisis, nonetheless, when the ocal currency is expected to depreciate substantially, the local cur- ency value of FX denominated debt, as well as its servicing cost, an increase considerably. These increases thus lead to an impair- ent of the repayment capacity of the debt holder. So there are
wo effects of a local currency deprecation that work effectively in pposite directions: the first one is a positive income effect and the econd is a negative balance sheet effect. The two opposing effects f a depreciation can result in the finding of a statistically insignifi- ant effect of exchange rate changes on NPLs for economies with a ignificant proportion of unhedged foreign currency debt that have xperienced periods of gradual as well as sharp depreciations of the omestic currency,
Since the NPL regression results in (1) are uninformative ith respect to exchange rate changes, we ignore the positive
n the financial sector could be problematic. Similarly, using country specific his- orical data especially for emerging countries, covers only a rather limited number f crises periods. For these reasons, we find the pooled regression approach prefer- ble for the sake of robustness of the acquired estimates, as lower income countries evelop and their own past experience may not be relevant in assessing the impact f possible future crises on their financial system and on the economy. Moreover, f more country specificity is desirable, the pooled regression estimates could be sed as priors in a Bayesian estimation of the NPL regression, including also addi- ional country specific variables, possibly also as latent variables (see, Brand et al., 010, on how latent variables can be incorporated in a monetary polciy modeling nvironment) 21 Note here again that we will simply refer to this variable as NPLs (non- erforming loans) in the text. 22 The results are similar in magnitude to those obtained in a recent study by erutti et al. (2010). 23 We acknowledge that other estimation approaches could be employed to try o isolate and further emphasize the income and balance-sheet effects of a local urrency depreciation on NPLs, such as, for example, including interactive crisis
354 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
Table 1 Selected through-the-cycle (TTC) probabilities of default (PDs) and losses given default (LGDs).
Asset class CEBS Group 1 CEBS Group 2 Non-G10 Group 2
PDs LGDs PDs LGDs PDs LGDs
Corporates 2.20 38.1 0.83 35.2 1.47 na SMEsa 3.26 38.8 3.66 31.7 4.31 49.6 Consumer Mortgage Loans 1.52 21.4 1.39 21.4 17.72 40.4 Consumer Loansb 3.69 55.0 2.33 51.9 11.34 55.7 Other Consumer Loans 4.33 47.9 2.32 42.2 6.22 45.1 Sovereignsc 0.13 27.7 0.04 38.2 0.24 na Banksd 0.22 39.4 0.11 39.4 0.74 na
Data are taken from the QIS5 study conducted by BIS (2006). a Retail. b QRE retail. c Loans to public institutions and state-owned enterprizes. d Loans to credit institutions.
Table 2 NPL regression estimation results.
Variable Estimate Std. error p-Value 95% confidence interval
NPL ratio (t − 1) 0.670 0.138 0 [0.398;0.941] GDP growth −0.262 0.089 0.004 [−0.438 ; −0.086] Inflation 0.131 0.054 0.015 [0.025;0.236] Lending rate 0.206 0.047 0 [0.113;0.299] Constant 0.086 0.102 0.402 [−0.116 ; 0.288] Adj. R-squared 0.69 H0 : No resid AR(1) z =−1.66 ; Prob >z = 0.0969 F(4, 246) 45.86 H0 : No resid AR(2) z =−0.08 ; Prob >z = 0.9343 Number of observations 251 Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: Number of countries 54 Chi2 (16) = 20.88 ; Prob > Chi2 (16) = 0.1830
N where h
e d c h
i o r e c
˛
w n c a s b ( o e c
i p r
l
�
w a l i
s i c
t n t i − t b e r i p c s t i
otes: The estimates were computed with the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator eteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
xposures played an important role in driving the overall credit risk uring financial crisis periods, most recently in Eastern European ountries. We use the assumption that a local currency depreciation as the same effect on NPLs as an increase in the lending rate.24
The sensitivity of NPLs to a local currency depreciation com- ng from the unhedged part of borrowers’ FX exposures is then btained as the product of the estimated elasticity on the lending ate and the share of FX lending. That is, the elasticity of NPLs to xchange rate changes in asset class i of bank j denoted by ˛FX
i,j , is
omputed as:
FX i,j
= ˇ3 × SFX i,j (2) here SFXi,j is the percentage share of foreign currency denomi- ated lending in total lending in asset class i of bank j and ˇ3 is the oefficient on rt+1,n in (1). Notice here that we specify this elasticity t the asset class level of each bank, so it is implicitly assumed that uch data are available. If this is not the case and only bank level, ut no asset class specific data are available, then the SFXi,j term in 2) can simply be replaced by SFXj so that the resulting ˛
FX j
varies
nly across banks but remains fixed over the asset classes held by ach bank. If bank level data are not available either, then SFXi,j ould be set equal to the average share of FX lending in the banking
dentification dummies, or interacting the exchange rate with the data on the ortion of unhedged FX debt. However, we leave this investigation for future esearch. 24 This relation can be derived from a standard UIP condition starting from its og-linear representation
et+1 = rt − r∗t+1 + ut+1 here ut+1 = et+1 − Et (et+1 ) is a zero mean forecasting error (see Svensson, 2000; Galí
nd Monacelli, 2005; Adolfson et al., 2008 for recent implantations in the DSGE iterature). A standard reference that shows that UIP holds over 2–5 year horizons s Chinn and Meredith (2005).
i
a r 1 e a ( t p s t i A u
a maximum instrument lag length of two was used. Standard errors are robust to
ystem, resulting in every bank receiving the same sensitivity to ndirect credit risk due to the local currency depreciation, i.e., one ould set ˛FX = ˇ3 × SFX.
The summary of the estimation results reported in Table 2 shows hat all the coefficient estimates have the expected sign and mag- itude. Note again that these estimates are elasticities. This means hat the coefficient on GDP growth measures the percentage change n NPLs to a 1% change in GDP growth. Thus, a coefficient value of 0.262 implies that a 1% drop in real output growth is expected
o increase the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans y 0.262%. Similarly, increases in lending rates and inflation are xpected to lead to an increase in NPLs. The diagnostic tests that are eported in Table 2 indicate that the difference transformation used n the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure appears to be appro- riate as there is no indication of any statistically significant serial orrelation in the residuals, with the residuals in general being rea- onably well behaved for a sample of this size and the type of data hat is used. Also, the over-identification test of Sargan (1958) for nstrument exogeneity does not reject the null hypothesis of the nstruments being exogenous.
It should be pointed out here that since NPLs are measured s a ratio, the dependent variable falls into the class of fractional esponse variables and is thus naturally bounded between 0 and
(0% and 100%). It would thus seem more appropriate to use an stimation approach that is explicitly designed for such variables, s, for example, the estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge 2008). Since the model is bounded between 0 and 1, the issues hat arise are similar to those encountered when using the linear robability model for a binary response variable. Nonetheless, it hould be pointed out that nearly all data points cluster around
he 3% to 30% interval, with the maximum value being 40%. So this s reasonably far enough into the center of the 0 and 1 interval. s the standard approach for fractional response variables is to se a Logit or Probit model, and as these models have a linear
f Finan
c t A e p
4
m w t p r m t 2 2
f m i i i m h u a s t t � �
i a s o c F “ i a
s n N s
n ( m r r s r m c b i t o t t
t N t t t
4
m c c i s m v N
n ( t f d o − c c s v n t
g c e p a i
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
onditional mean at the center of the [0, 1] interval, we found hat there is little to be gained from using such an estimator. dditionally, the coefficients of a linear model are considerably asier to interpret for policymakers and can therefore be readily ut into perspective in terms of their influence on NPLs.
.3. Macroeconomic mapping in normal versus crisis times
It is evident from the relation in (1) that the mapping from the acroeconomic variables to NPLs is a linear one in the sense that e do not estimate a model that allows the elasticity parameters
o take on different values, depending on whether we are in a crisis eriod or not. Nonetheless, the literature and evidence from the ecent financial crisis suggests that credit risks in general become ore responsive to worsening economic conditions during crisis
imes (Drehmann and Manning., 2004; Virolainen, 2004; Alves, 005; Pesaran et al., 2006; Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004; Bangia et al., 002).25
Although it is possible to estimate a model that explicitly allows or a non-linear relationship between NPLs and the macroecono-
ic variables in crisis and normal times, we do not do so here and nstead generate such a non-linear relationship artificially.26 This s achieved as follows. During normal times, the short-run elastic- ties ˇk, ∀ k = 1, 2, 3 capture the mapping between NPLs and the
acroeconomic variables. However in crisis times, when decision orizons shorten due to panic effects, herd behavior and increasing ncertainty about future developments, the economy as a whole nd the repayment capacity of its agents in particular become more ensitive to changing macroeconomic conditions. We approximate his increased sensitivity by using the long-term multipliers per- aining to the estimated NPL regression in (1), that is, by using k = ˇk/(1 − �), ∀ k = 1, 2, 3 as the elasticity in crisis times, where
is the coefficient on the one period lagged value of NPLs. Note that our use of short-term and long-term multipliers
nduces a simple threshold type (or discrete shift) non-linearity nd is thus a crude approximation to the true non-linear relation- hip that exists between NPLs and our macroeconomic variables f interest. Other approaches, such as “rule of thumb” increases,
ould have also been used to generate this non-linearity artificially. or example, Schmieder, Puhr and Hasan (2011, p. 6) use such a rule of thumb” increase in PDs to approximate the non-linearity n the relation between credit losses, correlations and income nd macroeconomic conditions in stress periods. We could have,
25 To the best of our knowledge, there do not seem to exist any studies that pecifically look at non-linearities in the relationship between NPLs and macroeco- omic variables when moving from normal economic conditions to a crisis period. onetheless, it seems to be widely acknowledged that a substantial increase in the
ensitivity is evident. 26 We have in fact tried to estimate a non-linear model for NPLs and our macroeco- omic variables of interest, taking again the crisis identifiers of Laeven and Valencia 2008) as classifiers. However, experimentation with a threshold type non-linear
odel with the Laeven and Valencia (2008) classifiers as the threshold indicators esulted in a number of unsatisfactory outcomes which lead us to discard these esults. The issues that were faced were similar to the ones encountered in the con- truction of the Stress International scenario, i.e., there were instances when the esponse to a crisis in fact reduced the size of the coefficients on the macroecono- ic variables, suggesting a reduced sensitivity of NPLs to worsening macroeconomic
onditions. Also, for some countries, such as Hong Kong and Switzerland, NPLs have een dropping consistently since the beginning of 2000, showing only very mild
ncreases during the recent financial crisis period. The difficulties are also related o the relatively small sample of data that is available to carry out the estimation f the elasticities, the large variation of the data around the conditional means, and he low (annual) frequency of the available time series. See also Breuer (2012) on his issue in the context of non-linear exchange rate models.
a n l c
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cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 355
herefore, also stipulated such a “rule of thumb” increase.27
onetheless, we try to be more structural when thinking about he transmission of the macroeconomic shocks to PDs in the sense hat we have a dynamic model and relate the non-linearity directly o the persistence of the NPLs series.28
.4. Linking macroeconomic scenarios to changes in NPLs
The changes in NPLs in the future period due to changes in the acroeconomic variables under the different scenarios, are cal-
ulated as follows. Let future scenario S = {PIT , Stress}, so that S orresponds to either the PIT or the Stress scenario. The change n NPLs under future scenario S denoted by �NPLSt+1 is then con- tructed by taking the difference between the future value of the acroeconomic variable of interest under scenario S and its TTC
alue, multiplied by the corresponding impact elasticity from the PL regression in (1).
For example, suppose that we are interested in the PIT sce- ario so that S = PIT . If the TTC value of GDP growth is 3.20% 0.032) and the future PIT value is 0.5% or 0.005 in time period
+ 1, then the change in NPLs, is calculated by taking the dif- erence (�yPIT
t+1 − �yTTC ) = (0.005 − 0.032) and multiplying this ifference by the corresponding impact elasticity of GDP growth f −0.262. This yields a change in NPLs under the PIT scenario of 0.262 × (0.005 − 0.032) = 0.007074 or around 0.71%. The entries
orresponding to interest rate and inflation related changes are omputed analogously. Notice that we do note write a time sub- cript on the TTC GDP growth term as this is a long-run equilibrium alue and should not vary over time. The calculations of stress sce- ario effects are performed in an analogous manner as those for he PIT scenario.
It should be emphasized here that the impact of changes in GDP rowth, inflation and the interest rate on NPLs is symmetric by onstruction. In contrast to that, we specify the indirect credit risk ffect of the exchange rate on NPLs, and thus on the bank credit ortfolio, to be asymmetric. That is, if the local currency depreci- tes relative to the US dollar (or the euro), then there will be an ncrease in NPLs due to this depreciation. However, if there is an ppreciation, this impact is restricted to be zero. We therefore do ot allow for a positive balance-sheet effect on NPLs caused by the
ocal currency appreciation. The indirect FX effect on NPLs is thus omputed as
ndirect FX = {
(�eS t+1 − �eTTC ) × ˛FXi,j if �e
S
t+1 < �e TTC (depreciation)
0 if �eS t+1 ≥ �eTTC (appreciation)
(3)
here �eS t+1 is the change in the exchange rate in future time
eriod t + 1 under scenario S, �eTTC is the corresponding through
he cycle equilibrium value of �et and ˛FXi,j is the impact elasticity omputed in (2).
27 See also Hardy and Schmieder (2012) for an overview of the use of “rules of humb” in credit risk stress testing. 28 We are borrowing this idea from the exchange rate literature. The unusually igh persistence in real exchange rates has lead to the use of non-linear time eries models to statistically describe deviations from the Purchasing Power Par- ty condition (see, for example, Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) who use a threshold utoregressive model to model real exchange rates and also MacDonald (2000) on ow long-term multipliers obtained within a cointegration framework are used in he exchange rate literature to calculate long-run averages as reference points to
easure misalignments).
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56 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
.5. Accounting for macroeconomic risks in aggregate PDs: the ystemic component of credit risk
Given the changes in NPLs in scenario S computed as described n Section 4.4, and the benchmark TTC PDs and LGDs taken from he QIS5 study and reported in Table 1, we can construct the prob- bility of default for asset class i under scenario S as the sum of the TC PDs for that asset class and an additional factor that is scaled y the influence of the macroeconomic variables in the considered cenario. To illustrate this computation, let �NPLSt+1 denote the hange of NPLs in the future period under macroeconomic sce- ario S, where S = {PIT , Stress} as before. Also, define the TTC PD
or asset class i as PDTTCi . The probability of default in macroecono- ic scenario S for asset class i (denoted by PDSi ) is then computed
s
DSi = � ×
weight
�NPLSt+1 × ︷ ︸︸ ︷ PDTTCi
PD TTC
︸ ︷︷ ︸ macroeconomy
+ PDTTCi︸ ︷︷ ︸ asset class
(4)
here PD TTC =
∑7 i=1PD
TTC i /7.
The �NPLSt+1 term captures changes in the aggregate NPLs of he banking sector due to changing macroeconomic conditions nder the PIT and Stress scenarios. The � parameter expresses the egree of proportionality between the changes in NPLs and PDs.29
n empirical applications, one can consider values in the 0.6–1.0 ange depending on the definition and reporting standards of NPLs. or instance, if NPLs are defined as 60-day overdue loans, one could onsider a � parameter that is closer to 0.6. If NPLs are defined as ategory D and E classified loans, a value of � closer to 1 could be sed. The calibration of the � parameter thus determines how close or far) a given NPL classification is from an actual default loan.30
Commercial banks generally consider 90-day overdue loans as efaulted loans in their internal PD and LGD models, while 30- ay or 60-day overdue loans are still commonly considered to be verdue rather than defaulted loans. The regulatory classification f loans for the purpose of provisioning varies significantly across ountries and comprises typically the A–E categories (see Laurin nd Majnoni, 2003; Barisitz, 2011; European Bank Coordination, 012). The classification has commonly both a backward (num- er of days overdue) and a forward (financial condition of the orrower) aspect to it. The E category of loans are fully (100%) pro- isioned loans to be written off and considered in default, whereas
category loans are typically 75% provisioned and not necessar-
ly considered as defaulted loans, but could be 90 days overdue or also less). The overall correspondence between NPLs and PDs an thus vary depending on which NPL classification is used in a
29 It should be clear that NPLs and PDs are not perfectly related, although NPLs are requently used as substitutes or proxies for PDs when relating them to macroeco- omic factors and PDs are not available (see for example the description in Table 4 on . 29 and also the second paragraph on p. 12 in Schmieder et al. (2011)). Fungácová nd Jakubík (2012) have recently proposed an interesting alternative framework or relating NPLs to PDs, by including outstanding loans and write-offs in this rela- ion (see Eqs. (4) and (6) in their paper). Nonetheless, they report that the write-off arameter (r) is difficult to model, so that its value is calibrated based on anecdotal vidence from the Russian banking sector, rather than estimated from data. In that egard, the proposed approach is still not practical to implement on a cross-country evel and we prefer to use changes in NPLs as a viable proxy variable to measure hanges in PDs in response to the macroeconomic variables of interest to us. 30 Note that we work here with the NPL ratio in terms of the volume of the non- erforming loans while a better measure to use would be the number of NPLs per otal number of loans. Due to the unavailability of relevant cross-country data, we eave this for future research or to the specific country cases.
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cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
iven country and what data are available for the implementation f the stress test. In our setting, the � parameter thus needs to be alibrated by the stress tester based on the definition of the NPL ata that are used and provides in this respect some additional exibility.
The role of the PDTTCi /PD TTC
term in (4) is to weight the influence rom the macroeconomic variables on the PDs by the relative size of he asset’s probability of default. This weighting scheme therefore nsures that an asset class that is, in relative terms, more likely to efault than another class when no macroeconomic shocks are con- idered is also more likely to default when macroeconomic shocks re accounted for. For instance, if an asset class is two times more ikely to default than the average of the considered asset classes in he TTC scenario, it is also two times more likely to default than he average of the considered asset classes in a Stress scenario. ence, the proportionality across the PDTTCi values before and after acroeconomic shocks is preserved. The last term in (4) adds the
TC PDs specific to each asset class to the effect coming from the acroeconomy. It should be pointed out here that we assume a constant relative
iskiness of the different asset classes across the scenarios owing o the lack of knowledge about changes in the relative riskiness of sset classes during crisis times, particularly in emerging market conomies where banks are not well diversified and internationally ctive. Whether riskiness converges or diverges during crisis times s an open question that still needs to be address appropriately in he literature. If one contrasts, for instance, unsecured consumer oans (credit cards) with corporate loans, anecdotal evidence sug- ests divergence as the cost of credit assumed by banks on credit ards is much higher in general and also during crisis times, where he lack of security (collateral) constitutes another disincentive to ervice a loan. Corporates generally tend to have greater negotia- ion power with banks to arrange for rollovers or a restructuring of oans and may also receive implicit or explicit government support specially when they are systemically important to the economy, r their production is labor intensive so that the potential effect on nemployment is an issue when allowing these sectors to file for ankruptcy.
In countries with a well developed secured transaction and nsolvency framework, adequate financial consumer protection nd corporate governance and minimal state involvement in the conomy, such divergence is not expected to occur. Convergence n relative PDs, nonetheless, can occur if systemic risk substantially ominate all idiosyncratic and sectoral (asset class specific) risks hat play a more important role during normal times and can be the ause of the often assumed positive diversification effect. Overall e see these convergence/divergence tendencies to play out dif-
erently depending on the specific circumstances of an economy, nd find the baseline specification of a constant relative riskiness pecification of the asset class PDs across the different scenarios easonable.
.6. Incorporating bank specific characteristics: the idiosyncratic omponent of credit risk
We use data on credit (EAD) growth for each bank and each asset lass before the peak of the last credit cycle, or the most recent ositive credit growth if the cycle is in an upturn, to get a measure f the relative aggressiveness of bank lending. The intention here s to approximate the quality of the underwriting standards of the ndividual banks in each asset class relative to the average of the
anking system. This is under the assumption that relatively more ggressive lending is associated with laxer underwriting standards. mpirical evidence of this assumption is provided in, among others, iménez and Saurina (2006).
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D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
To describe the construction of bank specific PDs, let PDSi,j denote he PD for bank j holding asset class i under scenario S, where S is ow re-defined as S = {TTC, PIT , Stress} and thus includes the TTC cenario as well. Also, let CGi,j be annual credit growth (in percent) or bank j in asset class i before the cycle’s peak, or the latest positive redit growth.31 PDSi,j is then computed as
DSi,j = PD S
i︸︷︷︸ aggregate
+
⎧⎨ ⎩ � ×
︷ ︸︸ ︷ (CGi,j − median(CGi )
(max(CGi ) − median(CGi )
individual bank level effect
if CGi,j > m
0 otherwise
here PDSi is the aggregate PD for asset class i under scenario S and he terms max(CGi) and median(CGi) are the maximum and median alues of credit growth in asset class i, where these are taken over ll banks in the financial system.
The � parameter in (5) is a scaling parameter that controls the enalty increase in PDs of banks that pursued a more aggressive redit growth than the median bank, where this average is again easured by the median value. Note that the � parameter also con-
rols the proportion between the systemic and idiosyncratic credit isk components in PDSi,j . This means that when � increases more
han the increase in PDSi , the extent to which the idiosyncratic omponent influences the PDSi,j relative to the systemic compo- ent increases as well. In general, we calibrate the � parameter o be in the 5–10% range for the TTC and PIT scenarios and in the 0–20% range for the Stress scenarios. Note here, that this cali- ration ensures that the systemic component dominates in Stress cenarios when PDSi increases more than �.
32 Notice again the symmetry in how the bank specific PDs in (5) are constructed. If redit growth in asset class i of bank j is less than the average credit rowth, then the probability of default in asset class i of bank j is qual to the aggregate PD, that is, PDSi,j = PD
S
i . 33 If, however, credit
rowth for bank j is greater than the average credit growth, then the robability of default under scenario S is scaled up by an amount hat depends upon how much larger credit growth was for this ank in a given asset class, relative to the median credit growth in he entire system.
Due to the restriction of a zero weight when CGi,j < median(CGi), he scaling term [CGi,j − median(CGi)]/[max(CGi) − median(CGi] is ounded between 0 and 1. This implies that the maximum amount y which the PD for bank j in asset class i can increase over the ggregate TTC PD due to the penalty is given by the size of the scal- ng parameter �. The effective bounds on PDSi,j are thus given by
PDSi , PD S
i + �]. Should it be the case that no annual credit growth ata at the individual bank level are available, then the � parame-
S
er can be set to 0. The consequence of this is that each PDi,j then
ollapses to PDSi . This effectively results in each bank having the ame PD for asset class i. Finally, notice that the scaling of the PDs
31 Credit Growth is calculated in the standard way as Creditt /Creditt−1 − 1 and the ycles peak refers to the peak of the aggregate banking system and is computed rom central bank data on Total Credit to Private Sector. Also, when credit growth s just turning positive out of a downturn and the economy enters the recovery hase of a credit cycle, care needs to be taken when the latest figures are considered s it may be still more appropriate to use the peak growth rates of the previous redit cycle. Once the economy is considered to be above potential growth, i.e., in he boom phase of a credit cycle, the latest available credit growth figures should e considered. 32 The calibration of � and other parameters hereafter is rather judgmental than trictly empirical in the sense that it is based on our experience of working with his model in specific countries and having the opportunity to work and draw on he experience of financial sector supervisors. Nevertheless, future research efforts hould be directed to ensure that more empirically motivated calibrations can be dopted. In Section 7.2.3 we perform a sensitivity analysis of the stress test outcomes ith respect to the calibrations used in the empirical example.
33 PDSi is equal to the values obtained in (4), for the PIT and Stress scenarios.
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cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 357
(CGi ) (5)
s linear. Therefore, a bank that experienced credit growth in a par- icular asset class at twice the rate of another bank in that asset lass will have a twice as large penalty increase in the probability f default compared to the other bank.
LGDs for the individual banks and asset classes under the dif- erent scenarios are constructed as follows. Let LGDSi,j be the Loss
iven Default for bank j in asset class i under scenario S. LGDSi,j is hen computed as
GDSi,j = LGD TTC i ×
( PDSi,j
PDTTCi − 1
) × �LGD,PD︸ ︷︷ ︸
individual bank level effect
+ LGDTTCi︸ ︷︷ ︸ aggregate
(6)
here LGDTTCi and PD TTC i are the through-the-cycle values of LGDs
nd PDs taken from the QIS5 study, PDSi,j are the values computed n (5), and the parameter �LGD,PD controls the extent of the corre- ation between LGDs and PDs. Note that there exists considerable vidence in the literature to suggest that �LGD,PD increases during risis times, that is, under the Stress scenario (see, for instance, ltman et al. (2002) and also the theoretical model of Miu and zdemir (2006)).34 We therefore suggest to calibrate the �LGD,PD arameter in the 10% −20 % range for the non-crisis TTC and PIT cenarios, and increase the �LGD,PD parameter to the 30–50% range uring crisis times (under the Stress scenario). The latter range cor- esponds to the preliminary results found in the study by Moody’s 2010) for the global financial crisis period.
Notice from 6, that because the PDSi,j are bounded by [PD S
i , PD S
i + ], where � will be greater than 0, the term (PDSi,j /PD
TTC i − 1) will be
if PDSi,j = PD TTC i and it will be equal to �/PD
TTC i if PD
S
i,j = PD TTC i + �.
his means that the relation in 6 gives bounds on the effective TTC GDi,j values of [LGD
TTC i , LGD
TTC i × �LGD,PD × �/PDTTCi ]. Since � enters
he upper bound as a product term, it is again the case that if � = 0, he LGDs for each bank will be set to the aggregate QIS5 TTC LGDs or that asset class.
. Exposures at default
We follow the general approach in the literature (see, for exam- le, Bluhm et al., 2003) and calculate the exposures at default EADs) for the purpose of credit risk modelling as a weighted sum f on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit risk exposures. Off- alance sheet exposures include future drawdowns such as loan ommitments, pre-approved credit card exposures and revolving redits. We use the classification scheme of Basel II and split the redit portfolio into seven asset classes including:
(i) Corporates.
(ii) SMEs (retail).
(iii) Consumer Mortgage Loans. (iv) Consumer Loans (QRE retail).
34 Also, there exists evidence that “the relationship between PDs and LGDs is non- inear” (Schmieder et al., 2011, p. 12). In that regard, it seems natural to allow for ifferent levels of correlation between PDs and LGDs during normal economic con- itions and crisis periods (see also Fitch (2008) and Fitch (2011) for how these orrelations increase substantially during stress times and also the paper by Huang t al. (2009) who document increases in systemic risk during crises). This effectively pproximates the non-linearity with a piecewise linear function.
3 f Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
(
o
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6
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f a u
a s t r e ( e n a
s d w e e t S o r a a l
c l s d s t a h d o c u l t t
58 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
(v) Other Consumer Loans. (vi) Sovereigns (loans to public institutions and state-owned
enterprises). vii) Banks (loans to credit institutions).
For the sake of simplicity and tractability, we abstract from all ther types of credit risk exposures.35
The exposures at default for bank j in asset class i (EADi,j) are onstructed as the following weighted sum:
ADi,j = EADONi,j + ıi,j × EAD OFF i,j (7)
here EADONi,j and EAD OFF i,j are, respectively, the on-balance sheet
nd off-balance sheet EADs for bank j and asset class i. Notice that he on-balance sheet EADs receive a weight of unity in the sum in , while the weight on the off-balance sheet EADs is determined y the ıi,j parameter.
36 For example, for loan commitments, ıi,j × ADOFFi,j estimates the amount that bank borrowers will draw on n the case of a default. If off-balance sheet data are not available ADOFFi,j can be set to zero and the stress test can be conducted with nly on-balance sheet data. The ıi,j parameter corresponds to the redit conversion factor of Basel III, which could range from 10% for nconditionally cancellable commitments to 100% for committed redit lines (see paragraph 164 in Basel III).
The calibration of ıi,j is, nonetheless, an empirical matter and epends on the circumstances of the specific economy and the anking system that is analyzed, as there can be differences in how ff-balance sheet credit exposures of, for instance, consumers and nterprizes behave in default situations. Further, if banks operate ased on business models that target different income segments of he population, it is useful to allow for bank and asset class specific ifferences in ıi,j. The stress tester will therefore frequently have o use her own judgment when setting ıi,j.
The EAD is an estimate of a bank’s potential exposure to a coun- erparty in the event and at the time of the counterparty’s default, aking into account the period of one year or the time-to-maturity f the exposure, whichever is shorter. In this regard, it is com- on to assume a full or partial rollover of the exposures with a
ime-to-maturity of less than one year. Overall, we consider gross ominal amounts of the EADs and do not take into account credit isk mitigation measures such as guarantees, collateral or securi- ies and on-balance sheet netting, as these are accounted for in the alibration of the LGDs.
. Construction of outcome indicators
The summary outcome indicator that we focus on is the effective apital buffer (the economic risk weighted capital adequacy ratio; ee Eq. 17 for the definition) that incorporates economic risks under he three different scenarios that we consider. In contrast to some ther stress testing approaches (e.g., Schmieder et al., 2011), we do ot focus on the conditional loss distribution at the different stages f a credit cycle when computing the effective capital buffer. We see he use of conditional loss distributions as an undesirable feature f an outcome indicator as these can introduce pro-cyclicality into
he capital requirements of a bank, which should be avoided.
To illustrate the latter point, consider the four stylized loss dis- ributions depicted in Fig. 3. The green, orange and red distributions
35 A detailed overview of other types of credit risk exposures can be found in Basel II. 36 Off-balance sheet exposures include commitments (including liquidity acilities), unconditionally cancellable commitments, direct credit substitutes, cceptances, standby letters of credit, trade letters of credit, failed transactions and nsettled securities (Basel II).
t w
d c
l r t
Fig. 3. Unconditional and conditional loss distributions.
re conditional loss distributions that correspond to three different tages of a credit cycle. For simplicity, we can think of the green dis- ribution corresponding to losses during an economic upturn, the ed one during a downturn and the orange one to losses when the conomy is thought to be close to (but still not at) its steady-state equilibrium) level. The black distribution is the unconditional (or nvelope) loss distribution that captures losses over an entire busi- ess cycle which contains upturns, downturns, as well as normal nd crisis periods.
When a conditional loss distribution is utilized to conduct a tress test, one can start from any one of the three possible con- itional distributions that are shown in Fig. 3. Which one is used ill evidently depend on the current state of the credit cycle of the
conomy. Suppose that the economy is thought to be close to its quilibrium, which would correspond to the orange loss distribu- ion shown in Fig. 3. When the supervisor conducts a stress test, a tress scenario is applied from this “starting” point, resulting in the range conditional loss distribution shifting to the position of the ed loss distribution. Given the increased level of both expected nd unexpected losses under the red distribution, the supervisor sks for additional capital in the magnitude that would cover the osses under the red distribution.
If, however, the current state of the economy is in an upside of a redit cycle, the same stress testing approach based on conditional oss distributions would start off from a distribution that corre- ponds to the upside of the credit cycle, that is, from the green loss istribution in Fig. 3. After a similar level of stress is applied by the upervisor that caused the shift from the orange to the red distribu- ion in the previous example, the green loss distribution would shift nalogously to the position of the orange distribution. The latter is, owever, not a loss distribution that would correspond to losses uring periods of stress, as it is located around the steady-state f the credit cycle and the macroeconomy. Any increases in the apital requirements that the supervisor may ask for to cover the nexpected losses under this Stress scenario will be substantially
ower, purely due to the fact that the conditioning loss distribu- ion that one started from was the loss distribution corresponding o the upside of a credit cycle. Using conditional loss distributions hus introduces pro-cyclicality into the stress testing framework hich should be minimized or, if possible, avoided altogether.37
The framework that we propose focuses on the use of an uncon- itional loss distribution, that is, a loss distribution that does not ondition on the state of the credit cycle in the calculation of
37 The positive association here is between the capital requirements and the ocation and dispersion of the conditional loss distribution, and not the capital equirements and the state of the economy that typically leads to the use of the erm pro-cyclicality in the literature.
f Finan
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D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
xpected and unexpected losses, economic risk-based loan loss eserves and risk-weighted assets (RWA). Such an unconditional oss distribution is depicted in Fig. 3 by the black distribution. otice from Fig. 3 that the unconditional distribution has sev- ral important properties. Firstly, its central tendency is calculated ased on the TTC PDs and LGDs. Secondly, its tail is long and at enough to cover the tail of the conditional distribution cor- esponding to the “over-the-cycle” Stress scenario. Thirdly, the nconditional loss distribution integrates the conditional distribu- ions by taking their interdependence into account.
We thus emphasize that macroprudential stress tests should lways start from an equilibrium or steady-state to ensure their onsistent implementation over time. This is particularly impor- ant when the economy finds itself in an upturn, as starting from the current” state of the economy (e.g., the upturn of the PIT scenario escribed in Fig. 2) will often lead to the construction of benign nd irrelevant stresses, and therefore also stress test outcomes. he continuous reference of stress testers to an equilibrium value rovides an anchoring point, so that macroprudential policy meas- res can be more consistently applied over time and over different tages of the business/credit cycle.38
We find it also important to highlight that one should avoid the ituation when, in an economic downturn, banks are asked by their upervisors to increase their capital levels, rather than having the ecessary capital buffers built up before such a downturn occurs. ince unexpected losses and thus needed capital levels are assessed y means of stress tests, the procyclicality of current stress testing pproaches should be minimized. This is not to suggest that banks ere not be asked to increase their capital in an economic down-
urn in the past, however, it can prove very difficult for banks to aise new capital during times when funding in the economy is dry- ng out and credit provision is being severely tightened. This is also ikely to be counterproductive in facilitating a general economic ecovery.
A challenge remains in practice to construct the unconditional oss distribution in such a way that it covers the tail of the unob- erved conditional loss distribution in a Stress scenario. In this ontext, we find the guidelines in Basel II in terms of the sug- ested calibration of the correlations and maturity adjustments not ery instructive, as the suggested calibration of the risk-parameters
ppears to have been misaligned with those observed empiri- ally during the global financial crisis (see Blundell-Wignall and tkinson, 2010; Anginer and Demirgüç -Kunt, 2011).39 Rather than
38 Instead of adopting a different point of departure of the economy (steady-state ather than upturn phase of the cycle), more adverse scenarios could also be built y increasing the applied level of stress (perhaps also adjusting the time horizon of he exercise) to arrive at more relevant scenarios. However, from a practical point f view and based on our discussions with senior financial stability supervisors, ot having a strongly anchored and thus time-consistent reference point happened o be one of the main weaknesses in stress test applications before the financial risis (e.g., Melecky and Podpiera, 2010). This weakness in the implementation of tress tests arose because senior management would typically screen the applied tresses for their plausibility and political correctness thus implicitly “put pressure” n technical level staff to apply less severe stress scenarios, as it was argued that he phase of the business cycle was unknown. This originated from, among other hings, the perception in the past boom period that the global economy had been ble to grow sustainably at a higher rate (partially through credit) and that the levels f potential output and equilibrium credit growth had been shifted upwards. The evere adjustment after the onset of the crisis revealed that sustainable output and redit growth levels have always been much lower than the overoptimistic percep- ion from the past boom suggested. Politically it is very difficult to keep increasing he level of stresses (and possibly lengthen their time horizon) as economic boom eriods progress and it is more sensible to create a time-consistent reference point s a baseline for the stress scenario. 39 See also the studies by Bonti et al. (2006), Chernih et al. (2006), Curcio et al. 2011), Fitch (2008) and Lee et al. (2009), among many others, that document similar ndings of the problematic calibration of the Basel II risk-parameters.
w e a w
W
T s p c p u
S
f t
s a
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 359
ollowing this framework, we calibrate the asset performance cor- elations in the tail of the loss distribution based on the lending oncentration of each individual bank in each asset class and the espective stress PDs. We also set the maturity adjustment penalty ased on the actual average time to maturity for each asset class of he individual banks.
More specifically, we calculate Expected Losses (ELSi,j ) for asset lass i and bank j under scenario S = {TTC, PIT , Stress} as: LSi,j = PD
S
i,j × LGD S
i,j . (8)
xpected losses for the TTC scenario thus correspond to the product f the individualized PDs and LGDs. Expected losses for the PIT and tress scenario relate to the predicted losses conditional on the ealization of the considered macroeconomic scenario. Net losses NetLossSj ) for each bank are computed as expected losses on the ntire credit portfolio less profits and loan loss reserves, that is:
etLossSj = 7∑
i=1 ELSi,j − (Reservesj + Profit
S
j ). (9)
TC Profits can be computed as a long term averages based on, for xample, historical Return on Assets (ROA) data.40 In order to com- ute PIT and Stress scenario Profits, a forecasting model is required, s forecasts need to be conditioned on the state of the economy. If o forecasting model is available, one can set the Profit term in 9) to zero for the PIT and Stress scenarios.41 This assumption is ommonly adopted by stress testers and can be seen as a rather onservative estimate of profits.
