Phyllis Young: PHI assignment 1
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phi_107_module_1_notes.rtfPHI 107: Module 1 Notes
Module 1 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 1 and 3.
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Please view Part 1 of the Online Presentation for Module 1 .
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Thinking about Ethics, Emotions, and Intuitions
Chapter 1 Lecture Notes: Thinking about Ethics
Ethics and Critical Thinking
Ethics requires that we have a definite grasp on the questions to which we seek answers. Understanding ethical questions requires being able to identify which premises are relevant to the conclusion. Changing one's beliefs in light of better arguments or new information is a sign of clear and honest thinking. We must therefore be aware of bad reasoning or fallacies when discussing ethical questions. Bad forms of reasoning include the following: red herring/irrelevant reason, ad hominem, principle of charity, strawman fallacy, and inconsistency. The red herring/irrelevant reason fallacy is a fallacy in which an irrelevant issue is given as a reason for accepting a certain conclusion. For example, if I say “We should ban rated-R movies because murder is wrong,” I have presented an irrelevant reason for banning R-rated movies, as the question is not whether murder is wrong, but whether such movies lead to murder. The ad hominem fallacy is an attack on the arguer as opposed to an attack on the argument itself. If I claim that someone is wrong because they are a bad person, I have committed an ad hominem because I have attacked the character of the arguer, not the reasoning of the argument itself. Arguments stand on their own, regardless of who presents them, and must be evaluated thusly.
When engaging in ethical discussions and philosophical discussions in general, it is important to remember the principle of charity. The principle of charity states that you should approach an opponent’s argument as generously and honestly as you can. This means that you should not misrepresent an argument in order to make it more easily defeated. Doing this is called a strawman fallacy, where you defeat an argument by distorting it.
Ethical reasoning also requires that one’s beliefs are consistent with each other. If I accept a belief, I must accept all accompanying implications of the belief as well; otherwise my beliefs will suffer from inconsistency, thus rendering them arbitrary and unreasonable.
Studying Ethics
It is not the intention of this course to make you a better person, but to examine a number of conflicting moral positions and help you see where your views might fit. What kinds of truths are ethical truths? Are they eternal, absolute and universal, and known only by some special power; or are they more common ordinary facts that are part of our world that can be known by ordinary means? Philosophers have taken various stands with regard to moral truths. Socrates saw morality as eternal, unchangeable truths known through pure reason, whereas Thomas Hobbes held morality to be a collection of self-interested agreements that contributed to a more peaceful society. The question of how we know or recognize ethical principles is an epistemic question. Some might hold that moral insight requires some sort of divine revelation, special intuition, or sublime reason. Others view moral knowledge as stemming from our natural capacity for reason, sympathy, or general social concern. When we think of an individual's morality, we can group it into two broad categories: one who holds that morality somehow transcends the natural world and thus must be discovered by rational beings, or one who believes morality is confined to the natural world and is created by rational beings. God’s Commands and Ethics
One of the most common views of ethical principles is that they are tied to the commands of a divine being. This view is referred to as theological volunteerism or the Divine Command theory of ethics. Theological volunteerism holds that a law or principle is right if and only if it is willed or commanded by God. Something is good because God wills it to be so, not because God recognizes it to be good. Theological volunteerism raises serious questions about the relationship between ethics and religion. If ethics is based on God's commands, there are two questions we might ask about the nature of these command: 1) Is something moral/ethical/right because God commands it, or 2) does God command something because it is moral? If a person believes the first to be true, then there is not much room for moral reflection or critical evaluation of moral principles. On the other hand, if one takes the second claim to be true, then the implication is that there are moral standards that are, in some sense, independent of God.
This is important because the first view renders moral principles arbitrary, since God could have commanded other moral principles instead. For example, if something is right only because God says it is, then anything could have been right if only God had commanded it to be so, including murder, stealing, etc. The second view, in contrast, diminishes God’s omnipotence because God must command something if it is morally right and could not have done otherwise. If God has to do something, then he is not infinitely powerful, as he is forced to follow rules. The intersection of religion and ethics raises another fundamental distinction in ethics, namely, the difference between moral motivation and moral justification. It is possible that the person of faith endorses theological volunteerism because of the possibility of divine punishment. Although this may provide one with a motive for obeying God's commands, it does not justify the commands themselves. One may be motivated to act in accordance with certain rules without reflecting on whether the rules are ones that ought to be followed. I may refrain from murder not because I believe that murder is bad, but only because I do not wish to suffer punishment in the afterlife. However, saying that murder is bad because murderers will suffer punishment in the afterlife does not justify murder as being wrong.
