680 WK 14 Questions

gusarman1

06sep_maye.pdf

Home >Government homework help >680 WK 14 Questions

This document was downloaded on December 02, 2014 at 12:47:30

Author(s) Maye, Diane L.

Title Measures of effectiveness Israeli counterterrorism strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada

Publisher Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School

Issue Date 2006-09

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2568

NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

Diane Leigh Maye

September 2006

Thesis Co-Advisors: Maria Rasmussen Daniel Moran

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE September 2006

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Measures of Effectiveness: Israeli Counterterrorism Strategies and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada 6. AUTHOR(S) Maye, Diane L.

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) On September 28, 2000, Israel's Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in the

Old City of Jerusalem. His visit spawned the al-Aqsa Intifada, a period of significant Palestinian resistance that has never “officially” ended, and whose reverberations continue to be felt to this day.

This thesis assesses Israel’s counter-terror strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada in light of established scholarly measures of effectiveness. It focuses on specific Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. These include: targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, border controls, administrative detention, controls on terrorist financing and technological advances. It assesses those tactics, year by year, to determine whether or not there was a correlation between the tactics and the number of anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. This tactical analysis provides a basis on which to appraise Israeli counter-terror strategy and its long-term effectiveness. It concludes with a consideration of the long-term implications of the Israeli’s experience.

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 93

14. SUBJECT TERMS Israel, Palestine, Occupied Territories, terrorism, counterterrorism, Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PIJ, suicide bomber, Arafat, PLO, measures of effectiveness, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hezbollah, explosive trace detection, jihad, al-Aqsa Intifada, Netanyahu, Sharon, terrorist financing, Green Line, border controls, Rantisi, administrative detention, IDF, home demolition, Oslo, Muslim Brotherhood, fundamentalism, Temple Mount, Jerusalem

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

iii

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

Diane L. Maye

Captain, United States Air Force B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2001

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2006

Author: Diane L. Maye

Approved by: Maria Rasmussen Thesis Co-Advisor

Daniel Moran Thesis Co-Advisor

Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

On September 28, 2000, Israel's Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the

Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit spawned the al-Aqsa Intifada, a

period of significant Palestinian resistance that has never “officially” ended, and whose

reverberations continue to be felt to this day.

This thesis assesses Israel’s counter-terror strategies and tactics during the al-

Aqsa Intifada in light of established scholarly measures of effectiveness. It focuses on

specific Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. These include: targeted

assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, border controls, administrative

detention, controls on terrorist financing and technological advances. It assesses those

tactics, year by year, to determine whether or not there was a correlation between the

tactics and the number of anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. This tactical analysis provides a

basis on which to appraise Israeli counter-terror strategy and its long-term effectiveness.

It concludes with a consideration of the long-term implications of the Israeli’s

experience.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 B. PURPOSE .........................................................................................................2 C. DEFINING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM.......................2 D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .............................................................4 E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES .............................................................6

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT .........9 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 B. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – ORIGINS AND

ORGANIZATIONS .......................................................................................10 1. 1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy .........................11 2. 1980 - 1992 The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism ..........................15 3. 1993 - 2000 Failure of Oslo and the al-Aqsa Intifada ...................18

C. MAJOR ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA ........................................................21 1. Characteristics and Tactics of the Anti-Israeli Palestinian

Terrorist Organizations.....................................................................21 2. Ideology and Actions of the Major Anti-Israeli Palestinian

Terrorist Organizations, 2000 – 2005...............................................23 a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) .........23 b. Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, Palestinian

Islamic Jihad (PIJ) .................................................................25 c. Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade ................................26 d. Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas)....................28 e. Hezbollah.................................................................................31

D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32 III. ISRAELI STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-AQSA

INTIFADA..................................................................................................................35 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................35 B. ISRAELI TACTICS ......................................................................................37

1. Targeted Assassinations ....................................................................37 3. Administrative Detention and Prosecution .....................................42 4. Border Controls .................................................................................43 5. Technological Advances ....................................................................45 6. Controls on Terrorist Financing ......................................................46

C. ISRAELI STRATEGY ..................................................................................47 1. General Policy and Outcomes...........................................................47 2. Organizational Effectiveness.............................................................48

D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .......................................................................51

A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51

viii

B. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................51 C. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS .......................52

1. Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents ................................................52 2. Injuries and Fatalities........................................................................54 2. Alterations in Terror Tactics ............................................................59 3. Organizational Disintegration ..........................................................60

E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................61 V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................63

A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................63 B. FINDINGS ......................................................................................................63 C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES .................................................................64 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................66

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................67 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................77 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................79

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Mortar and Rocket Attacks during "Ebb & Flow" 2001 - 2004 ......................23 Figure 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 – 2005.....................25 Figure 3. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PIJ 2000 – 2005.........................26 Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Fatah 2000 – 2005 .....................28 Figure 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Hamas 2000 – 2005...................30 Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization

September 2000 – December 2005 ..................................................................33 Figure 7. Total Number Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year, 2000 – 2005...................53 Figure 8. Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts October

2000 - November 2004 ....................................................................................54 Figure 9. Number of Israeli fatalities and injuries due to terrorist incidents, January

2001 - December 2005.....................................................................................56 Figure 10. Ratio of Israel Fatalities to Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and

Organization, January 2001 – December 2005................................................57 Figure 11. Major Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Tactic, 2000 – 2005 .............................60

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Daniel Moran and Dr. Maria

Rasmussen. Dr. Moran, thank you for your valuable insights and knowledge. Dr.

Rasmussen, thank you for your expertise and continually pushing me in the right

direction. Next, I would like to thank my parents and my brothers for supporting my

decision to join the U.S. Air Force and come to graduate school here in Monterey. Last, I

would like to thank Ms. Marianna Khoury, for helping me understand Palestinian and

Israeli culture from a first person perspective. Your insights were invaluable.

xii

THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with a summary of the origins of the al-Aqsa Intifada. It then

gives the purpose of this thesis research project. Next, it offers an examination of the

scholarly definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism and presents a literature review on

the scholarly measures of effectiveness. It concludes with the methodology and sources

used for this research.

A. BACKGROUND

In June 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Chairman of the

Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, met with U.S. President Bill Clinton at Camp David

with the intention of negotiating a permanent peace accord between Israel and Palestine.

Barak was on the verge of offering a fully independent Palestinian state to Arafat and

returning territories Israel gained during the 1967 war. Arafat refused to accept the peace

offer. Talks broke down over the issue of control of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the

holist site in Judaism and third holiest to Muslims, and the right of return for Palestinian

refugees. On September 28, 2000, Israel's right-wing Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon,

visited the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit sparked the beginning

of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of civil and paramilitary resistance to the Israeli

occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The al-Aqsa Intifada is attributed to failures

of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords and diplomatic break down at Camp David, which failed

to transfer political power from the Israelis to the Palestinian Authority. The terrorist acts

that took place during this time period presented an impediment to peace and stability,

and they have directly affected the military policy, training, doctrine and future planning

of the Israeli government.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada the Israelis developed several methods to counter

terrorist attacks by Palestinian resistance fighters. The Israeli government remains

divided on the best methods to counter resistance movements by organizations in

opposition to Israel. Hardliners, such as former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,

believe that retaliations, preemptive strikes and maintaining pressure on resistance groups

are the best method to counter terror. Furthermore, they believe that the Israeli

government should not negotiate with terrorists. Others have taken a more moderate and

conciliatory approach towards terrorist organizations. They believe that negotiations and

economic incentives are more effective strategies.

B. PURPOSE The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Israel’s counterterrorism strategy and

tactics between 2000 and 2005 and assess their outcomes against scholarly measures of

effectiveness. Although the region is plagued by a perpetual cycle of violence, the Israeli

government has successfully curtailed some terrorist activity. This thesis analyzes Israeli

strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada and uses Israel as a case study for how a

democratic country has attempted to reduce the frequency of terrorist incidents. It

concludes with implications drawn from Israel’s successful and unsuccessful strategies

and tactics.

C. DEFINING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM Definitions of terrorism vary by scholar, state and institution. Terrorism can be

described in terms of its tactics, motivations, targets and its perpetrators. Terrorists

typically exploit “the fears of the civilian population, thereby undermining the

government, compromising its alliances, and affecting the economy."1 At the tactical

level "the opponent conducting asymmetrical warfare tries to change the course of action

in order to prevent the achievement of political objectives."2 Those tactics often include

guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage taking and terror attacks.3 The United Nations

defines terrorism as "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated

to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the

general public."4 The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as, "premeditated,

politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national

1 Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding

the New Security Environment ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 485.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Israeli Defense Forces, "IDF Doctrine" [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

groups or clandestine state agents."5 Scholar Dr. Anthony James Joes describes terrorism

as being similar to the other forms of warfare which are typically the "option of those

who confront an enemy greatly superior in numbers, equipment, and training.”6 Although

the definitions vary, terrorism is distinct from other forms of warfare in that its

perpetrators typically seek to impact a government by attacking noncombatants.

