Questions for ReliableWriter

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Chapter 4

Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial

James M. Smith and Brent J. Talbot�

The authors break new, important strategic ground in their application of deterrence by denial of capability (the operational level), opportunity (the tactical level), and objectives sought by groups, movements, or insur- gencies considering the use of terrorism as a tactic to advance their cause (the strategic level). The approach flows from a causal analysis of what leads to the use of terrorist tactics in the first place. Strategy implementa- tion calls for pursuing both external or international actions—the “away game” as well as various domes- tic measures—the “home game.” Success comes from efforts to marginalize the terrorist message and deter or preclude attainment of terrorist objectives, thus defeat- ing strategically the group, movement, or insurgency threatening the U.S. homeland.

� The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Conventional wisdom holds that terrorists and terrorism cannot be deterred: terror- ists do not fear punishment or death, nor do they possess the territory and popu- lation of a state, and they are therefore immune from psychological coercion via threat of retaliation. We argue, however, that deterrence—specifically psychological coercion through denial as opposed to traditional deterrence by punishment—can not only be applied to terrorism, but also can be utilized at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels for an overall coercive effect. In developing this application, the chapter presents terrorism as a dynamic process described by interrelated essential elements and communication flows. It then presents concepts of deterrence as these enter into this dynamic process and disrupt its elements and linkages, thus shaping coercive influences, removing terrorist options, and forcing decisions that alter ter- rorist plans and actions.

At the base or tactical level the operative coercive mechanism for deterrence of an act of terrorism is denial of opportunity, which delinks the terrorist action cadre from its intended victim or victims. At the higher operational level—deterrence of a series of related terrorist actions or a campaign of terror—the mechanism is denial of capability, which disrupts organizational recruitment and maintenance, training, access to weapons and sanctuary, communications, finance, and other resources needed to undertake hostile actions. At the highest and most important or strategic level—deterrence of terrorism itself or defeat of the strategy—the mechanism is denial of objectives, or marginalization of the terrorist message from both its target population and its support base, leading to ultimate failure.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of how to implement a framework to create these effects, with specific attention to both international perception and influence, and domestic preparation and insulation. A wide range of efforts is required to create the synergistic deterrent effect within and across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Cognizant that terrorism is a form of strategic communication, implementation must be informed by the effort to use interna- tional effects and influence to shape messages to and among the regional and global terrorist “core” audience and potential supporters, and domestic effects that shape both U.S. government and population reactions to terrorist threats and actions. Only this total, deliberate, and strategic approach can achieve a deterrent effect on this otherwise intractable adversary.

Terrorism as a Dynamic Process The term “terrorism” is today used to describe a wide range of tactics, campaigns, and strategies of criminal and political violence. This chapter is specifically addressed to terrorism as deliberate violence undertaken for political objectives, with the attainment of these objectives resulting from psychological effects on tar- gets beyond the direct victims of the violence. We look to second- and third-order psychological effects of political violence—an examination that goes well beyond

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the physical act, weapon, and victim to the larger motivation, preparation, and orchestration of terrorism and the terrorist, as well as to the instrumental creation of fear or terror as the primary lever seeking to cause changes in government policy and action, particularly in driving popular demands on that government for the changes sought. At the same time, the act sends messages to create, deepen, and reinforce support for the terror and the terrorist group among its core audience, and it seeks to engender sympathy and support among wider regional and global audiences to foster its cause and secure both general and tangible support. It is both political violence and psychological communication—sometimes called “pro- paganda of the deed”—undertaken as asymmetrical warfare against an otherwise superior adversary.1

One way to conceptualize terrorism, and to design effective anticipatory and response efforts toward deterrence, is to depict it as a systematic process (a cause to action to effects chain, as depicted horizontally in Figure 4.1). The focal point for much of the terrorism analysis we see is the terrorist act—the terrorist committing a violent act employing some weapon against a selected victim. Although the ter- rorist, the act, the weapon, and the victim constitute an important tactical level of analysis relevant to responders and to the overall effort to combat terrorism, it is insufficient either to understand fully or to respond effectively to the threat. The process model we develop here adds the operational and organizational underpin- nings to the terrorist and his act, and it also includes the essential consequences and audiences terrorized or influenced by such acts.

