Case Study - Standard Concrete Products, Inc. vs. Teamsters Local 952
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standard_concrete_vs_teamsters.pdf
353 F.3d 668
STANDARD CONCRETE PRODUCTS INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, OFFICE, FOOD AND WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 952,
Defendant-Appellant.
Standard Concrete Products Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
General Truck Drivers, Office, Food and Warehouse Union, Local 952, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 01-57256.
No. 01-57257.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 8, 2003 — Pasadena, California.
Filed December 18, 2003.
Howard C. Hay, (argued and brief) and Glenn L. Briggs (brief), Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker, LLP, Costa Mesa, California, CA, for the plaintiff/appellee/appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Alicemarie
H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00016-AHS.
Before Harry PREGERSON, A. Wallace TASHIMA, and Richard R. CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
1
Plaintiff Standard Concrete Products ("Standard Concrete") delivers concrete throughout
Southern California. Relevant to this appeal, Standard Concrete has facilities in Riverside
County and in Orange County. The International Brotherhood of the Teamsters, General Truck
Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local 952 represents Standard Concrete's employees
at its Corona facility in Riverside County ("Corona bargaining unit"). Local 952 also represents
Standard Concrete's employees at its three Orange County facilities ("Orange County bargaining
unit") under a separate collective bargaining agreement.
2
In January 2000, the Corona bargaining unit went on strike against Standard Concrete. The strike
was called because the Corona bargaining unit believed that Standard Concrete was negotiating
with Local 952 in bad faith. Members of the Corona bargaining unit established picket lines at
the Corona facility. On the second day of the strike, the Corona bargaining unit extended its
picket lines to Standard Concrete's three facilities in Orange County. Members of the Orange
County bargaining unit honored the Corona bargaining unit's picket lines.
3
At issue in this case is whether the Orange County bargaining unit violated its Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with Standard Concrete when members of the Orange County
bargaining unit honored the Corona bargaining unit's picket lines at the Standard Concrete
facilities in Orange County. On January 6, 2000, Standard Concrete filed a complaint against
Local 952 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint
alleged that Local 952 breached the no-strike clause in the Orange County CBA by participating
in and encouraging the Orange County bargaining unit members to honor the Corona bargaining
unit's picket lines. On April 27, 2000, Local 952 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that Standard Concrete violated the Orange County CBA by failing to submit the dispute to
arbitration. Standard Concrete opposed Local 952's motion to dismiss and in addition filed a
motion seeking summary judgment against Local 952.
4
The district court denied Local 952's motion to dismiss and held that the Orange County CBA
did not require Standard Concrete to arbitrate its dispute with Local 952. In addition, the district
court granted Standard Concrete's motion for summary judgment, holding that Local 952
violated the Orange County CBA when the members of the Orange County bargaining unit
participated in a sympathy strike and refused to cross the Corona bargaining unit's picket line.
The district court then held a bench trial on the issue of Standard Concrete's damages. After a
three day trial, the district court awarded Standard Concrete $802,327.00 damages plus costs.
5
On appeal, Local 952 challenges the district court's summary judgment order that Local 952 and
the members of the Orange County bargaining unit violated its CBA with Standard Concrete by
honoring the Corona bargaining unit's picket line. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Primary Dispute
6
For approximately twenty years, Local 952 has represented the employees at the Standard
Concrete plant in Corona, California. On October 31, 1999, Standard Concrete withdrew its
recognition of Local 952 as the collective bargaining representative of the Corona unit's
employees, and refused to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with Local 952.
Local 952 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that Standard Concrete
unlawfully withdrew recognition of Local 952 as the representative of the Corona unit's
employees. In addition, Local 952 filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board
seeking an election to establish its representation of the Corona employees.
7
A month later, Local 952 won a new NLRB-conducted election to represent Standard Concrete's
employees at the Corona facility. On December 10, 1999, the National Labor Relations Board
certified Local 952 as the collective bargaining representative of the Corona facility's employees.
After Local 952 was recertified, the Corona bargaining unit and Standard Concrete began
negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement.
8
After several negotiating sessions, Local 952 determined that Standard Concrete was negotiating
in bad faith. Thus, on January 5, 2000, Local 952's Corona bargaining unit went on strike to
compel Standard Concrete to negotiate in good faith. The Corona bargaining unit set up picket
lines at Standard Concrete's Corona facility and at Standard Concrete's job sites in Riverside
County.
9
On January 6, 2000 and January 7, 2000, the Corona bargaining unit extended its picket lines to
three of Standard Concrete's facilities in Orange County: El Toro, Santa Ana, and Westminster.
Local 952 also represents the workers at all three Standard Concrete Orange County facilities
under the Orange County CBA.
10
Members of the Orange County bargaining unit at all three Orange County facilities honored the
Corona bargaining unit's picket line at Standard Concrete's Orange County facilities. Acting in
solidarity with the Corona bargaining unit, the Orange County bargaining unit members
informed Standard Concrete that they would not cross the Corona bargaining unit's picket line.
None of the Orange County bargaining unit members, however, participated in the Corona
bargaining unit's picket line.
11
After three days of picketing, Local 952 and Standard Concrete agreed in writing to cease
picketing at Standard Concrete's Orange County facilities from January 8, 2000 to January 18,
2000. In exchange, Standard Concrete agreed to resume negotiations with the Corona bargaining
unit.
12
At the expiration of the ten-day period, the Corona bargaining unit resumed picketing to pressure
Standard Concrete to negotiate in good faith. From January 18, 2000 to January 28, 2000, the
Corona bargaining unit again extended its picket lines to the Orange County facilities.
13
Members of the Orange County bargaining unit again refused to cross the Corona bargaining
unit's picket lines at Standard Concrete's Orange County facilities. Again, members of the
Orange County bargaining unit did not join the Corona bargaining unit's picket lines.
14
On February 3, 2000, the Corona bargaining unit and Standard Concrete settled their labor
dispute. They subsequently entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering the
employees at the Corona facility.
2. Secondary dispute
15
This case arises out of the Orange County bargaining unit's sympathy strike that honored the
Corona bargaining unit's picket lines at Standard Concrete's Orange County facilities.
16
The Orange County CBA in effect at the time contained several provisions relevant to this case.
The Orange County CBA begins with a recognition clause, Article 1, Section 1, that states: "The
employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective
bargaining ... for all employees in the bargaining unit working at its locations [in Westminster, El
Toro, and Santa Ana]." Article IX, Section 1 of the Orange County CBA provides that: "No
employee shall be discharged or discriminated against because of his/her ... Union activities,
including his/ her refusal to cross a picket line approved by the Union." Article II, Section 1 of
the agreement states that: "For the period of this Agreement, neither the Union nor its members
will cause or take part in any strike ... and the Union and its officers shall do all in their power to
prevent strikes."1
17
In addition, the Orange County CBA includes an arbitration provision. In Article XI, Section 1,
the grievance procedure establishes a three-step process by which Standard Concrete and Local
952 deal with grievances.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
18
Standard Concrete did not submit its dispute with the Orange County bargaining unit to
arbitration. Instead, on January 6, 2000, Standard Concrete filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. Relevant to this appeal, Standard Concrete alleged
that Local 952 violated the "no strike" provision of the Orange County CBA. On April 27, 2000,
Local 952 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment.
Local 952 argued that Standard Concrete violated the Orange County CBA by failing to arbitrate
its dispute with Local 952 before bringing suit in district court.
19
On November 28, 2000, the district court denied Local 952's motion to dismiss the complaint.
The district court held that Standard Concrete was not required to arbitrate its complaint with the
Union because the arbitration clause in the Orange County CBA requires only employees, and
not Standard Concrete, to arbitrate their grievances.
20
On March 5, 2001, Local 952 moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Orange
County bargaining unit acted in accordance with the Orange County CBA when its members
honored the Corona picket lines. Standard Concrete filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
contending that Local 952 violated the Orange County CBA by extending the Corona picket
lines to Standard Concrete's Orange County facilities and encouraging the Orange County
members to honor the picket lines.
