International Relations 2questions 680Wk12
gusarman1
schmid.pdf
1
Copyright – Alex Schmid
Director, Centre for the Study of Terrorism
and Political Violence (CSTPV)
School of International Relations
University of St Andrews
St Andrews, Fife
Scotland, UK, KY16 9AX
E-Mail: [email protected]
Elements of a Successful Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Keynote Speech,
by Prof. Alex P. Schmid
at
Security and Resilience Forum
London, 31 October 2006 1
INTRODUCTION
After more than five years of the „Global War on Terror‟
(GWOT), and with the turn of events in Afghanistan and Iraq in our
minds - the question „How to fight terrorism effectively?‟ is still without
a clear answer. We have seen that the application of a „war model‟, as
demonstrated by the United States, has not brought the decisive results
some have expected. On the other hand, the „criminal justice model‟,
which is preferred by most European governments, has not managed to
prevent major terrorist attacks like those in Madrid in 2004 and in
London in 2005 – although almost thirty other attacks have been
prevented. Great Britain, with its hard-won experience in Northern
Ireland, has developed an „extended criminal justice model‟ where the
army is involved but does not play the dominant role. Its approach
stands somewhere between the US and the EU approach.
1 The author is Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of
St. Andrews where he holds a Chair in International Relations.
2
However, it would be a mistake to think only in terms of a war
model and a criminal justice approach. There are more approaches and
more combinations possible. Some years ago, when I was Officer-in-
Charge of the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch, we
inventorized the instruments available for countering terrorism and
came up with close to 140 tools. We categorized them into eight
categories (Table 1):
Table 1: Toolbox of Counter-Terrorism Measures (TPB)
1. Politics and Governance (e.g. conflict resolution; rule of law);
2. Economic and Social (e.g. suppression of financing of terrorists;
addressing grievances);
3. Psychological-Communicational-Educational (e.g. psychological operations);
4. Military (applicability of a “war model”); 5. Judicial and Legal (applicability of a “[extended]criminal justice
model”);
6. Police and Prison System (e.g. encouraging „pentiti‟); 7. Intelligence and Secret Service (e.g. intelligence sharing); 8. Other (e.g. victim support).
Source: Alex Schmid. Toward Joint Political Strategies for De-legitimising
the Use of Terrorism. In: A. P. Schmid et al (Eds.). Countering Terrorism
through International Cooperation. Milan, ISPAC, 2001, pp.266-273.
(A full set of the Toolbox of Counter-Terrorism Measures is attached as an
Appendix to this paper).
However, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN never
managed to establish what the „Best Practices‟ were – the „Elements of a
Successful Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟ - as we did not have an
3
appropriate methodology nor where we given much latitude to do
empirical research by the UN.
The literature which tries to measure the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism measures is remarkably limited - there is very little systematic
work that would measure “success” or “progress” in the war on
terrorism with empirical data. 2
To create such a set of indicators is
important and we at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence, have just begun such an exercise. 3 We would like to work with
a dozen indicators and develop time-series, with intervals of six months,
starting in 1998, so that we can actually measure changes in the efforts
to counter terrorist campaigns:
Table 2: Indicators for Measuring Success and Failure in the War on
Terror (I)
1. Increase/decrease of number of terrorist groups/networks active in/against
a country: trends
2. Increase/decrease of recruiting rate of terrorist group /network over time
3. Increase/decrease of number of, and intervals between, terrorist attacks over time per group/network: trends
4. Civilian and security forces casualties (fatalities and injured) from terrorist attacks over time: trends
2 Among the few studies: Christopher Hewitt. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies. Lanham, MD.,
University Press o f America, 1989; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler. „ The Effectiveness of Anti-
Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Auto-regression-Intervention Analysis‟, American Political Science Review.
87 (4), 829-44, December 1993. 3 Prof. Michael S. Stohl , Chair of the Department of Communications at the University of California at St.
Barbara is currently working on the topic of “Measuring Success in Counterterrorism: What are the
Appropriate Indicators?”
4
5. Terrorist casualties and collateral damage (civilians killed) in WOT over time
6. Balance of number of imprisoned terrorists and terrorist at large per group over time
Table 3 : Indicators for Changes/Progress/Success/Effectiveness in
War on Terror
(II)
7. Increase/decrease of geographical zone in which a terrorist group /network operates over time
8. Increase/decrease in use of sophisticated tactics and weapons by terrorist group/network over time
9. Increase/decrease of sense of safety (based on public opinion polling) over time
10. Increase /decrease of public satisfaction with government performance in WOT over time
11. Increase/decrease of number of people approving of a) terrorist goals (potential sympathizers); b) terrorist methods (potential
supporters): trends
12. Popularity of terrorist leader/group/network among (sectors of the) population at home and abroad: trends.
Source: Indicators developed by author, with input from M.K.
Cunningham. Is the US Winning the War on Terrorism? An Assessment
of the First Five Years. St. Andrews School of International Relations
M.Litt, August 2006 and from Alisa Stack-O‟Connor (personal
communication).
I wish I could already present you with results but since we have no
specific funding for this project, I have to work with interns and first
results can only be expected next summer.