Chapter 3 Lecture Notes: Ethics, Emotions, and Intuitions
Follow Your Reason or Follow Your Heart?
At times it appears our moral sensibilities may be a better guide to what constitutes the right action. Consider the example of Huck Finn: although Huck’s moral code tells him that helping Jim escape is morally wrong (since Jim is the rightful property of Miss Watson), he still chooses to help his friend. We judge Huck’s decision to be correct, but the fact that it was based on emotion rather than reason may give us some pause. Although reason is not perfect, it is still our best guide to ethical principles. The tension discussed in the Huck Finn example is exemplified by the competing views of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Although Hume and Kant agree that morality is not something to be empirically discovered, they differed on the implications of this scientific worldview. For Kant, morality derives from pure abstract reasoning. On the other hand, Hume accounted for morality by appealing to feelings as the source of our ethical preferences.
Objective and Subjective Feelings
There is an ongoing debate over the nature of feelings. Subjectivists hold that feelings are not subject to reason and, therefore, cannot be a source of truth. Objectivists hold that feelings can be the source of non-rational (not irrational) moral truths.
Although subjectivism and objectivism are both based on feelings, their effect on an ethical debate is quite different. Subjectivists essentially hold that statements such as “x is wrong” are equivalent to “I believe x is wrong.” This reduction puts one’s ethical feelings on par with aesthetic judgments such as “I like chocolate;” consequently, this limits, if not eliminates, ethical debate. If all ethical discussion is subject to the individual, then ethics will differ person to person and there can be no or limited debate about it. On the other hand, the objectivist holds that that lack of appropriate feelings about a moral issue is objectively wrong. Feelings are a source of ethical truth for the objectivist.
Sentimentalism
For sentimentalists, feelings are an essential element of ethical decision making and ethical behavior. This is not to say that reason has no place in ethics, but only that reason alone is not enough. Sentimentalism, it should be stressed, is not the same as intuitionism.
Although there is some debate on the matter, sentimentalists generally agree that feelings are important for both moral motivation and objective moral truth. According to sentimentalists, if you only believe in feelings as moral motivators but not sources of ethical truth, then you are simply a non-objectivist, not a sentimentalist.
One variety of sentimentalism is moral sense theory. Moral sense theorists hold that feelings are not constitutive of objective moral truth, but are guides to an objective moral truth. Moral sense theorists often draw analogies with aesthetic judgments. The feelings one has when looking at Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, or the Sistine Chapel indicate that there is some objective underlying beauty. Similarly, our feelings, though possibly mistaken, also indicate an underlying moral truth. As noted in the text, the source of these feelings has been variously attributed to God’s design or Darwinian fitness. This sentimentalist approach has been adopted by several care ethicists who emphasize the importance of human relations not only in morality, but also as a means of maintaining social cooperation.
One of the main problems with sentimentalism is the evaluation of feelings. Sentimentalists often recommend a spectator’s perspective on feelings, whereby one imagines what others may be feeling, even if they do not have or have never had those feelings themselves. This emphasis has led to the contemporary version of sentimentalism often referred to as “neosentimentalism.” Neosentimentalism holds that we must carefully consider whether one’s feelings are appropriate, justified, and worthy of endorsement after reflecting upon them. Thus, when taking guidance from one’s feelings, the key question is not what you feel, but what you would feel if you were fully informed.
Intuitionism
Intuitionists distinguish themselves from sentimentalists by holding that ethical truths are known not by reason or feeling, but by a special power of intuition. Intuitionism requires that we pay careful attention to detail, a clear conceptual understanding of the language of morality, openness to our moral experiences, and unbiased consideration of all relevant factors.
One major question that is raised by intuitionism is exactly what it is we intuit, that is, what types of intuitions we have. Intuitionists differ on the topic, but whether it is a rule, a general principle, or a number of principles, all agree that they are self-evidently known. This leads to the further question of which intuitions we should trust. According to W. D. Ross, we should trust intuitions of the “best people.” Of course, who the best people are is a matter of great debate. Additionally, there is the problem of determining what to do in cases of a conflict of intuitions. Here again the intuitionists provide little guidance.
Required Audio:
Media Index . Please listen to the Audio to Go (located under Course) listed below.
- Rule Nonconsequentialist Theories
Constructing a Personal Moral System
NOTE: If you are having difficulty accessing the above material, please click on the PHI 107 Pearson Instructions .
Required Presentations:
