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Lecture 6 Systems-oriented theories/Mitchell_Toward_Theory.pdf
Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts
Ronald K. Mitchell; Bradley R. Agle; Donna J. Wood
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Oct., 1997), pp. 853-886.
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'Academy of Management Review 1997, Vol. 22, No 4 , 853-886
TOWARD A THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND SALIENCE: DEFINING THE
PRINCIPLE OF WHO AND WHAT REALLY COUNTS
RONALD K. MITCHELL University of Victoria
BRADLEY R. AGLE DONNA J. WOOD
University of Pittsburgh
Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristic for describing the management environment for years. but it has not attained full theo- retical status. Our aim in this article is to contribute to a theory of stakeholder identification and salience based on stakeholders pos- sessing one or more of three relationship attributes: power, legiti- macy. and urgency. By combining these attributes, we generate a typology of stakeholders. propositions concerning their salience to managers of the firm. and research and management implications.
Since Freeman (1984) published his landmark book, Strategic Man- agement: A Stakeholder Approach, the concept of "stakeholders" has be- come embedded in management scholarship and in managers' thinking. Yet, a s popular a s the term has become and a s richly descriptive a s it is, there is no agreement on what Freeman (1994) calls "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts." That is, who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom (or what) do managers pay attention? The first ques- tion calls for a normative theory of stakeholder identification, to explain logically why managers should consider certain classes of entities a s stakeholders. The second question calls for a descriptive theory of stake- holder salience, to explain the conditions under which managers do con- sider certain classes of entities a s stakeholders.
Stakeholder theory, reviewed in this article, offers a maddening va- riety of signals on how questions of stakeholder identification might be answered. We will see stakeholders identified a s primary or secondary
We thank the members of the Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory, spon- sored by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics at the University of Toronto, where the centrality of these three attributes to a theory of stakeholder-manager relationships was first noted. We also recognize the contribution of various working groups in SIM a n d IABS and a re grateful for the comments provided by A. R. Elangoven a n d Barry Mitnick, the intellectual and financial support of Fritz Faulhaber, a n d the valuable insights of the consulting editor and the anonymous reviewers.
854 Academy of Management Review October
stakeholders; a s owners and nonowners of the firm; a s owners of capital or owners of less tangible assets; a s actors or those acted upon; a s those existing in a voluntary or a n involuntary relationship with the firm; a s rights-holders, contractors, or moral claimants; a s resource providers to or dependents of the firm; as risk-takers or influencers; and a s legal princi- pals to whom agent-managers bear a fiduciary duty. In the stakeholder literature there are a few broad definitions that attempt to specify the empirical reality that virtually anyone can affect or be affected by a n organization's actions. What is needed is a theory of stakeholder identi- fication that can reliably separate stakeholders from nonstakeholders.
Also in the stakeholder literature are a number of narrow definitions that attempt to specify the pragmatic reality that managers simply cannot attend to all actual or potential claims, and that propose a variety of priorities for managerial attention. In this article we suggest that the question of stakeholder salience-the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims-goes beyond the question of stakeholder identification, because the dynamics inherent in each rela- tionship involve complex considerations that are not readily explained by the stakeholder framework a s it currently stands. What is needed also is a theory of stakeholder salience that can explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention.
Among the various ways of identifying stakeholders, a s well a s in the agency, behavioral, ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories of the firm, we have found no single attribute within a given theory that can guide us reliably on these issues. However, we find that one can extract from these literatures the idea that just a few attributes can be used to identify different classes of stakeholders in a firm's environment. We begin our analysis with Freeman's definition of stakeholder-"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46)-and develop a theory of stakeholder identification drawn from these various theoretical literatures. We start with a broad definition so that no stakeholders, po- tential or actual, are excluded from analysis arbitrarily or a priori. We then propose that classes of stakeholders can be identified by their pos- session or attributed possession of one, two, or all three of the following attributes: (1) the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, (2) the legiti- macy of the stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and (3)the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on the firm. This theory produces a comprehensive typology of stakeholders based on the normative assumption that these variables define the field of stakeholders: those entities to whom manag- ers should pay attention.
Building upon this typology, we further propose a theory of stake- holder salience. In this theory we suggest a dynamic model, based upon the identification typology, that permits the explicit recognition of situ- ational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritize stakeholder relationships. We demonstrate how the identifica-
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 855
tion typology allows predictions to be made about managerial behavior with respect to each class of stakeholder, a s well a s predictions about how stakeholders change from one class to another and what this means to managers. In the theory of stakeholder salience, we do not argue that managers should pay attention to this or that class of stakeholders. Rather, we argue that to achieve certain ends, or because of perceptual factors, managers do pay certain kinds of attention to certain kinds of stakeholders. Knowing what types of stakeholders actually exist, which our identification typology facilitates, and why managers respond to them the way they do, which our notion of salience clarifies, sets the stage for future work in stakeholder theory that specifies how and under what circumstances managers can and should respond to various stakeholder types.
The argument proceeds as follows. First, we review the stakeholder literature, laying out the various explicit and implicit positions on "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts." We then present our defense of the three key attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-as identifiers of stakeholder classes and briefly examine the major organizational theo- ries to discern how they handle these three crucial variables. Next we introduce managers and salience into the discussion and present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that result from possession of one, two, or three of these attributes, giving special attention to the managerial implications of the existence and salience of each stakeholder class. Fi- nally, we further illustrate the theory's dynamic qualities by showing how stakeholders can shift from one class to another, with important conse- quences for managers and the firm itself, and we explore the research questions and directions that emerge from the theory.
STAKEHOLDER THEORY-STATE OF THE ART
For more than a decade the stakeholder approach to understanding the firm in its environment has been a powerful heuristic device, intended to broaden management's vision of its roles and responsibilities beyond the profit maximization function to include interests and claims of non- stockholding groups. Stakeholder theory, in contrast, attempts to articu- late a fundamental question in a systematic way: which groups are stake- holders deserving or requiring management attention, and which are not? In this section we examine how scholars have so far answered these central questions. Who is a stakeholder, and what is a stake? What does stakeholder theory offer that is not found in other theories of the firm?
Who Is a Stakeholder, and What Is a Stake?
There is not much disagreement on what kind of entity can be a stakeholder. Persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the natural environment are generally thought to qualify a s actual or potential stakeholders. We find that it is the view
856 Academy of Management Review October
taken about the existence and nature of the stake that presents a n area of argument, because it is upon the basis of "stake" that "what counts" is ultimately decided.
Early vagueness in definition. In a n early statement Jones defined corporate social responsibility a s "the notion that corporations have a n obligation to constituent groups in society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract, indicating that a stake may go beyond mere ownership" (1980: 59-60). He then asked the prag- matic questions stakeholder theory still seeks to answer: "What are these groups? How many of these groups must be served? Which of their inter- ests are most important? How can their interests be balanced? How much corporate money should be allotted to serve these interests?" (1980: 60).
These questions are still being explored in stakeholder literature and management thinking. Alkhafaji, for example, defines stakeholders a s "groups to whom the corporation is responsible" (1989: 36). Thompson, Wartick, and Smith define stakeholders a s groups "in relationship with a n organization" (1991: 209). Most scholars, however, have attempted to specify a more concrete stakeholder definition, albeit with limited suc- cess.
Broad or narrow view? Windsor (1992) correctly points out that stake- holder theorists differ considerably on whether they take a broad or nar- row view of a firm's stakeholder universe. Freeman and Reed (1983) rec- ognized early on that there would be serious differences of opinion about broad versus narrow definitions of "Who or What Really Counts." Their broad definition of a stakeholder a s a n individual or group who "can affect the achievement of a n organization's objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives" (1983: 91) is virtually identical to Freeman's (1984) definition. And their narrow definition re- verted to the language of the Stanford Research Institute (1963), defining stakeholders a s those groups "on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival" (1983: 91).
Freeman's now-classic definition is this: "A stakeholder in a n organ- ization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46). This is certainly one of the broadest definitions in the literature, for it leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders unam- biguously open to include virtually anyone. In this definition the basis of the stake can be unidirectional or bidirectional-"can affect or is affected byr'-and there is no implication or necessity of reciprocal impact, a s definitions involving relationships, transactions, or contracts require. Ex- cluded from having a stake are only those who cannot affect the firm (have no power) and are not affected by it (have no claim or relationship).
In contrast, Clarkson offers one of the narrower definitions of stake- holders a s voluntary or involuntary risk-bearers: "Voluntary stakeholders bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm. Involuntary stakehold-
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 857
ers are placed at risk a s a result of a firm's activities. But without the element of risk there is no stake" (1994: 5). A stake, in this sense, is only something that can be lost. The use of risk to denote stake appears to be a way to narrow the stakeholder field to those with legitimate claims, regardless of their power to influence the firm or the legitimacy of their relationship to the firm. This search for legitimacy, we argue later, is necessary to understand fully a firm's stakeholder environment, but it also can be a powerful blinder to the real impact of stakeholder power and claim urgency. We argue, in contrast to the position of all those who appear to focus primarily on legitimacy, that this narrower view captures only one key attribute of stakeholder salience to managers.
Between the broad and narrow are many other efforts to define what constitutes a stakeholder. The range of definitions a s it has developed chronologically appears in Table 1.
Major differences between broad and narrow views. Narrow views of stakeholders are based on the practical reality of limited resources, lim- ited time and attention, and limited patience of managers for dealing with external constraints. In general, narrow views of stakeholders attempt to define relevant groups in terms of their direct relevance to the firm's core economic interests. For example, several scholars define stakeholders in terms of their necessity for the firm's survival (Bowie, 1988; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Nasi, 1995); a s noted, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders a s those who have placed something at risk in relationship with the firm, whereas Freeman and Evan (1990), Hill and Jones (1992), and Cornell and Shapiro (1987) speak of stakeholders a s contractors or participants in ex- change relationships.
A few scholars narrow the field of relevant groups in terms of their moral claims, arguing that the essence of stakeholder management should be the firm's participation in creating and sustaining moral rela- tionships (Freeman, 1994; Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994), or the firm's fulfilling its affirmative duty to stakeholders in terms of fairly distributing the harms and benefits of the firm's actions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Langtry, 1994). In any case, we see those favoring a narrow definition of stakeholders a s searching for a "normative core" of legitimacy so that managers can be advised to focus on the claims of a few legitimate stakeholders.
The broad view of stakeholders, in contrast, is based on the empirical reality that companies can indeed be vitally affected by, or they can vitally affect, almost anyone. But it is bewilderingly complex for manag- ers to apply. The idea of comprehensively identifying stakeholder types, then, is to equip managers with the ability to recognize and respond effectively to a disparate, yet systematically comprehensible, set of enti- ties who may or may not have legitimate claims, but who may be able to affect or are affected by the firm nonetheless, and thus affect the interests of those who do have legitimate claims.
The ultimate aim of stakeholder management practices, according to
Source
Stanford memo. 1963
Rhenman. 1964
Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen. 1971
Freeman & Reed. 1983: 91
Freeman. 1984: 46 Freeman & Gilbert.
1987: 397 Cornell & Shapiro.
1987: 5 Evan & Freeman,
1988: 75-76 Evan & Freeman,
1988: 79 Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2 Alkhafaji, 1989: 36 Carroll. 1989: 57
Freeman & Evan, 1990
Thompson et al.. 1991: 209
Savage e t al.. 1991: 6 1
Hill & Jones. 1992: 133
Brenner. 1993: 205
Carroll. 1993: 60
Freeman. 1994: 415 Wicks et al., 1994.
483 Langtry, 1994: 433
Starik, 1994: 90
Clarkson, 1994: 5
Clarkson. 1995: 106
Nasi, 1995: 19 Brenner, 1995: 76. n. 1 Donaldson & Preston.
1995: 85
Academy of Management Review October
TABLE 1 Who Is a Stakeholder? A Chronology
Stake
"those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist" (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983. and Freeman, 1984)
"are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals a n d on whom the firm is depending for its existence" (cited in Nasi. 19951
"driven by their own interests a n d goals a r e participants in a firm, and thus depending on it a n d whom for its sake the firm is depending" iclted in Nasi. 1995)
Wide: "can affect the achievement of a n organization's objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives"
Narrow: "on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival" "can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" "can affect or is affected by a business"
"claimants" who have "contracts"
"have a stake in or claim on the firm'
"benefit from or a r e harmed by, and whose rights a r e violated or respected by, corporate actions"
"without whose support the organization would cease to exlst" "groups to whom the corporation is responsible" "asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from a n
interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's assets or property"
contract holders
in "relationship with a n organization"
"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization a n d . . . the ability to influence it"
"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) a n d in exchange each expects its interests to b e satisfied (by inducements)"
"having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with a n organization [such as1 exchange transactions, action impacts, a n d moral responsibilities"
"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in businessw-may be affected or affect . . .
participants in "the human process of joint value creation" "interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation"
the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
"can a n d a re making their actual stakes knownu-"are or might be influenced by, or a r e or potentially a r e influencers of, some organization"
"bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value. in a firm" or "are placed a t risk a s a result of a firm's activities"
"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation a n d its activities"
"interact with the firm a n d thus make its operation possible" "are or which could impact or b e impacted by the firmiorganization" "persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive
aspects of corporate activity"
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 859
this view, could be firm centered or system centered; that is, managers might want to know about all of their stakeholders for firm-centered pur- poses of survival, economic well-being, damage control, taking advan- tage of opportunities, "doing in" the competition, winning friends and influencing public policy, coalition building, and so forth. Or, in contrast, managers might want a n exhaustive list of all stakeholders in order to participate in a fair balancing of various claims and interests within the firm's social system. Both the former public affairs approach and the latter social responsibility approach require broad knowledge of actual and potential actors and claimants in the firm's environment.
Claimants versus influencers. In order to clarify the term "stake," we need to differentiate between groups that have a legal, moral, or pre- sumed claim on the firm and groups that have a n ability to influence the firm's behavior, direction, process, or outcomes. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991) consider two attributes to be necessary to identify a stake- holder: (1) a claim and (2) the ability to influence a firm. Brenner (1993) and Starik (1994), however, pose these attributes a s eitherlor components of the definition of those with a stake.
In our view this is a muddled set, confusing and contrasting two of the three criteria we see a s important. Influencers have power over the firm, whether or not they have valid claims or any claims at all and whether or not they wish to press their claims. Claimants may have legitimate claims or illegitimate ones, and they may or may not have any power to influence the firm. Power and legitimacy are different, sometimes overlapping di- mensions, and each can exist without the other. A theory of stakeholder identification must accommodate these differences.
Actual versus potential relationship. Another crucial question lead- ing to the comprehensibility of the term "stake" is whether a n entity can be a stakeholder without being in actual relationship with the firm. Some scholars (e.g., Ring, 1994) emphatically answer, " No." We argue that, on the contrary, the potential relationship can be a s relevant a s the actual one. Clarkson's (1994) idea of involuntary stakeholders a s those with something not willfully placed at risk addresses the potentiality issue somewhat. Starik quite clearly includes potential when he refers to stake- holders a s those who "are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization" (1994: 90). We suggest that a theory of stakeholder identification and salience must somehow account for la- tent stakeholders if it is to be both comprehensive and useful, because such identification can, at a minimum, help organizations avoid problems and perhaps even enhance effectiveness.