In my presentation today, rather than using such a set of quantitative
indicators, I will rely on the qualitative judgment of ninety experts. I
asked them three questions:
5
Table 4: Questions addressed in this presentation:
(i) What are, in your view, the most effective counter-measures against international terrorism?
(ii) What are, in your view, the most effective counter-measures against domestic terrorism?
(iii) What (both positive and negative) lessons, in your view, can be learned from your country‟s experience with terrorism?
These questions are part of a questionnaire I developed for the writing
of a Handbook of Terrorism Research, which will be a successor volume
to the two manuals I published in 1984 and 1988 respectively under the
title Political Terrorism. A (new) Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data
Bases, Theories, and Literature Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing
Company).
In addition to the experts‟ views, I will also, at the end, presents you,
for whatever it is worth, with Twelve Rules for Preventing and
Combating Terrorism which I developed over the years on the basis of
my experience in the United Nations.
Before sharing with you some of the insights of these experts 4 , a
brief remark on the composition of the 90 experts who were kind
enough to answer the questionnaires. First, the professional
background of the respondents. Bear in mind that some have filled in
more than one category. You will notice that more than two thirds are
working in academia:
4 In this paper, the individual experts are not identified; this will be done in the forthcoming Handbook of
Terrorism Research. London, Routledge, 2007.
6
Table 5: Main Current Professional Interest of Respondents (n = 90)
Academic 70
Intelligence Analyst 12
Government Official/Civil Servant 11
Law Enforcement 8
Military 7
Media 7
Official of International Organization 4
Consultant 4
Victimological 3
Deviance 2
Other (Humanities, Medicine, Database Compilation, etc.) 8
Total: 136
In addition, there are a dozen intelligence analysts and almost as
many other government officials among the respondents.
In terms of Gender, 80 percent of the respondents were male, and 20
female.
In terms of Nationality, the breakdown is as follows:
Table 6: Nationality of Respondents (n = 85)
United States: 41
Israel 8
United Kingdom 7
Germany 4
Russia 4
Canada 3
Norway 3
Australia 2
Netherlands 2
Others (only one respondent per country):India, France, Egypt
Ireland, Bulgaria, Greece, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Switzerland,
7
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mauritius 11
Total: 80
More than half of the respondents are from the United States, the
United Kingdom and Israel. Non-Western countries are only weakly
represented with four respondents. Only three respondents are from
countries with a strong Muslim presence.
Counter-Measures against International Terrorism
Let us now turn to the findings from the first question: “What are, in
your view, the most effective counter-measures against international
terrorism?”
Table 7: Expert Views on Most Effective Counter-Measures against
International Terrorism (in declining order of perceived effectiveness):
Top Ten
No. in agreement
1. Intelligence
47
2. Inter-agency & internat. information sharing & cooperative action
44
3.Cutting off many of the sources of funding of terrorists
24
4. Prudent foreign policy
16
5. International consensus over definition and scope of terrorism
13
6. Limiting spread of terrorist ideology through propaganda and
Internet 11
7. Educating public about what do if attack is suspected and after attack
10
8
8. Providing CT assistance to countries lacking expertise
10
9. Military cooperation 9
10. Improved border, airport and maritime security
8
From the Table, it becomes clear that the single dominant element
for effective counter-terrorism is judged to be „intelligence‟, followed by
the related category of „Inter-agency and international information
sharing and cooperative action‟ which also depends on „intelligence‟.
Even the third item, relating to the funding of terrorists, has a strong
intelligence component. Following the money trail of the terrorists has
probably brought with it more successes in terms of intelligence gained
in the process than in terms of actual assets frozen or terrorist attacks
which failed for lack of money.
The intelligence failures and short-comings which led to the
catastrophic terrorism of 11 September 2006 form the background to
the importance given to intelligence. We only have to recall that the 9/11
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States and other investigations 5 revealed major gaps and
shortcomings: 6
Table 8: Intelligence Shortcomings revealed after 9/11
Over-reliance on SIGINT over HUMINT;
5 Cf. Statement of Representative Saxby Chambliss, Chairman , House Intelligence Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Homeland Security before the House Armed Services Committee Special Oversight Panel
on Terrorism, 2 September 2002. – at http:/www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_090502chambliss.html, as
consulted on 19/06/2006. 6 Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton . The 9/11 Report. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States. New York, New York Times, 2004.
9
Lack of coordination and collaboration between the 15 US
intelligence agencies
Unwillingness of adequate information sharing, esp. between CIA
and FBI
Lack of imagination to interpret information that fell „outside the
box‟
Inability to process suspicious passport and visa information in
time
Near-failure to penetrate the Al-Qaeda network
Lack of sufficient linguistic and analytical skills to exploit
relevant information in real time
Source: Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton . The 9/11 Report. The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New
York, New York Times, 2004; Statement of Representative Saxby
Chambliss, Chairman , House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Homeland Security before the House Armed Services Committee
Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, 2 September 2002. – at
http:/www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_090502chambliss.html, as
consulted on 19/06/2006
In order to improve intelligence performance on terrorism, a
number of issues need to be addressed. At a conference on
Intelligence and Terrorism which I chaired here in London last last
June, I highlighted at the end some of the gaps and shortcomings that
are apparent even to an outsider:
Table 9: Gaps and Shortcomings
Imbalance between HUMINT and SIGINT
10
Under-utilisation and under-funding of Global Open Sources
Research compared to SIGINT and HUMINT
Imbalance between intelligence collection and analysis
Too little cooperation and information exchange between
intelligence agencies, both at home and abroad
Insufficient cooperation Intelligence Community – Law
Enforcement Community
Too exclusive a focus on Al Qaeda and (Non-) Proliferation.