Counterterrorism can be described as the effort by governments to counter

terrorist activity. There is a scholarly controversy on how to categorize a government's

counter terror actions and policies. Scholars Ronald Crelinstein and Alex Schmid

contend that the most common way to differentiate amongst counterterrorism response

options is to separate them into "soft line" and "hard line" responses. Soft line responses

address the root causes of the terrorist activity, whereas hard line responses address the

actions taken by the terrorist organizations.7 Crelinstein and Schmid show a second

method of separating counter terror policies is to divide them into domestic criminal

justice matters or treating them as an external "form of war or low-intensity conflict."8 A

state that views counterterrorism as a criminal justice matter will target terrorists with an

internally-focused police force. To the contrary, a state that views counterterrorism as a

form of war will target terrorists with a foreign-focused paramilitary organization. In this

regard, Israel is in a unique situation. Most of the terrorist activity that takes place within

Israeli borders is conducted by individuals that are neither Israeli citizens nor foreign

fighters. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, most of Israel’s terrorist incidents come from the

Palestinians; a people living on Israeli territory but not apart of the Israeli nation-state.

Several other scholars have sought to provide a framework for assessing counter-

terrorism. Christopher Hewitt lists six specific categories of counter terror policies a

government can adopt: ceasefires, negotiations, improved economic conditions,

collective punishments, the use of security forces and political reforms as classifications

5 Department of State, Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global

Terrorism 1985 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).

6 Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1992), 5.

7 Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 310.

8 Ibid, 310.

for anti-terror policies.9 Similarly, in her essay, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism,

The Italian Case," Donatella Della Porta, uses changes "in legislation, the policy of the

police apparatus, and the actual activities of the security forces and courts in order to

assess a state's response to terrorist attacks.”10 She analyzes counter-terrorist strategies by

addressing changes in government policy. RAND scholars Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer

Morrison-Taw take a slightly different approach towards addressing counter terror

strategies and policies. Instead of listing the types of policies a government can use, they

list four elements which are necessary for a counter-terrorist campaign to be successful.

They assert that there must be "effective overall command and coordination structure,

legitimizing measures must be taken by the government to build public trust and support,

coordination between intelligence service, and foreign collaboration among governments

and security forces."11 Their approach measures the performance of the organization

countering terrorism as a precondition for the effectiveness of the policy.

D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS Scholars and policy analysts also have debated how to measure the effectiveness

of counterterrorist strategies and tactics. There is limited literature on the topic of whether

or not Israel’s operations have been successful, and there are few studies with respect to

how Israel's counter terror strategies actually rate in relation to these measures of

effectiveness. Furthermore, several methodological approaches have been designed to

measure counterterrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which

approach is most valid. A recent U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed

the challenge of measuring effectiveness. The author of the report stated that

governments may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators, such as the number of

incidents, while ignoring qualitative indicators, such as the morale of the terrorist

organization. The report showed that the problem with quantitative indicators is that they

do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying sentiments of a terrorist

9 Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of

America, 1984), 35.

10 Donatella Della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case" Western Responses to Terrorism, eds. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Cass, 1993), 156.

11 Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), v.

organization). In addition, an over reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-

like changes in terrorist organizations. The author indicated that the most important

indications of counter terror effectiveness is measured either qualitatively or

quantitatively: the author of the report focuses on the number of incidents, social attitudes

and overall trends.12 Another problem when it comes to measuring counterterrorism’s

effectiveness is with the issue of quantum changes in terrorist organizations.13 Because

terrorist organizations often behave in a “non-linear” matter, simply doing time-series

analyses of raw data may ignore data such as when terrorists develop radically new

strategies and tactics. For this reason, the report suggests tracking indications of

“quantum” change in a terrorist organization as well. These include: intelligence,

technology, impact on society, targets and their protection, alliances, disruption, amount

of unproductive energy expended, sophistication of effort, and morale and momentum.14

Radical changes in one or more of these elements may indicate a major shift in the

capability and momentum of the terrorist organization.

Hewitt measures counterterrorism's effectiveness using a quantitative time-series

analysis. According to Hewitt, if the amount of terrorist violence decreases over time

then counter-terror policies have been successful.15 David Bonner's essay entitled

"United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism" describes four measures

of effectiveness: the rate of prosecution of terrorist elements, overall level of terrorist

incidents, death toll, and alterations in terrorist tactics.16 Terrorism specialist Martha

Crenshaw offers an alternative approach, using both qualitative and quantitative

indicators. She argues that terrorism declines when there is "physical defeat of the

12 Raphael Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness," CRS Report for

Congress, 23 November 2005.