The operational level of analysis—a focus on cause and organizational response—adds the foundation and structure of terror, from its underlying causes and roots of discontent through the organizing infrastructure of recruitment, train- ing, support, communications, weapons procurement—all that goes into motivat- ing, organizing, preparing, supporting, and sustaining a quasi-military structure and strategy. It also includes focus on the complex psychological and organizational transformation from discontent to violence, or the action link that brings all of those motives and capabilities to the act of terrorist violence.

Terrorism does not end with the act of violence; that is only the beginning. It is the fear generated in the minds of the target audiences—not the victim—that provides the lever through (and only through) which the terrorist organization can hope to attain its objectives. Terrorism is a tool used by the relatively weak to attack a strong adversary, an asymmetrical tool that bypasses adversary strengths and seeks out the soft and vulnerable underbelly of society as the focus of influence. It is this second-order psychological effect on the “target of terror” that is the key to influencing adversary decisions and policies. The terrorist act also is to reinforce and expand the group’s influence on and support from its core support base, its broader regional or cultural base, and even the global audience—all “targets of influence.”2

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Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial3

Viewing terrorism as an interactive process as briefly outlined above indicates points of attack for an effective strategic response. These components and the dynamics between them define the terrorist group; its critical characteristics; and its operational, tactical, and strategic dimensions. They also point to its relative strengths and weaknesses, indicating potential responses to counter effectively its key strengths and capitalize on its weaknesses. Terrorism can be blunted—its dam- age prevented, deflected, or limited by tactical response policy elements. And it can be preempted or altered, even ultimately defeated, by strategic countermeasures that target and attack its operational and strategic bases or operational centers. This process context—its essential elements developed and related within an over- arching strategic perspective—is at the center of both the terrorist threat and the strategic response to that threat. It provides not only a template for a comprehensive threat assessment, but also a framework for systematic response.

Tactical Level: Deterrence by Denial of Opportunity

The tactical level of deterrence aims at prevention of an act or acts of terrorism. It seeks to delink terrorism from its victim. This can be accomplished by denying either the victim access to the terrorist through protection and hardening or by denying the terrorist access to the victim or weapon through efforts to block entry and obstruct movement. Potential “victims” with high value and high symbolic vis- ibility can be protected through physical means and protective measures. Making it difficult to reach or attack specific victims can cause terrorists to look elsewhere or to change (delay or defer) their decisions to act. Making it difficult to gain entry to the country, to travel with impunity within the vicinity of the priority victim, or to access weapons of choice or their essential components can also have this preventive effect.

Another key point here is that if short-term deterrence fails and an act of terror- ism does occur, then the visible effectiveness of the response can have strong and larger-scale deterrent effects toward future acts and continued terrorism. An effec- tive implementation of crisis and consequence management—strength of response, rescue, recovery, and clear leadership within those efforts—will limit the degree of “terror” in the local and national population, blunt the fear, and shorten the period of major psychological impact.

Accurate and timely attribution of the attack to the responsible party or parties and identification of weapons components employed by these terrorists will allow decisive retribution and a clear chain of movement toward effective prosecution of both perpetrators and their weapons suppliers. Rapid recovery followed by both symbolic and substantial reconstruction and reconstitution also will blunt much of the long-term effect. This limits the “terror” outcome and it helps with the stra-

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OPERATIONAL LEVEL TACTICAL LEVEL STRATEGIC LEVEL

Mobilization to Political Violence

Operationlization to Terrorism

2nd/3rd-Order Effects Ultimate Objectives

Causes/Perceived Deprivation

Ideology Organization Leadership

Acts of Terrorism

Fear in Primary Target Audience*

Influence on Other Target Audiences**

Strategic Goals

* Target government, media, population as a whole

** Terrorist base, supporters, recruitment pool, plus world media, other governments and populations

Terrorist Action

Figure 4.1 Essential process elements, dynamic linkages, and audiences.

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tegic preparation of the population for a sustained campaign to combat terrorism, also limiting the likelihood of the terrorist obtaining any favorable effect through future attacks. Less than fully effective deterrence today does not signal total fail- ure; today’s attack response can contribute significantly to tomorrow’s strengthened deterrent outcomes.