Power, dependence, and reciprocity in relationships. If the firm and a stakeholder have a relationship, what is the nature of that relationship? The literature offers a confusing jumble of answers to this question, but most answers use a power-dependence frame of some sort. As Table 2 shows, some definitions focus on the firm's dependency on stakeholders for its survival; some focus on the stakeholder's dependency on the firm
Academy of Management Review October
TABLE 2 A Sorting of Rationales for Stakeholder Identification
A Relationship Exists The firm and stakeholder are in relationship: Thompson et al., 1991: 209-in "relationship with a n organization" Brenner, 1993: 205-"having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with a n
organization [such a s ] exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral responsibilities"
Freeman, 1994: 415-participants in "the human process of joint value creation" Wicks et al . , 1994: 483-"interact with and give meaning a n d definition to the
corporation"
The stakeholder exercises voice with respect to the firm: Starik, 1994: 90-"can and a re making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be
influenced by, or a re or potentially are influencers of, some organizatlon"
Power Dependence: Stakeholder Dominant The firm is dependent on the stakeholder: Stanford memo, 1963-"those groups without whose support the organization would
cease to exist" (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983, and Freeman, 1984) Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Narrow: "on which the organization is dependent for its
continued survival" Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2-"without whose support the organization would cease to exist" Nasi, 1995: 19-"interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible"
The stakeholder has power over the firm: Freeman, 1984: 46-"can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's
objectives" Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-"can affect or i s affected by a business" Savage et al . , 1991: 61-"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization and . . . the
ability to influence it" Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business"-may
b e affected or af fect . . . Starik, 1994: 90-"can a n d are making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be
influenced by, or a re or potentially are influencers of, some organization" Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1-"are or which could impact or be impacted by the
firmlorganization"
Power Dependence: Firm Dominant The stakeholder is dependent on the firm: Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold
a moral or legal claim on the firm
The firm has power over the stakeholder: Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Wide: "can affect the achievement of a n organization's
objectives or who is affected by the achievement of a n organization's objectives" Freeman, 1984: 46-"can affect or i s affected by the achievement of the organization's
objectives" Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-"can affect or is affected by a business" Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in businessu-may
be affected or af fect . . .
- -
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood
TABLE 2 (continued)
Starik, 1994: 90-"can a n d a re making their actual stakes known"-"are or might be influenced by, or a re or potentially a re influencers of, some organization"
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1.-"are or which could impact or be impacted by the firmlorganization"
Mutual Power-Dependence Relationship
The firm and stakeholder are mutuallv dependent: Rhenman, 1964-"are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals and
on whom the firm IS depending for its existence" (cited in Nasi, 1995) Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen, 1971-"driven by their own interests and goals a re participants
in a firm, a n d thus depending on it a n d whom for its sake the firm is depending" (cited in Nasi, 1995)
Basis for Legitimacy of Relationship
The firm and stakeholder are in contractual relationship: Cornell & Shapiro, 1987: 5-"claimants" who have "contracts" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from
a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"
Freeman & Evan, 1990--contract holders Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . .
established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) a n d in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)"
The stakeholder has a claim on the firm: Evan & Freeman, 1988: 75-76-"have a stake in or claim on the firm" Alkhafaji, 1989: 36-"groups to whom the corporation is responsible" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from
a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of a n exchange relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)"
Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"
The stakeholder has something at risk: Clarkson, 1994: 5-"bear some form of risk a s a result of having invested some form of
capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm" or "are placed a t risk a s a result of a firm's activities"
The stakeholder has a moral claim on the firm: Evan & Freeman, 1988: 79-"benefit from or a re harmed by, a n d whose rights a re
violated or respected by, corporate actions" Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes"-"ranging from
a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"
Academy of Management Review October
TABLE 2 (continued)
Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"
Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 85-"identified through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing a s a result of the firm's actions or inactions"
Stakeholder Interests-Legitimacy Not Implied
The stakeholder has a n interest in the firm: Carroll, 1989: 57-"asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakesu-"ranging from
a n interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company's asse ts or property"
Savage et al., 1991: 61-"have a n interest in the actions of a n organization and . . . have the ability to influence it"
Carroll, 1993: 60-"asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business"-may be affected or a f f ec t . . .
Clarkson, 1995: 106-"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities"
for upholding its rights, minimizing harms, or achieving its interest; and some focus on the mutuality of power-dependence relations (although, interestingly, we found no definition that emphasized mutual power, and only two from Scandinavia that emphasized mutual dependence).
As shown, a broad-view sorting of stakeholders along previously de- fined dimensions is still somewhat overwhelming.
Sorting criteria. Thus, although Freeman's (1984) definition is widely cited in the literature, it is not accepted universally among scholars work- ing in the stakeholder minefields. Narrowing the range of stakeholders requires applying some acceptable and justifiable sorting criteria to the field of possibilities. Some additional approaches are relationship based, built on acknowledged transactional conditions, such a s the existence of a legal or implied contract, a n exchange relationship, or a n identifiable power-dependence relationship. Others are claim based, citing the exis- tence or attribution of a legal or moral right, a real or attributed benefit or harm, or merely a n interest.
Overall, the information in Table 2 suggests that scholars who at- tempt to narrow the definition of stakeholder emphasize the claim's le- gitimacy based upon contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral right, at-risk status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company actions and that, in contrast, scholars who favor a broad definition emphasize the stakeholder's power to influence the firm's be- havior, whether or not there are legitimate claims. As a bridging concept, we argue that the broad concept of stakeholder management must be better defined in order to serve the narrower interests of legitimate stake-
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 863
holders. Otherwise, influencing groups with power over the firm can dis- rupt operations so severely that legitimate claims cannot be met and the firm may not survive. Yet, at the same time, it is important to recognize the legitimacy of some claims over others. Power and legitimacy, then, are necessarily core attributes of a comprehensive stakeholder identification model. We argue that when these attributes are evaluated in light of the compelling demands of urgency, a systematic, comprehensible, and dy- namic model is the result.
What Added Value Does a Theory of Stakeholder Identification Offer?
As we see from the preceding discussion of the stakeholder literature, one can extract just a few attributes to identify different classes of stake- holders that are salient to managers in certain respects. We also can see that stakeholder power and legitimacy of the claim frequently are treated a s competing explanations of stakeholder status, when instead they are partially intersecting variables. Interestingly, this conceptual competition between power and legitimacy is reflected in virtually every major theory of the firm-particularly in agency, behavioral, institutional, population ecology, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories. This state- of-the-field provides a n opportunity for a theory of stakeholder identifica- tion to move us forward by showing how power and legitimacy interact and, when combined with urgency, create different types of stakeholders with different expected behavioral patterns regarding the firm.
Agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories are par- ticularly helpful in explaining why power plays such a n important role in the attention managers give to stakeholders. The central problem agency theory addresses is how principals can control the behavior of their agents to achieve their, rather than the agent's, interests. The power of agents to act in ways divergent from the interests of principals may be limited by use of incentives or monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), so that managers are expected to attend to those stakeholders having the power to reward and/or punish them. Resource dependence theory sug- gests that power accrues to those who control resources needed by the organization, creating power differentials among parties (Pfeffer, 1981), and it confirms that the possession of resource power makes a stake- holder important to managers. Transaction cost theory proposes that the power accruing to economic actors with small numbers bargaining ad- vantages will affect the nature of firm governance and structure (William- son, 1975, 1985). That is, stakeholders outside the firm boundary who par- ticipate in a very small competitive set can increase transaction costs to levels that justify their absorption into the firm, where the costs of hier- archy are lower than the transaction costs of market failure-a clear in- dication of their significance to managers (Jones & Hill, 1988).
These three organizational theories teach us why power is a crucial variable in a theory of stakeholder-manager relations. But, a s previously
864 Academy of Management Review October
noted, power alone does not help us to fully understand salience in the stakeholder-manager relationship. There remain stakeholders who do not have power, but who nevertheless matter to firms and managers. Other means to identify "Who or What Really Counts" are needed.
Organizational theories with a n open-system orientation (Scott, 19871, including institutional and population ecology theories, help us to under- stand the crucial effects of the environment upon organizations, but they are less helpful when it comes to understanding power in stakeholder- manager relationships. In both theories organizational legitimacy is linked closely with survival (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977, and Carroll & Hannan, 1989, respectively). In the socially constructed world within which managers engage stakeholders, these two theories suggest that "legitimate" stakeholders are the ones who "really count." Under institu- tional theory, "illegitimacy" results in isomorphic pressures on organiza- tions that operate outside of accepted norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Under population ecology theory, lack of legitimacy results in organiza- tional mortality (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). According to these two theories, legitimacy figures heavily in helping us to identify stakeholders that merit managerial attention. However, emphasizing legitimacy and ignor- ing power leave major gaps in a stakeholder identification scheme, be- cause some legitimate stakeholders have no influence.
A final attribute that profoundly influences managerial perception and attention, although not the primary feature of any particular organi- zational theory, is implicit in each. Agency theory treats this attribute in terms of its contribution to cost, a s does transaction cost theory. Behav- ioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963) treats it a s a consequence of unmet "aspirations." Institutional, resource dependence, and population ecology theories treat it in terms of outside pressures on the firm. This attribute is urgency, the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate at- tention. Whether dealing with the prevention of losses, the pursuit of goals, or selection pressures, one constant in the stakeholder-manager relationship is the attention-getting capacity of the urgent claim. Urgency, a s we discuss below, adds a catalytic component to a theory of stake- holder identification, for urgency demands attention.
In summary, it is clear that no individual organizational theory offers systematic answers to questions about stakeholder identification and sa- lience, although most such theories have much to tell us about the role of power or legitimacy (but not both) in stakeholder-manager relations. Ur- gency, in contrast, is not a main focus of any organizational theory, but it is critical nonetheless to any theory that purports to identify stakeholders and to explain the degree of attention paid to them by managers. There- fore, we suggest that to better understand "The Principle of Who and What Really Counts," we need to evaluate stakeholder-manager relationships systematically, both actual and potential, in terms of the relative absence or presence of all or some of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and/or urgency.
1997 Mitchell, Agle, a n d Wood
Defining Stakeholder Attributes
Power. Most current definitions of power derive, a t least in part, from the early Weberian idea that power is "the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947). Pfeffer rephrases Dahl's (1957) defi- nition of power a s "a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done" (1981: 3). Like Pfeffer and Weber, we concur that "power may be tricky to define, but it is not that difficult to recognize: '[it is] the ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire' " (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974: 3). This leads to the following ques- tion: How is power exercised, or, alternatively, what are the bases of power?
French and Raven's (1960) typology of power bases is one framework commonly cited in the organizational literature in answer to this question, but from a sociological perspective it is messy, for there is not a sorting logic a t work to create the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories a true typology requires. Etzioni (1964) suggests a logic for the more pre- cise categorization of power in the organizational setting, based on the type of resource used to exercise power: coercive power, based on the physical resources of force, violence, or restraint; utilitarian power, based on material or financial resources; and normative power, based on sym- bolic resources.'
Therefore, a party to a relationship has power, to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. We note, however, that this access to means is a
' Etzioni explains these types of power a s follows:
The use of a gun, a whip, or a lock is physical since it affects the body; the threat to use physical sanctions is viewed a s physical be- cause the effect on the subject is similar in kind, though not in inten- sity, to the actual use. Control based on application of physical means is ascribed a s coercive power.
Material rewards consist of goods and services. The granting of symbols (e.g. money) which allow one to acquire goods a n d services is classified as material because the effect on the recipient is similar to that of material means. The use of material means for control pur- poses constitutes utilitarian power.
Pure symbols a re those whose use does not constitute a physical threat or a claim on material rewards. These include normative sym- bols, those of prestige and esteem; and social symbols, those of love a n d acceptance. When physical contact i s used to symbolize love, or material objects to symbolize prestige, such contacts or objects a re viewed a s symbols because their effect on the recipient i s similar to that of "pure" symbols. The use of symbols for control purposes is referred to a s normative, normative-social, or social power. (1964: 59)
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variable, not a steady state, which is one reason why power is transitory: it can be acquired as well a s lost.
Legitimacy. It is apparent from our analysis in Table 2 that narrow- definition scholars, particularly those seeking a "normative core" for stakeholder theory, are focused almost exclusively on defining the basis of stakeholder legitimacy. Whether or not that core of legitimacy is to be found in something "at risk," or in property rights, in moral claims, or in some other construct, articulations of "The Principle of Who or What Real- ly Counts" generally are legitimacy based.
However, the notion of "legitimacy," loosely referring to socially ac- cepted and expected structures or behaviors, often is coupled implicitly with that of power when people attempt to evaluate the nature of rela- tionships in society. Davis, for example, distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate use of power by declaring, "In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it" (1973: 314). Many scholars seeking to define a firm's stakeholders narrowly also make a n implicit assumption that legitimate stakeholders a re necessarily powerful, when this is not always the case (e.g., minority stockholders in a closely held company), and that powerful stakeholders are necessarily legitimate (e.g., corporate raiders in the eyes of current managers).
Despite this common linkage, we accept Weber's (1947) proposal that legitimacy and power are distinct attributes that can combine to create authority (defined by Weber a s the legitimate use of power) but that can exist independently a s well. An entity may have legitimate standing in society, or it may have a legitimate claim on the firm, but unless it has either power to enforce its will in the relationship or a perception that its claim is urgent, it will not achieve salience for the firm's managers. For this reason we argue that a comprehensive theory of stakeholder salience requires that separate attention be paid to legitimacy a s a n attribute of stakeholder-manager relations.
Recently, Suchman (1995) has worked to strengthen the conceptual moorings of the notion of legitimacy, building upon Weber's functional- ism (1947). Parsons' structural-functional theory (1960), "open systems" theory (Scott, 19871, and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The definition that Suchman suggests is broad based and recognizes the evaluative, cognitive, and socially constructed nature of legitimacy. He defines legitimacy a s "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of a n entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (1995: 574).
Although this definition is imprecise and difficult to operationalize, it is representative of sociologically based definitions of legitimacy and contains several descriptions that are useful in our approach to stake- holder identification. Therefore, we accept and utilize Suchman's defini- tion of legitimacy, recognizing that the social system within which legiti-
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 867
macy is attained is a system with multiple levels of analysis, the most common of which are the individual, organizational, and societal (Wood, 1991).This definition implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good, that it is something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and that it may be defined and negotiated differently a t various levels of social organization.
Urgency. Viewing power and legitimacy a s independent variables in stakeholder-manager relationships takes us some distance toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience, but it does not capture the dynamics of stakeholder-manager interactions. We propose that add- ing the stakeholder attribute of urgency helps move the model from static to dynamic. "Urgency" is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary a s "calling for immediate attention" or "pressing." We believe that urgency, with synonyms including "compelling," "driving," and "imperative," ex- ists only when two conditions are met: (1)when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and (2) when that relationship or claim is im- portant or critical to the stakeholder. Thus, similar to Jones' (1993)descrip- tion of moral intensity a s a multidimensional construct, we argue that urgency is based on the following two attributes: (1) time sensitivity-the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relation- ship is unacceptable to the stakeholder, and (2) criticality-the impor- tance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder. We define ur- gency a s the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.
Although it was virtually ignored until now in any explicit sense in the stakeholder literature, the idea of paying attention to various stake- holder relationships in a timely fashion has been a focus of issues man- agement (Wartick & Mahon, 1994) and crisis management scholars for decades. Eyestone (1978)highlighted the speed with which a n issue can become salient to a firm, and Cobb and Elder discussed the important role symbols play in creating time urgency: "Symbols such a s 'Freedom Now' have a n advantage because they connote a specific time commitment to action. If one is attempting to mobilize a public against some outside threat, one must emphasize the rapidity with which the opponent is gain- ing strength" (1972: 139).
However, although time sensitivity is necessary, it is not sufficient to identify a stakeholder's claim or "manager relationship" a s urgent. In addition, the stakeholder must view its claim on the firm or its relation- ship with the firm a s critical or highly important. Some examples of why a stakeholder would view its relationship with the firm a s critical include the following:
ownership-the stakeholder's possession of firm-specific assets, or those asse ts tied to a firm that cannot be used in a different way with- out loss of value (Hill & Jones, 1992; Williamson, 1985).making it very costly for the stakeholder to exit the relationship;
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sentiment-us in the case of easily traded stock that is held by genera- tions of owners within a family, regardless of the stock's performance: expectation-the stakeholder's anticipation that the firm will continue providing it with something of great value (e.g., compensation and benefits in the case of employees): or exposure-the importance the stakeholder attaches to that which is a t risk in the relationship with the firm (Clarkson, 1994).