„Intelligence‟ is , like „trust‟, not something you can create in a
couple of months or even in a few years. Especially when it comes to
building up a good human intelligence network – this is a matter that
can take five to ten years.
In the framework of this presentation, I cannot discuss each of the
counter-measures listed by our 89 experts who answered the
questionnaire. Some of the results came as a surprise to me. I was, for
instance, amazed how few experts pleaded for addressing the so-called
root causes of terrorism. It came only on rank 13. The search for root
causes is dismissed by some as a waste of time – one has to fight the
symptoms right away, no matter what the causes. Others accuse those
who plead for investigating and alleviating discrete root causes as being
apologetic about the crimes of terrorists. Yet others point out that there
are too many alleged causes and some of them would involve profound
changes in foreign policies that no establishment politician interested in
(re-)election would consider them to begin with. Any concession, they
argue, would only wet the appetite of terrorists further and serve as
11
stepping stones to more and more far-reaching demands of violent
extremists. 7 Yet others point out that there is no agreement on causes
among experts and there is not likely to be an agreement as long as they
cannot even agree on a common definition of terrorism.
Perhaps a sense of desperation about the multitude of issues that can
„cause‟ terrorism has given this item such a low ranking. Yet some of
the most widespread causes should, in my view, be addressed more
vigorously.
Table 10: Root Causes of Terrorism (according to Oslo Panel of
Experts)
Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law
Illegitimate or corrupt governments, sometimes upheld by external actors
Failed and weak states, unable to control their territories
Discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin
Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers
Triggering events: provocative actions that call for response or revenge
Source: Tore Bjorgo. Strategies for Preventing Terrorism. Unpubl. Text,
2006.
7 As Walter Reich has pointed out: “The grievances cited by Osama bin Laden and other Islamists are not
only numerous but also maximalist. Their agenda doesn‟t stop with the removal of American combat troops
from Saudi, Iraqi, or Afghan soil, or even the blocking of wanton Western images from Muslim television
sets. It includes a reversal of centuries of humiliations by Muslims at the hands of Christendom, including
the loss of formerly Muslim lands, such as al Andalus, also known as Spain. It includes the creation of a
Muslim caliphate, a region governed by sharia, across the Muslim world. And in the texts of some
Islamists, it even includes the mass conversion of non-believers to Islam. Given the disinclination of
Islamists to compromise, it seems unlikely that addressing the limited Islamist goals, on the assumption that
they are “root causes” of terrorism, will be sufficiently satisfactory to Islamists such that they‟ ll decide that
they‟ve achieved enough and will no longer engage in a tactic that has been immensely successful”. -
Walter Reich. Perspectives on Terrorism. In: Henry R. Nau & David Shambaugh (Eds.). Divided
Diplomacy and the Next Administration: Conservative and Liberal Alternatives. Washington, D.C., The
George Washington University, 2004, p. 58.
12
Let me now turn to some other Counter-Measures mentioned by a
smaller number of our experts.
Table 11: Expert Views on Most Effective Counter-Measures against
International
Terrorism (in declining order of perceived effectiveness): 11-20 most
mentioned ones
No. in Agreement
11. Deterrence 8
12. Public support and involvement 7
13.Remedying root causes
7
14. Int. peace-building and state-building in failed or weak states
7
15. Arrests of key members of groups
7
16. Solid alliances – no seams between states which terrorists can exploit
7
17. Sorting out politics and ethics: support for democracy
or for anti-fundamentalist non-democratic regimes
6
18. Make the International Criminal Court (ICC) more proactive
6
19. Strengthening anti-proliferation measures
6
20.Targeted killings of terrorists and increasing manhunt capability
6
Among the less frequently mentioned counter-measures, there
was another one which I thought would score much higher - “winning
hearts and minds”. 8 I list a few important minority suggestions in the
following Table. An interesting suggestion is the last one: it is well
8 On this aspect, see: Carnes Lord. Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in
the Age of Terror. Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2006.
13
known that martial arts schools tend to attract organized crime figures.
The same fascination with violence might also be found among people
who are on the path to terrorism.
Table 12: Expert Views on Most Effective Counter-Measures against
International
Terrorism (in declining order of perceived effectiveness):
Important but
infrequently mentioned counter-measures (3-1 mentions)
1. Maintaining strong legitimacy among the public for fairness of the system
2. Sustained universal efforts towards improvements in human development
3. Winning hearts and minds 4. Changing ideologies 5. Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 1373 and others by
states
6. Biometric identity recognition 7. Scientific community R & D, e.g. on early warning/detection 8. De-coupling from religion 9. Isolation of radicals 10. Networking of Martial Arts clubs as reliable source on violence-
prone individuals.