We follow the guidelines in Basel II and compute Risk Weighted ssets (RWA) as:
WAi,j = Ki,j × 12.5 × EADi,j (10) here Ki,j is the capital charge (or capital requirement) equation of asel II (see p. 64).42 The capital charge is a function of each bank’s D, LGD, asset performance Correlation43 and maturity adjustment or the individual asset classes, conditional on the selected cut-off oint of the loss distribution, ie., the risk preference parameter c in 2. It is computed as:
i,j = [(LGDStressi,j × Wi,j ) − (PD
TTC i,j × LGD
TTC i,j )] × [1 + (Mi,j − 2.5) × bi,j ]
(1 − 1.5 × bi,j ) (11)
here bi,j is the maturity adjustment term of Basel II, Mi,j is the ffective residual maturity of an asset class computed as the aver- ge of the residual maturity of loans within a given asset class eighted by the size of each loan. The term Wi,j is computed as
i,j = ˚ (√
1
(1 − RH i,j
) ×˚−1 (PDi,j TTC ) +
√ RH
i,j
(1 − RH i,j
) ×˚−1 (c)
) . (12)
he terms ̊ and ˚−1 in (12) are the CDF and the inverse CDF of the tandard normal density function, respectively. The risk preference arameter c is generally set in accordance with the risk preferen- es of the shareholders or the supervisor and defines the cut-off
ercentile value of the loss distribution, such as 99.9%, up to which nexpected losses shall be hedged by capital.44
40 This calculation is thus the same as for the TTC macroeconomic scenarios in ection 3.1. 41 We leave the estimation of a Profit regression using cross-country panel data or future research, and set the Profit term in the empirical application to zero for he PIT and Stress scenarios. 42 These are the guidelines in the “Credit Risk – Internal Ratings Based Approach” ection, with the relevant formulas being on pp. 63–64 and 76–78 for the different sset classes that are considered. 43 In Basel II this is just referred to as Correlation (R). 44 99.9% is the value used in Basel II.
3 f Finan
h i B t W r fi t a P t e o i B t c
a t g ( i n c i B i s a p
r a l s c 2 b
o f t
R
T o T p t S
e 2
�
w c u t t o w fi d a c
m H c e c r s o e e e e i u t w t
a c h r a L
b w a t � c a t d t includes the bank-specific component.
The i,j parameter is a component of the bank and asset class specific correlation that recognizes that a bank with a more con- centrated portfolio in a given asset class will benefit less from
60 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
The term RH i,j
in (12) is the asset performance correlation. Note ere that we use the superscript H to indicate that a different cal-
bration from the one suggested in Basel II is used, as we find the asel II calibration inadequate to model the performance correla- ion of assets in emerging market economies (see also Blundell-
ignall and Atkinson, 2010). Basel II assumes a decreasing elationship between PDs and the correlation and is based on the t of an exponential function to data that comprises large interna- ional and well diversified banks over a period that does not include ny significant crises. As a result, the systemic risk component of Ds is relatively small and it is the idiosyncratic risk component hat drives the PDs and thus credit risks BIS (2005). Nonetheless, mpirical evidence suggests that during crisis times the proportion f the systemic risk component increases dramatically, thus result- ng also in increased correlations in asset performance.45 Since the asel II calibration does not allow for such an increase, our view is hat the suggested Basel II calibration is inappropriate to use during risis times and hence within stress testing applications.
The specification of RH i,j
in (12) also accounts for the impact of sset concentration, which in our view is one of the most impor- ant factors driving the heterogeneity of within-asset class (within roup) correlations across banks, and across normal and crisis stress) times (see also Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 2010). This s again contrary to the Basel II calibration which assumes that ame concentration is fully diversified away and relative sectoral oncentration and contagion (e.g., due to existing supply chains) s not adequately captured by the single factor model on which asel II is based. Banks in emerging market economies do not have
nfinitely fine grained portfolios, and the combination of name and ectoral concentration, as well as contagion, did and still does play n important role in driving asset performance correlations. This is articularly so during times of crisis.
There are two aspects to consider when calibrating the cor- elation parameter in the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) pproach. First, differentiating across banks with regards to their oan portfolio’s sensitivity to systemic risk. Second, since one hould expect an increase in the within-group asset performance orrelation from normal to crisis times (see also BCBS, 2006, p. 6), simply assuming that this increase will be homogenous across anks does not reflect the experience from empirical data.
The modeling strategy that we follow for RH i,j
is similar to that
f Cespedes et al. (2006). That is, we specify RH i,j
in (12), to be a unction of the TTC PDs, the lending concentration (LendConc), and he Stress PDs computed as
H i,j
= i + i,j + �i,j . (13)
he three components i, i,j, and �i,j are, respectively, the floor f the asset performance correlation (RH
i,j ) based on the relative
TC propensity to default for the considered asset class, an additive enalty based on bank and asset class specific lending concentra- ion, and an additive penalty based on bank and asset class specific tress PDs. The three components in (13) are calculated as:
i = max {
0, UB × [PDTTCi − median(PD
TTC )]
[max(PDTTC ) − median(PDTTC )]
} + LB (14)
{ }
i,j = max 0, UB ×
[LendConci,j − median(LendConci)] [max(LendConci) − median(LendConci)]
(15)
45 Discussions with a number of national supervisors in emerging market conomies corroborates this view among practitioners (see Melecky and Podpiera, 010).
a
t o s
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
i,j = max {
0, UB� × [PDStressi,j − median(PD
Stress i )]
[max(PDStressi ) − median(PD Stress i )]
} (16)
here the max and median values in (14) are taken over the asset lasses rather than over the banks, and LB and UB the lower and pper bounds of each component, respectively.46 We recommend o set LB around 0.2. The three upper bounds UB , UB and UB� need o be calibrated so that RH
i,j ranges between 0.3 and 0.5. This rec-
mmended range is based on anecdotal evidence from interviews ith bank credit risk officers in regards to the impact of the global nancial crisis on increases in the asset performance correlation ue to systemic risk materialization, loan portfolio concentration, nd lending to relatively risky groups of borrowers throughout the ycle.
The lending concentration term (LendConc) can be approxi- ated as either the share of the ten largest exposures or as the erfindahl–Hirschman (HH) concentration index for each asset lass and each bank across individual borrowers, sectors of the conomy, and regions. Our suggested measures of concentration ombines both name and sector concentration which point to elatively limited diversification of the portfolio and its sectoral ensitivity, and sectoral interconnectivity (e.g., the supply chain r concentrated economic control effect) especially in small open merging market economies. The measure of concentration, as we xplain, could vary across loans to consumers and firms. Small open conomies specialize and concentrate their industry structures by xploiting their comparative advantages to increase their compet- tiveness in external trade. By international comparison, small and ndiversified domestic banks that lend to Corporates are subject o name and sector concentration risk as well as contagion, all of hich are intertwined and thus not strictly separable, and add to
he particular asset class loan portfolio sensitivity to systemic risk. The i component of the R
H i,j
calibration postulates that if a given sset class is relatively more prone to default in the TTC scenario ompared to any other asset class, it will have a proportionately igher asset performance correlation and sensitivity to systemic isk during times of stress. For instance, we specify the Corporates sset class to have a floor correlation that is lower than Consumer oans (QRE retail) in our empirical application.47
The i,j component postulates that if an asset class of a given ank is more concentrated than the average bank in the system, here we again use the median value to measure this average, its
sset performance correlation and sensitivity to systemic risk in he Stress scenarios will be proportionately higher. Similarly, the i,j component postulates that if a bank’s Stress PDs in a given asset lass are high compared to the average bank, the corresponding sset performance correlation will also be higher. Note that while i takes into account only the relative propensity to default across he asset classes and not across the banks because the PDTTCi term oes not include the bank-specific component. The �i,j component hen accounts for the variation in PDStressi,j across the banks as it
46 In (15) and (16), the max(·) and median(·) values are again taken over the banks s before, while in (14) they are taken over the asset classes. 47 In principle, the floor per asset class can differ also across the banks based on heir business models if relevant supervisory information is available – e.g., a bank, n average (through the cycle), being more regionally focused than other banks, or ervicing a more vulnerable population or firms than other banks.
f Finan
t o s v r F p e p u o s o i n r m w p l i b
p i t t a c
t a t t g
C
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w b b t a h h f w a m f o t a
n s E I i e t n
s s o a s T r
t d t u t t r a s t d s t i t n i M
t b O i f b a t b r c p s r m b w r d
7
s E t f a p b
b o
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
he diversification effect that diminishes fast progressing losses n the portfolio in times of stress. As an example, a bank with a ingle-name or single-sector corporate portfolio will be much more ulnerable to losses from this portfolio than a bank with a corpo- ate portfolio diversified across different companies and sectors. urther, �i,j addresses the pitfalls of the Basel II calibration which ostulates that correlations are negatively associated with borrow- rs’ PDs as we discuss on p. 32. Namely, �i,j adjusts the correlation arameter for adverse selection of borrowers based on the individ- al bank/asset class PDs. This is not to imply that these PDs are those f the bank. �i,j captures the fact that if a bank enters a borrower egment toward the peak of a credit cycle (recall the construction f the bank and asset class specific probabilities of default PDij), t is much more likely to pick up less creditworthy and more vul- erable borrowers that will default on a larger scale once systemic isk begin to materialize. As an example, if a US bank entered the ortgage loan segment at the peak of the last US credit cycle and as thus largely involved with subprime borrowers with higher robabilities of default, this portfolio is more likely to experience
osses as systemic risk materializes than a bank that has built up ts mortgage portfolio more gradually over time focusing on prime orrowers.
To summarize the above computations, we assume a lower asset erformance correlation during normal times when the economy
s closer to its steady-state value, and an increased correlation in he tail of the loss distribution when systemic risk factors are at heir peak and all credit contracts are to some extent negatively ffected during times of stress and systemic risk realization. This is aptured by RH
i,j in 13.
Note that, since a bank cannot influence any economic risk fac- ors, only its risk exposures, it responds to materializing risks by djusting its exposures (EADs). If the asset classes have a long time o maturity (i.e., M is large), it is much more difficult for the bank o adjust its exposures and, as specified in 11, it will have to bear reater losses when credit risks materialize.
The Economic Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (ERW- AR) under the three different scenarios is computed as:
RW − CARSj = RegCapitalj − NetLossSj∑7
i=1RWAi,j (17)
here RegCapitalj is the amount of eligible regulatory capital held y each bank (see also Basel, 2010), and S = {TTC, PIT , Stress} as efore. The through-the-cycle ERW-CAR corresponds to the situa- ion when the macroeconomy is in its steady-state and banks are dequately provisioned so that dividends are paid out to share- olders based on bank profits and net losses are zero. Banks also ave enough capital to meet the ERW-CAR based on the risk pre-
erences of its shareholders or the macroprudential supervisor, hichever requirement is higher. In the PIT scenario, net losses
re non-zero and the sum of the regulatory capital and net losses ay or may not satisfy the supervisor’s or shareholders’ risk pre-
erences. To appropriately test the capital adequacy conditional n the risk preferences of the shareholders or the supervisor, he Stress scenario and its impact on the ERW-CAR needs to be nalyzed.
Note that the three resulting ERW-CARs for each of the sce- arios above have a different interpretation. For the TTC and PIT cenarios, which refer to a normal economic cycle, the computed RW-CAR should be at or close to the regulatory requirement. n contrast to that, when the Stress scenario is evaluated, the
mplied ERW-CAR should stay above the insolvency limit of, for xample, 2% or 0%. Nonetheless, if the predicted net loss under he Stress scenario is positive or not significantly negative, care eeds to be taken when analyzing the stress test results, as a Stress
t f a b
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 361
cenario that does not lead to banks using their capital buffers hould be regarded as irrelevant and not extreme enough. If this ccurs when conducting the stress test, the supervisor should be larmed because the stresses imposed on the banks may not be evere enough to be reliably used for macroprudential analysis. he design and the implementation of the stress test should be econsidered.
To obtain a reliable overview of the financial system that is stress ested, we recommend that the ERW-CAR indicator be computed at ifferent levels of aggregation, that is, at the individual bank level, he peer-group level and the system wide level. Further, we find it seful to examine not only the absolute level of the ERW-CAR rela- ive to the existing regulatory requirements, such as the insolvency hreshold or any other threshold that would trigger a prompt cor- ective action by the supervisor, but also the relative magnitudes cross the individual banks. It should be clear from the outset of the tress test implementation that it is very difficult to design a stress est with an absolute focus in mind, in the sense that it will be very ifficult to accurately quantify the outcome indicator of interest, uch as the ERW-CAR, that will be attained by a particular bank (or he system) in absolute magnitudes. A stress test should rather be mplemented and interpreted on a relative basis with the objective o identify problem banks relative to other banks in the system, and ot to accurately quantify the absolute magnitude of an outcome
ndicator. This view is outlined and discussed in greater detail in elecky and Podpiera (2010). We also recommend that the distribution of the ERW-CAR of
he entire system (or selected sub-system of banks) be examined efore and after the application of the TTC, PIT and Stress scenarios. ne should always monitor how the whole distribution, includ-
ng its mean, median, dispersion and possibly skewness, changes or the peer-groups and for the entire system. The mean should e computed not only as a simple (equally weighted) average, but lso as a weighted average, where the weights are determined by he size of the banks in the system, so that the influence of bigger anks is adequately captured by the summary statistics that are eported. The size of a bank can be approximated by its assets (or redits). We will refer to such a bank-size weighted average sim- ly as “asset weighted mean” throughout the text. The aggregate ummary statistics should provide useful indications of systemic isk within the system or across the peer-groups due to, e.g., com- on credit exposures, credit concentration and correlation of bank
usiness models, system-wide weak loan origination and under- riting, and excessive, system-wide maturity transformations,
egardless of whether or not such risks can be hedged away with erivatives.
. Empirical application
This section contains an empirical application of the proposed tress testing approach using data on a set of banks from an Eastern uropean country. We do not disclose the country or the names of he banks that are involved in the stress test as this is immaterial or the purpose of this study. The sole intention of the empirical pplication is to illustrate how the stress test can be implemented ractically, what data inputs are needed, and how the results can e interpreted and used in a policy environment.
The banking system that is analyzed consists of the ten largest anks in the country by asset size. Jointly they account for over 90% f the banking system as measured by 2010 assets. The banking sys-
em is fairly concentrated with the three largest banks accounting or around 2/3 of the banking system. The remaining seven banks re approximately equally sized, accounting for less than 5% of the anking system each. In the results that we present here, we have
362 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
Table 3 TTC, baseline PIT and stress scenarios.
Macroeconomic scenarios TTC Future (t + 1)
PIT Stress VAR Stress int. Prob(Stress Int.)
NPL ratio (%) 10.1 10.1 17.0 22.9 na GDP growth (% change) 3.2 0.5 −6.9 −6.3 86.7 Inflation (% change) 2.8 2.4 11.7 26.5 99.8 Lending rate (%) 9.4 9.3 10.0 19.0 100.0 Exchange rate (LCU/EUR) (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.0 −31.5 99.7
Notes: A negative value (−) in the (nominal) exchange rate denotes a depreciation of the local currency unit (LCU) relative to the EUR.
Table 4 Summary statistics of annual credit growth and the share of foreign exchange denominated lending for each asset class.
Asset class Annual Credit growth in 2007 Share of FX exposures in 2010
Min Median Max Min Median Max
Corporates −2.5% 40.6% 66.5% 30.4% 69.8% 90.9% SMEsa −42.9% 9.2% 146.1% 7.1% 45.3% 82.0% Consumer Mortgage Loans −35.8% 36.1% 1185.7% 7.1% 45.3% 82.0% Consumer Loansb −97.5% 17.9% 345.0% 7.1% 45.3% 82.0% Other Consumer Loans −85.1% 90.1% 1097.9% 7.1% 45.3% 82.0% Sovereignsc −92.8% 0.0% 73.6% 0.0% 66.5% 100.0% Banksd −100.0% 0.0% 300.0% 7.2% 49.2% 100.0%
Author’s calculations. a Retail.
s 1
7
7
t S t e o a e
v n e d u s b d E
u f u V p t E b S
e w u t h 2
n d r v s h o p 3 t d t
7
p g o e s sidered ten banks as of end-2007. The year 2007 marked the peak of the aggregate credit cycle for the subject economy, and between 2007 and 2010 annual credit growth was negative or around zero.
b QRE retail. c Loans to public institutions and state-owned enterprizes. d Loans to credit institutions.
orted the banks according to size, so that the largest bank is Bank and the smallest bank is Bank 10.
.1. Data requirements and calibration of parameters
.1.1. Macroeconomic scenarios We initially construct the TTC, PIT and two Stress scenarios of
he macroeconomic variables using the approaches described in ection 3. These scenarios are summarized in Table 3. We use quar- erly data on GDP growth, CPI inflation, the lending rate, LCU/EUR xchange rate change, and non-performing loans as a proportion f total loans (NPLs). We work with fourth differences of the vari- bles, i.e., four-quarter or year-on-year GDP growth, CPI inflation tc., measured in percentages.
The TTC values are the long-run equilibrium (or steady-state) alues of the four macroeconomic variables of interest and are eeded to compute a baseline reference point. We compute these quilibrium values as simple arithmetic averages using quarterly ata over the period from 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4. In addition, we se two year-ahead consensus forecasts to increase the effective ample size when calculating these averages. Values used in the aseline PIT scenario are the market consensus forecasts.48 The ata for both the TTC and PIT scenarios were obtained from the conomic Intelligence Unit.
The country specific (model based) stress scenario is reported nder the “Stress VAR” heading in Table 3. The stress values rom the VAR model were computed as the adverse 1% tail val- es of the four step-ahead forecast distribution. A first order AR model was estimated on country specific data covering the eriod from 1996:Q1 to 2010:Q4 where standard lag length selec- ion criteria were used to determine the appropriate lag order.
stimation results, together with an overview of the VAR model ased approach are presented in Section A.1. The international tress scenario based on the actual historical cross-country crisis
48 One could also use the four step-ahead point forecasts from the VAR model.
h f t d i
xperience is presented under the “Stress Int.” heading. In addition, e compute the corresponding probabilities of the Stress Int. val- es vis-à-vis the VAR(1) model forecast distributions, and report hem in the last column of Table 3 under the “Prob(Stress Int.)” eading.49 The individual bank level balance sheet data are as of 010:Q4.
Notice from Table 3 that under the TTC, PIT and Stress VAR sce- arios the change in the nominal exchange rate is set to 0%. This is ue to the fact that the economy operates under a fixed exchange ate regime vis-a-vis the Euro, and we assume that the current con- ersion rate to the EUR is sustained under the TTC, PIT and country pecific VAR Stress scenario. Nevertheless, since there exists ample istorical evidence suggesting that exchange rate pegs break down r are abandoned by the authorities during severe financial crisis eriods (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Wälti, 2005) we also consider a 1.5% depreciation of the local currency relative to the Euro under he Stress Int. scenario. The magnitude of this depreciation was etermined from historical cross-country data as described in Sec- ion 3.3.
.1.2. Bank level data The construction of the idiosyncratic (bank specific) risk com-
onent as described in Section 4 requires bank level data on credit rowth at the peak of the last credit cycle or the most recent period f positive credit growth, and if available, data on the share of for- ign currency denominated lending (SFX). Table 4 shows summary tatistics of annual credit growth in each asset class across the con-
49 These probabilities were constructed by taking the values under the “Stress Int.” eading in Table 3 and plugging them into the four step-ahead multivariate normal
orecast density of the VAR(1) model. The median probability is 99.7 percent so hat the banks that need to preserve at least a BBB rating during times of a severe ownturn should withstand this scenario without having their CAR fall under the
nsolvency threshold.
f Finan
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t t i r s a t t i s
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r h c
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a R r a T u 8 T A s i f P u b m r t t d
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
able 4 also shows summary statistics of the share of FX denomi- ated lending in each asset class as of end-2010.
It is evident from Table 4 that most of the credit growth at the eak of the last credit cycle occurred in the Other Consumer Loans sset class, which are typically secured loans such as car loans and oans for purchases of household appliances and electronics. Some anks also grew their mortgage portfolio fairly rapidly, starting rom a relatively low basis. Most FX denominated lending was to orporates, Sovereigns and Banks, but other asset classes also show
high exposure to FX denominated lending. Although we assume hat Corporates are hedged against FX risk from 50%, we are con- ervative with the treatment of individual retail borrowers such as MEs and the three consumer loans asset classes, and assume that hey are 100% unhedged against FX fluctuations.50
.1.3. Constructed bank-level PDs and LGDs Summary statistics of the constructed bank level PDs and LGDs
ncluding the aggregate macroeconomic (systemic) and bank level idiosyncratic) risk factors, as described in Section 4, are reported n the top and bottom panels of Table 5. Note that the country that he stress test is applied to falls into the CEBS-Group1 classification.
e thus use the aggregate TTC PDs and LGDs from the QIS5 study hich are shown under heading CEBS-Group1 in Table 1.
Since the bank specific PDs and LGDs in (5) and (6) have an addi- ive structure, where we add the individual bank specific terms to he aggregate asset class specific PDs and LGDs, the values reported n the “min” column of each scenario in Table 5 correspond to the espective aggregate PDs and LGDs for each asset class under each cenario.51 This means that the “min” values under the TTC PDs nd TTC LGDs heading correspond to the TTC aggregate values of he QIS5 study. In the construction of the LGDs we set the correla- ion between PDs and LGDs (as captured by the �LGD,PD parameter n 6) to 20% in the TTC and PIT scenarios and to 50% in the two Stress cenarios.
.1.4. Credit risk exposures, loan concentration and residual aturity
The calculation of expected losses and capital charges for each ank in the system, outlined in Section 6, requires data on expo- ures at default, asset class concentration as well as the residual oan maturity for each asset class. Summary statistics for these uantities for the seven different asset classes across the individual anks as of end-2010 are shown in Table 6. The “AW” column under Exposures at Default (EAD)” in Table 6 shows the asset weighted ean for each asset class to account for the size of the bank in the
omputation of these averages. We measure asset class concentra- ion as the share of the ten largest borrowers, and residual maturity s measured in years.
The summary statistics in Table 6 indicate that banks are most xposed to the Corporates asset class, which accounts on average or around 60% of their credit portfolio. This is true for both big and mall banks as the median and the asset weighted mean for the ystem shown under the AW column are fairly similar. Some dif-
erences for Other Consumer and SMEs Loans are visible though. amely, the asset weighted mean is somewhat larger than the edian in these two cases, suggesting that bigger banks allocate
50 Note that the ability of Corporates to generate foreign currency denominated evenue is given by the export share of their production. Although this share can old even during crisis times as a percentage of income, the volume of these exports an rapidly decline when external demand cools down. 51 Recall that the bank specific PD is equal to the aggregate PD for a particular sset class if credit growth for that bank was below the median value of the banking ystem, and the lending in FX was zero or the local currency depreciation did not ccur.
(
b t m
M o
b
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 363
elatively more credit exposure to these asset classes than small anks. The overall exposure to the Consumer group is the second iggest, with a median (asset weighted mean) value of over 31% 36%) for the three consumer loan segments in total. This is due o the rapid increase in consumer lending during the most recent redit boom.
On average, lending to Corporates and SMEs is considered to e highly concentrated with the average share of the ten largest orrowers being around 30%. However, Other Consumer Loans and onsumer Mortgage Loans are the most concentrated asset classes. his could be due to these asset classes being small in absolute alue and the youngest addition to the banking books of Eastern uropean banks.52
A longer average residual time-to-maturity in each asset class s a proxy for the time a bank would need to adjust its exposures to
given asset class in the case of a severe financial distress to con- ain mounting financial losses. Consumer Mortgage Loans have, on verage, the longest residual maturity among the considered asset lasses. Although the median value of 15 years is comparable to eveloped countries, the latter have significantly deeper mortgage
oan markets and also very liquid secondary markets during normal conomic conditions. Other Consumer Loans have an average time o maturity of over five years. Loans to Corporates and SMEs have verage times to maturity of around three years, with a maximum f six and four years, respectively. Loans to Banks are the most liq- id in terms of having the shortest average residual maturity, with nly three banks having a loan residual maturity of more than one ear.
.2. Results of the stress test
.2.1. Aggregate results for the banking system The aggregate stress test results for the entire banking system
re presented in Table 7. The top part of Table 7 (under the Current egulatory CAR heading) shows summary statistics for the current egulatory CARs held by the banks. The system wide averages are gain measured by the median value and the asset weighted mean. he standard deviation captures the dispersion of the current reg- latory CARs held by the banks. The minimum regulatory CAR is % for this banking system and the CAR insolvency threshold is 2%. he bottom part of Table 7 (under the Economic Risk Weighted pproach heading) shows the outcome indicator for the banking ystem based on economic risk considerations, the ERW-CAR, and ts summary statistics for the three different scenarios. Note that or the TTC and PIT scenarios, “Effective Undercapitalization (% of rofits)” is calculated to satisfy the 8% Regulatory CAR, whereas nder the Stress VAR and Stress Int. scenarios it is calculated to not e less than the Insolvency Threshold of 2%. This is because in nor- al times banks need to satisfy the minimum regulatory capital
equirement at all times, while in crisis times they may be allowed o drop below the regulatory minimum and replenish their capi- al using retained profits or capital injections. However, if a bank rops below the 2% CAR threshold, it should be closed as a failed or “gone concern”) bank.53
The current regulatory CAR section of Table 7 suggests that the
anking system is adequately capitalized based on existing regula- ion. Specifically, both the system-wide median and asset weighted
ean indicate that banks, on average, hold capital well above the
52 Many banks in Eastern European countries have expanded their Consumer ortgage Loans and Other Consumer Loans portfolios fairly rapidly and aggressively
ver the last decade. 53 A full discussion of how to assess a bank’s systemic importance and the various ank resolution options is beyond the scope of this paper.
364 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
Table 5 Summary Statistics of Constructed Bank Level PDs and LGDs.
Asset class TTC PDs PIT PDs Stress VAR PDs Stress Int. PDs
Min Median Max Min Median Max Min Median Max Min Median Max
Corporates 2.2% 2.6% 12.2% 2.8% 3.2% 12.8% 12.8% 13.6% 32.8% 17.3% 24.6% 43.9% SMEsa 3.3% 3.3% 13.3% 4.2% 4.2% 14.2% 19.0% 19.0% 39.0% 20.0% 32.0% 44.8% Consumer Mortgage Loans 1.5% 1.5% 11.5% 2.0% 2.0% 12.0% 8.8% 8.9% 28.8% 9.9% 18.5% 34.7% Consumer Loansb 3.7% 3.7% 13.7% 4.8% 4.8% 14.8% 21.5% 21.5% 41.5% 22.6% 29.7% 57.6% Other Consumer Loans 4.3% 4.3% 14.3% 5.6% 5.6% 15.6% 25.2% 25.2% 45.2% 26.2% 34.2% 50.6% Sovereignsc 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% Banksd 0.2% 0.2% 15.2% 0.3% 0.3% 15.3% 1.3% 1.3% 31.3% 2.2% 6.9% 39.7%
Asset class TTC LGDs PIT LGDs Stress VAR LGDs Stress Int. LGDs
Min Median Max Min Median Max Min Median Max Min Median Max
Corporates 38.1% 40.1% 65.0% 41.4% 43.1% 65.0% 75.6% 77.8% 95.0% 85.0% 85.0% 95.0% SMEsa 38.8% 38.9% 65.0% 42.2% 42.2% 65.0% 76.9% 77.0% 95.0% 92.4% 95.0% 95.0% Consumer Mortgage Loans 21.4% 21.4% 63.6% 23.3% 23.3% 58.9% 42.4% 42.5% 85.0% 65.3% 85.0% 85.0% Consumer Loansb 55.0% 55.1% 65.0% 59.8% 59.9% 75.0% 90.0% 90.1% 100.0% 92.4% 100.0% 100.0% Other Consumer Loans 47.9% 47.9% 65.0% 52.1% 52.1% 65.0% 90.0% 90.0% 95.0% 91.8% 95.0% 95.0% Sovereignsc 27.7% 27.7% 27.7% 30.1% 30.1% 30.1% 54.9% 54.9% 54.9% 65.0% 65.0% 65.0% Banksd 39.4% 39.4% 65.0% 42.8% 42.8% 65.0% 78.1% 78.1% 85.0% 85.0% 85.0% 85.0%
Author’s calculations. a Retail. b QRE retail. c Loans to public institutions. d Loans to credit institutions.
Table 6 Summary statistics of credit exposures (EAD), asset class concentration and residual maturity for 2010.
Asset class Exposures at default (EAD) Asset class concentration Residual maturity
Min Median Max AW Min Median Max Min Median Max
Corporates 32.5% 59.7% 88.3% 60.5% 11.8% 28.5% 55.9% 1.5 2.8 5.7 SMEsa 0.0% 0.2% 28.3% 1.8% 11.8% 28.5% 55.9% 0.0 2.8 4.1 Consumer Mortgage Loans 0.1% 7.7% 18.6% 7.5% 4.3% 37.8% 100.0% 4.2 14.9 17.6 Consumer Loansb 0.3% 12.8% 31.1% 11.5% 0.1% 2.5% 14.6% 0.0 1.0 4.6 Other Consumer Loans 4.5% 10.8% 37.5% 17.9% 4.9% 44.3% 95.5% 3.3 5.4 11.7 Sovereignsc 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 0.3% na na na 0.0 0.0 0.0 Banksd 0.0% 0.1% 2.6% 0.6% na na na 0.0 0.1 2.3
a Retail. b QRE retail. c Loans to public institutions and state-owned enterprizes. d Loans to credit institutions.
Residual maturity is the average residual time to maturity measured in years. The “AW” column under the EAD heading measures the Exposures of the banking system computed as an asset weighted mean to account for the size (measured by assets) of the different banks in the construction of the aggregate average.
Table 7 Summary of aggregate stress test results.
Current regulatory CAR (as of end-2010)
Regulatory CAR held at banks (banking system) Capital buffer – asset weighted mean 13.8% Capital buffer – median 16.7% Capital buffer – St.Dev. 4.9% Minimum regulatory CAR 8% CAR insolvency threshold 2%
Economic risk weighted approach (as of end-2011)
Economic risk weighted CAR (banking system) TTC PIT Stress VAR Stress Int.
Effective capital buffer (%) – asset-weighted average 10.6 10.3 4.4 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – median 11.1 10.9 4.3 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – St.Dev. 3.2 3.2 3.7 4.9 Effective undercapitalization (% of Profits) 12.7 14.5 17.3 126.8 Effective undercapitalization (% of GDP) 0.39 0.44 0.53 3.84 # of banks with effective capital buffer <8% 2 2 9 9 # of banks with effective capital buffer <2% 0 0 2 6
Author’s calculations. Notes: Note that TTC and PIT “undercapitalization (% of Profits)” is calculated to satisfy the 8% regulatory CAR, whereas under Stress VAR and Stress Int. it is calculated not to be less than the insolvency threshold of 2%.
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D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
inimum regulatory requirement of 8%. The regulatory CAR cal- ulation is based on a modified Basel I approach. However, once conomic risks are taken into account and the asset’s risk weights re individualized by bank and by asset class according to our roposed methodology, there are some results that require the upervisor’s attention. These results are shown in the bottom part f Table 7. Under the TTC scenario, when the economy and the redit cycle are assumed to be at the steady-state level, the median asset weighted mean) ERW-CAR for the system stands at 10.6% 11.1%).
Further, given the regulatory requirement of keeping the CAR bove 8%, two banks fall short of meeting this requirement in he TTC scenario, once economic risks are accounted for. It is also nteresting to note that the dispersion measured by the standard eviation of the ERW-CARs is noticeably smaller than the disper- ion of the regulatory CARs. A possible interpretation of this finding s that banks optimize their capital allocation based on economic isks and once such economic risks are reflected in the asset’s risk eights, banks appear more alike in terms of their capitalization
evels.54
This is in contrast to the regulatory CARs which do not reflect uch economic risks. Notice from the PIT heading in the bottom art of Table 7, that the results for the Point-in-Time scenario are ery similar to the TTC ones, so that the current macroeconomic onditions for the two coincide.55 It should be noted here that the TC and PIT scenarios should be passed by all banks without any ndication of a weakened financial condition. The Stress scenarios, onetheless, are constructed to force the banks into using their apital buffers so that underprovisioning (fully used-up loan loss eserves) is envisaged, but banks should stay above the insolvency hreshold of 2%.
The results for the country-specific Stress scenario shown under he “Stress VAR” heading indicate that the median ERW-CAR for he whole system would decline to a value of 4.3% when economic isks are properly considered. More specifically, nine banks will ave to draw on their capital buffers as their ERW-CARs drop below he 8% minimum capital adequacy requirement. Two banks would all under the insolvency threshold of 2% and would be considered failing” banks. All other banks are able to withstand the assumed ountry-specific Stress scenario. To recapitalize all banks in the sys- em to the extent that a 2% ERW-CAR would be maintained in the tress VAR scenario requires about 18% of the annual TTC profits enerated by the entire banking system. This figure is arrived at
y assuming a 3% TTC Return on Assets (ROA) during normal eco- omic conditions. This figure can also be calculated as a simple rithmetic average on historical ROA data.56 Profits for each bank
54 This difference could arise because under the Basel I and Basel II standardized pproaches applied by most emerging market economies, only general risks of indi- idual asset classes are addressed within the context of Pillar 1, using asset class pecific risk weights that are common for all banks. However, the Internal Rating ased (IRB) approach presented here individualizes these risk weights per asset class nd bank, while taking into account both Pillar I and Pillar II risks, including risk com- onents such as concentration, the degree of maturity transformation, underwriting tandards and indirect credit risks arising from FX lending to unhedged borrowers. his approach risk-weights bank assets more appropriately so that capital buffers f, for example, smaller banks or banks positioned for aggressive lending that are ypically much larger are adequately discounted for, provide a more precise com- arison across banks. In our case, such a comparison reveals that banks’ ERW-CAR re in fact more similar across banks and their capital holdings are optimized to a reater degree than suggested by the cross-bank variation in regular CARs. This is ost likely due to the IRB approach not being implemented in the country under
tudy as yet, with the regulatory CAR measures not disclosed. 55 This can easily occur when PIT = TTC as shown in Fig. 2 in Section 3. 56 This corresponds to through the-cycle profits because the (unconditional) aver- ges are computed over different stages of the business cycle and also preferably ver a number of different business cycles.
b r F c a
b T t 3 t b i a
h a w i
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cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 365
re then calculated as ROA times Total Assets and are subsequently ummed to provide a banking system wide measure of profits. We se TTC profits here as the base, because banks would normally se retained profits to gradually build up their capital buffers to he required level.57
The results of the Stress scenario based on the historical cross- ountry crisis experience under the “Stress Int.” heading indicate hat, on average, the capital buffers of the banking system would get educed to 0.4%, should this scenario occur. More specifically, nine anks would use their capital buffers, falling below the 8% mini- um regulatory CAR level, and six banks would become insolvent ith their ERW-CARs falling below 2%. Nevertheless, four banks ould still have capital buffers strong enough to withstand such
severe credit risk shock. Recapitalizing all banks so that they ould withstand this Stress scenario, i.e., bringing their ERW-CARs
bove the 2% level, requires about 126.8% of the annual TTC profits enerated by all banks.
The extent of the recapitalization needs at the system level is ubstantial at close to 0.53% of GDP under the country-specific cenario and about 3.84% of GDP under the international crisis cenario. However, given that we are working in the tail of the oss distribution, it becomes difficult to make precise statements bout potential losses in absolute magnitudes. As discussed ear- ier, looking at the relative rather than absolute standing of banks uring a Stress scenario could be a more informative way of identi- ying problem banks in the system. Individual bank results are thus iscussed in the next section.
.2.2. Bank level results The bank level results for the ten banks in the system are sum-
arized graphically in Fig. 4 and 5. The left panel of Fig. 4 shows comparison between the economic risk weighted CARs and the xisting regulatory CARs held by each bank under the TTC scenario. he right panel of Fig. 4 shows the corresponding recapitalization eeds in terms of bank profits to bring the ERW-CARs above the 8% hreshold. Recall that the banks are sorted by asset size where the argest bank in the system is Bank 1 and the smallest bank is Bank 0.
The left panel in Fig. 4 shows that for all banks the ERW-CARs re considerably smaller than the current regulatory CARs. The ap seems to be larger for smaller banks, which are more likely o hold more concentrated credit portfolios.58 Smaller banks also xtend more foreign currency denominated lending to unhedged orrowers than bigger banks. The biggest difference between the egulatory CAR and the ERW-CAR is shown by Bank 6 and Bank 10. or these two banks, the current regulatory capital requirements ould be significantly underestimating the capital needed to ensure dequate financial soundness and resilience.