Our theory does not specify why stakeholders assess their relation- ships with firms a s critical. Furthermore, our theory does not attempt to predict the circumstances under which "time will be of the essence." Rather, when both factors a re present, our theory captures the resulting multidimensional attribute a s urgency, juxtaposes it with the attributes of power and legitimacy, and proposes dynamism in the systematic identi- fication of stakeholders.
Additional Features of Stakeholder Attributes
Table 3 summarizes the constructs, definitions, and origins of the concepts discussed thus far in the article. To support a dynamic theory of stakeholder identification and salience, however, we need to consider several additional implications of power, legitimacy, and urgency. First, each attribute is a variable, not a steady state, and can change for any particular entity or stakeholder-manager relationship. Second, the exis- tence (or degree present) of each attribute is a matter of multiple percep- tions and is a constructed reality rather than a n "objective" one. Third, a n individual or entity may not be "conscious" of possessing the attribute or, if conscious of possession, may not choose to enact any implied behav- iors. These features of stakeholder attributes, summarized below, are im- portant to the theory's dynamism; that is, they provide a preliminary framework for understanding how stakeholders can gain or lose salience to a firm's managers:
1. Stakeholder attributes a r e variable, not steady state. 2. Stakeholder attributes a re socially constructed, not objective, reality. 3. Consciousness and willful exercise may or may not be present.
Thus, with respect to power, for example, access to the means of influencing another entity's behavior is a variable, with both discrete and continuous features. As we argued earlier, power may be coercive, utili- tarian, or normative-qualitatively different types that may exist inde- pendently or in combination. Each type of power may range from nonex- istent to complete. Power is transitory-it can be acquired a s well a s lost. Further, possession of power does not necessarily imply its actual or in- tended use, nor does possession of power imply consciousness of such possession by the possessor or "correct" perception of objective reality by the perceivers. An entity may possess power to impose its will upon a firm, but unless it is aware of its power and willing to exercise it on the firm, it is not a stakeholder with high salience for managers. Rather, latent power exists in stakeholder relationships, and the exercise of
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood
TABLE 3 Key Constructs in the Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience
Construct Definition Sources
Stakeholder Any group or individual who can affect or is Freeman, 1984; Jones, affected by the achievement of the 1995; Kreiner & organization's objectives Bhambri, 1988
Power A relationship among social actors in which Dahl, 1957; Pfeffer, 1981; one social actor, A, can get another social Weber, 1947 actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done
Bases Coercive-forceithreat Etzioni, 1964 Utilitarian-materiallincentives Normative-symbolic influences
Legitimacy A generalized perception or assumption that Suchman, 1995; Weber, the actions of a n entity a re desirable, 1947 proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, definitions
Bases Individual Wood, 1991 Organizational Societal
Urgency The degree to which stakeholder claims call Original-builds on the for immediate attention definition from the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary
Bases Time sensitivity-the degree to which Eyestone, 1978; managerial delay in attending to the Wartick & Mahon, claim or relationship is unacceptable to 1994 the stakeholder
Criticality-the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder specificity from
Hill & Jones, 1992; Williamson, 1985
Salience The degree to which managers give priority to Original-builds on the competing stakeholder claims definition from the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary
stakeholder power is triggered by conditions that a re manifest in the other two attributes of the relationship: legitimacy and urgency. That is, power by itself does not guarantee high salience in a stakeholder-manager re- lationship. Power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exer- cise through urgency.
Legitimacy, like power, is a variable rather than a steady state-a dynamic attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship. It may be pres- ent or absent. If it is present, it is based upon a generalized virtue that is perceived for or attributed to a stakeholder a t one or more social levels of analysis. Claimants may or may not correctly perceive the legitimacy of their claims; likewise, managers may have perceptions of stakeholder legitimacy that are a t variance with the stakeholder's own perception.
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Also, like the power attribute, legitimacy's contribution to stakeholder salience depends upon interaction with the other two attributes: power and urgency. Legitimacy gains rights through power and voice through urgency.
Finally, urgency is not a steady-state attribute but can vary across stakeholder-manager relationships or within a single relationship across time. As is true of power and legitimacy, urgency is a socially constructed perceptual phenomenon and may be perceived correctly or falsely by the stakeholder, the managers, or others in the firm's environment. For ex- ample, neighbors of a nuclear power plant that is about to melt down have a serious claim on that plant, but they may not be aware of the time pressure and criticality and, thus, may not act on their claim. Urgency by itself is not sufficient to guarantee high salience in the stakeholder- manager relationship. However, when it is combined with a t least one of the other attributes, urgency will change the relationship and cause it to increase in salience to the firm's managers. Specifically, in combination with legitimacy, urgency promotes access to decision-making channels, and in combination with power, it encourages one-sided stakeholder ac- tion. In combination with both, urgency triggers reciprocal acknowledg- ment and action between stakeholders and managers.
These three features of stakeholder attributes-variable status, per- ceptual quality, and variable consciousness and will-lay the ground- work for a future analysis of the dynamic nature of stakeholder-manager relations. The common "bicycle-wheel" model of a firm's stakeholder en- vironment does not begin to capture the ebb and flow of changes in stake- holder-manager relations or the fact that these relations are multilateral and often coalitional, not bilateral and independent. We explore the dy- namic possibilities of the theory of stakeholder salience briefly in the concluding section, but it seems clear that a great deal more paradigm- atic development is now possible because of our ability to recognize theo- retically that stakeholder-manager relations a re not static but, rather, a re in constant flux.
Managers' Role in the Theory
Cyert & March (1963) contributed to the management literature the notion of organizations a s coalitions of individuals and organized "sub coalitions" (1963: 27), with "disparate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited ability to attend to all problems simultaneously" (1963: 43). which, under uncertainty, must seek feedback from the environment (1963: 12). Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) picked up the idea of organizations a s coa- litions of varying interests and contributed the notion that organizations are "other-directed" (1978: 257), being influenced by actors that control critical resources and have the attention of managers (1978: 259-260). In developing their stakeholder-agency model, Hill and Jones (1992) em- ployed the agency theory view of the firm a s a nexus of contracts be- tween stakeholders and managers a t a central node, where managers
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have the responsibility to reconcile divergent interests by making strate- gic decisions and allocating strategic resources in a manner that is most consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups (1992: 134). They write:
Whatever the magnitude of their stake, each stakeholder i s a part of the nexus of implicit a n d explicit contracts that consti- tutes the firm. However, as a group, managers a re unique in this respect because of their position a t the centre of the nexus of contracts. Managers a r e the only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship with al l other stakehold- ers. Managers a re also the only group of stakeholders with direct control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm. (Hill & Jones, 1992: 134; emphasis in original)
The idea that the organization is a n environmentally dependent co- alition of divergent interests, which depends upon gaining the attention of (making claims upon) managers a t the center of the nexus to effect reconciliations among stakeholders, suggests that the perspective of managers might be vital. We propose that, although groups can be iden- tified reliably a s stakeholders based on their possession of power, legiti- macy, and urgency in relationship to the firm, it is the firm's managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention. In short, one can identify a firm's stakeholders based on attributes, but managers may or may not perceive the stake- holder field correctly. The stakeholders winning management's attention will be only those the managers perceive to be highly ~ a l i e n t . ~
Therefore, if managers are central to this theory, what role do their own characteristics play? The propositions we present later suggest that the manager's perception of a stakeholder's attributes is critical to the manager's view of stakeholder salience. Therefore, we suggest, although space constraints prohibit systematic development here, that managerial characteristics are a moderator of the relationships presented in this ar- ticle. For example, managers vary greatly in their environmental scan- ning practices (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988) and in their values (Ham- brick & Mason, 1984). Differences in managerial values are illustrative of the moderating effects of management characteristics (Frederick, 1995). Greer and Downey (1982) have found that managers' values relative to social regulation have a strong effect on how they react to stakeholders covered by these statutes. Another value theorists suggest a s important in
We note, however, that Freeman and Evan view the firm "as a series of multilateral contracts among stakeholders" (1990: 342), with no central role for managers. This implies a network theory solution to the problem of systematic description, in comparison with the cognitive approach that we take. We make no representations about a fully networked, nonnexus approach. We merely suggest the sociology-organization theory approach as a logically developed "sorting system" for improving the descriptive capability of the stake- holder approach.
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this relationship is management's sense of self-interest or self-sacrifice. Although some theorists have suggested that all behavior ultimately is self-interested (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 19741, several social scientists have questioned the common assumption of self-interest and have sug- gested that people often act in ways that benefit others, even to their own detriment (see Etzioni, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986). Like Perrow (1986) and Brenner and Cochran (1991), we treat managerial characteris- tics a s a variable and suggest that it will be a n important moderator of the stakeholder-manager relationship.
STAKEHOLDER CLASSES
Up to this point in the article, we have argued that a definition of "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts" rests upon the assumptions, first, that managers who want to achieve certain ends pay particular kinds of attention to various classes of stakeholders; second, that managers' per- ceptions dictate stakeholder salience; and third, that the various classes of stakeholders might be identified based upon the possession, or the attributed possession, of one, two, or all three of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We now proceed to our analysis of the stake- holder classes that result from the various combinations of these attrib- utes, a s shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders
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We first lay out the stakeholder types that emerge from various com- binations of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Logically and conceptually, seven types are examined-three possessing only one at- tribute, three possessing two attributes, and one possessing all three at- tributes. We propose that stakeholders' possession of these attributes, upon further methodological and empirical work, can be measured reli- ably. This analysis allows and justifies identification of entities that should be considered stakeholders of the firm, and it also constitutes the set from which managers select those entities they perceive a s salient. According to this model, then, entities with no power, legitimacy, or ur- gency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived a s having no salience by the firm's managers.
In conjunction with the analysis of stakeholder types, and based on the assumption that managers' perceptions of stakeholders form the cru- cial variable in determining organizational resource allocation in re- sponse to stakeholder claims, we also present several propositions lead- ing to a theory of stakeholder salience.
Therefore:
Proposition 1: Stakeholder salience will be positively re- lated to the cumulative number of stakeholder attrib- utes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-perceived by managers to be present.
The low salience classes (areas 1, 2, and 3), which we term "latent" stakeholders, are identified by their possession or attributed possession of only one of the attributes. The moderately salient stakeholders (areas 4, 5, and 6) are identified by their possession or attributed possession of two of the attributes, and because they are stakeholders who "expect some- thing," we call them "expectant" stakeholders. The combination of all three attributes (including the dynamic relations among them) is the de- fining feature of highly salient stakeholders (area 7).
In this section we present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that the theory identifies, paying special attention to the managerial implica- tions of the existence of each stakeholder class. We have given each class a descriptive name to facilitate discussion, recognizing that the names are less important than the theoretical types they represent. We invite the indulgence of the reader a s we alliterate these descriptive names a s a mnemonic device to promote recall and as a further means to suggest a starting point for future dialogue.
As Figure 2 illustrates, latent stakeholders are those possessing only one of the three attributes, and include dormant, discretionary, and de- manding stakeholders. Expectant stakeholders are those possessing two attributes, and include dominant, dependent, and dangerous stake- holders. Definitive stakeholders are those possessing all three attributes. Finally, individuals or entities possessing none of the attributes are non- stakeholders or potential stakeholders.
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FIGURE2 Stakeholder Typology:
One, Two. or Three Attributes Present
\ / Nonstakeholder
Latent Stakeholders
With limited time, energy, and other resources to track stakeholder behavior and to manage relationships, managers may well do nothing about stakeholders they believe possess only one of the identifying at- tributes, and managers may not even go so far a s to recognize those stakeholders' existence. Similarly, latent stakeholders are not likely to give any attention or acknowledgment to the firm. Hence:
Proposition la: Stakeholder salience will be low where only one of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-is perceived by managers to be present.
In the next few paragraphs we discuss the reasoning behind this expec- tation a s it applies to each class of latent stakeholder, and we also dis- cuss the implications for managers.
Dormant stakeholders. The relevant attribute of a dormant stake- holder is power. Dormant stakeholders possess power to impose their will on a firm, but by not having a legitimate relationship or a n urgent claim,
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 875
their power remains unused. Examples of dormant stakeholders are plen- tiful. For instance, power is held by those who have a loaded gun (coer- cive), those who can spend a lot of money (utilitarian), or those who can command the attention of the news media (symbolic). Dormant stakehold- ers have little or no interaction with the firm. However, because of their potential to acquire a second attribute, management should remain cog- nizant of such stakeholders, for the dynamic nature of the stakeholder- manager relationship suggests that dormant stakeholders will become more salient to managers if they acquire either urgency or legitimacy.
Although difficult, it is oftentimes possible to predict which dormant stakeholders may become salient. For example, while employees who have been fired or laid off from a n organization could be considered by the firm to be dormant stakeholders, experience suggests that these stakeholders can seek to exercise their latent power. The multiple shoot- i n g ~at postal facilities by ex-U.S. mail employees (coercive), the filing of wrongful dismissal suits in the court system (utilitarian), and the increase in "speaking out" on talk radio (symbolic) all are evidence of such com- binations.
Discretionary stakeholders. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy, but they have no power to influence the firm and no urgent claims. Discretionary stakeholders are a particularly interest- ing group for scholars of corporate social responsibility and performance (see Wood, 1991), for they are most likely to be recipients of what Carroll (1979) calls discretionary corporate social responsibility, which he later redefined a s corporate philanthropy (Carroll, 1991). The key point regard- ing discretionary stakeholders is that, absent power and urgent claims, there is absolutely no pressure on managers to engage in a n active rela- tionship with such a stakeholder, although managers can choose to do so.
Not all recipients of corporate philanthropy are discretionary stake- holders-only those with neither power over nor urgent claims on the firm. Examples of discretionary stakeholders include beneficiaries of the Take- A-Taxi program in the Twin Cities, in which the Fingerhut company picks up the tab for anyone who feels they have consumed too much alcohol to drive, and nonprofit organizations, such a s schools, soup kitchens, and hospitals, who receive donations and volunteer labor from such compa- nies a s Rhino Records, Timberland, Honeywell, JustDesserts, and Levi- Strauss.
Demanding stakeholders. Where the sole relevant attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship is urgency, the stakeholder is de- scribed a s "demanding." Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power nor legitimacy, are the "mosquitoes buzzing in the ears" of managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management attention, if any at all. Where stakeholders are unable or unwilling to acquire either the power or the legitimacy necessary to move their claim into a more salient status, the "noise" of urgency is insufficient to project a stakeholder claim
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beyond latency. For example, a lone millenarian picketer who marches outside the headquarters with a sign that says, "The end of the world is coming! Acme chemical is the cause!" might be extremely irritating to Acme's managers, but the claims of the picketer remain largely uncon- sidered.
Expectant Stakeholders
As we consider the potential relationship between managers and the group of stakeholders with two of the three identifying stakeholder attrib- utes, we observe a qualitatively different zone of salience. In analyzing the situations in which any two of the three attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-are present, we cannot help but notice the change in mo- mentum that characterizes this condition. Whereas one-attribute low- salience stakeholders are anticipated to have a latent relationship with managers, two-attribute moderate-salience stakeholders are seen a s "ex- pecting something," because the combination of two attributes leads the stakeholder to a n active versus a passive stance, with a corresponding increase in firm responsiveness to the stakeholder's interests. Thus, the level of engagement between managers and these expectant stakehold- ers is likely to be higher. Accordingly:
Proposition lb: Stakeholder salience will be moderate where two of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-re perceived by managers to be present.
We describe the three expectant stakeholder classes (dominant, de- pendent, and dangerous) in the following paragraphs.