13 Ibid., 7.

14 Ibid.

15 Hewitt, xii.

16 David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 200.

extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational

disintegration."17

There is limited literature on whether or not specific counter terror strategies and

tactics have been effective in Israel. Israeli scholar Noemi Gal-Or's essay "Countering

Terrorism in Israel" addresses the counter terror efforts by the Israeli government. Gal-

Or offers a history of the terrorist threat in Israel and responses by the Israeli government.

She asserts that the impact of Israeli counter terror measures can be measured by

empirical, political, and technical/operational criteria (i.e., negotiations and laws).

Conversely, she shows that terrorism's impact on Israeli society can only be measured

using socio-political criteria.18 Gal-Or also claims that the pattern of terrorist activity is

correlated to political dynamics and counter terror measures, and she offers a qualitative

analysis of the major anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. Her assessment covers select

incidents from the period of 1948 - 1987. Gal-Or does not discusses whether or not the

Israelis have been successful during the al-Aqsa Intifada.

Suzie Navot's essay, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War Against Terror"

addresses some of the decisions made by the Israeli government to counter terrorism.

She sets up her framework of analysis by addressing the tension between "claims of

national security" and the "principles of human rights."19 Specifically, Navot addresses:

targeted killings, evacuations, relocation, and legal measures. Navot's point was to

illustrate the legal challenges Israel faces in dealing with Palestinian terror, but in terms

of measures of effectiveness her report did not show a correlation between government

actions and changes in terrorist activity.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES This thesis does a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and

tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005. This thesis analyzes

17 Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines" in Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed. Clark

McCauley (Portland, OR: Cass, 1991), 70.

18 Noemi Gal-Or, "Countering Terrorism in Israel" in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, Its Effects on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 162.

19 Suzie Navot, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War against Terror," European Public Law 9, no. 3 (July – September 2003): 323.

Israel's specific counter terror policies against these scholarly categories in order to

generalize the Israeli’s approach to counterterrorism. It assesses whether or not the

Israelis are generally “hard-liners” or “soft-liners” based on the Crelinstien/Schmid

model, and whether they view counter-terrorism as a criminal justice matter or military

matter. It also categorizes the Israeli’s choices of tactics based on Hewitt and Della

Porta’s approach, and whether or not their counter-terrorism organization is a success

according to the approach taken by Hoffman and Morrison Taw. It assesses data

concerning major terrorist attacks and how government decision making and the military

response mechanism has affected the end result. Specifically, it looks at the range of

Israel's counter terror policies and how they measure up in terms of both tactical and

strategic categories and quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness. This

research borrows from the aforementioned scholarly approaches, and categorizes the

governmental responses into quantitative and qualitative outcomes. It then analyzes the

outcomes according to the criteria set forth by scholars and academics.

This thesis assesses critiques of Israeli counter-terrorism tactics and strategies,

perspectives on Israel’s achievements and failures, essays, academic studies, Israeli

government manuals, and Israeli military documents. Sources include books, journal

articles, public opinion polls and magazine and newspaper articles, and public statements

by political and military officials. Whenever possible, this project will assess data from

two or more sources in order to look for a general trend. The two quantitative measures

of effectiveness are studied: the number of terrorist incidents and the number of

casualties. The overall numbers of terrorist incidents are gathered from the RAND/MIPT

terrorism knowledge base as well as the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in

the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem). Data concerning casualties and death tolls is

gathered from International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT) and B’Tselem.

Polling data is gathered from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

(PCSPR), the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and the Israeli Public

Opinion on National Security and Tel Aviv University.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

- Yasser Arafat, 197420

Once we have war planes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self defense. But right now, we can only tackle the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves.

- Sheikh Ahmad Yassin21

A. INTRODUCTION This chapter offers a background on the Palestinian resistance movement. It

summarizes the political history of Palestine from 1947 through 2005 and gives a

synopsis of the major decisions made by Palestinian leaders since the UN’s partition of

the region. This chapter then assesses the major anti-Israeli terrorist organizations during

the al-Aqsa Intifada and summaries their chief objectives and outcomes.

