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Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts

Ronald K. Mitchell; Bradley R. Agle; Donna J. Wood

The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Oct., 1997), pp. 853-886.

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'Academy of Management Review 1997, Vol. 22, No 4 , 853-886

TOWARD A THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND SALIENCE: DEFINING THE

PRINCIPLE OF WHO AND WHAT REALLY COUNTS

RONALD K. MITCHELL University of Victoria

BRADLEY R. AGLE DONNA J. WOOD

University of Pittsburgh

Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristic for describing the management environment for years. but it has not attained full theo- retical status. Our aim in this article is to contribute to a theory of stakeholder identification and salience based on stakeholders pos- sessing one or more of three relationship attributes: power, legiti- macy. and urgency. By combining these attributes, we generate a typology of stakeholders. propositions concerning their salience to managers of the firm. and research and management implications.

Since Freeman (1984) published his landmark book, Strategic Man- agement: A Stakeholder Approach, the concept of "stakeholders" has be- come embedded in management scholarship and in managers' thinking. Yet, a s popular a s the term has become and a s richly descriptive a s it is, there is no agreement on what Freeman (1994) calls "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts." That is, who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom (or what) do managers pay attention? The first ques- tion calls for a normative theory of stakeholder identification, to explain logically why managers should consider certain classes of entities a s stakeholders. The second question calls for a descriptive theory of stake- holder salience, to explain the conditions under which managers do con- sider certain classes of entities a s stakeholders.

Stakeholder theory, reviewed in this article, offers a maddening va- riety of signals on how questions of stakeholder identification might be answered. We will see stakeholders identified a s primary or secondary

We thank the members of the Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory, spon- sored by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics at the University of Toronto, where the centrality of these three attributes to a theory of stakeholder-manager relationships was first noted. We also recognize the contribution of various working groups in SIM a n d IABS and a re grateful for the comments provided by A. R. Elangoven a n d Barry Mitnick, the intellectual and financial support of Fritz Faulhaber, a n d the valuable insights of the consulting editor and the anonymous reviewers.

854 Academy of Management Review October

stakeholders; a s owners and nonowners of the firm; a s owners of capital or owners of less tangible assets; a s actors or those acted upon; a s those existing in a voluntary or a n involuntary relationship with the firm; a s rights-holders, contractors, or moral claimants; a s resource providers to or dependents of the firm; as risk-takers or influencers; and a s legal princi- pals to whom agent-managers bear a fiduciary duty. In the stakeholder literature there are a few broad definitions that attempt to specify the empirical reality that virtually anyone can affect or be affected by a n organization's actions. What is needed is a theory of stakeholder identi- fication that can reliably separate stakeholders from nonstakeholders.

Also in the stakeholder literature are a number of narrow definitions that attempt to specify the pragmatic reality that managers simply cannot attend to all actual or potential claims, and that propose a variety of priorities for managerial attention. In this article we suggest that the question of stakeholder salience-the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims-goes beyond the question of stakeholder identification, because the dynamics inherent in each rela- tionship involve complex considerations that are not readily explained by the stakeholder framework a s it currently stands. What is needed also is a theory of stakeholder salience that can explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention.

Among the various ways of identifying stakeholders, a s well a s in the agency, behavioral, ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories of the firm, we have found no single attribute within a given theory that can guide us reliably on these issues. However, we find that one can extract from these literatures the idea that just a few attributes can be used to identify different classes of stakeholders in a firm's environment. We begin our analysis with Freeman's definition of stakeholder-"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46)-and develop a theory of stakeholder identification drawn from these various theoretical literatures. We start with a broad definition so that no stakeholders, po- tential or actual, are excluded from analysis arbitrarily or a priori. We then propose that classes of stakeholders can be identified by their pos- session or attributed possession of one, two, or all three of the following attributes: (1) the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, (2) the legiti- macy of the stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and (3)the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on the firm. This theory produces a comprehensive typology of stakeholders based on the normative assumption that these variables define the field of stakeholders: those entities to whom manag- ers should pay attention.

Building upon this typology, we further propose a theory of stake- holder salience. In this theory we suggest a dynamic model, based upon the identification typology, that permits the explicit recognition of situ- ational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritize stakeholder relationships. We demonstrate how the identifica-

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 855

tion typology allows predictions to be made about managerial behavior with respect to each class of stakeholder, a s well a s predictions about how stakeholders change from one class to another and what this means to managers. In the theory of stakeholder salience, we do not argue that managers should pay attention to this or that class of stakeholders. Rather, we argue that to achieve certain ends, or because of perceptual factors, managers do pay certain kinds of attention to certain kinds of stakeholders. Knowing what types of stakeholders actually exist, which our identification typology facilitates, and why managers respond to them the way they do, which our notion of salience clarifies, sets the stage for future work in stakeholder theory that specifies how and under what circumstances managers can and should respond to various stakeholder types.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, we review the stakeholder literature, laying out the various explicit and implicit positions on "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts." We then present our defense of the three key attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-as identifiers of stakeholder classes and briefly examine the major organizational theo- ries to discern how they handle these three crucial variables. Next we introduce managers and salience into the discussion and present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that result from possession of one, two, or three of these attributes, giving special attention to the managerial implications of the existence and salience of each stakeholder class. Fi- nally, we further illustrate the theory's dynamic qualities by showing how stakeholders can shift from one class to another, with important conse- quences for managers and the firm itself, and we explore the research questions and directions that emerge from the theory.

STAKEHOLDER THEORY-STATE OF THE ART

For more than a decade the stakeholder approach to understanding the firm in its environment has been a powerful heuristic device, intended to broaden management's vision of its roles and responsibilities beyond the profit maximization function to include interests and claims of non- stockholding groups. Stakeholder theory, in contrast, attempts to articu- late a fundamental question in a systematic way: which groups are stake- holders deserving or requiring management attention, and which are not? In this section we examine how scholars have so far answered these central questions. Who is a stakeholder, and what is a stake? What does stakeholder theory offer that is not found in other theories of the firm?

Who Is a Stakeholder, and What Is a Stake?

There is not much disagreement on what kind of entity can be a stakeholder. Persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the natural environment are generally thought to qualify a s actual or potential stakeholders. We find that it is the view

856 Academy of Management Review October

taken about the existence and nature of the stake that presents a n area of argument, because it is upon the basis of "stake" that "what counts" is ultimately decided.

Early vagueness in definition. In a n early statement Jones defined corporate social responsibility a s "the notion that corporations have a n obligation to constituent groups in society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract, indicating that a stake may go beyond mere ownership" (1980: 59-60). He then asked the prag- matic questions stakeholder theory still seeks to answer: "What are these groups? How many of these groups must be served? Which of their inter- ests are most important? How can their interests be balanced? How much corporate money should be allotted to serve these interests?" (1980: 60).

These questions are still being explored in stakeholder literature and management thinking. Alkhafaji, for example, defines stakeholders a s "groups to whom the corporation is responsible" (1989: 36). Thompson, Wartick, and Smith define stakeholders a s groups "in relationship with a n organization" (1991: 209). Most scholars, however, have attempted to specify a more concrete stakeholder definition, albeit with limited suc- cess.

Broad or narrow view? Windsor (1992) correctly points out that stake- holder theorists differ considerably on whether they take a broad or nar- row view of a firm's stakeholder universe. Freeman and Reed (1983) rec- ognized early on that there would be serious differences of opinion about broad versus narrow definitions of "Who or What Really Counts." Their broad definition of a stakeholder a s a n individual or group who "can affect the achievement of a n organization's objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives" (1983: 91) is virtually identical to Freeman's (1984) definition. And their narrow definition re- verted to the language of the Stanford Research Institute (1963), defining stakeholders a s those groups "on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival" (1983: 91).

Freeman's now-classic definition is this: "A stakeholder in a n organ- ization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46). This is certainly one of the broadest definitions in the literature, for it leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders unam- biguously open to include virtually anyone. In this definition the basis of the stake can be unidirectional or bidirectional-"can affect or is affected byr'-and there is no implication or necessity of reciprocal impact, a s definitions involving relationships, transactions, or contracts require. Ex- cluded from having a stake are only those who cannot affect the firm (have no power) and are not affected by it (have no claim or relationship).

In contrast, Clarkson offers one of the narrower definitions of stake- holders a s voluntary or involuntary risk-bearers: "Voluntary stakeholders bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm. Involuntary stakehold-

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 857

ers are placed at risk a s a result of a firm's activities. But without the element of risk there is no stake" (1994: 5). A stake, in this sense, is only something that can be lost. The use of risk to denote stake appears to be a way to narrow the stakeholder field to those with legitimate claims, regardless of their power to influence the firm or the legitimacy of their relationship to the firm. This search for legitimacy, we argue later, is necessary to understand fully a firm's stakeholder environment, but it also can be a powerful blinder to the real impact of stakeholder power and claim urgency. We argue, in contrast to the position of all those who appear to focus primarily on legitimacy, that this narrower view captures only one key attribute of stakeholder salience to managers.

Between the broad and narrow are many other efforts to define what constitutes a stakeholder. The range of definitions a s it has developed chronologically appears in Table 1.

Major differences between broad and narrow views. Narrow views of stakeholders are based on the practical reality of limited resources, lim- ited time and attention, and limited patience of managers for dealing with external constraints. In general, narrow views of stakeholders attempt to define relevant groups in terms of their direct relevance to the firm's core economic interests. For example, several scholars define stakeholders in terms of their necessity for the firm's survival (Bowie, 1988; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Nasi, 1995); a s noted, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders a s those who have placed something at risk in relationship with the firm, whereas Freeman and Evan (1990), Hill and Jones (1992), and Cornell and Shapiro (1987) speak of stakeholders a s contractors or participants in ex- change relationships.

A few scholars narrow the field of relevant groups in terms of their moral claims, arguing that the essence of stakeholder management should be the firm's participation in creating and sustaining moral rela- tionships (Freeman, 1994; Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994), or the firm's fulfilling its affirmative duty to stakeholders in terms of fairly distributing the harms and benefits of the firm's actions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Langtry, 1994). In any case, we see those favoring a narrow definition of stakeholders a s searching for a "normative core" of legitimacy so that managers can be advised to focus on the claims of a few legitimate stakeholders.

The broad view of stakeholders, in contrast, is based on the empirical reality that companies can indeed be vitally affected by, or they can vitally affect, almost anyone. But it is bewilderingly complex for manag- ers to apply. The idea of comprehensively identifying stakeholder types, then, is to equip managers with the ability to recognize and respond effectively to a disparate, yet systematically comprehensible, set of enti- ties who may or may not have legitimate claims, but who may be able to affect or are affected by the firm nonetheless, and thus affect the interests of those who do have legitimate claims.

The ultimate aim of stakeholder management practices, according to

Source

Stanford memo. 1963

Rhenman. 1964

Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen. 1971

Freeman & Reed. 1983: 91

Freeman. 1984: 46 Freeman & Gilbert.

1987: 397 Cornell & Shapiro.

1987: 5 Evan & Freeman,

1988: 75-76 Evan & Freeman,

1988: 79 Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2 Alkhafaji, 1989: 36 Carroll. 1989: 57

Freeman & Evan, 1990

Thompson et al.. 1991: 209

Savage e t al.. 1991: 6 1

Hill & Jones. 1992: 133

Brenner. 1993: 205

Carroll. 1993: 60

Freeman. 1994: 415 Wicks et al., 1994.

483 Langtry, 1994: 433

Starik, 1994: 90

Clarkson, 1994: 5

Clarkson. 1995: 106

Nasi, 1995: 19 Brenner, 1995: 76. n. 1 Donaldson & Preston.

1995: 85

Academy of Management Review October

TABLE 1 Who Is a Stakeholder? A Chronology

Stake

"those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist" (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983. and Freeman, 1984)

"are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals a n d on whom the firm is depending for its existence" (cited in Nasi. 19951

"driven by their own interests a n d goals a r e participants in a firm, and thus depending on it a n d whom for its sake the firm is depending" iclted in Nasi. 1995)

Wide: "can affect the achievement of a n organization's objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives"

Narrow: "on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival" "can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" "can affect or is affected by a business"

"claimants" who have "contracts"

"have a stake in or claim on the firm'

"benefit from or a r e harmed by, and whose rights a r e violated or respected by, corporate actions"

"without whose support the organization would cease to exlst" "groups to whom the corporation is responsible" "asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from a n

interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's assets or property"

contract holders

in "relationship with a n organization"

"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization a n d . . . the ability to influence it"

"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) a n d in exchange each expects its interests to b e satisfied (by inducements)"

"having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with a n organization [such as1 exchange transactions, action impacts, a n d moral responsibilities"

"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in businessw-may be affected or affect . . .

participants in "the human process of joint value creation" "interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation"

the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm

"can a n d a re making their actual stakes knownu-"are or might be influenced by, or a r e or potentially a r e influencers of, some organization"

"bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value. in a firm" or "are placed a t risk a s a result of a firm's activities"

"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation a n d its activities"

"interact with the firm a n d thus make its operation possible" "are or which could impact or b e impacted by the firmiorganization" "persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive

aspects of corporate activity"

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 859

this view, could be firm centered or system centered; that is, managers might want to know about all of their stakeholders for firm-centered pur- poses of survival, economic well-being, damage control, taking advan- tage of opportunities, "doing in" the competition, winning friends and influencing public policy, coalition building, and so forth. Or, in contrast, managers might want a n exhaustive list of all stakeholders in order to participate in a fair balancing of various claims and interests within the firm's social system. Both the former public affairs approach and the latter social responsibility approach require broad knowledge of actual and potential actors and claimants in the firm's environment.

Claimants versus influencers. In order to clarify the term "stake," we need to differentiate between groups that have a legal, moral, or pre- sumed claim on the firm and groups that have a n ability to influence the firm's behavior, direction, process, or outcomes. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991) consider two attributes to be necessary to identify a stake- holder: (1) a claim and (2) the ability to influence a firm. Brenner (1993) and Starik (1994), however, pose these attributes a s eitherlor components of the definition of those with a stake.

In our view this is a muddled set, confusing and contrasting two of the three criteria we see a s important. Influencers have power over the firm, whether or not they have valid claims or any claims at all and whether or not they wish to press their claims. Claimants may have legitimate claims or illegitimate ones, and they may or may not have any power to influence the firm. Power and legitimacy are different, sometimes overlapping di- mensions, and each can exist without the other. A theory of stakeholder identification must accommodate these differences.

Actual versus potential relationship. Another crucial question lead- ing to the comprehensibility of the term "stake" is whether a n entity can be a stakeholder without being in actual relationship with the firm. Some scholars (e.g., Ring, 1994) emphatically answer, " No." We argue that, on the contrary, the potential relationship can be a s relevant a s the actual one. Clarkson's (1994) idea of involuntary stakeholders a s those with something not willfully placed at risk addresses the potentiality issue somewhat. Starik quite clearly includes potential when he refers to stake- holders a s those who "are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization" (1994: 90). We suggest that a theory of stakeholder identification and salience must somehow account for la- tent stakeholders if it is to be both comprehensive and useful, because such identification can, at a minimum, help organizations avoid problems and perhaps even enhance effectiveness.