Dominant stakeholders. In the situation where stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate, their influence in the firm is assured, since by possessing power with legitimacy, they form the "dominant coalition" in the enterprise (Cyert & March, 1963).We characterize these stakeholders a s "dominant," in deference to the legitimate claims they have upon the firm and their ability to act on these claims (rather than a s a forecast of their intentions with respect to the firm-they may or may not ever choose to act on their claims). It seems clear to us, at least, that the expectations of any stakeholders perceived by managers to have power and legitimacy will "matter" to managers.
Thus, we might expect that dominant stakeholders will have some formal mechanism in place that acknowledges the importance of their relationship with the firm. For example, corporate boards of directors generally include representatives of owners, significant creditors, and community leaders, and there is normally a n investor relations office to handle ongoing relationships with investors. Most corporations have a human resources department that acknowledges the importance of the firm-employee relationship. Public affairs offices are common in firms
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that depend on maintaining good relationships with government. In ad- dition, corporations produce reports to legitimate, powerful stakeholders, including annual reports, proxy statements, and, increasingly, environ- mental and social responsibility reports. Dominant stakeholders, in fact, are those stakeholders that so many scholars are trying to establish a s the only stakeholders of the firm. In our typology dominant stakeholders ex- pect and receive much of managers' attention, but they are by no means the full set of stakeholders to whom managers should or do relate.
Dependent stakeholders. We characterize stakeholders who lack power but who have urgent legitimate claims a s "dependent," because these stakeholders depend upon others (other stakeholders or the firm's managers) for the power necessary to carry out their will. Because power in this relationship is not reciprocal, its exercise is governed either through the advocacy or guardianship of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal management values.
Using the case of the giant oil spill from the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound a s a n example, we can show that several stakeholder groups had urgent and legitimate claims, but they had little or no power to enforce their will in the relationship. To satisfy their claims these stake- holders had to rely on the advocacy of other, powerful stakeholders or on the benevolence and voluntarism of the firm's management. Included in this category were local residents, marine mammals and birds, and even the natural environment itself (Starik, 1993). For the claims of these de- pendent stakeholders to be satisfied, it was necessary for dominant stake- holders-the Alaska state government and the court system-to provide guardianship of the region's citizens, animals, and ecosystems. Here a dependent stakeholder moved into the most salient stakeholder class by having its urgent claims adopted by dominant stakeholders, illustrating the dynamism that can be modeled effectively using the theory and prin- ciples of stakeholder identification and salience suggested here.
Dangerous stakeholders. We suggest that where urgency and power characterize a stakeholder who lacks legitimacy, that stakeholder will be coercive and possibly violent, making the stakeholder "dangerous," liter- ally, to the firm. "Coercion" is suggested a s a descriptor because the use of coercive power often accompanies illegitimate status.
Examples of unlawful, yet common, attempts at using coercive means to advance stakeholder claims (which may or may not be legitimate) in- clude wildcat strikes, employee sabotage, and terrorism. For example, in the 1970s General Motors' employees in Lordstown, Ohio, welded pop cans to engine blocks to protest certain company policies. Other examples of stakeholders using coercive tactics include environmentalists spiking trees in areas to be logged and religious or political terrorists using bomb- ings, shootings, or kidnappings to call attention to their claims. The ac- tions of these stakeholders not only are outside the bounds of legitimacy but are dangerous, both to the stakeholder-manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved.
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It is important for us to note that we, along with other responsible individuals, are very uncomfortable with the notion that those whose ac- tions are dangerous, both to stakeholder-manager relationships a s well a s to life and well-being, might be accorded some measure of legitimacy by virtue of the typology proposed in this analysis. Notwithstanding our discomfort, however, we are even more concerned that failure to identify dangerous stakeholders would result in missed opportunities for mitigat- ing the dangers and in lower levels of preparedness, where no accommo- dation is possible. Further, to maintain the integrity of our approach to better define stakeholders, we feel bound to "identify" dangerous stake- holders without "acknowledging" them, for, like most of our colleagues, we abhor their practices. We are fully aware that society's "refusal to acknowledge" after identification of a dangerous stakeholder, by coun- teracting terror in all its forms, is a n effective counteragent in the battle to maintain civility and civilization. The identification of this class of stake- holder is undertaken with the support of this tactic in mind.
Definitive Stakeholders
Previously, we defined "salience" a s the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims. Thus:
Proposition lc: Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes-power, legiti- macy, and urgency-re perceived by managers to be present.
By definition, a stakeholder exhibiting both power and legitimacy already will be a member of a firm's dominant coalition. When such a stakehold- er's claim is urgent, managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholder's claim. The most common occurrence is likely to be the movement of a dominant stakeholder into the "definitive" category.
For example, in 1993 stockholders (dominant stakeholders) of IBM, General Motors, Kodak, Westinghouse, and American Express became active when they felt that their legitimate interests were not being served by the managers of these companies. A sense of urgency was engendered when these powerful, legitimate stakeholders saw their stock values plummet. Because top managers did not respond sufficiently or appropri- ately to these definitive stakeholders, they were removed, thus dem- onstrating in a general way the importance of a n accurate perception of power, legitimacy, and urgency; the necessity of acknowledgment and action that salience implies; and, more specifically, the conse- quences of the misperception of or inattention to the claims of definitive stakeholders.
Any expectant stakeholder can become a definitive stakeholder by acquiring the missing attribute. As we saw earlier, dependent Alaskan citizens became definitive stakeholders of Exxon by acquiring a powerful
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 879
ally in government. Likewise, the "dangerous" African National Congress became a definitive stakeholder of South African companies when it ac- quired legitimacy by winning free national elections.
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF A DYNAMIC THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION
In our analysis we have proposed that stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We predict that the salience of a particular stakeholder to the firm's man- agement is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, and high if all three attributes are present.
Dynamism in Stakeholder-Manager Relations
As our earlier discussion demonstrates, latent stakeholders can in- crease their salience to managers and move into the "expectant stake- holder" category by acquiring just one of the missing attributes. If the stakeholder is particularly clever, for example, at coalition building, po- litical action, or social construction of reality, that stakeholder can move into the "definitive stakeholder" category (characterized by high salience to managers), starting from any position-latent, expectant, or potential.
Static maps of a firm's stakeholder environment are heuristically use- ful if the intent is to raise consciousness about "Who or What Really Counts" to managers or to specify the stakeholder configuration at a par- ticular time point. But even though most theorists might try for static clarity, managers should never forget that stakeholders change in sa- lience, requiring different degrees and types of attention depending on their attributed possession of power, legitimacy, and/or urgency, and that levels of these attributes (and thereby salience) can vary from issue to issue and from time to time.
We can observe a n example of stakeholder dynamism in recent events in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) began a s a group with a n urgent claim but not a legitimate one, given the ruling South African culture and government, and it had no power. At first it was a latent, demanding stakeholder. The ANC next moved into the "danger- ous category" by using coercive power. However, this did not lead to definitive status. It was only by acquiring legitimacy while relinquishing the use of coercive power, and thus becoming a dependent stakeholder, that the ANC was able to achieve definitive status, high salience, and eventual success.
Thus, when the ANC moved its urgent claim into the world environ- ment, the claim's legitimacy was established, and the ANC, a s well a s the South Africans it represented, became a n expectant, dependent stake- holder of the multinational enterprises (MNEs) located in South Africa. As a dependent stakeholder, the ANC was able to acquire the protection, advocacy, and guardianship of more salient stakeholders (especially
880 Academy of Management Review October
investors). With the powerful advocacy of these stakeholders, the ANC moved into the "definitive" zone of the stakeholder attribute model for South African MNEs. In fact, it is now widely acknowledged that the worldwide divestment/disinvestment movement, led by MNE stockhold- ers, was a major force in the transformation of the South African system of government and the rise to political power of the ANC (e.g., see Paul, 1992).
Another example of dynamism in stakeholder attributes is offered by Nasi, Nasi, and Savage (1994). This case, involving a business owner, workers, and the courts, illustrates how a dependent stakeholder worker group (one with a legitimate and urgent claim) can increase its salience to a firm's managers by aligning itself with other stakeholders (in this case, a union and the courts) who have the power to impose their will upon a stubborn business owner.
Thus, using our identification typology, we are able to explain stake- holder salience and dynamism systematically. This new capability has implications for management, research, and for the future of the stake- holder framework.
Implications for Management, Research, and Future Directions
On the basis of the model we develop in this article, we can envision refinements in long-standing management techniques designed to assist managers in dealing with multiple stakeholders' interests. Presently, management techniques based on the stakeholder heuristic are being utilized to help managers deal effectively with multiple stakeholder re- lationships. Current methods include identification of stakeholder roles (e.g., employees, owners, communities, suppliers, and customers), analy- sis of stakeholder interests, and evaluation of the type and level of stake- holder power (e.g., see current textbooks by Carroll, 1993; Frederick, Post, Lawrence, & Weber, 1996; and Wood, 1994).
The approach introduced in this paper has the potential to improve upon current practice. To current techniques that emphasize power and interests, the model we suggest adds the vital dimensions of legitimacy and urgency. Further, this model enables a more systematic sorting by managers of stakeholder-manager relationships a s these relationships attain and relinquish salience in the dynamics of ongoing business. In addition, our three-attribute model permits managers to map the legiti- macy of stakeholders and therefore to become sensitized to the moral implications of their actions with respect to each stakeholder. In this sense, our model supports and initiates normative thought in the mana- gerial context. Thus, these refinements contribute to the potential effec- tiveness of managers a s they deal with multiple stakeholder interests. And, a s these refinements find their way into accepted practice, we can further envision subsequent rounds of inquiry, which test whether "new maps" result in "new methods."
Stakeholder theory, we believe, holds the key to more effective man- agement and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society.
1997 Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 88 1
Focusing attention on salience in the manager-stakeholder relationships existing in a firm's environment appears to be a productive strategy for researchers and managers alike in realizing these aspirations. The stake- holder identification typology we have developed here is amenable to empirical operationalization and to the generation of testable hypotheses concerning, for example, predictions about the circumstances under which a stakeholder in one category might attempt to acquire a missing attribute and thus enhance its salience to a firm's managers. We have not developed such operational definitions and hypotheses here, for lack of space, but we believe that such development is the next logical step in articulating completely "The Principle of Who or What Really Counts."
Specifically, we call for empirical research that answers these ques- tions: Are present descriptions of stakeholder attributes adequate? Do the inferences we make herein hold when examining real stakeholder- manager relationships? Are there models of interrelationships among the variables identified here (and possible others) that reveal more subtle, but perhaps more basic, systematics? We realize that for these and other such questions to be addressed, item and scale development, demographic calibration, and second-order model building, among other things, are necessary.
In the process we hope that additional clarity can be achieved at the conceptual level a s well. We ask, what are the implications of this model and its subsequent tests for additional research on power, legitimacy, and urgency? More importantly, are power, legitimacy, and urgency really the correct and parsimonious set of variables in understanding stakeholder- manager relationships? We acknowledge that despite their level of em- phasis in the second Toronto conference, and despite our logical and theoretical justification of their importance in developing a more inferen- tial and empirically based stakeholder theory, other stakeholder attrib- utes also may be well suited to stakeholder analysis-and we call for the critical evaluation of our choices.
Finally, in attempting to build momentum in the development of stakeholder theory, we are acutely aware that we have necessarily made sweeping assumptions that, for the sake of clarity in a preliminary ar- ticulation, are passed over, with the implicit understanding that for the theory to hold, these must be revisited and assessed. For example, we assume and argue that power and legitimacy are distinct attributes. But some might cast one a s a subset of the other. To build our identification typology, we treat each attribute a s "present or absent," when it is clear that each operates on a continuum or series of continua. Each of these issues, and others like them, point toward additional inquiry that can enrich the theory and add to its usefulness.
Conclusion: The Search for Legitimacy in Stakeholder Theory
Many stakeholder scholars, in attempting to narrow the range of "Who or What Really Counts" in a firm's stakeholder environment, are
882 Academy of Management Review October
searching for the bases of legitimacy in stakeholder-manager relation- ships. When scholars such a s Freeman, Clarkson, Donaldson, Preston, and Dunfee argue that stakeholder theory must articulate a "normative core," they are looking for a compelling reason why some claims and some relationships are legitimate and worthy of management attention and why others are not. They discount the importance of power in stake- holder-manager relations, arguing that the important thing is whether the stakeholder has legitimate (e.g., moral, legal, and property-based) claims.
The theory of stakeholder identification and salience developed in this article in no way discredits this search for a legitimate normative core for stakeholder theory. It makes sense to articulate theoretically why cer- tain groups will hold legitimate, possibly stable claims on managers and firm; these are the stakeholders who should really count. Our aim, how- ever, is to expand scholarly and management understanding beyond le- gitimacy to incorporate stakeholder power and urgency of a claim, be- cause these attributes of entities in a firm's environment-and their dynamism over periods of time or variation in issues-will make a critical difference in managers' ability to meet legitimate claims and protect le- gitimate interests. We offer this preliminary theory a s a way of under- standing which stakeholders do really count.
In 1978 William C. Frederick (in a paper subsequently published in 1994) observed that business and society scholarship was in a transition from a moral focus on social responsibility (CSR,) to a n amoral focus on social responsiveness (CSR,). When stakeholder theory focuses only on issues of legitimacy, it acquires the fuzzy moral flavor of CSR,. Focusing only on stakeholder power, however, a s several major organizational theories would lead us to do, yields the amorality and self-interested action focus of CSR,. Instead, we propose a merger.
In sum, we argue that stakeholder theory must account for power and urgency a s well a s legitimacy, no matter how distasteful or unsettling the results. Managers must know about entities in their environment that hold power and have the intent to impose their will upon the firm. Power and urgency must be attended to if managers are to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders.
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Ronald K. Mitchell is a n assistant professor in the Faculty of Business at the University of Victoria. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Utah. His research interests focus on entrepreneurship-specifically, the study of expert information processing theory, strategic management, and stakeholder theory a s they apply to entrepreneurs, ventures, and the venturing environment.
Bradley R. Agle is a n assistant professor of management at the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer- sity of Washington. His research interests include strategic leadership, with par- ticular emphasis on its ethical dimension, moral development, stakeholder theory, and corporate social performance.
Donna 1. Wood is a professor of business administration a t the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. She is a founder and rising president of the International Association for Business and Society (IABS) and has served a s Chair of the Social Issues in Management Division of the Academy of Management. Cur- rently, she is Editor of the IABS journal, Business & Society. Her research interests focus on corporate social performance and stakeholder theory, international busi- ness and society, collaborative social problem solving, business ethics, and busi- ness-government relations.
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Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts Ronald K. Mitchell; Bradley R. Agle; Donna J. Wood The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Oct., 1997), pp. 853-886. Stable URL:
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Lecture 6 Systems-oriented theories/O'Higgins2009(1).pdf
Corporations, Civil Society, and
Stakeholders: An Organizational
Conceptualization Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
ABSTRACT. This article presents a descriptive con-
ceptual framework comprising four different company
configurations with respect to orientations toward cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR). The four types are
Skeptical, Pragmatic, Engaged, and Idealistic. The frame-
work is grounded in instrumental and normative stake-
holder theory, and a company’s configuration is based on
its instrumental and/or normative stance toward stake-
holders. Its configuration indicates what position a com-
pany adopts in relation to CSR. This article argues that
there is no one formula to fit all companies, descriptively
or prescriptively, but the potential variety in approaches
to CSR is not infinite, as it can be distilled logically into a
few fundamental approaches, embodied in the four
organizational configurations presented in the conceptual
framework. Each configuration constitutes a middle-
range theory of interlocking characteristics in terms of
CSR, and so each type of company will assume respon-
sibilities to civil society in ways consistent with its con-
figurational characteristics. The framework incorporates
previous empirical findings and theoretical explanations.
It is intuitively clear and reasonable to managers, and thus,
has practical value in organizational management.
KEY WORDS: stakeholders, corporate social responsi-
bility, organizational configurations
Introduction
Business is increasingly expected to fulfill a role
beyond that of private economic entities that pro-
duce and distribute goods and services, as corporate
social responsibility (CSR) and stakeholders capture
attention (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Indeed, there
are growing beliefs that not only are companies duty
bound to improve civil society, but also are
particularly well-suited to do so (Cumming et al.,
2005; Wilkes, 2005). Large transnational companies
(TNCs), especially those from developed countries,
can have a significant impact on the socioeconomic
well-being of those countries where they have a
presence (Hsieh, 2004; O’Higgins, 2003). However,
the CSR that is increasingly proposed raises a
number of questions. First, what defines CSR? The
range of definitions encompasses factors such as
company values, motives, behavioral features, and
firm and social outcomes (Crilly et al., 2008). Then,
how does CSR relate to the company’s core business
definition? Should companies go beyond their eco-
nomic tasks? How far and under what circumstances
should they do so? What capabilities do companies
need to enact their chosen social ends? What is the
place of stakeholder voice in deciding on forms of
social involvement? Is there a ‘business case’ for
CSR, and should that matter?
Most studies in the literature take a prescriptive
approach to CSR, on a ‘the-more-the-better’ basis.
This article takes a different approach, to show that
there is no one formula or definitive prescription or
description to delineate CSR. Instead, the article
presents an explanatory organizational framework,
grounded in stakeholder theory (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994; Phillips, 2003),
which categorizes firms into four types with respect
to their orientation to stakeholders. The types are:
Skeptical, Pragmatic, Engaged, and Idealistic. The
typology is based on a configurational approach.
This means that each configuration is conceived as
an interlocking pattern of elements of organizational
values and behavior dispositions. The notion of
configuration offers a robust synthesis of attributes
and circumstances that lie at the heart of theory
Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 94:157–176 � Springer 2009 DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0254-2
building (Christensen and Sundahl, 2001). The
simultaneous treatment of so many variables makes
the configurational approach more powerful in its
explanatory potential than a contingency one. Sev-
eral authors (Dess et al., 1997; Miller, 1986; Miller
and Friesen, 1984) compare configurations with
contingencies. They argue that it is an oversimpli-
fication to assume that the same relationships exist
among variables, no matter what the other aspects of
organizational context, since contingencies differ,
depending on context itself. Configurations are
predictively useful in the descriptive sense, since a
few common configurations can account for the
variety in a large proportion of organizations. A
partial understanding of the dynamics of a particular
organization is sufficient to predict other features of
the same organization, given its configuration
(Meyer et al., 1993; Miller, 1986). Hence, an
understanding of stakeholder orientations within a
configuration can predict how the organization will
handle its approach to and role in society.
Middle-range theory, developed by sociologist
Merton (1968), used to explain how the pieces of
each configuration act together, occupies the ground
between narrow empiricism and grand universal
theory. Theory of the middle range is especially
suited at the level of typologies (Doty and Glick,
1994; Pinder and Moore, 1979). By their very nat-
ure, configurations are not prone to incremental
change because multiple interlocking elements
mutually reinforce the overall pattern of the con-
figuration when any one or two contingencies are
disturbed. Real change implies a realignment of all
the elements into another viable configuration
(Meyer et al., 1993).
Configurations may be discovered empirically or
conceptually, according to Miller and Friesen
(1984). The empirical approach finds clusters of
similar organizations from multivariate analyses of
descriptive data. The conceptual approach, adopted
in the creation of this stakeholder/CSR framework,
synthesizes the literature, logically incorporating
empirical findings and theoretical explanations.
The article first presents the stakeholder logic of
the four configurations within the framework.
Then, the framework is used to depict how each of
the four organizational configurations would behave
in terms of its approach to CSR. Thus, the article
demonstrates that while there is no grand theory to
give one definitive answer to what firms should and
can do in relation to civil society, the variety is not
infinite but is distillable into the four fundamental
approaches concentrating on ‘what firms are actually
doing’ (Margolis and Walsh, 2003, p. 278), offering
prototypical examples. It examines the issues at the
unit of the individual company, whereby each type
is explained within its own processes and inter-
locking features. Then, the article presents its theo-
retical and practical implications in the final section,
including an inductive research agenda.
A framework of stakeholder orientation
configurations
It is clear that business responds to multiple stake-
holders for myriad reasons in different ways (Berrone
et al., 2007; Brickson, 2007; Clarkson, 1991, 1995;
Jones et al., 2007). The proposed framework delin-
eates this variety of approaches to stakeholders
parsimoniously into a finite number of four config-
urations that explains their broad CSR approaches.
Each configuration consists of clusters of interactive
value system and behavioral characteristics, unique
to that configuration (Fiss, 2007). Since the frame-
work is concerned with CSR approaches, it is par-
ticularly apt to use stakeholder theory, notably
instrumental and normative stakeholder theories
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994) as a
central parameter to construct the configurations.
Approaches to stakeholders are a way of accessing
aspects of CSR (Jamali, 2008) and expressing orga-
nizational identity (Berrone et al., 2007; Brickson,
2005, 2007). Phillips (2003) regards the stakeholder
domain as notably applicable to organizational
analysis. He argues that one of the features of an
ethics of organizations is that they have ‘substantive
aims’ (p. 56). In the configurational approach, the
firm is deemed to have visions, strategies, goals, and
responsibilities. A perspective of organizations as
responsible entities perceives them as possessing an
ethic of their own, with intent toward stakeholders
and a capacity to act for or against their interests
(Moir, 2001; Pruzan, 2001). The corporation has a
‘personality’ that reflects modes of thinking, behav-
ior, values, and corporate identity (Kay, 1997; Van
de Ven, 2008).
158 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
In a similar manner to Donaldson and Preston
(1995), Freeman (1994) unpacks stakeholder theory
into normative, descriptive, and instrumental dimensions,
but he adds a fourth metaphorical dimension as ‘a
genre of stories about how we could live’ (p. 413).
The framework integrates all four of Freeman’s
dimensions: It is grounded in the normative and
instrumental dimensions; it is descriptive in portraying
extant organizational-stakeholder attitudes and rela-
tionships in different types of firms. The framework
is metaphorical since each configuration or organiza-
tional ‘story’ can be construed as having its own
distinctive character, portrayed by its title name,
which captures a rich interlocking configuration of
dynamic relationships among organizational values,
motives, and behavioral dispositions. With respect to
normative and instrumental stances toward stake-
holders, critically, the framework recognizes that, in
practice, the normative and instrumental can operate
independently of each other, or together, or not at
all, yielding four possible combinations of stake-
holder orientations. Each combination of these
variables, as embodied in a configuration derived
from stakeholder theory, then suggests what attri-
butes and behavior one might expect to see (Bennett
and Elman, 2007). The normative and instrumental
need not be antithetical, as traditionally presented,
and the existence of mixed motives is realized (Di-
Norcia and Tigner, 2000).
Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework and
the four configurations. Before delineating the
configurations in detail, the normative and instru-
mental stakeholder dimensions, and the sense in
which they are applied, is presented.
The normative view
The normative approach to stakeholders draws on its
rationale from a variety of sources. These include
legal precedent, property rights (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995), a Doctrine of Fair Contracts (Free-
man, 1994), Integrated Social Contracts Theory
(ISCT) (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), communi-
tarian thinking (Etzioni, 1998), and the psychology
of managers (Donaldson, 1999). Foremost among
the philosophical traditions supporting normative
stakeholder approaches are Kantianism (Bowie,
1999) and fairness (Phillips, 2003). It is in the sense
of these last two stakeholder conceptions that the
normative dimension is applied to the stakeholder/
CSR framework. This is consistent with the inter-
pretation of the normative dimension applied by
Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 67) when they
defined normative stakeholders as ‘persons or groups
with legitimate interests in procedural and/or sub-
stantive aspects of corporate activity, identified by
their interests in the corporation, whether the cor-
poration has any corresponding functional interest in
them’. The worth of stakeholders does not derive
from worth created for others (Donaldson, 2008).
Consistent with Donaldson’s stance, Bowie
(1999) confirms a normative stakeholder view that
cannot support any action that violates the respect,
dignity, and just consideration due to legitimate
stakeholders, based on a Kantian perspective. Among
the precepts of a moral firm, Bowie also suggests that
every profit-making firm has an imperfect duty of
beneficence, calling on arguments from citizenship
and from gratitude. ‘Corporate citizens’, whose
creation and continued existence are dependent on
society, are expected to contribute to that society.
On the gratitude front, corporations tend to owe the
state more than they contribute in taxes. Fairness
underpinning stakeholder theory is manifested when
all the firm’s stakeholders are recompensed in the
measure that they have incurred costs and damages,
even if the firm has not benefited from those
stakeholder inputs (Bowie, 1999; Phillips, 2003).
This equates to Kaler’s (2006) notion of those with a
moral claim as being stakeholders. Hosmer and
Kiewitz (2005) also take up the fairness concept as
critical in normative stakeholder theory. They en-
dorse four forms of justice – distributive, procedural,
interactional, and informational – that the firm must
IN S
T R
U M
E N
T A
L
HIGH
LOW
LOW
Pragmatic Example – Coca Cola
Engaged Example - Unilever
Skeptical Example – Exxon Mobil
Idealistic Examples – Body Shop; Ben & Jerry’s;
Social Entrepreneurs
NORMATIVE HIGH
Fig. 1. Stakeholder orientation framework.
159Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
afford to stakeholders. Others might go beyond
immediate fairness considerations, to those of
inherited or derivative obligations. For example, if a
company benefits from low wages prevailing in a
country whose government abnegates its responsi-
bilities to provide for the basic health, education, etc.
of its people, the benefiting company steps in to fill
these welfare shortcomings. These are role specific,
perfect responsibilities on the part of the company,
because the local population which has the role of
hosting the company is acknowledged as having the
right to expect recompense from the company,
which has a corresponding obligation (Kaler, 2003).
Finally, there are those who go so far as to argue that
companies owe beneficence to everyone in needy
societies, even if they do not affect those societies
directly, because of the desire for the common good
(Reed, 2002), making everyone a potential stake-
holder, thereby far extending the identification of
potential stakeholders.
The instrumental view
A firm recognizes instrumental stakeholders as those
whom it requires to achieve the ends of the firm
and/or its principals. The needs of stakeholders, their
intrinsic well-being, and their fair treatment are of
secondary interest. These will be catered to only
insofar as they must, to ensure the inputs desired
from the stakeholders concerned. Phillips (2003)
justifies instrumental behavior toward a certain class
of stakeholders whose legitimacy is ‘derivative’.
Kaler (2002) would see them as influencers. These
stakeholders may have no normative claim, but they
can help or harm the firm. Thus, they must be dealt
with accordingly to protect the firm and to fulfill
primary obligations to normative stakeholders.
A stakeholder overview of the four
organizational configurations
The four organizational types vary on a number of
factors ultimately relevant to CSR: organizational
purposes; stakeholder identification and salience;
stakeholder management, performance metrics; and
the boundaries between the firm and stakeholders
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003). The descriptions that
follow are idealized prototypes, portrayed in Table I,
which summarizes the main features of each of the
four configurations.
Organizational purposes
How does the organization conceive of its organi-
zational purposes, i.e., why and for whose benefit
does the company exist? What role, if any, do
stakeholders play in achieving its purposes?
Skeptical configuration companies’ identity is
consistent with the view of the firm as a bundle of
assets which exists solely to provide benefits to its
shareholders/‘owners’ (Schneper and Guillen, 2004).
As per the traditional shareholder versus stakeholder
divide, the Skeptical company does not recognize
stakeholders per se (Letza et al., 2004). Shareholders/
owners alone hold a ‘stake’ in the firm, giving them
the rights to participate in its profits via dividends, its
prospects via capital gains, and its control via voting
rights and approval of directors (Metcalfe, 1998).
The Skeptical firm is not unaware of what Phillips
(2003) designates ‘derivative stakeholders’, but it
would regard them as ‘influencers’, which should be
taken into consideration only to the extent that they
aid or impede the attainment of strategic objectives
(Kaler, 2002). Skeptical firms include those in con-
troversial industries, such as tobacco or gaming
companies. The Skeptical firm also deals with
stakeholders, albeit reluctantly, when the law re-
quires. For example, oil major Exxon (net income in
2008 was $45.2 billion) battled in the courts for
19 years to overturn a punitive fine of $5 billion
awarded against the company to the victims of the
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Arguably,
ingrained systemic management practices had facili-
tated the disaster in the first place (Hosmer, 1998).
Exxon claimed it had already spent $3.4 billion for
cleanup and compensatory payments, settlements,
and fines. Having fought all the way to the Supreme
Court, in 2008, the company succeeded in having
the fine reduced to $507 million, and so the pay-
ment per person affected (arguably normative
stakeholders) dropped from $75,000 to $15,000.
The Pragmatic firm is instrumental in its recog-
nition of stakeholders, embracing ‘enlightened
stakeholder theory’ in its management of relation-
ships with important constituencies, to optimize
160 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
economic performance. Campbell (1997) argues that
in the ‘economic jungle’, the company needs the
loyalty of its ‘active’ stakeholders. Notably, he de-
fines active stakeholders as those who can affect the
firm’s performance, whose ‘demands are unquench-
able’ (p. 447). Thus, both Skeptical and Pragmatic
firms are single objective in purpose, although
Pragmatic firms are pluralist in the style in which
they implement their strategies. Coca Cola exem-
plifies a Pragmatic company, as it reacts to criticisms
over its water depletion and pollution causing
activities in developing countries by establishing ad
hoc projects to deal with water quality, nutrition, and
education in communities where it operates. It also
publishes an elaborate CSR report, wherein it
addresses the readers in a letter from the CEO as
‘Dear stakeholder’.
The long-term sustainability of the company is at
the heart of the Engaged corporation’s purposes. It
attempts to safeguard itself into the future, by cre-
ating a self-perpetuating virtuous cycle that is good
for all stakeholders, including owners, enabling it to
serve two purposes simultaneously. This kind of
virtuous cycle is depicted very eloquently by Davies
(1999) in the notion of ‘Tomorrow’s Company’,
which ‘treat(s) stakeholders as the spokes of a wheel
– all are needed to move forward and each takes the
load in turn’ (p. 194). Therefore, doing well for all
stakeholders is synonymous with doing well for the
firm, achieving its economic ends by means that
fulfill its deeper purposes and ethical values. It rejects
the traditional trade-off between financial and social
objectives (DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000), preferring
shared values and aspirations among all the firm’s
stakeholders. Similarly, Jones and Wicks (1999)
propose that unitary or ‘convergent’ stakeholder
theory is both normatively sound and practically
viable, based on a rationale that trusting relationships
with stakeholders is good business practice. Unile-
ver, the Anglo-Dutch consumer goods company,
exemplifies such an Engaged company, as it pursues
economic ends in ways that engage positively with
its legitimate stakeholders (Senge et al., 2006).
