Phyllis Young
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phi_module_6_overview.rtfPHI Module 6 Overview
The Scope of Morality
Welcome to Module Six. If I eat a steak, am I acting in an immoral way? Why do we care for some animals as members of our family and eat others? Some say that it is morally wrong to kill animals for food when we do not have to, and others claim that that it is okay because animals do not suffer the way we do. This module discusses the impact of moral consideration and its influence on our behavior and actions.
Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this module, you should be able to:
2D
explain moral agents and their intent.
2E
discuss the moral status of nonhuman animals.
3C
evaluate the scope of morality under the different ethical theories.
Module 6 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapter 12.
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The Scope of Morality
Who Is Due Moral Consideration
Many of the moral theories covered thus far have a conception of who, morally speaking, counts. Another way of asking this question is to whom moral consideration is owed; that is, to whom we are morally obligated. Many of the theories already covered offer different answers to this question.
Social Contract Ethics
Under the social contract model, to qualify as a participant in the contract one must be capable of understanding and following rules. Those who lack the capacity to abide by the contract have no moral standing. Of course, there may be rules that are agreed upon that protect children, the elderly, or the mentally incompetent, but there would be no moral obligation to these individuals. We respect them because we have agreed to do so and not because they possess any moral rights or standing.
Kantian Ethics
The requirements for moral agency under Kantian ethics are much stricter. According to Kant and his followers, a person can only be considered a moral agent if he or she has the ability to reason. This is because of the fact that the moral laws are derived using only reason. If one cannot reason, then they cannot understand the moral law. If one cannot understand the moral law, then he or she cannot be a member of the moral community, which, to Kant, is the same as being a member of the kingdom of ends. This view can lead to pretty unappealing results. If only reasoning creatures are part of the kingdom of ends, then it would be okay, according to this view, to torture puppies and infants, as they are incapable of reasoning and, thus, are not due any moral consideration. This has long been an issue of contention in Kantian ethics.
Tom Regan’s Kantian Account of Animal Rights
In an attempt to make the Kantian account of ethics more inclusive, Tom Regan has offered a neo-Kantian approach to agency. Rather than focusing exclusively on reason, Regan proposes that in order to possess inherent worth (and be a member of the “kingdom of ends”), you need only be “the subject of a life,” not a rational lawmaker. That is, you must be conscious of having a life that can go better or worse. This view allows for degrees of agency and consideration that is excluded from the traditional Kantian approach.
Utilitarians and the Moral Community
Utilitarians are by far the most inclusive theorists when it comes to moral agency. In the utilitarian view, the morally right act is the act that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain for all who are affected. In this view, minimizing suffering is morally good, whether the suffering afflicts a human, a chimpanzee, or a dog. If it can suffer, then it is due moral concern and must be counted in our moral decision making.
Eastern Views
Eastern religions tend to have an even more inclusive attitude towards morality. According to Buddhism, the personal moral development of an individual is of vital importance. In order for a person to develop morality, they must show concern for all living creatures. Jainism takes this attitude even further. Jainists believe that they should not only show concern for all living creatures, but must not harm any living creature, including plants. Although they may eat the fruit of plants because this does no harm to the plant, Jainists refuse to eat root vegetables, such as carrots, because this will cause the death of the plant. Jainists concern for the well-being of other living creatures has two motives: one, to respect the value of the creature as a living thing, and two, to purify themselves and avoid corruption that comes from harming others.
Moral Agents
Another aspect of the scope of morality is moral agency. According to many theorists, although many things may be subjects of moral behavior, there are only a limited number of things can be said to act as moral agents. When we recognize something as a moral agent, we are acknowledging that that thing can act morally or immorally.
By and large, moral agency is connected to intentions, though intentionality alone is not enough to establish a morally worthy act. “Acting morally” seems to require moral intent; but that leads to ambiguity and confusion. I can fully intend to do a generous act without intending to follow a moral rule of generosity; yet, in such instances we still may say that I did a good dead. We need not abide by a strict Kantian notion of duty for an intentional act to be morally good.
The emphasis on intentionality in moral agency raises issues for nonhuman agency. Can animals form intentions? It seems that it is possible to attribute intentions to some animals, even if those animals cannot verbally conceptualize those intentions. Rather than verbal conceptualization being a necessary condition of specific intentions, it is probably more common for the manifestation of intentions to serve as the prompt for teaching verbal categorizations of intent. Intent may exist prior to the ability to express the intent, i.e. we may be able to form intentions much earlier than we are able to express those intentions. So, it is possible that animals may be incapable of “intending to action morally” and still intentionally perform a morally good act.
The arguments attempting to attribute intentionality to animals have been challenged by those holding that apparent acts of intentional altruism are actually attempts to eliminate “feelings of distress.” By this account, animals care for others in order to reduce the “emotional contagion” they experience by seeing others in distress. They help each other simply because they do not want to suffer the emotional distress that they feel when seeing another animal suffering rather than doing so because it is the morally correct thing to do. Unfortunately, this argument has not stood up to empirical testing, leaving open the possibility for animal intentionality.
Darwin and the Status of Nonhuman Animals
Scientists often want to draw a strict line between human research and nonhuman research, but a strict line between humans and animals is inconsistent with contemporary evolutionary science. There is no clear moral gap between humans and other species. Evolution strongly suggests that life lies on a spectrum of cognitive ability. More so, evolutionary science has produced an overwhelming amount of evidence demonstrating that we are very closely related to, and are in fact a part of, the animal kingdom, making us no different than other animals. Many of these animals, including great apes, dolphins, and several species of birds, show a strong capacity for reasoning abilities. These scientific findings would make the distinction between humans and other animals in terms of moral agency and moral consideration entirely arbitrary, thereby making a strong case for animal rights.
Required Audio:
Media Index . Please listen to the Audio to Go (located under Course) listed below.
- The Context of Morality
NOTE: If you are having difficulty accessing the above material, please click on the PHI 107 Pearson Instructions .
Required Web Resources:
In the following articles, consider what, if any, stance is being made concerning the moral status of non-human animals and their rights.
Utilitarianism and Animal Rights
Required Presentation:
