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LMU_SELP_694_Memo_Sample_(1).docx
MEMO
<indicate, First Submission, Second Submission, or Final Submission>
FROM: <insert student name>
TO: Professor Poladian, Instructor SELP 694, LMU
DATE: <insert date>
SUBJECT: Memo on <insert speaker name>, <insert title of speaker’s presentation in quotes>
On February XX, 2015 in the SELP 694 Seminar Class, Mr. XYZ presented a lecture entitled “Systems Engineering LMU SE Seminar Class.” Mr. XYZ is currently the Vice President of ABC Corp. Mr. XYZ graduated from XYZ University and joined the US Navy to work in various intelligence positions and travelled throughout the world.
Mr. XYZ described the typical career path for a systems engineer including the expectations and responsibilities of the various positions. Furthermore, Mr. XYZ shared the different aspects of business sizes and how to develop new business in both the commercial and government arenas.
Mr. XYZ started off the seminar with a concept called “MATTESS,” which stands for “Money, Advancement, Travel, Training, Experience, Satisfaction, and Security.” The concept states that an employee is motivated to do their best work by at least one of the aforementioned items. System engineers usually promote themselves out of a job, which includes the transition to engineering management, then managing engineering, then program management, and finally business development. Transitioning to engineering management requires good communication and motivational skills. In addition, transitioning to managing engineering requires the understanding of corporate goals as well as management of budgets, schedules, requirements, and business strategy development. Furthermore, transitioning to program management requires successful budget, schedule, requirements, and new business development as well as providing key interactions with the customer. Lastly, transitioning to business development requires a good understanding of how business is generated, engaging customers and competitors, helping the customer sell the solution, find funding, and finally keeping the program sold. Mr. XYZ described the different business sizes including the large-sized businesses such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, medium-sized businesses such as Honeywell and Rockwell Collins, and finally small-sized businesses, which are the largest growing market segments relied upon by the government and large-sized businesses.
Mr. XYZ’s presentation made me realize that satisfaction is what motivates me to do my best work as a subcontracts manager at my company. Furthermore, my position allows me to transition into my company’s business development area and I found Mr. XYZ’s presentation useful in helping me achieve my promotion goal into this new area.
I found the speaker very engaging and I appreciated his openness with his personal life which allowed the audience to connect more with him on a personal level. I also appreciated the information he shared about the current and future financial situation of the nation that allowed us to remain optimistic about our future business and security.
memo_0.docx
MEMO
FROM: Student’s Name
TO: Professor Poladian,
DATE: 9th February 2015
SUBJECT: Ken Cureton Presentation on Systems Architecting and Political Process
Early this month on 2nd of February 2015, Professor Ken Cureton was the key presenter in the SAE 550 seminar class. The speaker concentrated on the topic Systems Architecting and the Political Process. Professor Ken Cureton is the head of engineering school at the University of Southern California. He has vast knowledge and experience in the field of space programs and has written many articles on the topic. I, therefore, found the lecture to be very interesting and informative given my strong passion for space engineering.
In his discussion, the professor shared with us some of the factors that are currently affecting manned space programs. Political influence was the major force that dictated both the concept and design of the space shuttle. It is the main problem that affects the funding and operationalization of space activities. For instance, in 1970s, space infrastructure and shuttle failed because there was no funding and political approval. By 1980s, when the programs got the funding the results were totally different from the expectations of the participants. The design of the shuttle was influenced by political forces and was different from the expectations of the NASA team. Specific political problems associated with the situation included wrong award of contracts. For example, NASA signed the solid booster contracts with Morton Thiokol located in Utah instead of using Building/Testing located in Florida. The arrangement came with negative performance impacts as solids had to be transported by rail to Florida. Their sizes had to be reduced so as conform to the size of the railway cars. The future of the space program was affected by the loss of the Challenger in 1987 and in 1990s; NASA realized that design was outdated. It was expensive to maintain and launch. In addition, cancelation of the proposed replacement systems also interfered with the progress of the plan.
The professor revealed some of the programs that have been recently cancelled. He highlighted that in 2010, the Constellation program was canceled by the national space policy. This situation has forced NASA to rely on Russian space programs. The astronauts in the country rely on Russian spacecrafts as the only means of travelling to the space. However, the future of this collaboration is in jeopardy as Russia declared that it will end its support in 2020. This has forced NASA to identify the companies in the country that can support the initiative.
The presentation by professor Ken Cureton enabled me to learn the interplay between politics and technology. Based on the presentation I have learnt that politics affects every aspect of a space program starting from the operational domain of the system architecture, performance schedule, and cost management issues. It is, therefore, important that the participants involved in the space programs become aware of the political influences on their operations. Such awareness can ensure that they perform their activities in accordance to the political requirements in the country.
SELP_694_Guidelines_(2).docx
· Memos should summarize the content of the lecturer’s presentation. Pretend you are writing to a boss or colleague when you write about the contents of the speech.
· Use proper grammar and mechanics. By the time you submit the final draft to the professor, there should be no grammar, spelling, or mechanical mistakes. It is both your job and mine to make sure that you are submitting a coherent, intelligent, and well-written paper after each speaker.
· Before you turn in the final copy, you will email the first two rough drafts of your memo to me.
Memo Timeline
· 1. The first draft you will turn in will be due the Saturday at 5 pm following the presentation to [email protected]. If you turn it in even a minute late, I will only give you one round of edits rather than two. This will affect your grade!
· 2. I will return your papers back to you by Monday morning with my suggested edits.
· 3. You will revise your paper again with my edits and send it to me by Tuesday at 5 pm. I will give you one more round of edits by Wednesday at 5 pm, and then you will have to edit your paper one more time before you submit it to the professor on Thursday.
Grading Criteria
· Proper spelling
· Subject-verb agreement
· Word choice—did you use the correct word and demonstrate that you have a grasp on tone and language?
· Format
· All papers must be in Times New Roman font, size 12.
· One inch margins
· Approximately 500-750 words
· Professionalism.
· Avoid slang and colloquial phrases
Space_X_John_Muratore_Final.pdf_.pdf
System Engineering:
A Traditional Discipline in a Non-traditional Organization
John F. Muratore – 23 January 2014
My own personal journey on classical formal SE methods • Started out learning them in USAF designing VAFB Shuttle complex
– Watched a morass develop
• Watched them as a shuttle flight controller and flight director
• Used them as head of flight software production for shuttle
• Discarded them as head of prototype project for shuttle mission control ($3M) and then as head of Mission Control Center upgrade ($250M)
– Literally threw the requirements specs in the trash can
• Did not use them in X-38 – used rapid spiral development methodologies
– 8 atmospheric tests and a full space vehicle built for $300M
– Learned how to translate rapid prototype methods into classical language
• After the Columbia accident, I was head of Shuttle Systems Engineering and integration
– Classical methods did not identify critical issues
– Specifications still had major TBDs after the program had been flying for 20 years
– Used Integrated Hazard Analysis to analyze systems to identify hazards, controls and verifications and risk management based on probabilistic models to get flying again
• Watched NASA Constellation program thrash itself to death with classical methods
• At University of Tennessee modified research aircraft using rapid prototype methods and hazard analysis
– Put “my money where my mouth was” and flew on all test flights
• I believe classical methods only work well when you are building something which is completely understood
– Otherwise you need a crystal ball to understand system interactions and I didn’t get one issued to me in engineering school
• SpaceX completely uses next generation approach to systems engineering. Rejecting formal classical methods means you need to use alternative methods to understand system interactions and get system performance
– Rapid prototyping
– Communication through networking versus hierarchy
– Rapid change and risk management
– Mapping to classical methods to explain – use classical methods for top level customer requirements
2nd Lt Software Engineer 6595th Shuttle Test Group Vandenberg AFB Ca
1st Lt – Loaned to NASA Orbiter Integration Engineer STS 1-5
USAF Test Controller Inertial Upper Stage STS-6
My pre-SpaceX life
My career at NASA had two Distinct phases – one in Operations and one in Engineering
Instrumentation and Communications Officer Shuttle Flight Director
X-38 Program Manager
My pre-SpaceX life
My pre-SpaceX life - Shuttle – First round – Flight Controller and Flight Director
My pre-SpaceX life - New Mission Control Center
Eliminated formal requirements decomposition and specifications and replaced it with rapid prototyping
A 10 year project was implemented in 18 months with a budget reduction from $325M to $250M
My pre-SpaceX life - Old vs New MCC
1993 - Centralized Mainframe driven IBM Black and White displays Limited Graphics Programmed in Assembly Language Custom consoles
1995 - Distributed Architecture Workstation based Unix Applications programmed in C by users Core services programmed in C Color, Graphics Commercial Off the Shelf hardware and Operating System
Common Hardware – Shuttle nd Station
My pre-SpaceX life - X-38 – Crew Return Vehicle Lifeboat and Ambulance for the International Space Station
MY pre-SpaceX life - Shuttle Second Round
Loss of Columbia – 1 February 2003
How can a piece of foam bring down a billion dollar vehicle designed to go into space an return again? - Wrong question Right question - How much energy does a 1.2 lb piece of phone impart at impact at 4 times the speed of sound ? Answer - 6 times that of a 44 Magnum bullet
Our sense of physical reality is calibrated at 1g, at sea level at low speeds
Need testing, calculations, simulation, curiosity and imagination to replace “gut feel”
SpaceX
Corporate Overview
• Founded with the singular goal of providing highly reliable space transportation
• Tech-style Organization—Flat and Fast
• 3000 employees and growing
• Nearly 1 million sq. ft. of offices, manufacturing and production in Hawthorne, California
• >1 square mile (2.5 square km) state-of-the-art Propulsion and Structural Test Facility in central Texas
• Launch sites at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg
• Commercial launch site nearing selection
Central TexasCentral Texas
Hawthorne (Los Angeles) HeadquartersHawthorne (Los Angeles) Headquarters
SLC-40, Cape CanaveralSLC-40, Cape Canaveral
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
SLC 4, VandenbergSLC 4, Vandenberg
Part of the System is the Business
• Over $5B in backlog through 2017
• Competitive in the world market, reducing business risk
• Free Cash flow positive and profitable since 2007
• Signing new customers at a rapid pace and growing market share in Asia:
• Diverse Customer Base
• Over 50 Falcons sold
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
SpaceX Large Scale Developments
Falcon 1Falcon 1 Falcon 9Falcon 9 Dragon SpacecraftDragon SpacecraftFalcon HeavyFalcon Heavy
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Falcon Launch Vehicle Evolution
• F1 and F9 share similar architecture
• F1 and F9 use nearly the same Merlin 1C engine
• Similar software and avionics
• Similar launch and ground operations
• Lessons learned from Falcon 1 applied to Falcon 9
• Falcon Heavy’s first stage will be made up of three nine-engine cores, which are used as the first stage of the Falcon 9
• Same second stage as Falcon 9.
• Falcon Heavy can deliver 53 metric tons to Low Earth Orbit
Falcon 1
Falcon Heavy
5.2 m Fairing
Falcon 9
Dragon
Falcon 9 V1.1
5.2 m Fairing
Page 14© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Grasshopper and F9R – prototypes for 1st stage return landing
Launcher Production
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Dragon Production
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Horizontal Integration at launch site
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Dragon – Cargo system to ISS evolving to Crew
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
SpaceX is in the systems business • SpaceX is in the business of
– Designing – Manufacturing – Testing – And operating complex systems
• In its 12 year history, SpaceX has successfully implemented – The Merlin 1, Kestrel, Merlin 1C, Merlin Vacuum C , Merlin 1D and Merlin
Vacuum D rocket engines – 3 major launch vehicles (Falcon 1, Falcon 9 and Falcon 9 V1.1) – A Cargo spacecraft capable of autonomous rendezvous and berthing with
the International Space Station with the Draco and SuperDraco rocket engines
– The Grasshopper vertical takeoff and landing demonstrator – Launch Pads at Vandenberg (F1) , Kwajelein(F1), the Cape (F9),
Vandenberg (F9 V1.1 and FH), and the Cape (F9 V1.1) – A Mission Control Center at Hawthorne and network of ground stations – A full set of test facilities in McGregor Texas for structural and propulsion
test – Avionics testbeds and simulations – Manufacturing facilities
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Currently under development
• Falcon 9 Reusable – The follow on to Grasshopper
• Falcon Heavy
• Crew Dragon
• Upgrading Launch Complex 39A for F9 V1.1 and Falcon Heavy
• A potential new commercial launch site
• The Raptor engine
• A new larger launch vehicle
• With a staff of 3000 people, SpaceX is the most prolific systems developer in modern aerospace
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Falcon 9 Upgrade
• SpaceX has upgraded the Falcon 9 launch vehicle from v1.0 to v1.1
• Falcon 9 V1.1 has flown three flights from two launch sites
• v1.1 provides improvements in four key areas – Reliability
• Fault-tolerant avionics
• Lower part count (particularly in Merlin 1D engine, stage separation)
– Performance • 50% more thrust, 50% more propellant, 20% longer
– Manufacturability • Improved process control and repeatability
• Fewer parts, less touch labor
• More in-house production
– Recoverability • First stage landing legs
• Return-to-launch-site recovery capability
• The v1.1 is SpaceX’s launch vehicle for both Dragon and Fairing launch missions going forward
– Operational Cargo and Crew launch for the International Space Station with Dragon
– Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)/US National Security Space missions
– Commercial satellite launch
– v1.1 also serves as the core for the Falcon Heavy
• Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral launch sites are operational for F9 V1.1
v1.0 v1.1© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
SpaceX Launch Vehicle History – 10 in a row
• 5 Flights of Falcon 1 – Last 2 were successful
• 5 Flights of Falcon 9 – all 5 successful
• 3 Flights of Falcon 9 V1.1 – all 3 successful
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
F9 V1.1 Milestones in Pictures
First Launch of F9 V1.1 from Vandenberg Sep 28, 2013
Second and Third launches of Falcon 9 V1.1 from Cape December 3 2013 and Jan 6 2014
Stage 1 Recovery Demonstration on First V1.1 Launch from Vandenberg
Two successful geotransfer missions
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Premise: Systems Engineering is a discipline established to protect the enormous investment of large scale, complex system
development by anticipating and solving integration problems ahead of time
And yet--history has shown that humans are very poor at anticipating all
potential integration problems, especially in new systems
Central Philosophy
• SpaceX is a systems oriented culture whose goal is the engineering and integration of reliable and safe systems
• SpaceX operates on the philosophy of Responsibility—no engineering process in existence can replace this for getting things done right, efficiently
• There is an important balance between heavy up front systems engineering and rapid prototyping to reduce systems risk—tipping point heavily dependent on organizational agility, cost of iteration, and the ability to trade lower level requirements
• Because we can design-build-test at low cost (21st century infrastructure) we can afford to learn through experience rather than consuming schedule attempting to anticipate all possible system interactions
• Design a testable system and test what you fly!
• Test rigorously and at multiple levels of integration—including right before
service
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Page 26
Key element of SpaceX success is inhouse development • Over 70% of the Falcon 9 rocket by mass is manufactured inhouse
– SpaceX builds components inhouse that most aerospace companies buy • Fairings • Tank domes • Stage tanks • Flight Computers • Engine controllers • Batteries • Engines and thrusters • Turbopumps • Valves • Star Trackers and Lidars • Radios • Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessels (COPVs) (designed and initial builds
inhouse – wound by outside vendor for production) • And many many more
• This allows SpaceX to escape the traditional aerospace cost structure as well as provides it superior insight into the design and qualification of all the parts that make up its systems
• Having active production and test of all major components provides superior ability to respond to issues and ensure mission success
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Strong inhouse build allows alternate approaches to systems engineering
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Some Examples of “Do Overs”: Engine Controller
Previous Design Current Design
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Some Examples of “Do Overs”: Engine
Previous Design Current Design
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
More Specifics:
• Distribute systems level tasks to departments to get departments focused on systems thinking
• Follow up with a network of integrators spread throughout the company
• User requirements are tracked and verified but everything below these requirements is constantly traded and optimized during the design phase
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Page 31
• Use modern 21st century information system tools to replace traditional control boards as forum for discussion and integration – use a paradigm more similar to social networking
• Focus on TOOLS NOT RULES
• Test rigorously and often
Distribute systems level tasks to departments and follow up with a network of integrators
• Placing system level integration responsibilities inside departments builds departments with system wide thinking
• Integrators distributed throughout company to perform specialty integration functions
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Page 32
User requirements are tracked and verified but everything below these requirements is constantly traded and optimized during the design phase
Traditional Vee SpaceX
Top Level Requirements (Level 2)
Integrated Verification (Level 2)
Derived Requirements (Level 3)
Derived Requirements (Level 4)
Verification (Level 3)
Verification (Level 4)
Component Design
Systems Engineering
Decomposition
Decomposition
Integration
Integration
Top Level Requirements (Level 2)
Integrated Verification (Level 2)
Identify Key Performance Parameters
Model & Analyze
Build & Development Test
Adjust Key Performance Parameters For Optimum System Performance to meet Top Level Requirements
Integration
Qualify units to predicted/measured environments
Monitor Key Parameters
Possible to trade key parameters between subsystems to optimize results because designers not separated by contract-subcontract bounds
Integration
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
SpaceX learns through experience rather than attempting to anticipate all possible system interactions
Traditional Developments Use Single Cycle to Product—This Mandates Heavy Systems Engineering to Protect the Design-Build-Test Investment