Power, dependence, and reciprocity in relationships. If the firm and a stakeholder have a relationship, what is the nature of that relationship? The literature offers a confusing jumble of answers to this question, but most answers use a power-dependence frame of some sort. As Table 2 shows, some definitions focus on the firm's dependency on stakeholders for its survival; some focus on the stakeholder's dependency on the firm

Academy of Management Review October

TABLE 2 A Sorting of Rationales for Stakeholder Identification

A Relationship Exists The firm and stakeholder are in relationship: Thompson et al., 1991: 209-in "relationship with a n organization" Brenner, 1993: 205-"having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with a n

organization [such a s ] exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral responsibilities"

Freeman, 1994: 415-participants in "the human process of joint value creation" Wicks et al . , 1994: 483-"interact with and give meaning a n d definition to the

corporation"

The stakeholder exercises voice with respect to the firm: Starik, 1994: 90-"can and a re making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be

influenced by, or a re or potentially are influencers of, some organizatlon"

Power Dependence: Stakeholder Dominant The firm is dependent on the stakeholder: Stanford memo, 1963-"those groups without whose support the organization would

cease to exist" (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983, and Freeman, 1984) Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Narrow: "on which the organization is dependent for its

continued survival" Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2-"without whose support the organization would cease to exist" Nasi, 1995: 19-"interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible"

The stakeholder has power over the firm: Freeman, 1984: 46-"can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's

objectives" Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-"can affect or i s affected by a business" Savage et al . , 1991: 61-"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization and . . . the

ability to influence it" Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business"-may

b e affected or af fect . . . Starik, 1994: 90-"can a n d are making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be

influenced by, or a re or potentially are influencers of, some organization" Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1-"are or which could impact or be impacted by the

firmlorganization"

Power Dependence: Firm Dominant The stakeholder is dependent on the firm: Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold

a moral or legal claim on the firm

The firm has power over the stakeholder: Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Wide: "can affect the achievement of a n organization's

objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives" Freeman, 1984: 46-"can affect or i s affected by the achievement of the organization's

objectives" Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-"can affect or is affected by a business" Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in businessu-may

be affected or af fect . . .

- -

Mitchell, Agle, and Wood

TABLE 2 (continued)

Starik, 1994: 90-"can a n d a re making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be influenced by, or a re or potentially a re influencers of, some organization"

Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1.-"are or which could impact or be impacted by the firmlorganization"

Mutual Power-Dependence Relationship

The firm and stakeholder are mutuallv dependent: Rhenman, 1964-"are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals and

on whom the firm IS depending for its existence" (cited in Nasi, 1995) Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen, 1971-"driven by their own interests and goals a re participants

in a firm, a n d thus depending on it a n d whom for its sake the firm is depending" (cited in Nasi, 1995)

Basis for Legitimacy of Relationship

The firm and stakeholder are in contractual relationship: Cornell & Shapiro, 1987: 5-"claimants" who have "contracts" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from

a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"

Freeman & Evan, 1990--contract holders Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . .

established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) a n d in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)"

The stakeholder has a claim on the firm: Evan & Freeman, 1988: 75-76-"have a stake in or claim on the firm" Alkhafaji, 1989: 36-"groups to whom the corporation is responsible" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from

a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"

Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)"

Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm

Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"

The stakeholder has something at risk: Clarkson, 1994: 5-"bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of

capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm" or "are placed a t risk a s a result of a firm's activities"

The stakeholder has a moral claim on the firm: Evan & Freeman, 1988: 79-"benefit from or a re harmed by, a n d whose rights a re

violated or respected by, corporate actions" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from

a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"

Academy of Management Review October

TABLE 2 (continued)

Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm

Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"

Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 85-"identified through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing a s a result of the firm's actions or inactions"

Stakeholder Interests-Legitimacy Not Implied

The stakeholder has a n interest in the firm: Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakesu-"ranging from

a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"

Savage et al., 1991: 61-"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization and . . . have the ability to influence it"

Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business"-may be affected or a f f ec t . . .

Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"

for upholding its rights, minimizing harms, or achieving its interest; and some focus on the mutuality of power-dependence relations (although, interestingly, we found no definition that emphasized mutual power, and only two from Scandinavia that emphasized mutual dependence).

As shown, a broad-view sorting of stakeholders along previously de- fined dimensions is still somewhat overwhelming.

Sorting criteria. Thus, although Freeman's (1984) definition is widely cited in the literature, it is not accepted universally among scholars work- ing in the stakeholder minefields. Narrowing the range of stakeholders requires applying some acceptable and justifiable sorting criteria to the field of possibilities. Some additional approaches are relationship based, built on acknowledged transactional conditions, such a s the existence of a legal or implied contract, a n exchange relationship, or a n identifiable power-dependence relationship. Others are claim based, citing the exis- tence or attribution of a legal or moral right, a real or attributed benefit or harm, or merely a n interest.

Overall, the information in Table 2 suggests that scholars who at- tempt to narrow the definition of stakeholder emphasize the claim's le- gitimacy based upon contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral right, at-risk status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company actions and that, in contrast, scholars who favor a broad definition emphasize the stakeholder's power to influence the firm's be- havior, whether or not there are legitimate claims. As a bridging concept, we argue that the broad concept of stakeholder management must be better defined in order to serve the narrower interests of legitimate stake-

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 863

holders. Otherwise, influencing groups with power over the firm can dis- rupt operations so severely that legitimate claims cannot be met and the firm may not survive. Yet, at the same time, it is important to recognize the legitimacy of some claims over others. Power and legitimacy, then, are necessarily core attributes of a comprehensive stakeholder identification model. We argue that when these attributes are evaluated in light of the compelling demands of urgency, a systematic, comprehensible, and dy- namic model is the result.

What Added Value Does a Theory of Stakeholder Identification Offer?

As we see from the preceding discussion of the stakeholder literature, one can extract just a few attributes to identify different classes of stake- holders that are salient to managers in certain respects. We also can see that stakeholder power and legitimacy of the claim frequently are treated a s competing explanations of stakeholder status, when instead they are partially intersecting variables. Interestingly, this conceptual competition between power and legitimacy is reflected in virtually every major theory of the firm-particularly in agency, behavioral, institutional, population ecology, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories. This state- of-the-field provides a n opportunity for a theory of stakeholder identifica- tion to move us forward by showing how power and legitimacy interact and, when combined with urgency, create different types of stakeholders with different expected behavioral patterns regarding the firm.

Agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories are par- ticularly helpful in explaining why power plays such a n important role in the attention managers give to stakeholders. The central problem agency theory addresses is how principals can control the behavior of their agents to achieve their, rather than the agent's, interests. The power of agents to act in ways divergent from the interests of principals may be limited by use of incentives or monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), so that managers are expected to attend to those stakeholders having the power to reward and/or punish them. Resource dependence theory sug- gests that power accrues to those who control resources needed by the organization, creating power differentials among parties (Pfeffer, 1981), and it confirms that the possession of resource power makes a stake- holder important to managers. Transaction cost theory proposes that the power accruing to economic actors with small numbers bargaining ad- vantages will affect the nature of firm governance and structure (William- son, 1975, 1985). That is, stakeholders outside the firm boundary who par- ticipate in a very small competitive set can increase transaction costs to levels that justify their absorption into the firm, where the costs of hier- archy are lower than the transaction costs of market failure-a clear in- dication of their significance to managers (Jones & Hill, 1988).

These three organizational theories teach us why power is a crucial variable in a theory of stakeholder-manager relations. But, a s previously

864 Academy of Management Review October

noted, power alone does not help us to fully understand salience in the stakeholder-manager relationship. There remain stakeholders who do not have power, but who nevertheless matter to firms and managers. Other means to identify "Who or What Really Counts" are needed.

Organizational theories with a n open-system orientation (Scott, 19871, including institutional and population ecology theories, help us to under- stand the crucial effects of the environment upon organizations, but they are less helpful when it comes to understanding power in stakeholder- manager relationships. In both theories organizational legitimacy is linked closely with survival (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977, and Carroll & Hannan, 1989, respectively). In the socially constructed world within which managers engage stakeholders, these two theories suggest that "legitimate" stakeholders are the ones who "really count." Under institu- tional theory, "illegitimacy" results in isomorphic pressures on organiza- tions that operate outside of accepted norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Under population ecology theory, lack of legitimacy results in organiza- tional mortality (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). According to these two theories, legitimacy figures heavily in helping us to identify stakeholders that merit managerial attention. However, emphasizing legitimacy and ignor- ing power leave major gaps in a stakeholder identification scheme, be- cause some legitimate stakeholders have no influence.

A final attribute that profoundly influences managerial perception and attention, although not the primary feature of any particular organi- zational theory, is implicit in each. Agency theory treats this attribute in terms of its contribution to cost, a s does transaction cost theory. Behav- ioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963) treats it a s a consequence of unmet "aspirations." Institutional, resource dependence, and population ecology theories treat it in terms of outside pressures on the firm. This attribute is urgency, the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate at- tention. Whether dealing with the prevention of losses, the pursuit of goals, or selection pressures, one constant in the stakeholder-manager relationship is the attention-getting capacity of the urgent claim. Urgency, a s we discuss below, adds a catalytic component to a theory of stake- holder identification, for urgency demands attention.

In summary, it is clear that no individual organizational theory offers systematic answers to questions about stakeholder identification and sa- lience, although most such theories have much to tell us about the role of power or legitimacy (but not both) in stakeholder-manager relations. Ur- gency, in contrast, is not a main focus of any organizational theory, but it is critical nonetheless to any theory that purports to identify stakeholders and to explain the degree of attention paid to them by managers. There- fore, we suggest that to better understand "The Principle of Who and What Really Counts," we need to evaluate stakeholder-manager relationships systematically, both actual and potential, in terms of the relative absence or presence of all or some of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and/or urgency.

1997 Mitchell, Agle, a n d Wood

Defining Stakeholder Attributes

Power. Most current definitions of power derive, a t least in part, from the early Weberian idea that power is "the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947). Pfeffer rephrases Dahl's (1957) defi- nition of power a s "a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done" (1981: 3). Like Pfeffer and Weber, we concur that "power may be tricky to define, but it is not that difficult to recognize: '[it is] the ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire' " (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974: 3). This leads to the following ques- tion: How is power exercised, or, alternatively, what are the bases of power?

French and Raven's (1960) typology of power bases is one framework commonly cited in the organizational literature in answer to this question, but from a sociological perspective it is messy, for there is not a sorting logic a t work to create the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories a true typology requires. Etzioni (1964) suggests a logic for the more pre- cise categorization of power in the organizational setting, based on the type of resource used to exercise power: coercive power, based on the physical resources of force, violence, or restraint; utilitarian power, based on material or financial resources; and normative power, based on sym- bolic resources.'

Therefore, a party to a relationship has power, to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. We note, however, that this access to means is a

' Etzioni explains these types of power a s follows:

The use of a gun, a whip, or a lock is physical since it affects the body; the threat to use physical sanctions is viewed a s physical be- cause the effect on the subject is similar in kind, though not in inten- sity, to the actual use. Control based on application of physical means is ascribed a s coercive power.

Material rewards consist of goods and services. The granting of symbols (e.g. money) which allow one to acquire goods a n d services is classified as material because the effect on the recipient is similar to that of material means. The use of material means for control pur- poses constitutes utilitarian power.

Pure symbols a re those whose use does not constitute a physical threat or a claim on material rewards. These include normative sym- bols, those of prestige and esteem; and social symbols, those of love a n d acceptance. When physical contact i s used to symbolize love, or material objects to symbolize prestige, such contacts or objects a re viewed a s symbols because their effect on the recipient i s similar to that of "pure" symbols. The use of symbols for control purposes is referred to a s normative, normative-social, or social power. (1964: 59)

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variable, not a steady state, which is one reason why power is transitory: it can be acquired as well a s lost.

Legitimacy. It is apparent from our analysis in Table 2 that narrow- definition scholars, particularly those seeking a "normative core" for stakeholder theory, are focused almost exclusively on defining the basis of stakeholder legitimacy. Whether or not that core of legitimacy is to be found in something "at risk," or in property rights, in moral claims, or in some other construct, articulations of "The Principle of Who or What Real- ly Counts" generally are legitimacy based.

However, the notion of "legitimacy," loosely referring to socially ac- cepted and expected structures or behaviors, often is coupled implicitly with that of power when people attempt to evaluate the nature of rela- tionships in society. Davis, for example, distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate use of power by declaring, "In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it" (1973: 314). Many scholars seeking to define a firm's stakeholders narrowly also make a n implicit assumption that legitimate stakeholders a re necessarily powerful, when this is not always the case (e.g., minority stockholders in a closely held company), and that powerful stakeholders are necessarily legitimate (e.g., corporate raiders in the eyes of current managers).

Despite this common linkage, we accept Weber's (1947) proposal that legitimacy and power are distinct attributes that can combine to create authority (defined by Weber a s the legitimate use of power) but that can exist independently a s well. An entity may have legitimate standing in society, or it may have a legitimate claim on the firm, but unless it has either power to enforce its will in the relationship or a perception that its claim is urgent, it will not achieve salience for the firm's managers. For this reason we argue that a comprehensive theory of stakeholder salience requires that separate attention be paid to legitimacy a s a n attribute of stakeholder-manager relations.

Recently, Suchman (1995) has worked to strengthen the conceptual moorings of the notion of legitimacy, building upon Weber's functional- ism (1947). Parsons' structural-functional theory (1960), "open systems" theory (Scott, 19871, and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The definition that Suchman suggests is broad based and recognizes the evaluative, cognitive, and socially constructed nature of legitimacy. He defines legitimacy a s "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of a n entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (1995: 574).

Although this definition is imprecise and difficult to operationalize, it is representative of sociologically based definitions of legitimacy and contains several descriptions that are useful in our approach to stake- holder identification. Therefore, we accept and utilize Suchman's defini- tion of legitimacy, recognizing that the social system within which legiti-

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 867

macy is attained is a system with multiple levels of analysis, the most common of which are the individual, organizational, and societal (Wood, 1991).This definition implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good, that it is something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and that it may be defined and negotiated differently a t various levels of social organization.

Urgency. Viewing power and legitimacy a s independent variables in stakeholder-manager relationships takes us some distance toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience, but it does not capture the dynamics of stakeholder-manager interactions. We propose that add- ing the stakeholder attribute of urgency helps move the model from static to dynamic. "Urgency" is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary a s "calling for immediate attention" or "pressing." We believe that urgency, with synonyms including "compelling," "driving," and "imperative," ex- ists only when two conditions are met: (1)when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and (2) when that relationship or claim is im- portant or critical to the stakeholder. Thus, similar to Jones' (1993)descrip- tion of moral intensity a s a multidimensional construct, we argue that urgency is based on the following two attributes: (1) time sensitivity-the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relation- ship is unacceptable to the stakeholder, and (2) criticality-the impor- tance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder. We define ur- gency a s the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.

Although it was virtually ignored until now in any explicit sense in the stakeholder literature, the idea of paying attention to various stake- holder relationships in a timely fashion has been a focus of issues man- agement (Wartick & Mahon, 1994) and crisis management scholars for decades. Eyestone (1978)highlighted the speed with which a n issue can become salient to a firm, and Cobb and Elder discussed the important role symbols play in creating time urgency: "Symbols such a s 'Freedom Now' have a n advantage because they connote a specific time commitment to action. If one is attempting to mobilize a public against some outside threat, one must emphasize the rapidity with which the opponent is gain- ing strength" (1972: 139).

However, although time sensitivity is necessary, it is not sufficient to identify a stakeholder's claim or "manager relationship" a s urgent. In addition, the stakeholder must view its claim on the firm or its relation- ship with the firm a s critical or highly important. Some examples of why a stakeholder would view its relationship with the firm a s critical include the following:

ownership-the stakeholder's possession of firm-specific assets, or those asse ts tied to a firm that cannot be used in a different way with- out loss of value (Hill & Jones, 1992; Williamson, 1985).making it very costly for the stakeholder to exit the relationship;

Academy of Management Review October

sentiment-us in the case of easily traded stock that is held by genera- tions of owners within a family, regardless of the stock's performance: expectation-the stakeholder's anticipation that the firm will continue providing it with something of great value (e.g., compensation and benefits in the case of employees): or exposure-the importance the stakeholder attaches to that which is a t risk in the relationship with the firm (Clarkson, 1994).