Operational Level: Deterrence by Denial of Capability Actions that contribute to effective deterrence at the operational level address the organizational and operational process. In organizational terms, the United States can seek to affect the legitimacy and attractiveness of the organization’s cause, its ability to recruit members and supporters, and most significantly its process of socialization and mobilization toward violent action. These are often broadly based and long-term counterterrorism efforts.

Shorter-term actions include attempts to disrupt the operational process by removing access to sanctuary and open support, putting and keeping terrorist leadership underground and on the run. Terrorist action can be disrupted by denying access to weaponry—at least its worst forms—training grounds and resources, free movement and associated travel documents, secure communica- tions, and finance.

With effective intelligence and international support, we can sometimes preempt terror preparations and attack. We can interdict these organizational and operational processes, and we can at least limit group capabilities and attack severity. In the end, we seek to isolate the terrorist from support bases and sources of sanctuary, and to limit the ability even to undertake acts of terrorism.

Strategic Level: Deterrence by Denial of Objectives Strategic deterrence of terrorism is aimed at creating the clear perception in the mind of the terrorist leadership that their goals cannot be achieved by means of a terror campaign against the United States; their strategy cannot succeed, and any action on their part can only leave them exposed to all levels of audience as ineffec- tive, irrelevant, and unworthy of attention or support. This level of deterrent action builds from the tactical and operational levels specifically to limit the psychological vulnerability and to build the psychological strength of the target—in this case the United States public and its government.

Preparing the American target to mute the effects of terrorism is, first, a func- tion of education prior to attack. Fear of the misunderstood magnifies the impact of terrorism, and knowing something about the true weakness and understanding the morally bankrupt foundation of the terrorist cause can provide an effective damper on the generation of “terror.” Knowing what is going on across an attack through open and nonsensational information is essential to limiting fear. These

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effects, along with strong and visible tactical and operational efforts to prevent and respond to terror, will go far toward insulating the target from the full, desired terrorist reaction. Effective prevention, mitigation, and response combine to mar- ginalize and mute the terrorist message. Since the terrorist is already an ineffective, marginal player on the global stage in all other dimensions of power and influence, such a negative impact on his strategic “message” dooms him to failure. Terrorism without “terror” cannot succeed as a political strategy, and failure ultimately will feed on itself, destroying the terrorist cause and effort.

All of these levels and components of terrorism and deterrence are graphically displayed in Figure 4.2. While that depiction only provides the framework for deterring terrorism, the following discussion of implementation gets at the broad, combined, and synergistic effects on the target audiences of terrorism and of the response; the international and domestic audiences, or targets of influence and tar- gets of terror. It is ultimately here that success or failure for the United States or for the terrorist is written.

International Implementation—the “Away Game” The implementation of the components of a comprehensive, synergistic strategy has to be centered on the international community since the most significant threats to the United States stem from transnational terrorism. This represents the “away game” within the overall effort, focusing on affecting the terrorists before they manifest their threats in the U.S. homeland, and specifically on the “targets of influence” that provide essential support, sanctuary, and sustenance to the terror- ists and terrorism. This effort, besides the operational preemption and interdiction actions mentioned above, centers on creating operational and strategic effects to deny terrorist capabilities and attainment of the objectives of terror. The success of our strategy to combat terrorism depends significantly on the image and influ- ence of the United States in the regional and cultural world from which this threat stems.

International implementation efforts must first identify the target population that provides the terrorists with recruits as well as a support base. Second, with the target population in mind, we must develop an influence strategy that marginalizes the terrorist message, which means we must initially define the core message at the strategic level, and then outline appropriate counters against it. This simply boils down to getting out the real truth. Finally, we must also offset the operational-level propaganda efforts of the terrorists that attempt to mask the rationale for U.S. military operations in their region of concern while at the same time distorting the truth behind their own involvement in terror attacks, which attempt to draw implausible parallels to “just causes.” Terrorists might even devise conspiracy theo- ries designed to inspire doubt as to who are the real instigators of acts of terror. At the operational level we can also use the media to analyze the results of terrorist