21
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Standard Concrete. During oral
argument, the court interpreted the no strike clause in the Orange County CBA to mean that
Local 952 had an obligation independent of the obligation of the Orange County bargaining unit
to not cause or take part in any strike. On April 10, the district court issued a written order
holding that Local 952 violated the Orange County CBA because it did not abide by its duty to
"do all in their power to prevent strikes." The court held that Article II, Section 1 was a clear
waiver of "the Union's" right to participate in a sympathy strike. Furthermore, the court held that
the Orange County bargaining unit's refusal to cross the Corona bargaining unit's picket lines
was not a "sympathy strike" because "it was not a different Union that set up the line at Standard
Concrete's Orange County facilities."
22
The district court held a bench trial to determine the damages Standard Concrete suffered as a
result of Local 952's breach of the Orange County CBA. After a three day bench trial, the district
court awarded Standard Concrete $802,327 in damages.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
23
This court reviews a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Howard v. Everex Sys.,
Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir.2000). In reviewing a judgment as a matter of law, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of that party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 149-50, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). If conflicting inferences may be
drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury. Howard, 228 F.3d at 1060.
DISCUSSION
I.
24
Local 952 argues that the district court erred in holding that the Orange County CBA did not
require Standard Concrete to arbitrate its dispute with Local 952. The district court's decision,
Local 952 contends, is contrary to the strong presumption in favor of arbitration and this court's
precedent. Standard Concrete argues that the district court correctly held that the grievance
procedure, by its plain text, only requires employees to arbitrate their disputes. We agree with the
district court and hold that the Orange County CBA did not require Standard Concrete to
arbitrate its grievances with Local 952 before filing suit in district court.
25
Under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), Congress "assigned the courts the duty of determining whether the
reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) (hereinafter Warrior &
Gulf Navigation); see also United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 770 v. Geldin
Meat Co., 13 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.1994) (hereinafter Geldin Meat Co.) ("The courts have
the duty only to determine whether a party has breached its promise to arbitrate."). The final
"[dispute-resolution] method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). Our determination whether the Orange
County CBA required Standard Concrete to arbitrate its grievances "must be strictly confined to
the question whether [Standard Concrete] did agree to arbitrate." Geldin Meat Co., 13 F.3d at
1368 (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347). "The party
contesting arbitrability bears the burden of demonstrating how the language in the collective
bargaining agreement excludes a particular dispute from arbitration." Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
v. Phoenix Mailers Union Local 752, 989 F.2d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir.1993). We are mindful that
"[i]n labor contracts with arbitration clauses, the presumption of arbitrability is very strong,"
Dennis L. Christensen Gen'l Bldg. Contractor v. S. Cal. Conf. of Carpenters, 952 F.2d 1073,
1076 (9th Cir.1991), and that "doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage," Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. at 583, 80 S.Ct. 1347.
26
The plain language of the grievance procedure in the Orange County CBA, however, overcomes
the strong presumption in favor of arbitrating labor disputes. The Orange County CBA grievance
procedure refers only to employee-initiated grievances. To bring a grievance under the Orange
County CBA, a party is required to proceed in three chronological steps.2 The language of Steps
One and Two of the grievance procedure describe only the Union's and the employees' duties in
initiating a grievance against Standard Concrete. ("An employee having a grievance may first
take his/her grievance up with his/her foreman ..."); ("If the grievance is not settled in Step One
within two working days ... it shall be presented in writing through the Union to the Employer.").
To the extent Steps One and Two require employer action, they describe only how Standard
Concrete is obligated to respond to an employee grievance ("the Employer shall produce the
payroll records that bear upon the grievance").
27
Local 952 bases its argument that Standard Concrete must arbitrate its dispute with the Union on
the opening clause of the grievance procedure and on Step Three. The opening clause, the Union
argues, refers to the manner that "[g]rievances" shall be processed, and is not modified or limited
to a particular party, i.e., an employee or Union. Step Three states, in relevant part: "If the
grievance is not settled within thirty working days in Step Two, [from] the time it was presented
in writing, either the Employer or the Union may, within ten (10) working days thereafter...
request the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to submit a list of arbitrators...."
28
Local 952's argument that these provisions require Standard Concrete to arbitrate its grievances
is without merit.