There was other valuable, though debatable, advice in the
suggestions made by a few experts, including, these three „Do Nots‟
which should, in my view, have received broader support from the other
experts:
Table 13: Expert Views on Most Effective Counter-Measures against
International
Terrorism: Other minority advice.
1. Not over-reacting
14
2. Not using military force except in exceptional cases (e.g. hostage- taking)
3. Not following extra-legal practices of certain countries in War on Terrorism.
Counter-Measures against Domestic Terrorism
The views listed so far reflected counter-measures deemed
effective against international terrorism. The question is whether or not
the same measures apply to domestic terrorism. As far as “intelligence”
is concerned, it indeed appears again as most frequently mentioned
category.
When it comes to domestic terrorism, the following picture emerged:
Table 14: Expert Views on Most Effective Counter-Measures against
Domestic Terrorism (n = 90): top ten
1. Intelligence 41
2. Visible CT police capabilities
24
3. Preventive detention 16
4. Financial tracking of suspected terrorists and sympathizers
15
5. Inter-agency information sharing and cooperative action
14
6. Media compliance with information policy
10
7. Government cooperation with civic groups, religious institutions, etc.
9
8. Prohibiting external actors to define spiritual and political life of local
communities 9
9. Adequate anti-terrorism legislation
8
15
10. Law enforcement and assurance of human security for all
8
“Intelligence” as a category is immediately followed by „police
capabilities‟ which did not rank high on the list for international
terrorism. The police, especially in the case of community policing, is
also an excellent source of intelligence and can detect changes in the
environment early on. The links between organized crime and
preparatory acts to launch terrorist campaigns is another reason why
the police component probably scores high. The application of
situational crime prevention to terrorism is something that is still
under-utilized. The “take-them-out mindset” which is often so
characteristic to a military approach to countering terrorism, has led to
a neglect of a systematic approach for reducing opportunities for
terrorism 9 .
Table 15: Demotivation through Situational Prevention
Increasing the difficulties, costs and risk, and reducing the rewards and
excuses for carrying out terrorist attacks by
Increase the effort: target hardening, control access to facilities, deflect the offenders, control weapons and other tools of terror)
Increase the risks : assist natural surveillance and increase formal surveillance, reduce anonymity, extend guardianship and place
managers at facilities
Reduce the rewards: reduce access to attractive targets, do not give in to blackmail, reduce publicity, deny benefits
9 On this subject, see: Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman. Outsmarting the Terrorists. Westport,
Conn., Praeger, 2006.
16
Reduce provocations: avoid excessive use of force, humiliations, and other unnecessary provocations that may cause anger,
resentment and calls for revenge, discourage imitation
Remove excuses: make clear that terrorist violence is unacceptable, counter depersonalisation of victims, alert
conscience, avoid provocative acts.
Source: Tore Bjorgo. Strategies for Preventing Terrorism. Unpubl. Text,
2006; Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman. Outsmarting the
Terrorists. Wesport, Conn., Praeger, 2006, pp. 188 – 195.
While our experts did not mention the application of situational
crime prevention techniques to terrorism, the following counter-
measures for domestic terrorism, were mentioned with some frequency
by them:
Table 16: Expert Views on Effective Counter-Measures against
Domestic
Terrorism (n=90) Frequently cited methods
11. Development of inclusive institutions that provide
alternative methods of political change
8
12. Protection of major targets
7
13. An understanding of the issues
7
14. Public support and involvement
7
15. Border controls 7
16. Regulation of religious schools/meeting places
5
17. Demonstration of good governance, fairness, stability,
determination 5
18. Liberal Democracy
5
19. Neutralizing extreme indoctrination 5
20. Strengthening of state 5
17
If we go down the frequency scale, here are a few of the less often
mentioned counter-measures against domestic terrorism. It is a mixed
and even contradictory bag of proposals, ranging from amnesty for
terrorists to the death penalty for them.
Table 17: Expert Views on Effective Counter-Measures against
Domestic Terrorism
(n=90): Selected minority views (less than 5 mentions)
1. Regulating religious clergy 2. Situational crime prevention 3. Assimilation of immigrants 4. Maintaining strong legitimacy among the public for fairness of
the system
5. Targeted assassinations 6. Addressing root causes 7. Death penalty for terrorist activities 8. Amnesty for terrorists 9. Profiling 10. Easing of restrictions on rules of evidence in court
Personally, I find item 4 – legitimacy – of crucial importance – even
more important in the long run than intelligence. The key question is:
who holds the moral high ground? – not only in our own eyes but in the
eyes of the world – the diasporas in our midst, the common people in the
streets of the Arab and Muslim world and in the non-Western world at
large. If people think that what the terrorists want and do is more
legitimate than what we want and do, there will be a continuing supply
of recruits to their ranks. If a revival of the Caliphate offers a more
desirable perspective to their followers than the Western vision of One
World of Good Governance, Democracy, the Rule of Law and Social
Justice we will continue to be plagued by Jihadi terrorism. However, to
18
be credible, we have to avoid double-standards of morality. The
German sociologist Peter Waldmann has pointed out why this is so:
“Terrorist groups all over the world consist predominantly of
middle class intellectuals. Nothing is more provocative for intellectuals,
offers more nourishments for the resentments of academics and
students from weak, dependent states, than when the powerful of this
world do not adhere to the principles which they themselves proclaim:
to advocate the worldwide expansion of the rule of law and the
protection of fundamental rights, without respecting these themselves;
to plead for the realization of democracy everywhere, but not to shy
back from cooperating with authoritarian rulers out of realpolitik
considerations if necessary….” 10
Globalization is pushing us towards one world. The call for global
standards that apply to all is likely to increase. There are several such
standards but the most fundamental one is social justice. When
injustices are not resolved but allowed to continue for years and
sometimes generations without any light in sight at the end of the tunnel
- should we be amazed that desperate people – and others who
champion their cause – are willing to die and to kill for what they
perceive to be a just cause?
10
Peter Waldmann. Determinanten der Entstehung und Entwicklung terroristischer Organisationen –
Forschungsstand und Untersuchungsergebnisse. Manuscript, 2004, p.20.
19
If we compare the first five measures against international terrorism
proposed by our experts with those they proposed as effective against
domestic terrorism, there is much less overlap than expected: only
“intelligence” and “inter-agency information sharing and cooperative
action” are among the top five. To me, this is a somewhat surprising
finding. The whole distinction between “domestic terrorism” and
“international terrorism” becomes , in many cases, obsolete, in a world
characterized by globalization and mass migration.
Lessons Learned
So far I have addressed assumed – not proven!) Best Practices.
Let us now turn to the Lessons Learned, both negative and positive, on
the basis of the experts‟ experience of their own countries encounters
with terrorism. 11
The question I posed was:
What (both positive and negative) lessons can, in your view, be learned
from your country’s experience with terrorism?
Again, on the positive side, intelligence scores high, although not on
the first place which is taken by international cooperation.
Positive Lessons Learned
Table 18: Positive Lessons Learned from Respondent‟s Country
Experience
11
For a broad and systematic compilations of Lessons Learned, seethe inventories of „Lessons Learned‟
maintained by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism at http://www.mipt.org/Lessons-
Learned.asp.
20
1. Build international cooperation/coalitions/regimes/norms for CT
19
2. Intelligence, above all, is what it takes to defeat terrorism
16
3. Common understanding of the problem
12
4. Protect civil liberties while ensuring security
12
5. Effective preparations (training) to enhance capability to cope with
terror 10
6. Need to improve communication between law enforcement and
intelligence10
7. Sufficient political culture (tolerance) to refrain from hostile/revenge
acts 10
8. Treat terrorism as a law enforcement issue; design stronger CT laws
9
9. No local support for terror group agitation
7
10.Terrorists cannot destroy the soul of a nation
7
Among the less frequently mentioned positive lessons learned, one
stand out very clearly: “Avoid Abu Ghraib-type atrocities”. Nothing, I
believe, has done more harm to the United States claim of moral
leadership than the revelations of Abu Ghraib and its subsequent
mishandling, de facto exculpating high-ranking officials.
Table 19: Positive Lessons Learned from Respondent‟s Country
Experience: Selected minority views (less than seven mentions)
1. Avoid Abu Ghraib-type atrocities
2. Never make unilateral concessions to a terrorist (group)
3. Do not allow extremist religious propaganda by outsiders
4. Transparent government and law enforcement
5. Terrorism is real and not just a scare tactic.
6. Reintegration of ex-combatants into society
7. Arrest rather than kill terrorists to avoid the creation of martyrs
21
8. Dialogue with immigrants
9. Recognising when your opponents is prepared to concede (as with
PIRA)
10.Law enforcement is important
Negative Lessons Learned
Table 20: Negative Lessons Learned from Respondent‟s Country
Experience,
according to Experts
1. US experiences in Iraq suggest that military interventions are not necessarily effective
15
2. Loss of human rights 12
3. Failure of intelligence 10
4. Arrogance in foreign police decision-making can breed terrorism
9
5. There is always a danger of repeat attacks
8
6. Re-examine barriers between law enforcement and intelligence
8
7. Training frontline troops is useless unless command elements have matching training 7
8. The connection between Iraq and terrorism was weak
6
8. Military measures without political solutions are likely to increase violence 6
10. Defining efforts to defeat terrorism as a „war‟ in the first place
5
When we turn to the Negative Lessons Learned, the top position
of the replies reflects on the 2003 intervention in Iraq, followed by the
related category of Loss of Human Rights due to terrorism and counter-
22
terrorism. The intelligence failure again comes back here on the third
position.
Among the remaining Negative Lessons Learned, there is also the
sobering „ Being „nice‟ to terrorists does not help‟. Some of the lessons
learned mentioned by only a few experts are extremely pertinent,
though debatable, like the last two (9. 10) in the following Table:
Table 21 : Negative Lessons Learned from Respondent‟s Country
Experience, according to Minority of Experts . Selected minority views
(less than 5)
1. Terrorists can be as innovative and smart as us. 2. Do not give terrorists free publicity 3. Without the most emphatic pressure, troops will misbehave and
make things worse
4. Being „ nice‟ to terrorists does not help 5. Perception of regional imperialism must be avoided 6. Collective punishments do not work 7. Statistics on terrorism and definitions can be very misleading 8. Language and its use matters in profound ways with respect to
CT efforts (e.g. Bush statement that we will fight a „crusade‟)
9. The continued growth and expansion of conspiracy theories that further feed and fuel to those prone for recruitment. The problem
is further mitigated by the total non-existence of any counter
argument and dispelling these dangerous and inflammatory
urban legends.