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TACTICAL LEVELOPERATIONAL LEVEL STRATEGIC LEVEL

Terrorist ActionMobilization to Political Violence

Operationalization to Terrorism

2nd/3rd-Order Effects Ultimate Objectives

Deterrence by Denial of Capability

Deterrence by Denial of Opportunity

Deterrence by Denial of Objectives

Causes/Perceived Deprivation

Ideology Organization Leadership

Acts of Terrorism

Fear in Primary Target Audience

Influence on Other Target Audiences

Strategy Attainment of Objectives Marginalize Message

Modes of Preservation Preempt Interdict Diminish Isolate

Modes of Mitigation Protect Manage Retribution Prosecution Reconstruct Reconstitute

Modes of Response Prepare Educate Inform Insulate

Figure 4.2 Terrorism dynamic process model with deterrence overlay: strategic response based on causal analysis of terrorist threat.

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attacks and point out to the targets of influence that often those attacks leave many innocents as victims—including members of the target of influence populations, which if properly publicized, could turn significant numbers of supporters against the attacks.

Identifying and Influencing the Target Population The primary locus for U.S. strategy in combating terrorism today is found within the Muslim world. As the basis for the rest of this analysis, we will focus on the application of this process model to the Muslim world. Even though Muslims com- prise over 1.3 billion members worldwide, Richard Clarke, former terrorist “czar” in the Clinton and early-Bush administrations, subdivides the Muslim population into three concentric circles. The outermost circle comprises all 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide—most being “absorbed in their daily lives with no inclination to terror or extremism.” By contrast, the innermost circle is made up of extremist Islamists, perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 radical “jihadists bent on the West’s destruction, and against whom hard power is the only viable response.” In the middle, however, are millions of Muslims either living in the West or Western-educated who, under the right circumstances, could be persuaded to support terrorism. According to Clarke, this is the group the United States “most urgently needs to cultivate.”4

From a strategic perspective, influencing this particular group is the best means of cutting support to the core radicals who are unable to sustain a global jihad on their own. The growth of extremist groups like al-Qaeda in terms of both recruit- ment and popularity depends on developing supporters within this middle group. They are reliant on these supporters for political and economic support as well as safe-haven in states where they are persecuted by the governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Terrorism is not a randomly occurring process, so what could motivate this middle group to support acts of terror? Many scholars recognize that a perceived sense of deprivation provides a strong motive for violence. Pillar identifies two pre- cursors relevant to the surfacing of terrorist groups and those sympathetic to their cause: (1) “political repression and an accompanying lack of self-determination” and (2) the poor “socioeconomic prospects of populations that are, or may become, the breeding stock for terrorists.”5 Related is Rapoport’s assessment describing modern terrorism as a “religiously inspired fourth wave” based upon “anti-globalization … tension between the have and have-not nations … the elite and underprivileged. … In an era where reforms occur at a pace much slower than is desired, terrorists … exploit the frustrations of the common people (especially in the Arab world).”6

Although conditions of poverty and political repression remain commonplace throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, as indeed they have existed historically, it is particularly in regions or countries experiencing increased urbanization and the interconnectedness of globalization that populations become aware of their under-

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privileged status, terror directed against outsiders or oppressors becoming a tool for mobilization. Education is a key difference between those in the middle group enabled politically and the outermost circle of the Muslim masses less prone to engage in political activities. Terrorist groups can exploit awareness brought about by education and subsequent attempts to engage in politics that are repressed by government. Islam becomes a tool for mobilization against the perceived injustices of the state. After all, Islam is a religion calling for an end to injustice, sharing of wealth to help the poor, and reverence for God above the state.

Given its access to education, this media-savvy middle group—the target population—can be influenced to turn its support away from the jihadists who, of course, are themselves increasingly prone to use the same media to advance their cause. Moreover, educational awareness is also prevalent among the Muslim diaspora—those who have migrated to countries outside of the Arab and Muslim worlds. In fact, the sense of relative deprivation is perhaps greater between immi- grants and native populations, particularly in Europe and North America where Muslims are a minority unable to climb social ladders to the same degree of success. Indeed, the Club de Madrid summit on terrorism held in March 2005 claimed that 80 percent of new recruits to the global jihadist movement are Muslim immigrants or refugees.7

If the extremist core is recruited primarily outside the Arab or Muslim states, then it follows that sympathizers are at least as likely to come from immigrant sources. Those outside the Middle East are also more likely to be educated and have surplus resources with which they might support terrorist causes. When one considers that the London, Madrid, and even 9/11 attackers were all Muslim immi- grants—or in the more recent cases, those born to immigrants in the West—it follows that radicalism is just as likely to rear its head among Muslim immigrants as among those who remain in the Middle East. This also means that an influence campaign should not limit itself to the Middle East arena, but also focus on global media sources referenced by the Muslim diaspora, particularly Muslim sources emanating in Europe and North America.