29
Because Steps One and Two refer only to employee-initiated grievances, we cannot conclude
that the opening clause and Step Three of the procedure indicate the parties' intent that Standard
Concrete submit its grievances with the Union to arbitration. First, the opening clause requires a
grieving party to follow the chronological steps of the grievance procedure. It is also clear from
the language and structure of the grievance procedure that any grievance must go through the
steps sequentially. The steps are labeled chronologically as "Step One," "Step Two," and "Step
Three." A party cannot reach Step Three without exhausting Steps One and Two; a grievant may
only proceed to the next step of the grievance procedure if he or she is not able to resolve the
grievance under the previous step. Thus, Step Three can not refer to the way a new grievance
should be filed: it refers only to grievances that have gone through Steps One and Two.
30
We therefore affirm the district court's ruling that Standard Concrete was not obligated to
arbitrate its dispute with Local 952. It is clear from the plain text of the Orange County CBA that
the grievance clause only applies to employee grievances. Cf. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370
U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (holding that a CBA did not require an employer
to arbitrate a dispute where the arbitration procedures in the CBA described only an employee
grievance procedure and expressly limited the procedure to employee-initiated grievances).
II.
31
We next consider Local 952's liability for damages under the CBA. Local 952 argues that the
district court erred in holding that Local 952 violated the Orange County CBA by engaging in a
sympathy strike. Local 952 argues that it cannot be held liable under the Orange County CBA
because Local 952 did not clearly waive its right to take part in a sympathy strike. Further,
according to Local 952, the district court incorrectly held that the members of the Orange County
bargaining unit were not technically on a sympathy strike when some of its members refused to
cross the Corona bargaining unit's picket lines. Local 952 points out that the district court was
incorrect to hold that a bargaining unit does not engage in a sympathy strike when its members
refuse to cross the picket line of another bargaining unit represented by the same Local union,
even though the units are covered under separate CBAs. We reverse the district court's decision
holding Local 952 liable for money damages under the Orange County CBA.
A.
32
Local 952 argues that it did not violate the Orange County CBA because the Agreement did not
include a prohibition against sympathy strikes. To support its argument, Local 952 relies on
Children's Hospital Medical Center v. California Nurses Association, 283 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th
Cir.2002), where this court held that a general no-strike clause does not waive union members'
rights to respect a picket line. Local 952 argues that under Children's Hospital, the no-strike
clause in the Orange County CBA did not bar it from engaging in a sympathy strike. In addition,
Local 952 argues, there is evidence in the plain text of the CBA that it did not give up its right to
engage in a sympathy strike. Standard Concrete argues that this case is distinguishable from
Children's Hospital because Local 952 produced no evidence based on the parties' past practice
and bargaining history to prove that the "no strike" clause did not waive Local 952's right to
engage in a sympathy strike. We disagree with Standard Concrete, and hold that the no strike
clause in the Orange County CBA did not constitute a sufficient "clear and express" waiver of
Local 952's right to engage in a sympathy strike under Children's Hospital.
33
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, guarantees workers and unions
the right to engage in a sympathy strike, i.e., to refuse to cross the picket line of another
bargaining unit that is on strike against its employer. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141, 1143 (hereinafter Local 1-547) (9th Cir.1988); Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 387, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1986). The right to
strike and sympathy strike may be waived in a CBA. To do so, the union must make a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver in the CBA. Children's Hosp., 283 F.3d at 1192; Local 1-547, 842 F.2d at
1143. We require a specific "clear and unmistakable" waiver of a Union's right to sympathy
strike because:
34
[I]f a Union is negotiating away employees' rights that are fundamental to the collective
bargaining process, any proposed contract must unambiguously put those employees on notice of
the waiver.
35
Children's Hosp., 283 F.3d at 1192.
36
In Children's Hospital we made clear that "[a] general no-strike clause that does not specify
whether sympathy strikes are included or excluded does not, simply by virtue of its incorporation
in a collective bargaining agreement, constitute such a clear and unmistakable waiver [of
sympathy strikes]." Children's Hosp., 283 F.3d at 1192. We must "examine the relevant extrinsic
evidence to determine if the parties intended that general [no strike] language to include
sympathy strikes." Id. at 1194. The burden is on the "employer to show by clear and
unmistakable evidence that a general waiver of the right to strike includes sympathy strikes." Id.
at 1195. The court's analysis as to the scope of a no strike clause is guided by "the bargaining
history, the context in which the contract was negotiated, the interpretation of the contract by the
parties, and the conduct of the parties bearing upon its meaning." Id. (quoting Arizona Public
Serv., 788 F.2d at 1414).