The right panel of Fig. 4 shows the recapitalization needs to ring each bank above the 8% threshold based on the ERW-CAR. his recapitalization requirement is again expressed in terms of he assumed annual TTC profits of an individual bank based on a % ROA. Bank 6 and Bank 4 are the only two banks in our system hat will need to inject additional capital to reach the 8% threshold
ased on the ERW-CAR. In terms of annual TTC profits, this quantity
s around 25% for Bank 4. For Bank 6, the extra capital requirements re substantially higher, exceeding 300% of annual profits. Given
57 However, note that capital injections, coming either from existing or new share- olders, or from public resources (e.g., the government budget), could also be pplied as a viable recapitalization measure. These would be particularly relevant hen the recapitalization needs of the affected bank are so high and immediate that
t could be considered a “failing” bank. 58 The portfolio concentration appears to be roughly two times bigger for banks ith an above median asset size than for those with a below median asset size.
366 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
CARs
t l s
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Fig. 4. Economic risk weighted versus actual regulatory
he results of the TTC scenario, Bank 6 could be considered a prob- em bank in the system and may require attention of the prudential upervisor.
Fig. 5 summarizes the bank level results for the two Stress sce- arios. The left panel of Fig. 5 shows the ERW-CARs under the tress VAR and Stress Int. scenarios for each bank. The right panel of ig. 5 shows the capital requirements, as the percentage of annual TC profits, that are needed to bring the ERW-CAR above the 2% nsolvency threshold.
Fig. 5 indicates that the most vulnerable banks are Bank 6 and ank 4 which were identified earlier, as well as Bank 5 and Bank . The most resilient banks are the three smallest banks in the sys- em (Banks 10, 9 and 8) and Bank 2. Assuming that the supervisor equires the banks to raise their ERW-CAR above the 2% insolvency
hreshold, Bank 6 and Bank 4 would need the largest amounts of apital to be injected relative to the remaining banks. Under the tress Int. scenario, the magnitude of the additional capital required s around 600% of annual TTC profits for these two banks. Bank 5
l i t c
Fig. 5. Economic risk weighted CARs and recapitalizat
and recapitalization needs by bank for the TTC scenario.
nd Bank 7 need approximately 350% and 250% of annual profits, espectively. Across the two different Stress scenarios that we con- ider, Bank 6 and Bank 4 are identified as the most vulnerable banks n the system.
Overall, the presented empirical results point to the need to etter align the capitalization requirements with the individual isk profiles of the banks. The prudential supervisor can achieve his by adjusting asset risk weights across the board (or for elected asset classes), applying individual capital surcharges to he identified problem banks, or by developing individual adjust-
ent programs for the most vulnerable banks in the system o reduce their key risk exposures under a suitable supervi- ory arrangement. The key risk factors that the supervisor could ddress are the maximum share of FX denominated lending, the
ending concentration within the individual asset classes, the max- mum maturity transformation that a bank can perform, and he overall concentration of a bank’s lending across the asset lasses.
ion needs by bank for the two stress scenarios.
D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370 367
Table 8 Impact of alternative parameter calibrations on stress test outcome indicators.
Banking system/sensitivity parameter TTC Int. Stress
kappa = 5% kappa = 10% kappa = 10% kappa = 20%
Effective capital buffer (%) – asset-weighted average 11.3 10.6 0.8 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – median 11.8 11.1 0.7 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – St.Dev. 2.8 3.2 4.5 4.9 Effective undercapitalization (% of Profits) 3 13 103 127 # of banks with effective capital buffer <8% 1 2 9 9 # of banks with effective capital buffer <2% 0 0 6 6
Banking system/sensitivity parameter TTC Int. Stress
rho(LGD,PD) = 10% rho(LGD,PD) = 20% rho(LGD,PD) = 30% rho(LGD,PD) = 50%
Effective capital buffer (%) – asset-weighted average 11.0 10.6 0.4 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – median 11.4 11.1 0.4 0.4 Effective capital buffer (%) – St.Dev. 3.0 3.2 4.9 4.8 Effective undercapitalization (% of Profits) 7 13 127 131 # of banks with effective capital buffer <8% 1 2 9 9 # of banks with effective capital buffer <2% 0 0 6 6
Banking system/sensitivity parameter TTC Int. Stress
c cap = 99.5 c cap = 99.9 c cap = 99.5 c cap = 99.9
Effective capital buffer (%) – asset-weighted average 10.6 7.4 0.4 0.2 Effective capital buffer (%) – median 11.1 7.8 0.4 0.3 Effective capital buffer (%) – St.Dev. 3.2 2.0 4.9 3.4 Effective undercapitalization (% of Profits) 13 65 127 163 # of banks with effective capital buffer <8% 2 6 9 10 # of banks with effective capital buffer <2% 0 0 6 8
Banking system/sensitivity parameter TTC Int. Stress
corp.hedging = 50% corp.hedging = 30% corp.hedging = 50% corp.hedging = 30%
Effective capital buffer (%) – asset-weighted average 10.6 10.3 0.4 0.8 Effective capital buffer (%) – median 11.1 10.8 0.4 0.8 Effective capital buffer (%) – St.Dev. 3.2 3.1 4.9 5.0 Effective undercapitalization (% of Profits) 13 14 127 113 # of banks with effective capital buffer <8% 2 2 9 9 # of banks with effective capital buffer <2% 0 0 6 8
Author’s calculations. N rp.hed
7 p
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(
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otes: The symbols �, � and c are denoted by kappa, rho and c cap, respectively. Co
.2.3. Sensitivity of outcome indicators to changes in calibrated arameters
As the suggested stress testing framework relies on a number f calibrated parameters, we find it informative here to provide a ompact sensitivity analysis that shows how responsive the out- ome indicators of interest are with respect to changes in some f our key calibrated parameters. The parameters that we look t are:
(a) the � parameter in (5) which controls the penalty increase in the bank specific PDs for banks that were more aggressive in their lending than the average bank in the system
b) the asset performance correlation parameter �LGP,PD in (6) (c) the risk preference parameter c in the capital charge equation
in (12) d) and the assumption that a 50% share of FX denominated expo-
sures of Corporates is hedged by corresponding FX revenues.
The alternative calibrations that we consider, as well as their mpact on some of the outcome indicators that we focus on, are eported in Table 8. The results of the sensitivity analysis point
o greater variability of the TTC scenario to the calibration of � han the Stress Int. scenario. Other things equal, a larger value of
increases the share of the idiosyncratic component in a PD and he PD itself. This increases expected losses, the correlation and the
w T o a
ging is the proportion of hedged FX exposures by the Corporates asset class.
apital requirements. In the TTC scenario, the share of the idiosyn- ratic component is greater than in the stress scenario to start ith. In the TTC sensitivity scenario, � increases by 5 percentage oints and the capital buffer (median) decreases by 0.7 percentage oints.
For the Int. Stress scenario, � increases by 10 percentage points nd the capital buffer decreases by 0.3 percentage points. Hence, he sensitivity to � is greater in the TTC scenario where a smaller ncrease in � causes a larger decrease in the available capital buffer. he calibration of �LGP,PD has a greater influence under the TTC sce- ario, supposedly because there are greater relative differences in Ds (and therefore LGDs and expected losses) under this scenario, wing to the dominance of the idiosyncratic risk factor over the ystemic one.
By far the greatest influence that spans over both the TTC nd Stress Int. scenarios comes from changes in the c parameter denoted by c cap) which cuts off the portion of unexpected losses hat should be hedged by capital holdings – and thus expresses he risk aversion of the supervisor or shareholders. Changes in the egree to which Corporate FX exposures are hedged by Corporates’ X revenues have an impact only under the Stress Int. scenario
hen a local currency depreciation vis-à-vis the EUR is considered.
his impact is significant and underscores the importance of anal- gous assumptions in stress tests applied to banking systems with
high share of FX lending.
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68 D. Buncic, M. Melecky / Journal o
. Conclusion
This paper proposed a macroprudential stress testing approach nd illustrated its application and properties on an empirical data et that comprised a group of Eastern European banks. The inno- ative features of the proposed macroprudential stress test were nspired by the effects of the global financial crisis on Eastern urope. We demonstrated in the empirical application section how he proposed approach can be effectively used to identify sys- emic and idiosyncratic risk factors to gauge the relative financial oundness and resilience of individual banks to economic risks. he proposed approach is also useful for monitoring and assessing anking-sector wide systemic risk via aggregate measures of utcome indicators under the three different macroeconomic sce- arios that are analyzed.
The direction of future research should focus on estimating the esponse functions of the banking sector and the policy makers to hanging balance-sheet solvency conditions of the banking system. uture research should also focus on connecting these response unctions to the real economy so that dynamic stress tests can e constructed which would enable stress testers to study the esponse pattern of some key macroeconomic and bank specific ariables to various shocks that hit the economy and the financial ystem. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight here that bank- evel granularity, which is valuable to policy makers, should be reserved to ensure the practical usefulness of any newly proposed pproaches relative to pure macroeconomic models which contain nly an aggregate financial sector.
cknowledgment
Financial support from the Czech Science Foundation AP403/11/2073 is gratefully acknowledged.
ppendix A.
.1. Overview of VAR approach and summary of estimates
To briefly illustrate the exact steps of how a VAR based Stress cenario can be constructed, consider for simplicity of exposition he following first order VAR model:
t = C + AY t−1 + Ut (18) here Yt is a 4 by 1 vector containing the four macroeconomic
ariables real GDP growth, CPI inflation, the lending rate and the hange in the nominal exchange rate denoted by �yt, �t, rt and �et, espectively. The coefficient matrix A captures the dynamics of the ystem and Ut is a multivariate normal vector of disturbances with ero mean and variance-covariance matrix �u.
One year ahead point forecasts are computed as the iterated (or ynamic) four period forecasts from the quarterly Yt series. That is, e use the forecast recursion
ˆ T +h|T = + Ah(YT − ) (19) o construct the h step ahead forecast, where is a 4 by 1 vector f the unconditional mean of Yt computed as = (I − A)−1C, with I eing a 4 by 1 identity matrix. Letting ̨ denote the statistical level f significance, given the multivariate normal assumption of Ut in 18), we can construct (1− ˛)100 % forecast confidence intervals as
ˆ T +h|T,k ± z˛/2�k(h) (20)
here ŶT +h|T,k is the h step ahead point forecast of the kth variable n Yt, z˛/2 is the upper ˛/2 percentage point of the standard normal
l a i t
cial Stability 9 (2013) 347– 370
istribution and �k(h) is the square root of the kth diagonal entry of he h step ahead forecast error variance-covariance matrix �u(h). he variance-covariance matrix �u(h) is computed from
u(h) = h−1∑ p=0
˚p�u˚ ′ p (21)
here ˚p is the pth term of the infinite Vector Moving Average VMA) representation of the VAR in 18. Because the VAR model in 18) is of first order, we have that ˚p = Ap for all p = 0, 1, 2, . . . so hat we can simply take powers of p to get the pth term of the VMA see Lütkepohl, 2005, pp. 22–24, 35–40).
Due to the multivariate normality of the h step ahead density orecast, the model based Stress scenario is obtained simply as the dverse (1 − ˛)100% forecast confidence interval for the macro- conomic variables of interest. For the real GDP growth series, for xample, it would correspond to the lower tail of the forecast confi- ence interval, while for the lending rate, it would be the upper tail alue of the forecast confidence interval. The size of the z˛/2 term n the construction of the Stress scenario should be chosen in line
ith the risk preferences of the macroprudential supervisor. This alue could be set to −2.3263 which would correspond to the lower % tail value under the standard normal density function, so that his adverse scenario would occur with 1% probability in a classical epeated sampling context.
Note that the construction of the Stress scenario based on the dverse forecast confidence interval in (20) relies on the assump- ion of Ut being multivariate normal. This may or may not be ppropriate. Should it not be appropriate, one can resort to re- ampling techniques such as bootstrapping to compute, say, 1000 ootstrapped forecast values, and then use the value correspond-
ng to the 1st percentile as a stress value for real GDP growth and he 99th percentile for the lending rate.
A summary of the estimates of the VAR parameters is reported n (22).
�yt (se.)
= 1.8726 (2.1043)
+ 0.9771 (0.1143)
�yt−1 − 0.1424 (0.0773)
�t−1 − 0.1038 (0.1837)
rt−1 + 0.0681 0.1315)
�et−1
�t (se.)
= −0.7196 (2.8425)
+ 0.4509 (0.1543)
�yt−1 + 0.5148 (0.1045)
�t−1 + 0.1368 (0.2482)
rt−1 + 0.1929 0.1777)
�et−1
rt (se.)
= 2.6061 (0.9356)
− 0.0796 (0.0508)
�yt−1 + 0.0356 (0.0344)
�t−1 + 0.7539 (0.0817)
rt−1 − 0.0073 0.0585)
�et−1
�et (se.)
= 1.1758 (2.5127)
+ 0.0378 (0.1364)
�yt−1 + 0.0277 (0.0923)
�t−1 − 0.0405 (0.2194)
rt−1 − 0.0447 0.1570)
�et−1
(22)
log-like = −333.3151 SIC = 16.1565 HIC = 15.9439
; �̂u =
⎡ ⎣ 3.1091 1.4746 0.1767 0.24381.4746 5.6735 0.0456 1.6591
0.1767 0.0456 0.6147 0.1011 0.2438 1.6591 0.1011 4.4331
⎤ ⎦
We used standard information criteria such as the Schwarz nformation criterion (SIC) and the Hanna-Quinn information cri- erion (HIC) to determine the optimal lag length in the VAR (see vanov and Kilian, 2005 for a review on lag selection in VARs). We tarted with a maximal lag length of 4 (quarterly) lags and then hoose the VAR model based on the smallest SIC and HIC values. he best fitting model is a VAR(1).
.2. Application of the proposed stress testing approach when no ank-by-bank level supervisory data are available
We will briefly discuss in this section how the proposed stress esting approach can be implemented when bank-level supervisory ata are not available and the stress tester needs to rely on pub-
icly available data sources. First, we assume that an accounting nd reporting framework for banks is in place in the country that s analyzed, that this framework is adequate and reliable enough o be used for stress testing purposes, and that it is comparable
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o current international standards. In more advanced countries, rudential regulation authorities would have implemented the
nternational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).59 Additionally, n some countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Turkey and others) bank-by-bank ata on credit exposures within selected asset classes are published y the supervisory authority as part of the Pillar 3 information isclosure of Basel II.
In any case, banks should be obliged to publish their exter- al audit reports that would, under normal circumstances, include ost of the information needed to deploy the proposed stress test-
ng approach at a reasonable level of granularity and with the ecessary bank-by-bank information. For instance, based on pre- ailing accounting standards (including the IFRS), audit reports ormally have a classification of lending to individual borrow- rs, companies, other financial institutions, and the state and state wned enterprizes (SOEs). This would make it possible to differen- iate across the banks with regards to the structure of their credit xposures. In addition, the level of secured loans and collateral can e obtained and applied (correspondingly or judgmentally) to clas- ify credit exposures by their level of security and their associated GDs.
Overall loan exposures or exposures in selected asset classes an be constructed from historical audit reports. The most recent redit growth period can be determined from aggregate historical ata published by the central bank or the supervisor. Credit growth t the individual bank level in the period of interest and in selected sset classes can be determined based on the year-to-year change n credit exposures published in external audit reports, and then sed to compute the individual PDs based on the scaling factor that
s proposed in Section 4.6. Indirect credit risks from FX exposures an also be estimated based on data from audit reports. If no data at he asset class level is available, this information should be available t least at the individual bank level and can be incorporated into he proposed framework as outlined in the paragraph following Eq. . General as well as specific provisions or loan loss reserves and ier 1 and Tier 2 capital can also be obtained from the audit reports.
Similarly, a bank level approximation of off-balance sheet expo- ures can be taken from the audit reports and added (either roportionately or judgmentally) to the individual on-balance heet exposures. Lending concentration and residual maturity can e aggregated at the bank level if no asset class data are avail- ble or skipped altogether if relevant data are not retrievable. With his information, the minimal set of bank-level variables can be ompiled so that the proposed approach can be deployed at a rea- onable degree of granularity, where it is assumed that the required country-specific) macroeconomic data are available either from ountry authorities or IFIs.
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- Macroprudential stress testing of credit risk: A practical approach for policy makers
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Conceptual outline of the proposed stress testing approach
- 3 Construction of macroeconomic scenarios
- 3.1 TTC and PIT scenarios
- 3.2 Country-specific stress scenario
- 3.3 Stress scenario based on international experience
- 4 Linking macroeconomic scenarios to credit risk factors
- 4.1 TTC macroeconomic scenarios, PDs and LGDs
- 4.2 Estimating the NPL elasticities
- 4.3 Macroeconomic mapping in normal versus crisis times
- 4.4 Linking macroeconomic scenarios to changes in NPLs
- 4.5 Accounting for macroeconomic risks in aggregate PDs: the systemic component of credit risk
- 4.6 Incorporating bank specific characteristics: the idiosyncratic component of credit risk
- 5 Exposures at default
- 6 Construction of outcome indicators
- 7 Empirical application
- 7.1 Data requirements and calibration of parameters
- 7.1.1 Macroeconomic scenarios
- 7.1.2 Bank level data
- 7.1.3 Constructed bank-level PDs and LGDs
- 7.1.4 Credit risk exposures, loan concentration and residual maturity
- 7.2 Results of the stress test
- 7.2.1 Aggregate results for the banking system
- 7.2.2 Bank level results
- 7.2.3 Sensitivity of outcome indicators to changes in calibrated parameters
- 8 Conclusion
- Acknowledgment
- A.1 Overview of VAR approach and summary of estimates
- A.2 Application of the proposed stress testing approach when no bank-by-bank level supervisory data are available
- References
- References
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Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Financial Stability
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j f s t a b i l
ating banking crises using incidence and size of bank failures: our crises reconsidered
aymond Chaudron a, Jakob de Haan a,b,c,∗
De Nederlandsche Bank, The Netherlands University of Groningen, The Netherlands CESifo, Munich, Germany
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history: eceived 17 March 2014 eceived in revised form 23 July 2014 ccepted 2 September 2014 vailable online 10 September 2014
EL classification: 01 21 20
a b s t r a c t
We analyze three databases of banking crises and investigate their consistency in the identification and timing of crises. We find that there are large and statistically significant discrepancies between the datasets. We also compare the dating of banking crises according to these databases using information on the number and size of bank failures for four crises for which the timing strongly differs across these databases. We conclude that information on these variables allows determining the timing of banking crises more precisely. Our dating of the four crises corresponds closely with that of Laeven and Valencia.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
eywords: ystemic banking crises ating of crises ank failures onetary statistics
b t T c i a e p t t f s d
inancial accounts
. Introduction
Due to the worldwide financial crisis there is renewed interest in he causes and consequences of banking crises. A serious method- logical challenge which researchers face is the identification of systemic) banking crises. Most recent research on banking crises ses the following three sources for dating banking crises: Caprio t al. (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia 2008, 2013). These databases identify a (systemic) banking cri- is based on exceptional events or policy interventions, such as ank closures, deposit freezes and government rescues. Although hey are all based on what Von Hagen and Ho (2007) refer to as events methodology’, these databases employ different definitions
f a banking crisis. In contrast to economic recessions for which a recise definition exists (i.e. two consecutive quarters of negative rowth in real GDP), a widely accepted definition of a (systemic)
∗ Corresponding author at: De Nederlandsche Bank, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amster- am, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 205245756; fax: +31 205242506.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Chaudron), [email protected], [email protected] (J. de Haan).
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p i i o c
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.09.001 572-3089/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
anking crisis is lacking. Consequently, there are large and statis- ically significant differences between these sets of crises dates. he databases provide different start and/or end dates and as a onsequence come up with different lengths of the crises. Events dentified as a crisis by one database are frequently not considered
banking crisis by another database. Also the concordance with conomic cycles differs considerably. Low GDP growth sometimes recedes the crisis, sometimes follows the crisis or coincides with he crisis. Even though the crisis dates of Reinhart and Rogoff are o a large extent based on those of Caprio et al. there are large dif- erences between both datasets. An example is the dating of the avings and loan crisis in the US, which we will analyze in more etail in this paper (along with three other banking crises). Caprio t al. date this crisis from 1988 to 1991. According to Reinhart nd Rogoff, this crisis runs from 1984 to 1991, while Laeven and alencia limit the crisis to 1988.
These differences in identifying and dating banking crises have otentially significant consequences. The timing of crises is, for
nstance, instrumental in estimating output losses caused by bank- ng crises. It may also cause ambiguity in determining the causes f crises. For instance, differences in timing may lead to different onclusions regarding the question of whether a crisis was caused
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y factors within the financial sector or by factors external to it e.g. a worsening of general economic conditions). Another possi- le consequence is that early warning models to predict crises may rovide unreliable signals if imprecise and inconsistent dates are sed.
Authors rely on multiple criteria to determine the occurrence of banking crisis often in combination with expert judgment. Classi- ying and dating (systemic) banking crises is inherently subjective Frydle, 1999). Authors rely on expert judgment in the absence of n independent arbiter, a role the National Bureau of Economic esearch plays in identifying economic recessions. When compar-
ng the main databases referred to above, it becomes clear that hese expert judgments differ considerably.
The fact that definitions and dates of banking crises differ across tudies has been discussed before (cf. Frydle, 1999; Boyd et al., 009; Babecký et al., 2012). However, most empirical studies on anking crises have merely noted the differences and opted for one r the other database. Alternatively, some authors avoid relying n existing indicators of banking crises altogether and introduce lternatives. For instance, Boyd et al. (2009) construct systemic ank shock indicators derived from a theoretical model. Von Hagen nd Ho (2007) propose an index based on money market pressure o identify banking crises. Money market pressure indexes yield
any more banking crises than the events method as shown by ing et al. (2014) who have expanded the sample of Von Hagen nd Ho (2007), both in terms of the number of countries and the ample period covered. Although Jing et al. (2014) can relate some f these crises to turbulent developments in the financial system f the countries concerned the very high number of crises should ake us worry about the reliability of the von Hagen-Ho approach.1
he purpose of our paper is therefore to improve upon existing atabases based on the events methodology by introducing new
nformation on the number of bank failures and the size of bank osses, which has generally not been used in identifying crises. on Hagen and Ho (2007, p. 1038) mention a number of short- omings of the events methodology: (1) interventions can occur in he absence of an acute crisis, (2) deciding whether an intervention s large enough to be called a crisis involves subjective judgment, 3) interventions happen when the crisis is already on-going, and 4) crises may be averted due to central bank policy interventions o that they will not be included if crises are identified based on nterventions by government authorities. We believe that at least he first two objections can be remedied using our approach.
For this purpose we use data sources, which have not been idely employed in the literature: data on bank failures and infor- ation on support measures in combination with either financial
ccounts, monetary or supervisory statistics. From these sources e construct time series for what we consider the most impor-
ant characteristics of banking crises, namely the number of bank ailures and the relative size of bank losses. Using this information
ay shed new light on the differences between the most widely sed databases of banking crises and enable to date banking crises ore precisely. To illustrate our argument, we analyze four impor-
ant and widely researched banking crises for which the timing trongly differs across these databases. We believe that our method or investigating these crises shows that much of the subjective udgment, for which the events methodology has been criticized, an be eliminated. Data availability has limited our work. While
ost countries publish fairly long time series for either financial
ccounts, monetary or supervisory statistics from which the size f the banking sector can be assessed, only few countries publish
1 It is therefore perhaps not surprising that most research on banking crises is till based on crises identified by the events methodology.
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complete and systematic overview of measures which have been aken to support banks. Nevertheless, while these four crises may ot be representative, they are important and major crises. A lot f information on these crises is available which has been taken nto account in constructing the databases examined here. What
e show is (1) that even for these well-researched crises periods he databases come up with a very different dating of these crises in line with the outcomes of our comparison of the dating of all rises in the databases); (2) taking information on bank failures and osts of banking crises into account may be useful to better iden- ify the timing of banking crises. We therefore advise to apply the uggested approach to a larger set of countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 ummarizes the definitions used in the literature on banking crises nd compares three widely used databases. The crises dates from hese three databases are also compared with the crises dates of ing et al. (2014) who followed Von Hagen and Ho (2007) using a
oney market pressure indicator to identify banking crises. Section confronts these sets of crises dates with data on bank failures and ank losses for four crises: the savings and loan crisis in the United tates, the banking crisis during the 1990s in Japan, the banking risis in Norway, and the crisis in Turkey during the late 1990s. The nal section offers our conclusions.
. Comparing databases of banking crises
The definition of a systemic banking crisis varies considerably cross studies. There are common elements to most definitions, uch as widespread bank insolvency, but there is no agreement on
precise definition. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) define a banking risis as a situation of “. . . financial distress, in which the banking ystem has negative net worth.” This is a somewhat restrictive defi- ition as most crises rarely affect all banks to the same extent. Their
ist of banking crises ultimately takes into account the extent of the risis to distinguish between systemic and non-systemic crises. But t relies very much on expert judgment, in particular with respect o the timing of bank insolvency. No specific measure for the pro- ortion of the banks’ equity that is destroyed is used to make this istinction. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) point to a lack of infor- ation in general and specifically on the mark-to-market balance
heets of banks for this. These authors do not provide a specific riterion to determine the end of a crisis.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) base their identification of banking rises on certain events. Similar to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), hey point to a lack of data which prevents the use of a formal efinition.2 Relative stock prices of banks cannot be used as not all anks are listed. Using changes in deposits would miss crises which o not involve bank-runs, while non-performing loans are deemed oo unreliable for lack of harmonized accounting rules. Reinhart nd Rogoff (2009, p. 10) therefore settle on two events: “(1) bank uns that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public ector of one or more financial institutions . . . and (2) if there are o runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-scale government ssistance of an important financial institution (or group of institu- ions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other nancial institutions.” They denote these banking crises by type I systemic) and type II (financial distress), respectively. However,
hey do not use this distinction in their classification of crises nor o they indicate what an important financial institution is.
Laeven and Valencia (2008, p. 5) state that “. . . in a sys- emic banking crisis, a country’s corporate and financial sectors
2 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), p. 8.
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75 65
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1 9
7 6
1 9
7 7
1 9
7 8
1 9
7 9
1 9
8 0
1 9
8 1
1 9
8 2
1 9
8 3
1 9
8 4
1 9
8 5
1 9
8 6
1 9
8 7
1 9
8 8
1 9
8 9
1 9
9 0
1 9
9 1
1 9
9 2
1 9
9 3
1 9
9 4
1 9
9 5
1 9
9 6
1 9
9 7
1 9
9 8
1 9
9 9
2 0
0 0
2 0
0 1
2 0
0 2
2 0
0 3
2 0
0 4
R
in cris
e c r a T h t f “ i t s w l o G
i y w i t i
a d r a c t i b s t b o e c
F i
i p C L i i m a a n t s i e
c e F C o a s R
d t y o s b m w p agreement calculation since kappa takes the agreement occurring by chance into account. It has the advantage that it also provides
Caprio et al. (all)
Fig. 1. Number of countries
xperience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and orporations face great difficulty repaying contracts on time. As a esult, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the ggregate banking system capital is exhausted” (emphasis added). he dates included in the most recent version of their database, owever, do not exclusively relate to “signs of financial distress in he banking system” (2013, p. 228), which is their first condition or identifying a banking crisis. Banking crises are also identified by significant banking policy intervention measures” of which they dentify six (such as a deposit freeze or nationalizations). At least hree of these measures need to have been implemented for a cri- is to be classified as systemic. This condition is supplemented ith three other criteria, namely that the share of nonperforming
oans exceed 20 percent, bank closures make up least 20 percent f banking assets and fiscal restructuring costs exceed 5 percent of DP.
In order to assess the correspondence of the three separate def- nitions, we compare the dates of (systemic) banking crises for the ears 1976–2004 between the three studies for the 99 countries hich are included in all three databases. Also, the comparison
s limited to the years 1976–2004, i.e. the years covered by all hree studies.3 The recent worldwide financial crisis of 2007/2008 s therefore excluded.
The database of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) has been updated couple of times. We have chosen the most recent version of their atabase, published as an annex in Honohan and Laeven (2005), eferred to here as Caprio et al. (2005). Laeven and Valencia have lso published an updated list in 2013. For details regarding certain rises, we rely on the data file accompanying the 2012 version of heir study (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Laeven and Valencia only dentify systemic banking crises, while Reinhart and Rogoff identify anking crises without distinguishing between systemic and non- ystemic crises in their crises list as published in appendix A.4 in heir book. Caprio et al. (2005) list all crises but make a distinction etween systemic and non-systemic crises. This may explain some
f the differences across these studies. For instance, both Caprio t al. and Reinhart and Rogoff identify a (non-systemic) banking risis in Canada in 1983–1985, whereas this crisis does not appear
3 Countries are only included from the year a market economy was introduced. or example, many of the former Soviet republics and COMECON countries are only ncluded from 1991 onwards.
g l C (
ei nhart and Rogoff
is by reference, 1976–2004.
n the list of Laeven and Valencia. There are, therefore, two com- arisons to be made: Reinhart and Rogoff with the complete list of aprio et al. and the systemic crises of Caprio et al. with those of aeven and Valencia. In order to examine the magnitude of error n comparing two inconsistent crisis definitions – one for bank- ng crises in general and one for systemic banking crises – we also
ake the comparison between Laeven and Valencia and Reinhart nd Rogoff. The start and end dates of the crises of the three studies re listed in Appendix C.4 Caprio et al. and Reinhart and Rogoff do ot provide precise start and end dates for certain crises. In order o make the comparison, we have substituted dates from the other tudies for the missing dates, although this will produce some bias n the comparison presented below. This mostly affected the Caprio t al. database, since this list of banking crises is the least complete.
Figs. 1–3 present graphical summaries of the data for each of the omparisons. The figures display the number of countries experi- ncing a (systemic) crisis according to each of the three studies. ig. 1 compares the incidence of all banking crises according to aprio et al. and Reinhart and Rogoff. Fig. 2 compares the incidence f systemic banking crises according to Caprio et al. and Laeven nd Valencia, while Fig. 3 presents the comparison between the ystemic crises of Laeven and Valencia and all crises identified by einhart and Rogoff.
Tables 1–3 below present pair-wise contingency tables for the ata for countries present in all three studies classified by each of he studies as crisis years. The tables summarize the number of ears each of the studies classifies as a crisis-year in comparison to ne of the other studies. Apart from relative frequencies, the tables how the phi-coefficient (equal to the correlation coefficient on the inary data for crisis years) and Cohen’s kappa coefficient. Kappa easures the agreement between two ratings on a nominal scale, here a value of 0 indicates complete disagreement and 1 com- lete agreement. It is a more robust measure than simple percent
4 According to one of the referees, the coding of crises listed in Appendix C sug- ests that for a number of emerging market countries all three databases confuse iberalization and structural changes in the banking sector with bank failures (e.g. hile 1970s, Israel 1970s, Czech Republic 1990s) – for details, see Babecký et al. 2012).
66 R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
Fig. 2. Number of countries in systemic crisis by reference, 1976–2004.
Fig. 3. Number of countries in (systemic) crisis by reference, 1976–2004.
Table 1 Cross-table of crisis years identified by Caprio et al. versus Reinhart and Rogoff, 1976–2004. Notes: For each of the 99 countries common to all three studies, every year from 1976 to 2004 was rated by each of the three studies as either a crisis year or a non-crisis year. The four inner data-cells of the table present the absolute and relative frequencies of the possible combinations, as well as the expected frequencies under independence. The outer cells contain row and column totals. If the relative frequencies in the inner cell are represented by the symbol pij where i and j = crisis year (C) or non-crisis year (N), and the row and column totals by pi and pj respectively, then the expected frequencies equal pe ij = pj · pi . Let po = pCC + pNN and pe = pe CC + pe NN , then kappa = (po − pe )/(1 − pe ).
Caprio et al. (2005) Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Crisis years Non-crisis years Total
Crisis years Absolute frequency 407 75 482 Relative frequency 0.158 0.029 0.187 Expected frequency 0.034 0.153 –
Non-crisis years Absolute frequency 59 2036 2095 Relative frequency 0.023 0.790 0.813 Expected frequency 0.147 0.666 –
Total Absolute frequency 466 2111 2577 Relative frequency 0.181 0.819 1.000 Expected frequency – – –
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75 67
Table 2 Cross-table of systemic crisis years identified by Caprio et al. versus Laeven and Valencia, 1976–2004. Note: for an explanation of this table, see the notes to Table 1.
Caprio et al. (2005) Laeven and Valencia (2013)
Crisis years Non-crisis years Total
Crisis years Absolute frequency 239 194 433 Relative frequency 0.093 0.075 0.168 Expected frequency 0.023 0.145 –
Non-crisis years Absolute frequency 114 2030 2144 Relative frequency 0.044 0.788 0.832 Expected frequency 0.114 0.718 –
s c
d c i i d i R f a – s
y o a e d i f c c s j t m d o
t e s
l i s T v a 8
y s k r t a t R a f b k i c m l t
p t d d
T C N
Total Absolute frequency Relative frequency Expected frequency
tandard errors for the point estimate which allows calculating a onfidence interval (see Fleiss et al., 1969).
The comparison of the Caprio et al. and Reinhart and Rogoff atabases produces a phi-coefficient of 0.8270. The kappa for the omparison of the Caprio et al. and Reinhart and Rogoff databases s 0.8268 with a standard error of 0.0145, giving a 95%-confidence nterval of 0.7984–0.8552. From these measures, it is clear that the atabases of Caprio et al. and Reinhart and Rogoff have fairly sim-
lar classifications of crisis years (which is to be expected, since einhart and Rogoff make extensive use of Caprio et al. as a source
or crises dates), but nevertheless they differ significantly. Remark- bly, each study identifies a roughly equal incidence of crisis years
18.7% for Caprio et al. and 18.1% for Reinhart and Rogoff – but the tudies agree on just 15.8% of the cases (see Table 1).
The second comparison is for years classified as systemic crisis ears by Caprio et al. on the one hand and Laeven and Valencia n the other (see Table 2). There is again a high degree of associ- tion, but much less so than for the comparison between Caprio t al. and Reinhart and Rogoff. The correlation between the crises ates according to Caprio et al. and those of Laeven and Valencia
s only 0.5424. The kappa is 0.5385 with a standard error of 0.0231 or a 95%-confidence interval of 0.4932–0.5838. We can therefore onclude that both databases come up with very different classifi- ations of systemic crises. Caprio et al. classify 16.8% of years as a ystemic crisis, whereas for Laeven and Valencia the proportion is ust 13.7%. The studies agree on 9.3% of the years as crises. As men- ioned, Laeven and Valencia limit the length of a systemic crisis to a
aximum of 5 years. Casual inspection of the Laeven and Valencia ata reveals that their crises episodes are often shorter than those f Caprio et al.
As pointed out before, the final comparison is intended solely o show the danger of comparing crises dates based on two differ- nt definitions: all crises as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff and the ystemic crises from Laeven and Valencia. This comparison has the
t d f i
able 3 ross-table of all versus systemic crisis years identified by Laeven and Valencia versus Re ote: for an explanation of this table, see the notes to Table 1.
Laeven and Valencia (2013)
Crisis years Absolute frequency Relative frequency Expected frequency
Non-crisis years Absolute frequency Relative frequency Expected frequency
Total Absolute frequency Relative frequency Expected frequency
353 2224 2577 0.137 0.863 1.000 – – –
owest correlation coefficient (0.4843). The kappa for this compar- son, presented in Table 3, is also the lowest at 0.4778, although till significantly different from zero (its standard error is 0.0234). he difference in the proportion of crisis years is similar to the pre- ious comparison with 13.7% in the Laeven and Valencia database nd 18.1% in that of Reinhart and Rogoff, but they agree on only .9% of the cases.
For the sake of comparison, we have also made a similar anal- sis between the crisis dates from the three databases analyzed o far and those constructed using an indicator of money mar- et pressure (the results are not shown here but available upon equest). In order to make the best comparison possible we used he dates from Jing et al. (2014) for 91 countries as the Von Hagen nd Ho (2007) study only covers 47 countries. The kappas from hese comparisons ranged between 0.091 (between Jing et al. and einhart and Rogoff) and 0.151 (between Jing et al. and Laeven nd Valencia). Even though all of the kappas were significantly dif- erent from zero, they indicate that there is little correspondence etween event based crisis dates and those based on money mar- et pressure indicators. Even in the case with the highest kappa, .e. between the datasets of Jing et al. and Laeven and Valencia, the risis years correspond in just 69 cases. Apparently, not all money arket pressure is associated with a crisis and that not all crises
ead to money market pressure. In the remainder of the paper we herefore focus on the datasets based on the events methodology.