In sum, an influence campaign against Islamic-inspired terrorism should focus on the middle group identified by Clarke. These educated Muslims, many of whom live outside the Middle East, are deprived politically and economically and are thus the most likely supporters of the global jihad inspired by al-Qaeda actions against the United States. Strategic and operational elements of the influence campaign are spelled out below.

Denial Strategy—Marginalizing the Terrorist Message A corresponding effort must focus on development of a proper influence strategy to marginalize the terrorist message, which means we must first define the mes- sage. In the case of al-Qaeda, its longer-term, overall goal apparently is to bring

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about a “new world order.” Its terror campaign is aimed at the United States and Israel because they make up what it labels the “far-away enemy.” This far-away enemy is distinct from the “near enemy”—the corrupt Arab and other Muslim state governments that prevent the implementation of sharia (God’s law) and whose existence prevents the unification of the umma (the Muslim community) under a single caliphate (understood to be a divinely inspired government). It is Western governments, particularly the United States, that protect corrupt Muslim govern- ments from overthrow by their own populations.

Al-Qaeda also believes the United States is interested in dominating and subju- gating the region (aided by its Zionist client state, Israel) because of its oil resources, and due to a religious divide—God-fearing Muslims versus Godless, materialis- tic, Westerners—the United States blamed for initiating what Samuel Huntington refers to as a “clash of civilizations.” Thus, based upon fatwas (religious rulings) and other pronouncements issued in the past by al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,8 the far-away enemy must be driven from Muslim lands to save Islam from destruction; the jihadists are to effect the downfall of cor- rupt governments, ushering in a return of the caliphate.

Countering this al-Qaeda appeal is complicated by the early error by President Bush, alluding to a “crusade” against terrorism that, consistent with Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations thesis, was interpreted in the Muslim world as the latest chap- ter of anti-Muslim efforts—a direct, historical reminder of the European Christian campaign to recapture the Holy Land during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This slip of the tongue—repeated frequently in Middle East media—set the context in many minds for an adverse interpretation of U.S. actions in the region. It was relatively easy for bin Laden and others to liken U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to modern crusades aimed at destroying Islam in those regions.

An influence campaign at the strategic level should refute the al-Qaeda and other terrorist messages directly, attempting at the same time to make the Arab and Muslim worlds well aware of U.S. public and private assistance to Muslims worldwide. This counter-message should also highlight respect for religious prac- tices of Muslims and others within the United States and underscore the freedoms and economic successes enjoyed by American Muslims. The generosity of both public and private American donors to charitable causes should be made known as a counter to the image of America as if it were a corrupt and Godless nation bent only on material gain.

Denial of Capability: Public Diplomacy and Disrupting Recruitment and Retention Next we turn to a discussion of the means of disrupting terrorists at the operational level. At this level, terrorists fighting the global jihad have distorted the rationale for U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Jihadists paint an image of the United

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States bent on making war against Islam in order to control Muslim oil. But this can be countered by comparing U.S. involvement in the first Gulf War—to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and to defend another Muslim country, Saudi Ara- bia. In fact, the United States neither took control of Kuwaiti oil, nor did the U.S. forces residing in Saudi Arabia stay in place but, rather, subsequently withdrew from Saudi soil. The message needs to underscore that the U.S. military is not in the Middle East to stay or to occupy territory.

A related operational-level concern is al-Qaeda’s attempts to justify each indi- vidual attack with its overall rationale for global jihad. Osama bin Laden went to great lengths to legitimize the September 11 suicide hijackings as a logical extension of the Palestinian suicide bombings against Israel, which began in earnest after the failure of the Camp David peace talks during the summer of 2000. By 2001, images of Israeli repression and Palestinian funerals filled Middle Eastern airwaves, which in bin Laden’s view provided sufficient legitimacy on the Arab street for his massive suicide attack plan.

Still, a famous al-Jazeera television cleric condemned the hijackings by stating that “the anti-Israeli suicide attacks of the Palestinians could be justified as martyr- dom … since they were part of a defensive jihad aimed at reclaiming Palestinian Islamic land that had been usurped by the Jews … [But, the] September 11 hijack- ers [were] suicides rather than martyrs, because, contrary to Muslim teachings, they had unduly taken the lives Allah had given them …the difference … was that America is not a legitimate target of defensive jihad.” 9

Such condemnations against al-Qaeda’s operational justification for September 11 and other attacks needs to be presented repeatedly to audiences to underscore how such terrorist actions are contrary to Islamic teachings, thus countering claims by al-Qaeda to the contrary.10 If a potential martyr doubts that his actions will lead him to paradise, then he is less likely to carry out his attack. But more importantly, doubts among potential terrorist supporters hurt recruitment and retention neces- sary to sustain operations.

Still, CIA expert Michael Scheuer asserts that “U.S. public diplomacy cannot negate the impressions formed by real-time video from Palestine, Iraq, and Afghan- istan that shows Muslims battling aggressive Western forces, thus validating in their minds bin Laden’s claim that the West intends to destroy Islam.”11 Scheuer believes that ultimately it is the radical Islamists who have the upper hand when it comes to control of the Arab media. Be that as it may, the Arab media are not really so monolithic. Western efforts to influence Middle East publics are an uphill contest, but an important one nonetheless.

Another factor often contributing to resistance against condemning known ter- rorists is the widespread belief in conspiracy theories. Rumors after the September 11 attacks, for example, initially blamed the Israeli Mossad (Secret Service) or in some instances even the CIA, for the attacks in New York and Washington, and some even went so far as to claim that e-mail was sent to all Jews working at the World Trade Center informing them to stay home on that tragic date. So why

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do people cling to conspiracy theories? Johnson reports that “while the idea of a Muslim hero standing up to the United States has appeal, many Muslims remain deeply disturbed by terrorist tactics.”12 They do not want to believe such acts could be carried out in the name of Islam, defiling the very religion the attacks were sup- posed to defend. Publicizing admissions of responsibility for terrorist actions as well as counterarguments to the conspiracy theories that abound in this region of the world are essential if the West is to have any opportunity at all to counter the claims of terrorist groups.

Domestic Implementation—the “Home Game” The international or “away game” is critical to the success of the comprehensive effort to deter and defeat terrorism; however, the domestic components of the strat- egy or “home game” are also critical to achieving the overall synergy that defines success. Terrorism must be attacked before, during, and after it is carried out. The domestic effort is aimed directly at preparing and mitigating impacts on the “target of terror,” generating tactical and strategic effects to deny terrorists the opportunity to achieve their objectives. The domestic effort certainly revolves around the actions taken to harden victims against attack, to limit terrorist access to those victims, and to limit access to weapons of choice to carry out attacks. These actions contribute to effective prevention of terrorist attacks. The “home game” equally involves efforts to mitigate the effects of attacks that do take place. And the mitigation, response, and recovery actions during and after a terrorist attack that is not prevented all contribute to longer-term strategic deterrent effects against terrorism.

Educating and Preparing Domestic Publics

Uncertainty and a lack of understanding breed fear, magnify the already negative emotions generated by casualties and destruction of properties—both fueling and deepening the terror that flows from calculated acts of violence. On the other hand, education based on accurate information effectively delivered contributes to mental preparation and “hardening,” thus reducing to some degree adverse effects on the mass population. Education of this kind is needed well prior to any terrorist attack if such knowledge and understanding are to serve as a solid foundation for effective crisis communication and management.

Former Speaker of the House Thomas “Tip” O’Neill’s dictum on American politics (that “all politics are local”) also applies to the most fundamental level of domestic terrorism; all terrorism is local. The effects, the search for useful informa- tion by the public in the face of crisis, and the fundamental propensity to experi- ence greater or lesser degrees of fear—the depth and extent of “terror” generated by the incident—are all firmly rooted at the local level. In crises, one’s perceptions

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are reality, and local factors most significantly shape those perceptions of the most directly impacted “target” audience. Even those far removed from the immedi- ate scene can be profoundly influenced by the role of the news media. In essence, “journalists are first responders”:13

This country isn’t ready to deal with a catastrophic terrorist attack, and government preparedness may not be the biggest problem. Indeed, one of the most critical parts of our infrastructure—the nation’s news media—doesn’t appear near the top of anyone’s list of concerns. They should be of utmost concern to those responsible for homeland security.14

We need clear, well-designed educational materials to address the technical and human dimensions of the threat, and we need a prepared noninflammatory chan- nel of presentation for those materials in times of crisis. A comprehensive home- land security strategy must capitalize on quality materials and experiences to target localized delivery of education and the information. It must involve establishing cooperative relations with local media outlets. This is not easy, as adversarial rela- tions may exist between government and the media at various levels, but being able to harness the support of the media in extending information during these times of crisis is a critical variable in implementing a successful homeland security strategy.

The implementation of a comprehensive strategy to create deterrent effects requires measures at both international and domestic levels of implementation. These measures do require a strategic guiding hand to ensure comprehensive, com- plementary implementation and synergistic deterrent effects. This coordination of the effort must remain a central area of emphasis at every level, including leader- ships at the pinnacles of power and authority.

Concluding Comments First, there is no one “magic bullet” that can be used to defeat terrorism. Terrorism aimed at the United States today is a complex, asymmetrical threat. And this threat demands an equally complex, asymmetrical, adaptive, and cumulative response package.

Second, each of the response actions and strategies is individually important. Each element of effective response advances the effort to blunt and defeat terror- ism. As stated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: “Ours is a strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations.”15 We agree completely with that strategic response perspective.

Finally, even if all of the actions addressed are implemented immediately, ter- rorist violence likely would still continue—at least in the short term. Over the

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Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial  n  67

longer term, however, the net effect can indeed be a deterrent effect, leading the terrorist leadership, core support base, and regional or ideological community to select other, less violent means of addressing their political, economic, and social grievances.

Endnotes 1. Dan Gressang’s presentation “Reconsidering the Functionality of Terrorism: Impli-

cations for Security Planning” to the International Studies Association in Chicago, 23 February 2002, spurred the author’s development of the strategic communication dimensions added to this model.

2. The terms “target of terror” and “target of influence” are from Donald J. Hanle, Ter- rorism: The Newest Face of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989) as adapted by Troy S. Thomas in Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, November 2004), 11.

3. The three-tiered construct for deterrence of non-state actors (including terrorism) is a refined development of ideas first expressed in James M. Smith, “A Strategic Response to Terrorism,” in After 9/11: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World, ed. David A. Charters and Graham F. Walker (Halifax, Nova Scotia: University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies and Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Stud- ies, 2005), 259–277.

4. Clarke’s categories are outlined in Zachary Shore, “Can the West Win Muslim Hearts and Minds?” Orbis 49 (Summer 2005): 479.

5. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, updated 2003), 30–31.

6. David Rapoport’s arguments are summarized by Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security 27 (Win- ter 2002/03): 35.

7. “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” Volume I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, 8–11 March 2005, Club de Madrid, 9.

8. See chapter 3, “Striking at the Faraway Enemy,” for further discussion, in Giles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 70–107. Additional references on bin Laden and al-Qaeda include Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004), see ch. 5; and Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (Roseville, CA: Prima Publish- ing, 2001).

9. Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 102–103. 10. Too detailed to present in depth here, Patai describes the need among Arabic

speakers to repeat and exaggerate threats in order to make them understood, but at the same time repeating the threat also removes the psychological pressure to carry it out, which may also explain why some terrorist threats never come to fruition. See Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 49–65.

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11. Scheuer is the noted CIA expert on Osama bin Laden. See Michael Scheuer, “Al- Qaeda’s Next Generation: Less Visible and More Lethal,” Terrorism Focus 2, no. 18 (October 2005): 3.

12. Jeannie L. Johnson, “Exploiting Weakness in the Far Enemy Ideology,” Strategic Sights, IV, 6 (June 2005):2.

13. Randy Atkins, “The News Media Could Be Our Weakest Link,” Washington Post, 26 January 2003, B3.

14. Ibid. 15. National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Feb-

ruary 2003).

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