37
In Children's Hospital, we considered whether the California Nurses Association's ("Nurses
Association") decision to participate in a sympathy strike breached the general no strike clause in
its collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Children's Hospital. The Nurses Association
gave notice to Children's Hospital that it was going to conduct a 24-hour sympathy strike to
support the International Long-shore and Warehouse Union, which had a primary labor dispute
with the hospital. Children's Hospital brought suit against the Nurses Association, seeking a
declaratory ruling that the Nurses Association was barred from participating in a sympathy strike
under the general no strike clause in its CBA with the Nurses Association. We held that the
general no strike clause in the CBA did not waive the Nurses Association's right to honor the
picket line. We based our decision on (1) the Nurses Association's bargaining history with
Children's Hospital, where the Nurses Association consistently rejected Children's Hospital's
proposal for a broader no strike clause that expressly barred sympathy strikes, and (2) Children's
Hospital's past practice of not objecting to the Nurses Association's participation in previous
sympathy strikes. Id. at 1195-1997.
38
We find that Children's Hospital is controlling. There is evidence in the express text of the
Orange County CBA that the parties did not intend to bar sympathy strikes when they agreed to a
general no strike clause. Article IX, Section 1 of the Orange County CBA provides: "No
employee shall be discharged or discriminated against because of his/her membership in the
Union or Union activities, including his/her refusal to cross a picket line approved by the
Union."3 If Standard Concrete intended the no strike clause to encompass a ban on sympathy
strikes, it would not have agreed to safeguard the jobs of Local 952 members that refuse to cross
a picket line.
39
Furthermore, Standard Concrete negotiated this clause with an awareness that the Orange County
bargaining unit could participate in a sympathy strike with another bargaining unit. For over
twenty years, Standard Concrete has had separate CBAs for its Orange County and Corona
facilities. It was not until after the Orange County bargaining unit refused to cross the Corona
bargaining unit's picket line that Standard Concrete negotiated a limitation in the Orange County
CBA on Local 952's right to participate in a sympathy strike.
40
We conclude that Local 952 did not make a clear and unmistakable waiver of its members' right
to refuse to cross the picket line of another union or bargaining unit of the same union.
B.
41
Further, Local 952 argues that the district court also erred in holding that the Orange County
bargaining unit did not take part in a "sympathy strike" when its members refused to cross the
Corona bargaining unit's picket line. The district court held that the Orange County bargaining
unit did not participate in a sympathy strike because Local 952 represents both bargaining units.
Standard Concrete contends that the district court correctly held that a sympathy strike by a
bargaining unit to support a bargaining unit of the same local union is not technically a sympathy
strike. To support its argument, Standard Concrete relies on our decision NLRB v. Southern
California Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir.1981), where we stated: "Section 7 protects
employees who engage in sympathy strikes in support of a lawful primary strike by a sister union
[i.e., different union] of the same employer." (emphasis added).
42
A sympathy strike "ordinarily refers to a strike conducted by workers belonging to one
bargaining unit in support of a primary strike that is conducted by workers belonging to another
bargaining unit at the same plant or shop." Children's Hosp., 283 F.3d at 1191 (footnote
omitted). In a sympathy strike, members of one bargaining unit refuse to cross a picket line that
is established by another bargaining unit that has a primary dispute with a common employer.
"Sympathy strikes are a means by which workers can demonstrate their solidarity with their
`brothers and sisters' who are engaged in a primary strike." Id. at 1191-92.
43
We hold that the district court misapplied our holding in Southern California Edison when it
read our decision to only allow a "sister union" to participate in a sympathy strike for another
union. In fact, the Third Circuit in Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Local
Union 326, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir.1980), cited in Southern California Edison, upheld a
bargaining unit's right under § 7 of the NLRA to honor the picket line of another bargaining unit
represented by the same local union.
