605 WK13 QUESTION

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AFGHANISTAN: THE FRAGILE TRANSITION

U. S. INTERESTS & OBJECTIVES: WHAT’S AT STAKE?

• Transfer Security to a Stable, Legitimate Regime • Contain Radical Extremism • Harmonize U.S. & Regional Interests • Preserve NATO/ISAF Credibility • Preserve U.S. Political & Military Credibility

THE THREE MUSTS

• A Stable, Legitimate Regime That Demonstrates it Can Reduce & Prosecute Corruption, Provide Good Governance & Demonstrate 2014 Electoral Integrity

• Capable Security Forces

• Pakistani Cooperation in Denying Sanctuaries & Support to the Taliban and al Qaeda

GEOPOLITICS

• Four Thousand Years= Bridge Between Continents & Cultures

• A “Place In Between” the Warring Extremities of Clashing Empires

• Buffer State Separating Clashing European Empires

• Cold War Battleground & Legacy

• Now Links Many Regional Conflicts

“CONFLICTS” LINKED WITH AFGHANISTAN

• The War Against Terrorism • India-Pakistan • Pakistan-Afghanistan • U.S.-Pakistan • Iran, the Taliban, the U. S., & Pakistan • Central Asia, Radical Islam, & Democratic Reforms • Russia and Radical Islam • THUS, A Regional Strategy--More Than AfPak

“War is God’s way of teaching Americans geography”...Amborse Bierce

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

• Rural Based Insurgency

• Enemy Sanctuaries in Pakistan

• Weak and Corrupt Afghanistan Government

• Thriving Narcotics Industry

• Poorly Developed Infrastructure

• Forbidding Terrain

• A History of Defeating Foreigners

THE MULTI-FRONT, CROWDED BATTLE SPACE & Human Terrain

• Hard Core Afghan Taliban

• Local Afghan “Part-time” Insurgents or “Accidental Guerrillas”

• Pakistani Taliban

• Al Qaeda/Foreign Fighters

• Warlords & Radical Clerics

• Ethnic/Tribal/Village/Family Rivalries & Blood Feuds—A Kaleidoscope of Blood Feuds, Competing Interests & Shifting Alliances

• Criminal Gangs/Drug Infrastructure

THE THREE MUSTS

• A Stable, Legitimate Regime That Demonstrates it Can Reduce Corruption , Govern, & Provide Electoral Integrity in 2014

• Capable Security Forces

• Pakistani Cooperation in Denying Sanctuaries & Support to the Taliban and al Qaeda

The Northern Alliance, CIA, Special Ops & Airpower Defeated the Taliban in the 2001

Invasion

THE DYNAMICS OF GOVERNANCE: CONNECTING TOP & BOTTOM

• Violent Oscillations from Constitutional Monarchy to Communist to Taliban to “Democratic”

• Three Parallel Authority Structures Decimated

• Constitution With Strong Executive, Weak Parliament, & Fragile Ties To Local Institutions

A RELIABLE PARTNER: A TRUST DEFICIT?

• How Much Corruption?

• Anti-American Rants

• Domestic Audience?

• Or Loss of Confidence In U.S./ISAF Ability to Defeat Taliban?

• Looking Past an American Presence

• And a Little Knowledge of History Helps

History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars Still Resonate

Shau Suja-British Puppet

Dost Mohammad- Overthrown, but Regained Control & Defeated the British

Government Karzai Style

• Poor Efforts at State & Nation Building

• Unwilling to Weed Out Incompetent Leaders

• Rules by Patronage & Power Brokers

• Failure to Hold Honest Elections in 2014 Will Jeopardize External Aid

$2.5 BILLION IN BRIBES OVER THE PAST 12 MONTHS (Social Services Corruption)

THE THREE MUSTS

• A Stable, Legitimate Regime That Demonstrates it Can Reduce & Prosecute Corruption, Provide Good Governance & Demonstrate 2014 Electoral Integrity

• Provide Capable Security Forces

• Pakistani Cooperation in Denying Sanctuaries & Support to the Taliban and al Qaeda

THE ANP: GOOD COP-BAD COP?

• The Least Popular Institution in Afghanistan • Mass Illiteracy, Crime, Corruption, Equipment

Losses, Drug Use, Intelligence Leaks • Short Staffed, Overstretched, Highest

Casualty Rate • Must Link to Civil/Criminal Justice System • Requires More Trainers, Common Standards,

& Reductions of the 25% Dropout Rate

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

• The Most Popular Institution in Afghanistan • Grew from -90,000 to 134,000 in 2010 • 40% Pay Increase a Big Help • Goal: Professional Army Capable of Independent

Operations & Self-Sustaining at 171,000 End State • Annual Attrition/Desertion Rates of +30% per Year • Shortage of NCOs & Jr. Officers • Ability to Maintain Equipment? • Ethnic Balance? • MOTIVATION • $+ 27Billion Spent on Training to date; Continues to

2017

Green On Blue Violence

• Taliban Infiltration

• Cultural Differences

• Pashtun Honor Code

• Military Frustration

• The Strain of Combat

THE LARGE VERSUS THE SMALL FOOTPRINT DEBATE

LARGE VERSUS SMALL FOOTPRINT?