Our theory does not specify why stakeholders assess their relation- ships with firms a s critical. Furthermore, our theory does not attempt to predict the circumstances under which "time will be of the essence." Rather, when both factors a re present, our theory captures the resulting multidimensional attribute a s urgency, juxtaposes it with the attributes of power and legitimacy, and proposes dynamism in the systematic identi- fication of stakeholders.

Additional Features of Stakeholder Attributes

Table 3 summarizes the constructs, definitions, and origins of the concepts discussed thus far in the article. To support a dynamic theory of stakeholder identification and salience, however, we need to consider several additional implications of power, legitimacy, and urgency. First, each attribute is a variable, not a steady state, and can change for any particular entity or stakeholder-manager relationship. Second, the exis- tence (or degree present) of each attribute is a matter of multiple percep- tions and is a constructed reality rather than a n "objective" one. Third, a n individual or entity may not be "conscious" of possessing the attribute or, if conscious of possession, may not choose to enact any implied behav- iors. These features of stakeholder attributes, summarized below, are im- portant to the theory's dynamism; that is, they provide a preliminary framework for understanding how stakeholders can gain or lose salience to a firm's managers:

1. Stakeholder attributes a r e variable, not steady state. 2. Stakeholder attributes a re socially constructed, not objective, reality. 3. Consciousness and willful exercise may or may not be present.

Thus, with respect to power, for example, access to the means of influencing another entity's behavior is a variable, with both discrete and continuous features. As we argued earlier, power may be coercive, utili- tarian, or normative-qualitatively different types that may exist inde- pendently or in combination. Each type of power may range from nonex- istent to complete. Power is transitory-it can be acquired a s well a s lost. Further, possession of power does not necessarily imply its actual or in- tended use, nor does possession of power imply consciousness of such possession by the possessor or "correct" perception of objective reality by the perceivers. An entity may possess power to impose its will upon a firm, but unless it is aware of its power and willing to exercise it on the firm, it is not a stakeholder with high salience for managers. Rather, latent power exists in stakeholder relationships, and the exercise of

Mitchell, Agle, and Wood

TABLE 3 Key Constructs in the Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience

Construct Definition Sources

Stakeholder Any group or individual who can affect or is Freeman, 1984; Jones, affected by the achievement of the 1995; Kreiner & organization's objectives Bhambri, 1988

Power A relationship among social actors in which Dahl, 1957; Pfeffer, 1981; one social actor, A, can get another social Weber, 1947 actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done

Bases Coercive-forceithreat Etzioni, 1964 Utilitarian-materiallincentives Normative-symbolic influences

Legitimacy A generalized perception or assumption that Suchman, 1995; Weber, the actions of a n entity a re desirable, 1947 proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, definitions

Bases Individual Wood, 1991 Organizational Societal

Urgency The degree to which stakeholder claims call Original-builds on the for immediate attention definition from the

Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Bases Time sensitivity-the degree to which Eyestone, 1978; managerial delay in attending to the Wartick & Mahon, claim or relationship is unacceptable to 1994 the stakeholder

Criticality-the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder specificity from

Hill & Jones, 1992; Williamson, 1985

Salience The degree to which managers give priority to Original-builds on the competing stakeholder claims definition from the

Merriam-Webster Dictionary

stakeholder power is triggered by conditions that a re manifest in the other two attributes of the relationship: legitimacy and urgency. That is, power by itself does not guarantee high salience in a stakeholder-manager re- lationship. Power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exer- cise through urgency.

Legitimacy, like power, is a variable rather than a steady state-a dynamic attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship. It may be pres- ent or absent. If it is present, it is based upon a generalized virtue that is perceived for or attributed to a stakeholder a t one or more social levels of analysis. Claimants may or may not correctly perceive the legitimacy of their claims; likewise, managers may have perceptions of stakeholder legitimacy that are a t variance with the stakeholder's own perception.

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Also, like the power attribute, legitimacy's contribution to stakeholder salience depends upon interaction with the other two attributes: power and urgency. Legitimacy gains rights through power and voice through urgency.

Finally, urgency is not a steady-state attribute but can vary across stakeholder-manager relationships or within a single relationship across time. As is true of power and legitimacy, urgency is a socially constructed perceptual phenomenon and may be perceived correctly or falsely by the stakeholder, the managers, or others in the firm's environment. For ex- ample, neighbors of a nuclear power plant that is about to melt down have a serious claim on that plant, but they may not be aware of the time pressure and criticality and, thus, may not act on their claim. Urgency by itself is not sufficient to guarantee high salience in the stakeholder- manager relationship. However, when it is combined with a t least one of the other attributes, urgency will change the relationship and cause it to increase in salience to the firm's managers. Specifically, in combination with legitimacy, urgency promotes access to decision-making channels, and in combination with power, it encourages one-sided stakeholder ac- tion. In combination with both, urgency triggers reciprocal acknowledg- ment and action between stakeholders and managers.

These three features of stakeholder attributes-variable status, per- ceptual quality, and variable consciousness and will-lay the ground- work for a future analysis of the dynamic nature of stakeholder-manager relations. The common "bicycle-wheel" model of a firm's stakeholder en- vironment does not begin to capture the ebb and flow of changes in stake- holder-manager relations or the fact that these relations are multilateral and often coalitional, not bilateral and independent. We explore the dy- namic possibilities of the theory of stakeholder salience briefly in the concluding section, but it seems clear that a great deal more paradigm- atic development is now possible because of our ability to recognize theo- retically that stakeholder-manager relations a re not static but, rather, a re in constant flux.

Managers' Role in the Theory

Cyert & March (1963) contributed to the management literature the notion of organizations a s coalitions of individuals and organized "sub coalitions" (1963: 27), with "disparate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited ability to attend to all problems simultaneously" (1963: 43). which, under uncertainty, must seek feedback from the environment (1963: 12). Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) picked up the idea of organizations a s coa- litions of varying interests and contributed the notion that organizations are "other-directed" (1978: 257), being influenced by actors that control critical resources and have the attention of managers (1978: 259-260). In developing their stakeholder-agency model, Hill and Jones (1992) em- ployed the agency theory view of the firm a s a nexus of contracts be- tween stakeholders and managers a t a central node, where managers

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 871

have the responsibility to reconcile divergent interests by making strate- gic decisions and allocating strategic resources in a manner that is most consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups (1992: 134). They write:

Whatever the magnitude of their stake, each stakeholder i s a part of the nexus of implicit a n d explicit contracts that consti- tutes the firm. However, as a group, managers a re unique in this respect because of their position a t the centre of the nexus of contracts. Managers a r e the only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship with al l other stakehold- ers. Managers a re also the only group of stakeholders with direct control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm. (Hill & Jones, 1992: 134; emphasis in original)

The idea that the organization is a n environmentally dependent co- alition of divergent interests, which depends upon gaining the attention of (making claims upon) managers a t the center of the nexus to effect reconciliations among stakeholders, suggests that the perspective of managers might be vital. We propose that, although groups can be iden- tified reliably a s stakeholders based on their possession of power, legiti- macy, and urgency in relationship to the firm, it is the firm's managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention. In short, one can identify a firm's stakeholders based on attributes, but managers may or may not perceive the stake- holder field correctly. The stakeholders winning management's attention will be only those the managers perceive to be highly ~ a l i e n t . ~

Therefore, if managers are central to this theory, what role do their own characteristics play? The propositions we present later suggest that the manager's perception of a stakeholder's attributes is critical to the manager's view of stakeholder salience. Therefore, we suggest, although space constraints prohibit systematic development here, that managerial characteristics are a moderator of the relationships presented in this ar- ticle. For example, managers vary greatly in their environmental scan- ning practices (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988) and in their values (Ham- brick & Mason, 1984). Differences in managerial values are illustrative of the moderating effects of management characteristics (Frederick, 1995). Greer and Downey (1982) have found that managers' values relative to social regulation have a strong effect on how they react to stakeholders covered by these statutes. Another value theorists suggest a s important in

We note, however, that Freeman and Evan view the firm "as a series of multilateral contracts among stakeholders" (1990: 342), with no central role for managers. This implies a network theory solution to the problem of systematic description, in comparison with the cognitive approach that we take. We make no representations about a fully networked, nonnexus approach. We merely suggest the sociology-organization theory approach as a logically developed "sorting system" for improving the descriptive capability of the stake- holder approach.

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this relationship is management's sense of self-interest or self-sacrifice. Although some theorists have suggested that all behavior ultimately is self-interested (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 19741, several social scientists have questioned the common assumption of self-interest and have sug- gested that people often act in ways that benefit others, even to their own detriment (see Etzioni, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986). Like Perrow (1986) and Brenner and Cochran (1991), we treat managerial characteris- tics a s a variable and suggest that it will be a n important moderator of the stakeholder-manager relationship.

STAKEHOLDER CLASSES

Up to this point in the article, we have argued that a definition of "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts" rests upon the assumptions, first, that managers who want to achieve certain ends pay particular kinds of attention to various classes of stakeholders; second, that managers' per- ceptions dictate stakeholder salience; and third, that the various classes of stakeholders might be identified based upon the possession, or the attributed possession, of one, two, or all three of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We now proceed to our analysis of the stake- holder classes that result from the various combinations of these attrib- utes, a s shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders

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We first lay out the stakeholder types that emerge from various com- binations of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Logically and conceptually, seven types are examined-three possessing only one at- tribute, three possessing two attributes, and one possessing all three at- tributes. We propose that stakeholders' possession of these attributes, upon further methodological and empirical work, can be measured reli- ably. This analysis allows and justifies identification of entities that should be considered stakeholders of the firm, and it also constitutes the set from which managers select those entities they perceive a s salient. According to this model, then, entities with no power, legitimacy, or ur- gency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived a s having no salience by the firm's managers.

In conjunction with the analysis of stakeholder types, and based on the assumption that managers' perceptions of stakeholders form the cru- cial variable in determining organizational resource allocation in re- sponse to stakeholder claims, we also present several propositions lead- ing to a theory of stakeholder salience.

Therefore:

Proposition 1: Stakeholder salience will be positively re- lated to the cumulative number of stakeholder attrib- utes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-perceived by managers to be present.

The low salience classes (areas 1, 2, and 3), which we term "latent" stakeholders, are identified by their possession or attributed possession of only one of the attributes. The moderately salient stakeholders (areas 4, 5, and 6) are identified by their possession or attributed possession of two of the attributes, and because they are stakeholders who "expect some- thing," we call them "expectant" stakeholders. The combination of all three attributes (including the dynamic relations among them) is the de- fining feature of highly salient stakeholders (area 7).

In this section we present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that the theory identifies, paying special attention to the managerial implica- tions of the existence of each stakeholder class. We have given each class a descriptive name to facilitate discussion, recognizing that the names are less important than the theoretical types they represent. We invite the indulgence of the reader a s we alliterate these descriptive names a s a mnemonic device to promote recall and as a further means to suggest a starting point for future dialogue.

As Figure 2 illustrates, latent stakeholders are those possessing only one of the three attributes, and include dormant, discretionary, and de- manding stakeholders. Expectant stakeholders are those possessing two attributes, and include dominant, dependent, and dangerous stake- holders. Definitive stakeholders are those possessing all three attributes. Finally, individuals or entities possessing none of the attributes are non- stakeholders or potential stakeholders.

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FIGURE2 Stakeholder Typology:

One, Two. or Three Attributes Present

\ / Nonstakeholder

Latent Stakeholders

With limited time, energy, and other resources to track stakeholder behavior and to manage relationships, managers may well do nothing about stakeholders they believe possess only one of the identifying at- tributes, and managers may not even go so far a s to recognize those stakeholders' existence. Similarly, latent stakeholders are not likely to give any attention or acknowledgment to the firm. Hence:

Proposition la: Stakeholder salience will be low where only one of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-is perceived by managers to be present.

In the next few paragraphs we discuss the reasoning behind this expec- tation a s it applies to each class of latent stakeholder, and we also dis- cuss the implications for managers.

Dormant stakeholders. The relevant attribute of a dormant stake- holder is power. Dormant stakeholders possess power to impose their will on a firm, but by not having a legitimate relationship or a n urgent claim,

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 875

their power remains unused. Examples of dormant stakeholders are plen- tiful. For instance, power is held by those who have a loaded gun (coer- cive), those who can spend a lot of money (utilitarian), or those who can command the attention of the news media (symbolic). Dormant stakehold- ers have little or no interaction with the firm. However, because of their potential to acquire a second attribute, management should remain cog- nizant of such stakeholders, for the dynamic nature of the stakeholder- manager relationship suggests that dormant stakeholders will become more salient to managers if they acquire either urgency or legitimacy.

Although difficult, it is oftentimes possible to predict which dormant stakeholders may become salient. For example, while employees who have been fired or laid off from a n organization could be considered by the firm to be dormant stakeholders, experience suggests that these stakeholders can seek to exercise their latent power. The multiple shoot- i n g ~at postal facilities by ex-U.S. mail employees (coercive), the filing of wrongful dismissal suits in the court system (utilitarian), and the increase in "speaking out" on talk radio (symbolic) all are evidence of such com- binations.

Discretionary stakeholders. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy, but they have no power to influence the firm and no urgent claims. Discretionary stakeholders are a particularly interest- ing group for scholars of corporate social responsibility and performance (see Wood, 1991), for they are most likely to be recipients of what Carroll (1979) calls discretionary corporate social responsibility, which he later redefined a s corporate philanthropy (Carroll, 1991). The key point regard- ing discretionary stakeholders is that, absent power and urgent claims, there is absolutely no pressure on managers to engage in a n active rela- tionship with such a stakeholder, although managers can choose to do so.

Not all recipients of corporate philanthropy are discretionary stake- holders-only those with neither power over nor urgent claims on the firm. Examples of discretionary stakeholders include beneficiaries of the Take- A-Taxi program in the Twin Cities, in which the Fingerhut company picks up the tab for anyone who feels they have consumed too much alcohol to drive, and nonprofit organizations, such a s schools, soup kitchens, and hospitals, who receive donations and volunteer labor from such compa- nies a s Rhino Records, Timberland, Honeywell, JustDesserts, and Levi- Strauss.

Demanding stakeholders. Where the sole relevant attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship is urgency, the stakeholder is de- scribed a s "demanding." Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power nor legitimacy, are the "mosquitoes buzzing in the ears" of managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management attention, if any at all. Where stakeholders are unable or unwilling to acquire either the power or the legitimacy necessary to move their claim into a more salient status, the "noise" of urgency is insufficient to project a stakeholder claim

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beyond latency. For example, a lone millenarian picketer who marches outside the headquarters with a sign that says, "The end of the world is coming! Acme chemical is the cause!" might be extremely irritating to Acme's managers, but the claims of the picketer remain largely uncon- sidered.

Expectant Stakeholders

As we consider the potential relationship between managers and the group of stakeholders with two of the three identifying stakeholder attrib- utes, we observe a qualitatively different zone of salience. In analyzing the situations in which any two of the three attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-are present, we cannot help but notice the change in mo- mentum that characterizes this condition. Whereas one-attribute low- salience stakeholders are anticipated to have a latent relationship with managers, two-attribute moderate-salience stakeholders are seen a s "ex- pecting something," because the combination of two attributes leads the stakeholder to a n active versus a passive stance, with a corresponding increase in firm responsiveness to the stakeholder's interests. Thus, the level of engagement between managers and these expectant stakehold- ers is likely to be higher. Accordingly:

Proposition lb: Stakeholder salience will be moderate where two of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-re perceived by managers to be present.

