phyllis young: Module 7 assignment
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phi_107_module_7_overview.rtfModule 7 Overview
Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Welcome to Module Seven. Are there moral truths? Is it actually wrong to lie, or do we just believe it is wrong? Moral nonobjectivists claim that there are no objective moral truths; that is, moral truths exist apart from ourselves. If tomorrow it suddenly became legal to leave a store without paying for an item, would you do it? Would your friends participate? This module assesses moral objectivism and moral nonobjectivism.
Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this module, you should be able to:
3D
examine the reasons why moral realism might fail.
6G
describe moral nonobjectivism.
6H
discuss the nature of ethical nonobjectivism.
6I
explain the modesty of moral realism.
Module 7 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 10 and 11.
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Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Chapter 10 Lecture Notes: Ethical Nonobjectivism
The Nature of Ethical Nonobjectivism
Ethical nonobjectivists hold that there are no objective moral facts and no objectively true moral principles. It is important to emphasize that this theory does not just believe that moral facts are difficult to discover or that we might not be sure what they are; rather, it holds that there are no objective moral truths to discover. One version of ethical nonobjectivism is emotivism or noncognitivism. According to this theory, sentences that appear to state ethical facts, such as “stealing is wrong,” are instead merely expressions of emotion and not genuine statements at all. Most contemporary nonobjectivists, however, are not emotivists; they believe that such sentences are statements, but that there are no objective facts to support these statements.
Arguments for Ethical Nonobjectivism from Moral Diversity
The key argument for ethical nonobjectivism is the argument of moral diversity. This argument focuses on the enormous diversity of moral beliefs both within cultures and cross-culturally. Many cultures around the world hold conflicting moral beliefs that cannot both be correct. If these cultures cannot agree on what is morally true, then there cannot be any moral truths to begin with.
The objectivist has two possible answers to this argument. First, the great divergence of moral opinion is more apparent than real. At a deeper level there is convergence; that is, there are moral truths upon which we can all agree. Secondly, the objectivist can acknowledge the diversity of views, but hold that all that means is that some people’s opinions are false. Some cultures may just be wrong about what is morally true and others may have it right. Argument from the Impossibility of Arguments about Ethics
One view held by A. J. Ayer states that no genuine argument is possible on ethical issues, thus showing that there is nothing objective to argue about. Essentially, Ayer’s view is that all apparently ethical arguments are really arguments about other things. Thus, arguments about abortion are really arguments about biology, psychology, and theology; arguments about pain are really arguments about biology and neuroscience; and arguments about pollution are really arguments about chemistry and meteorology. All supposed talk about ethics is really just talk about science and other non-ethical subjects. Here again, objectivists have two possible responses. First, they could try and show there is room for genuine argument on even the most basic ethical issues. Second, they could accept Ayer’s assertion that argument on ethical issues is not possible, but insist that ethics is objective nonetheless: some basic ethical truths are intuitively obvious to anyone who thinks clearly and looks objectively at the issue.
Argument from Simplicity: Ockham’s Razor
The argument from queerness and simplicity claims that ethical nonobjectivism is more plausible than any version of ethical objectivism because objectivism requires a much more elaborate explanatory scheme. This elaborate scheme posits the existence of very strange entities: moral facts. According to J. L. Mackie, these strange moral facts would have to have two properties: 1) they must be facts that exist independently of us, and 2) they must be facts that have the very special and queer property of commanding our approval. The problem with this view is that a much simpler explanation is available, which accounts for moral statements without requiring the extra theoretical baggage. Thus, by Ockham’s Razor, which states essentially that the simplest explanation tends to be the correct one, we should endorse the nonobjectivist view of morality. The nonobjectivist view of morality explains all the data that the objectivist view can but posits fewer entities, i.e. fewer things, making it simpler and more probable by Ockham’s Razor.