• “The less the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike us”….Field Marshall Lord Roberts, 1880, 2nd

Afghan War

The Opium Dilemma

WHATS AT STAKE: DILEMMAS OF A TWO FRONT WAR--DRUGS & INSURGENCY

• Statistics of Opium: 40-50% of GDP, 92% of World Production--Number 1 Global Drug Killer

• Irony = Profits & Eradication Both Fuel Insurgency • Is the Karzai Government the Problem? YES • Crops Concentrated in South Where Insurgency is

Strongest (98% According to U. N.) • What Eradication Methods Work? Target

Traffickers (Short-term), Crop Substitution (Long- term & Labor Intensive)

• Production Up 61% in 2011 & Continues to Grow

THE ENDGAME STRATEGY: A LOCAL & REGIONAL FOCUS

• Disrupt, Dismantle, Defeat al Qaeda

• Train & Mentor Afghan Security Forces-$5 Billion Per Year to 2018

• Retain & Secure Support Bases

• Continue Counter Terror Operations

• Sustain Political Stability Through the 2014 Elections

WHO ARE THE TALIBAN

LOCAL POWER OR GLOBAL “JIHAD”: Who is the Enemy?

• Mixing al Qaeda, Afghan & Pakistani Taliban = Metamorphosis From a Local Power Struggle to Support for al Qaeda’s Global Terrorism?

• Or,Tactical Mentors

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS THE COUNTER-TERRORISM DEBATE: We Were

Doing Both

• Taliban & al Qaeda are Linked

• Al Qaeda Will Return

• A Taliban Role May be Portrayed as a Defeat for the U.S.

• Robust Coin Ops

• Afghan Taliban Not a Direct Threat to U. S./ No Interest in Global Jihad

• A Coalition of Religious Militants & Warlords

• Al Qaeda Responsible for Fall From Power

• Resent Arab Arrogance • Tactical Not Strategic

Cooperation With al Qaeda • A Dispensable Ally? Don’t

Conflate • Robust Counter Insurgency

NEGOTIATING WITH THE TALIBAN

• AFGHAN & ISAF POSITIONS:

• Accept Afghan Constitution • End Violence • Break With al Qaeda! How? • Power Sharing? • Elections/Jirga? • Constitution? • Social Issues?

• Dilemma: Power Sharing Without Undermining Democratic Institutions & Human Rights

• TALIBAN POSTIONS:

• Americans Withdraw

• Or, Set a firm Timetable Before Negotiations Begin

• Power Sharing in a Post-2014 Government

THE THREE MUSTS

• A Stable, Legitimate Regime That Demonstrates it Can Reduce & Prosecute Corruption, Provide Good Governance, & 2014 Election Integrity

• Provide Capable Security Forces

• Pakistani Cooperation in Denying Sanctuaries & Support to the Taliban & al Qaeda

HOW PAKISTAN DEFINES ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS

• India is the Enemy & Dominates Strategic Perceptions

• Afghan Pashtuns (ie Taliban) Are a Strategic Asset Protecting Pakistan from Indian Support of Non-Pashtun Forces

• Afghanistan Provides Strategic Depth

• Fears Afghanistan May Foment Separatist Revolt Among Pakistani Pashtuns, thus Support Radical Islamists Over Nationalists

• A “Hedging Strategy” With to U.S.

A British Legacy: The 1893 Durand Line

A Hopeful Strategic Shift in Pakistani Calculations

• Opening Dialogue With Non-Pashtun Ethnic Groups Who Were Former Enemies

• Afghan Taliban Are an Asset, but if They Win, the Pakistani Taliban Will be Strengthened

• Most Pakistani Taliban are Enemies of the Pakistani Government

• Thus, a Broad-Based Government in Afghanistan best Serves Pakistan’s Interests

• BUT: Still Employ Radical Islamist Groups as Proxies Against India (e.g. Kashmir & Bombay)

PAKISTAN AS THE PERFECT STORM

• Spending Heavily on Second Generation Nuclear Arms

• 77,000 Personnel Work in a Dispersed WMD Infrastructure

• Multiple Terrorist Groups, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Neighbor, Poverty, Instability

• Loyalty of Personnel & Stockpile Security Big Unknowns for U.S. Intelligence

THE STRAINED STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

• +35,000 Killed Since 9/11 • Captured More al Qaeda Members Than Any

Other Country • Supports Lashkar-e-Taiba as Asymmetric

Proxy Against India • Agrees Most Pakistani Taliban are Threat • Limited Intelligence Cooperation • Dependent on Military/Economic Assistance • Stop Using Afgan Insurgents to Pursue

National Goals or U.S. Takes Unilateral Action

$300 FOR A 10 DAY 2500KM TRIP--$5 billion for the

Economy, Employs 30,000

The Politics of the Northern Distribution Route

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Stability

• Contain Radical Islamists

• Interdict Drug Traffic

• Concern With Premature ISAF Withdrawal

• But: No-Permanent American Bases in Central Asia

Post-2014 “Strategic Partnership” (SOFA?)

• 5 Bases for CT OPS, Training and Mentoring

• Demonstrates Lasting Commitment-Decades Long Presence

• 8,000 to 13,000 U.S. Forces

• 7,000 Allied Forces

• Airpower

Ambassador James Dobbins

CONCLUSIONS

• Afghanistan’s Neighbors are Threatened in Varying Degrees by Instability & Radical Islamists

• A Focused, Regional Strategy Requires Prioritizing Mutual Interests at the Expense of Bi-lateral Conflicts

• The “Three Musts” Are Not Being Achieved & Post-2014 Stability is Problematic

• Strategy & Resources Affected Most by U. S. Domestic Economic Crisis, Loss of Support for the War, & Complex Crises in the Middle East

The Costs of Afghanistan

• Killed: +2200

• Wounded: 19,000

• And Counting