In conclusion, while consistent definitions matter when com- aring crisis dates between different studies (as shown in he comparison of the Laeven-Valencia and Reinhart-Rogoff atabases), the extent to which the crisis dates differ even if the atabases refer to the same type of crisis is remarkable. Despite
he use of expert judgment, the databases considered give very ifferent assessments of the start and length of banking crises. The ollowing part of this study therefore investigates these differences n more detail by zooming in on four specific banking crises.
inhart and Rogoff, 1976–2004.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Crisis years Non-crisis years Total
229 124 353 0.089 0.048 0.137 0.025 0.112 –
237 1987 2224 0.092 0.771 0.863 0.156 0.707 –
466 2111 2577 0.181 0.819 1.000 – – –
6 of Fin
3 b
3
d t o p o u l a ‘ J m w b t I m b p b o t
a t o t a n c l t p a s F o n s a U
a s
w s t g q e p r o t
i V p
m B w b c i t t s o a o e p b t g H p l o
3
d t A s ( i e a a t
1 A T e o m s
c
8 R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal
. Dating banking crises on the basis of bank failures and ank losses
.1. Data
In order to investigate the accuracy of the crisis dates from the atabases compared above in more detail, we have compiled data o reconstruct what in our view are the most important aspects f a systemic banking crisis, namely that a significant number or roportion of the banks fail and/or that a significant proportion f the banking’s sector equity is destroyed by losses.5 Bank fail- res materialize in a number of ways. Banks either fail and are
iquidated completely or the bank or its assets are in some form ssimilated (merged or taken over) by either a special purpose
bad bank’, such as the Resolution and Collection Corporation in apan, or by another commercial bank with or without govern-
ent assistance. If banks are liquidated, merged or taken over, e rely on the estimates of the losses provided as share of the
anking sector’s equity. Another related measure is the propor- ion of the banking sector’s assets represented by the failed banks. n discussing the crises, we apply a threshold for the latter two
easures. The threshold used is 10% for both the losses of failed anks as a proportion of the banking sectors’ equity and the roportion of the banking sectors’ assets represented by failed anks. There is no theoretical reasoning for choosing a thresh- ld of 10%. Our main findings are not driven by this level of the hreshold.6
We try to adhere as much as possible to the definition of a bank s a depository institution, in the sense that it takes deposits from he general public. This implies that our analysis does not cover ther financial institutions when they are not considered deposi- ory institutions. Investment banks are, for instance, not included, s they are not depository institutions or bank holding compa- ies (although after the sub-prime crisis most investment banks onverted to banks). Our analysis also does not cover specialized ending institutions, such as the Jusen, which played an impor- ant role in the crisis in Japan, and the mortgage companies which layed a similar part in Norway’s crisis. We have not limited our nalysis to domestic banks, but include foreign banks in our analy- is, as most banking sectors have both domestic and foreign banks. inally, most countries’ banking sectors consist of a wide variety f general banks and specialized banks with either a regional or a ational presence. In our analysis, we only consider the banking ector as a whole even though a crisis may disproportionally affect
subsector (as was the case in the savings and loan crisis in the S).
We rely on datasets which have not yet been widely used in nalyzing banking crises: financial accounts data for the banking ector as a whole or aggregate balance sheet data either drawn from
5 As we focus on two indicators that should have high values in case of a crisis, e do not think that they can be used to identify periods during which authorities
uccessfully averted crises. According to one of the referees, it is well conceivable o have a period with large losses of bank capital in which the central bank or the overnment keeps the banks afloat so that no open crisis occurs. One can of course uestion whether a crisis was averted if the government was forced to provide xtensive support to banks. Generally, governments only provide this type of sup- ort if the banking sector faces severe difficulties. For instance, during the most ecent financial crisis, many countries supported their banks, thereby avoiding all- ut failures. So the authorities kept banks afloat, but we think there is no dispute hat there was a crisis.
6 It is possible to apply our method and use another threshold if so desired. Defin- ng crises requires some subjective decisions for thresholds. Also the approach of on Hagen and Ho (2007) is based on some arbitrary and subjective decisions as ointed out by Jing et al. (2014).
d t a f t m o a a
b b L f c M W t
ancial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
onetary statistics or provided by the supervisory authorities.7
oth sources provide macro-economic data encompassing the hole banking sector of a country. The main difference between
oth sources is that the financial accounts data are part of a fully onsistent economy-wide data set and monetary statistics are an ndependent set of data. Monetary statistics are, however, usually he most important source for the compilation of the bank data in he financial accounts. They can therefore be regarded as a valuable ubstitute if financial accounts data is absent. Another advantage f these sources is that data are compiled according to internation- lly harmonized guidelines. The availability and the comparability f data between countries has greatly improved in recent years, specially in Europe as harmonized data was a prerequisite for the reparation of monetary policy under EMU. Increased cooperation etween countries under the direction of international organiza- ions, such as the UN, the IMF, the OECD, Eurostat and the ECB, has reatly increased the acceptance of common statistical standards. owever, the historical data is often less harmonized but for the urpose of our study international comparability is not a particu-
ar problem, since we combine data from one and the same country nly and not across countries.
.2. The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in the United States
We analyze the savings and loan (S&L) crisis in the United States uring the 1980s first. Savings and loan associations are deposi- ory institutions as documented by the Federal Deposit Insurance ct and are thus considered banks. The three databases examined trongly disagree in dating and classifying this crisis. Caprio et al. 2005) date the American S&L crisis from 1988 to 1991 but classify t at as a non-systemic crisis. No explanation is given why the crisis nds in 1991. The authors comment that: “More than 1400 savings nd loan institutions and 1300 banks failed. Cleaning up savings nd loan institutions cost $180 billion, or 3 percent of GDP.” But his does not explain the dates chosen.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) date the savings and loan crisis from 984 to 1991. The only explanation provided is given in annex .4: “There were 1400 savings and loan and 1300 bank failures.” his is exactly the same explanation given by Caprio et al. (2005), ven though the crisis dates differ. There is neither any indication f the losses incurred nor of their timing. Reinhart and Rogoff, as entioned before, do not distinguish between systemic and non-
ystemic crises. Laeven and Valencia (2013) limit the S&L crisis to 1988, but they
onsider it a “borderline case”. In summary, two out of the three atabases agree on either the start date or the end date. According o Caprio et al. and Laeven and Valencia, non-performing loans as
share of total loans outstanding peaked at 4.1%. However, data rom the FDIC as used in our calculations presented below show hat non-performing loans for the whole banking sector reached a
aximum of 2.5% in 1990. It is not clear to us where the number
f 4.1% originates from (Laeven and Valencia cite “IMF Staff reports nd Financial Soundness Indicators” in their downloadable dataset) nd why 1988 was chosen as the crisis date.
7 There are two basic forms of (supervisory) banking statistics: on a locational asis and on a consolidated basis. Locational banking statistics cover the whole anking sector located in a particular country, disregarding the nationality of banks. ocal branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks are included in this dataset, while oreign branches and subsidiaries of local banks are excluded. Consolidated statistics over banks by nationality, i.e. according to where the headquarters are located. onetary and financial accounts statistics are always compiled on a locational basis. e use both forms in our study, depending on which of the two is available. Although
his might influence the results somewhat, we believe the effects are limited.
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75 69
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1980 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6 198 7 198 8 198 9 199 0 199 1 199 2 199 3 199 4 199 5 Savings and loan as sociati ons S&L s and comm ercial banks
f a C i b c t a p c b p R s a l 1 1 a l o w t t I
F e
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1980 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6 198 7 198 8 198 9 199 0 199 1 199 2 199 3 199 4 199 5 Savings and loan associations S&Ls and commercial banks Threshold
Crisis dates: Reinhart and Rogoff 1984-1991 Caprio et al. 1988-1991 Laeven and Valencia 1988
F a
o – fi
e T i h T b n n l b (
F o e s a a
Fig. 4. Number of failed depository institutions in the US, 1980–1995.
We construct our measures on the basis of monthly time series rom the historical data on failures of banks and savings and loan ssociations in the US compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance orporation FDIC, the organization responsible in the US for deposit
nsurance. We combine these data with the FDIC’s data on the alance sheets of both types of institutions. The first time series onstructed is the simple number of failures (see Fig. 4). The second ime series is the aggregate estimated loss for failed institutions as
proportion of equity, shown in Fig. 5. Unfortunately, the FDIC only rovides data on estimated losses from 1986 onwards for commer- ial banks while the data is sketchy for savings and loan associations efore 1989 when the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor- oration (FSLIC) itself became insolvent and was replaced by the esolution Trust Corporation (RTC). We have extended the time- eries on estimated losses backwards for both commercial banks nd savings and loan associations to 1980 by taking the average oss per failed institution over the period January 1986 to December 992 for commercial banks and from February 1989 to December 992 for savings and loan associations, and multiplying the aver- ge loss by the number of failures per month. Our estimated total oss for savings and loan associations during the years 1986–1988 f USD 26 billion is slightly higher than the estimate by the FDIC hich amounts to USD 22 billion (see Curry and Shibut, 2000). For
he commercial banks, we made an exception in the compilation of he estimate of losses in May 1984 for the failure of the Continental llinois National Bank and Trust Company. Information on the cost
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1980 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6 198 7 198 8 198 9 199 0 199 1 199 2 199 3 199 4 199 5 Savings and loan as sociati ons S&L s and comm ercial banks Thres hold
Crisis dates: Reinhart and Rogoff 1984-1991 Caprio et al. 1988-1991 Laeven and Valencia 198 8
ig. 5. Losses incurred by failed depository institutions in the US as a proportion of quity, 1980–1995.
i
t f a i i c t o
s o c o w
3
i t t
ig. 6. Assets of failed depository institutions in the US as a proportion of total ssets, 1980–1995.
f the rescue was made public and because of its exceptional size capital support amounted to USD 2 billion – we substituted this gure for the estimate of the losses for May 1984.
Our figures raise the question of why 1984 should be consid- red as the start date, as chosen by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). here were actually more failures in 1982 (119 against 106) than n 1984. We suspect that the sources used by Reinhart and Rogoff ave taken the failure of the Continental Illinois National Bank and rust Company in May 1984 as the event by which to mark the eginning of the crisis. However, the failure of the Continental Illi- ois National Bank and Trust Company was a fairly isolated event ot related to losses on mortgage investments which caused the
arge number of failures among the savings and loan associations, ut on loans made to the energy sector and to developing countries FDIC, 1997).
In late 1988 and 1989 the S&L losses increased dramatically (see ig. 5). During both February and March 1989, 20% of the equity f savings and loan institutions (expressed as percentage of total quity of the S&L sector) was destroyed by failures. But since the avings and loan sector made up only a quarter of the equity of ll depository institutions, in terms of equity of the banking sector s a whole the effects were more limited and never reached our ndicative threshold of 10% of equity per month.
The analysis of the assets of failed institutions as a proportion of he total banking sectors’ assets, as presented in Fig. 6, suggests that ailures were at no time pervasive enough for the crisis to qualify s systemic. To begin with, most of the failures were limited to sav- ngs and loan institutions. Additionally, at the height of the crisis, n March 1989, the failure of 176 banks and savings and loan asso- iations represented USD 61.3 billion, or just 1.3% of total assets of he banking sector. Even among the savings and loan associations, ur indicator reaches a maximum of only 3.6% in February 1990.
We conclude that the S&L crisis should not be considered as a ystemic banking crisis. Comparing our analysis with the dating f the S&L crisis in the three databases considered, our analysis is losest to that of Laeven and Valencia, who date the crisis to 1988 nly, although our analysis suggests that the height of the crisis as in 1989.
.3. Japan’s banking crisis of the 1990s
We next apply our method to probably one of the most often nvestigated crises, the banking crisis in Japan of the 1990s. The hree databases again differ markedly in their classification and iming of the crisis in Japan. Caprio et al. (2005) document a
7 of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
s t “ w a a a a 2 t
f G s w a e b Y m p b W n a 2
s ( g e n h
c a H 2 a o i s p t c t i a b
r c t f a t t l l o D b o s U
0
5
10
15
20
25
1994 199 5 199 6 199 7 199 8 199 9 200 0 200 1 200 2 200 3 200 4
o w
t s M N fi g c w a t h h
3
w m m w differ in dating this crisis. Caprio et al. (2005) date the crisis from 1990 to 1993 and classify it as systemic. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the crisis runs from 1987 to 1993, while Laeven and
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1994 199 5 199 6 199 7 199 8 199 9 200 0 200 1 200 2 200 3 200 4
Crisis dates: Reinhart and Rogoff 1992-1997 Caprio et al. 199 2-? Laeven and Val encia 199 7-200 1
0 R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal
ystemic banking crisis starting in 1992, but provide no end date. In he comments accompanying their classification they mention that By 2002, fiscal cost estimates rose to 24 percent of GDP” (p. 323), hich would suggest that they have the crisis last at least to 2002,
n assumption often made in other studies (see e.g. Demirgüç -Kunt nd Detragiache, 2005). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also have 1992 s start date, but they date the end of the crisis in 1997. Laeven nd Valencia consider the crisis systemic and date it from 1997 to 001. Their end date is determined by their decision to truncate he length of a crisis to five years.
Caprio et al. seem to have dated the crisis on the basis of the act that 1992 was the year with the lowest growth rate of real DP (0.9%). As with the US savings and loan crisis, this is not con- istent with current official economic data as GDP growth in 1993 as lower at 0.2%; in 1998 and 1999 growth rate even turned neg-
tive, at −2.1% and −0.1% respectively. In their explanation, Caprio t al. (2005, p. 323) mention that “In 1999 Hakkaido Takoshodu ank was closed, the Long Term Credit Bank was nationalized, atsuda Trust was merged with Fuji Bank, and Mitsui Trust was erged with Chuo Trust. In 2002 nonperforming loans were 35
ercent of total loans; with a total of 7 banks nationalized, 61 anks financial institutions closed and 28 institutions merged.” hile these institutions were certainly among the largest that
eeded official assistance, the amounts involved represent only bout a fifth of the total support provided to banks from 1992 to 003.
While Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also start the Japanese cri- is in 1992, this year does not appear in their historical summary appendix A.4, p. 371) at all. In contrast to their own definition, overnment assistance to banks in 1992, 1993 and 1994 does not xceed 50 billion yen. Reinhart and Rogoff mention estimates of onperforming loans for 1995, 1998 and 2002, but it is not clear ow this relates in any way to their crisis dates of 1992–1997.
Laeven and Valencia (2013) start the crisis in November 1997, oinciding with the decision of the Japanese Ministry of Finance nd the Bank of Japan to issue a blanket guarantee on deposits. owever, they do not provide an explanation for ending the crisis in 001 other than their rule to truncate a crisis after five years. Laeven nd Valencia (2012, Data file – Additional details – Brief description f the crises) argue that, while there had already been problems n the banking sector since 1989, “it was not until 1997 that the ystemic proportions of the problem became evident when high rofile financial institutions failed.” We may therefore conclude hat from the three studies considered, only Laeven and Valencia onsistently apply their own definition for identifying the start of he banking crisis in Japan. The systemic nature of the crisis though, s exclusively founded on the introduction of policy measures by uthorities without any reference to the size of losses in relation to anks’ equity.
For our analysis we have taken information from the annual eports of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) and ompiled a list of failed institutions along with the financial assis- ance they received for the years 1991 to 2010. Somewhat different rom the US data, the data from the DICJ concerns the amount of ssistance and not the losses estimated. Nevertheless, as the assis- ance is aimed at covering losses and replenishing equity capital, he method applied to the US data is applicable here as well. We col- ected data on the number of failed institutions (see Fig. 7) and the osses (proxied by the financial assistance provided) as a proportion f equity of the whole banking sector (see Fig. 8). Unfortunately, the ICJ does not provide information on the total assets of the failed
anks. We therefore could not analyze failures by the proportion f assets represented by failed banks. Equity for the whole banking ector is taken from the monetary statistics of the Bank of Japan. nfortunately, this series only starts in October 1993. As there were
F e
Bank fail ures
Fig. 7. Number of failed depository institutions in Japan, 1994–2004.
nly two small failures in the years 1991 and 1992, this arguably ill not affect the outcomes of our analysis.
The time series for losses incurred by failed banks as a propor- ion of the equity of the whole banking sector, as shown in Fig. 8, uggests that that there were four crises-months: November 1998, arch 1999, February 2000 and August 2000. Over the period from ovember 1998 to August 2000, 69% of equity was destroyed. The rst year of this period, 1998, is also the first year with negative GDP rowth (−2.0%, the lowest growth rates throughout the 1990s). Our risis dating analysis tallies best with that of Laeven and Valencia, ho consider the crisis as systemic from 1997 to 2001. Reinhart
nd Rogoff and Caprio et al. start the crisis five years earlier, when here are actually hardly any failures yet as shown in Fig. 7. Rein- art and Rogoff end the crisis in 1997, when most of the failures ave yet to occur.
.4. Norway’s crisis in the 1980s and 1990s
While the United States and Japan have large banking sectors ith a large number of banks, many European countries have ore concentrated banking sectors. In order to investigate how our ethod works out in these countries, we also investigate the Nor- egian banking crises during the 1980s. Again, the three databases
Losses Threshold
ig. 8. Losses incurred by failed depository institutions in Japan as a proportion of quity, 1994–2004.
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Fina
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Losses Thres hold
Crisis dates: Rei nhart and Rogoff 198 7-199 3 Caprio et al. 1990-1993 Laeven and Valencia 1991-1993
F o
V 1 b w S c s
o i l b t f f t s t d a (
C y t t a a w M
f h o ( o b d o o p b y
f
o U T V s d
3
e c a t 2 2
a F T r t g ( a h s t p
p ( b C m o m v f t
t m c r o a t i c T
1 b s O 1 2 lier studies have taken along the failures in January and December 1999, but start the crisis in 2000. Similarly, none of the studies seems to take into account the failure of Pamukbank in June 2002,
ig. 9. Losses incurred by failed depository institutions in Norway as a proportion f equity, 1989–1993.
alencia (2013) argue that this (systemic) crisis runs from 1991 to 993. So the three studies agree on 1993 as the end date of the crisis, ut the start dates range between 1987 and 1991. In 1993 the Nor- egian government provided support for banks for the last time.
ince all studies agree on the end date and since this date seems onsistent with events, we focus primarily on the differences in tarting dates.
Caprio et al. provide no detailed explanation for their timeframe f 1990 to 1993. They mention (government and) central bank ntervention, but this had already started – although on a more imited scale – in the fall of 1988 (Moe et al., 2004, p. 5) and the ank failures were not yet of systemic proportions. The failures in he years from 1988 and 1990 were resolved through mergers of ailed institutions with larger banks along with additional financing rom the banks’ own guarantee funds and liquidity support from he central bank. Caprio et al. (2005, p. 328) mention that “(t)he tate took control of the three largest banks . . .”, certainly an event hat would indicate a crisis of systemic proportions. This, however, id not occur until the second half of 1991. Caprio et al. list 1989 s the year with the lowest GDP growth, but it was lowest in 1988 −0.2%).
Reinhart and Rogoff use much of the information compiled by aprio et al. but data the start of the Norwegian crisis in 1987, a ear before the first failures. Surprisingly, one of the other sources hey refer to is the seminal article by Kaminsky and Reinhart on win crises, which lists the beginning of Norway’s banking crisis s November 1988 (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, Table 2). Laeven nd Valencia start the crisis in October 1991, which is consistent ith the announcement of support measures as documented by oe et al. (2004). For our own analysis, we could not rely on data on losses or
ailures from an official supervisory agency as Norway’s banks ad instituted a private deposit insurance fund. We therefore rely n studies documenting the crisis extensively, such as Moe et al. 2004), specifically their Appendix B. We have taken the data on fficial support, like in the case of Japan, as a proxy for the losses of anks receiving the support. We compared losses with equity using ata for commercial and savings banks from the statistical office f Norway. We have not found data on the 13 bank failures that ccurred between 1988 and 1990. According to Moe et al. (2004, . 5), in those years “13 small and some regional medium-sized anks failed, mostly savings banks. The size of these banks did not
et qualify to call it a systemic crisis.”
The results of our analysis are presented in Fig. 9. We refrained rom presenting a figure on the number of failures, since after 1990 w
ncial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75 71
nly four banks were involved. Applying the same method as for the S and Japan suggests a crisis from December 1991 to April 1992. hat we find a start date two months later than that of Laeven and alencia is explained by the fact that we use the date the actual upport measures were executed instead of the announcement ate.
.5. Turkey’s crisis in the late 1990s
As we also wanted to apply our approach to an emerging market conomy, we chose the crisis in Turkey at the beginning of this entury as our final case study. Caprio et al. (2005) identify 2000 s the start date of this crisis but have no end date and classify he crisis as systemic. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) limit the crisis to 000 and Laeven and Valencia (2013) date the crisis from 2000 to 001.
Caprio et al. only provide the explanation that two banks closed nd 19 banks were taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance und. No further reference to the timing of these events is given. he year with lowest GDP growth rate is once again not corrobo- ated by official statistics. Caprio et al. list 1999 as the year with he lowest growth rate of −4.7%, while official data (after revision) ive a figure of −3.4% for 1999, while growth was lowest in 2001 at −5.7%). Reinhart and Rogoff refer to the Caprio et al. dataset nd provide no further explanation. Laeven and Valencia seem to ave adopted 2000 as the starting year of the crisis from earlier tudies and extended the crisis to include 2001 as the year when he government recapitalized the banks. No exact explanations are rovided.
We have taken data on bank failures from a number of reports roduced by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency BRSA) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). Data on the alance sheet for the banking sector as a whole come from the entral Bank of Turkey (Deposit Money, Investment and Develop- ent and Participation Banks’ Aggregated Balance Sheet). The data
n bank failures contains information on accumulated losses at the oment of take-over by the SDIF for commercial banks8 and on the
alue of securitized ‘duty losses’ by the Treasury for State Banks. As or the other countries, this data was then compiled into a monthly ime-series for losses.
Besides capital injections to replenish capital, most banks were emporarily exempted from certain capital and reserve require-
ents, while some were also refinanced by issuing bonds. In other ases, deposits at the central bank were released and reserve equirements suspended. This complicates the assessment of the fficial support measures, since they are a mix of recapitalizations nd provision of additional ‘emergency’ liquidity. The documen- ation of the SDIF also does not provide sufficiently detailed nformation on these liquidity measures to include them in our cal- ulations. We have thus concentrated on the accumulated losses. he results for Turkey are presented in Figs. 10 and 11.
Fig. 10 presents the number of failed banks in the period 997–2002, while Fig. 11 depicts the losses of banks taken over y the SDIF and the value of securitized ‘duty losses’ by the Trea- ury for State Banks as a percentage of the banking sector’s equity. n four occasions, the losses exceeded the indicative threshold of 0%: in January 1999, in December 1999, from October 2000 to July 001 and in June 2002. It is somewhat puzzling that none of the ear-
8 For two banks, we used capital support from the SDIF as a proxy since no data as provided for losses at the moment of takeover.
72 R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal of Fin
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1997 199 8 199 9 200 0 200 1 200 2 Bank failures
Fig. 10. Number of failed depository institutions in Turkey, 1997–2002.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1997 199 8 199 9 200 0 200 1 200 2 Total losses (SDIF and state banks) Threshold
Crisis dates: Reinh art and Rogoff 200 0 Caprio et al. 200 0-? Laeven and Val encia 200 0-200 1
F o
e c
3
a w l n 1 1 t f k C 9 c T w
4
c e d
t R s s i c o
l N a o t t o o w z t m p
A
c d
A a
A s
(HSOB), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Turkey Monthly Money and Banking Statistics, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
www.tcmb.gov.tr
ig. 11. Losses incurred by failed depository institutions in Turkey as a proportion f equity, 1997–2002.
ven though it was the largest loss due to the failure of an individual ommercial bank.
.6. Comparison of kappas
While the analysis presented above suggests that the Laeven nd Valencia database of crisis dates has the best correspondence ith our own findings for the four crises investigated, we calcu-
ated kappas to verify if this is borne out by the data. Although the umber of observations is limited to only 43 years in total (US: 980–1995, Japan: 1990–2004, Norway: 1988–1993 and Turkey: 997–2002), there is enough data to draw statistical inferences. It urns out that none of the kappas calculated are significantly dif- erent from zero, except for the dates of Laeven and Valencia. The appa for the comparison with the dates for the systemic crises of aprio et al. is 0.0906 with a standard error of 0.1599 implying a 5% confidence interval of −0.2228 to 0.4041. The kappa for the omparison with Reinhart and Rogoff is even negative (−0.1316). he kappa for the comparison with Laeven and Valencia is 0.6103 ith a standard error of 0.1430.
. Conclusions
Our comparison of three widely used databases on banking rises has shown that these databases differ significantly from ach other. Consistent definitions matter when comparing crisis ates between different studies as shown in the comparison of
A r s
ancial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
he Laeven-Valencia database of systemic crises and the Reinhart- ogoff database which does not make a distinction between ystemic and non-systemic crises. Still, the extent to which the cri- is dates differ even if the databases refer to the same type of crisis s remarkable. Despite the use of expert judgment, the databases onsidered give very different assessments of the start and length f banking crises.
Our investigations of four crises – the United States savings and oan crisis during the 1980s, Japan’s banking crisis of the 1990s, orway’s banking crisis during the early 1990s and Turkey’s crisis round the turn of the century–have shown that quantitative data n bank failures and losses suffered by failed banks (or alterna- ively on official assistance provided) can help to identify and date hese crises more precisely. Our analysis suggests that the dating f these four banking crises of Laeven and Valencia is closest to urs. Our proposed method can be applied to other countries as ell, although it will require some effort. But international organi-
ations like the IMF, with much better access to comparative data han we had, should be able to gather this type of data for many
ore countries so that this information may be helpful in better inpointing the timing of banking crises.
cknowledgements
We like to thank two anonymous referees for their very helpful omments on a previous version of the paper. The views expressed o not necessarily reflect the views of De Nederlandsche Bank.
ppendix A. Sources for information on bank failures and ssistance
Country Data on bank failures Website
Japan Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan
www.dic.go.jp
Norway Moe et al. (2004) – United States Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation www.fdic.gov
Turkey Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
www.bddk.org.tr
(Savings Deposit Insurance Fund)
ppendix B. Sources for information on the banking ectors’ balance sheet
Country Data on the banking sector’s balance sheet
Website
Japan Assets and liabilities of domestically licensed banks, Bank of Japan
www.boj.or.jp
Norway Banking and credit statistics, Statistics Norway
www.ssb.no
United States Historical Statistics on Banking www.fdic.gov
ppendix C. Overview of (systemic) banking crises years by eference for countries which appear in all three event tudies
of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75 73
io et al. Laeven & Valencia
End Systemic Start End
1996 Y 1994 1994 1992 Y 1990 1994 1982 Y 1980 1982
– – – – 1990 Y 1989 1991 1995 Y 1995 1995
? Y 2001 2003 1996 Y 1994 1994 1996 Y 1995 1995 1980s 1996 Y 1987 1987
? N 1995 1995 1990 Y 1988 1992 1988 Y 1986 1986 ? Y 1994 1994 ? Y 1992 1996
– – – – 1990 Y 1990 1994
1999 Y 1994 1998 1997 Y 1996 1997 1994 Y 1990 1994 ? Y 1994 1998 1993 Y 1987 1991 1998 Y 1995 1997 ? Y 1993 1993 1992 Y 1976 1976 1999 Y 1995 1996 s Y 1983 1983
1992 Y 1992 1996 1976 Y 1976 1976 1983 Y 1981 1985 s ? Y 1998 1998
1987 Y 1982 1982 – – 1998 2000
s Y 1983 1983 1992 Y 1991 1994 1996 Y 1994 1998 ? Y 1992 1994
– – 1987 1991 1996 Y 1994 1995 1991 Y 1988 1992 1996 Y 1998 1999 1991 Y 1996 2000 1992 N – – 1993 Y 1991 1995
– – – – ? Y 2003 2004
1980s Y 1982 1986 – – – –
1997 Y – – 2001 Y 1998 2002
1980s Y 1980 1980 1995 N 1989 Y 1989 1990
– – – – 1985 Y 1983 1983 1993 Y 1993 1993 1995 Y 1992 1994 1998 N – – 1994 Y 1991 1995 1996 Y 1991 1995 1989 Y 1982 1983 ? N – – 1985 Y 1985 1985 1994 Y 1993 1993 1996 Y 1995 1998 1995 Y 1991 1995 ? N 1993 1993
– – – – 1994 N – – 2002 Y 1997 2001
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal
Country Reinhart & Rogoff Capr
Start End Start
Albania 1992 1992 1992 Algeria 1990 1992 1990 Argentina 1980 1982 1980 Argentina 1985 1985 – Argentina 1989 1990 1989 Argentina 1995 1995 1995 Argentina 2001 2001 2001 Armenia 1994 1996 1994 Azerbaijan 1995 1995 1995 Bangladesh 1987 1996 Late Belarus 1995 1995 1995 Benin 1988 1990 1988 Bolivia 1987 1988 1986 Bolivia 1994 1994 1994 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 ? 1992 Brazil 1985 1985 – Brazil 1990 1990 1990 Brazil 1994 1996 1994 Bulgaria 1995 1997 1996 Burkina Faso 1988 1994 1988 Burundi 1994 1995 1994 Cameroon 1987 1993 1987 Cameroon 1995 1998 1995 Cape Verde 1993 1993 1993 Central African Republic 1976 1982 1976 Central African Republic 1988 1999 1995 Chad 1980 1989 1980 Chad 1992 1992 1992 Chile 1976 1976 1976 Chile 1980 1980 1981 China, People’s Republic 1997 1999 1990 Colombia 1982 1987 1982 Colombia 1998 1998 – Congo, Dem Republic 1982 1982 1980 Congo, Dem Republic 1991 1992 1991 Congo, Dem Republic 1994 ? 1994 Congo, Republic 1992 ? 1992 Costa Rica 1987 1987 – Costa Rica 1994 1997 1994 Cote d’Ivoire 1988 1991 1988 Croatia 1996 1996 1996 Czech Republic 1991 ? 1989 Denmark 1987 1992 1987 Djibouti 1991 1993 1991 Dominican Republic 1996 1996 – Dominican Republic 2003 2003 2003 Ecuador 1981 1981 Early Ecuador 1994 1994 – Ecuador 1996 1996 1996 Ecuador 1998 1999 1998 Egypt 1980 1981 Early Egypt 1990 1995 1991 El Salvador 1989 1989 1989 El Salvador 1998 1998 – Equatorial Guinea 1983 1985 1983 Eritrea 1993 1993 1993 Estonia 1992 1995 1992 Estonia 1998 1998 1998 Finland 1991 1994 1991 Georgia 1991 1991 1991 Ghana 1982 1989 1982 Ghana 1997 1997 1997 Guinea 1985 1985 1985 Guinea 1993 1994 1993 Guinea-Bissau 1995 1995 1995 Hungary 1991 1995 1991 India 1993 1996 1993 Indonesia 1992 1992 – Indonesia 1994 1994 1994 Indonesia 1997 2002 1997
Israel 1977 1983 1977 1983 Y 1977 1977 Jamaica 1994 1997 1994 1994 N 1996 1998 Jamaica 1995 2000 1996 2000 Y – – Japan 1992 1997 1992 ? Y 1997 2001 Jordan 1989 1990 1989 1990 N 1989 1991
7 of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 63–75
. Laeven & Valencia
End Systemic Start End
1989 Y 1985 1985 1992 Y 1992 1994 1995 Y – – ? N – – – – – – 2002 Y 1997 1998 Y 1982 1985 Y 1995 1999 1996 Y 1995 1996 1990 Y 1990 1993 1995 Y 1991 1995 1996 Y 1995 1996 1994 Y 1993 1995 1988 Y 1988 1988 1988 N – – 2001 Y 1997 1999 1989 Y 1987 1991 1993 Y 1984 1984 1991 Y 1981 1985 2000 Y 1994 1996
Y 1980 1984 ? Y 1987 1991 1988 Y 1988 1988 ? Y 1990 1993 – – 2000 2001 1996 Y 1983 1985 1995 Y 1991 1995 1997 N – – 1993 Y 1991 1993 1989 Y 1988 1989 2000 Y 1995 1995 ? N – – – – – – 1990 Y 1983 1983 – – – – 1987 Y 1983 1986 ? Y 1997 2001 1995 Y 1992 1994 1996 Y 1990 1992 1995 Y – – 1999 Y 1998 1998
990s Y 1992 1992 1991 Y 1988 1991 1996 Y 1990 1994 1995 Y – – – – 1998 2002 1994 Y 1992 1992 1985 Y 1977 1981 1993 Y 1989 1991 ? Y 1995 1999 1994 Y 1991 1995
1990s Y 1987 1988 – – – – 1987 Y 1983 1983 2002 Y 1997 2000 1995 Y 1993 1994 1995 N 1991 1991 1985 Y 1982 1984 – – – – 1994 N – – ? Y 2000 2001 1996 Y 1994 1994 1998 Y 1998 1999 1991 N 1988 1988 1984 Y 1981 1985 ? Y 2002 2005
and 1980s N – – 1995 Y 1994 1998
4 R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal
Country Reinhart & Rogoff Caprio et al
Start End Start
Kenya 1985 1989 1985 Kenya 1992 1996 1992 Kenya – – 1993 Kenya – – 1996 Korea 1986 1986 – Korea 1997 1997 1997 Kuwait 1983 1983 1980S Kyrgyz Republic 1993 1993 1990S Latvia 1994 1999 1995 Lebanon 1988 1990 1988 Liberia 1991 1995 1991 Lithuania 1995 1996 1995 Macedonia, FYR 1993 1994 1993 Madagascar 1988 1988 1988 Malaysia 1985 1988 1985 Malaysia 1997 1997 1997 Mali 1987 1989 1987 Mauritania 1984 1993 1984 Mexico 1981 1992 1981 Mexico 1994 1997 1994 Morocco 1983 1983 Early 1980s Mozambique 1987 1995 1987 Nepal 1988 1988 1988 Nicaragua 1987 1996 Late 1980s Nicaragua 2000 2002 – Niger 1983 ? 1983 Nigeria 1992 1995 1991 Nigeria 1997 1997 1997 Norway 1987 1993 1990 Panama 1988 1989 1988 Paraguay 1995 1999 1995 Paraguay – – 2001 Paraguay 2002 2002 – Peru 1983 1990 1983 Peru 1999 1999 – Philippines 1981 1987 1983 Philippines 1997 1998 1998 Poland 1991 1991 1992 Romania 1990 1990 1990 Russia 1995 1995 1995 Russia 1998 1999 1998 São Tomé & Príncipe 1991 1991 1980s and 1 Senegal 1988 1991 1988 Sierra Leone 1990 1990 1990 Slovak Republic 1991 1991 1991 Slovak Republic – – – Slovenia 1993 1994 1992 Spain 1977 1985 1977 Sri Lanka 1989 1993 1989 Swaziland 1995 1995 1995 Sweden 1991 1994 1991 Tanzania 1987 1987 Late 1980s; Thailand 1979 1979 – Thailand 1983 1987 1983 Thailand 1996 1996 1997 Togo 1993 1995 1993 Tunisia 1991 1995 1991 Turkey 1982 1985 1982 Turkey 1991 1991 – Turkey 1994 1994 1994 Turkey 2000 2000 2000 Uganda 1994 2002 1994 Ukraine 1997 1998 1997 United States 1984 1991 1988 Uruguay 1981 1984 1981 Uruguay 2002 2002 2002 Venezuela 1978 1986 Late 1970s Venezuela 1993 1995 1994
Vietnam 1997 ? 1997 ? Y 1997 1997 Yemen 1996 ? 1996 ? Y 1996 1996 Zambia 1995 1995 1995 ? Y 1995 1998 Zimbabwe 1995 1995 1995 1996 Y 1995 1999
of Fina
R
B
B
C
C
C
D
F
F
F H
J
K
L
L
L
M Bank Occasional Paper 33.
R. Chaudron, J. de Haan / Journal
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abecký, J., Havránek, T., Matějů, J., Rusnák, M., Šmidková, K., Vašiček, B., 2012. Bank- ing, debt and currency crises: early warning indicators for developed countries. ECB Working Paper 1485.
oyd, J., de Nicolò, G., Loukoianova, E., 2009. Banking crises and crisis dating: theory and evidence. IMF Working Paper 09/141.
aprio, G., Klingebiel, D., 1996. Bank insolvencies, cross-country experience. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1620.
aprio, G., Klingebiel, D., Laeven, L., Noguera, G., 2005. Appendix: banking crisis database. In: Honohan, P., Laeven, L. (Eds.), Systemic Financial Crises: Contain- ment and Resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
urry, T., Shibut, L., 2000. The cost of the savings and loan crisis: truth and conse- quences. FDIC Bank. Rev. 13, 26–35.
emirgüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., 2005. Cross-country empirical studies of sys- temic bank distress: a survey. Natl. Inst. Econ. Rev. 192, 68–83.