The Idealistic firm prioritizes the normative, in
pursuit of an ideal world where stakeholders,
selected from a wide pool, matter. The priority
purpose of the firm’s existence is to serve society,
and the firm is a medium for serving stakeholder
interests (Etzioni, 1998). Economic activities are a
T A
B L E
I
F ea
tu re
s o f
th e
st ak
eh o ld
er o ri
en ta
ti o n
fr am
ew o rk
S k ep
ti ca
l P ra
g m
at ic
E n g ag
ed Id
ea li st
ic
O rg
an iz
at io
n al
p u rp
o se
S h ar
eh o ld
er s/
o w
n er
w el
fa re
S h ar
eh o ld
er s/
o w
n er
w el
fa re
F ir
m w
el fa
re ,
em b ra
ci n g
le g it im
at e
st ak
eh o ld
er s
S o ci
et y
w el
fa re
S ta
k eh
o ld
er ID
/s al
ie n ce
N o
st ak
eh o ld
er s,
o n ly
‘g en
er al
in fl u en
ce rs
’
P o w
er an
d u rg
en cy
N o rm
at iv
e le
g it im
ac y ,
p o w
er an
d
u rg
en cy
, p lu
s d er
iv at
iv e
st ak
eh o ld
er s
N o rm
at iv
e le
g it im
ac y ,
d ep
en d en
cy ,
u rg
en cy
S ta
k eh
o ld
er m
an ag
em en
t R
ea ct
iv e,
co m
p li an
t,
im p er
so n al
C o n v en
ti o n al
, en
li g h te
n ed
se lf -i
n te
re st
, m
it ig
at e
st ak
eh o ld
er p o w
er
F ai
rn es
s, in
te rd
ep en
d en
cy ,
re la
ti o n sh
ip s,
d ia
lo g u e,
tr u st
B en
efi ce
n t
p at
ro n
P er
fo rm
an ce
m et
ri cs
S h ar
eh o ld
er re
tu rn
s P ro
fi ta
b il it y ,
m ar
k et
sh ar
e,
sh ar
eh o ld
er re
tu rn
s
V ir
tu o u s
cy cl
e o f
fi n an
ci al
p er
fo rm
an ce
an d
co rp
o ra
te
so ci
al p er
fo rm
an ce
C o rp
o ra
te so
ci al
im p ac
t
F ir
m an
d st
ak eh
o ld
er
b o u n d ar
ie s
F ir
m d is cr
et e
fr o m
so ci
et y
F ir
m d is cr
et e
fr o m
so ci
et y
In te
g ra
te d
in to
so ci
al n et
w o rk
s
w it h
v ar
ie ty
o f
st ak
eh o ld
er s
L in
k ag
es w
it h
se lf -c
h o se
n
co n st
it u en
ci es
161Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
means toward those social ends, not the other way
around. Managers would opt for the normative
solution in case of a conflict between the instru-
mental and the normative. In general, companies
founded by social entrepreneurs exemplify the Ide-
alistic configuration. Examples of companies in this
category are the toiletries retailer, The Body Shop,
and the ice cream company, Ben and Jerry’s, both of
which were originally founded by owners who used
their companies as vehicles to pursue social aims and
serve stakeholders of their personal choosing.
Stakeholder identification and salience
The different organizational purposes of the four
configurational types, in turn, imply different criteria
for designating who is a stakeholder, and the salience
of designated stakeholders to the firm in achieving its
purposes.
Stakeholder identification is not an issue to
Skeptical firms. This does not preclude dealing
strategically with persons or groups who can help or
hinder the firm, no different to coping with other
important influences. Although it does not recognize
stakeholders, the Skeptical firm is not absolved from
moral obligations toward human beings in general
(Phillips, 2003). Even when considering moral
obligations to all people, Skeptical firms are likely to
practice moral relativism as they maneuver their way
into competitive advantage. Exxon, denounced by
various environmental NGOs and concerned
shareholders, has traditionally been a laggard in
spending on finding renewable energy sources and
in acknowledging the existence of climate change.
However, under pressure, by 2008, the company
launched a campaign, proclaiming its leadership in
solving the global energy challenge by means of
efficiency and technology to secure energy supplies
in an environmentally friendly way, and acknowl-
edging climate change as an issue.
The instrumental stance of Pragmatic firms
advocates that the company must act to please
powerful stakeholders who have the coercive, util-
itarian, or symbolic resources that the company
requires to achieve desired results. According to
Mitchell et al. (1997), salience of particular stake-
holders derives from their power, legitimacy, and
urgency with respect to the focal firm. Michael
Porter’s (1998) popular competitive strategy frame-
work basically exhorts companies to reduce the
power of certain salient stakeholders to attain com-
petitive advantage. As moral relativists, Pragmatic
firms may actually inflict harm on less powerful
stakeholders to serve more powerful ones, regardless
of the normative legitimacy of the less powerful.
Coca Cola defended its continuing sponsorship of
the Olympics in Beijing, against critics who deplore
China’s human rights record, and support of a re-
gime which apparently practices genocide in Sudan.
Coca Cola itself operates in Sudan, despite an em-
bargo, by using a loophole. Coca Cola’s defense rests
on its longstanding support for Olympic ideals and
investment of $5 million for clean water in Sudan
(Coca Cola 2008 net income was $5.8 billion) and
various other projects in health and education, as
well as claiming a behind-the-scenes search for a
socio-political solution (Isdell, 2008).
In Engaged firms, the power of stakeholders is not
ignored, but normative obligations – duties of fair-
ness toward legitimate stakeholders, consent, stake-
holders as ends in themselves – prevent subverting
the rights of a group of legitimate stakeholders in
favor of another more powerful but less legitimate
one, unless it had longer-term beneficial conse-
quences for the less powerful group with normative
claims. Legitimate stakeholders emerge naturally in
the course of everyday business with those in the
Engaged firm’s task environment (Zenisek, 1979).
Especially important are those with firm-specific
commitments, such as employees, managers, share-
holders, creditors, and the local community (Blair
and Stout, 1999). Thus, Engaged firms regard
responsibilities to firm-specific stakeholders and
shareholders as role specific and perfect (Kaler,
2003). They integrate both power and legitimacy in
stakeholder identification and salience. While diffi-
cult to effect practically, such a reconciliation may be
achieved through Phillips’ (2003) formulation of
two types of stakeholders – those whose status is
based on normative foundations, and the derivative
stakeholders whose status is based on their power.
Engaged firms become institutionalized in their
normative orientation, contrary to Pragmatic ones
which adopt temporary, ad hoc, ‘as if’ normative
attitudes to stakeholders. This ‘as if’ normative
behavior (Donaldson, 1999) in Pragmatic firms will
be non-resistant to economic pressures to abandon
162 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
it, since they regard responsibilities to stakeholders as
‘imperfect’, i.e., discretionary (Kaler, 2003). In
contrast, in a conflict between the normative and
instrumental, the Engaged firm would try to resolve
the conflict by finding an imaginative resolution in
collaboration with affected stakeholders (Driver,
2006; Maharaj, 2008).
Idealistic organizations acknowledge as legitimate
stakeholders only those with normative claims on
the firm, dismissing Phillips’ (2003) derivative
stakeholders. However, the Idealistic firm would
designate as normative a wider range of stakeholders
than the other organizational types. Whereas the
Engaged firm acknowledges as normative stake-
holders those in its task environment, with an
interest in the firm and affected by its operations, the
Idealistic firm extends its designation of its stake-
holders beyond this, shouldering responsibility for
those it would like to help, extending role-speci-
ficity and perfect obligations very widely (Kaler,
2003). Indeed, Idealistic firms see their managers as
fiduciaries for all of society, the broadest view of
what is a stakeholder, and one questioned by those
with an anti-stakeholder inclination (Kaler, 2006).
Many Idealistic firms are established with the express
intention of addressing a particular cause or stake-
holder class, as happens with social entrepreneurs
(Nicholls 2006).
Stakeholder management
The four organizational types base their decisions
and actions with respect to stakeholders on their
different approaches toward strategic analysis.
The Skeptical firm carries out strengths–weak-
nesses–opportunities–threats (SWOT) analyses in
pursuit of competitive advantage, listing stakeholders
as opportunities or threats or competitive forces to
be dealt with in the same way as any pressures. This
stance corresponds to coercion (Stoney and Win-
stanley, 2001) or ‘reactivity’ (Clarkson, 1991, 1995).
Skeptical firms deal with these ‘forces’, complying
with prohibitions and obligations, although they can
cross the line into manipulation (Arnstein, 1969). As
examples, tobacco companies provide selective flat-
tering information in their CSR reports; Exxon
ranks in the lowest tier among oil companies on
openness about sums paid to host countries for oil,
and other details of its revenues, according to a
survey by Transparency International, the anti-cor-
ruption watchdog (www.transparency.org).
The instrumentalist affirmation of stakeholder
power in Pragmatic firms finds its expression in
stakeholder mapping techniques, whereby high
power/interest/urgency stakeholders are designated
as key players, thus demanding the undivided
attention of management. This corresponds to
Clarkson’s (1991, 1995) ‘defensive’ category, doing
only what is required, taking a public relations ap-
proach. These firms are likely to abandon stake-
holders as soon as their common interests cease to
coincide, or there is no business case for it (Steger
et al., 2007). Pragmatic organizations may forestall
stakeholder activism through various mechanisms,
including placation and co-optation which may take
the form of ‘dialogue’ with hand-selected stake-
holder focus groups, often mediated by consultants
hired by the firm (Thomson and Bebbington, 2005).
Engaged firms may also use stakeholder mapping,
but as a starting point to help identify both norma-
tive and instrumental stakeholders and their interests.
The Engaged configuration, which embraces both
the normative and instrumental, is consistent with
‘accommodation’ and being ‘proactive’, since it ac-
cepts responsibility and does all that is required, but
may go further when it makes sense in terms of its
relationships and business model (Clarkson, 1991,
1995). Engaged firms move on to dialogue and
exploration of issues of common concern to the firm
and the identified stakeholders. It is suggested that
the implementation of fairness at the core of stake-
holder legitimacy should take place in a context of
cooperation and communicative action (Roloff,
2008). The quality of the interaction and relation-
ships between the Engaged firm and its stakeholders
can be distinguished from that of the Pragmatic firm.
In the latter, interaction with stakeholders may take
place largely for public relations, placatory, or
compliance reasons.
Thomson and Bebbington (2005) point out that
compliance with codified CSR standards such as
AA1000 has little to do with stakeholder engage-
ment. (AA1000, issued by the Institute of Social and
Ethical Accountability, is one of a myriad of CSR
performance standards proposed by various bodies
positioning themselves as social auditors and certifi-
cation organizations.) Genuine stakeholder engage-
163Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
ment implies the discussion of issues which concern
stakeholders within an explicit mutually reflexive
accountability context, placing stakeholders as co-
principals, rather than as objects – circumstances
likelier to prevail in the Engaged firm than in the
other configurations. It is ‘relational’, having moved
away from ‘managing’ stakeholders to building vig-
orous, long-term, resilient relationships with them
within networks (Lozano, 2005). These are media
for continuous learning, co-creating platforms for
mutual advantage, building communities of practice
to develop knowledge, innovation, and an accu-
mulation of critical resources from a diversity of
competencies and perspectives, in an ongoing
atmosphere of trust (Roloff, 2008).
In Idealistic firms, an internally generated ‘phi-
losophy’ or ‘ethos’ dictates approaches to stake-
holders (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). It is
‘proactive’, characterized by corporate behavior that
promotes the interests of stakeholders, broadly des-
ignated, exceeding requirements (Clarkson, 1991,
1995). Sometimes, their principled stance toward
stakeholders is an intrinsic part of their unique
positioning, and self-professed Idealistic firms may
use social actions as a way of reinforcing their own
social identity and image, as have Ben and Jerry’s and
The Body Shop.
Performance metrics
It follows that since each of the four configurations
has different purposes, they should assess their success
in performance according to their purpose, consistent
with how they are trying to achieve those purposes in
terms of their stakeholder management practices.
Since the Skeptical firm sees itself as answerable
only to shareholders and optimizing shareholder
welfare, it would aim to maximize classic share-
holder value creation measures.
The purely instrumental perspective of the Prag-
matic firm means that intermediate financial and
market performance, such as profitability and market
share gains ultimately impact shareholder returns.
These intermediate measures are boosted because
the firm performs well in its business operations
through its supposed due attention to powerful
stakeholders. This is eventually rewarded when the
shareholders gain.
The long-term viability of the Engaged firms’
approach depends on the supposition that firms
which are doing well financially have the means to
invest in Corporate Social Performance (CSP),
which in turn, contributes to enhanced financial
performance, providing overall ‘positive synergy’ in
a self-reinforcing performance cycle (Waddock and
Graves, 1997). Engaged firms are more likely to
justify their CSR activities on values and motivation
than on assigning precise metrics to demonstrate the
business case (Steger et al., 2007). Thus, in Engaged
firms, awareness of stakeholder concerns may inau-
gurate a virtuous cycle that contributes to both
stakeholder and strategic performance. Senge et al.
(2006) show how Unilever’s work with a number of
partners on projects in developing countries is of real
value to various beneficiary stakeholders and to
Unilever itself, within a learning context.
Idealistic firms reckon their success to the extent
that they satisfy or benefit their legitimate stake-
holders as an end in itself, where anyone whose
needs they feel obliged to answer qualifies as their
stakeholder.
The boundaries between the firm and stakeholders
The corporation can see itself as a private body,
separate to society, defined as a nexus of contracts
and a set of relationships between principals and
agents (Kay and Silberston, 1995; Schneper and
Guillen, 2004). In contrast, the corporation can see
itself as a social institution, a vehicle for executing
the interests of a wide variety of stakeholders from
within and without, with the boundary between the
corporation and society regarded as permeable or
even non-existent.
Skeptical and Pragmatic firms perceive themselves
as discrete entities within their wider environments.
In a typology of stakeholder identity developed by
Brickson (2005), both Skeptical and Pragmatic firms
could be seen as Individualistic in the way that they
promote their own uniqueness and welfare. The
nature of their contractual view of relationships is
transactional for both Skeptical and Pragmatic firms,
but Skeptical ones are likelier to regard contracts as
more impersonal, whereby the firm is defined as
‘a group of people who find it expedient every
morning to renew their contracts with each other’
164 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
(Kay, 1997, p. 135). Exxon resisted the will of the
descendants of John D. Rockefeller, the company
founder, when they and other shareholders chal-
lenged its corporate governance structures and its
reluctance to finding alternative energy sources. It was
easy to ignore the Rockefeller family when the
company posted the second largest ever first quarter
profit ($10.9 billion) in US history in 2008. Pragmatic
firms would not be as unresponsive, since the salience
of ongoing relationships with individuals and groups is
important, albeit, assessed in instrumental terms. This
attitude is seen in Coca-Cola’s ad hoc social projects.
The Engaged firm acknowledges its mutual
interdependence with its internal and external
stakeholders. It recognizes multiple objectives and an
array of stakeholders with legitimate claims on the
firm through its primary and secondary interaction
within the milieus within which it operates, as a
node in a complex network of interrelated stake-
holders (Roloff, 2008). Hence, it is embedded in
civil society through these stakeholder obligations
and networks (Lozano, 2005), part of its task envi-
ronment (Zenisek, 1979). Simultaneously, the En-
gaged firm, anchored in economic reality, takes its
role seriously in the efficient provision of goods and
services. Thus, Engaged firms can be seen as hybrid
Relational/Collectivistic/Individualistic in Brick-
son’s (2005) stakeholder typology, since they con-
nect specifically to stakeholders with whom they
have a particular relationship, while still viewing the
organization as part of an extended collective.
Moreover, they have to pursue economic aims at the
same time. Interpreting and fulfilling these concur-
rent roles involves a strong normative dimension
(Phillips, 2003), exemplified in serious stakeholder
dialogue conducted by Unilever to promote sus-
tainable food production (Senge et al., 2006). Also,
investors, interested in a social agenda, may well be
attracted to Engaged companies.
Idealistic firms strive for civil society enhance-
ment through selected causes and initiatives, which
may or may not be related to their main business.
Thus, they may not be as embedded as Engaged
firms. The limits they place on their stakeholder
involvements are discretionary, perhaps based on
management preferences, often from concentrated
owners, as in the Ben and Jerry’s and Body Shop
cases. Both companies actively pursued selected so-
cial causes whilst majority owned by their idealistic
founders. Alternatively, Idealistic firms’ causes may
be backed by their activist social investment funds
(Nicholls, 2006). Since they do not confine them-
selves to those whom they affect in their task envi-
ronment, even indirectly, Idealistic firms regard an
extensive swathe of potential stakeholders as their
concern and therefore as being responsible to them.