Test Experience
SpaceX relies on rapid design-build test cycles to inform design by experience
Plan Design Build Test Plan Design Build Test Plan Design Build Test Test
Experience
Test Experience
Documentation and process becomes more formal as systems move into later cycles Final qualification, first flight and production
Test
Experience
Approach can be viewed as rapid spiral development methodology
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Not only “Test Like You Fly”, but “Test What You Fly”
Integrated testing tools are a key investment and provide points where integration is assessed and ensured using a “Test Like You Fly” approach
• Ironbirds at Hawthorne – hardware–software integration
• McGregor engine test – engine and avionics integration in real dynamics environment
• McGregor stage test firing– tanks, plumbing, avionics and propulsion integration in real dynamics environment
• Launch Site Hardware in the Loop Simulations - hardware-software integration with all system components
• Launch Site Wet Dress Testing and Static Fire - hardware-software integration with all system components in real dynamics environment
Engine Test and Stage Firing at McGregor and Static Firing at PadEngine Test and Stage Firing at McGregor and Static Firing at Pad © Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Flexible test hierarchy increases formality as product matures
• Development Tests used to determine hardware capability in excess of requirements and to find weaknesses (running at extended temperatures, ultimate strength tests)
• Qualification tests demonstrate hardware performance limits (worst case flight conditions plus required factor of safety or margins). Qualification tests are performed every design/environment combination
• Acceptance Tests verify workmanship and functionality. All hardware acceptance tested
• HITL – Hardware in the Loop – shows hardware-software integration. Run for every hardware-software change
F9 First Stage Qualification Tank at McGregor, TX
Development Test – Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessel Ultimate
Thermal qualification test of Dragon Claw – connection between Dragon and Trunk
Second Stage Acceptance Test Flight 3 – McGregor, TX
M1C Merlin Engine Foreign Object Ingestion Demonstration Test
Thermal qualification of F9 separation system
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Component, Assembly and End to End Testing
Dragon Trunk – Falcon 9 Second Stage Separation Qualification Test
Draco (Dragon Thruster) Acceptance Testing
DragonEye – Dragon Rendezvous Thermal Sensor) Shuttle Development Flight Test
Space Station End To End Communications Testing
Merlin Nozzle Carbon Coating Development Test
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Electronic tools replace traditional control boards and capture interactions – More like social networking: TOOLS NOT RULES
Connection to system- level inputs
Traceability
Additional Documentation
Distribution
Links to additional information
Accountability
Documentation & Results
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Closing Thoughts • It is difficult to build a creative high performance engineering
culture
• It is really easy to ruin the creativity and performance by too much organization, rules and process
• SpaceX is achieving a good balance of creativity and systems engineering for agility and affordability
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Page 40
I think we are doing alright!
Comments, Questions, Nasty remarks?
© Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
Space_X_muratore_short_bio_2014_use_this (1).doc
Short Biography
· John Muratore is a 30 year veteran aerospace engineer.
· John first started as an Air Force Officer at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral as a software developer, and launch vehicle test conductor.
· He then moved to NASA in Houston as a shuttle flight controller serving as an Integrated Communications Officer.
· He headed Space Shuttle Flight Software Production for two years before being selected as a Space Shuttle Flight Director.
· He led teams on four flights of the space shuttle, including leading one of the three teams that performed the first Hubble Repair Missions.
· He then was promoted to the Chief of Mission Control Center Division at JSC. He led an 18 month $250 M effort that transformed the Apollo-early shuttle mainframe-based control center into the current distributed-systems control center, used for the International Space Station.
· He then led the X-38 project from concept through 8 successful atmospheric drop tests which included the development of the world’s largest parafoil.
· After the shuttle Columbia accident, he led the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration effort for Return To Flight.
· Retiring from NASA in 2007, he taught systems engineering and flight testing as a professor at the University of Tennessee Space Institute.
· In 2011 he joined SpaceX in Mission Assurance working on vehicle certification for human and other government missions.
· He recently served as Launch Chief Engineer for the sixth flight of the Falcon 9 launching the SES-8 satellite, and for the seventh flight of the Falcon 9 launching the Thaicom-6 satellite.