DIC, 1997. History of the Eighties—Lessons for the Future, Volume I: An Exam- ination of the Banking Crises of the 1980 and Early 1990, Available from: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html
leiss, J.L., Cohen, J., Everett, B.S., 1969. Large sample standard errors of Kappa and weighted Kappa. Psychol. Bull. 72, 323–327.
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rydle, E.J., 1999. The length and costs of banking crises. IMF Working Paper 99/30. onohan, P., Laeven, L. (Eds.), 2005. Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and
Resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ing, Z., de Haan, J., Jacobs, J., Jang, H., 2014. Identifying banking crises using money
market pressure: new evidence for a large set of countries. J. Macroecon., forth- coming.
aminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., 1999. The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. Am. Econ. Rev. 89, 473–500.
aeven, L., Valencia, F., 2008. Systemic banking crises: a new database. IMF Working Paper 08/224.
aeven, L., Valencia, F., 2012. Systemic banking crises database: an update. IMF Working Paper 12/163.
aeven, L., Valencia, F., 2013. Systemic banking crises database. IMF Econ. Rev. 61, 225–270.
oe, T.G., Solheim, J.A., Vale, B. (Eds.), 2004. The Norwegian banking crisis. Norges
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- Dating banking crises using incidence and size of bank failures: Four crises reconsidered
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Comparing databases of banking crises
- 3 Dating banking crises on the basis of bank failures and bank losses
- 3.1 Data
- 3.2 The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in the United States
- 3.3 Japan's banking crisis of the 1990s
- 3.4 Norway's crisis in the 1980s and 1990s
- 3.5 Turkey's crisis in the late 1990s
- 3.6 Comparison of kappas
- 4 Conclusions
- Acknowledgements
- Appendix A Sources for information on bank failures and assistance
- Appendix B Sources for information on the banking sectors’ balance sheet
- Appendix C Overview of (systemic) banking crises years by reference for countries which appear in all three event studies
- References
23049436.pdf
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American Economic Association
A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation Author(s): Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2011), pp. 3-28 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23049436 Accessed: 11-03-2015 19:24 UTC
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 25, Number 1—Winter 2011—Pages 3-28
A Macroprudential Approach to
Financial Regulation
Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and
Jeremy C. Stein
Many
observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place
prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely
"microprudential" in nature (Crockett, 2000; Borio, Furfine, and Lowe,
2001; Borio, 2003; Kashyap and Stein, 2004; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2008;
Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin, 2009; Bank of England,
2009; French et al., 2010). A microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of
individual financial institutions. By contrast, a "macroprudential" approach recog
nizes the importance of general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the
financial system as a whole. In the aftermath of the crisis, there seems to be agree
ment among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to
move in a macroprudential direction. For example, according to Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke (2008):
■ Samuel G. Hanson is a Ph.D. Candidate in Business Economics, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts. From February to December 2009, Hanson was a Special Assistant
at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. Anil K Kashyap is Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance and Richard N. Rosett Faculty Fellow, University of
Chicago Booth School of Business, Chicago, Illinois. Jeremy C. Stein is Moise Y. Safra Professor
of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. From February to July 2009,
Stein was Senior Advisor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and Staff Member
of the National Economic Council, both in Washington, D. C. Kashyap and Stein are both
Research Associates, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Their e-mail addresses are ([email protected]), ([email protected]), and ([email protected]).
doi=10.1257/jep.25.1.3
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4 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what their
appropriate "field of vision" should be. Under our current system of safety
and-soundness regulation, supervisors often focus on the financial conditions
of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which has been
called systemwide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the mandate
of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic
risks and weaknesses as well.
In this paper, we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime
might be designed. Our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern
financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system, as well as one
based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks, is likely to be fragile. We
begin by identifying the key market failures at work: why individual financial firms,
acting in their own interests, deviate from what a social planner would have them
do. Next, we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures. We
conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the
United States and to proposed global banking reforms.
Theories of Financial Regulation
Microprudential Regulation
Traditional microprudential regulation of banks is based on the following logic. Banks finance themselves with government-insured deposits. While deposit
insurance has the valuable effect of preventing runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983;
Bryant, 1980), it creates an incentive for bank managers to take excessive risks,
knowing that losses will be covered by the taxpayer. The goal of capital regulation
is to force banks to internalize losses, thereby protecting the deposit insurance
fund and mitigating moral hazard. Thus, if the probability of the deposit insurer
bearing losses is reduced to a low enough level, microprudential regulation is
doing its job. To be specific, consider a bank with assets of $100 that is financed with insured
deposits and some amount of capital. Suppose that the regulator can check on the
bank once a quarter. Suppose further that the volatility of the bank's assets is such
that with probability 99.5 percent, the assets do not decline in value by more than
6 percent during a quarter. Then if the goal of policy is to reduce the probability of bank failure (whereby capital is wiped out and there are losses to the deposit insurance fund) to 0.5 percent, this goal can be accomplished by requiring the bank
to have capital equal to 6 percent of its assets as a cushion against losses. Notice
that in this setting, the exact form of the capital cushion is not important. It can be
common equity, but it can equally well be preferred stock, or subordinated debt, as
long as these instruments are not explicitly or implicitly insured—that is, as long as
they will in fact bear losses in a bad state.
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein 5
An important element of existing capital regulation is the presumption that
a bank will take immediate steps to restore its capital ratio in the wake of losses.
Returning to our example, suppose the bank starts out with capital of $6 but then
over the next quarter experiences losses of $2, so that its capital falls to $4. If the
volatility of its assets remains unchanged, in order for its probability of failure over
the subsequent quarter to stay at 0.5 percent, it would need to bring its capital ratio
back up to 6 percent. It could do so in one of two ways: either by going to the market
and raising $2 of fresh capital, or by leaving its capital unchanged and shrinking its
asset base to $66.67 (4/66.67 = 6 percent). The basic critique of microprudential regulation can be understood as follows.
When a microprudentially oriented regulator pushes a troubled bank to restore
its capital ratio, the regulator does not care whether the bank adjusts via the numerator or
via the denominator—that is, by raising new capital or by shrinking assets. Either way, the
bank's probability of failure is brought back to a tolerable level, which is all that a
microprudential regulator cares about.
Such indifference to the method of adjustment makes sense if we are consid
ering a single bank that is in trouble for idiosyncratic reasons. If that bank chooses
to shrink its assets—perhaps by cutting back on lending—others can pick up the
slack. Indeed, asset shrinkage in this case can be part of a healthy Darwinian process,
whereby market share is transferred from weaker troubled institutions to their
stronger peers. However, if a large fraction of the financial system is in difficulty, a
simultaneous attempt by many institutions to shrink their assets is likely to be more
damaging to the economy.
Macroprudential Regulation
In the simplest terms, one can characterize the macroprudential approach to
financial regulation as an effort to control the social costs associated with excessive balance
sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common shock. To
make a compelling case for macroprudential regulation, two questions must be
answered. First, what are the costs imposed on society when many financial firms
shrink their assets at the same time? Second, why do individual firms not internalize
these costs? That is, why do they not raise fresh capital rather than reduce assets
when a bad shock hits? Or alternatively, why do they not build sufficiently large
capital buffers ahead of time so that they can withstand a shock without needing
either to raise capital or to reduce assets?
Generalized asset shrinkage has two primary costs: credit-crunch and fire-sale
effects. If banks shrink their assets by cutting new lending, operating firms find
credit more expensive and reduce investment and employment, with contractionary
consequences for the economy. If a large number of banks instead shrink their
assets by all dumping the same illiquid securities (think of toxic mortgage-backed
securities) the prices of these securities can drop sharply in a "fire sale" of the sort
described by Shleifer and Vishny in this issue. Moreover, the fire-sale and credit
crunch effects are intimately connected (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Shleifer and
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6 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Vishny, 2010; Stein, 2010a). If a toxic mortgage security falls in price to the point where it offers a (risk-adjusted) 20 percent rate of return to a prospective buyer, this
will tend to drive the rate on new loans up towards 20 percent as well—since from
the perspective of an intermediary that can choose to either make new loans or buy
distressed securities, the expected rate of return on the two must be equalized. In
other words, in market equilibrium, the real costs of fire sales manifest themselves
in the further deepening of credit crunches. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) offer
evidence on the extent of credit contraction during the recent crisis.
Of course, to make a case for regulatory intervention, one has to explain why
these 20 percent rates of return inside the financial sector—which are much higher
than the outside rates on, say, Treasury securities—don't naturally draw in enough
private capital to eliminate the return differentials. One reason why capital is immo
bile once a crisis is underway is the "debt overhang" problem identified by Myers
(1977). Once a bank is in serious trouble and its debt is impaired in value, the bank is reluctant to raise new equity even to fund investments that have a positive
net present value. This is because much of the value that is created is siphoned off
by the more senior creditors. Given the debt overhang problem, banks that act in
the interests of their shareholders will tend to fix their damaged capital ratios by
shrinking assets rather than by raising new capital, even when the latter is more
desirable from a social perspective.
If so, why don't banks voluntarily build up adequate buffer stocks of excess
capital in good times, when debt overhang is not yet a concern, so they can absorb
losses in bad times without having to either shrink assets or raise new capital under
duress? After all, such a dry-powder strategy would allow them to exploit profitable
opportunities should a crisis arise. This question is addressed in Stein (2010a), who
extends the fire-sale model to consider banks' initial choices of capital structure.
He shows that if short-term debt is a cheaper form of finance than equity, banks
will tend to take on socially excessive levels of debt: while the banks capture the
benefits of cheap debt finance, they do not internalize all of its costs.1 In particular, when Bank A takes on more debt, it does not account for the fact that by doing
so, it degrades the collateral value of any assets it holds in common with another
Bank B—since in a crisis state of the world, A's fire-selling of its assets lowers the
liquidation value that B can realize for these same assets.2
1 The assumption that short-term debt is a cheap form of finance represents a particular deviation from
the Modigliani-Miller (1958) capital-structure irrelevance framework. In the context of financial firms, this deviation can arise to the extent that their short-term claims are "money-like" and carry a premium that reflects their usefulness as a transactions medium. We discuss this point in greater detail below. 2 A subtlety is that this is a pecuniary externality—that is, it works through prices. For a pecuniary externality to cause a misallocation of resources, one requires a departure from the standard assump tions that deliver the fundamental welfare theorems (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). In Stein
(2010a), this departure is in the form of a collateral constraint: banks' ability to raise short-term debt is constrained by the collateral value of their assets.
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A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation 7
In sum, a model based on fire sales and credit crunches suggests that financial
institutions have overly strong incentives 1) to shrink assets rather than recapitalize
once a crisis is underway, and 2) to operate with too thin capital buffers before a
crisis occurs, thereby raising the probability of an eventual crisis and systemwide balance-sheet contraction. Therefore, the macroprudential approach to capital
regulation aims to counterbalance these two tendencies. With this in mind, we turn
next to some of the individual items in the macroprudential toolkit.
Before doing so, however, we should emphasize that, in contrast to the tradi
tional view, nothing in this alternative theory relies on the existence of deposit insurance.
In other words, in a model of crises based on fire sales, there is socially excessive
balance-sheet shrinkage, and a rationale for regulation, even absent government
deposit insurance. Thus, there is a strong presumption that macroprudential regu
lation should apply to more than just insured deposit-takers. The broader point
(stressed by Tucker, 2010, and Kashyap, Berner, and Goodhart, forthcoming) is
that regulators need to pay attention to all the channels through which the actions
of financial institutions—both those who are insured and those who are not—can
cause damage.
Macroprudential Tools
We now discuss six sets of tools that can be helpful in implementing a macro
prudential approach to financial regulation. Our goal here is not to provide a
comprehensive laundry list of reform proposals, but rather to show how a particular
conceptual framework provides a unified way of thinking about what otherwise
might seem like a hodgepodge of different fixes.
As a prelude, note that if the goal of regulation is to prevent financial firms
from shrinking their balance sheets excessively in an adverse state of the world, a
simple accounting identity imposes a lot of discipline on our thinking. In particular, when a bank is hit with a shock that depletes its capital, there are only two ways to
prevent it from shrinking its assets: 1) it can raise new capital to replace that which
was lost; or 2) it can let its ratio of capital to assets decline. Many of the tools that we
discuss are just different mechanisms for facilitating adjustment on one of these two
margins. We start with capital proposals and then broaden the discussion to other
options that have heretofore been outside of the regulatory toolkit.
Time-Varying Capital Requirements One intuitively appealing response to the problem of balance-sheet shrinkage
is to move to a regime of time-varying capital requirements, with banks being asked
to maintain higher ratios of capital to assets in good times than in bad times. Under
such a rule, banks can draw down their buffers when an adverse shock hits and
continue operating with less pressure to shrink assets. Kashyap and Stein (2004)
argue that time-varying capital requirements emerge as an optimal scheme in a
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8 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Table 1
Capital Ratios for Top Four U.S. Banks, 2010Q1
Bank of JPMorgan Wells Weighted America Citigroup Chase Fargo average
Total risk-weighted assets 1,519 1,023 1, 147 988
($ millions)
Tier 1 common equity to 7.6 9.1 9.1 7.1 8.2
risk-weighted assets (%) Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted 10.2 11.2 11.5 10.0 10.7
assets (%)
Sources: Data is from the websites of individual banks.
Note: This table lists the capital ratios for the four largest U.S. banks as of 2010Q1.
model where the social planner maximizes a welfare function that weights both
1) the microprudential objective of protecting the deposit insurance fund and
2) the macroprudential objective of maintaining credit creation during recessions.
A planner concerned with both objectives should be willing to tolerate a higher
probability of bank failure in bad times, when bank capital is scarce and credit
supply is tight, than in good times.
One challenge in designing such a regime is that, in bad times, the regu
latory capital requirement is often not the binding constraint on banks. Rather,
as the risk of their assets rises, the market may impose a tougher test on banks
than do regulators, refusing to fund institutions that are not strongly capitalized.3
Table 1 shows that, as of the first quarter of 2010, the four largest U.S. banks had
an average ratio of Tier 1 common equity to risk-weighted assets of 8.2 percent and
an average ratio of total Tier 1 capital (including preferred stock, for example) to risk-weighted assets of 10.7 percent. These are both well above the pre-crisis
regulatory standard, which required a ratio of total Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted
assets of 6 percent for a bank to be deemed "well capitalized." Thus, even as the
U.S. economy was emerging from a deep financial crisis in early 2010, the regula
tory constraint was nonbinding.
This pattern implies that to achieve meaningful time variation in capital ratios, the regulatory minimum in good times must substantially exceed the market-imposed standard
in bad times. Thus, if the market standard for equity-to-assets in bad times is 8 percent,
and we want banks to be able to absorb losses of, say, 4 percent of assets without
pressure to shrink, then the regulatory minimum for equity-to-assets in good times
3 This tendency may be amplified by the widespread use of "Value at Risk" (VaR) models by banks. As measured volatility and hence VaR go up in bad times, such models mechanically call for banks to hold
higher ratios of capital. Thus, banks' own internal risk management practices might compel shrinkage even if market funding remains available.
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein 9
would have to be at least 12 percent. A loss on the order of 4 percent of assets is
actually less severe than the experience of the major banks during the recent crisis;
the IMF (2010) estimates that cumulative credit losses at U.S. banks from 2007 to
2010 were on the order of 7 percent of assets. Using this figure, one could argue for
a good-times regulatory minimum ratio of equity to assets of 15 percent. Either way,
these are high values, significantly higher than obtained from a microprudential calculation that asks only how much capital is needed to avert outright failure. (We
examine the potential costs of raising capital requirements by this much below, in
the penultimate section of the paper.)
Higher-Quality Capital
Traditionally, the capital metric given the most attention by regulators has
been the ratio of total Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. In addition to common
equity, total Tier 1 capital includes, among other items, preferred stock. Thus, both
equity and preferred have "counted" in the same way towards satisfying capital
requirements. From a microprudential perspective, this makes perfect sense. If the
only concern is avoiding losses to the deposit insurer in the event of bank failure,
so long as both common and preferred holders are strictly junior in priority to the
deposit insurer, they will provide the desired loss-absorption cushion.
However, in the wake of the financial crisis, many investors and regulators
have discussed the "quality" of a bank's capital base and how common stock is a
"higher-quality" form of capital than preferred. While this distinction is hard to
understand from a microprudential loss-absorption perspective, it flows naturally
from the macroprudential approach, which focuses less on a static failure scenario
and more on enabling troubled institutions to recapitalize dynamically and remain
viable as going concerns. Common equity is more friendly to the recapitalization
process than preferred stock because it is more junior and hence less problematic
in terms of the debt overhang problem described above.
To see this point, consider two banks, A and B. Both begin with total assets of
$100 and total capital of $6. But A's capital is composed entirely of equity, while B
has $2 of equity and $4 of preferred. Now suppose both banks lose $3. To avoid
shrinking their assets, they would like to raise new capital. Suppose they do so by
trying to issue equity. This will be harder for Bank B—whose entire pre-existing
equity layer has been wiped out and whose preferred stock is, as a result, now trading
at a steep discount to its face value—for any new equity that B brings in will largely
serve to bail out the position of its more senior preferred investors.
This logic suggests that given the goal of promoting rapid recapitalization by
going-concern banks that run into trouble, it is entirely reasonable for regulators
to require that most of the capital requirement be satisfied with common equity.
Indeed, one can argue that essentially all of what is now the Tier 1 requirement
should be in terms of equity, or instruments that are contractually guaranteed to
convert into equity in a bad state (see below for a discussion), while more senior
securities like preferred stock should for the most part not count.
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10 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Corrective Action Targeted at Dollars of Capital, Not Capital Ratios
When regulators are vigilant, banks that fall below a designated capital threshold
may be subject to a variety of sanctions (for example, restrictions on dividends)
until they repair their capital ratios. The principle of rapid regulatory intervention
is undoubtedly a good one, but the form of the intervention matters a great deal.
If a bank is put in the penalty box until it manages to fix its capital ratio, it may well
choose to fix the ratio not by raising the numerator (capital) but by reducing the
denominator (assets) .4 A better approach is to create incentives for the bank to raise
incremental dollars of new capital.
One way to implement this policy would be with a capital ratio requirement that
refers to the maximum of current and lagged assets. Imagine a bank that starts with
assets of $100 and capital of $8 at the end of year t, and suppose that the threshold for
corrective action is a capital ratio of 6 percent. Now assume that the bank has losses of
$4 over year t + 1, so it ends the year with $4 of capital. Normally regulators would push the bank to get its ratio back to 6 percent, which it might do by shrinking its assets to
$66.67. Under our alternative, the bank would only get out of the penalty box when
its ratio of capital to the maximum of year t assets or year t+ 1 assets exceeded 6 percent.
Given that year t assets were $100 and cannot be reduced retroactively, the bank would
have to raise $2 of new capital—it could not avoid sanctions by shrinking assets.
A dramatic illustration of this dollars-based corrective action principle comes
from the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), the "stress tests" that
the major U.S. banks underwent in spring 2009.5 The output of the SCAP was, for
each bank being tested, a dollar target for new equity capital that had to be raised,
via equity issues or asset sales. For some of the banks involved, the numbers were
very large—for example, Bank of America was required to raise $33.5 billion. The
penalty box in this case was that any bank failing to raise the capital from the private
markets would be required to accept an equity injection from the Treasury, which
would have involved strict limits on executive compensation. Remarkably, in the
few weeks following the release of the SCAP results, the banks involved were able to
raise nearly $60 billion in new common equity; by the end of 2009 this figure had risen to over $125 billion.
Here is a case where a strong regulatory hand appears to have had highly
beneficial effects. Indeed, by being tough and giving banks no choice, regulators probably made it easier for banks to do the capital raising. This is because absent
discretion, the adverse selection problem normally associated with equity issues
disappears. If a bank has a choice of whether to issue equity, its decision to do so
may signal that management believes it to be overvalued, and hence this issuance
may knock down the stock price (Myers and Majluf, 1984). But if it has no choice,
4 Hart and Zingales (2010) recommend forcing banks to issue equity whenever their credit risk (as measured by spreads on credit default swaps) goes above a certain level. However, this does not address the shrinkage problem, because a bank can also reduce its credit spreads by selling risky assets. ° See Hirtle, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2009) for a fuller discussion of the lessons learned from the SCAP.
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A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation 11
there is no information content, and hence no negative price impact. We hope that
this lesson can be incorporated into regulatory policy going forward. As we note
below, it may be especially helpful in thinking about the phase-in of higher capital
requirements under Basel III.
Contingent Capital
A dollars-based correcdve action policy amounts to an attempt to force banks
to recapitalize on the fly when they get into trouble. A closely related idea is to "pre
wire" the recapitalization with a contingent instrument that automatically increases
a bank's equity position when some prespecified contractual provision is triggered.
Two broad types of contingent capital instruments have been proposed. The first,
sometimes called "reverse convertibles" or "contingent convertibles," involves a bank
issuing a debt security that automatically converts into equity if a measure of either
the bank's regulatory capital or stock market value falls below a fixed threshold
(Flannery, 2005; French et al., 2010).6 For example, in November 2009, Lloyds Bank
issued £7.5 billion in contingent convertible debt, with conversion to equity to be
triggered if Lloyds' Tier 1 capital ratio falls below 5 percent. A second type of contingent capital is "capital insurance," which involves a bank
purchasing an insurance policy that pays off in a bad state of the world (Kashyap,
Rajan, and Stein, 2008). To address concerns about the insurer defaulting, the policy
would be fully collateralized—that is, the insurer would put the full amount of the
policy into a lock-box up front. For example, a bank might contract with a pension
fund to buy a capital insurance policy that pays $20 billion in the event that an econo
mywide index of bank stock prices falls below some designated value any time in the
next five years. At initiation, the pension fund would turn the $20 billion over to a
custodian; if the bad state is not realized within five years, the $20 billion reverts back
to the pension fund, and if it is realized, the funds are transferred to the bank.
These designs share a common motivation. The premise is that banks view
equity capital as an expensive form of finance—in other words, there are one or
more violations of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) conditions that make banks reluc
tant to carry large precautionary buffers of equity. (We discuss the precise nature
of these violations in detail below.) In principle, regulation could simply mandate
that banks maintain very large equity buffers. However, it may be more efficient to
develop a financing arrangement that delivers more equity only in those bad states
where it is most valuable.
If these forms of contingent capital are such a good idea, why haven't we seen
more of them? One simple answer is that they would have to be allowed to count
towards regulatory capital requirements. Consider the following approach. The
capital requirement for a bank in good times might be set at a relatively high level,
6 There are many important design issues associated with the specification of the trigger in a contingent
convertible security, with both pros and cons to using a trigger based on stock prices as opposed to
regulatory accounting numbers. See McDonald (2010) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
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12 Journal of Economic Perspectives
say 20 percent. Banks would then be given a choice: they could satisfy the entire
requirement with equity, or they could satisfy up to say 10 percentage points of it
with a reverse convertible so long as it was contractually guaranteed to turn into
equity in a well-defined bad state. (As we discuss below, Swiss banking regulators
recently announced new rules of exactly this form.) The reverse convertible might
be seen as more costly than straight debt—which is why banks would not use it if it
did not count as regulatory capital—but as long as it was cheaper than equity, there
would be an efficiency gain.
Finally, it is worth noting the close connection between contingent capital and
proposals to reform executive compensation by imposing bonus holdbacks on key
employees of financial firms. For example, French et al. (2010) suggest withholding a significant share of each senior manager's total compensation for several years.
The withheld compensation would not take the form of stock or options, but would
instead be a fixed dollar amount. And, managers would forfeit their holdbacks if
the firm were to fail or to receive extraordinary government assistance.
Structurally, this holdback proposal is similar to the capital insurance scheme
of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), with the key difference being that it requires firm managers—rather than, say, a pension fund—to be the insurance provider.
The merit of this approach is that not only does the held-back compensation
create an extra, contingent capital buffer, it also helps to improve incentives
within the firm. In particular, by making insiders bear downside risk without any
additional upside potential, it aligns their fortunes with those of taxpayers and other creditors—and in so doing, leans against the "heads I win, tails you lose"
risk-taking incentives created by more conventional forms of stock- and profit linked compensation.
Regulation of Debt Maturity
One important lesson from the recent crisis is that the distinction between
short-term and long-term debt had been given insufficient attention by regula tors. Table 2 presents a snapshot of the aggregate liability structure of the U.S.
banking system, including not only traditional commercial banks but also broker
dealer firms. Clearly, the majority of their debt is short-term: either in the form of
deposits or "wholesale" funding, which includes commercial paper and repurchase
(repo) agreements. While deposits are generally insured and hence not likely to run at the first sign of trouble, the same is not true for wholesale funding. Indeed,
wholesale funding runs—a refusal of repo and commercial paper creditors to roll
over their loans—played a key role in the demise of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns,
and Lehman Brothers, among other high-profile failures (Shin, 2009; Gorton and
Metrick, 2010; Duffie, 2010). The case for regulating the use of short-term debt by financial firms—above
and beyond regulating total leverage—rests on two observations. First, the ability of
short-term lenders to run leads to more fragility than in the case with an equivalent amount of long-term debt (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). It is hard to imagine that
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein
Table 2
Liability Structure of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 2009
Assets 15.927
Liabilities
Deposits 7.502
Short-term wholesale funding
Repurchase agreements and federal funds purchased 1.658
Other short-term wholesale funding 0.880
Trading liabilities 0.736
Total 3.274
Long-term funding
Long-term wholesale funding 1.718
Subordinated debt and trust preferred 0.416
Total 2.134
Other liabilities 1.570
Total liabilities 14.480
Equity Common stock 1.309
Preferred stock 0.137
Total equity 1.446
Sources: The table is based on data from the FR Y-9C reports that Bank Holding Companies are required to file with the Federal Reserve.
Note: This table summarizes the liability structure of U.S. bank holding companies as of December 31, 2009.
Northern Rock, or Bear Stearns, or Lehman would have faced the same problems
had they done most of their borrowing on a long-term basis. Second, in the pres
ence of marketwide fire sales, the choice of debt maturity creates an externality.
When an individual bank or broker-dealer opts to finance largely with short-term
debt, it fails to internalize that in a crisis, an inability to roll over short-term debt
will force it to liquidate assets, thereby imposing a fire-sale cost on others who
hold the same assets and who see the value of their own collateral diminished. The
result is a level of short-term financing that is socially excessive—hence the role for
regulation (Stein, 2010a).
Regulating the Shadow Banking System The fire-sale risk associated with excessive short-term funding comes from not
just insured depositories, but rather, any financial intermediary whose combina
tion of asset choice and financing structure may exacerbate a systemic fire-sale
problem. A narrow interpretation of this principle would say that regulation should
cover large, systemically significant nonbank institutions such as Bear Stearns and
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14 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Figure 1
Quarterly Issuance of Asset-Backed Securities, 2000-2010Q2
Traditional (auto, credit cards, student loans)
Nontraditional (subprime, CDOs, CLOs)
% '/ \ \ \ \ \ ^ ^ ^ ^ • a,
' o} «j
Source: The data underlying this figure come from Thompson SDC.
Notes: The figure plots the quarterly issuance of traditional versus nontraditional asset-backed securities
(ABS). Traditional ABS includes securitizations backed by auto loans, credit card receivables, and
student loans. Nontraditional issuance includes ABS backed by subprime mortgages, collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). While the nontraditional category includes securitizations backed by subprime mortgages, it does not include securitizations backed by
prime mortgages, such as mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Lehman Brothers, who did not finance themselves with insured deposits but who
were nevertheless subject to wholesale financing runs. While this specific point is
now well appreciated, the principle has broader application. From the perspective
of credit creation and macroeconomic impact, some of the most damaging aspects
of the crisis arose not just from the problems of individual large firms, but also from
the collapse of an entire market—namely the market for asset-backed securities.
Figure 1 illustrates this collapse.' The market for "traditional" asset-backed secu
rities, those based on credit-card, auto, and student loans, averaged between $50 and
$70 billion of new issues per quarter in the years prior to the crisis (total issuance for
2007 was $238 billion). However, in the last quarter of 2008, following the demise
of Lehman, issues in this category fell to just over $2 billion. The disappearance of
this market represented a major contraction in the supply of credit to consumers.
The investors who buy tranches of asset-backed securities frequently do so
by relying on short-term borrowing. Entities known as "structured investment
vehicles" or "conduits," which in the past tended to be affiliated with sponsoring
'The discussion in the remainder of this section is a much-abridged version of material in Stein (2010b).
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A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation 15
commercial banks, hold tranches of asset-backed securities and finance them with
commercial paper, which typically has a maturity of only days or weeks. Hedge
funds and broker-dealer firms may finance their holdings of asset-backed securides
with repurchase agreements, a form of overnight collateralized borrowing. Collec
tively, these various investors who acquire asset-backed securities and finance them
with short-term debt are often referred to as the shadow banking system. Moreover,
as emphasized by Gorton (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2010), and Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009), the collapse of the asset-backed securities market featured the
essential elements of a classic bank run—namely an inability of investors in asset
backed securities to roll over short-term financing.
One manifestation of the withdrawal of short-term lending to the asset-backed
securities market comes from the behavior of "haircuts" in repurchase agreements.
When an investor borrows in the repo market, the investor is required to post a
margin, or down payment, known as the "haircut." Haircuts on most highly rated
asset-backed securities were very low prior to the crisis, on the order of 2 percent.
Thus, if a hedge fund wanted to buy $1 billion of AAA-rated, auto-linked asset
backed securities, it only needed to put up $20 million of its own capital. The other
$980 million could be borrowed on an overnight basis in the repo market; in many cases the ultimate lenders were money-market mutual funds.8
In the midst of the crisis, haircuts skyrocketed. Even haircuts on consumer
asset-backed securities—which were not linked to subprime problems—rose to over
50 percent. From the perspective of the hedge fund holding $1 billion of such
securities, all of a sudden it could only borrow $500 million, and instead of having to
post a $20 million down payment, had to put up $500 million. If it did not have the
cash to do so, it would be forced to liquidate its holdings. These liquidations, and
the effect they had on the level and volatility of prices, in turn justified the increased
skittishness of the lenders in the repo market, since their protection depends on
the collateral value of the assets they lend against. In other words, the disruption to
the asset-backed securities market may have been what Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) call a "margin spiral." From a macroprudential perspective, it would be a
mistake to focus too
narrowly on the largest financial institutions while paying insufficient attention
to potential vulnerabilities in the rest of the system.9 What concrete steps might
be taken in this regard? A useful first principle is that an effort should be made to
impose similar capital standards on a given type of credit exposure irrespective of
8 This is not to say that the hedge fund's overall leverage would be 50 to 1, as in this example—only that
it could borrow aggressively against certain highly rated assets that were seen as low risk and hence as
very good collateral. 9 Some have advocated a "narrow banking" model, whereby tightly regulated banks are restricted to
core deposit-taking and lending activities, and a substantial chunk of their other business is pushed out
to a more lightly regulated periphery. While such an approach may keep certain functions (such as the
payments system) safe, the risk is that the overall process of credit creation may be made more vulner
able, not less, to shutdown in the event of a crisis.
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16 Journal of Economic Perspectives
who winds up ultimately holding the exposure—be it a bank, broker-dealer, hedge
fund, or special purpose vehicle. This task is not easy, but one tool that would help
is broad-based regulation of haircuts on asset-backed securities.10
Consider the case where the exposure is a consumer loan. If this loan is made
by a bank, it will be subject to a capital requirement. Now suppose instead that
the loan is securitized by the bank and becomes part of a consumer asset-backed
security whose tranches are distributed to investors. The regulation we have in mind
would stipulate that whoever holds a tranche of the asset-backed security would
be required to post and maintain a minimum haircut against that tranche—with
the value of the haircut depending on the seniority of the tranche, the quality of
the underlying collateral, and so forth. Such a requirement is nothing conceptually
new and should not be difficult to enforce; indeed, it is closely analogous to the
initial and maintenance margin requirements that are currently applicable to inves
tors in common stocks. For models that suggest a role for haircut regulation, see
Geanakoplos (2010) and Stein (2010a). If these requirements are well-structured, they would have two benefits. First,
they could help to harmonize regulation across organizational forms, thereby
reducing the incentive for lending activity to migrate into the shadow banking sector. Second, for those assets that do end up in the shadow banking system,
haircut regulation can dampen the destabilizing dynamics described above. If hair
cuts start out at 2 percent and then jump to 50 percent in a crisis, this creates a
powerful forced-selling pressure on owners of asset-backed securities. If haircuts are
set instead at a higher value before the crisis, this forced-selling mechanism and the
vicious spiral it unleashes might be attenuated. Note that central banks, through their discount window and emergency-lending facilities, have already developed
significant expertise in determining prudent values of haircuts on various kinds of
asset-backed securities.
While we have focused on regulations that address fire-sale externalities, the
problems of the asset-backed securities market arguably go beyond fire sales. Hanson
and Sunderam (2010) show that the "tranching" process, by which large fractions
of underlying collateral pools are turned into AAA-rated securities, can blunt the
incentives of investors to become informed about what they are buying—because
AAA-rated securities are ostensibly so low risk that the returns to becoming informed
are minimal. A lack of informed investors can in turn make securitization markets
more fragile when times turn bad and the need to analyze securitization cash flows
rises. This implies that regulators should worry about the structure of securitiza
tions—particularly the amount of AAA-rated securities being manufactured from
any given collateral pool.
10 A more general version of this observation is that a regulatory toolkit with only a capital ratio and a
single liquidity ratio will be inadequate for controlling instability arising from deposit defaults, fire sales, and credit crunches (Kashyap, Berner, and Goodhart, forthcoming).
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein 17
What Are the Costs of Higher Capital Requirements?
We have argued that a macroprudential approach involves imposing substan
tially higher capital requirements on financial firms, particularly in good times.
But will these higher capital requirements lead to increased costs for borrowers? In
what follows, we focus on the long-run steady-state consequences of higher capital
requirements, setting aside the transitional issues associated with phase-in of a new
regime.11 To preview, our reading of the theory and relevant empirical evidence
suggests that while increased capital requirements might be expected to have some
long-run impact on the cost of loans, this effect is likely to be quite small.
A Modigliani-Miller Perspective
Modigliani and Miller (1958) famously showed that under certain conditions, a
firm's capital structure is irrelevant for its operating decisions. In the banking context,
this would imply that the rate that a firm charges on its loans should be independent
of its capital ratio. The Modigliani and Miller conditions are stringent, including no taxes, symmetric information, rational risk-based pricing, and cashflows that are
independent of financial policy. Thus, they are not meant as an accurate depiction
of reality. Rather, the value of the Modigliani and Miller framework is that it forces
one to be precise about which of the conditions is violated, and this allows for a more
disciplined analysis of the effects associated with changes in capital structure.
In particular, the Modigliani and Miller paradigm exposes the flaw in the
following reasoning: "Equity is more expensive than debt because it is riskier. Thus,
if a bank is forced to rely more on equity, its overall cost of finance will go up, and
it will have to charge more for its loans." The fallacy here is that the risk of equity,
and hence its required return, is not a constant, but rather declines as leverage
falls.12 Indeed, when all the Modigliani and Miller conditions hold, this effect is just
enough to offset the increased weight of the more-expensive equity in the capital
structure so that the overall cost of capital stays fixed as bank leverage varies.
With this caveat in mind, we discuss two deviations from Modigliani and
Miller's idealized conditions that are likely to be relevant in the present context.
First, interest payments on corporate debt are tax deductible while dividend
payments on equity are not. This effect lends itself to easy measurement. Suppose
that new equity capital displaces long-term debt in a bank's capital structure and
that the only effect on the bank's weighted average cost of capital comes from the
lost tax shields on the debt. If the coupon on the debt is 7 percent, and given a
corporate tax rate of 35 percent, each percentage point of increased equity raises
11 This section draws on material from our unpublished working paper, Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson
(2010). 12 In Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), we show that this holds empirically in the banking sector:
in a
panel of large banks, those with less leverage have significandy lower values of both beta and stock-return
volatility.
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18 Journal of Economic Perspectives
the weighted average cost of capital by .07 x .35 = .0245 percent, or 2.45 basis
points. Thus, even a 10 percentage-point increase in the capital requirement only
boosts the weighted average cost of capital—and hence loan rates—by 25 basis
points, which is a small effect.