We describe the three expectant stakeholder classes (dominant, de- pendent, and dangerous) in the following paragraphs.

Dominant stakeholders. In the situation where stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate, their influence in the firm is assured, since by possessing power with legitimacy, they form the "dominant coalition" in the enterprise (Cyert & March, 1963).We characterize these stakeholders a s "dominant," in deference to the legitimate claims they have upon the firm and their ability to act on these claims (rather than a s a forecast of their intentions with respect to the firm-they may or may not ever choose to act on their claims). It seems clear to us, at least, that the expectations of any stakeholders perceived by managers to have power and legitimacy will "matter" to managers.

Thus, we might expect that dominant stakeholders will have some formal mechanism in place that acknowledges the importance of their relationship with the firm. For example, corporate boards of directors generally include representatives of owners, significant creditors, and community leaders, and there is normally a n investor relations office to handle ongoing relationships with investors. Most corporations have a human resources department that acknowledges the importance of the firm-employee relationship. Public affairs offices are common in firms

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 877

that depend on maintaining good relationships with government. In ad- dition, corporations produce reports to legitimate, powerful stakeholders, including annual reports, proxy statements, and, increasingly, environ- mental and social responsibility reports. Dominant stakeholders, in fact, are those stakeholders that so many scholars are trying to establish a s the only stakeholders of the firm. In our typology dominant stakeholders ex- pect and receive much of managers' attention, but they are by no means the full set of stakeholders to whom managers should or do relate.

Dependent stakeholders. We characterize stakeholders who lack power but who have urgent legitimate claims a s "dependent," because these stakeholders depend upon others (other stakeholders or the firm's managers) for the power necessary to carry out their will. Because power in this relationship is not reciprocal, its exercise is governed either through the advocacy or guardianship of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal management values.

Using the case of the giant oil spill from the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound a s a n example, we can show that several stakeholder groups had urgent and legitimate claims, but they had little or no power to enforce their will in the relationship. To satisfy their claims these stake- holders had to rely on the advocacy of other, powerful stakeholders or on the benevolence and voluntarism of the firm's management. Included in this category were local residents, marine mammals and birds, and even the natural environment itself (Starik, 1993). For the claims of these de- pendent stakeholders to be satisfied, it was necessary for dominant stake- holders-the Alaska state government and the court system-to provide guardianship of the region's citizens, animals, and ecosystems. Here a dependent stakeholder moved into the most salient stakeholder class by having its urgent claims adopted by dominant stakeholders, illustrating the dynamism that can be modeled effectively using the theory and prin- ciples of stakeholder identification and salience suggested here.

Dangerous stakeholders. We suggest that where urgency and power characterize a stakeholder who lacks legitimacy, that stakeholder will be coercive and possibly violent, making the stakeholder "dangerous," liter- ally, to the firm. "Coercion" is suggested a s a descriptor because the use of coercive power often accompanies illegitimate status.

Examples of unlawful, yet common, attempts at using coercive means to advance stakeholder claims (which may or may not be legitimate) in- clude wildcat strikes, employee sabotage, and terrorism. For example, in the 1970s General Motors' employees in Lordstown, Ohio, welded pop cans to engine blocks to protest certain company policies. Other examples of stakeholders using coercive tactics include environmentalists spiking trees in areas to be logged and religious or political terrorists using bomb- ings, shootings, or kidnappings to call attention to their claims. The ac- tions of these stakeholders not only are outside the bounds of legitimacy but are dangerous, both to the stakeholder-manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved.

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It is important for us to note that we, along with other responsible individuals, are very uncomfortable with the notion that those whose ac- tions are dangerous, both to stakeholder-manager relationships a s well a s to life and well-being, might be accorded some measure of legitimacy by virtue of the typology proposed in this analysis. Notwithstanding our discomfort, however, we are even more concerned that failure to identify dangerous stakeholders would result in missed opportunities for mitigat- ing the dangers and in lower levels of preparedness, where no accommo- dation is possible. Further, to maintain the integrity of our approach to better define stakeholders, we feel bound to "identify" dangerous stake- holders without "acknowledging" them, for, like most of our colleagues, we abhor their practices. We are fully aware that society's "refusal to acknowledge" after identification of a dangerous stakeholder, by coun- teracting terror in all its forms, is a n effective counteragent in the battle to maintain civility and civilization. The identification of this class of stake- holder is undertaken with the support of this tactic in mind.

Definitive Stakeholders

Previously, we defined "salience" a s the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims. Thus:

Proposition lc: Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-re perceived by managers to be present.

By definition, a stakeholder exhibiting both power and legitimacy already will be a member of a firm's dominant coalition. When such a stakehold- er's claim is urgent, managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholder's claim. The most common occurrence is likely to be the movement of a dominant stakeholder into the "definitive" category.

For example, in 1993 stockholders (dominant stakeholders) of IBM, General Motors, Kodak, Westinghouse, and American Express became active when they felt that their legitimate interests were not being served by the managers of these companies. A sense of urgency was engendered when these powerful, legitimate stakeholders saw their stock values plummet. Because top managers did not respond sufficiently or appropri- ately to these definitive stakeholders, they were removed, thus dem- onstrating in a general way the importance of a n accurate perception of power, legitimacy, and urgency; the necessity of acknowledgment and action that salience implies; and, more specifically, the conse- quences of the misperception of or inattention to the claims of definitive stakeholders.

Any expectant stakeholder can become a definitive stakeholder by acquiring the missing attribute. As we saw earlier, dependent Alaskan citizens became definitive stakeholders of Exxon by acquiring a powerful

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 879

ally in government. Likewise, the "dangerous" African National Congress became a definitive stakeholder of South African companies when it ac- quired legitimacy by winning free national elections.

RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF A DYNAMIC THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION

In our analysis we have proposed that stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We predict that the salience of a particular stakeholder to the firm's man- agement is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, and high if all three attributes are present.

Dynamism in Stakeholder-Manager Relations

As our earlier discussion demonstrates, latent stakeholders can in- crease their salience to managers and move into the "expectant stake- holder" category by acquiring just one of the missing attributes. If the stakeholder is particularly clever, for example, at coalition building, po- litical action, or social construction of reality, that stakeholder can move into the "definitive stakeholder" category (characterized by high salience to managers), starting from any position-latent, expectant, or potential.

Static maps of a firm's stakeholder environment are heuristically use- ful if the intent is to raise consciousness about "Who or What Really Counts" to managers or to specify the stakeholder configuration at a par- ticular time point. But even though most theorists might try for static clarity, managers should never forget that stakeholders change in sa- lience, requiring different degrees and types of attention depending on their attributed possession of power, legitimacy, and/or urgency, and that levels of these attributes (and thereby salience) can vary from issue to issue and from time to time.

We can observe a n example of stakeholder dynamism in recent events in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) began a s a group with a n urgent claim but not a legitimate one, given the ruling South African culture and government, and it had no power. At first it was a latent, demanding stakeholder. The ANC next moved into the "danger- ous category" by using coercive power. However, this did not lead to definitive status. It was only by acquiring legitimacy while relinquishing the use of coercive power, and thus becoming a dependent stakeholder, that the ANC was able to achieve definitive status, high salience, and eventual success.

Thus, when the ANC moved its urgent claim into the world environ- ment, the claim's legitimacy was established, and the ANC, a s well a s the South Africans it represented, became a n expectant, dependent stake- holder of the multinational enterprises (MNEs) located in South Africa. As a dependent stakeholder, the ANC was able to acquire the protection, advocacy, and guardianship of more salient stakeholders (especially

880 Academy of Management Review October

investors). With the powerful advocacy of these stakeholders, the ANC moved into the "definitive" zone of the stakeholder attribute model for South African MNEs. In fact, it is now widely acknowledged that the worldwide divestment/disinvestment movement, led by MNE stockhold- ers, was a major force in the transformation of the South African system of government and the rise to political power of the ANC (e.g., see Paul, 1992).

Another example of dynamism in stakeholder attributes is offered by Nasi, Nasi, and Savage (1994). This case, involving a business owner, workers, and the courts, illustrates how a dependent stakeholder worker group (one with a legitimate and urgent claim) can increase its salience to a firm's managers by aligning itself with other stakeholders (in this case, a union and the courts) who have the power to impose their will upon a stubborn business owner.

Thus, using our identification typology, we are able to explain stake- holder salience and dynamism systematically. This new capability has implications for management, research, and for the future of the stake- holder framework.

Implications for Management, Research, and Future Directions

On the basis of the model we develop in this article, we can envision refinements in long-standing management techniques designed to assist managers in dealing with multiple stakeholders' interests. Presently, management techniques based on the stakeholder heuristic are being utilized to help managers deal effectively with multiple stakeholder re- lationships. Current methods include identification of stakeholder roles (e.g., employees, owners, communities, suppliers, and customers), analy- sis of stakeholder interests, and evaluation of the type and level of stake- holder power (e.g., see current textbooks by Carroll, 1993; Frederick, Post, Lawrence, & Weber, 1996; and Wood, 1994).

The approach introduced in this paper has the potential to improve upon current practice. To current techniques that emphasize power and interests, the model we suggest adds the vital dimensions of legitimacy and urgency. Further, this model enables a more systematic sorting by managers of stakeholder-manager relationships a s these relationships attain and relinquish salience in the dynamics of ongoing business. In addition, our three-attribute model permits managers to map the legiti- macy of stakeholders and therefore to become sensitized to the moral implications of their actions with respect to each stakeholder. In this sense, our model supports and initiates normative thought in the mana- gerial context. Thus, these refinements contribute to the potential effec- tiveness of managers a s they deal with multiple stakeholder interests. And, a s these refinements find their way into accepted practice, we can further envision subsequent rounds of inquiry, which test whether "new maps" result in "new methods."

Stakeholder theory, we believe, holds the key to more effective man- agement and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society.

1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 88 1

Focusing attention on salience in the manager-stakeholder relationships existing in a firm's environment appears to be a productive strategy for researchers and managers alike in realizing these aspirations. The stake- holder identification typology we have developed here is amenable to empirical operationalization and to the generation of testable hypotheses concerning, for example, predictions about the circumstances under which a stakeholder in one category might attempt to acquire a missing attribute and thus enhance its salience to a firm's managers. We have not developed such operational definitions and hypotheses here, for lack of space, but we believe that such development is the next logical step in articulating completely "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts."

Specifically, we call for empirical research that answers these ques- tions: Are present descriptions of stakeholder attributes adequate? Do the inferences we make herein hold when examining real stakeholder- manager relationships? Are there models of interrelationships among the variables identified here (and possible others) that reveal more subtle, but perhaps more basic, systematics? We realize that for these and other such questions to be addressed, item and scale development, demographic calibration, and second-order model building, among other things, are necessary.

In the process we hope that additional clarity can be achieved at the conceptual level a s well. We ask, what are the implications of this model and its subsequent tests for additional research on power, legitimacy, and urgency? More importantly, are power, legitimacy, and urgency really the correct and parsimonious set of variables in understanding stakeholder- manager relationships? We acknowledge that despite their level of em- phasis in the second Toronto conference, and despite our logical and theoretical justification of their importance in developing a more inferen- tial and empirically based stakeholder theory, other stakeholder attrib- utes also may be well suited to stakeholder analysis-and we call for the critical evaluation of our choices.

Finally, in attempting to build momentum in the development of stakeholder theory, we are acutely aware that we have necessarily made sweeping assumptions that, for the sake of clarity in a preliminary ar- ticulation, are passed over, with the implicit understanding that for the theory to hold, these must be revisited and assessed. For example, we assume and argue that power and legitimacy are distinct attributes. But some might cast one a s a subset of the other. To build our identification typology, we treat each attribute a s "present or absent," when it is clear that each operates on a continuum or series of continua. Each of these issues, and others like them, point toward additional inquiry that can enrich the theory and add to its usefulness.

Conclusion: The Search for Legitimacy in Stakeholder Theory

Many stakeholder scholars, in attempting to narrow the range of "Who or What Really Counts" in a firm's stakeholder environment, are

882 Academy of Management Review October

searching for the bases of legitimacy in stakeholder-manager relation- ships. When scholars such a s Freeman, Clarkson, Donaldson, Preston, and Dunfee argue that stakeholder theory must articulate a "normative core," they are looking for a compelling reason why some claims and some relationships are legitimate and worthy of management attention and why others are not. They discount the importance of power in stake- holder-manager relations, arguing that the important thing is whether the stakeholder has legitimate (e.g., moral, legal, and property-based) claims.

The theory of stakeholder identification and salience developed in this article in no way discredits this search for a legitimate normative core for stakeholder theory. It makes sense to articulate theoretically why cer- tain groups will hold legitimate, possibly stable claims on managers and firm; these are the stakeholders who should really count. Our aim, how- ever, is to expand scholarly and management understanding beyond le- gitimacy to incorporate stakeholder power and urgency of a claim, be- cause these attributes of entities in a firm's environment-and their dynamism over periods of time or variation in issues-will make a critical difference in managers' ability to meet legitimate claims and protect le- gitimate interests. We offer this preliminary theory a s a way of under- standing which stakeholders do really count.

In 1978 William C. Frederick (in a paper subsequently published in 1994) observed that business and society scholarship was in a transition from a moral focus on social responsibility (CSR,) to a n amoral focus on social responsiveness (CSR,). When stakeholder theory focuses only on issues of legitimacy, it acquires the fuzzy moral flavor of CSR,. Focusing only on stakeholder power, however, a s several major organizational theories would lead us to do, yields the amorality and self-interested action focus of CSR,. Instead, we propose a merger.

In sum, we argue that stakeholder theory must account for power and urgency a s well a s legitimacy, no matter how distasteful or unsettling the results. Managers must know about entities in their environment that hold power and have the intent to impose their will upon the firm. Power and urgency must be attended to if managers are to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders.

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Ronald K. Mitchell is a n assistant professor in the Faculty of Business at the University of Victoria. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Utah. His research interests focus on entrepreneurship-specifically, the study of expert information processing theory, strategic management, and stakeholder theory a s they apply to entrepreneurs, ventures, and the venturing environment.

Bradley R. Agle is a n assistant professor of management at the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer- sity of Washington. His research interests include strategic leadership, with par- ticular emphasis on its ethical dimension, moral development, stakeholder theory, and corporate social performance.

Donna 1. Wood is a professor of business administration a t the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. She is a founder and rising president of the International Association for Business and Society (IABS) and has served a s Chair of the Social Issues in Management Division of the Academy of Management. Cur- rently, she is Editor of the IABS journal, Business & Society. Her research interests focus on corporate social performance and stakeholder theory, international busi- ness and society, collaborative social problem solving, business ethics, and busi- ness-government relations.

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Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts Ronald K. Mitchell; Bradley R. Agle; Donna J. Wood The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Oct., 1997), pp. 853-886. Stable URL:

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Lecture 6 Systems-oriented theories/O'Higgins2009(1).pdf

Corporations, Civil Society, and

Stakeholders: An Organizational

Conceptualization Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

ABSTRACT. This article presents a descriptive con-

ceptual framework comprising four different company

configurations with respect to orientations toward cor-

porate social responsibility (CSR). The four types are

Skeptical, Pragmatic, Engaged, and Idealistic. The frame-

work is grounded in instrumental and normative stake-

holder theory, and a company’s configuration is based on

its instrumental and/or normative stance toward stake-

holders. Its configuration indicates what position a com-

pany adopts in relation to CSR. This article argues that

there is no one formula to fit all companies, descriptively

or prescriptively, but the potential variety in approaches

to CSR is not infinite, as it can be distilled logically into a

few fundamental approaches, embodied in the four

organizational configurations presented in the conceptual

framework. Each configuration constitutes a middle-

range theory of interlocking characteristics in terms of

CSR, and so each type of company will assume respon-

sibilities to civil society in ways consistent with its con-

figurational characteristics. The framework incorporates

previous empirical findings and theoretical explanations.

It is intuitively clear and reasonable to managers, and thus,

has practical value in organizational management.

KEY WORDS: stakeholders, corporate social responsi-

bility, organizational configurations

Introduction

Business is increasingly expected to fulfill a role

beyond that of private economic entities that pro-

duce and distribute goods and services, as corporate

social responsibility (CSR) and stakeholders capture

attention (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Indeed, there

are growing beliefs that not only are companies duty

bound to improve civil society, but also are

particularly well-suited to do so (Cumming et al.,

2005; Wilkes, 2005). Large transnational companies

(TNCs), especially those from developed countries,

can have a significant impact on the socioeconomic

well-being of those countries where they have a

presence (Hsieh, 2004; O’Higgins, 2003). However,

the CSR that is increasingly proposed raises a

number of questions. First, what defines CSR? The

range of definitions encompasses factors such as

company values, motives, behavioral features, and

firm and social outcomes (Crilly et al., 2008). Then,

how does CSR relate to the company’s core business

definition? Should companies go beyond their eco-

nomic tasks? How far and under what circumstances

should they do so? What capabilities do companies

need to enact their chosen social ends? What is the

place of stakeholder voice in deciding on forms of

social involvement? Is there a ‘business case’ for

CSR, and should that matter?

Most studies in the literature take a prescriptive

approach to CSR, on a ‘the-more-the-better’ basis.

This article takes a different approach, to show that

there is no one formula or definitive prescription or

description to delineate CSR. Instead, the article

presents an explanatory organizational framework,

grounded in stakeholder theory (Donaldson and

Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994; Phillips, 2003),

which categorizes firms into four types with respect

to their orientation to stakeholders. The types are:

Skeptical, Pragmatic, Engaged, and Idealistic. The

typology is based on a configurational approach.

This means that each configuration is conceived as

an interlocking pattern of elements of organizational

values and behavior dispositions. The notion of

configuration offers a robust synthesis of attributes

and circumstances that lie at the heart of theory

Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 94:157–176 � Springer 2009 DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0254-2

building (Christensen and Sundahl, 2001). The

simultaneous treatment of so many variables makes

the configurational approach more powerful in its

explanatory potential than a contingency one. Sev-

eral authors (Dess et al., 1997; Miller, 1986; Miller

and Friesen, 1984) compare configurations with

contingencies. They argue that it is an oversimpli-

fication to assume that the same relationships exist

among variables, no matter what the other aspects of

organizational context, since contingencies differ,

depending on context itself. Configurations are

predictively useful in the descriptive sense, since a

few common configurations can account for the

variety in a large proportion of organizations. A

partial understanding of the dynamics of a particular

organization is sufficient to predict other features of

the same organization, given its configuration

(Meyer et al., 1993; Miller, 1986). Hence, an

understanding of stakeholder orientations within a

configuration can predict how the organization will

handle its approach to and role in society.

Middle-range theory, developed by sociologist

Merton (1968), used to explain how the pieces of

each configuration act together, occupies the ground

between narrow empiricism and grand universal

theory. Theory of the middle range is especially

suited at the level of typologies (Doty and Glick,

1994; Pinder and Moore, 1979). By their very nat-

ure, configurations are not prone to incremental

change because multiple interlocking elements

mutually reinforce the overall pattern of the con-

figuration when any one or two contingencies are

disturbed. Real change implies a realignment of all

the elements into another viable configuration

(Meyer et al., 1993).

Configurations may be discovered empirically or

conceptually, according to Miller and Friesen

(1984). The empirical approach finds clusters of

similar organizations from multivariate analyses of

descriptive data. The conceptual approach, adopted

in the creation of this stakeholder/CSR framework,

synthesizes the literature, logically incorporating

empirical findings and theoretical explanations.

The article first presents the stakeholder logic of

the four configurations within the framework.

Then, the framework is used to depict how each of

the four organizational configurations would behave

in terms of its approach to CSR. Thus, the article

demonstrates that while there is no grand theory to

give one definitive answer to what firms should and

can do in relation to civil society, the variety is not

infinite but is distillable into the four fundamental

approaches concentrating on ‘what firms are actually

doing’ (Margolis and Walsh, 2003, p. 278), offering

prototypical examples. It examines the issues at the

unit of the individual company, whereby each type

is explained within its own processes and inter-

locking features. Then, the article presents its theo-

retical and practical implications in the final section,

including an inductive research agenda.

A framework of stakeholder orientation

configurations

It is clear that business responds to multiple stake-

holders for myriad reasons in different ways (Berrone

et al., 2007; Brickson, 2007; Clarkson, 1991, 1995;

Jones et al., 2007). The proposed framework delin-

eates this variety of approaches to stakeholders

parsimoniously into a finite number of four config-

urations that explains their broad CSR approaches.

Each configuration consists of clusters of interactive

value system and behavioral characteristics, unique

to that configuration (Fiss, 2007). Since the frame-

work is concerned with CSR approaches, it is par-

ticularly apt to use stakeholder theory, notably

instrumental and normative stakeholder theories

(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994) as a

central parameter to construct the configurations.

Approaches to stakeholders are a way of accessing

aspects of CSR (Jamali, 2008) and expressing orga-

nizational identity (Berrone et al., 2007; Brickson,

2005, 2007). Phillips (2003) regards the stakeholder

domain as notably applicable to organizational

analysis. He argues that one of the features of an

ethics of organizations is that they have ‘substantive

aims’ (p. 56). In the configurational approach, the

firm is deemed to have visions, strategies, goals, and

responsibilities. A perspective of organizations as

responsible entities perceives them as possessing an

ethic of their own, with intent toward stakeholders

and a capacity to act for or against their interests

(Moir, 2001; Pruzan, 2001). The corporation has a

‘personality’ that reflects modes of thinking, behav-

ior, values, and corporate identity (Kay, 1997; Van

de Ven, 2008).

158 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

In a similar manner to Donaldson and Preston

(1995), Freeman (1994) unpacks stakeholder theory

into normative, descriptive, and instrumental dimensions,

but he adds a fourth metaphorical dimension as ‘a

genre of stories about how we could live’ (p. 413).

The framework integrates all four of Freeman’s

dimensions: It is grounded in the normative and

instrumental dimensions; it is descriptive in portraying

extant organizational-stakeholder attitudes and rela-

tionships in different types of firms. The framework

is metaphorical since each configuration or organiza-

tional ‘story’ can be construed as having its own

distinctive character, portrayed by its title name,

which captures a rich interlocking configuration of

dynamic relationships among organizational values,

motives, and behavioral dispositions. With respect to

normative and instrumental stances toward stake-

holders, critically, the framework recognizes that, in

practice, the normative and instrumental can operate

independently of each other, or together, or not at

all, yielding four possible combinations of stake-

holder orientations. Each combination of these

variables, as embodied in a configuration derived

from stakeholder theory, then suggests what attri-

butes and behavior one might expect to see (Bennett

and Elman, 2007). The normative and instrumental

need not be antithetical, as traditionally presented,

and the existence of mixed motives is realized (Di-

Norcia and Tigner, 2000).

Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework and

the four configurations. Before delineating the

configurations in detail, the normative and instru-

mental stakeholder dimensions, and the sense in

which they are applied, is presented.

The normative view

The normative approach to stakeholders draws on its

rationale from a variety of sources. These include

legal precedent, property rights (Donaldson and

Preston, 1995), a Doctrine of Fair Contracts (Free-

man, 1994), Integrated Social Contracts Theory

(ISCT) (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), communi-

tarian thinking (Etzioni, 1998), and the psychology

of managers (Donaldson, 1999). Foremost among

the philosophical traditions supporting normative

stakeholder approaches are Kantianism (Bowie,

1999) and fairness (Phillips, 2003). It is in the sense

of these last two stakeholder conceptions that the

normative dimension is applied to the stakeholder/

CSR framework. This is consistent with the inter-

pretation of the normative dimension applied by

Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 67) when they

defined normative stakeholders as ‘persons or groups

with legitimate interests in procedural and/or sub-

stantive aspects of corporate activity, identified by

their interests in the corporation, whether the cor-

poration has any corresponding functional interest in

them’. The worth of stakeholders does not derive

from worth created for others (Donaldson, 2008).

Consistent with Donaldson’s stance, Bowie

(1999) confirms a normative stakeholder view that

cannot support any action that violates the respect,

dignity, and just consideration due to legitimate

stakeholders, based on a Kantian perspective. Among

the precepts of a moral firm, Bowie also suggests that

every profit-making firm has an imperfect duty of

beneficence, calling on arguments from citizenship

and from gratitude. ‘Corporate citizens’, whose

creation and continued existence are dependent on

society, are expected to contribute to that society.

On the gratitude front, corporations tend to owe the

state more than they contribute in taxes. Fairness

underpinning stakeholder theory is manifested when

all the firm’s stakeholders are recompensed in the

measure that they have incurred costs and damages,

even if the firm has not benefited from those

stakeholder inputs (Bowie, 1999; Phillips, 2003).

This equates to Kaler’s (2006) notion of those with a

moral claim as being stakeholders. Hosmer and

Kiewitz (2005) also take up the fairness concept as

critical in normative stakeholder theory. They en-

dorse four forms of justice – distributive, procedural,

interactional, and informational – that the firm must

IN S

T R

U M

E N

T A

L

HIGH

LOW

LOW

Pragmatic Example – Coca Cola

Engaged Example - Unilever

Skeptical Example – Exxon Mobil

Idealistic Examples – Body Shop; Ben & Jerry’s;

Social Entrepreneurs

NORMATIVE HIGH

Fig. 1. Stakeholder orientation framework.

159Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

afford to stakeholders. Others might go beyond

immediate fairness considerations, to those of

inherited or derivative obligations. For example, if a

company benefits from low wages prevailing in a

country whose government abnegates its responsi-

bilities to provide for the basic health, education, etc.

of its people, the benefiting company steps in to fill

these welfare shortcomings. These are role specific,

perfect responsibilities on the part of the company,

because the local population which has the role of

hosting the company is acknowledged as having the

right to expect recompense from the company,

which has a corresponding obligation (Kaler, 2003).

Finally, there are those who go so far as to argue that

companies owe beneficence to everyone in needy

societies, even if they do not affect those societies

directly, because of the desire for the common good

(Reed, 2002), making everyone a potential stake-

holder, thereby far extending the identification of

potential stakeholders.

The instrumental view

A firm recognizes instrumental stakeholders as those

whom it requires to achieve the ends of the firm

and/or its principals. The needs of stakeholders, their

intrinsic well-being, and their fair treatment are of

secondary interest. These will be catered to only

insofar as they must, to ensure the inputs desired

from the stakeholders concerned. Phillips (2003)

justifies instrumental behavior toward a certain class

of stakeholders whose legitimacy is ‘derivative’.

Kaler (2002) would see them as influencers. These

stakeholders may have no normative claim, but they

can help or harm the firm. Thus, they must be dealt

with accordingly to protect the firm and to fulfill

primary obligations to normative stakeholders.

A stakeholder overview of the four

organizational configurations

The four organizational types vary on a number of

factors ultimately relevant to CSR: organizational

purposes; stakeholder identification and salience;

stakeholder management, performance metrics; and

the boundaries between the firm and stakeholders

(Margolis and Walsh, 2003). The descriptions that

follow are idealized prototypes, portrayed in Table I,

which summarizes the main features of each of the

four configurations.

Organizational purposes

How does the organization conceive of its organi-

zational purposes, i.e., why and for whose benefit

does the company exist? What role, if any, do

stakeholders play in achieving its purposes?

Skeptical configuration companies’ identity is

consistent with the view of the firm as a bundle of

assets which exists solely to provide benefits to its

shareholders/‘owners’ (Schneper and Guillen, 2004).

As per the traditional shareholder versus stakeholder

divide, the Skeptical company does not recognize

stakeholders per se (Letza et al., 2004). Shareholders/

owners alone hold a ‘stake’ in the firm, giving them

the rights to participate in its profits via dividends, its

prospects via capital gains, and its control via voting

rights and approval of directors (Metcalfe, 1998).

The Skeptical firm is not unaware of what Phillips

(2003) designates ‘derivative stakeholders’, but it

would regard them as ‘influencers’, which should be

taken into consideration only to the extent that they

aid or impede the attainment of strategic objectives

(Kaler, 2002). Skeptical firms include those in con-

troversial industries, such as tobacco or gaming

companies. The Skeptical firm also deals with

stakeholders, albeit reluctantly, when the law re-

quires. For example, oil major Exxon (net income in

2008 was $45.2 billion) battled in the courts for

19 years to overturn a punitive fine of $5 billion

awarded against the company to the victims of the

1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Arguably,

ingrained systemic management practices had facili-

tated the disaster in the first place (Hosmer, 1998).

Exxon claimed it had already spent $3.4 billion for

cleanup and compensatory payments, settlements,

and fines. Having fought all the way to the Supreme

Court, in 2008, the company succeeded in having

the fine reduced to $507 million, and so the pay-

ment per person affected (arguably normative

stakeholders) dropped from $75,000 to $15,000.

The Pragmatic firm is instrumental in its recog-

nition of stakeholders, embracing ‘enlightened

stakeholder theory’ in its management of relation-

ships with important constituencies, to optimize

160 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

economic performance. Campbell (1997) argues that

in the ‘economic jungle’, the company needs the

loyalty of its ‘active’ stakeholders. Notably, he de-

fines active stakeholders as those who can affect the

firm’s performance, whose ‘demands are unquench-

able’ (p. 447). Thus, both Skeptical and Pragmatic

firms are single objective in purpose, although

Pragmatic firms are pluralist in the style in which

they implement their strategies. Coca Cola exem-

plifies a Pragmatic company, as it reacts to criticisms

over its water depletion and pollution causing

activities in developing countries by establishing ad

hoc projects to deal with water quality, nutrition, and

education in communities where it operates. It also

publishes an elaborate CSR report, wherein it

addresses the readers in a letter from the CEO as

‘Dear stakeholder’.

The long-term sustainability of the company is at

the heart of the Engaged corporation’s purposes. It

attempts to safeguard itself into the future, by cre-

ating a self-perpetuating virtuous cycle that is good

for all stakeholders, including owners, enabling it to

serve two purposes simultaneously. This kind of

virtuous cycle is depicted very eloquently by Davies

(1999) in the notion of ‘Tomorrow’s Company’,

which ‘treat(s) stakeholders as the spokes of a wheel

– all are needed to move forward and each takes the

load in turn’ (p. 194). Therefore, doing well for all

stakeholders is synonymous with doing well for the

firm, achieving its economic ends by means that

fulfill its deeper purposes and ethical values. It rejects

the traditional trade-off between financial and social

objectives (DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000), preferring

shared values and aspirations among all the firm’s

stakeholders. Similarly, Jones and Wicks (1999)

propose that unitary or ‘convergent’ stakeholder

theory is both normatively sound and practically

viable, based on a rationale that trusting relationships

with stakeholders is good business practice. Unile-

ver, the Anglo-Dutch consumer goods company,

exemplifies such an Engaged company, as it pursues

economic ends in ways that engage positively with

its legitimate stakeholders (Senge et al., 2006).

The Idealistic firm prioritizes the normative, in

pursuit of an ideal world where stakeholders,

selected from a wide pool, matter. The priority

purpose of the firm’s existence is to serve society,

and the firm is a medium for serving stakeholder

interests (Etzioni, 1998). Economic activities are a

T A

B L E

I

F ea

tu re

s o f

th e

st ak

eh o ld

er o ri

en ta

ti o n

fr am

ew o rk

S k ep

ti ca

l P ra

g m

at ic

E n g ag

ed Id

ea li st

ic

O rg

an iz

at io

n al

p u rp

o se

S h ar

eh o ld

er s/

o w

n er

w el

fa re

S h ar

eh o ld

er s/

o w

n er

w el

fa re

F ir

m w

el fa

re ,

em b ra

ci n g

le g it im

at e

st ak

eh o ld

er s

S o ci

et y

w el

fa re

S ta

k eh

o ld

er ID

/s al

ie n ce

N o

st ak

eh o ld

er s,

o n ly

‘g en

er al

in fl u en

ce rs

P o w

er an

d u rg

en cy

N o rm

at iv

e le

g it im

ac y ,

p o w

er an

d

u rg

en cy

, p lu

s d er

iv at

iv e

st ak

eh o ld

er s

N o rm

at iv

e le

g it im

ac y ,

d ep

en d en

cy ,

u rg

en cy

S ta

k eh

o ld

er m

an ag

em en

t R

ea ct

iv e,

co m

p li an

t,

im p er

so n al

C o n v en

ti o n al

, en

li g h te

n ed

se lf -i

n te

re st

, m

it ig

at e

st ak

eh o ld

er p o w

er

F ai

rn es

s, in

te rd

ep en

d en

cy ,

re la

ti o n sh

ip s,

d ia

lo g u e,

tr u st

B en

efi ce

n t

p at

ro n

P er

fo rm

an ce

m et

ri cs

S h ar

eh o ld

er re

tu rn

s P ro

fi ta

b il it y ,

m ar

k et

sh ar

e,

sh ar

eh o ld

er re

tu rn

s

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tu o u s

cy cl

e o f

fi n an

ci al

p er

fo rm

an ce

an d

co rp

o ra

te

so ci

al p er

fo rm

an ce

C o rp

o ra

te so

ci al

im p ac

t

F ir

m an

d st

ak eh

o ld

er

b o u n d ar

ie s

F ir

m d is cr

et e

fr o m

so ci

et y

F ir

m d is cr

et e

fr o m

so ci

et y

In te

g ra

te d

in to

so ci

al n et

w o rk

s

w it h

v ar

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o f

st ak

eh o ld

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k ag

es w

it h

se lf -c

h o se

n

co n st

it u en

ci es

161Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

means toward those social ends, not the other way

around. Managers would opt for the normative

solution in case of a conflict between the instru-

mental and the normative. In general, companies

founded by social entrepreneurs exemplify the Ide-

alistic configuration. Examples of companies in this

category are the toiletries retailer, The Body Shop,

and the ice cream company, Ben and Jerry’s, both of

which were originally founded by owners who used

their companies as vehicles to pursue social aims and

serve stakeholders of their personal choosing.

Stakeholder identification and salience

The different organizational purposes of the four

configurational types, in turn, imply different criteria

for designating who is a stakeholder, and the salience

of designated stakeholders to the firm in achieving its

purposes.

Stakeholder identification is not an issue to

Skeptical firms. This does not preclude dealing

strategically with persons or groups who can help or

hinder the firm, no different to coping with other

important influences. Although it does not recognize

stakeholders, the Skeptical firm is not absolved from

moral obligations toward human beings in general

(Phillips, 2003). Even when considering moral

obligations to all people, Skeptical firms are likely to

practice moral relativism as they maneuver their way

into competitive advantage. Exxon, denounced by

various environmental NGOs and concerned

shareholders, has traditionally been a laggard in

spending on finding renewable energy sources and

in acknowledging the existence of climate change.

However, under pressure, by 2008, the company

launched a campaign, proclaiming its leadership in

solving the global energy challenge by means of

efficiency and technology to secure energy supplies

in an environmentally friendly way, and acknowl-

edging climate change as an issue.

The instrumental stance of Pragmatic firms

advocates that the company must act to please

powerful stakeholders who have the coercive, util-

itarian, or symbolic resources that the company

requires to achieve desired results. According to

Mitchell et al. (1997), salience of particular stake-

holders derives from their power, legitimacy, and

urgency with respect to the focal firm. Michael

Porter’s (1998) popular competitive strategy frame-

work basically exhorts companies to reduce the

power of certain salient stakeholders to attain com-

petitive advantage. As moral relativists, Pragmatic

firms may actually inflict harm on less powerful

stakeholders to serve more powerful ones, regardless

of the normative legitimacy of the less powerful.

Coca Cola defended its continuing sponsorship of

the Olympics in Beijing, against critics who deplore

China’s human rights record, and support of a re-

gime which apparently practices genocide in Sudan.

Coca Cola itself operates in Sudan, despite an em-

bargo, by using a loophole. Coca Cola’s defense rests

on its longstanding support for Olympic ideals and

investment of $5 million for clean water in Sudan

(Coca Cola 2008 net income was $5.8 billion) and

various other projects in health and education, as

well as claiming a behind-the-scenes search for a

socio-political solution (Isdell, 2008).

In Engaged firms, the power of stakeholders is not

ignored, but normative obligations – duties of fair-

ness toward legitimate stakeholders, consent, stake-

holders as ends in themselves – prevent subverting

the rights of a group of legitimate stakeholders in

favor of another more powerful but less legitimate

one, unless it had longer-term beneficial conse-

quences for the less powerful group with normative

claims. Legitimate stakeholders emerge naturally in

the course of everyday business with those in the

Engaged firm’s task environment (Zenisek, 1979).

Especially important are those with firm-specific

commitments, such as employees, managers, share-

holders, creditors, and the local community (Blair

and Stout, 1999). Thus, Engaged firms regard

responsibilities to firm-specific stakeholders and

shareholders as role specific and perfect (Kaler,

2003). They integrate both power and legitimacy in

stakeholder identification and salience. While diffi-

cult to effect practically, such a reconciliation may be

achieved through Phillips’ (2003) formulation of

two types of stakeholders – those whose status is

based on normative foundations, and the derivative

stakeholders whose status is based on their power.

Engaged firms become institutionalized in their

normative orientation, contrary to Pragmatic ones

which adopt temporary, ad hoc, ‘as if’ normative

attitudes to stakeholders. This ‘as if’ normative

behavior (Donaldson, 1999) in Pragmatic firms will

be non-resistant to economic pressures to abandon

162 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

it, since they regard responsibilities to stakeholders as

‘imperfect’, i.e., discretionary (Kaler, 2003). In

contrast, in a conflict between the normative and

instrumental, the Engaged firm would try to resolve

the conflict by finding an imaginative resolution in

collaboration with affected stakeholders (Driver,

2006; Maharaj, 2008).

Idealistic organizations acknowledge as legitimate

stakeholders only those with normative claims on

the firm, dismissing Phillips’ (2003) derivative

stakeholders. However, the Idealistic firm would

designate as normative a wider range of stakeholders

than the other organizational types. Whereas the

Engaged firm acknowledges as normative stake-

holders those in its task environment, with an

interest in the firm and affected by its operations, the

Idealistic firm extends its designation of its stake-

holders beyond this, shouldering responsibility for

those it would like to help, extending role-speci-

ficity and perfect obligations very widely (Kaler,

2003). Indeed, Idealistic firms see their managers as

fiduciaries for all of society, the broadest view of

what is a stakeholder, and one questioned by those

with an anti-stakeholder inclination (Kaler, 2006).

Many Idealistic firms are established with the express

intention of addressing a particular cause or stake-

holder class, as happens with social entrepreneurs

(Nicholls 2006).

Stakeholder management

The four organizational types base their decisions

and actions with respect to stakeholders on their

different approaches toward strategic analysis.

The Skeptical firm carries out strengths–weak-

nesses–opportunities–threats (SWOT) analyses in

pursuit of competitive advantage, listing stakeholders

as opportunities or threats or competitive forces to

be dealt with in the same way as any pressures. This

stance corresponds to coercion (Stoney and Win-

stanley, 2001) or ‘reactivity’ (Clarkson, 1991, 1995).

Skeptical firms deal with these ‘forces’, complying

with prohibitions and obligations, although they can

cross the line into manipulation (Arnstein, 1969). As

examples, tobacco companies provide selective flat-

tering information in their CSR reports; Exxon

ranks in the lowest tier among oil companies on

openness about sums paid to host countries for oil,

and other details of its revenues, according to a

survey by Transparency International, the anti-cor-

ruption watchdog (www.transparency.org).

The instrumentalist affirmation of stakeholder

power in Pragmatic firms finds its expression in

stakeholder mapping techniques, whereby high

power/interest/urgency stakeholders are designated

as key players, thus demanding the undivided

attention of management. This corresponds to

Clarkson’s (1991, 1995) ‘defensive’ category, doing

only what is required, taking a public relations ap-

proach. These firms are likely to abandon stake-

holders as soon as their common interests cease to

coincide, or there is no business case for it (Steger

et al., 2007). Pragmatic organizations may forestall

stakeholder activism through various mechanisms,

including placation and co-optation which may take

the form of ‘dialogue’ with hand-selected stake-

holder focus groups, often mediated by consultants

hired by the firm (Thomson and Bebbington, 2005).

Engaged firms may also use stakeholder mapping,

but as a starting point to help identify both norma-

tive and instrumental stakeholders and their interests.

The Engaged configuration, which embraces both

the normative and instrumental, is consistent with

‘accommodation’ and being ‘proactive’, since it ac-

cepts responsibility and does all that is required, but

may go further when it makes sense in terms of its

relationships and business model (Clarkson, 1991,

1995). Engaged firms move on to dialogue and

exploration of issues of common concern to the firm

and the identified stakeholders. It is suggested that

the implementation of fairness at the core of stake-

holder legitimacy should take place in a context of

cooperation and communicative action (Roloff,

2008). The quality of the interaction and relation-

ships between the Engaged firm and its stakeholders

can be distinguished from that of the Pragmatic firm.

In the latter, interaction with stakeholders may take

place largely for public relations, placatory, or

compliance reasons.

Thomson and Bebbington (2005) point out that

compliance with codified CSR standards such as

AA1000 has little to do with stakeholder engage-

ment. (AA1000, issued by the Institute of Social and

Ethical Accountability, is one of a myriad of CSR

performance standards proposed by various bodies

positioning themselves as social auditors and certifi-

cation organizations.) Genuine stakeholder engage-

163Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

ment implies the discussion of issues which concern

stakeholders within an explicit mutually reflexive

accountability context, placing stakeholders as co-

principals, rather than as objects – circumstances

likelier to prevail in the Engaged firm than in the

other configurations. It is ‘relational’, having moved

away from ‘managing’ stakeholders to building vig-

orous, long-term, resilient relationships with them

within networks (Lozano, 2005). These are media

for continuous learning, co-creating platforms for

mutual advantage, building communities of practice

to develop knowledge, innovation, and an accu-

mulation of critical resources from a diversity of

competencies and perspectives, in an ongoing

atmosphere of trust (Roloff, 2008).

In Idealistic firms, an internally generated ‘phi-

losophy’ or ‘ethos’ dictates approaches to stake-

holders (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). It is

‘proactive’, characterized by corporate behavior that

promotes the interests of stakeholders, broadly des-

ignated, exceeding requirements (Clarkson, 1991,

1995). Sometimes, their principled stance toward

stakeholders is an intrinsic part of their unique

positioning, and self-professed Idealistic firms may

use social actions as a way of reinforcing their own

social identity and image, as have Ben and Jerry’s and

The Body Shop.

Performance metrics

It follows that since each of the four configurations

has different purposes, they should assess their success

in performance according to their purpose, consistent

with how they are trying to achieve those purposes in

terms of their stakeholder management practices.

Since the Skeptical firm sees itself as answerable

only to shareholders and optimizing shareholder

welfare, it would aim to maximize classic share-

holder value creation measures.

The purely instrumental perspective of the Prag-

matic firm means that intermediate financial and

market performance, such as profitability and market

share gains ultimately impact shareholder returns.

These intermediate measures are boosted because

the firm performs well in its business operations

through its supposed due attention to powerful

stakeholders. This is eventually rewarded when the

shareholders gain.

The long-term viability of the Engaged firms’

approach depends on the supposition that firms

which are doing well financially have the means to

invest in Corporate Social Performance (CSP),

which in turn, contributes to enhanced financial

performance, providing overall ‘positive synergy’ in

a self-reinforcing performance cycle (Waddock and

Graves, 1997). Engaged firms are more likely to

justify their CSR activities on values and motivation

than on assigning precise metrics to demonstrate the

business case (Steger et al., 2007). Thus, in Engaged

firms, awareness of stakeholder concerns may inau-

gurate a virtuous cycle that contributes to both

stakeholder and strategic performance. Senge et al.

(2006) show how Unilever’s work with a number of

partners on projects in developing countries is of real

value to various beneficiary stakeholders and to

Unilever itself, within a learning context.

Idealistic firms reckon their success to the extent

that they satisfy or benefit their legitimate stake-

holders as an end in itself, where anyone whose

needs they feel obliged to answer qualifies as their

stakeholder.

The boundaries between the firm and stakeholders

The corporation can see itself as a private body,

separate to society, defined as a nexus of contracts

and a set of relationships between principals and

agents (Kay and Silberston, 1995; Schneper and

Guillen, 2004). In contrast, the corporation can see

itself as a social institution, a vehicle for executing

the interests of a wide variety of stakeholders from

within and without, with the boundary between the

corporation and society regarded as permeable or

even non-existent.

Skeptical and Pragmatic firms perceive themselves

as discrete entities within their wider environments.

In a typology of stakeholder identity developed by

Brickson (2005), both Skeptical and Pragmatic firms

could be seen as Individualistic in the way that they

promote their own uniqueness and welfare. The

nature of their contractual view of relationships is

transactional for both Skeptical and Pragmatic firms,

but Skeptical ones are likelier to regard contracts as

more impersonal, whereby the firm is defined as

‘a group of people who find it expedient every

morning to renew their contracts with each other’

164 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

(Kay, 1997, p. 135). Exxon resisted the will of the

descendants of John D. Rockefeller, the company

founder, when they and other shareholders chal-

lenged its corporate governance structures and its

reluctance to finding alternative energy sources. It was

easy to ignore the Rockefeller family when the

company posted the second largest ever first quarter

profit ($10.9 billion) in US history in 2008. Pragmatic

firms would not be as unresponsive, since the salience

of ongoing relationships with individuals and groups is

important, albeit, assessed in instrumental terms. This

attitude is seen in Coca-Cola’s ad hoc social projects.

The Engaged firm acknowledges its mutual

interdependence with its internal and external

stakeholders. It recognizes multiple objectives and an

array of stakeholders with legitimate claims on the

firm through its primary and secondary interaction

within the milieus within which it operates, as a

node in a complex network of interrelated stake-

holders (Roloff, 2008). Hence, it is embedded in

civil society through these stakeholder obligations

and networks (Lozano, 2005), part of its task envi-

ronment (Zenisek, 1979). Simultaneously, the En-

gaged firm, anchored in economic reality, takes its

role seriously in the efficient provision of goods and

services. Thus, Engaged firms can be seen as hybrid

Relational/Collectivistic/Individualistic in Brick-

son’s (2005) stakeholder typology, since they con-

nect specifically to stakeholders with whom they

have a particular relationship, while still viewing the

organization as part of an extended collective.

Moreover, they have to pursue economic aims at the

same time. Interpreting and fulfilling these concur-

rent roles involves a strong normative dimension

(Phillips, 2003), exemplified in serious stakeholder

dialogue conducted by Unilever to promote sus-

tainable food production (Senge et al., 2006). Also,

investors, interested in a social agenda, may well be

attracted to Engaged companies.

Idealistic firms strive for civil society enhance-

ment through selected causes and initiatives, which

may or may not be related to their main business.

Thus, they may not be as embedded as Engaged

firms. The limits they place on their stakeholder

involvements are discretionary, perhaps based on

management preferences, often from concentrated

owners, as in the Ben and Jerry’s and Body Shop

cases. Both companies actively pursued selected so-

cial causes whilst majority owned by their idealistic

founders. Alternatively, Idealistic firms’ causes may

be backed by their activist social investment funds

(Nicholls, 2006). Since they do not confine them-

selves to those whom they affect in their task envi-

ronment, even indirectly, Idealistic firms regard an

extensive swathe of potential stakeholders as their

concern and therefore as being responsible to them.

In Brickson’s (2005) typology, Idealistic firms are

collectivist, but paradoxically individualistic, often

acutely self-conscious of their own unique identity.

An example is Anita Roddick, founder of The Body

Shop, who entitled her book Business as Unusual and

stated that she was inclined to see where her com-

petitors were going and turn 180� (Roddick, 2005).

Organizational CSR preferences

Corporate involvement with civil society is open to

discretion, and a great deal of variety in attitudes and

behavior is seen in the way this discretion is exercised

via CSR. In the configurational framework, the way

that a firm expresses its broader interactions with

society through its CSR preferences is intertwined

with the way it perceives and deals with stakeholders.

The stakeholder orientation framework is able to

classify the variety of CSR approaches within the four

organizational configurations. These are delineated

under a number of categories, significant in under-

standing CSR attitudes and behavior. The categories

are: how the firm senses stimuli for CSR involvement;

how response options are generated and evaluated;

how the chosen option is implemented; and impact on

the firm itself (Driver, 2006; Margolis and Walsh,

2003). Table II summarizes the CSR preference

stances of the four types of firms.

Sensing stimuli for CSR involvement

What provokes CSR involvement by companies?

How do they become conscious of a social need that

they can fill, and why should they want to act on this

knowledge?

Skeptical firms are not sensitized to notice the

needs of civil society in their environmental scan-

ning, although they may take up what amount to

CSR behaviors in response to some perceived

opportunities and threats, as a specific strategic

solution. When Exxon contracted to build a pipeline

165Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

carrying oil from Chad, an African country, the

company was placed under certain obligations to

make provision for health and education resources

for the affected local population. These conditions,

and others, regarding environmental preservation,

and essential facilities for the inhabitants came about

after pressure from up to 250 NGOs and the World

Bank, groups whose consent was a necessary part of

Exxon’s license to operate in Chad.

Pragmatic companies may sense initially that they

had better get involved from strategic analysis

exercises, such as mapping techniques, or from

stakeholder forums. They take action for defensive

reasons if they are under pressure to do so from

stakeholders on whom they depend, and to whose

power they defer. More positive reasons may also

propel Pragmatic firms to act on behalf of dependent

stakeholders. It may be a reputation bolstering

exercise. For example, Coca Cola actively proclaims

its AIDS prevention and treatment programs for its

employees in Africa to legitimize its operations, but

it also enhances the reliability of its workforce.

Engaged firms obtain feedback in dialogue with

primary and secondary stakeholders in their networks

to bring attention to social needs where they might

play a role. Similar to Pragmatic firms, they attend to

signals from powerful stakeholders. However, they

also attend to messages from less powerful stake-

holders, i.e., those who are considered legitimate on

a normative basis. The Engaged firm aspires to

compensate individuals and groups affected by the

firm, according to the fairness principle (Phillips,

2003). An instance of an Engaged company’s notion

of its normative obligations might arise if it employs

large numbers of workers in developing countries.

The company may receive more in terms of payroll

savings, tax breaks, and grants than it has put back

into the economy. Thus, it can be argued that it

should offset the shortfall by providing training,

education, and healthcare for its workers and

recompense others adversely affected by its presence

in the country. This is in line with Bowie’s (1999)

declaration of beneficence out of obligation or

Kaler’s (2003) role-specific perfect responsibilities.

Further, Engaged companies would accept Hsieh’s

(2004) extended notion of beneficence beyond their

task environment if it is a matter of ‘rescue’. This

must satisfy three conditions: the harm in question is

a grave one; the company is in a position to correct

T A

B L E

II

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an iz

at io

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166 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

the harm, and prevention or reversal of the harm is of

little cost relative to the harm eradicated. An example

that satisfies these conditions is Unilever’s engage-

ment in a research project with the NGO, Oxfam, to

investigate and enhance the impacts of MNCs on

poverty reduction in developing countries.

The Idealistic firm takes its normative responsibil-

ities even further, acting for the benefit of those it

designates as stakeholders, beyond its direct and

indirect task environment. On a Kantian basis, it

acknowledges a duty of beneficence from citizenship

(the common good), or of gratitude (to make up for

shortfalls in its contribution) (Bowie, 1999). Consis-

tent with the arguments of critical theorists, Idealistic

companies from developed countries operating in

developing countries, especially those which lack the

political, economic, and sociocultural conditions en-

joyed by people in developed countries, feel obliged

to compensate for these shortcomings, to direct

stakeholders and the wider community alike (Reed,

2002). They advocate that companies from developed

countries should provide the civil and political rights

that negligent or corrupt agents fail to provide to the

populace in developing countries. This is on the basis

that they are there on the sufferance of the people

rather than by the rights granted by a legitimate

authority.

In summary, Skeptical firms are not stimulated to

CSR per se. Pragmatic firms are stimulated to CSR by

powerful stakeholders, especially with urgent de-

mands. Engaged firms are stimulated by powerful and

legitimate stakeholders in the firm’s task environment,

based primarily on fairness. Idealistic firms are stimu-

lated to social action by their own purposes and by

legitimate and urgent stakeholders. Legitimacy is

based on need and urgency, as perceived by the Ide-

alistic firm.

Generation and evaluation of CSR options

When they decide to take sociopolitical action, how

do firms generate their potential responses? On what

bases do they determine what action to take? Whom

do they involve in the decision process and how?

The way companies habitually take decisions with

respect to their stakeholder orientation offers insights

about decision making with respect to CSR.

Skeptical firms do not expressly consider taking

social action. However, when Skeptical firms rec-

ognize the strategic advantages of a particular stra-

tegic or tactical approach, it may have secondary

incidental social impacts, beneficial or detrimental

(DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000). For example, in cer-

tain circumstances, Skeptical firms might find it

expedient to provide philanthropic donations for

social programs to strengthen their competitive

positioning, as Exxon does. Skeptical firms might

also try to divert attention away from otherwise

questionable activities. Examples may be found in

tobacco companies which subsidize medical research

or alcoholic beverage producers which contribute

to, or even organize, anti-binge drinking campaigns.

The costs and benefits of CSR are weighed up

carefully by Pragmatic companies for their effects on

the bottom line and/or shareholder well-being.

Since the social actions of Pragmatic firms are carried

out for instrumental reasons in pursuit of economic

objectives, they are assessed only on the extent to

which they satisfy these economic objectives.

Alternatives are assessed to find the one that puts the

firm into the most advantageous position vis-à-vis its

salient stakeholders, either by answering the de-

mands of the stakeholders sufficiently to placate

them, or, mitigating their power over the firm. For

example, banks, which are under pressure from

NGOs not to finance projects that harm the envi-

ronment or involve human rights abuses, may agree

to refrain from individual loans on an ad hoc basis

(Maitland, 2004). This example illustrates the

piecemeal episodic approach adopted by Pragmatic

firms to CSR involvement. Pragmatic firms also

copy precedents by other companies, where social

action has been used to enhance economic perfor-

mance. Indeed, stakeholder activism is giving rise to

a common set of institutionalized responses by cor-

porations, as seen in the mission statements and

glossy CSR reports now issued by all large compa-

nies, irrespective of underlying social values and

motives (Bartkus and Glassman, 2008).

The generation of alternative CSR options is

complex in Engaged firms, because they may have to

balance conflicting demands and to foresee a cascade

of consequences, rather than making just one simple

decision. Moreover, their method of generation

differs to that of Pragmatic companies, as Engaged

firms participate in discourse with all those primary

167Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

and secondary stakeholders, to whom they believe

they owe fairness, often on specific issues (Roloff,

2008). They may also engage with a range of con-

stituencies, such as NGOs, to tap relevant expertise.

The benefits of dialogue are numerous. Apart from

resolving possible tension and obtaining cooperation,

it can build trust and reputation and reduce the risk of

public attacks on the company. Moreover, discourse

and collaboration with an extensive network of

stakeholders may also constitute opportunities to

generate more imaginative and entrepreneurial social

involvement alternatives that will ultimately yield

competitive advantages (Roloff, 2008). Unilever’s

multi-stakeholder projects on sustainable food pro-

vision and on mitigating poverty came out of this kind

of thinking.

There are risks in stakeholder dialogue around

social involvement: creating overly high expecta-

tions; sterile repetitive discussion; lack of internal

support within the firm or stakeholder groups; or a

breakdown of confidence and trust. Networking,

communication, and partnering skills and experience

are necessary to avoid these mishaps (Sagawa and

Segal, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). This implies a

requirement for a mentality that differs from the

debate, zero-sum game type of interaction to which

many managers are comfortably accustomed.

Idealistic firms may not have quite the range of

stakeholders that Engaged companies have in their

task environment, since they tend to be smaller,

more focused companies. Therefore, they are un-

likely to have the critical mass to be involved across a

broad spectrum. If they are Idealistic firms ab initio,

they may well be concentrating on some particular

aspect of social entrepreneurship. An example is

ApproTEC, a firm which creates and markets simple

and inexpensive tools in Tanzania and Kenya. Its

best known product is an irrigation pump called the

MoneyMaker, costing just $38–78. It eliminates the

need to draw water from wells with ropes and

buckets. The company was founded by entrepreneur

Martin Fischer, who went for many years without a

salary, gratified that ApproTEC’s products generated

an additional $33 million in wages and profit a year.

ApproTEC is supported by Geneva-based Schwab

Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, which

supports late-stage social entrepreneurs. Some Ide-

alistic companies may chop-and-change different

causes along the way, less integrated with the busi-

ness of the enterprise, depending on the predilec-

tions of the company leadership. The leaders may

have fixed ideas of what causes to support, and how,

so that they may go their own way, rather than plan

with others, even their beneficiaries, as was typical of

Anita Roddick in The Body Shop. This may leave

some Idealistic firms open to charges of meddling

and paternalism, perpetuating the dependency that

prevents beneficiaries from being enabled to manage

their own affairs (Margolis and Walsh, 2003).

In summary, as regards the generation and eval-

uation of CSR involvement options, Skeptical firms

may produce beneficial and/or harmful social effects

as a by-product of strategic decisions, not concerned

with CSR per se. Pragmatic companies use a com-

petitive strategic analysis and imitation of successful

firms to find alternative social activities, choosing

those that advance their economic goals as efficiently

and effectively as possible. Engaged firms hold dis-

course with stakeholders along with strategic analysis

to generate social action alternatives. In agreement

with their beneficiaries, other stakeholders and

partners, they choose those that offer the best sus-

tainable balance of effectiveness and efficiency for

the firm and its legitimate stakeholders. Idealistic

companies generate and evaluate social action alter-

natives in accordance with their own ethos and

purposes and their individualistic choices of CSR

projects.

Implementation of chosen CSR options

The nature of implementation of CSR involvement

is consistent with the reasoning behind the action, as

per the particular configuration, and varies according

as whether the company itself takes direct action, or

it is outsourced. Companies might work in part-

nership with others, often NGOs which brought the

need to the attention of the company initially.

Implementation may also vary along the temporal

dimension; the action taken ranges from once-off, to

ongoing and long-term.

The CSR activities of Skeptical companies are

merely by-products of their strategic approach, such

as Exxon’s activities in Chad, mentioned above.

Meanwhile, a Pragmatic company takes action on

the basis of enlightened self-interest, consistent with

its instrumental stance. A social project may be taken

168 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

on to resolve a particular stakeholder issue for the

company, which does what is in its own immediate

interest and may withdraw support if involvement

no longer suits that interest. For instance, Coca

Cola’s water quality projects in developing countries

are a direct response to allegations of water depletion

and contamination by the company in its operations.

Both Pragmatic and Engaged companies choose

CSR initiatives that are related to the stakeholder

domains of their task environment. However, the

Engaged firms behave in a way that not only en-

hances the economic purposes of the firm, but also

best achieves the intent of the action on behalf of its

beneficiaries and social outcomes, compatible with

normative principles, by working out an agenda

with others. Also similar to Pragmatic companies,

Engaged firms partner with others to take social

action. However, Engaged firms are more likely to

develop ongoing integrative collaborations that span

several projects to create lasting impact. The capacity

of Engaged firms to collaborate with stakeholders

may encourage them to form long-term alliances

with companies with which they trade, as well as

with other actors (Balogun and Hailey, 2004; Sag-

awa and Segal, 2000; Senge et al., 2006). It is

through such alliances, that the Engaged company

upgrades entrepreneurship and technical and mana-

gerial skills in its communities to spread best practice.

In addition, the Engaged company may develop

effective business networks or ecosystems. These can

include vertical supply–chain relationships and hor-

izontal clustering. The UN Commission on the

Private Sector & Development suggests that such

business ecosystems bypass weak regulatory envi-

ronments in developing countries by creating private

capacity for regulation and enforcement within the

network (UNDP, 2004). As more of these ecosys-

tems are established, best practice could become the

widespread norm, through mimetic processes. An

example of such a network is Hindustan Lever Ltd.,

a Unilever subsidiary in India. Its product sales

ecosystem includes 80 manufacturing facilities, 150

small and medium enterprise suppliers, employing

up to 40,000 people, 7000-plus stockists, 12,000

wholesalers and small retailers, 300,000 shop owners,

and 150,000 entrepreneurs in remote villages

(UNDP, 2004). Developing new business models to

cater to hitherto huge unserved markets of poor

consumers ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’ can add up

to value creation for the firm, and a better life and

dignity for the poor themselves (Prahalad, 2004).

Idealistic firms can be found engaging directly

with the local community in the context of their

core activities or through extracurricular good works

in the community. An example is Grupo Ecologico

Sierra Gordo in Mexico, founded by Pati Ruiz

Corozo, after abandoning a career as a violinist. The

company works with residents of the region to

preserve the environment with sustainable programs

including commercial tree planting and eco-tourism.

Idealistic firms are active, either on their own, or

working with NGOs. Since CSR involvement is

core to their mission, even when Idealistic firms

work with partners, they want direct control of

contact and activity with those whom they consider

their legitimate stakeholders or beneficiaries, a

characteristic of The Body Shop in its CSR projects.

In summary, as regards deliberate implementation

of CSR involvement, Skeptical firms may produce

beneficial social effects as spin-offs to their ordinary

strategic approaches. Both Pragmatic and Engaged

firms implement CSR by themselves or by out-

sourcing or partnership. However, Pragmatic firms

act in an episodic manner, depending on their own

needs entirely, while Engaged firms are more likely

to implement CSR in an ongoing continuous

manner, depending on both their own and social

needs. Idealistic firms implement their social actions,

episodically or continuously, by themselves or by

outsourcing or partnership depending on their

immediate preferences and resource constraints.

Impact of CSR involvement on the firm

Does social involvement leave any lasting mark on

the firm itself, and if so, how and why? The nature

of the involvement will determine these effects,

according to configuration patterns.

While the Skeptical firm does not get involved in

social action intentionally, the question is still rele-

vant. Forced social involvement, such as alcoholic

beverage companies which support anti-binge

drinking campaigns is actually calculated to maintain

the company fundamentally as it is and to stave off

any threats to change it. Exxon’s late attention to

climate change is a defensive, self-preservative

reaction. This type of action corresponds to Argyris

169Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

and Schon’s concept of ‘single-loop learning’. Sin-

gle-loop learning entails taking corrective action in a

defensive manner to preserve existing paradigms.

When this action is successful, the organization

learns to repeat the behavior (Argyris and Schon,

1978). Thus, if its social impacts, even unintended,

produce positive consequences for shareholders,

then the Skeptical firm may repeat the particular

behavior insofar as it produces net benefits for itself,

but without any fundamental change in its social

outlook.

Pragmatic companies carry out social actions lar-

gely to enable the company to preserve and enhance

its strategic positioning. Thus, self-change is not part

of the CSR agenda. The instrumentally oriented

relationships and transactional approach with stake-

holders that typify the Pragmatic firm are likely to

induce ‘either–or’ thinking rather than ‘and–and’

thinking (Driver, 2006), as expressed in a win–lose

attitude (Argyris et al., 1985). In the disposition of

single-loop learning, if CSR activity is synergistic

with its own economic success, it may become a

defensive habit, on the supposition that social per-

formance within firms become self-reinforcing

(Waddock and Graves, 1997). For example, there is

some evidence that Coca Cola’s widespread pro-

motion of sport for well-being is becoming a CSR

strand that stands on its own. However, the limited

nature of this change illustrates that generally, a

Pragmatic firm’s discrete, ad hoc reactive social

projects, do not provide the contextual institution-

alized routines (Selznick, 1983) that sustain funda-

mental change in the overall nature of its

configuration.

Engaged firms are most likely of the four con-

figurations to experience internal change from their

social impact activities. In order to reconcile both

economic and normative criteria, the Engaged firm

has to apply thought and imagination. The ‘rela-

tional’ Copernican perspective (Lozano, 2005) im-

plies an ongoing interchange of ideas between the

firm and society. These interactions can provide a

learning medium for the absorption of knowledge

and skills which lead to competence development

and improvement in general business processes.

However, intense meaningful interaction and col-

laboration may result in even more fundamental

change in both the firm and the society where it

enacts its social measures (McEvily and Marcus,

2005). In the Hindustan Lever example mentioned

earlier, Unilever has begun adding managers from

developing country subsidiaries to its board of

directors and top management committees at its own

head office (Hart and Sharma, 2004). Engaged firms

fit into their trading peers’ ecosystems, particularly in

their international locations. The nature of the

change in Engaged firms is made possible by ‘dou-

ble-loop learning’ as espoused by Argyris et al. 1985

and Argyris and Schon, 1978). Double-loop learning

entails reflection on underlying assumptions about

ideas, policies, and goals, before arriving at a solution

to a problem. This reflection is usually carried out

publicly with others in a joint problem-solving

exercise (Argyris, 1990).

Idealistic firms are unlikely to change in the

course of implementing social action, since they

perceive themselves primarily as virtuous change

agents, not as objects for changing. They hold

themselves up as role models to their peers and

might work to help reform them. Paradoxically,

Idealistic companies could be forced to take action in

a less idealistic direction, as they engage with the real

world. They may have to compromise to achieve

their utopian purposes, as they realize that they are

not achievable unless they have the necessary assets

and political influence. Therefore, they will have to

recognize and work with those Phillips (2003) terms

‘derivative’ stakeholders, whose participation is

necessary to achieve the aims of the firm and its

normative stakeholders. The solutions adopted are in

the nature of corrective action, i.e., single-loop

learning. Many Idealistic firms are social entrepre-

neurs. If they want to keep growing and broaden

their domain, then they are likely to encounter

tough competitors and trading partners with whom

they must deal on an instrumental basis. For instance,

pioneer companies adopting a fair trade business

model are increasingly confronted by powerful

mainstream rivals also adopting fair trade products as

part of their strategic approach (Beattie, 2005).

Paradoxically, both Ben and Jerry’s and The Body

Shop were able to ensure their survival only by

being acquired by larger companies, albeit with

guarantees to safeguard their missions and social

values.

In summary, as regards the impact of CSR on the

firm itself, Skeptical, Pragmatic, and Idealistic firms

remain largely unchanged through corrective single-

170 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

loop learning, while Engaged firms may experience

substantial internal changes through double-loop

learning. The propensity for organizations to retain

an illusory autonomous, unified, stable self, as con-

trasted with narratives of an interdependent, dynamic

self, through CSR (Driver, 2006), parallel the con-

trast between the configurations in the framework,

which attempt to maintain themselves as they are and

those that change themselves through social action.

Implications and conclusions

The stakeholder orientation framework offers a

rationale for the variety of instrumental and norma-

tive contingencies that guide CSR characteristics.

While there are no general answers governing all

firms, the variety can be assessed in a systematic way

through configurations. The framework is econom-

ical in distilling a number of variables and contem-

poraneous interdependencies among them. Each

configuration makes sense in its own right in the way

all the pieces operate together in the interior and

exterior facing orientations and conduct of the firm,

including approaches to its place in civil society.

The configurational approach in the framework

advances the development of descriptive stakeholder

theory, where a gap has been identified (Brickson,

2007). It integrates all the components of stakeholder

theory previously identified by Freeman (1994):

normative, instrumental, descriptive, and meta-

phorical. The synthesis of stakeholder and CSR

thinking embodied in the framework also incorpo-

rates previous stakeholder typologies built on single

dimensions (Brickson, 2007; Clarkson, 1991, 1995;

Jones et al., 2007). The historical tension between

economic and civil society activities in corporate life

is addressed, as is the popular justification of CSR by

treating it as instrumental to economic purposes.

Patterns are predicted in the ways that different types

of companies address the tension, embedded in their

adoption of instrumental and/or normative orien-

tations. Different firms may be effective in their own

ways, and prescriptions may be counterproductive.

More is not always better. Higher responsiveness

levels, as advocated by Clarkson (1991, 1995) may

not be desirable in all situations, especially when

attempting to achieve a fair balance among the de-

mands and needs of many stakeholders.

Most CSR proponents present ‘business case

based’ logic as a way of solving the tension between

economic and social goals, by reasoning that

achieving social goals will enhance economic per-

formance (McWilliams et al., 2006; Porter and

Kramer, 2006) and protect the license to operate

(Post, 2002). This is basically instrumental. Among

hundreds of studies attempting to prove the business

case, including meta-analyses, some do show a po-

sitive relationship, but many provide evidence of no

relationship or mixed results, and even a negative

relationship (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky

et al., 2003; Wu, 2006). This vein of research is

beset with measurement, methodological, and

interpretation problems. Further, dependence on the

business case to justify social involvement begs the

question of what to do when the business case does

not apply. The business case argument accounts only

for CSR that attends to the demands of stakeholders

with influence over the fortunes of the firm. Hence,

matching/mismatching in the stakeholder frame-

work presented in this article explains some of the

inconsistent findings on the link between corporate

social and financial performance. The matching of

firms with CSR choices, based on their skills and

competences, and on preferences with which they

can cope avoids misalignments between actual,

communicated, and conceived identities. (Van de

Ven, 2008). It may be that when social involvement

is at odds with the nature of the firm – its overall

purposes, how it identifies stakeholders, its bases of

action, and its conception of the relationship be-

tween business and society – it ends up having a

detrimental effect on the bottom line. Also, the

presence of other contextual variables that mediate

the relationship suggests that a combination of fac-

tors, such as found in configurations, rather than

simple social performance measures, may determine

outcomes. Brickson (2007) has also suggested that

different organizational identities can yield social

value in their own ways and should best be consis-

tent with their mission and values.

Corporate social responsibility involvement may

have the effect of changing the firm itself incre-

mentally, but large-scale transformation in the

interlocked patterns of configurations is difficult

(Miller and Friesen, 1984). Ecology theory also

implies that inertial pressures and prevailing power

structures often prevent organizations from going

171Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders

beyond incremental change, since more would in-

volve a complete realignment of a large number of

the interlocked factors that comprise each configu-

ration (Alvarez Ma Valle, 2002; Hannan and Free-

man, 1989). Therefore, it may be better to think in

terms of matching/avoiding mismatching rather than

converting all firms to the same prescriptive model,

which suggests firms being forced to behave contrary

to their values, interests, and capabilities.

The interrelated features of the Engaged config-

uration suggest that the simultaneous achievement of

social and economic goals is not necessarily anti-

thetical (DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000). The efforts to

remove the tension between them is redirected to-

ward the task of embracing both, to find more

creative outcomes then attempts to justify social

action for instrumental purposes alone have pro-

duced. De Wit and Meyer (2004) urge the accep-

tance of paradox, i.e., the co-existence of two

apparently contradictory truths, as a stimulus toward

a synthesis that stretches thinking, highlighting

critical contrasts and points of agreement, using

ingenuity to get the best of all worlds. Therefore, the

ability to embrace paradox may be a competence

that is developed in the Engaged firm, enabling it to

move toward an authentic self that is complex and

dynamic (Driver, 2006).

Certain CSR actions call for relationships based

on partnering skills and the flexibility to meet

challenges arising within the partnerships themselves

and/or the external environment (Balogun and

Hailey, 2004; Roloff, 2008; Sagawa and Segal, 2000;

Senge et al., 2006). This is exemplified by Unilever,

an Engaged company at the forefront of business

network ecosystems involving myriad partners from

business and civil society. Inherent in building

embedded relationships are business skills which

transfer to social action: networking – to have and be

able to leverage multiple networks; communication

– to communicate consistently and appropriately

through many channels (Foster and Jonker, 2005);

creativity – to be able to see the big picture and

contribute to the visioning process (Balogun and

Hailey, 2004). If the firm does not see eye-to-eye

with its partners about the moral purpose of their

joint social initiatives, then conflicts among the

stakeholders may overwhelm implementation, as the

firm’s representatives do not have the organizational

support to act in good faith, and instead participate

in ‘pretend partnerships’ (Broussine and Miller,

2005). This is not to say that an Engaged firm has

deep trust-based relationships with all stakeholders.

An inherent aspect of its skills is to tailor and nuance

its relations with specific stakeholders rather than to

generic groups, ranking those claims on legitimacy.

It is perfectly in order for the Engaged firm to have

instrumental circumscribed transactional relationship

with some stakeholders, sufficient to the level of

business and obligations formed between them

(Kaler, 2006).

Middle-range theory as applied to the framework

is ideally suited to describe configurations/typolo-

gies. Each configuration makes sense in its own

right in the way all the pieces operate together in

the interior and exterior facing orientations and

conduct of the firm. The framework is parsimoni-

ous but not simplistic in distilling a number of

variables and contingencies. The configurational

approach of the framework also illustrates the

complex dynamics of interpreting CSR behavior,

and shows that a unidimensional approach, such as

the egoism versus other-directed one is incomplete,

also noted by Brickson (2007). The egoism ap-

proach has been designated ‘individually self-inter-

ested to fully other regarding’ (Jones et al., 2007)

and ‘egoist–instrumentalist–moralist’ (Everett et al.,

2008). In effect, these continuums are versions of

the separation hypothesis (Freeman, 1999) of

instrumental versus normative, or selfish versus

unselfish, without recognizing that both can exist

together, intertwined with a number of other

dimensions to create the character and identity of

an organization. The Ideal configuration exempli-

fies a company that belies such a continuum. It is

moral and egoistic at the same time. It caters very

purposefully to legitimate stakeholders, going very

far in extending the definition of such potential

stakeholders. However, at the same time, the Ideal

firm is also very self-regarding, interested in con-

solidating its moral identity and even superiority.

This may be seen as egoistical, even if not in the

traditional homo economicus sense. Brickson

(2005, 2007) has built a typology based on the

dimension of relational identity with stakeholders.

This has been shown to have empirical validity, and

the approach in this article incorporates the rela-

tional identity dimension as part of overall broad

configurations.

172 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

It can be argued that the framework is constructed

within the relatively conservative Anglo-American

model where government is seen to have a lesser role

for social welfare than in the rest of the world. In this

conservative system, business may step in to fill the gap

in social functions. However, Matten and Moon

(2008) show how the recent worldwide adoption of

CSR policies and strategies suggests an ‘American-

ization’ (p. 406) of CSR practices, encompassing

financial, labor, and cultural systems, although the

detail varies in different countries. Thus, CSR prac-

tices and attitudes are becoming more universal,

suggesting that the framework has broad applicability.

Empirical research could complement the con-

ceptual approach provided in the framework, which

offers a systematic way of studying CSR. Fiss (2007)

offers a set-theoretic methodology of studying con-

figurations that helps to go beyond the merely cor-

relational to understand multiple contemporaneous

causal relationships. The set-theoretic -approach

studies inconsistencies rather than controlling for

them. Such an approach, using measures of the basic

stakeholder orientation dimensions and the CSR

ones, as per Tables I and II, in a number of organi-

zations, could uncover the configurational patterns

proposed in the framework. Other related factors,

such as organizations’ core competencies in partner-

ing, could be included. Bennett and Elman (2007)

show how case studies can be used to corroborate

typological theories by ‘process tracing’ (p. 183),

which involves the inductive and deductive study of

events and sequences to establish complex causation.

Indeed, including financial performance in the mix

might address the previous inconsistencies in deter-

mining the presence of a corporate social and financial

performance link, if positive (poor) financial out-

comes are related to a match (mismatch) between

organizational type and the nature of CSR. There is

already suggestive research that Fortune 500 compa-

nies break down into the four configurational types in

the framework, where, of 98 companies, 10 espoused

the pure stockholder view (Skeptical), 22 espoused a

legally and ethically bounded stockholder focus

(Pragmatic), 64 espoused approaches maximizing the

welfare of all stakeholders (Engaged), and two aimed

at solving social problems (Idealistic) (Agle and

Mitchell, 2008). Empirical research could also extend

and develop the framework by discovering additional

dimensions to add to those already proposed, for

example, characteristics of managers, such as princi-

ples and values.

Managers can also relate to the framework intui-

tively, as a working model of reality, since it is

inclusive of everyday strategic concerns and notions

of identity without being esoteric. Practitioners can

avail of the framework as an interesting tool by which

they can examine and measure their firms and the

influences they exert with respect to CSR, integrated

with general strategic reviews. It could thereby help

managers, to create a better match between their

configuration and their CSR activities.

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E-mail: [email protected]

176 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins

  • Corporations, Civil Society, and Stakeholders: An Organizational Conceptualization
    • ABSTRACT
    • Introduction
    • A framework of stakeholder orientation configurations
      • The normative view
      • The instrumental view
    • A stakeholder overview of the four organizational configurations
      • Organizational purposes
      • Stakeholder identification and salience
      • Stakeholder management
      • Performance metrics
      • The boundaries between the firm and stakeholders
    • Organizational CSR preferences
      • Sensing stimuli for CSR involvement
      • Generation and evaluation of CSR options
      • Implementation of chosen CSR options
      • Impact of CSR involvement on the firm
    • Implications and conclusions
    • References

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Lecture 6 Systems-oriented theories/SystemsOrientedtheories 2014 2015.ppt