In Brickson’s (2005) typology, Idealistic firms are
collectivist, but paradoxically individualistic, often
acutely self-conscious of their own unique identity.
An example is Anita Roddick, founder of The Body
Shop, who entitled her book Business as Unusual and
stated that she was inclined to see where her com-
petitors were going and turn 180� (Roddick, 2005).
Organizational CSR preferences
Corporate involvement with civil society is open to
discretion, and a great deal of variety in attitudes and
behavior is seen in the way this discretion is exercised
via CSR. In the configurational framework, the way
that a firm expresses its broader interactions with
society through its CSR preferences is intertwined
with the way it perceives and deals with stakeholders.
The stakeholder orientation framework is able to
classify the variety of CSR approaches within the four
organizational configurations. These are delineated
under a number of categories, significant in under-
standing CSR attitudes and behavior. The categories
are: how the firm senses stimuli for CSR involvement;
how response options are generated and evaluated;
how the chosen option is implemented; and impact on
the firm itself (Driver, 2006; Margolis and Walsh,
2003). Table II summarizes the CSR preference
stances of the four types of firms.
Sensing stimuli for CSR involvement
What provokes CSR involvement by companies?
How do they become conscious of a social need that
they can fill, and why should they want to act on this
knowledge?
Skeptical firms are not sensitized to notice the
needs of civil society in their environmental scan-
ning, although they may take up what amount to
CSR behaviors in response to some perceived
opportunities and threats, as a specific strategic
solution. When Exxon contracted to build a pipeline
165Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
carrying oil from Chad, an African country, the
company was placed under certain obligations to
make provision for health and education resources
for the affected local population. These conditions,
and others, regarding environmental preservation,
and essential facilities for the inhabitants came about
after pressure from up to 250 NGOs and the World
Bank, groups whose consent was a necessary part of
Exxon’s license to operate in Chad.
Pragmatic companies may sense initially that they
had better get involved from strategic analysis
exercises, such as mapping techniques, or from
stakeholder forums. They take action for defensive
reasons if they are under pressure to do so from
stakeholders on whom they depend, and to whose
power they defer. More positive reasons may also
propel Pragmatic firms to act on behalf of dependent
stakeholders. It may be a reputation bolstering
exercise. For example, Coca Cola actively proclaims
its AIDS prevention and treatment programs for its
employees in Africa to legitimize its operations, but
it also enhances the reliability of its workforce.
Engaged firms obtain feedback in dialogue with
primary and secondary stakeholders in their networks
to bring attention to social needs where they might
play a role. Similar to Pragmatic firms, they attend to
signals from powerful stakeholders. However, they
also attend to messages from less powerful stake-
holders, i.e., those who are considered legitimate on
a normative basis. The Engaged firm aspires to
compensate individuals and groups affected by the
firm, according to the fairness principle (Phillips,
2003). An instance of an Engaged company’s notion
of its normative obligations might arise if it employs
large numbers of workers in developing countries.
The company may receive more in terms of payroll
savings, tax breaks, and grants than it has put back
into the economy. Thus, it can be argued that it
should offset the shortfall by providing training,
education, and healthcare for its workers and
recompense others adversely affected by its presence
in the country. This is in line with Bowie’s (1999)
declaration of beneficence out of obligation or
Kaler’s (2003) role-specific perfect responsibilities.
Further, Engaged companies would accept Hsieh’s
(2004) extended notion of beneficence beyond their
task environment if it is a matter of ‘rescue’. This
must satisfy three conditions: the harm in question is
a grave one; the company is in a position to correct
T A
B L E
II
O rg
an iz
at io
n al
C S R
p re
fe re
n ce
s
S k ep
ti ca
l P ra
g m
at ic
E n g ag
ed Id
ea li st
ic
S en
si n g
st im
u li
to C
S R
in v o lv
em en
t
N o n e
re la
ti n g
to C
S R
P o w
er an
d u rg
en cy
o f
st ak
eh o ld
er s
L eg
it im
ac y
o f
st ak
eh o ld
er s
b as
ed o n
fa ir
n es
s in
ta sk
en v ir
o n m
en t;
p o w
er an
d
u rg
en cy
o f
st ak
eh o ld
er s
O w
n p u rp
o se
s, u rg
en t
an d
n ee
d y
co n st
it u en
ci es
,
fa ir
n es
s
G en
er at
io n ,
ev al
u at
io n
o f
o p ti o n s
In ci
d en
ta l
S tr
at eg
ic an
al y si s,
in st
ru m
en ta
ll y
lo g ic
al ,
m im
et ic
D is co
u rs
e, b al
an ce
o f
in te
re st
s
(fi rm
an d
le g it im
at e
st ak
e
h o ld
er s)
A n sw
er in
g se
lf -c
h o se
n
so ci
al n ee
d s
Im p le
m en
ta ti
o n
B y -p
ro d u ct
o f
st ra
te g y
E p is o d ic
, o u ts
o u rc
in g
p o p u la
r
L o n g -t
er m
o n g o in
g
d ev
el o p m
en ta
l, in
p ar
tn er
sh ip
E p is o d ic
o r
co n ti n u o u s;
se lf ,
o u ts
o u rc
in g
o r
p ar
tn er
in g
Im p ac
t o n
th e
fi rm
L ar
g el
y u n ch
an g ed
L ar
g el
y u n ch
an g ed
P o te
n ti al
fo r
su b st
an ti al
le ar
n in
g an
d in
te rn
al
d ev
el o p m
en t
L ar
g el
y u n ch
an g ed
166 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
the harm, and prevention or reversal of the harm is of
little cost relative to the harm eradicated. An example
that satisfies these conditions is Unilever’s engage-
ment in a research project with the NGO, Oxfam, to
investigate and enhance the impacts of MNCs on
poverty reduction in developing countries.
The Idealistic firm takes its normative responsibil-
ities even further, acting for the benefit of those it
designates as stakeholders, beyond its direct and
indirect task environment. On a Kantian basis, it
acknowledges a duty of beneficence from citizenship
(the common good), or of gratitude (to make up for
shortfalls in its contribution) (Bowie, 1999). Consis-
tent with the arguments of critical theorists, Idealistic
companies from developed countries operating in
developing countries, especially those which lack the
political, economic, and sociocultural conditions en-
joyed by people in developed countries, feel obliged
to compensate for these shortcomings, to direct
stakeholders and the wider community alike (Reed,
2002). They advocate that companies from developed
countries should provide the civil and political rights
that negligent or corrupt agents fail to provide to the
populace in developing countries. This is on the basis
that they are there on the sufferance of the people
rather than by the rights granted by a legitimate
authority.
In summary, Skeptical firms are not stimulated to
CSR per se. Pragmatic firms are stimulated to CSR by
powerful stakeholders, especially with urgent de-
mands. Engaged firms are stimulated by powerful and
legitimate stakeholders in the firm’s task environment,
based primarily on fairness. Idealistic firms are stimu-
lated to social action by their own purposes and by
legitimate and urgent stakeholders. Legitimacy is
based on need and urgency, as perceived by the Ide-
alistic firm.
Generation and evaluation of CSR options
When they decide to take sociopolitical action, how
do firms generate their potential responses? On what
bases do they determine what action to take? Whom
do they involve in the decision process and how?
The way companies habitually take decisions with
respect to their stakeholder orientation offers insights
about decision making with respect to CSR.
Skeptical firms do not expressly consider taking
social action. However, when Skeptical firms rec-
ognize the strategic advantages of a particular stra-
tegic or tactical approach, it may have secondary
incidental social impacts, beneficial or detrimental
(DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000). For example, in cer-
tain circumstances, Skeptical firms might find it
expedient to provide philanthropic donations for
social programs to strengthen their competitive
positioning, as Exxon does. Skeptical firms might
also try to divert attention away from otherwise
questionable activities. Examples may be found in
tobacco companies which subsidize medical research
or alcoholic beverage producers which contribute
to, or even organize, anti-binge drinking campaigns.
The costs and benefits of CSR are weighed up
carefully by Pragmatic companies for their effects on
the bottom line and/or shareholder well-being.
Since the social actions of Pragmatic firms are carried
out for instrumental reasons in pursuit of economic
objectives, they are assessed only on the extent to
which they satisfy these economic objectives.
Alternatives are assessed to find the one that puts the
firm into the most advantageous position vis-à-vis its
salient stakeholders, either by answering the de-
mands of the stakeholders sufficiently to placate
them, or, mitigating their power over the firm. For
example, banks, which are under pressure from
NGOs not to finance projects that harm the envi-
ronment or involve human rights abuses, may agree
to refrain from individual loans on an ad hoc basis
(Maitland, 2004). This example illustrates the
piecemeal episodic approach adopted by Pragmatic
firms to CSR involvement. Pragmatic firms also
copy precedents by other companies, where social
action has been used to enhance economic perfor-
mance. Indeed, stakeholder activism is giving rise to
a common set of institutionalized responses by cor-
porations, as seen in the mission statements and
glossy CSR reports now issued by all large compa-
nies, irrespective of underlying social values and
motives (Bartkus and Glassman, 2008).
The generation of alternative CSR options is
complex in Engaged firms, because they may have to
balance conflicting demands and to foresee a cascade
of consequences, rather than making just one simple
decision. Moreover, their method of generation
differs to that of Pragmatic companies, as Engaged
firms participate in discourse with all those primary
167Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
and secondary stakeholders, to whom they believe
they owe fairness, often on specific issues (Roloff,
2008). They may also engage with a range of con-
stituencies, such as NGOs, to tap relevant expertise.
The benefits of dialogue are numerous. Apart from
resolving possible tension and obtaining cooperation,
it can build trust and reputation and reduce the risk of
public attacks on the company. Moreover, discourse
and collaboration with an extensive network of
stakeholders may also constitute opportunities to
generate more imaginative and entrepreneurial social
involvement alternatives that will ultimately yield
competitive advantages (Roloff, 2008). Unilever’s
multi-stakeholder projects on sustainable food pro-
vision and on mitigating poverty came out of this kind
of thinking.
There are risks in stakeholder dialogue around
social involvement: creating overly high expecta-
tions; sterile repetitive discussion; lack of internal
support within the firm or stakeholder groups; or a
breakdown of confidence and trust. Networking,
communication, and partnering skills and experience
are necessary to avoid these mishaps (Sagawa and
Segal, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). This implies a
requirement for a mentality that differs from the
debate, zero-sum game type of interaction to which
many managers are comfortably accustomed.
Idealistic firms may not have quite the range of
stakeholders that Engaged companies have in their
task environment, since they tend to be smaller,
more focused companies. Therefore, they are un-
likely to have the critical mass to be involved across a
broad spectrum. If they are Idealistic firms ab initio,
they may well be concentrating on some particular
aspect of social entrepreneurship. An example is
ApproTEC, a firm which creates and markets simple
and inexpensive tools in Tanzania and Kenya. Its
best known product is an irrigation pump called the
MoneyMaker, costing just $38–78. It eliminates the
need to draw water from wells with ropes and
buckets. The company was founded by entrepreneur
Martin Fischer, who went for many years without a
salary, gratified that ApproTEC’s products generated
an additional $33 million in wages and profit a year.
ApproTEC is supported by Geneva-based Schwab
Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, which
supports late-stage social entrepreneurs. Some Ide-
alistic companies may chop-and-change different
causes along the way, less integrated with the busi-
ness of the enterprise, depending on the predilec-
tions of the company leadership. The leaders may
have fixed ideas of what causes to support, and how,
so that they may go their own way, rather than plan
with others, even their beneficiaries, as was typical of
Anita Roddick in The Body Shop. This may leave
some Idealistic firms open to charges of meddling
and paternalism, perpetuating the dependency that
prevents beneficiaries from being enabled to manage
their own affairs (Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
In summary, as regards the generation and eval-
uation of CSR involvement options, Skeptical firms
may produce beneficial and/or harmful social effects
as a by-product of strategic decisions, not concerned
with CSR per se. Pragmatic companies use a com-
petitive strategic analysis and imitation of successful
firms to find alternative social activities, choosing
those that advance their economic goals as efficiently
and effectively as possible. Engaged firms hold dis-
course with stakeholders along with strategic analysis
to generate social action alternatives. In agreement
with their beneficiaries, other stakeholders and
partners, they choose those that offer the best sus-
tainable balance of effectiveness and efficiency for
the firm and its legitimate stakeholders. Idealistic
companies generate and evaluate social action alter-
natives in accordance with their own ethos and
purposes and their individualistic choices of CSR
projects.
Implementation of chosen CSR options
The nature of implementation of CSR involvement
is consistent with the reasoning behind the action, as
per the particular configuration, and varies according
as whether the company itself takes direct action, or
it is outsourced. Companies might work in part-
nership with others, often NGOs which brought the
need to the attention of the company initially.
Implementation may also vary along the temporal
dimension; the action taken ranges from once-off, to
ongoing and long-term.
The CSR activities of Skeptical companies are
merely by-products of their strategic approach, such
as Exxon’s activities in Chad, mentioned above.
Meanwhile, a Pragmatic company takes action on
the basis of enlightened self-interest, consistent with
its instrumental stance. A social project may be taken
168 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
on to resolve a particular stakeholder issue for the
company, which does what is in its own immediate
interest and may withdraw support if involvement
no longer suits that interest. For instance, Coca
Cola’s water quality projects in developing countries
are a direct response to allegations of water depletion
and contamination by the company in its operations.
Both Pragmatic and Engaged companies choose
CSR initiatives that are related to the stakeholder
domains of their task environment. However, the
Engaged firms behave in a way that not only en-
hances the economic purposes of the firm, but also
best achieves the intent of the action on behalf of its
beneficiaries and social outcomes, compatible with
normative principles, by working out an agenda
with others. Also similar to Pragmatic companies,
Engaged firms partner with others to take social
action. However, Engaged firms are more likely to
develop ongoing integrative collaborations that span
several projects to create lasting impact. The capacity
of Engaged firms to collaborate with stakeholders
may encourage them to form long-term alliances
with companies with which they trade, as well as
with other actors (Balogun and Hailey, 2004; Sag-
awa and Segal, 2000; Senge et al., 2006). It is
through such alliances, that the Engaged company
upgrades entrepreneurship and technical and mana-
gerial skills in its communities to spread best practice.
In addition, the Engaged company may develop
effective business networks or ecosystems. These can
include vertical supply–chain relationships and hor-
izontal clustering. The UN Commission on the
Private Sector & Development suggests that such
business ecosystems bypass weak regulatory envi-
ronments in developing countries by creating private
capacity for regulation and enforcement within the
network (UNDP, 2004). As more of these ecosys-
tems are established, best practice could become the
widespread norm, through mimetic processes. An
example of such a network is Hindustan Lever Ltd.,
a Unilever subsidiary in India. Its product sales
ecosystem includes 80 manufacturing facilities, 150
small and medium enterprise suppliers, employing
up to 40,000 people, 7000-plus stockists, 12,000
wholesalers and small retailers, 300,000 shop owners,
and 150,000 entrepreneurs in remote villages
(UNDP, 2004). Developing new business models to
cater to hitherto huge unserved markets of poor
consumers ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’ can add up
to value creation for the firm, and a better life and
dignity for the poor themselves (Prahalad, 2004).
Idealistic firms can be found engaging directly
with the local community in the context of their
core activities or through extracurricular good works
in the community. An example is Grupo Ecologico
Sierra Gordo in Mexico, founded by Pati Ruiz
Corozo, after abandoning a career as a violinist. The
company works with residents of the region to
preserve the environment with sustainable programs
including commercial tree planting and eco-tourism.
Idealistic firms are active, either on their own, or
working with NGOs. Since CSR involvement is
core to their mission, even when Idealistic firms
work with partners, they want direct control of
contact and activity with those whom they consider
their legitimate stakeholders or beneficiaries, a
characteristic of The Body Shop in its CSR projects.
