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PHI210 RS Module 4 Lecture Notes

Introduction

Welcome to this lecture about duties to oneself and others.

Duties as Perfect and Imperfect

The distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is not something Kant invented (it has roots in

Stoicism.) But Kant’s interpretation has been influential and it can be helpful for thinking about the moral

quality of actions in case analyses. All moral duties, on the Kantian view, hold universally, if they hold at

all. And all of them recognize the status of the parties implicated in the application of a moral rule as free,

rational beings. But some moral rules, even though they hold universally, give moral agents some leeway

in how they are to apply them. These are the imperfect duties, also known as meritorious duties.

Here is a summary categorization of duties and the examples as Kant discussed them in Fundamental

Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. He distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties and

duties to oneself and duties to others, as in the following table:

Duties

Duties to Self

Duties to

Others

Perfect

Duties

Duty not to

take one’s

own life

Duty to keep

one’s

promises

Imperfect

Duties

Duty to

cultivate one’s

talents

Duty to be

charitable (to

help others)

Perfect Duties to Others

Let’s look first at the perfect duties to others. They are such that their denial is inimical to the very

institution and continuation of a society of rational agents. “I ought not keep my promises” if universalized

would nullify the very notion of a promise. The duties of keeping one’s promises, telling the truth,

providing full disclosure and avoiding deception are very similar. Their denial is practically (meaning, in

relation to action) self-defeating, so their denial is never a legitimate law of action. Universalizing the

commands: “One ought make false promises”; ”One ought tell untruths”; One ought to resort to

deception” invalidates the very notion of a rational standard. False promises, for instance, nullify the very

conventions on which the possibility of social coordination rests, including the tacit conventions of

language. Their denial also implies that rational beings who are on the receiving end of the broken

promise, the lie, or the deception are treated as means to an end, rather than being shown respect for

their status as autonomous beings, who can make choices for themselves.

Perfect Duties to Oneself

Consider next what according to Kant is a perfect duty to oneself: One ought never take one’s own life.

He did not mean to rule out sacrifice of self for a higher cause. The example he gave is of a person who

is rational, but who is tired of living and seeks comfort in death. The duty, universalized, would be: “One

ought to commit suicide.” This, according to Kant, insofar as one is a rational being, is to destroy the

possibility of rationality in the world. The act is inimical to the preservation of a society of rational agents.

It is like cutting the branch on which a free, rational will rests, and so is self-defeating. It also amounts to

treating oneself as a means to an end, the end being comfort, instead of living up to one’s status as a

free, rational being, no matter how inconvenient this status is. Kant said similar things about self-

mutilation, unless required to save one’s life. This Kantian analysis of the duty not to commit suicide is

particularly controversial. Utilitarians believe that, far from being compelling, it is muddled. What do you

think?

Imperfect Duties to Oneself

Let’s now look at the imperfect duties, and begin with the imperfect duty to develop one’s talents. By this,

Kant meant the cultivation of distinctively human talents, which he thought involved rationality and will. As

a rational being, one necessarily wills that one’s faculties be developed. The maxim of not developing

one’s talents, because one doesn’t want to expend the effort it takes would, however, if universalized, not

be self-defeating in the way committing suicide is. Suicide cuts off the possibility of exercising any rational

abilities. Not developing one’s talents is not as radical a limitation of rationality. Now, for Kant, rationality

is intrinsically non-self-limiting. It seeks improvement in whatever conditions it finds itself. So it would still

be contrary to reason to not develop one’s talents, even though it is not radically self-defeating, like

suicide. Moreover, one would be treating oneself as a means rather than an end by subordinating the

development of one’s talents to laziness. Nevertheless, which talents one develops and how far one

develops them is up to us and depends to some extent on circumstances. For instance, one could not

have developed one’s talents as a sociologist prior to the 19 th century, since there was no discipline of

sociology before then.

Imperfect Duties to Others

Finally, let’s look at the duty to be charitable, an imperfect duty to others. The maxim of not being

charitable, because I just want to help myself, if universalized, would, according to Kant, not be utterly

self-defeating in the way that resorting to lies, deception, or false promises would. The latter are inimical

to very possibility of a society of free and rational individuals. Each could live according to the maxim of

just wanting to help oneself. Yet acting in accordance with the maxim of just helping yourself, not others,

Kant argued, would ultimately defeat your own ability to help yourself because we all, at some time or

other, find ourselves in need of some kind of assistance or other. Rationality “wants” more of itself, and as

rational beings, we each realize that being charitable, rather than uncharitable, is what allows greater

scope for the development of rationality, or the improvement of the condition of humanity. In this sense, it

would be contrary to rationality to be uncharitable, although not utterly self-defeating.

Moreover, the status of others as ends in themselves is not thwarted if I do not act charitably toward

them. But it is not promoted, and I rationally want to promote and increase rationality, whether in myself

or in others. Acting charitably toward others in need, and helping them so that they can act as rational,

free agents is acting in such a way that it promotes everyone’s status as ends in themselves.

Nevertheless, I can exercise discretion as to who should be the recipient of charity and how much help to

give. We generally recognize that when the burden to myself is slight and the need of the recipient is

great, my obligation is stronger than when the burden to myself is very great and the need of the recipient

is slight. Kant agreed with such common sense ideas about the discretion that attends to acting

charitably.