Objectivists could respond in two ways to Mackie’s argument. First, the objectivist could claim that there are moral facts, but that they do not necessarily motivate us to favor the moral facts. This leads to the debate between internalists, who insist that any real moral fact must motivate those who recognize the fact, and externalists, who hold that the motive to act morally is separate from the recognition of objective moral facts. Secondly, the objectivist could argue that moral facts are simply complicated in the same way scientific theories may be complicated.
But do ethics require complicated explanations? The objectivist may want to offer a defense of their position by citing a principle that appears to have universal acceptance, namely, “treat others as you would want to be treated.” How would the nonobjectivist reply to this contender for moral fact? Unswayed, the nonobjectivist might offer an evolutionary or social-psychological account of our acceptance of this type of principle.
Chapter 11 Lecture Notes: Moral Realism
Contemporary Moral Realism
In its contemporary form, moral realism is the view that objective moral facts will prove to be the best possible explanation for our experiences of moral phenomena. Contemporary moral realism is a relatively modest moral realism in comparison to the versions of moral realism favored by Plato and by Kant; contemporary moral realists are more cautious in their claims for the truth of moral realism. Rather than claiming certain knowledge of absolute objective moral truths, contemporary moral realists regard moral realism as a plausible hypothesis that might ultimately prove the simplest and most promising explanation for observed phenomena.
Moral realists do not believe that the existence of moral facts can be established by simple observation or intuition or by pure reason; rather, moral facts must prove to be the most fruitful and effective model for understanding an emerging consensus on crucial moral questions. Although the development of moral consensus would not prove moral realism, if moral realism emerges as the best explanation for that consensus, then moral realism would have as much claim to objectivity as do contemporary scientific explanations.
Moral Realism and the Argument from Simplicity
One of the challenges facing the moral realist comes from the nonobjectivist’s argument of simplicity. In response to this, the moral realist contends that realism is compatible with good scientific practice and that moral realism might prove the most scientifically adequate account of ethics and ethical behavior.
As the textbook notes, the realist holds that establishing moral fact is much like establishing scientific fact: although we generally think of scientific facts as deriving from an orderly process of hypothesis, experiment, and confirmation or disconfirmation, in reality the process is far less orderly. As Thomas Kuhn notes, scientific advances often require “paradigm shifts” in which one comprehensive theory is replaced by another. Such a shift may also be required to establish moral facts. Resolving the debate between nonobjectivists and objectivists will require looking not just at the specific event, but at the larger question of what explanatory account ultimately works best for a wide range of questions.
Moral Facts and Scientific Revolutions
Just as Kuhn notes the way two competing theories may exist for extended periods of time, so, too, do the realists hold that realism is one of the competing moral theories attempting to establish itself. There is no “crucial experiment” that will establish either the truth or falsity of moral realism. The question is whether morality works better, proves itself more valuable, and whether a consensus forms around our moral judgments in such a way that moral realism emerges as the most plausible explanation. If there is such agreement, then the most plausible and productive theory to account for that agreement is that there are real moral facts to agree upon.
Two Ways Moral Realism Might Fail
There are two ways moral realism may fail. First, we might reach some general agreement concerning ethical principles, but some other theory will prove more useful in explaining that agreement. As mentioned in the last chapter, a social-psychological or evolutionary account may prevail. But since that is not yet the case, realism is at least one viable possibility that should be given a chance to compete.
Secondly, moral realism could fail if there is no general agreement on moral principles. Since realism is designed to explain moral consensus, the lack of consensus could strongly suggest that there is nothing to explain. Of course, the realist believes that beneath the apparent disagreement over moral facts there may lay deep moral consensus. Such a consensus may be found if we put ourselves in a position to think calmly, observe carefully and without prejudice, and consider thoughtfully.
Required Audio:
Media Index . Please listen to the Audio to Go (located under Course) listed below.
- Applying Ethical Systems
NOTE: If you are having difficulty accessing the above material, please click on the PHI 107 Pearson Instructions .
Required Web Resource:
Please read the entry about Moral Realism in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. While reading, ask yourself what role language is playing in the argument for and against moral realism and how this relates to some of the arguments against realism that we have read this week.
Required Presentations:
