phyllis young
whieso
phi_module_8_overview.rtfPHI Module 8 Overview
Free Will, Freedom, Moral Responsibility, and Ethics
Welcome to Module Eight. The question of free will is much harder than it initially would seem. Most of us take it for granted that we have free will. But what do we mean by free will or moral responsibility? Did you ever wonder why God put the apple on the tree in Eden, or why Adam and Eve ate the apple at all? Why were they guilty? It is because there was a rule, and they had a choice whether or not to break it. This module examines links between free will, moral responsibility, and ethics.
Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this module, you should be able to:
4B
discuss the compatibility between determinism and free will.
4C
evaluate the types of moral responsibilities from the perspective of ethics.
6J
describe determinism and fatalism.
6K
discuss libertarian free will.
Module 8 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 13 and 14.
Course Login Instructions
If you are a first time user:
Please register your Pearson Online Solutions Student Access Code. You can find your Student Access Code in the AAU Course Registration e-mail that came with your text.
If you are a returning user:
Please visit the Access Code Registration page to log in. You must log in every time you access this course. If you are not logged in, you will not be able to access the premium resources.
NOTE: Bookmarking pages in this site, especially the resources you access with the link above, is not recommended.
Please view Part 1 of the Online Presentation for Module 8 .
Please view Part 2 of the Online Presentation for Module 8 .
Free Will, Freedom, Moral Responsibility, and Ethics
Chapter 13 Lecture Notes: Free Will
Determinism
Determinism is the view that everything that happens is the inevitable result of past events. Determinism gains its support from two main sources. First, religious belief in an omnipotent and omniscient God seems to imply that since God already knows everything you will do long before you are born, your acts are completely determined; and since God is all-powerful, all genuine choices and power must be in God and not in human choices independent of God. Second, Newtonian physics, with its fixed and precise laws of motion, suggests that everything in the universe follows a path determined by such causal laws and ultimately everything is as predictable as the path of Halley’s Comet. David Hume embraces this determinist view, arguing that it is a matter of common sense and that all of us actually believe in determinism.
The reaction to determinism runs the gamut from promise to hopelessness or helplessness. In the case of the former, many see determinism as a doctrine of promise: everything that happens has a cause, and thus it is always worthwhile to examine why events occur. On the other hand, other view determinism as a doctrine of hopelessness or helplessness: determinism means that we are ridiculous puppets whose strings are pulled by forces beyond our understanding, and the illusion that we act freely only makes us more absurd. Of course, the fact that my life may be determined does not mean that anyone knows the outcome of their life. So, the idea by philosophers such as William Barret that determinism conflicts with novelty, freshness or creation, does not seem to follow.
Fatalism
Although often equated with determinism, fatalism implies that the actual causal path is largely irrelevant: whatever you do, the ultimate results are fixed by fate, though there might be many paths to that fated result. Fatalists believe that your “fate” is fixed, your destiny sealed, and struggle as you will there is nothing you can do to change it.
Fatalism seems an implausible doctrine since it disconnects all our efforts and acts from the system of real causes, and replaces them with a notion of God as a cosmic con man. We feel as if we are having an effect on the world, but the real strings are invisible to us, and are being pulled by a devious deity. For many, there seems to be no reason whatsoever to suppose that such a malevolent power exists.
Determinism and Free Will
The implications of determinism for free will have long been a topic of fierce debate. Hume maintains that determinism is compatible with free will; indeed, he insists that determinism is essential for free will. According to his simple compatibilism, everyone not in chains is free and determinism does not change that. Other compatibilist views set stronger demands for free will, though they all agree with Hume that there is no conflict between determinism and free will. According to the deep compatibilism of Harry Frankfurt, free will requires that we have the will—the desires and preferences—that we deeply approve. The rational compatibilism of Susan Wolf holds that genuine freedom requires following the right path for the right reasons.
Libertarian Free Will and the Rejection of Determinism
Libertarians believe that determinism would destroy free will and they reject determinism. Real free will is the power to make choices that are not determined by anything—not by our genetics, our conditioning, nor even by our reason. Free will requires a very special power: the power to choose among genuinely open alternatives, and thus make yourself according to your own plans and preferences.