To generate a higher figure, consider a case where equity displaces short
term debt; this can be interpreted as capturing the joint effects of an increase
in both capital and liquidity requirements. Moreover, following Gorton (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2010), and Stein (2010a), assume that—in violation of the
Modigliani and Miller conditions—there is a non-risk-based "money" premium
on wholesale short-term bank debt that reflects its usefulness as a transactions
medium. (Commercial paper and repo are often held by money-market mutual
funds, who in turn issue checkable deposits.) An upper-bound estimate of this
money premium might be on the order of 100 basis points.13 Now, a 10 percentage
point increase in capital requirements raises the weighted average cost of capital
by an added 10 basis points relative to the previous taxes-only case, and we are up
to 35 basis points. This number is still quite modest.
Time Variation in Bank Capital Ratios and Lending Rates
Our calibrations based on the Modigliani-Miller paradigm suggest that the
long-run effects of higher capital requirements on loan rates should be small. A
complementary approach is to examine the historical record. Figure 2A, which is
adapted from Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995), shows the ratio of book equity to
book assets for U.S. commercial banks from 1840 to 2009. Capital ratios exceeded
50 percent in the 1840s and fell steadily for the next 100 years, reaching 6 percent
by the 1940s. Have these large fluctuations in capital ratios translated into big differ
ences in the cost of bank credit? To address this question, we have examined the
behavior of various proxies for the markup that banks charge on loans. In a variety
of regression specifications (not shown here), we found no reliable time-series
correlation between these markup variables and bank capital ratios. The historical
data is simply too noisy, and our proxies for loan spreads too crude, for us to draw
any confident conclusions about whether a correlation between equity ratios and
loan rates even exists.
To illustrate the loose ties between loan costs and capital ratios, Figure 2B
plots capital ratios for the period 1920-2009 against two markup proxies: 1) the
net interest margin (net interest income over earning assets); and 2) the yield on
loans (interest income on loans over gross loans) minus the rate paid on deposits
(interest expense on deposits over deposits). As can be seen, there is no apparent
correlation between capital ratios and either measure of markups.
13 As a benchmark, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) estimate that Treasury securities
impound a money-like convenience premium of approximately 72 basis points, on top of what would be
expected in a standard risk-vs.-return asset-pricing setting.
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A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation 19
Figure 2
U.S. Bank Capital Ratios and Loan Spreads
A: Book Equity to Assets for U.S. Banks, 1840-2009
60%-.
—— Bank equity/assets (left scale) —*— Bank net interest margins (right scale)
• Bank loan yield - Deposit rate (right scale)
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20 Journal of Economic Perspectives
But Then Why Are Banks So Determined to Operate with High Leverage?
These conclusions may appear surprising, even paradoxical. If significant
increases in capital ratios have only small consequences for the rates that banks
charge their customers, why do banks generally feel compelled to operate in
such a highly leveraged fashion in spite of the risks this poses? And why do they
deploy armies of lobbyists to fight increases in their capital requirements? After
all, nonfinancial firms tend to operate with much less leverage and indeed appear
willing in many cases to forego the tax (or other) benefits of debt finance altogether.
In Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), we argue that the resolution of this
puzzle has to do with the nature of competition in financial services. The most
important competitive edge that banks bring to bear for many types of transactions
is the ability to fund themselves cheaply. Thus, if Bank A is forced to adopt a capital structure that raises its cost of funding relative to other intermediaries by 20 basis
points, it may lose most of its business, (or become much less profitable, since the
return on assets in banking is on the order of 125 basis points). Contrast this with,
say, the auto industry, where cheap financing is only one of many possible sources
of advantage: a strong brand, quality engineering and customer service, and control
over labor costs may all be vastly more important than a 20 basis-point difference in
the cost of capital.
One suggestive piece of evidence for this competition hypothesis comes from
the distribution of capital ratios by bank size, as illustrated in Figure 3, which covers
the period 1976-2009. There is a strong inverse relationship between bank size
and capital ratios, with the smallest banks (with assets under $100 million) having Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios more than double those of the largest banks (with
assets over $100 billion) for most of the sample period. Whatever their root cause,
these large differences in capital ratios hint at a couple of important points. First,
they suggest that several percentage points of additional capital need not imply
prohibitively large effects on lending rates—for if they did, it would be hard to understand how the smaller community banks have managed to stay in business.
Second, the ability of small banks to survive at higher capital levels probably reflects
something about the softer degree of competition in their core line of business. A
large literature argues that small banks tend to focus on informationally intensive
"relationship lending" and that the embedded soft information in these relation
ships creates a degree of specificity between firms and their lenders (Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005). To the extent that larger banks deal with larger customers where competition from
other providers of finance is more intense, even small cost-of-capital disadvantages
are likely to prove unsustainable.
Testing the Competition Hypothesis
To further investigate the competition hypothesis, we examine the effects of
changes in state branching regulations. We test two basic predictions. First, we expect that a regulatory shock that increases the degree of competition in a state should
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein
Figure 3
U.S. Bank Capital Ratios by Bank Size, 1976-2009
A: Book Equity to Book Assets
14% -i
12%
10%
t—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—I—i—I—i—I—I—I—I—i—r /o. /o. /o /o- /o- /a- /o- /o. /o- Sn Sn So_ xin \%
i—I—I—r— rfc. A
% % ■*o
v> % "V °o
Assets < $100m
» $10B < Assets < $100B
• $100m < Assets < $1B
• Assets > $100B
$1B < Assets < $10B
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22 Journal of Economic Perspectives
lead the average capital ratio of banks in that state to decline. Second, we expect a
compression effect the decline in capital ratios should be largest for those banks in the
state that, prior to the shock, were operating with the highest capital ratios. Or said
differently, we expect the regulatory shock to reduce the cross-sectional dispersion
of capital ratios of banks in the given state.
To implement our tests, we take data on the year that various state banking
regulations were relaxed from Stiroh and Strahan (2003). We examine two types
of deregulation: the easing of intrastate branching restrictions and the advent of
interstate banking. Prior to 1970, two-thirds of states had restrictions on intrastate
branching which were relaxed from 1975 to 1992. Between 1982 and 1993, 48 states
entered into regional or national agreements permitting interstate banking—i.e.,
allowing out-of-state bank holding companies to own banks in their state. Given the
timing of deregulation, we focus on bank data (from bank Call Reports) over the
period from 1976 to 1994. Since our source of variation is at the state-year level, we
work with state-year aggregates. We estimate reduced-form regressions of the state
level equity-to-asset ratio on dummies that switch on in the year that a state relaxes
its regulations, along with state and year fixed effects. We have two deregulatory
dummies: INTRASTATE is based on the year that a state allows intrastate branching
by mergers, while INTERSTATE is based on the year that a state enters a regional or
national interstate banking agreement.
Table 3 displays the results of these regressions where the dependent vari
able in the first column is the mean equity-to-asset ratio in state s in year t; in the
second column is the cross-sectional standard deviation of equity-to-assets; and in
the remaining columns are the cross-sectional quantiles of the equity-asset ratio.
The results in the first column imply that equity-to-assets falls by about 0.3 percentage
points following intrastate branching and another 0.2 percentage points following
interstate banking. Thus, equity-to-assets falls by roughly 0.5 percentage points for
the average state relaxing both restrictions. This decline can be compared to the
typical cross-sectional standard deviation of 1.08 percentage points and is economi
cally meaningful considering that the average equity-to-assets ratio in our sample is
just over 7 percent.
The remaining columns in Table 3 show that, consistent with the notion of
a compression effect, the dispersion of capital ratios within a state falls following deregulation, and capital ratios fall the most for those banks that were previously
in the upper tail of the distribution. This appears to have been particularly true
following the advent of intrastate banking: the capital ratios of banks in the 75th and
90th percentiles of the distribution fall by 60 and 70 basis points, respectively, versus
only a 10 basis point change at the 10th and 25th percentiles.
In sum, the data support the hypothesis that when banks are faced with more
intense competition, they gravitate towards both higher and more uniform levels
of leverage. Such competitive effects combined with our earlier Modigliani-Miller based calibration results suggest one reason why tougher capital regulation of
financial firms is appealing: it would seem to have the potential to reduce competition
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A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation 23
Table 3
Impact of Deregulation on Distribution of Equity-to-Assets within States
Dependent variable
Standard 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Mean deviation %tile %tile %tile %tile %tile
Regression 1: -0.288 -0.274 -0.099 -0.106 -0.193 -0.626 -0.682 INTRASTATE [-2.10] [-2.75] [-0.70] [-0.81] [-1.49] [-2.47] [-2.40]
Regression 2: -0.217 -0.133 0.037 -0.182 -0.278 -0.290 -0.349
INTERSTATE [-2.25] [-0.68] [0.31] [-1.46] [-2.68] [-1.96] [-1.73]
Regression 3: -0.281 -0.270 -0.100 -0.100 -0.183 -0.617 -0.671
INTRASTATE [-2.05] [-2.68] [-0.71] [-0.78] [-1.41] [-2.44] [-2.33] INTERSTATE -0.203 -0.120 0.042 -0.177 -0.269 -0.261 -0.317
[-2.05] [-0.62] [0.34] [-1.43] [-2.62] [-1.69] [-1.47]
Sources: Based on an annual state-level panel from 1976-1994 assembled from bank Call Reports. The
deregulation dummies are based on the data in Table 1 of Stiroh and Strahan (2003).
Notes: The table shows regressions of equity-to-assets on dummies for deregulation. The INTRASTATE
dummies switch on beginning in the year when the state first permitted intrastate branching via mergers. The INTERSTATE dummies switch on beginning in the year when the state entered a regional or national
interstate banking agreement. The dependent variables are alternately the asset-weighted average, standard
deviation, and quantiles of the equity-to-assets ratio within each state-year. The table reports coefficients
from 21 separate regressions (7 dependent variables each with 3 specifications). All regressions include a
full set of state and year effects and have 969 observations (51 states x 19 years), ^statistics, in brackets, are
based on standard errors that are robust to clustering (i.e., serial correlation of residuals) at the state level.
on a dimension that creates negative externalities and systemic risk, while at the
same time not raising loan rates by much. However, the complication is that these
same competitive pressures also create powerful incentives to evade either the letter
or the spirit of the rules. Thus, the most worrisome long-run byproduct of higher
capital requirements will likely not be its effect on the cost of credit to borrowers, but
the pressure it creates for activity to migrate outside of the regulated banking sector.
A Financial Reform Report Card
To conclude the paper, we briefly compare our proposals to policy reforms that
emerged in the second half of 2010. Our focus is primarily on the recommendations
made by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in September 2010 as part of the so-called "Basel III" process (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010, for a summary). We will say less about the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act—often called the Dodd-Frank legislation—that was signed into law
in July 2010. This is because our analysis has been centered on capital regulation
and closely related issues, the implementation of which has been taken up in more
specific numerical detail in Basel III; conversely, we have not attempted in this paper
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24 Journal of Economic Perspectives
to speak to a number of the other central elements in Dodd-Frank, such as consumer
protection, regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, and resolution authority.
We have stressed the importance of requiring that financial firms have both
more capital, and, crucially, higher-quality capital. On this score, the Basel III
recommendations look quite good. They would raise the minimum common equity
requirement from 2 percent of risk-weighted assets to 7 percent (this is inclusive of
a "capital conservation buffer"). While we have argued for a higher number, this is a
significant step in the right direction. Moreover, systemically important institutions
will be required to have an additional, as-yet-undetermined increment in terms of
equity capital, which, if it turns out to be material, would be further good news.
The mjyor shortcoming on the equity capital front is its very slow phase-in; the
new requirements do not become fully effective until January 2019. The motivation
for this slow phase-in is the concern that if banks are asked to comply with the higher
ratios in a more compressed timeframe, they will do so by shrinking their balance
sheets rather than by raising new external equity capital, thereby causing a further
credit crunch. While we agree that this worry might be legitimate if the phase-in is truncated and no other offsetting steps are taken, our above analysis suggests an
obvious alternative: during the phase-in period, regulators should push those banks
that are shy of the new capital standards to raise new dollars of equity, rather than giving
them the option to adjust via asset shrinkage. The U.S. stress tests conducted in 2009
showed that this approach can work, and if it were applied again, the phase-in period
could be made much shorter with little adverse impact on credit supply.
We also discussed the usefulness of time-varying capital requirements. Here the
Basel Committee proposes an additional countercyclical buffer that will range between
0 and 2.5 percent, to be implemented on a country-by-country basis. As the report states: "The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader macro
prudential goal of protecting the banking sector in periods of excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will only be in effect when there is
excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide build up of risk." This too is a
step in the right direction, though we worry that the wording would seem to require an affirmative finding of "excess credit growth" for the requirement to kick in; one
can imagine that it will be politically challenging for regulators to make this case when they ought to.
Other elements of the reform package remain less well developed. For example, on the topic of debt maturity, the Basel Committee introduces the concept of a
"net stable funding ratio" test—a requirement that financial firms' capital structures
have a certain amount of long-term funding, which would encompass both equity and debt with a maturity of greater than one year. However, the details regarding the design and calibration of this rule remain to be worked out, with an "observa
tion period" to begin in 2012 and the introduction of the standard itself put off
until 2018.
Similarly, while the Basel Committee continues to study various forms of contin
gent capital, it has not yet reached any final conclusions; a review is scheduled to
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Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein 25
be completed in mid 2011. Interestingly, however, Swiss banking regulators have
chosen to move forward on their own on this front. The Final Report of the Swiss
Commission of Experts proposed that the two big Swiss banks—UBS and Credit
Suisse—be required to have 19 percent total capital by 2019. Of this, 10 percent
would have to be in common equity (a higher standard than the 7 percent under
Basel III) while the remaining 9 percent could, at the bank's discretion, take the
form of contingent convertibles that would convert when the ratio of equity to assets
hit a predetermined trigger value (Morgan Stanley Research, 2010). This "opting"
approach to contingent capital is, both qualitatively and quantitatively, closely in
line with what we described above.
Finally, perhaps the most glaring weak spot in financial reform thus far—one
that cuts across both the Dodd-Frank legislation and the Basel III process—is the
failure to fully come to grips with the shadow banking system. As we have emphasized,
if one takes a macroprudential view, the overarching goal of financial regulation
must go beyond protecting insured depositories and even beyond dealing with the
problems created by "too-big-to-fail" nonbank intermediaries. Instead, the task is to
mitigate the fire-sales and credit-crunch effects that can arise as a consequence of
excessive short-term debt anywhere in the financial system.
While higher capital and liquidity requirements on banks will no doubt help to
insulate banks from the consequences of large shocks, the danger is that, given the
intensity of competition in financial services, they will also drive a larger share of
intermediation into the shadow banking realm. For example, perhaps an increasing
fraction of corporate and consumer loans will be securitized and in their securitized
form will end up being held by a variety of highly leveraged investors (say hedge funds) who are not subject to the usual bank-oriented capital regulation. If so,
the individual regulated banks may be safer than they were before, but the overall
system of credit creation may not.
To safeguard the system as a whole, attention must be paid to not tilting the
playing field in a way that generates damaging unintended consequences. Admit
tedly, regulating the shadow banking sector and the other parts of the financial
system consistently is a complex task, and one that will require a variety of specific
tools. As one concrete first step, we reiterate that it would be a good idea to establish
regulatory minimum haircut requirements on asset-backed securities, so that no
investor who takes a position in credit assets is able to evade constraints on short
term leverage.
This discussion raises a final question about how such regulation might be
implemented. In the United States and in Europe, macroprudential oversight has
been delegated to large councils: the Financial Stability Oversight Committee and
the European System Risk Board, respectively. Membership of both groups consists
of the heads of many regulatory organizations. Whether either council can function
effectively and avoid turf wars is an open question. But these committees will be
pivotal in determining whether existing weaknesses in the regulatory system—such
as those having to do with the shadow banking sector—can be addressed sensibly.
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26 Journal of Economic Perspectives
■ We are grateful for helpful comments from Charles Goodhart, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Andrew
Metrick, Victoria Saporta, Hyun Shin, Andrei Shleifer, Rene Stulz, Lawrence Summers, Paul
Tucker, seminar participants at numerous institutions, and JEP editors David Autor, Chad
Jones, and Timothy Taylor. Kashyap thanks the Initiative on Global Markets and the Center
for Research on Securities Prices for research support on this project.
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- Article Contents
- p. [3]
- p. 4
- p. 5
- p. 6
- p. 7
- p. 8
- p. 9
- p. 10
- p. 11
- p. 12
- p. 13
- p. 14
- p. 15
- p. 16
- p. 17
- p. 18
- p. 19
- p. 20
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- p. 22
- p. 23
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- p. 27
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- Issue Table of Contents
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2011) pp. 1-256
- Front Matter
- Symposium: Financial Regulation after the Crisis
- A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation [pp. 3-28]
- Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics [pp. 29-48]
- Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis [pp. 49-70]
- A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008 [pp. 71-90]
- Consumer Financial Protection [pp. 91-113]
- Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures [pp. 115-138]
- Who Pays for Obesity? [pp. 139-157]
- Priceless: The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling [pp. 159-184]
- Lessons from the Kibbutz on the Equality—Incentives Trade-off [pp. 185-207]
- Behavior under Extreme Conditions: The "Titanic" Disaster [pp. 209-221]
- Features
- Retrospectives: The Phillips Curve: A Rushed Job? [pp. 223-237]
- Recommendations for Further Reading [pp. 239-246]
- Notes [pp. 247-248]
- Back Matter
imfer20129a.pdf
Macroprudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation
JAVIER BIANCHI, EMINE BOZ and ENRIQUE GABRIEL MENDOZAn
The interaction between credit frictions, financial innovation, and a switch from optimistic to pessimistic beliefs played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis. This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework in which this interaction drives the financial amplification mechanism to study the effects of macroprudential policy. Financial innovation enhances the ability of agents to collateralize assets into debt, but the riskiness of this new regime can only be learned over time. Beliefs about transition probabilities across states with high and low ability to borrow change as agents learn from observed realizations of financial conditions. At the same time, the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality, because agents fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on asset prices. Quantitative analysis shows that the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in this environment depends on the government’s information set, the tightness of credit constraints, and the pace at which optimism surges in the early stages of financial innovation. The policy is least effective when the government is as uninformed as private agents, credit constraints are tight, and optimism builds quickly. [JEL D62, D82, E32, E44, F32, F41] IMF Economic Review (2012) 60, 223–269. doi:10.1057/imfer.2012.9;
published online 5 June 2012
n Javier Bianchi is an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a visiting
Assistant Professor at the New York University and a Faculty Research Fellow of the NBER. Emine Boz has been an Economist at the International Monetary Fund since 2006, after receiving her PhD from the University of Maryland. Enrique G. Mendoza is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of International Macroeconomics and Finance at the University of Maryland. This paper was prepared for the Twelfth IMF Annual Research Conference. The authors are grateful for comments by Dan Cao, Stijn Claessens, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Ayhan Kose, Paolo Pesenti, and participants at the 12th IMF Annual Research Conference, the 2011 Research Conference of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the 2011 Quantitative Macro Workshop of the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the 7th ECB-Federal Reserve Board International Research Forum on Monetary Policy. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund.
IMF Economic Review Vol. 60, No. 2
& 2012 International Monetary Fund
I think we will have continuing danger from these markets and that we will have repeats of the financial crisis. It may differ in details, but there will be significant financial downturns and disasters attributed to this regulatory gap over and over until we learn from experience. (Brooksley Born, August 28, 2009 interview for FRONTLINE: The Warning)
Policymakers have responded to the lapses in financial regulation in theyears before the 2008 global financial crisis and the unprecedented systemic nature of the crisis itself with a strong push to revamp financial regulation following a “macroprudential” approach. This approach aims to focus on the macro (that is, systemic) implications that follow from the actions of credit market participants, and to implement policies that influence behavior in “good times” in order to make financial crises less severe and less frequent. The design of macroprudential policy is hampered, however, by the need to develop models that are reasonably good at explaining the macro dynamics of financial crises and at capturing the complex dynamic interconnections between potential macroprudential policy instruments and the actions of agents in credit markets.
The task of developing these models is particularly challenging because of the fast pace of financial development. Indeed, the decade before the 2008 crash was a period of significant financial innovation, which included both the introduction of a large set of complex financial instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, and the enactment of major financial reforms of a magnitude and scope unseen since the end of the Great Depression. Thus, models of macroprudential regulation have to take into account the changing nature of the financial environment, and hence deal with the fact that credit market participants, as well as policymakers, may be making decisions lacking perfect information about the true riskiness of a changing financial regime.
This paper proposes a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which the interaction between financial innovation, credit frictions and imperfect information is at the core of the financial transmission mechanism, and uses it to study its quantitative implications for the design and effectiveness of macroprudential policy. In the model, a collateral constraint limits the agents’ ability to borrow to a fraction of the market value of the assets they can offer as collateral. Financial innovation enhances the ability of agents to “collateralize,” but also introduces risk because of the possibility of fluctuations in collateral requirements or loan-to-value ratios.
We take literally the definition of financial innovation as the introduction of a truly new financial regime. This forces us to deviate from the standard assumption that agents formulate rational expectations with full information about the stochastic process driving fluctuations in credit conditions. In particular, we assume that agents learn (in Bayesian fashion) about the transition probabilities of financial regimes only as they observe regimes with high and low ability to borrow over time. In the long run, and in the absence of new waves of financial innovation, they learn the true transition
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
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probabilities and form standard rational expectations, but in the short run agents’ beliefs display waves of optimism and pessimism depending on their initial priors and on the market conditions they observe. These changing beliefs influence agents’ borrowing decisions and equilibrium asset prices, and together with the collateral constraint they form a financial amplification feedback mechanism: optimistic (pessimistic) expectations lead to overborrow- ing (underborrowing) and increased (reduced) asset prices, and as asset prices change the ability to borrow changes as well.
Our analysis focuses in particular on a learning scenario in which the arrival of financial innovation starts an “optimistic phase,” in which a few observations of enhanced borrowing ability lead agents to believe that the financial environment is stable and risky assets are not “very risky.” Hence, they borrow more and bid up the price of risky assets more than in a full- information rational expectations equilibrium. The higher value of assets in turn relaxes the credit constraint. Thus, the initial increase in debt because of optimism is amplified by the interaction with the collateral constraint via optimistic asset prices. Conversely, when the first realization of the low- borrowing-ability regime is observed, a “pessimistic phase” starts in which agents overstate the probability of continuing in poor financial regimes and overstate the riskiness of assets. This results in lower debt levels and lower asset prices, and the collateral constraint amplifies this downturn.
Macroprudential policy action is desirable in this environment because the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality in credit markets that leads to more debt and financial crises that are more severe and frequent than in the absence of this externality. The externality exists because individual agents fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on asset prices, particularly future asset prices in states of financial distress (in which the feedback loop via the collateral constraint triggers a financial crash).
There are several studies in the growing literature on macroprudential regulation that have examined the implications of this externality, but typically under the assumption that agents form rational expectations with full infor- mation (for example, Lorenzoni, 2008; Stein, 2011; Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Korinek, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Benigno and others, 2010). In contrast, the novel contribution of this paper is in that we study the effects of macroprudential policy in an environment in which the pecuniary externality is influenced by the interaction of the credit constraint with learning about the riskiness of a new financial regime. The analysis of Boz and Mendoza (2010) suggests that taking this interaction into account can be important, because they found that the credit constraint in a learning setup produces significantly larger effects on debt and asset prices than in a full-information environment with the same credit constraint. Their study, however, focused only on quantifying the properties of the decentralized com- petitive equilibrium and abstracted from normative issues and policy analysis.
The policy analysis of this paper considers a social planner under two different informational assumptions. First, an uninformed planner who has to learn about the true riskiness of the new financial environment, and faces the
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
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set of feasible credit positions supported by the collateral values of the competitive equilibrium with learning. We start with a baseline scenario in which private agents and the planner have the same initial priors and thus form the same sequence of beliefs, and study later on scenarios in which private agents and the uninformed planner form different beliefs. Second, an informed planner with full information, who therefore knows the true transition probabilities across financial regimes, and faces a set of feasible credit positions consistent with the collateral values of the full-information, rational expectations competitive equilibrium.
1
We compute the decentralized competitive equilibrium of the model with learning (DEL) and contrast this case with the above social planner equilibria. We then compare the main features of these equilibria, in terms of the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates and asset pricing indicators, and examine the characteristics of macroprudential policies that support the allocations of the planning problems as competitive equilibria. This analysis emphasizes the potential limitations of macroprudential policy in the presence of significant financial innovation, and highlights the relevance of taking into account informational frictions in evaluating the effectiveness of macroprudential policy.
The quantitative analysis indicates that the interaction of the collateral constraint with optimistic beliefs in the DEL equilibrium can strengthen the case for introducing macroprudential regulation compared with the decentralized equilibrium under full information (DEF). This is because, as Boz and Mendoza (2010) showed, the interaction of these elements produces larger amplification both of the credit boom in the optimistic phase and of the financial crash when the economy switches to the bad financial regime. The results also show, however, that the effectiveness of macroprudential policy varies sharply with the assumptions about the information set and collateral pricing function used by the social planner. Moreover, for the uninformed planner, the effectiveness of macroprudential policy also depends on the tightness of the borrowing constraint and the pace at which optimism builds in the early stages of financial innovation.
Consider first the uninformed planner. For this planner, the undervaluation of risk weakens the incentives to build precautionary savings against states of nature with low-borrowing-ability regimes over the long run, because this planner underestimates the probability of landing on and remaining in those states. In contrast, the informed planner assesses the correct probabilities of landing and remaining in states with good and bad credit regimes, so its incentives to build precautionary savings are stronger. In fact, the informed planner’s optimal macroprudential policy features a precautionary component that lowers borrowing levels at given asset prices, and a component that
1 The assumption that the planners face a pricing function for collateral that corresponds
to a competitive equilibrium is in line with the concept of conditional or financial efficiency defined by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and applied by Lustig (2000) to the setting of a credit market with collateral.
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
226
influences portfolio choice of debt vs. assets to address the effect of the agents’ mispricing of risk on collateral prices.
It is important to note that even the uninformed planner has the incentive to use macroprudential policy to tackle the pecuniary externality and alter debt and asset pricing dynamics. In our baseline calibration, however, the borrowing constraint becomes tightly binding in the early stages of financial innovation as optimism builds quickly, and as a result macroprudential policy is not very effective (that is, debt positions and asset prices differ little between the DEL and the uninformed planner). Intuitively, since a binding credit constraint implies that debt equals the high-credit-regime fraction of the value of collateral, debt levels for the uninformed social planner and the decentralized equilibrium are similar once the constraint becomes binding for the planner. But this is not a general result.
2 Variations in the information
structure in which optimism builds more gradually produce outcomes in which macroprudential policy is effective even when the planner has access to the same information set. On the other hand, it is generally true that the uninformed planner allows larger debt positions than the informed planner because of the lower precautionary savings incentives.
We also analyze the welfare losses that arise from the pecuniary externality and the optimism embedded in agents’ subjective beliefs. The losses arising because of their combined effect are large, reaching up to 7 percent in terms of a compensating variation in permanent consumption that equalizes the welfare of the informed planner with that of the DEL economy. The welfare losses attributable to the pecuniary externality alone are relatively small, in line with the findings reported by Bianchi (2011) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), and they fall significantly at the peak of optimism.
Our model follows a long and old tradition of models of financial crises in which credit frictions and imperfect information interact. This notion dates back to the classic work of Fisher (1933), in which he described his debt- deflation financial amplification mechanism as the result of a feedback loop between agents’ beliefs and credit frictions (particularly those that force fires sales of assets and goods by distressed borrowers). Minsky (1992) is along a similar vein. More recently, macroeconomic models of financial accelerators (for example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Aiyagari and Gertler, 1999) have focused on modeling financial amplification but typically under rational expectations with full information about the stochastic processes of exogenous shocks.
The particular specification of imperfect information and learning that we use follows closely that of Boz and Mendoza (2010) and Cogley and
2 It is also important to note that this result is not due to the fact that the uninformed
planner faces the same collateral pricing function as DEL. Working under the same pricing assumption in a model with full information, but using a different calibration of collateral coefficients, Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) found that the planner supports very different debt allocations and asset prices than the decentralized equilibrium.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
227
Sargent (2008a), in which agents observe regime realizations of a Markov- switching process without noise but need to learn its transition probability matrix. The imperfect information assumption is based on the premise that the U.S. financial system went through significant changes beginning in the mid-1990s as a result of financial innovation and deregulation that took place at a rapid pace. As in Boz and Mendoza (2010), agents go through a learning process in order to “discover” the true riskiness of the new financial environment as they observe realizations of regimes with high or low borrowing ability.
Our quantitative analysis is related to Bianchi and Mendoza (2010)’s quantitative study of macroprudential policy. They examined an asset pricing model with a similar collateral constraint and used comparisons of the competitive equilibria vis-à-vis a social planner to show that optimal macroprudential policy curbs credit growth in good times and reduces the frequency and severity of financial crises. The government can accomplish this by using Pigouvian taxes on debt and dividends to induce agents to internalize the model’s pecuniary externality. Bianchi and Mendoza’s framework does not capture, however, the role of informational frictions interacting with frictions in financial markets, and thus is silent about the implications of differences in the information sets of policymakers and private agents.
Our paper is also related to Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012), who study financial innovation in an environment in which “local thinking” leads agents to neglect low probability adverse events (see also Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010). As in our model, the informational friction distorts decision rules and asset prices, but the informational frictions in the two setups differ.
3
Moreover, the welfare analysis of Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) focuses on the effect of financial innovation under local thinking, while we emphasize the interaction between a fire-sale externality and informational frictions.
Finally, our work is also related to the argument developed by Stein (2011) to favor a cap-and-trade system to address a pecuniary externality that leads banks to issue excessive short-term debt in the presence of private information. Our analysis differs in that we study the implications of a form of model uncertainty (that is, uncertainty about the transition probabilities across financial regimes) for macroprudential regulation, instead of private information, and we focus on Pigouvian taxes as a policy instrument to address the pecuniary externality.
3 In the model of Gennaioli and others agents ignore part of the state space relevant for
pricing risk by assumption, assigning zero probability to rare negative events, while in our setup agents always assign nonzero probability to all the regimes that are part of the realization vector of the Markov switching process of financial regimes. However, agents do assign lower (higher) probability to tight credit regimes than they would under full information rational expectations when they are optimistic (pessimistic), and this lower probability is an outcome of a Bayesian learning process. Moreover, learning yields equilibrium asset pricing functions in future dates, after learning progresses, that agents did not consider possible with the beliefs of previous dates.
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228
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the model. Section II conducts the quantitative analysis comparing the decentralized competitive equilibrium with the various planning problems. Section III provides the main conclusions.
I. A Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation
The setup of the model’s competitive equilibrium and learning environment is similar to Boz and Mendoza (2010). The main difference is that we extend the analysis to characterize social planning problems under alternative information sets and collateral pricing functions.
Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical agents who maximize a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function. Agents choose consumption, ct, holdings of a risky asset ktþ1 (that is, land), and holdings of a one-period discount bond, btþ1, denominated in units of the consumption good. Land is a risky asset traded in a competitive market, where its price qt is determined, and is in fixed unit supply. Individually, agents see themselves as able to buy or sell land at the market price, but since all agents are identical, at equilibrium the price clears the land market with all agents choosing the same land holdings.
Bonds carry an exogenous price equal to 1/R, where R is an exogenous gross real interest rate. Thus, the model can be interpreted as a model of a small open economy, in which case b represents the economy’s net foreign asset position and R is the world’s interest rate, or as a partial equilibrium model of households or a subset of borrowers in a closed economy, in which case b represents these borrowers’ net credit market assets and R is the economy’s risk free real interest rate. Under either interpretation, the behavior of creditors is not modeled from first principles. They are simply assumed to supply funds at the real interest rate R subjected to the collateral constraint described below.
The bond market is imperfect because creditors require borrowers to post collateral that is “marked to market” (that is, valued at market prices). In particular, the collateral constraint limits the agents’ debt (a negative position in b) to a fraction k of the market value of their individual land holdings.4
The collateral coefficient k is stochastic and follows a Markov regime- switching process. Information is imperfect with respect to the true transition probability matrix governing the evolution of k, and the agents learn about it by observing realizations of k over time. We will model learning so that in the long run the agents’ beliefs converge to the true transition probability matrix,
4 This constraint could follow, for example, from limited enforcement of credit contracts,
by which creditors can only confiscate a fraction k of the value of a borrower’s land holdings. In actual credit contracts, this constraint resembles loans subject to margin calls or loan-to- value limits, value-at-risk collateralization, and mark-to-market capital requirements.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
229
at which point the model yields the same competitive equilibrium as a standard rational-expectations asset pricing model with a credit constraint.
Agents operate a production technology etY(kt) that uses land as the only input, and facing a productivity shock et. This shock has compact support and follows a finite-state, stationary Markov process about which agents are perfectly informed.
The agents’ preferences are given by:
Es0
X1 t¼0
bt c1�st 1�s
" # (1Þ
E s is the subjective conditional-expectations operator that is elaborated on
further below, b is the subjective discount factor, and s is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The budget constraint faced by the agents is:
qtktþ1 þ ct þ btþ1 Rt ¼ qtkt þbt þ etYðktÞ (2Þ
The agents’ collateral constraint is:
� btþ1 Rt � ktqtktþ1 (3Þ
Using mt for the Lagrange multiplier of Equation (3), the first-order conditions of the agents optimization problem are given by:
u0ðtÞ¼ bREst u 0ðtþ1Þ½ �þmt (4Þ
qtðu0ðtÞ�mtktÞ¼ bE s t u 0ðtþ1Þðetþ1Ykðktþ1Þþqtþ1Þ½ � (5Þ
A decentralized competitive equilibrium with learning (DEL) is a sequence of allocations [ct, ktþ1, btþ1]t¼0
N and prices [qt]t¼0
N that satisfy the above
conditions, using the agents’ beliefs about the evolution of k to formulate expectations, together with the collateral constraint (3) and the market- clearing conditions for the markets of goods and assets:
ct þ btþ1 Rt ¼ bt þ etYðktÞ
kt ¼ 1 The decentralized competitive equilibrium with full information (DEF) is
defined in the same way, except that expectations are formulated using the true transition distribution of k.
Learning Environment
Expectations in the payoff function (1) are based on Bayesian beliefs agents form based on initial priors and information they observe over time. We model learning following closely Boz and Mendoza (2010) and Cogley and
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
230
Sargent (2008a). Hence, we provide here only a short description and refer the interested reader to those other articles for further details.
The stochastic process of k follows a classic two-point regime-switching Markov process. There are two realizations of k, a regime with high ability to borrow kh and a regime with low ability to borrow kl. The “true” regime- switching Markov process has continuation transition probabilities defined by Fhh a and Fll
a , with switching probabilities given by Fhl
a ¼1�Fhha and Flha ¼1�Flla. Hence, learning in this setup is about forming beliefs regarding the distributions of the transition probabilities Fhh
s and Fll
s by combining initial
priors with the observations of k that arrive each period. After observing a sufficiently long and varied set of realizations of kh and kl, agents learn the true regime-switching probabilities of k. Modeling of learning in this fashion is particularly useful for representing financial innovation as the introduction of a brand-new financial regime for which there is no data history agents could use to infer the true transition distribution of k, while maintaining a long-run equilibrium that converges to a conventional rational expectations equilibrium.
Agents learn using a beta-binomial probability model starting with exogenous initial priors. Take as given a history of realizations of k that agents observe over T periods, kT�{k0, k1, y, kT�1, kT}, and initial priors, F s , of the distributions of Fhh
s and Fll
s for date t¼0, p(Fs). Bayesian learning
with beta-binomial distributions yields a sequence of posteriors { f(F s |kt)}t¼1
T .
To understand how the sequence of posteriors is formed, consider first that at every date t, from 0 to T, the information set of the agent includes k t
as well as the possible values that k can take (kh and k l). This means that agents also know the number of times a particular regime has persisted or switched to the other regime (that is, agents know the set of counters [nt
hh , nt
hl , nt
ll , nt
lh ]t¼0 T
where each nt ij denotes the number of transitions from
state ki to k j that have been observed prior to date t).5 These counters, together with the priors, form the arguments of the Beta-binomial distributions that characterize the learning process. For instance, the initial priors are given by pðFiisÞ/ ðFiisÞn
ij 0 �1ð1�FiisÞn
ij
0 �1. As in Cogley and Sargent
(2008a), we assume that the initial priors are independent and determined by n0 ij (that is, the number of transitions assumed to have been observed prior to
date t¼1). The agents’ posteriors about Fhh
s and Fll
s have Beta distributions as well.