10. The current Islamic threat is trans-national, involving myriad groups and there is no specific grievance which can be addressed,
nor any specific leadership with whom one can seek a
compromise.
Where do all these expert opinions leave us? What is needed is, to the
extent possible, some rigorous empirical testing of the hypotheses
23
contained in many of the counter-measures referred to by experts. The
same applies for the positive and negative “Lessons Learned”. What we
need are evidence-based findings, rather than merely informed or
educated guesses by experts.
Let me conclude by presenting my own list of counter-measures
which I developed while I was at the UN and which I have since
expanded, incorporating also suggestions from colleagues who are also
experts in this field. I cannot comment on all twelve issues but would
like to highlight three.
Table 22: Twelve Rules for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (I)
1. Try to address the underlying conflict issues exploited by the terrorists and work towards a peaceful solution while not making
substantive concessions to the terrorists themselves;
2. Prevent alienated individuals and radical groups from becoming terrorist extremists by confronting them with a mix of 'carrot and
stick' –tactics and search for effective counter-motivation
measures;
3. Stimulate and encourage defection and conversion of free and imprisoned terrorists and find ways to reduce the tacit or open
support of aggrieved constituencies for terrorist organizations;
4. Deny terrorists access to arms, explosives, false identification documents, safe communication, safe travel and sanctuaries;
disrupt and incapacitate their preparations and operations
through infiltration, communication intercept, espionage and by
limiting their criminal- and other fund-raising capabilities.
(i). First, I think, we run the risk of de-contextualising terrorism
from the conflicts which give rise to the use of this inhuman tactic and
treat terrorism as a unitary and coherent global phenomenon. That is
24
not so: there are many users of terrorism and without addressing the
conflicts that give rise to each of their campaigns, we will not get very
far in controlling the problem. This is contained in my first point.
Table 23: Twelve Rules for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (II)
5. Reduce low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike by enhancing communications-, energy- and transportation-security,
by hardening critical infrastructures and potential sites where
mass casualties could occur and apply principles of situational
crime prevention to the prevention of terrorism;
6. Keep in mind that terrorists seek publicity and exploit the media and the Internet to gain recognition, propagate their cause, glorify
their attacks, win recruits, solicit donations, gather intelligence,
disseminate terrorist know-how and communicate with their
target audiences. Try to devise communication strategies to
counter them in each of these areas.
7. Prepare for crisis- and consequence-management for both 'regular' and ' catastrophic' acts of terrorism in coordinated
simulation exercises and educate first responders and the public
on how to cope with terrorism.
8. Establish an All Sources Early Detection and Early Warning intelligence system against terrorism and other violent crimes on
the interface between organized crime and political conflict;
(ii). From the second batch of Rules, I would like to highlight number
six: Terrorism consists of the combination of violence and
communication, it is, as one observer put I,t “1% bang and 99%
publicity”. We have to engage in a much more determined efforts to
deal with the propaganda side of terrorism.
Table 24: Twelve Rules for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (III)
25
9. Strengthen coordination of efforts against terrorism both within and between states; enhance international police and intelligence
cooperation, and offer technical assistance to those countries
lacking lack the know-how and means to upgrade their counter-
terrorism instruments.
10. Show solidarity with, and offer support to, victims of terrorism at home and abroad.
11. Maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the Rule of Law, Good Governance,
Democracy and Social Justice and by matching your deeds with
your words;
12. Last but not least: counter the ideologies, indoctrination and propaganda of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get
the upper hand in the war of ideas – the battle for the hearts and
minds of those terrorists claim to speak and fight for.
(iii) Regarding the last batch of the Twelve Rules, I would like to
highlight again a theme I already alluded to earlier - keeping the moral
high ground in the fight against terrorism.
What the terrorist engage in are basically war crimes and they
should be seen and treated as such in wartime and - if the attacks occur
in times and zones of peace - as “peacetime equivalents of war crimes”
12 . Lowering our moral standards to the same level and to tactics used
by terrorists, means that there is no longer much moral distinction
between the conflicting parties. That sorry state would be very
deplorable indeed, especially for the civilian populations on all sides. In
this context it is encouraging to learn from a recent BBC poll held in 25
different countries among more than 27,000 people that a solid majority
of people (59%) are opposed to torture even if its purpose is to elicit
12
Following this logic, acts of „catastrophic terrorism‟ should be seen as „crimes against humanity‟ ,
subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
26
information that could save innocent lives from terrorism. The
respective figure for the United States was 58% and for the United
Kingdom 72% 13
We should never abandon the moral high ground which alone can
provide lasting legitimacy in what is likely to be a long struggle against
terrorist movements. Intelligence is, as our experts pointed out, of
paramount importance in the War on Terror but legitimacy is, I would
argue, the one thing we cannot do without in this struggle. And there is,
I believe, even a bonus to this : greater legitimacy will also give us
better intelligence.
Thank you for your attention!
For comments, please send these to Alex P. Schmid, CSTPV,
University of St. Andrews, Scotland, UK
Email: [email protected]
13
World Citizens Reject Torture, BBC Global Poll Reveals. – World Public Opinion Org., 23 October
2006; at < http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/261.php?nid=&id=&pnt….> ,
23/10/2006.
27
APPENDIX: A Toolbox of Measures to Prevent and Suppress
Terrorism*
1. Politics and Governance
1.1 Address specific political grievance of terrorists i.e. change of policy to accommodate, wholly or in part, political grievance of
terrorists constituency (e.g. partial devolution of power to a hitherto marginalized
national minority).
1.2 Engage in conflict resolution a. by means of public dialogue
b. in (secret) negotiations
1.3 Offer political concessions
a. to terrorists
b. to parties sharing terrorists= goals but using less objectionable tactics
1.4 Participation in broader political process
a. invite terrorists to participate in mass-based movements aimed at political change
(e.g. elections, if group lays down arms)
b. encourage the formation of opposition group that reduces the constituency of
terrorist movements
c. enter new coalition with other opponents of terrorist movement
d. declare political and/or military wing of terrorist groups illegal
e. ban membership of terrorist groups and/or front organizations.
1.5 Amnesty
a. partial
b. conditional
1.6 Diplomatic pressure on state sponsors to decrease their support
a. expel diplomats from states which support terrorist organizations
b. break diplomatic relations with sponsors of terrorist organizations
c. ostracize states and other entities which sponsor terrorists, by listing them.
28
* This list, developed within the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime,
Vienna, is simply meant to identify and classify possible preventive and counter-terrorist measures,
regardless of their use, efficacy or rate of success. The United Nations does not necessarily endorse
specific measures from this list. Some measures listed are objectionable on moral and legal grounds
but have been included because examples of such practices could be found in the literature on
counter-terrorism.
2
2. Economic and Social 2.1 Address specific socio-economic grievances
(including removing/reducing socio-economic grievances of
the constituency of the terrorist movement) 2.2 Engage in socio-economic policies that reduce inclination to engage in political violence by
a. employment schemes
b. anti-discrimination measures
c. poverty-reduction schemes (e.g. land redistribution)
d. opening legal economic alternatives to black-market activities, etc.
2.3 Address financial/monetary aspects of terrorism
a. ban fundraising (and transfer of funds from potential front- organizations) of
terrorist groups
b. freeze assets of families of kidnap victims (to prevent paying of ransom)
c. boycott/sanction state supporters of terrorists
i. freeze assets
ii. ban trade
iii. ban travel
iv. ban arms sales
v. ban sale of dual use and precursor substances
vi. other
d. place sanctions on companies that invest in countries alleged to be state sponsors
of terrorism
e. trace terrorist funds (e.g. by lifting bank secrecy)
f. information exchange between states on movement of funds suspected to support
terrorism
g. offer financial rewards for information leading to the arrest of terrorists.
2.4 Other
e.g. decrease capacity of terrorist groups to obtain material assistance
3. Psychological-Communicational-Educational 3.1 Attempts to establish a common value base with political opponents, such as:
a. value of dignified life
b. value of prosperity
c. value of treating others as you would like to be treated
d. value of not becoming a victim
e. other
3.2 Providing a forum for freedom of expression
i.e. provision of public space where conflict between government and armed
opposition can be discussed openly (e.g. in an academic forum, or on neutral
territory)
3.3 Use of media
a. ban (live) broadcast of interviews with terrorists
b. ban publication of terrorist texts/manifestos
c. provide publicity to terrorists in return for release of hostages
d. publish terrorist texts/manifestos
29
e. other policies regarding media access to terrorist groups (e.g. grant terrorists free
publicity in exchange for concessions from terrorists)
f. provide training to journalists on responsible coverage of terrorist events (e.g.
show the harmful effects of premature or full disclosure of information on
terrorist activity)
g. provide precautionary guidelines for the eventuality of a serious terrorist threat
(especially use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear [CBRN]
materials)
3
3.4 Counterterrorism public relations campaign
a. initiate/strengthen public awareness programs and activities on illegitimacy and
human/economic costs of terrorism
b. use highly-respected personalities and/or popular (movie/sport) >heroes= to
condemn terrorist acts in the media
c. use and support former (repentant) terrorists for counter-terrorist campaign
d. use “wanted” posters and invite the public to denounce terrorists
e. use former victims of terrorism in counterterrorism campaigns
3.5 Other
e.g. facilitate the exit of individuals from terrorist organizations by offering them
face-saving ways of phasing out
4. Military 4.1 Use of strikes/operations
a. pre-emptive strikes against base of terrorists
b. commando action against headquarters of terrorists (for arrest and/or
neutralization)
c. punitive retaliatory action against location or community hosting terrorists (e.g.
erect roadblocks or engage in active search for weapons)
d. rescue operations for liberation of kidnap victims or hostages in siege/barricade
situations
4.2 Use of armed forces for protecting potential victims and objects
a. persons, e.g. VIPs
b. facilities, e.g. infrastructure facilities such as nuclear power plants, electricity
grids, data flow switchboards, water-storage tanks, propane gas tanks, etc.
4.3 Recruitment/training/maintenance of personnel
a. of high alert counter-terrorist special reaction force teams (incl. hostage rescue
units)
b. of bomb disposal teams
c. of commando units
d. of new special units (e.g. for dealing with CBRN threats)
e. of private security forces to deal with terrorist threats or offensives
f. other
4.4 Operating procedures and policies
a. update existing martial law/state of emergency law
b. develop new checklists, standard operating procedures and rules of engagement
c. maintain strict controls of uniforms, weapons and munitions of security
forces to avoid leakage to terrorist organizations
d. develop independent supervisory mechanisms to investigate complaints of alleged
abuses of power by security forces (torture-allegations, killing of disarmed
hostage-takers, etc.)
e. develop reporting policies on all use of lethal force and on arrests by security
forces
f. limit authority of military courts in anti-terrorist matters to areas allowed by
international law and human rights
g. other
30
5. Judicial and Legal 5.1 International efforts
a. become party of international and regional conventions and protocols, and
incorporate obligations in national legislation and build capacity for
implementation
b. expand extradition treaties
c. comply with well-founded extradition requests of alleged terrorists
d. enhance mutual legal assistance with other states
e. enhance information exchange with judiciary in other countries.
5.2 Domestic legislation
a. review and update emergency legislation
b. adopt successful legislation from other countries
c. review existing rules and laws on terrorism for counter-productive/ unwanted
boomerang effects
d. introduce new legislation to specifically address terrorism and its evolution
(e.g. limit the possibilities of use of encryption by terrorists)
e. adjust (i.e. increase/decrease), where appropriate, sentences for terrorist
crimes
f. use of political offence exception
5.3 Witnesses
a. use of crown witnesses where necessary (but avoid undue inequality before
the law which might ensue from their ill-considered use)
b. provide witness protection
c. provide repentant terrorists protection
d. protect fact-finder (e.g. of lawyers and jury members)
5.4 Courts
a. increase speed of judicial process against terrorism
b. introduction of special courts to deal with terrorist crimes
c. trials in absentia
6. Police and Prison System 6.1 Target hardening
a. of high-risk activities (e.g. sporting events, public appearances by high-profile
politicians)
b. of perimeters of high-risk targets (e.g. embassies)
c. of public utilities, infrastructures, communication systems, transport systems
(incl. aviation security)
d. of weapons and explosive storage areas (e.g. nuclear facilities, liquid gas
storage tanks, etc.)
e. of mail, residences, vehicles
f. use of proven and new technologies (e.g. closed circuit television cameras)
6.2 Enhance international police cooperation
a. by stationing liaison officers abroad
b. participation in multinational fora (e.g. regional initiatives)
c. other
6.3 Enhance capacity of law enforcement officials
a. provide training (initial and upgrading) opportunities to ensure
preparedness, particularly in the case of a CBRN attack
b. engage in joint simulation exercises (e.g. with military forces)
c. engage in contingency planning
4 6.4 Informants/infiltrators
a. encourage voluntary informers
b. control infiltration of police through external checks on police officers (e.g. by
intelligence agency)
6.5 Police behaviour
a. ensuring lawful police behaviour
31
b. put in place procedures for investigating charges of police brutality and
torture
c. regulate use of (potentially) deadly force
6.6 Police powers
a. increase powers of arrest
b. expand powers/period of detention
c. expand legal space for (electronic) surveillance of suspected terrorists
d. suspension of certain civil rights
6.7 Measures to inhibit the formation and perpetuation of terrorist networks in prison
e.g. by solitary confinement or distribution of terrorists in several prisons
7. Intelligence and Secret Service 7.1 Use of technology (traditional and newly developed) and human intelligence
(HUMINT)
a. decryption
b. eavesdropping/interception
c. surveillance
d. satellites
e. other (e.g. „Rasterfahndung”)
7.2 Engage in exchange of intelligence
a. with domestic sister intelligence agencies
b. with security agencies abroad
7.3 Intelligence/Infiltration
a. infiltrate terrorist organizations
b. turn members of terrorist groups into informers
c. use of defectors
d. establish/use database on all alleged terrorists and the context in which they
operate
7.4 Use of secret negotiations
e.g. by discussions with imprisoned terrorists
7.5 Develop an early warning system based on indicators of public violence
9. Other 8.1 Concessions/Deals
a. none
b. limited
c. negotiated
d. substantive (e.g. release of prisoners)
e. symbolic/tactical (e.g. free publicity, granting safe passage)
8.2 Immigration measures
a. tighten visa restrictions
5 b. harmonization of visa policies with neighbouring countries
c. tighten border controls
d. spot-checks
e. profiling
f. deportation/banishment/expulsion
g. introduce counterfeit-proof passports
h. database of suspected terrorists
i. curb abuse of asylum
8.3 Victim support
a. victim group support
b. post-incident debriefing
c. support >ex-victims-help victims= programs
8.4 Governmental strategy
a. re-organization of anti-terrorism bureaucracy
b. use of lead agency concept
c. funding of research
d. other.
32
Source: Alex P. Schmid. Towards Joint Political Strategies for De-legitimising the Use of
Terrorism. In: Alex P. Schmid (Ed.) Countering Terrorism through International Cooperation.
Milan, ISPAC, 2001, pp.266-273.