Existentialist libertarians maintain that we have total free will and total responsibility to make ourselves according to our own choices. According to the existentialist, our existence precedes our essence, so we are free to choose who we want to be. There are no fixed values to that guide us and no causal factors that determine us.
Other libertarians take a somewhat more modest view of libertarian free will: C. A. Campbell states that free will is exercised in some very important but limited sphere, such as in the choice between duty and desire. According to Campbell, although genetics, causal forces, and social conditioning can in large measure determine who we are, there is still a small space left for free will. This small domain consists of “contracausal free will” that enables us to overcome our conditioning, genes, and social shaping.
Chapter 14 Lecture Notes: Freedom, Moral Responsibility, and Ethics
Types of Responsibility
Some philosophers maintain that the question of free will is important primarily because free will is the essential foundation for responsibility. There are, however, two quite different senses of responsibility. One is role responsibility, which is the responsibility we have for our commitments to others and the projects we undertake and (assuming a minimum degree of competency) the conduct of our own lives. The other is moral responsibility, defined by the responsibility of just deserts that justifies praise and blame and reward and punishment.
Another way of distinguishing between moral and role responsibility is that one can often take role responsibility, but one cannot take moral responsibility. Role responsibility and free will are closely connected in that I take role responsibility for my moral life only if I can take moral responsibility for my own decisions. Although role responsibility and free will are closely connected, the relation between free will and moral responsibility is a disputed issue.
Moral Responsibility and the Utility of Punishment
One common basis for justifying moral responsibility is the utility of punishment. However, even if punishment in accordance with the principles of moral responsibility were useful in modifying behavior—a doubtful proposition—it is not clear how relevant that is for justifying moral responsibility itself. If a person justly deserves punishment, then that person must be morally responsible for the punished act, and the utility or disutility of the punishment is irrelevant; likewise, if a person justly deserves the reward for winning a race, the fact that more people would be made happy by giving the reward to someone else has no bearing on the winner’s just deserts.
Conditions for Moral Responsibility
The exact conditions under which moral responsibility claims are justified continue to divide philosophers, but there is a case for libertarian free will being a necessary foundation. C. A. Campbell argues that the only account of free will that can support moral responsibility is the libertarian view, in which you are acting freely (and thus you are morally responsible for your acts) if and only if you could have actually done otherwise.
Strawson’s Social Justification of Moral Responsibility
Peter Strawson offers a different justification for moral responsibility. According to Strawson, many of our basic social practices presuppose a belief in moral responsibility. He refers to these as “participant reactive attitudes;” that is, attitudes of natural human social reaction, such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, and reciprocal love. Since we cannot give up these attitudes and practices—and Strawson argues that we would not want to even if we could—we cannot really consider giving up belief in moral responsibility. Moral responsibility is necessary if I want maintain reactive attitudes. I cannot react to your gratitude if you are not responsible for the action worthy of gratitude.
Moral Responsibility and Ethics
It seems that for many philosophers, particularly those studied in the previous chapter, moral responsibility is not possible without a compatibilist or libertarian theory of free will. If we cannot control our actions, then we should not be responsible for those actions. Although a few philosophers have tried to argue against this point, this seems to be intuitively true for most people.
Ethics without Moral Responsibility
Moral responsibility is often taken to be a basic condition for ethical judgments, but the connection is questioned by some. There appear to be many important ethical judgments exclusive of retributive justice claims that remain viable in the absence of moral responsibility. It is possible to distinguish between morally good or bad acts, and one’s responsibility for those acts. For example, I can say that Dave’s act of assaulting Scott in the reading was morally wrong, but that does not say anything about whether Dave is morally responsible for the assault if the situation exists in which someone slipped Dave a violence drug at the bar that caused him to lash out at Scott.
Required Audio:
Media Index . Please listen to the Audio to Go (located under Course) listed below.
- Freedom and Determinism
Reward and Punishment
NOTE: If you are having difficulty accessing the above material, please click on the PHI 107 Pearson Instructions .
Required Presentations