The details of how they follow from the priors and the counters are provided in Cogley and Sargent (2008a) and Boz and Mendoza (2010). The posteriors are of the form Fhh
s pBeta (nt
hh , nt
hl ) and Fll
s pBeta (nt
lh , nt
ll ), and the posterior
means satisfy:
Et½F shh� ¼ n hh t =ðn
hh t þn
hl t Þ; Et½F
s ll� ¼ n
ll t =ðn
ll t þn
lh t Þ (6Þ
5 The number of transitions across regimes is updated as follows: n
ij tþ1 ¼ n
ij t þ1 if both
ktþ1¼k j and kt¼ki, and n ij tþ1 ¼ n
ij t otherwise.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
231
This is a key result for the solution method we follow, because, as will be explained later in this section, the method relies on knowing the evolution of the posterior means as learning progresses.
An important implication of Equation (6) is that the posterior means change only when that same regime is observed at date t. Since in a two- point, regime-switching setup continuation probabilities also determine mean durations, it follows that the beliefs about both the persistence and the mean durations of the two financial regimes can be updated only when agents actually observe k l or kh.
Learning, Debt and Price Dynamics after Financial Innovation
The potential for financial innovation to lead to significant underestimation of risk can be inferred from the evolution of the posterior means. Consider in particular an experiment in which financial innovation is defined as the arrival of a brand new environment in which credit conditions can shift between kh and k l. By construction, this implies starting the learning process from values of n0
ij that are close to zero.6 Given this assumption and the
conditions mapping counters of regime realizations into posterior means (equation (6)), it follows that the first sequence of realizations of kh generates substantial optimism (that is, a sharp increase in Et[Fhh
s ] relative to Fhh
a ). 7
Moreover, it also follows that the magnitude of the optimism that any subsequent sequence of realizations of kh generates will be smaller than in the initial optimistic phase. Intuitively, this is because it is only after observing the first switch to kl that agents rule out the possibility of kh being an absorbent state. Similarly, the first realizations of kl generate a pessimistic phase, in which Et[Fll
s ] is significantly higher than Fll
a , so the period of
optimistic expectations is followed by a period of pessimistic expectations. Following Boz and Mendoza (2010), the effects of the above optimistic
beliefs on debt and land prices that result from the interaction between the collateral constraint and learning can be explained intuitively by combining the Euler equations on land and bonds (equations (4) and (5)) to obtain an expression for the model’s land premium, Et
s [Rtþ1þ i
q ], and then solving
forward for the price of land in Equation (5). Defining Rtþ1
q �(etþ1Yk(tþ1)þq(tþ l))/q(t), the expected land premium one-period ahead is given by:
E st ½R q tþ1 �R� ¼
ð1�ktÞmt � covtsðbu0ðctþ1Þ;R q tþ1Þ
E st ½bu0ðctþ1Þ� (7Þ
6 Recall that n0
ij are counters of the number of times a regime has been observed before
learning starts. A truly new environment would have n0 ij¼0, but since the binomial
distribution is not denned for n0 ij¼0, n0ij close to zero provides the best approximation to a
truly new regime. 7 From Equation (6), if n0
ij¼0.1 for i, j¼h, l and we observe five quarters of k h, Et[Fhhs] rises from 0.5 at t¼0 to 0.98 at t¼5, while Et[Flls] remains unchanged at 0.5.
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
232
This land premium rises in every state in which the collateral constraint binds because of a combination of three effects: the increased excess return on land because of the shadow value of the collateral constraint (which is limited to the fraction (1�kt) of mt because the fraction kt of land can be collateralized into debt), the lower covariance between marginal utility and land returns, and the increased expected marginal utility of future consumption. The latter two effects occur because the binding credit constraint hampers the agents’ ability to smooth consumption and tilts consumption toward the future.
Consider now a state at date t in the initial optimistic phase of financial innovation in which the collateral constraint binds even at kh. Compare first what the land premium would look like in the DEL of the learning economy (Et
s [Rtþ1
q |kt
h¼kh, mt40]) vs. the DEF of the perfect information economy (Et
a [Rtþ1
q |kt
h¼kh, mt40]). If beliefs are optimistic (that is, Et[Fhh
s ]4Fhh
a ), agents assign lower probability to the risk of switching to
kl at tþ1 (which has higher land returns because the constraint is more binding for kl than for kh) than they would under perfect information. This lowers the expected land premium in the learning model because agents’ beliefs put more weight on states with lower land returns.
To see how this affects asset prices, consider the forward solution of qt:
qt ¼ Est X1 j¼0
Yj i¼0
1
Est½R q tþ1þi�
� � ! etþ1þjYkðktþ1þjÞ
" # : (8Þ
This expression shows that the lower land returns that follow financial innovation when learning leads to optimistic beliefs, either at date t or expected along the equilibrium path for any future date, translate into higher land prices at t (and higher than under full information). But if the constraint was already binding at t with kh, and kh is the current state, the value of collateral rises and agents borrow more. In addition, as collateral values rise the constraint becomes relatively less binding (that is, mt falls), but this puts further downward pressure on land premiums (see equation (8)), which in turn puts further upward pressure on land prices. Hence, optimistic beliefs and the credit constraint interact to amplify the total upward effects on credit and prices. Notice, however, this feedback process is nonlinear, because it depends on the equilibrium dynamics of beliefs, land prices and m. For example, if the constraint becomes nonbinding as prices rise, at that point the amplification mechanism would stop.
When the first observation of kl arrives after the initial spell of kh0s that followed financial innovation, the opposite process is set in motion, and this process is characterized by the classic Fisherian deflation mechanism. Observing the first realization of kl leads agents to update their regime counters, and hence the posterior mean for the low-credit regime in Equation (6) turns pessimistic (that is, Et[Fll
s ]4Fll
a ), so they assign excessive
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
233
probability to staying in kl.8 This increases the expected land premium because now agents’ beliefs put more weight on states with higher land returns, and the higher expected premiums lower asset prices relative to full information. As asset prices fall, and if kl is the current state, the collateral constraint becomes even more binding, which triggers a Fisherian deflation and fire sales of assets, which in turn put further upward pressure on land premiums and downward on land prices as m rises, and agents continue to put higher probability in these states with even higher land returns and lower land prices.
Recursive Anticipated Utility Competitive Equilibrium
The fact that this learning setup involves learning from and about an exogenous variable (k) allows us to solve for the equilibrium dynamics following a two-stage solution method. In the first stage, we use the Bayesian learning framework to generate the agents’ sequence of posterior means determined by Equation (6). In the second stage, we characterize the agents’ optimal plans as a recursive equilibrium by adopting Kreps’s Anticipated Utility (AU) approach to approximate dynamic optimization with Bayesian learning. The AU approach focuses on combining the sequences of posterior means obtained in the first stage with chained solutions from a set of “conditional” AU optimization problems (AUOP).
9
Each of these problems solves what looks like a standard optimization problem with full information and rational expectations, but using the posterior means of each date t instead of the true transition probabilities (see Boz and Mendoza (2010) for further details).
The AU competitive equilibrium in recursive form is constructed as follows. Consider the date-t AUOP. At this point agents have observed kt, and use it to update their beliefs so that Equation (6) yields Et[Fhh
s ] and Et[Fll
s ].
Using this posterior means, they construct the date-t beliefs about the transition probability matrix across financial regimes
E st ½k 0jk� �
Et½F shh� 1�Et½F s hh�
1�Et½F sll� Et½F s ll�
" # :
8 Again starting from n0
ij¼0.1 for i, j¼h, l and observing kh the first five quarters and kl the sixth quarter, Et[Fll
s ]¼0.5 for t¼0 to 5 and then rises to 0.917 at t¼6.
9 Cogley and Sargent (2008b) show that the AU approach is significantly more tractable
than full Bayesian dynamic optimization and yet produces very similar quantitative results, unless risk aversion coefficients are large. The full Bayesian optimization problem uses not just the posterior means but the entire likely evolution of posterior density functions to project the effects of future k, realizations on beliefs. This problem runs quickly into the curse of dimensionality because it requires carrying the counters nt
hh , nt
hl , nt
ll , nt
lh ]t¼0
T as additional state
variables. It follows from this argument that one can also interpret AU optimization as a form of bounded rationality.
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
234
The solution to the date-t AUOP is then given by policy functions (bt 0(b, e, k),
ct(b, e, k), mt(b, e, k)) and a pricing function qt(b, e, k) that satisfy the following recursive equilibrium conditions:
u0ðctðb;e;kÞÞ¼ bR X
e02E k0 2fkh;klg
X Est½k
0jk�pðe0jeÞu0ðctðb0;e0;k0ÞÞ
2 4
3 5
þmtðb;e;kÞ; (9Þ
qtðb;e;kÞ u0ðctðb;e;kÞÞ�mtðb;e;kÞk½ �
¼ b P
z02Z k0 2fkh;klg
P Est ½k0jk�pðe0jeÞu0ðctðb0;e0;k0ÞÞ e0Yð1Þþqtðb0;e0;k0Þ½ �
2 4
3 5ð10Þ
ctðb;e;kÞþ bt 0ðb;e;kÞ R
¼ eYð1Þþb; (11Þ
bt 0ðb;e;kÞ R
��kqtðb;e;kÞ1 (12Þ
The time subscripts that index the policy and pricing functions indicate the date of the beliefs used to form the expectations, which is also the date of the most recent observation of k (date t). Notice that these equilibrium conditions already incorporate the market clearing condition of the land market.
It is critical to note that solving for date-t policy and pricing functions means solving for a full set of optimal plans over the entire (b, e, k) domain of the state space and conditional on date-t beliefs. Thus, we are solving for the optimal plans agents “conjecture” they would make over the infinite future acting under those beliefs. For characterizing the “actual” equilibrium dynamics to match against the data, however, the solution of the date-t AUOP determines optimal plans for date t only. This is crucial because beliefs change as time passes, and each subsequent kt is observed, which implies that the policy and pricing functions that solve each AUOP also change.
The model’s recursive AU equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition Given a T-period history of realizations kT¼(kT, kT�1, y, k1), a recursive AU competitive equilibrium for the economy is given by a sequence of decision rules [bt
0(b, e, k), ct(b, e, k), mt(b, e, k) and pricing functions [qt(b, e, k)]t¼1
T such that: (a) the decision rules and pricing
function for date t solve the date-t AUOP conditional on Et s [k0|k]; (b)
Et s [k0|k] is the conjectured transition probability matrix of k produced by the
date-t posterior density of F s determined by the Bayesian passive learning as
defined in Equation (6).
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
235
Intuitively, the complete solution of the recursive equilibrium is formed by chaining together the solutions for each date-t AUOP. For instance, the sequence of equilibrium bond holdings that the model predicts for dates t¼1, y, T is obtained by chaining the relevant decision rules as follows: b2¼b10(b, e, k), b3¼b20(b, e, k), y, bTþ1¼bT0(b, e, k).
Conditionally Efficient Planners’ Problems
We examine macroprudential policy by studying two versions of an optimal policy problem faced by a benevolent social planner who maximizes the agents’ utility subject to the resource constraint and the collateral constraint. The key difference between these planners’ problems and the DEL is that the former internalize the effects of borrowing decisions on the market price of assets that serve as collateral.
We follow Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) in considering that the planners face the same borrowing ability at every given state as agents in a competitive equilibrium. This implies that the planner is required to implement the same pricing function for the valuation of collateral as in a decentralized equilibrium (that is, we do not allow the planner to manipulate the current price of land at a particular state of nature). The planners, however, can alter future values of land by choosing the amount of debt in the economy. In particular, the planners internalize that when the economy has a larger amount of debt, a negative shock triggering the collateral constraint leads to a lower asset price and a further tightening of collateral constraints via the Fisherian deflation.
10
The assumption that the collateral pricing function faced by the planners corresponds to the pricing function of a competitive equilibrium is in line with the concept of conditional or financial efficiency defined by Kehoe and Levine (1993) in their analysis of endogenous debt limits, and studied by Lustig (2000) in the context of a credit market with collateral. As Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) argued, there are several advantages of this formulation for the analysis of macroprudential policy in models with collateral constraints. First, this formulation makes the planners’ optimization problem time-consistent, which guarantees that macroprudential policy, if effective, improves welfare across all states and dates in a time-consistent fashion. Second, it allows for a simpler characterization and decentralization based on the use of Pigouvian taxes on debt and dividends, as we explain below. Third, even with this constrained notion of efficiency, correcting the fire-sale externality can lead to a sharp reduction in the probability and the severity of financial crises (see again Bianchi and Mendoza).
The two planner problems we construct are based on the information set assumed for the government. First, we define an uninformed planner (SP1) as one who is subject to a similar learning problem as private agents.
10 In contrast, if a planner can manipulate the collateral pricing function, the planner would
internalize not only how the choice of debt at t affects the land price at tþ1, but also how it affects land prices and the tightness of the collateral constraint in previous periods.
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
236
This planner observes the same history kT and starts learning off date-0 priors that may or may not be the same as those of the private sector. Because of the conditional efficiency assumption, SP1 prices collateral using the DEL’s collateral pricing functions (qt
DEL (b,e,k)), which ensures that SP1 faces the
same set of feasible credit positions as private agents in the DEL. Second, we construct a fully informed planner (SP2) as a planner who knows Fhh
a and Fll
a ,
and prices collateral using the time-invariant pricing function of the DEF q DEF
(b,e,k).11 Hence, conditional efficiency for this planner means that it can implement the same set of feasible credit positions as private agents in the DEF.
The two planners’ optimization problems in standard intertemporal form can be summarized as follows:
Ei0
X1 t¼0
bt c1�st 1�s
" # for i ¼ SP1;SP2 (13Þ
s:t: ct þ btþ1 Rt ¼ bt þ etYð1Þ (14Þ
� btþ1 Rt
pktq i t (15Þ
with qt SP1¼qtDEL and qtSP2¼qtDEF. Note that in SP1, the planner solves a
similar Bayesian learning problem as private agents observing the same history of credit regimes kT. This planner’s initial priors are denoted p
0
ij for
i, j¼h, l. If p 0 ij¼n
0 ij, which will be our baseline scenario, so that both SP1 and
private agents have identical beliefs at all times. Later in sensitivity analysis we examine the implications of relaxing this assumption. In SP2, the planner uses the true transition probabilities Fhh
a and Fll
a .
We solve the problem of each planner in recursive form, and to simplify the exposition we represent the two AU problems in recursive form.
12 For
each planner i¼SP1, SP2 the solution to the date-t AUOP is given by policy functions (bt
0(b, e, k), ct(b, e, k), mt(b, e, k)) that satisfy the following recursive equilibrium conditions:
u0ðctðb;e;kÞÞ�mtðb;e;kÞ
¼ bR X
e02E k0 2fkh;klg
X Eit½k
0jk�pðe0jeÞ
2 4 "u0ðctðb0;e0;k0ÞÞ
þk0mtðb 0;e0;k0Þ
qqitðb0;e0;k0Þ qb0
�# ; ð16Þ
11 These pricing functions are time invariant because they correspond to the solutions of a
standard recursive rational expectations equilibrium. The resulting planning problem is analogous to the one solved in Bianchi and Mendoza (2010).
12 This is redundant for SP2 because this planner solves a standard full-information rational
expectations recursive equilibrium with time-invariant decision rules and pricing functions.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
237
ctðb;e;kÞþ bt 0ðb;e;kÞ R
¼ eYð1Þþb; (17Þ
bt 0ðb;e;kÞ R
��kqitðb;e;kÞ1; (18Þ
where the pricing functions for each planner are qt SP1
(b, e, k)¼qtDEL (b, e, k) and qt
SP2 (b, e, k)¼qtDEF (b, e, k). Moreover, expectations in each planner’s
date-t AUOP are taken using
E SP1t ½k 0jk� �
Et½F ghh� 1�Et½F g hh �
1�Et½F gll � Et½F g ll �
" #
and
E it ½k 0jk� �
F ahh 1�F a hh
1�F all F a ll
" #
for i¼SP2.13 Note also that in these problems the time subindices of expectations operators, decision rules and pricing functions represent the date of the AUOP to which they pertain, and not the indexing of time within each AUOP. That is, in the date-t AUOP the planner creates expectations of the prices and allocations of all future periods using the date-t recursive decision rules and pricing functions (for example, in the date-t AUOP, consumption projected for tþ1 is given by the expectation of ct(b0, e0, k0)). Moreover, for SP2, since the planner has full information and can implement the credit feasibility set of the DEF, the decision rules are actually time- invariant at equilibrium (all date-t AUOP’s for SP2 are identical because they use the true Markov process of k and the DEF time-invariant pricing functions).
We can now define the two recursive social planner problems for a given history of realizations kT: SP1 equilibrium: Given the DEL time-varying asset pricing functions [qt
DEL (b, e, k)]t¼1
T , a recursive AU equilibrium for the SP1 planner is given
by a sequence of decision rules [bt 0(b, e, k), ct(b, e, k), mt(b, e, k)]t¼1
T such that:
(a) the decision rules for date t solve SPl’s date-t AUOP conditional on Et
g [k0|k]; and (b) the elements of Et
g [k0|k] are the posterior means produced by
the date-t posterior densities of Fhh g
and Fll g determined by the Bayesian
learning process. SP2 equilibrium: Given the DEF time-invariant asset pricing function q DEF
(b, e, k), a recursive AU equilibrium for the SP2 planner is given by
13 By analogy with the results in Equation (6), the posterior means of the government’s
learning dynamics satisfy: Et½F ghh�¼p hh t =ðphht þphlt Þ, Et½F
g ll �¼p
ll t =ðpllt þplht Þ. Note that, since
both the private sector and the government observe the same k sequence, these counters can differ from those of private agents only because of differences in date-0 priors.
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
238
time-invariant decision rules [b0(b, e, k), c(b, e, k), m(b, e, k)] such that the decision rules solve SP2’s date-t AUOP conditional on E
a [k0|k] for all t.
Pecuniary Externality and Decentralization of Planners’ Allocations
The key difference between the first-order conditions of the social planners and those obtained in the private agents’ DEL is the pecuniary externality reflected in the right-hand-side of the planners’ Euler equation for bonds (equation (16)): The planners internalize how, in states in which the collateral constraint is expected to bind next period (that is, mt(b
0, e0, k0)40 for at least some states), the choice of debt made in the current period, b0, will alter the tightness of the constraint by affecting prices in the next period (qqt
i (b0, e0, k0)/
qb0). This derivative represents the response of the land price tomorrow to changes in the debt chosen today, which can be a very steep function when the collateral constraint binds because of the Fisherian deflation mechanism.
While the two planning problems consider the above price derivative, they differ sharply in how they do it. Consider again the period of optimism produced by the effect on the private agents’ beliefs of the initial spell of kh
realizations after financial innovation starts. Since in the baseline case SP1 has the same initial priors as private agents (because the baseline assumes p0 ij¼n0
ij ), its beliefs are always identical to those of private agents. Thus, SP1
shares in the agent’s optimism both directly, in terms of beliefs about transition probabilities of k, and indirectly, in terms of facing the feasible set of credit positions implied by optimistic collateral prices in the DEL pricing function. This planner still wants to use macroprudential policy to dampen credit growth because it internalizes the slope of the asset pricing function when the collateral constraint on debt is expected to bind, but this planner’s expectations are as optimistic as the private agents’ and hence it assigns very low probability to a financial crash (that is, a transition from kh to kl ), and it internalizes a pricing function inflated by optimism. Our quantitative findings show that, if optimism builds quickly (that is, Et[Fhh
s ] approaches 1) and the
collateral constraint binds tightly in the early stages of financial innovation, these limitations can result in SP1 attaining equilibrium debt and land prices close to those of the DEL, thus reducing the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. But if optimism builds gradually and/or the collateral constraint is not tightly binding, SP1 attains lower debt positions than private agents in the DEL, and this causes the crash to be significantly less severe when financial conditions reverse.
SP2 differs sharply because it does not share the private agents’ optimistic beliefs and thus assign higher probability to the likelihood of observing a kh-to-k l transition than in the DEL, which therefore strengthens SP2’s incentive to build precautionary savings and borrow less. SP2 is also more cautious than SP1, because it assigns higher probability to transitions from states with optimistic prices to those with pessimistic crash prices. Again depending on whether the constraint binds and how optimistic beliefs are,
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
239
SP2 acquires less debt and experiences lower land price booms than both SP1 and DEL, and for the same reason its use of macroprudential policy is more intensive.
Given the model’s pecuniary externality, the most natural choice to model the implementation of macroprudential policies are Pigouvian taxes. In particular, using taxes on debt (tb, t
i ) and land dividends (tl, t
i ) we can fully
implement the planner problems’ allocations (for i¼SP1, SP2). With these taxes, the budget constraint of private agents becomes:
qtktþ1 þ ct þ btþ1
Rtð1þ t ib;tÞ ¼ qtkt þbt þ etYðktÞð1� t il;tÞþT
i t : (19Þ
Tt i represents lump-sum transfers by which the government rebates to private
agents all its tax revenue (or a lump-sum tax in case the tax rates are negative, which is not ruled out).
The Euler equations of the competitive equilibrium with the macropruden- tial policy in place are:
u0ðtÞ ¼ bRð1þtib;tÞE s t½u 0ðtþ1Þ�þmt; (20Þ
qtðu0ðtÞ�mtkÞ ¼ bE st ½u 0ðtþ1Þ�ðetþ1Ykðktþ1Þð1� til;tÞþqtþ1Þ� (21Þ
We compute the state-contingent, time-varying schedules of these taxes by replacing each planner’s allocations in these optimality conditions and then solving for the corresponding tax rates, so that the DEL with macroprudential policy supports both the same allocations of each planner’s problem and the corresponding asset pricing functions that each planner uses to value collateral.
The debt tax is needed to replicate the planner’s debt choices, and the dividends tax is needed to support the pricing functions that the planner used to value collateral as the competitive equilibrium asset pricing functions.
14
The tax schedules in recursive form are denoted tb, t i (b, e, k) and tb, t
i (b, e, k).
There will be one of these schedules for each date-t AUOP solved by private agents in the DEL with Pigouvian taxes.
It is important to note that when the collateral constraint is binding at t, one can construct multiple representations of the tax schedules that implement the allocations of the planning problems. This is because when mt40 the value of btþ1 is determined by the collateral constraint and not by the Euler equation for bonds. In particular, if we plug a given planner’s consumption and debt plans and collateral pricing function in conditions (20) and (21), there are different schedules of debt and dividend taxes depending on a chosen schedule for the shadow value mt in the DEL with taxes. For simplicity, we chose the tax schedules such that tb, t
i ¼0 when the collateral constraint binds. Hence, when mt40, the shadow value of the constraint is set
14 The tax on debt is also equivalent to tightening margin requirements, that is, reducing k
when the credit constraint is slack (see Bianchi, 2011).
Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, and Enrique Gabriel Mendoza
240
at mt¼u 0(t)�bREts [u0(tþ1)], and given this the corresponding tax on dividends when the constraint binds follows from condition (21).
The debt tax can be decomposed into three terms that are useful for interpreting how macroprudential policy responds to the effects of imperfect information, the pecuniary externality and the interaction of these two. In particular, combining Equations (20) and (16) and rearranging terms, the debt tax for each planner can be expressed as follows:
tib;t ¼ E it ½u0ðtþ 1Þ� E st ½u0ðtþ 1Þ�
�1|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} information
þ E it ktþ1mtðtþ 1Þ
qqitðtþ1Þ qb0
h i �E st ktþ1mtðtþ1Þ
qq itðtþ1Þ qb0
h i E st ½u0ðtþ 1Þ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
interaction
þ E st ktþ1mtðtþ 1Þ
qqitðtþ1Þ qb0
h i E st ½u0ðtþ 1Þ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
externality
ð22Þ
where all variables are evaluated at the corresponding planner’s problem. The first term in the right-hand side of this expression is labeled “information” because it reflects the contribution to the debt tax that arises from deviations in the one-period-ahead expected marginal utilities of private agents and planner i, which arise because of the beliefs formed with their different information sets. If the two information sets, and hence beliefs, are identical, as they are in our baseline SP1, this term vanishes, but for SP2 it does not vanish. The second term, labeled “interaction,” reflects differences in the expected value of the externality when evaluated using the beliefs of each planner vs. the private agents’ beliefs. This term is zero when either the information sets are the same or the DEL is far from the region where the constraint binds, and hence the externality term is zero for all possible states in tþ1. Thus, the label “interaction” reflects the fact that both the informational difference and the externality need to be present for this term to be nonzero. Finally, the third term labeled “externality” is simply the value of the externality evaluated using the beliefs of private agents.
II. Quantitative Analysis
This section explores the quantitative implications of the model. We discuss first the baseline calibration of parameter values, and then compare the DEL with the two planning problems. We also quantify the macroprudential tax schedules that decentralize the planners’ allocations and decompose them into their three components.
Baseline Calibration
We borrow the baseline calibration from Boz and Mendoza (2010), so we keep the description here short. In contrast with their work, however, our aim here is to study how the interaction between the learning friction and the
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
241
pecuniary externality affect the design of macroprudential policy in the aftermath of financial innovation. This implies that the uncertainty surrounding the values of the parameters driving the learning process and the collateral constraint takes particular relevance, so we view this initial calibration more as a baseline to begin the quantitative analysis than as a calibration intended to judge the model’s ability to match the data.
The model is calibrated to U.S. quarterly data at annualized rates and assuming a learning period of length T in which k¼kh from t¼1, y, J (the optimistic phase) and k¼kl from Jþ1 to T (the pessimistic phase). The parameter values are listed in Table 1.
As in Boz and Mendoza (2010), we set the start of the learning dynamics and the dates T and J based on observations from a timeline of the financial innovation process and events leading to the 2008 U.S. financial crisis. As explained earlier, we define financial innovation as a structural change that creates a new environment with stochastic switches between kh and kl. Before financial innovation, we assume the financial environment was characterized by a regime with a single time-invariant collateral coefficient kl. We set the date of the structural change as of 1997:Q1 to be consistent with two important facts. First, 1997 was the year of the first publicly available securitization of mortgages under the New Community Reinvestment Act and the first issuance of corporate CDS’s by JPMorgan.
15 Second, this was
also the year in which the net credit assets-GDP ratio of U.S. households started a protracted decline that lasted until the end of 2008, while prior to 1997 this ratio was quite stable at about �30 percent. We date the start of the
Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
b Discount factor (annualized) 0.91 s Risk aversion coefficient 2.0 c Consumption-GDP ratio 0.670
A Lump-sum absorption 0.321
r Interest rate (annualized) 2.660
r Persistence of endowment shocks 0.869 se Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.008 a Factor share of land in production 0.025 kh Value of k in the high securitization regime 0.926 kl Value of k in the low securitization regime 0.642 Fhh a
True persistence of kh 0.95 Fll a
True persistence of kl 0.95 n 0
hh, n 0
hl Priors 0.0205
15 Several other major financial reforms were also introduced in the late 1990s, including
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which moved over-the-counter derivatives beyond the reach of regulators, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act, which removed legal barriers separating bank and nonbank financial intermediaries set in 1933 with the Glass- Steagall act.
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financial crisis at 2007:Q1, consistent with the initial nation-wide decline in home prices and the early signs of difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. The experiment ends two years later. These assumptions imply setting T¼48 and J¼40 (that is, 40 consecutive quarters of kh realizations followed by eight consecutive quarters of kl).
The model’s parameters are calibrated as follows: First, the values of (s, R, r, se, k
l , kh, Fhh
a , F
ll
a ) are calculated directly from the data or set to
standard values from the quantitative DSGE literature. Second, the values of (a, b) are calibrated such that the model’s prefinancial innovation stochastic stationary state is consistent with various averages from U.S. data from the prefinancial-innovation period (that is, pre-1997), assuming that in that period the financial constraint with kl was binding on average. Finally, the initial priors are calibrated assuming that they are symmetric, with a common value n0 for all transitions targeted to match an estimate of observed excess land returns, as described later in this Section.
We set the real interest rate to the average ex-post real interest rate on U.S. three-month T-bills during the period 1980:Q1–1996:Q4, which is 2.66 percent annually. The value of s is set to s¼2.0, the standard value in DSGE models of the U.S. economy.
To pin down kl and kh, we use the data on net credit market assets of U.S. households and nonprofit organizations from the Flow of Funds of the Federal Reserve Board as a proxy for b in the model. The proxy for ql is obtained from the estimates of the value of residential land provided by Davis and Heathcote (2007). On average over the 1980:Q1–1996:Q4 period, the ratios of the value of residential land and net credit market assets relative to GDP were stable around 0.477 and �0.313, respectively. Next, we construct a macro estimate of the household leverage ratio, or the loan-to- value ratio, by dividing net credit market assets by the value of residential land. We set the value of kl by combining the 1980:Q1–1996:Q4 average of this ratio with the calibrated value of R which yields kl¼0.659/ 1.0266¼0.642. Following a similar idea, we set kh to the 2006:Q4 value of the estimated leverage ratio, hence kh¼0.926.
The value of Fhh a is set based on Mendoza and Terrones (2008)’s finding
that the mean duration of credit booms in industrial economies is seven years. To match this mean duration, we set Fhh
a ¼0.95. We assume a symmetric process by setting Fll
a¼0.95. Notice that the true transition probability matrix across financial regimes is not needed to solve the DEL, but is necessary for solving SP2 and DEF.
16
We assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: Y(kt)¼kta. Using the 1980:Q1–1996:Q4 average of the value of residential land to GDP,
16 Notice also that while knowing F ahh and F
a ll is not necessary for solving the DEL over the
assumed sequence of 48 realizations of k, solving the DEL over an infinite horizon does require the true probabilities, because the counters must satisfy the condition that the ratios nhl=nhh and klh=nll need to converge to F ahl=F
a hh and F
a lh=F
a ll respectively as the counters go to
infinity.
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243
the value of R, and the condition that arbitrages the returns on land and bonds, which follows from the optimality conditions (4)-(5), the implied value for a is a¼0.0251.17
The stochastic process for e is set to approximate an AR(1) process (ln(et)¼rln(et�1)þet) fitted to HP-filtered real U.S. GDP per capita using data for the period 1965:Q1–1996:Q4. The parameter estimates of this process are r¼0.869 and se¼0.00833, which imply a standard deviation of TFP of se¼1.68 percent.
The value of b is set so that in the prefinancial-innovation stochastic steady state the model matches the observed standard deviation of consumption relative to output over the 1980:Q1–1996:Q4 period, which is 0.8. This yields b¼0.91.
We introduce an exogenous, time-invariant amount of autonomous spending in order to make the model’s average consumption-output ratio and average resource constraint consistent with the data. As noted earlier, the Flow of Funds data show that the observed average ratio of net credit assets to GDP in the 1980:Q1–1996:Q4 period was very stable at �b¼�0.313. In the case of the consumption-GDP ratio, the data show a slight trend, so we use the last observation of the prefinancial-innovation regime (1996:Q4), which implies �c¼0.670.18 To make these ratios consistent with the model’s resource constraint in the average of the stochastic stationary state for that same financial regime, we introduce autonomous spending by the share A of GDP, so that the long-run average of the resource constraint is given by 1¼ �cþA� �b (R�1)/R. Given the values for �b , �c and R, A is calculated as a residual A¼1��cþ �b (R�1)/R¼0.321.19 This adjustment represents the averages of investment and government expenditures, which are not explicitly modeled.
The remaining parameters are the counters of the beta-binomial distributions that determine the initial priors. Because we assume symmetric priors, n0¼n0hl¼n0hh¼n0ll¼n0lh, so that there is only one parameter to calibrate. We set no so that in the DEL the implied expected excess return on land one period ahead of t¼0 matches the annualized 1997:Q2 spread on the Fannie Mae residential MBS with 30-year maturity over the T-bill rate. This excess return was equal to 47.6 basis points and the model matches it with no¼0.0205.
17 Since the model with a single financial regime set at kl (that is, the prefinancial-
innovation regime) yields a collateral constraint that is almost always binding and a negligible excess return on land, we use the approximation E[R
q ]ER, and then conditions (4) and (5)
imply: a¼(ql/la)[R�1þb�1(1�bR)(1�kl)]. 18 Consumption and GDP data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics
of the IMF. 19 Note that, since land is in fixed unit supply and the unconditional mean of e equal to 1,
the mean of output in the model is also 1.
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Baseline Results
The main quantitative experiment compares the dynamics triggered by financial innovation over the learning period (t¼1, y, 48) in the DEL with those of the two planning problems. These dynamics are computed by solving the sequence of AUOPs for each date t that define each equilibrium, and constructing simulations that chain together the decision rules of each date-t AUOP as described in Boz and Mendoza (2010).
20 These simulations keep
TFP unchanged at its mean value (e¼1) and start from the initial condition b0¼�0.345, which corresponds to the net credit market assets-GDP ratio of U.S. households observed in the data in 1996:Q4. Figure 1 plots the dynamics of bonds and land prices (panels (a) and (b)), the shadow value of collateral mt (panel (c)), the agents’ beliefs (panel (d)), and the pecuniary externality, defined as Et[ktþ1mt(tþ1)(qqti(tþ1)/qb0)] for i¼SP1, SP2 (panel (e)).
The evolution of beliefs in panel (d) shows the large and rapid buildup of optimism that follows the arrival of financial innovation. Et[Fhh
s ] rises from
0.980 to 0.999 from t¼1 to t¼40, as agents observe the long spell of khs. Since there are no observations of kl, the beliefs about kl do not change during this time (recall equation (6)). At date 41, when the economy switches to k l for the first time, E41[Fhh
s ] falls to 0.975, and more importantly E41[Fll
s ]
rises sharply from 0.5 to 0.98. Hence, beliefs turn pessimistic very quickly after the first realization of kl. Panel (d) also shows the time-invariant true transition probabilities Fhh
a and Fll
a , which are the same because we assumed a
symmetric process for k. The excess of Et[Fhh s ] over Fhh
a (Fhh
a over Et[Fll
s ])
measures the degree of optimism (pessimism) built during the optimistic (pessimistic) phase.
The increase in Et[Fhh s ] from date 1 to 40 may appear small (from 0.98 to
0.999) and the difference relative to Fhh a
(which is set at 0.95) may also seem small. However, even these small differences have important implications for the perception of riskiness of the financial environment, particularly for the expected mean duration of the kh regime and the perceived variability of the k process. The expected mean duration of kh rises from 50 quarters with E1[Fhh
s ]¼0.98 to 1,000 quarters with E40[Fhhs ]¼0.999 at the peak of the
optimistic phase, and the coefficient of variation of k based on date-40 beliefs is about 1/4 of that based on date-1 beliefs. Thus, agents’ expectations of the riskiness of the new financial environment drop dramatically as the optimistic phase progresses. This is also true relative to Fhh
a ¼0.95, which implies that in the true regime-switching Markov process the kh regime has a significantly shorter mean duration of 28 periods. This is about half of what the agents that are learning perceive already at t¼1 of the optimistic phase, and a negligible fraction of the mean duration they expect by t¼40.
20 Recall that, as explained in Section I, the decision rules of DEL and SP1 change every
period as their beliefs evolve, and hence the dynamics shown for these scenarios result from chaining together the corresponding period’s bond decision rules and equilibrium prices.
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The difference between Et[Fll s ] as learning progresses and Fll
a has a similar
implication. During the optimistic phase, in which Et[Fll s ] remains constant at
1/2, and since Fll a¼0.95, agents’ beliefs imply a projected mean duration for
the k l regime of only two periods, whereas the true mean duration is 28 periods.
Figure 1. Dynamics in the Baseline Calibration: (a) Bonds; (b) Land Price; (c) Shadow Price; (d) Beliefs; (e) Externality
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Notes: DEL: Imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SPI: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
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These sharp differences in projected mean durations of both k regimes play a key role in driving the much stronger incentives for precautionary savings of SP2. This planner anticipates that kh (kl) will arrive less (more) often and that sequences of kh (kl) are likely to be of much shorter (longer) duration than what agents in the DEL and SP1 believe. Thus, DEL and SP1 perceive much less riskiness in the new financial environment than SP2.
In line with the above description of the evolution of beliefs, panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that in DEL there is a large and sustained increase in debt (a decline in bonds) for the first 40 periods and a very sharp correction at date 41. This increase in debt accounts for about 2/3rds of the observed rise in net credit liabilities of U.S. households. Panel (b) shows that the surge in debt in the DEL is accompanied by a sharp increase in the price of the risky asset, which is about 44 percent the observed rise in U.S. residential land prices. These two results are reassuring, because they show that the model’s baseline DEL is a reasonable laboratory in which to conduct macroprudential policy experiments inasmuch as the Fisherian interaction of the financial friction and financial innovation produce sizable, sustained booms in debt and land prices. Moreover, as Boz and Mendoza (2010) showed, these booms are twice as large as what the model would predict by either removing the debt-deflation amplification mechanism or the informational friction.
Panel (a) also shows that the two social planners choose lower debt positions than the DEL during the optimistic phase, but the size of the adjustment differs across the two planners. SP1 chooses only slightly smaller debt (higher bonds) than DEL, while SP2 chooses debt levels that are much smaller than those of SP1 and DEL.