44
Standard Concrete states that our decision in Children's Hospital supports the district court's
decision. But in that decision we stated: "[t]he two groups of workers [participating in the
secondary and primary strike] are usually represented by different unions." Children's Hosp., 283
F.3d at 1191 (emphasis added). We did not say that only sister unions were entitled to participate
in sympathy strikes. To the contrary, our rationale for protecting sympathy strikes under § 7
applies with equal force where the primary strikers and secondary strikers are different units with
different CBAs, represented by the same union:
45
The primary strikers are seeking improved wages, benefits, and working conditions or are
protesting unfair labor practices or other grievances. The sympathy strikers do not have a
primary objective of their own, but seek to assist the primary strikers to achieve their goals.
46
Id. at 1191 (emphasis in the original). When the members of the Orange County bargaining unit
engaged in a sympathy strike to protect the rights of the Corona bargaining unit, the Orange
County bargaining unit did not have a primary objective of its own; it was acting to support the
Corona bargaining unit in settling its contract dispute.
47
The language of § 7 also does not distinguish between sympathy strikers who are represented by
the same union that represents the primary strikers and sympathy strikers who are represented by
a different union that represents the primary strikers. Instead, § 7 categorically protects the rights
of employees "to form, join or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157. Because § 7 protects employees generally, we hold that § 7 safeguards the right of
bargaining unit members to engage in a sympathy strike to support another bargaining unit
engaging in a primary strike, even though the two bargaining units are represented by the same
local union.
48
On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that Local 952 and its Orange County bargaining unit
engaged in a permissible sympathy strike and therefore did not violate the Orange County CBA.
The district court's judgment in favor of Standard Concrete, and the award of damages and costs,
are reversed.
III.
49
Because we conclude that the district court erred and that Local 952 is thus not liable for
damages, we need not address the other issues raised by the parties.
CONCLUSION
50
Accordingly, the district court's decision is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
Notes:
1
Following the labor dispute between the Corona bargaining unit and Standard Concrete, the
Orange County bargaining unit and Standard Concrete entered into a successor collective
bargaining agreement, effective January 16, 2001. In contrast to the 1997-2001 CBA, the
successor CBA expressly prohibits the Orange County bargaining unit from honoring the picket
lines of other Local 952 bargaining units
2
The grievance procedure in the Orange County CBA states in relevant part:
Grievances shall be taken up and processed in the following manner:
(A) Step One: Any employee having a grievance may first take his/her grievance up with his/her
foreman, shop steward, or Union Representative. On request of the Union Representative, the
Employer shall produce the payroll records that bear upon the grievance for examination by the
Union Representative. In any event, an attempt to settle the grievance with an Employer
Representative shall be made prior to proceeding to Step Two of this grievance procedure.
(B) Step Two: If the grievance is not settled in Step One within two (2) working days, then
within five (5) working days thereafter, it shall be presented in writing through the Union to the
Employer. A committee of an equal number of representatives of the Employer and the Union
will meet within thirty (30) working days thereafter to settle the grievance. If a decision is
reached by this committee, it shall be final and binding upon all parties involved.
(C) Step Three: If the grievance is not settled within thirty (30) working days in Step Two,
[from] the time it was presented in writing, either the Employer or the Union may, within ten
(10) working days thereafter, request, in writing that the issue be arbitrated, provided that it
involves a question of interpretation or application of this Agreement.... The decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties; provided, however, that the power and
authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to the question presented to him/her.... Further the
arbitrator shall have no power to substitute his/her discretion for the Company's discretion in
cases where the Company is given discretion by this agreement or by any supplementary
agreement, as long as the Company's discretion is not arbitrary or capricious.
3
An arbitrator gave effect to this provision when Standard Concrete permanently replaced four
Local 952 Orange County bargaining unit members who honored the Corona bargaining unit's
picket lines. Local 952 submitted a grievance to dispute the dismissal of these four workers. In
its grievance, Local 952 argued that Standard Concrete violated Article IX of the Orange County
CBA by discharging the four Local 952 workers for not crossing the Corona unit's picket line.
On September 25, 2000, an arbitrator ruled that Standard Concrete violated the CBA when it
permanently replaced the employees