In summary, as regards deliberate implementation
of CSR involvement, Skeptical firms may produce
beneficial social effects as spin-offs to their ordinary
strategic approaches. Both Pragmatic and Engaged
firms implement CSR by themselves or by out-
sourcing or partnership. However, Pragmatic firms
act in an episodic manner, depending on their own
needs entirely, while Engaged firms are more likely
to implement CSR in an ongoing continuous
manner, depending on both their own and social
needs. Idealistic firms implement their social actions,
episodically or continuously, by themselves or by
outsourcing or partnership depending on their
immediate preferences and resource constraints.
Impact of CSR involvement on the firm
Does social involvement leave any lasting mark on
the firm itself, and if so, how and why? The nature
of the involvement will determine these effects,
according to configuration patterns.
While the Skeptical firm does not get involved in
social action intentionally, the question is still rele-
vant. Forced social involvement, such as alcoholic
beverage companies which support anti-binge
drinking campaigns is actually calculated to maintain
the company fundamentally as it is and to stave off
any threats to change it. Exxon’s late attention to
climate change is a defensive, self-preservative
reaction. This type of action corresponds to Argyris
169Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
and Schon’s concept of ‘single-loop learning’. Sin-
gle-loop learning entails taking corrective action in a
defensive manner to preserve existing paradigms.
When this action is successful, the organization
learns to repeat the behavior (Argyris and Schon,
1978). Thus, if its social impacts, even unintended,
produce positive consequences for shareholders,
then the Skeptical firm may repeat the particular
behavior insofar as it produces net benefits for itself,
but without any fundamental change in its social
outlook.
Pragmatic companies carry out social actions lar-
gely to enable the company to preserve and enhance
its strategic positioning. Thus, self-change is not part
of the CSR agenda. The instrumentally oriented
relationships and transactional approach with stake-
holders that typify the Pragmatic firm are likely to
induce ‘either–or’ thinking rather than ‘and–and’
thinking (Driver, 2006), as expressed in a win–lose
attitude (Argyris et al., 1985). In the disposition of
single-loop learning, if CSR activity is synergistic
with its own economic success, it may become a
defensive habit, on the supposition that social per-
formance within firms become self-reinforcing
(Waddock and Graves, 1997). For example, there is
some evidence that Coca Cola’s widespread pro-
motion of sport for well-being is becoming a CSR
strand that stands on its own. However, the limited
nature of this change illustrates that generally, a
Pragmatic firm’s discrete, ad hoc reactive social
projects, do not provide the contextual institution-
alized routines (Selznick, 1983) that sustain funda-
mental change in the overall nature of its
configuration.
Engaged firms are most likely of the four con-
figurations to experience internal change from their
social impact activities. In order to reconcile both
economic and normative criteria, the Engaged firm
has to apply thought and imagination. The ‘rela-
tional’ Copernican perspective (Lozano, 2005) im-
plies an ongoing interchange of ideas between the
firm and society. These interactions can provide a
learning medium for the absorption of knowledge
and skills which lead to competence development
and improvement in general business processes.
However, intense meaningful interaction and col-
laboration may result in even more fundamental
change in both the firm and the society where it
enacts its social measures (McEvily and Marcus,
2005). In the Hindustan Lever example mentioned
earlier, Unilever has begun adding managers from
developing country subsidiaries to its board of
directors and top management committees at its own
head office (Hart and Sharma, 2004). Engaged firms
fit into their trading peers’ ecosystems, particularly in
their international locations. The nature of the
change in Engaged firms is made possible by ‘dou-
ble-loop learning’ as espoused by Argyris et al. 1985
and Argyris and Schon, 1978). Double-loop learning
entails reflection on underlying assumptions about
ideas, policies, and goals, before arriving at a solution
to a problem. This reflection is usually carried out
publicly with others in a joint problem-solving
exercise (Argyris, 1990).
Idealistic firms are unlikely to change in the
course of implementing social action, since they
perceive themselves primarily as virtuous change
agents, not as objects for changing. They hold
themselves up as role models to their peers and
might work to help reform them. Paradoxically,
Idealistic companies could be forced to take action in
a less idealistic direction, as they engage with the real
world. They may have to compromise to achieve
their utopian purposes, as they realize that they are
not achievable unless they have the necessary assets
and political influence. Therefore, they will have to
recognize and work with those Phillips (2003) terms
‘derivative’ stakeholders, whose participation is
necessary to achieve the aims of the firm and its
normative stakeholders. The solutions adopted are in
the nature of corrective action, i.e., single-loop
learning. Many Idealistic firms are social entrepre-
neurs. If they want to keep growing and broaden
their domain, then they are likely to encounter
tough competitors and trading partners with whom
they must deal on an instrumental basis. For instance,
pioneer companies adopting a fair trade business
model are increasingly confronted by powerful
mainstream rivals also adopting fair trade products as
part of their strategic approach (Beattie, 2005).
Paradoxically, both Ben and Jerry’s and The Body
Shop were able to ensure their survival only by
being acquired by larger companies, albeit with
guarantees to safeguard their missions and social
values.
In summary, as regards the impact of CSR on the
firm itself, Skeptical, Pragmatic, and Idealistic firms
remain largely unchanged through corrective single-
170 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
loop learning, while Engaged firms may experience
substantial internal changes through double-loop
learning. The propensity for organizations to retain
an illusory autonomous, unified, stable self, as con-
trasted with narratives of an interdependent, dynamic
self, through CSR (Driver, 2006), parallel the con-
trast between the configurations in the framework,
which attempt to maintain themselves as they are and
those that change themselves through social action.
Implications and conclusions
The stakeholder orientation framework offers a
rationale for the variety of instrumental and norma-
tive contingencies that guide CSR characteristics.
While there are no general answers governing all
firms, the variety can be assessed in a systematic way
through configurations. The framework is econom-
ical in distilling a number of variables and contem-
poraneous interdependencies among them. Each
configuration makes sense in its own right in the way
all the pieces operate together in the interior and
exterior facing orientations and conduct of the firm,
including approaches to its place in civil society.
The configurational approach in the framework
advances the development of descriptive stakeholder
theory, where a gap has been identified (Brickson,
2007). It integrates all the components of stakeholder
theory previously identified by Freeman (1994):
normative, instrumental, descriptive, and meta-
phorical. The synthesis of stakeholder and CSR
thinking embodied in the framework also incorpo-
rates previous stakeholder typologies built on single
dimensions (Brickson, 2007; Clarkson, 1991, 1995;
Jones et al., 2007). The historical tension between
economic and civil society activities in corporate life
is addressed, as is the popular justification of CSR by
treating it as instrumental to economic purposes.
Patterns are predicted in the ways that different types
of companies address the tension, embedded in their
adoption of instrumental and/or normative orien-
tations. Different firms may be effective in their own
ways, and prescriptions may be counterproductive.
More is not always better. Higher responsiveness
levels, as advocated by Clarkson (1991, 1995) may
not be desirable in all situations, especially when
attempting to achieve a fair balance among the de-
mands and needs of many stakeholders.
Most CSR proponents present ‘business case
based’ logic as a way of solving the tension between
economic and social goals, by reasoning that
achieving social goals will enhance economic per-
formance (McWilliams et al., 2006; Porter and
Kramer, 2006) and protect the license to operate
(Post, 2002). This is basically instrumental. Among
hundreds of studies attempting to prove the business
case, including meta-analyses, some do show a po-
sitive relationship, but many provide evidence of no
relationship or mixed results, and even a negative
relationship (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky
et al., 2003; Wu, 2006). This vein of research is
beset with measurement, methodological, and
interpretation problems. Further, dependence on the
business case to justify social involvement begs the
question of what to do when the business case does
not apply. The business case argument accounts only
for CSR that attends to the demands of stakeholders
with influence over the fortunes of the firm. Hence,
matching/mismatching in the stakeholder frame-
work presented in this article explains some of the
inconsistent findings on the link between corporate
social and financial performance. The matching of
firms with CSR choices, based on their skills and
competences, and on preferences with which they
can cope avoids misalignments between actual,
communicated, and conceived identities. (Van de
Ven, 2008). It may be that when social involvement
is at odds with the nature of the firm – its overall
purposes, how it identifies stakeholders, its bases of
action, and its conception of the relationship be-
tween business and society – it ends up having a
detrimental effect on the bottom line. Also, the
presence of other contextual variables that mediate
the relationship suggests that a combination of fac-
tors, such as found in configurations, rather than
simple social performance measures, may determine
outcomes. Brickson (2007) has also suggested that
different organizational identities can yield social
value in their own ways and should best be consis-
tent with their mission and values.
Corporate social responsibility involvement may
have the effect of changing the firm itself incre-
mentally, but large-scale transformation in the
interlocked patterns of configurations is difficult
(Miller and Friesen, 1984). Ecology theory also
implies that inertial pressures and prevailing power
structures often prevent organizations from going
171Corporations, Civil Society and Stakeholders
beyond incremental change, since more would in-
volve a complete realignment of a large number of
the interlocked factors that comprise each configu-
ration (Alvarez Ma Valle, 2002; Hannan and Free-
man, 1989). Therefore, it may be better to think in
terms of matching/avoiding mismatching rather than
converting all firms to the same prescriptive model,
which suggests firms being forced to behave contrary
to their values, interests, and capabilities.
The interrelated features of the Engaged config-
uration suggest that the simultaneous achievement of
social and economic goals is not necessarily anti-
thetical (DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000). The efforts to
remove the tension between them is redirected to-
ward the task of embracing both, to find more
creative outcomes then attempts to justify social
action for instrumental purposes alone have pro-
duced. De Wit and Meyer (2004) urge the accep-
tance of paradox, i.e., the co-existence of two
apparently contradictory truths, as a stimulus toward
a synthesis that stretches thinking, highlighting
critical contrasts and points of agreement, using
ingenuity to get the best of all worlds. Therefore, the
ability to embrace paradox may be a competence
that is developed in the Engaged firm, enabling it to
move toward an authentic self that is complex and
dynamic (Driver, 2006).
Certain CSR actions call for relationships based
on partnering skills and the flexibility to meet
challenges arising within the partnerships themselves
and/or the external environment (Balogun and
Hailey, 2004; Roloff, 2008; Sagawa and Segal, 2000;
Senge et al., 2006). This is exemplified by Unilever,
an Engaged company at the forefront of business
network ecosystems involving myriad partners from
business and civil society. Inherent in building
embedded relationships are business skills which
transfer to social action: networking – to have and be
able to leverage multiple networks; communication
– to communicate consistently and appropriately
through many channels (Foster and Jonker, 2005);
creativity – to be able to see the big picture and
contribute to the visioning process (Balogun and
Hailey, 2004). If the firm does not see eye-to-eye
with its partners about the moral purpose of their
joint social initiatives, then conflicts among the
stakeholders may overwhelm implementation, as the
firm’s representatives do not have the organizational
support to act in good faith, and instead participate
in ‘pretend partnerships’ (Broussine and Miller,
2005). This is not to say that an Engaged firm has
deep trust-based relationships with all stakeholders.
An inherent aspect of its skills is to tailor and nuance
its relations with specific stakeholders rather than to
generic groups, ranking those claims on legitimacy.
It is perfectly in order for the Engaged firm to have
instrumental circumscribed transactional relationship
with some stakeholders, sufficient to the level of
business and obligations formed between them
(Kaler, 2006).
Middle-range theory as applied to the framework
is ideally suited to describe configurations/typolo-
gies. Each configuration makes sense in its own
right in the way all the pieces operate together in
the interior and exterior facing orientations and
conduct of the firm. The framework is parsimoni-
ous but not simplistic in distilling a number of
variables and contingencies. The configurational
approach of the framework also illustrates the
complex dynamics of interpreting CSR behavior,
and shows that a unidimensional approach, such as
the egoism versus other-directed one is incomplete,
also noted by Brickson (2007). The egoism ap-
proach has been designated ‘individually self-inter-
ested to fully other regarding’ (Jones et al., 2007)
and ‘egoist–instrumentalist–moralist’ (Everett et al.,
2008). In effect, these continuums are versions of
the separation hypothesis (Freeman, 1999) of
instrumental versus normative, or selfish versus
unselfish, without recognizing that both can exist
together, intertwined with a number of other
dimensions to create the character and identity of
an organization. The Ideal configuration exempli-
fies a company that belies such a continuum. It is
moral and egoistic at the same time. It caters very
purposefully to legitimate stakeholders, going very
far in extending the definition of such potential
stakeholders. However, at the same time, the Ideal
firm is also very self-regarding, interested in con-
solidating its moral identity and even superiority.
This may be seen as egoistical, even if not in the
traditional homo economicus sense. Brickson
(2005, 2007) has built a typology based on the
dimension of relational identity with stakeholders.
This has been shown to have empirical validity, and
the approach in this article incorporates the rela-
tional identity dimension as part of overall broad
configurations.
172 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
It can be argued that the framework is constructed
within the relatively conservative Anglo-American
model where government is seen to have a lesser role
for social welfare than in the rest of the world. In this
conservative system, business may step in to fill the gap
in social functions. However, Matten and Moon
(2008) show how the recent worldwide adoption of
CSR policies and strategies suggests an ‘American-
ization’ (p. 406) of CSR practices, encompassing
financial, labor, and cultural systems, although the
detail varies in different countries. Thus, CSR prac-
tices and attitudes are becoming more universal,
suggesting that the framework has broad applicability.
Empirical research could complement the con-
ceptual approach provided in the framework, which
offers a systematic way of studying CSR. Fiss (2007)
offers a set-theoretic methodology of studying con-
figurations that helps to go beyond the merely cor-
relational to understand multiple contemporaneous
causal relationships. The set-theoretic -approach
studies inconsistencies rather than controlling for
them. Such an approach, using measures of the basic
stakeholder orientation dimensions and the CSR
ones, as per Tables I and II, in a number of organi-
zations, could uncover the configurational patterns
proposed in the framework. Other related factors,
such as organizations’ core competencies in partner-
ing, could be included. Bennett and Elman (2007)
show how case studies can be used to corroborate
typological theories by ‘process tracing’ (p. 183),
which involves the inductive and deductive study of
events and sequences to establish complex causation.
Indeed, including financial performance in the mix
might address the previous inconsistencies in deter-
mining the presence of a corporate social and financial
performance link, if positive (poor) financial out-
comes are related to a match (mismatch) between
organizational type and the nature of CSR. There is
already suggestive research that Fortune 500 compa-
nies break down into the four configurational types in
the framework, where, of 98 companies, 10 espoused
the pure stockholder view (Skeptical), 22 espoused a
legally and ethically bounded stockholder focus
(Pragmatic), 64 espoused approaches maximizing the
welfare of all stakeholders (Engaged), and two aimed
at solving social problems (Idealistic) (Agle and
Mitchell, 2008). Empirical research could also extend
and develop the framework by discovering additional
dimensions to add to those already proposed, for
example, characteristics of managers, such as princi-
ples and values.
Managers can also relate to the framework intui-
tively, as a working model of reality, since it is
inclusive of everyday strategic concerns and notions
of identity without being esoteric. Practitioners can
avail of the framework as an interesting tool by which
they can examine and measure their firms and the
influences they exert with respect to CSR, integrated
with general strategic reviews. It could thereby help
managers, to create a better match between their
configuration and their CSR activities.
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University College Dublin,
Dublin, Ireland
E-mail: [email protected]
176 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins
- Corporations, Civil Society, and Stakeholders: An Organizational Conceptualization
- ABSTRACT
- Introduction
- A framework of stakeholder orientation configurations
- The normative view
- The instrumental view
- A stakeholder overview of the four organizational configurations
- Organizational purposes
- Stakeholder identification and salience
- Stakeholder management
- Performance metrics
- The boundaries between the firm and stakeholders
- Organizational CSR preferences
- Sensing stimuli for CSR involvement
- Generation and evaluation of CSR options
- Implementation of chosen CSR options
- Impact of CSR involvement on the firm
- Implications and conclusions
- References
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