SP1 borrows slightly less than DEL in the early periods after financial innovation is introduced, but then bond holdings and asset prices become nearly identical in the two equilibria starting at t¼7. This may seem puzzling, because in principle SP1 still has the incentive to use macroprudential policy, as reflected in the positive externality terms for SP1 displayed in panel (e). In fact, as we show later in the sensitivity analysis, the nearly identical bond and price dynamics in the baseline DEL and SP1 is not a general result. It is the outcome for the baseline calibration because the borrowing constraint binds tightly as a result of the rapid surge in optimism soon after financial innovation starts (see panel (d)). Thus, households’ willingness to borrow induces them to face a high shadow value from relaxing the collateral constraint, and hence, since SP1 also considers the high value of current consumption attributed by households, it also decides to borrow up to the limit. Notice that although date-t borrowing decisions for DEL and SP1 coincide, the fact that the collateral constraint is expected to bind one period ahead still generates an externality for SP1 (see panel (e)), but this is not strong enough to offset the high value assigned to date-t borrowing, which pushes both private agents and SP1 to borrow up to the limit.
Panel (e) also shows that SP1’s externality becomes weaker over time as it approaches the end of the optimistic phase at t¼40. The weak externality at
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this date is easier to interpret by examining Figure 2, which plots the bond decision rules and pricing functions for t¼40 in the two k regimes (for e¼1). The externality term is given by E40[k
0m40(b 0, e0, k0)(qq40
DEL (b0, e0, k0)/qb0)]. As
panel (b) of Figure 2 shows, the pricing function q40 DEL
(b, 1, kh) is relatively flat, which means that land prices do not differ much for different choices
of b0. Thus, in the kh state that SP1 believes most likely to continue, the price derivative driving the externality, (qq40
DEL (b0, e0, k0)/qb0), is small. In the other
financial regime, kl, the pricing function qt DEL
(b, 1, kl) is very steep (see panel (d)), but this carries a very small weight because SP1 assigns a negligible probability to switching from kh to kl. A similar dynamic is at play as the externality weakens from t¼6 to t¼40. The externality weakens because optimistic beliefs imply that, conditional on having observed kt¼kh at each
Figure 2. Period 40 Bond Holdings and Asset Prices: (a) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kh); (b) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kh); (c) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kl);
(d) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kl)
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Notes: SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of full information decentralized equilibrium.
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date of the optimistic pase, SPl’s perceived probability of a switch to kl is very low (that is, Et[Fhl
s ] is close to zero). Hence, as the optimistic phase progresses,
SP1 evaluates the externality assigning a large and increasing weight to the
one-period-ahead state with the small derivative (qqt DEL
(b0,1,k0)/qb0) and nearly zero weight to the state with the large derivative (qqt
DEL (b 0,1,k0)/qb0) Notice that
there is another effect that goes in the opposite direction. At higher levels of debt along the transition path, the slope of the pricing functions becomes relatively steeper, which would make the externality term larger. But the previous effect on the increasing weight on kh regime still dominates.
Using the true regime-switching transition probabilities across the k regimes, SP2 perceives higher risk in the new financial environment (both in terms of the likelihood of switching to kl one period ahead of each date t¼1, y, 40 and in terms of the long-run perceived mean duration of the kh regime and the volatility of the k process). Thus, SP2 has significantly stronger precautionary savings motives, and chooses much lower debt levels than SP1 and DEL during the optimistic phase (see panel (a) of Figure 1). In fact, on average SP2 avoids hitting the borrowing constraint during the entire optimistic phase, and thus obtains mt¼0 for t¼1, y, 40 (see panel (e)).
The equilibrium prices for SP2 are lower than SP1, because SP1 faces the DEF pricing function, q
DEF (b0, 1, kh). Moreover, in the dynamics, land prices
actually fall slightly for SP2 (see panel (b) of Figure 1, because in the DEF the new regime with switching k0s allows for more debt on average than the prefinancial-innovation regime with a constant kl, but it also entails more risk because of the variability of k. Under full information the latter effect dominates, thus causing land prices to fall slightly. The q
DEF (b0, 1, kh) pricing
function supports lower land prices because it is unaffected by the optimistic beliefs and underpricing of risk present in the DEL, although it retains the property that prices are relatively flat for kh and very steep for kl when the collateral constraint binds (see panels (b) and (d) of Figure 2). Hence, SP2 chooses lower debt levels because of precautionary reasons, and these credit positions support lower land prices because this planner can attain credit positions that undo the effect of optimistic expectations on prices.
The dynamics of consumption are easy to infer from the debt and price dynamics. During the early periods of the optimistic phase, consumption in DEL and SP1 exceeds that of SP2, in line with the larger debt buildup in those equilibria.
Consider now the model dynamics for the DEL and the two planners when the first switch to kl arrives at t¼41, which we define as a “crisis episode.” To illustrate the crisis dynamics clearly, Figure 4 shows event windows for seven quarters before and after the crisis. As shown in panel (a) of this figure, SP2, who chose the lowest levels of debt in the optimistic phase, experiences the smallest debt correction. This is consistent with the macroprudential behavior that led SP2 to take precautionary action and choose lower debt levels, because SP2 can correct the optimism of private beliefs and their effect on the set of feasible credit positions (that is, it can
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support collateral values consistent with those of the DEF). With both sources of overborrowing shut down, the smaller correction in debt at t¼41 is in response to the exogenous tightening of the constraint because of the lower realization of k. This exogenous debt correction cannot be avoided even with full information about the transition probability matrix across financial regimes.
The realization of kl in period 41 leads to a change in the beliefs of SP1 and DEL about the persistence of the kh regime, making the debt correction they experience more pronounced. Since in the baseline calibration SP1 can do almost nothing to undo the overborrowing effect of optimistic beliefs, it cannot avoid arriving at date 40 with the same debt level as in the DEL, at which the economy is vulnerable to a large correction in case of a transition to kl. In addition, once the credit regime shift occurs, beliefs turn pessimistic increasing the perceived riskiness of the financial environment and strengthening the feedback process of the Fisherian deflation mechanism as described in the previous section. As a result, the change in debt that SP1 experiences in date 41 is more than twice as large as that of SP2.
The ranking of the price declines in SP2, SP1 and DEL (with SP2 smaller and DEL and SP1 larger) follows the ranking of the debt correction. Consistent with the sharp change in beliefs at date 41, having built a larger debt than SP2 and facing the same set of feasible credit positions as DEL, SP1 cannot avoid falling on the relatively steep portion of the pricing function, as plotted in panel (d) of Figure 3. In the region where SP1 chose debt levels, prices vary significantly across debt positions in the kl regime, leading to a large decline in the asset price for SP1, as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 4. Notice also how the differences across the different equilibria shrink for all the macroeconomic series plotted in this figure toward the end of the time-series experiment, as the beliefs get closer to rational expectations.
Figure 5 shows the taxes on debt, tb, and dividends, tl, necessary to support each planners’ allocations as DELs with taxes. In line with the above results showing that SPl’s debt and land prices deviate only slightly from the outcomes of the DEL without taxes, SP1 makes limited use of these taxes. In the seven periods after financial innovation starts, it uses a debt tax of about 2–3 percent and a subsidy on dividends of up to 3 percent. After that, as the collateral constraint becomes binding for SP1, the debt tax drops to zero and the dividends rises to about 2 percent. In contrast, SP2 uses macroprudential taxes more actively. SP2 increases debt taxes gradually from about 4 to 8 percent in the optimistic phase, and then cuts it to zero as the financial crisis erupts. Moreover, SP2 increases the subsidy on land dividends in the early stages of the optimistic phase, and then keeps it constant at about 5 percent until the crisis occurs, at which time the subsidy falls to almost zero.
Figure 6 decomposes the above tax policy dynamics in terms of the information, interaction, and externality terms. Since SP1 goes through the same learning process as private agents in the DEL without taxes, the information and interaction terms of the debt taxes for this planner are always zero. The externality term (which captures the expected value of the
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pecuniary externality in units of marginal utility using the DEL’s beliefs ) accounts for the full amount of SPl’s debt taxes shown in Figure 5. This terms rises up to a maximum of about 3 percent, before vanishing after the seventh period. Again, the results that the externality tax term and the total debt tax itself are small are consistent with the finding that SPl’s debt and land prices deviate slightly from those obtained in the DEL without taxes.
The debt taxes of SP2 are significantly higher than those of SP1, but not because of the externality component. In fact, the externality component remains relatively small for SP2.
21 In the early stages after financial
Figure 3. Period 41 Bond Holdings and Asset Prices: (a) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kh); (b) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kh); (c) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kl);
(d) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kl)
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Notes: SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of full information decentralized equilibrium.
21 Interestingly, the size of the externality tax component is comparable in magnitude to
the debt taxes estimated by Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) in a model with a similar collateral constraint but with a constant k, production with labor and working capital financing of wages, and rational expectations formed with full information.
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innovation starts, this component is even smaller for SP2 than for SP1, but in contrast with SP1, the externality component remains slightly positive throughout the optimistic phase. The debt taxes of SP2 are higher because of large information and interaction components, which rise gradually during the early stages of the optimistic phase to stabilize at about 3.3 and 4.2 percent respectively. In contrast, both of these components are zero for SP1, as explained above.
Welfare Analysis
The welfare effects of the informational friction, the pecuniary externality and the use of macroprudential policy can be quantified by computing compensating variations in terms of constant consumption levels that yield the same lifetime utility as the consumption allocations of DEL, SP1, and
Figure 4. Crisis Episode: (a) Bonds; (b) Land Price; (c) Shadow Price; (d) Consumption
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Notes: This figure plots the time series dynamics in periods 41 7 7. DEL: Imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SPI: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
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SP2. This is similar to the standard welfare analysis used in DSGE models, but we make modifications to take into account the time-varying nature of the value functions and decision rules pertaining to the AU optimization problems at each date t¼0, y, 48. In particular, since the solution to each AU problem represents the “perceived” full solution of an infinite-horizon dynamic programming problem with the given set of beliefs, we construct a perceived lifetime welfare measure at each date t as follows:
Vtðb;e;kÞ¼ uðctðb;e;kÞÞþbE i½Vðb 0
tðb;e;kÞ;e 0;k0� i ¼ s;a;
where ct(b, e, k) and bt 0(b, e, k) are the decision rules for consumption and
bonds for the date-t optimization problem (with a pair of these decision rules for DEL, SP1, and SP2). The expectation in the right-hand side can be computed using either the true transition probabilities across financial regimes or the subjective beliefs. This procedure yields a welfare number Vt(b, e, k) at each date t of the simulation for each triple in the state space (b, e, k) and for each of the three model economies. We then convert each
Figure 5. Taxes on Debt and Land Dividends: (a) Taxes on Debt; (b) Taxes on Dividends
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Notes: This figure plots the taxes on debt and on land dividends that support the corresponding planners allocations as competitive equilibrium. SPI: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
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welfare number into a constant consumption level that is equivalent in terms of lifetime utility (that is, the value �c that solves Vt(b, e, k) ¼ P1
t¼0 b tðc�1�s=1�sÞ.
Table 2 reports welfare effects as the percentage change in the welfare- equivalent consumption levels across the different economies for t¼1 and 40, computed using both the true transition probabilities and the subjective beliefs. Since we have a value of �c for each triple in the state space in each economy, we report average welfare effects based on the perceived ergodic distribution of (b, e, k) at each date t in the DEL.22 For comparison, we also
Figure 6. Decomposition of Taxes on Debt
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Notes: This figure plots the decomposition of taxes on debt to three distinct parts: “information” arises because of the differences in the expectation of one period ahead consumption between private agents and the social planner, “externality” captures the pecuniary externality, “interaction” is because of the differences in the expectation of the one period ahead externality between private agents and the social planner. SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
22 Figure 7 in Boz and Mendoza (2010) plots the evolution of these perceived ergodic
distributions over the 48 periods of the DEL simulation. As optimism increases, the ergodic
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report welfare effects fixing b¼b1DEL or b40DEL (that is, the values of b along the simulated time-series path of the DEL in Figure 1) and et¼E [e]¼1 and kt¼kh The results are similar, suggesting that the aggregation using the DEL ergodic distributions is not biasing the analysis.
The largest welfare gains are obtained when comparing SP2 vs. DEL using the true transition probabilities across financial regimes. In this case, the planner is internalizing the pecuniary externality and avoiding all the effects of the misperception of risk implied by optimistic beliefs. The latter include both the effects on the equilibrium allocations and the effects from underestimating the transition to kl in the expectation taken in the right-hand side of Vt(b, e, k). At date 1 this translates into an average welfare gain of about l/3rd of a percent, and at the peak of optimism just before the crisis (t¼40), a gain of 7.4 percent. This is a very large gain relative to existing estimates in the DSGE literature on the cost of business cycles, the benefits of faster growth, or the benefits of fully eliminating tax distortions. Note also that since SP1 and DEL display nearly identical dynamics as they approach the peak of optimism, the welfare gains of SP2 vs. SP1 at t¼40 would be the same as in the comparison SP2 vs. DEL. This indicates that in the baseline experiment the large welfare gains obtained by SP2 are largely the result of removing the informational friction and the associated financial amplification mechanism (which is what the comparison of SP2 vs. SP1 isolates, since both planners internalize the pecuniary externality).
The welfare gain of SP2 vs. DEL is smaller if instead of computing welfare effects using the true probabilities in the expression for Vt(b, e, k) above we use subjective beliefs, and take the measure as the ratio of DEL vs. SP2. In this case, the losses for DEL are about �0.4 percent at t¼1 and �2.7 percent at t¼40. The welfare losses that result from comparing DEL against SP2 under subjective beliefs arise because in this case the probabilities used to
Table 2. Welfare Gains
(in percentage)
Average (bt DEL
, kt, et)
t=1 t=40 t=1 t=40
True probabilities
(1) SP2 vs. DEF 0.052 0.05 0.06 0.07
(2) SP2 vs. DEL 0.37 7.4 0.30 7.39
(3) SP1 vs. DEL 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03
Subjective beliefs
(4) SP1 vs. DEL 0.025 0.0 0.025 0.0
(5) DEL vs. SP2 �0.39 �2.7 �0.27 �2.73
distribution shifts sharply to the left, supporting large levels of debt at high probabilities, which otherwise would have zero probability in the DEF ergodic distribution.
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compute expected utility under DEL are biased toward more positive outcomes. Notice that in absolute value, the t¼1 loss is about the same as the gain of SP2 over DEL based on true probabilities, but for t¼40 the loss based on subjective beliefs is about l/3rd the size of the gain based on true probabilities. This is further indication of the large social cost of the informational friction and its financial implications, because it shows that keeping allocations the same and isolating only the effect of assigning the correct transition probabilities across k0s, instead of underestimating significantly the likelihood of a kh-to-kl transition, results in a welfare gain of SP2 vs. DEL that is 4.7 percentage points larger (7.4 gain under SP2 vs. DEL with true probabilities, relative to the absolute value of the �2.7 percent loss of DEL vs. SP2 with subjective beliefs). In qualitative terms, a similar message follows from comparing SPI vs. DEL using true probabilities against SPI vs. DEL using subjective beliefs. Again the welfare gains are larger when true probabilities are used to assess the risk of financial regime switches.
Finally, the welfare effects comparing SP2 vs. DEF using the true transition probabilities, and SPI vs. DEL using subjective beliefs, isolate the benefits of internalizing the pecuniary externality alone, leaving the informational friction either absent (SP2 vs. DEF) or with identical beliefs across private agents and the social planner (SPI vs. DEL). As reported in Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), this results in positive but modest welfare gains of up 0.052 percent.
Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection conducts a sensitivity analysis to study how the parameterization of the initial priors affect baseline results. This is important because there is obviously a lot of uncertainty about the values of the initial priors, and as we indicated earlier, in this regard the baseline parameterization is more a benchmark to start the quantitative analysis than a calibration backed by robust empirical estimates. We will show in particular that the baseline result indicating that debt and land price dynamics of SPI and DEL are similar, and hence that SPl’s macroprudential policy makes little difference during the optimistic phase, is not robust to alternative specifications of the priors.
We conduct two sets of sensitivity experiments altering the initial priors. In one we change the initial priors in the DEL and SPI to induce a gradual buildup of optimism, and in the other we introduce heterogeneous priors between private agents and the social planner. In all of these experiments, the optimization problem of the social planner is analogous to that solved by SPI in problem (13). Table 3 reports the values of the initial counters that characterize the initial priors for these experiments, and Figure 7 plots the evolution of beliefs that corresponds to each experiment.
(a) Gradual optimism In this experiment, initial priors are still the same for the government and the private sector, but they are constructed so that optimism builds more
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gradually in the early stages of financial innovation than in the baseline. This is accomplished by setting the initial priors so that the date-0 posterior means are equal to the true transition probabilities and the initial counters are asymmetric across the four transitions. In particular, we assume that n0 hh¼7.6, higher than in the baseline, but then set n0hl¼0.4 so that E0[Fhh
s ]¼Fhha ¼0.95, and we keep n0hl¼0.02 as in the baseline, but then set
n0 ll¼0.38 so that E0[Flls]¼Flla¼0.95. In this experiment, as Figure 7 shows, learning starts from E0[Fhh
s ]¼0.95 and rises gradually toward 1, while in the
baseline it starts at E0[Fhh s ]¼0.5 and jumps to 0.98 with just the first
observation of kh (by contrast, the gradual optimism scenario reaches 0.98 after 12 observations of kh). Keep in mind also that while beliefs start at the true transition probabilities, neither private agents nor SP1 know that, and hence their beliefs shift away from the true probabilities as realizations of k arrive, until they converge back to the true values in the long run.
Gradual optimism yields noticeably larger differences between the outcomes attained by DEL and SP1 (see Figure 8). In the run-up to the crisis, debt levels in DEL reach about 4 percentage points of GDP more than in SP1. Moreover, during the crash, asset prices are 16 percent higher for SP1 because of the lower leverage at the time of the crisis. Clearly, SP1 accumulates less debt during the transition phase which leads to a smaller crash at t¼41, and hence in this scenario macroprudential policy is more effective even when both private agents and the government face the same learning problem and the same collateral pricing functions.
The key reason for the different results under baseline and gradual optimism is that in the baseline the combination of the rapid surge in optimism and the households’ impatience leads them to borrow up to the limit, and attain a high shadow value from relaxing the collateral constraint. Since the benevolent planner also considers the high value assigned to current consumption by the households, it also decides to borrow up to the limit. In line with this reasoning, Figure 8 shows that the differences in bond positions between DEL and SP1 narrow as the optimistic phase progresses and the shadow value of relaxing the collateral constraint increases.
In general, we find that the more gradual is the buildup of optimism, the more the collateral constraint is likely to remain slack or be marginally binding during the optimistic phase, and the more effective is macroprudential policy, even if the planner is as uninformed as private agents. The planner that has full
Table 3. Summary of Priors
n0 hh
n0 hl
n0 ll
n0 lh
DEL & SP1
Baseline 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Gradual optimism 7.6 0.4 0.38 0.02
SP2 & SP3 -N n0 hh (1�Fhha )/Fhha -N n0ll(1�Flla)/Flla
SP4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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information continues to be significantly more cautious, however, and hence implements more active macroprudential policies.
The prices under the DEL and SPI continue to be very similar because the DEL pricing function in the kh regime continues to be relatively flat (see Figure 9). The externality itself, however, is actually larger, because the pricing function is again very steep for the kl regime and the gradual buildup of opti- mism means that SPI assigns higher probability to switching to this regime than it did in the baseline. Hence, SPI levies larger debt taxes in this scenario than in the baseline (see Figure 10). In contrast, SP2 charges slightly lower debt taxes.
In terms of the components of the debt tax (Figure 11), gradual optimism reduces the information component for SP2 (recall it is always zero for SPI). The interaction term is also now smaller than baseline for SP2. By contrast, the externality component of the taxes rises sharply for both planners under the gradual optimism scenario, relative to the baseline. This is in line with the previous findings indicating that the gradual buildup of optimism enlarges the externality and creates more room for macroprudential policy.
Figure 7. Priors
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.6
0.8
1 E[f hh]
E[f hh]
E[f ll]
DEL & SP1 Baseline SP1 Gradual Learning SP3 SP4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0.9
0.95
1
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.6
0.8
1
DEL & SP1 Baseline SP1 Gradual Learning SP3 SP4
Notes: DEL: Imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, Gradual Learning: Scenario with priors such that optimism builds more gradually in the early stages of financial innovation than in the baseline. SP3: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF. SP4: Social planner with imperfect information and different priors than private agents implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL.
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(b) Heterogeneous priors between government and private agents In the experiments we study next the initial priors of the government and the private sector differ. This is interesting because heterogeneous beliefs can be used to construct variants of the SPI planner in which the government can be more or less optimistic than private agents about the new financial regime,
Figure 8. Dynamics in Gradual Optimism Calibration: (a) Bonds; (b) Land Price; (c) Shadow Price; (d) Beliefs
0 10 20 30 40 50 −0.5
−0.45
−0.4
−0.35
−0.3
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
Bondsa b
d
e
c
0 10 20 30 40 50 0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Land Price
0 10 20 30 40 50 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Shadow Price
0 10 20 30 40 50 0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1 Beliefs
Es[Fhh]
Fhh
Es[Fll]
Fll
0 10 20 30 40 50 0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Externality
DEL
SP1
SP2
DEL
SP1
SP2
DEL
SP1
SP2
SP1
SP2
Notes: DEL: Imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
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and thus will have incentives to respond more or less forcefully with macroprudential policy. From a technical standpoint, this is similar to applying the Hansen-Sargent risk-sensitivity operator to bias the date-0 priors of the government.
23
We study two experiments with heterogeneous priors. In both experiments we keep the initial priors of private agents as in the baseline DEL. In the first experiment, we modify SP1 to construct an extreme case in which the planner (now labeled SP3) has initial priors such that effectively the planner’s beliefs have converged to the true transition probabilities. This occurs as the initial counters that represent the planner’s priors go to infinity
Figure 9. Period 40 Bond Holdings and Prices: Gradual Optimism: (a) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kh); (b) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kh); (c) Bond Holdings: b0(b, 1, kl);
(d) Asset Prices: q(b, 1, kl)
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
DEL DEF
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
DEL DEF
SP1 SP2
SP1 SP2
Notes: SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of full information decentralized equilibrium.
23 Cogley and Sargent (2008a) used this approach to bias downward beliefs about
consumption growth at the end of the Great Depression so as to support large equity premiums in their learning asset pricing model.
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260
under the conditions that (p0 hl /p0
hh )¼ (Fhla/Fhha ) and (p0lh/p0ll)¼(Flha/Flla). The
second experiment represents a social planner, SP4, who has initial priors given by p0
hh¼p0ll¼0.2. Here the priors remain symmetric, so that E0
p [Fhh]¼E0
p [Fll]¼0.5 as plotted in Figure 7. Recall also that both SP3 and
SP4, like SP1, still have to value collateral using the land pricing functions of the DEL, which are influenced by the private agents’ beliefs.
Consider first the results for SP3. SP3 is similar to the fully informed SP2 in that it assesses the correct probabilities of landing and remaining in states with good and bad credit regimes, so its incentives to build precautionary savings are stronger than SP1, as suggested by a comparison of Figures 1 and 12. Hence, SP3 chooses lower debt levels than SP1 and DEL during the optimistic phase (see panel (a) of Figure 12). SP3 cannot, however, correct the agent’s mispricing of collateral under the DEL’s beliefs, and hence still allows larger debt positions than SP2.
Despite SP3 choosing significantly less debt than SP1, the land prices of the two are similar because both SP1 and SP3 use the same collateral
Figure 10. Taxes on Debt and Land Dividends: Gradual Optimism: (a) Taxes on Debt; (b) Taxes on Dividends
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 −0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 −0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
SP1 SP2
SP1 SP2
Notes: This figure plots the taxes on debt and on land dividends that support the corresponding planners allocations as competitive equilibrium. SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
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pricing functions qt DEL
(b, 1, k), and because these pricing functions have a flat slope in the kh state. In particular, since qqt
DEL (b0, 1, kh)/qb0 is small
for SP1 and SP3 for t¼1, y, 40, their different choice of bonds translates into small differences in land prices. If the pricing functions were steeper at the optimal debt choices, the equilibrium dynamics of land prices would be different even though both SP1 and SP3 use the same pricing functions, because the lower debt levels chosen by SP3 would imply different date-t prices picked from the same pricing function (that is, the same qt DEL
(b 0, 1, k h) would return different prices for each planner because of the different choices of b 0).
SP3 actively uses macroprudential taxes as shown in the top panel of Figure 13. Taxes on debt increase gradually from about 4 percent to close to 9 percent in the optimistic phase, and then drop to zero as the financial crisis
Figure 11. Decomposition of Taxes on Debt: Gradual Optimism
0 10 20 30 40 −0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03 Information
0 10 20 30 40 −0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03 Interaction
0 10 20 30 40 0
0.02
0.04
0.06 Externality
SP1
SP2
SP1
SP2
SP1
SP2
Notes: This figure plots the decomposition of taxes on debt to three distinct parts: “information” arises because of the differences in the expectation of one period ahead consumption between private agents and the social planner, “externality” captures the pecuniary externality, “interaction” is because of the differences in the expectation of the one period ahead externality between private agents and the social planner. SP1: Social planner with imperfect information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP2: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEF.
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erupts and the collateral constraint binds. Comparing Figures 6 and 13, SP3 and SP2’s dividends tax policies are qualitatively similar, with subsidies that increase gradually during the optimistic phase, but quantitatively SP2 uses smaller subsidies, because SP2 aims to support the DEF asset pricing functions, which are uniformly lower than the DEL pricing functions supported by SP3. Thus, SP2 taxes debt just as much as SP3 to weaken the incentives of private agents to borrow, but subsidizes land dividends less to deflate the effect of optimistic beliefs on land prices.
Figure 12. Dynamics in Asymmetric Priors Calibration: (a) Bonds; (b) Land Price; (c) Shadow Price; (d) Agents’ Beliefs; (e) Externality; (f) Planners’ Beliefs
0 10 20 30 40 −0.7
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0 a b
dc
e f
Bonds
DEL SP3 SP4
0 10 20 30 40 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Land Price
DEL
SP3
SP4
0 10 20 30 40 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Shadow Price
DEL SP3 SP4
0 10 20 30 40
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Agents′ Beliefs
Es[Fhh]
Fhh
Es[Fll]
Fll
0 10 20 30 40 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Externality
SP4
0 10 20 30 40
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Planners′ Beliefs
ESP3[Fhh]
ESP4[Fhh]
ESP3[Fll]
ESP4[Fll]
SP3
Notes: DEL: Imperfect information decentralized equilibrium, SP3: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP4: Social planner with imperfect information and different priors than private agents implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
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The dynamics of the tax components show that the externality component remains small for SP3, but the information and interaction components are large and rise gradually during the optimistic phase. Interestingly, SP3 displays a lower information component than SP2, along with a higher interaction component. The higher information term for SP2 is because of the fact that consumption booms less under this planner than under SP3, which results in higher expected marginal utility. Given that the externality components for SP2 and SP3 are similar, it follows from Equation (22) that the higher interaction term for SP3 is because of the fact that this planner has higher expected externality terms (Et
SP2 [k0m (b0, e0, k0)(qqt
DEL (.)/
qb0)]4Et SP3
[k0m (b0, e0, k0)(qqt DEL
(.)/qb0)]), which in turn result from the steeper DEL collateral pricing functions in the kl regime than in the DEF (see Figure 2) and the fact that both SP2 and SP3 assign more weight to kl using the true Markov-switching probabilities across financial regimes.
Now we turn to the experiment for SP4. SP4 has higher initial counters for the persistence of each regime than DEL or SP1, which alters significantly the perception of the riskiness of the new financial environment. For instance, at date t¼1 after the first realization of kh is observed, SP4 expects the mean duration of the kh regime to be about six quarters while the private agents and SP1 expect a mean duration of 50 quarters under the baseline calibration of n0 hh¼0.0205. Hence, SP4 perceives more riskiness in the financial environment inasmuch as it believes the mean duration of the good credit regime will be significantly shorter. Moreover, this scenario has a feature similar to the gradual optimism experiment because optimism builds more gradually for SP4 than for the DEL and SP1. The evolution of the mean beliefs under SP4 and the DEL are plotted in panels (f) and (d) of Figure 12, respectively.
Panel (a) of Figure 12 reveals that introducing asymmetric beliefs to make SP4 perceive more risk once again results in an outcome in which a planner subject to learning and facing the same collateral prices of the DEL chooses lower debt positions than in the DEL. In fact, SP4’s debt levels are also lower than those of SP1 plotted in Figure 1.
24 This is because of the
combination of the higher perception of risk, the more gradual buildup of optimism, and the fact that under the influence of these forces the collateral constraint is not binding for SP4 under the entire optimistic phase. Given a uniformly higher externality term, as plotted in panel (e), and uniformly less optimistic beliefs than SP1, SP4 chooses lower debt levels, and not up to the point where the constraint binds. In fact, SP4 only hits the borrowing limit when the economy switches to the kl state. This is evident in the shadow price being almost always zero in panel (c) of Figure 12 except in period 41 and the last few periods of the experiment.
It is also interesting to note in panel (e) of Figures 12 and 1 that the dynamics of the externality term have similar shapes for SP4 and SP1. The
24 The comparison of SP4 with SP1 is very relevant because both of them go through a
learning process and face the same collateral pricing function.
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main difference is in that the levels are uniformly higher for SP4. Similar forces are at play for these planners, initially the fast buildup of debt relative to the buildup of optimism increases the probability assigned to the constraint becoming binding at date tþ1. After about period 10, the buildup of debt slows down and this effect is dominated by the beliefs becoming more optimistic over time leading to a weakening of the externality as these planners assign smaller probabilities to a switch to kl, where the derivative of the pricing function, qqt
DEL (b0, 1, k0)/qb0, is large. The externality
term is uniformly larger for SP4 than SP1 because its beliefs are uniformly less optimistic. SP4 always assigns a higher weight to the kl regime where the derivative of the pricing function, qqt
DEL (b0, 1, k0)/qb0 is large.
The price dynamics of SP4 are very similar to those of DEL. The lower debt choices of this planner do not translate into large differences in the price
Figure 13. Taxes on Debt: Asymmetric Priors: (a) SP3; (b) SP4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0
0.05
0.1
Total Information Interaction Externality
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0
0.1
0.2
Total Information Interaction Externality
Notes: This figure plots the taxes on debt that support the corresponding planners allocations as competitive equilibrium for SP3 and SP4. (SP3: Social planner with full information implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL, SP4: Social planner with imperfect information and different priors than private agents implementing the set of feasible credit positions of DEL.) Taxes are decomposed into three distinct parts: “information” arises because of the differences in the expectation of one period ahead consumption between private agents and the social planner, “externality” captures the pecuniary externality, “interaction” is because of the differences in the expectation of the one period ahead externality between private agents and the social planner.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN A FISHERIAN MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
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given the flatness of the pricing function. 25
In fact, SP4 prices are slightly above those of DEL since lower debt positions are associated with higher land prices.
Consistent with the externality being large, SP4 levies taxes on debt that are higher than in the baseline and also higher than in the gradual optimism scenario. Moreover, for SP4 the interaction component of the debt tax is the largest almost throughout the entire experiment, as was the case for SP2 and SP3 in the baseline. Hence, our finding that the interaction of financial and information frictions play a key role in the design of macroprudential policy remains robust to considering a social planner with beliefs different from those of private agents or from the true rational expectations, and this was also the case in the gradual optimism scenario.
III. Conclusion
This paper provides a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework for studying macroprudential policy that incorporates two key elements of the financial amplification mechanism: Imperfect information about the true riskiness of new financial regimes and a credit constraint that limits the debt of agents to a fraction of the market value of their assets. The fraction of the value of assets that can be pledged as collateral increases with financial innovation, but risk also increases because this collateral coefficient also becomes stochastic, and the persistence of regimes with high and low ability to borrow needs to be learned over time. As learning progresses, agents go through waves of optimism and pessimism which distort their debt decisions and hence equilibrium asset prices. In addition, the credit constraint introduces a pecuniary externality whereby individual agents do not internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on equilibrium prices. The interaction of waves of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs with this pecuniary externality produces a powerful amplification mechanism that can yield large increases in debt and asset prices in a decentralized competitive equilibrium.
We study the effects of macroprudential policies in the form of Pigouvian taxes on debt and dividends in this environment, considering two conditionally efficient social planner problems that face different information sets and feasible credit positions. The first planner faces a similar learning problem as private agents and faces the collateral pricing function of the decentralized competitive equilibrium with learning (that is, the same set of feasible credit positions as private agents). The second planner has full information and in addition it faces the collateral pricing function of a rational expectations equilibrium with full information (that is, the set of feasible credit positions of private agents in this equilibrium).
In a baseline calibration to U.S. data, the second social planner supports debt positions and land prices that are much lower than those in the
25 Since DEL prices do not change when we change the priors of the planner, we do not
re-plot them here.
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266
decentralized competitive equilibrium with learning, and hence faces smaller corrections in debt, consumption and land prices when financial crises hit. In contrast, the first planner supports allocations and prices that deviate only slightly from those of the DEL. Thus, in the baseline parameterization, macroprudential policy is significantly more effective when the planner has full information and can support collateral values free from the effect of optimistic beliefs, and has negligible effects when the planner is subject to the same subjective beliefs and collateral pricing conditions of the DEL. Sensitivity analysis shows, however, that by varying the initial priors of the learning setup, particularly by modifying them so as to induce a gradual buildup of optimism in the early stages of financial innovation or to introduce heterogeneous priors between the social planner and private agents, it is possible even for the first planner to use macroprudential policy to attain different equilibrium debt than DEL, and thus improve the performance of the economy during financial crises.
Under our baseline parameterization, we find large welfare losses from the undervaluation of risk during credit expansions and the resulting collapse during the reversal of financial conditions. This suggests that there is a key interaction between perception of risk, and the externality introduced by the systemic feedback loop between asset prices and collateral constraints. The welfare gains from correcting purely the pecuniary externality are much smaller.
These results highlight the importance of considering the information set of policymakers in the design of macroprudential policies. If regulators operate with the same incomplete information set as the private agents, the effects of these policies are more limited and can even be negligible. This is particularly important in a boom-bust cycle in credit largely driven by financial innovation, about which the regulators are likely to be just as uninformed as the private agents. If on the other hand, in a credit boom episode where the private agents operate under incomplete or misleading information while the regulators can acquire better information, say by looking at similar previous episodes in the history of the country or other countries in similar situations, then macroprudential policy has good potential to contain the amplitude of the boom-bust cycle.
One important aspect that we have not considered in our analysis is belief heterogeneity. As proposed by Geanakoplos (2010) and more recently investigated in Cao (2011) and Simsek (2010), this can generate credit cycles with important effects over asset price volatility and investment volatility. The connection between financial innovation and Fisherian deflation in such a framework can shed further light on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy.
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APPENDIX
A.I. Recursive Optimization Problems
We assume that agents make decisions according to the anticipated utility approach.
Accordingly, the recursive optimization problem can be written as
Vtðb;k;B;eÞ¼ max b0;k0;c
c1�s
1�s þbE st ½Vtþ1ðb
0;k0;B0;e0Þ�
s:t: qðB;eÞk0 þcþ b0
R ¼ qðB;eÞkþbþ eFðkÞ
B0 ¼ GðB;eÞ
b0
R � kqðB;eÞk0
Notice that the value function is indexed by t because beliefs are changing over time.
In rational expectations, instead, the value function would be a time-invariant function of
the individual and aggregate state variables.
Definition The (AU) recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by a subjective
conditional-expectation operator Et s , an asset pricing function qt(B, e), a perceived law of
motion for aggregate bond holdings Gt(B, e), and a set of decision rules {b̂t 0(b, k, B, e),
k̂t 0(b, k, B, e), ĉt(b, k, B, e)} with associated value function Vt(b, k, B, e) such that:
1. {b̂t 0(b, k, B, e), k̂t
0(b, k, B, e), ĉt(b, k, B, e)} and Vt(b, k, B, e) solve (A1), taking as given Gt(B, e).
2. The perceived law of motion for aggregate bonds is consistent with the actual law of
motion: Gt(B, e)¼ b̂t0(B, �K, B, e). 3. Land prices satisfy q(B,e)¼Ee0|e{bu0(ĉ(G(B,e), �K,G(B,e),e0)) [e0Fk( �K,e0)þq(Gt(B,e),e0)]/
(u0(ĉ(B, �K, B, e))�kmax[0, u0(ĉ(B, �K, B, e))�bREe0|eu0(ĉG(B, e), �K, G(B, e), e0])} 4. Goods and asset markets clear: (b̂0(B, �K, B, e)/R)þc(B, �K, B, e)¼ef ( �K)þBt and
k̂(B, �K, B, e)¼ �K
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