Nearly four million Palestinian Arabs and six and a half million Israeli Jews

currently occupy the territory that became known, after the First World War, as the

Palestine Mandate.22 Since the reemergence of Jewish settlers to the area in the early

20th century, there has been contention between the two groups for control of both the

land and society. The Palestinian Arabs claim that it is their land, and they have a right to

reject foreign occupation. Israeli Jews believe that the land is their historic home, and that

they deserve to control it.

20 “The Speech of Yasser Arafat, Palestine at the United Nations,” Journal of Palestine Studies 4, no.

2 (Winter 1975): 192.

21 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 3-4.

22 CIA World Fact Book, "West Bank and Gaza Strip,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006.

Since the UN’s partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel in

1948, the Israelis have won wars against Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq but they

continue to have an ongoing struggle with the indigenous Palestinian population. In

1949, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel agreed to armistices with neighboring

Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. The frontier of the state of Israel agreed at this time is

generally referred to as the “Green Line.” The Green Line has been a major source of

contention for displaced Palestinian refugees, as well as Israeli settlers that desire to

occupy areas outside the Green Line.

B. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATIONS The clash between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an example of sustained

civil warfare in the form of a resistance movement, or a communal conflict.23 The

displaced Palestinian refugee population poses grave security concerns for neighboring

countries. Disputes over Israeli settlements in the predominately Palestinian areas of the

Gaza Strip in the south and on the West Bank of the Jordan River are at the heart of the

Arab-Israeli peace process. 24

The Palestinian resistance movement has been led by several groups. The first

organized movement towards Palestinian nationalism came soon after Israel claimed its

sovereignty as a nation-state. This organization, known as the Movement of Arab

Nationalists (MAN) embraced Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser’s visions of pan-

Arab Nationalism, and sought to liberate Palestine through collective, Arab action.25

From the 1960’s through the 1990’s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

emerged as the most powerful representative of the Palestinian people. At its core, the

PLO's resistance efforts seek to challenge the Jewish presence in Palestine. The

resistance movement has a direct affect upon the region's social framework, policies and

the Israeli government’s ability to conduct future planning. The PLO's terrorist tactics

23 John Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New York:

Pergamon Press, 1980), 4.

24 CIA World Fact Book, “Israel,” [database on-line]; available from

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html#Geo; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006.

25 Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948 – 2005” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no.4 (Summer 2005): 44.

exploit the fears of the Israeli civilian population as an attempt to undermine their

government, challenge their alliances, and affect their economy.26 The tactics they

employ often include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage-taking and terror attacks.27

Since its founding, the PLO constantly evolved its diplomatic and military

strategy to remain in power. Internally, the PLO has had to contain competition from

like-minded organizations such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP) as well as resident political elites and rival organizations like Hamas

and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). From a military standpoint, external actors categorize

the PLO's military branches and competing rivals as terrorist organizations because their

aims tend to be political, religious or ideological, and they promote fear by targeting non-

combatants.28 Diplomatically, the PLO has been in a quagmire. For much of its existence

it has operated as an exiled government. Externally, the PLO has had to maintain

strategic relationships with Arab neighbors, great powers, and intergovernmental

organizations; yet, internally, they have struggled to maintain the support of the

Palestinian people. Furthermore, as a non-state actor, PLO members are not given

recognition as representatives of a sovereign nation.

1. 1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy The PLO was founded on May 28, 1964. Its purpose was "as a mobilizing

leadership of the forces of the Palestinian Arab people to wage the battle of liberation, as

a shield for the rights and aspirations of the people of Palestine and as a road to

victory."29 The PLO was originally the idea of Nasser. He sought to use the Palestinians'

cause to further his visions of pan-Arab nationalism.30 Led by Ahmad Shukeiri, the

organization organized terrorist raids from the Gaza Strip and sought to undermine

26 de Wijk, 485.

27 Ibid.

28 Institute for Counterterrorism, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada- an Engineered Tragedy,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.ict.org.il/; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006.

29 Palestine-UN, “Statement of Proclamation of the Organization (28 May 1964),” [database on-line] available from http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/doc_three.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006.

30 Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: Crane Russack & Co., 1989), 8.

Jordan's monarchy.31 After Israel's victory in the 1967 war, however, the Palestinians

were less inclined to believe that Arab unity would be the key in their liberation from

Jewish control.32

Following the 1967 war, there was an effort by the Palestinians to emphasize the

importance of a Palestinian identity over an Arab identity.33 After 1967, the conflict was

redefined by Palestinian strategists, in order to shift the focus away from Arab and

towards Palestinian concerns.34 In 1968, the Palestinians created a national charter which

declared Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people.

Internally, the period between 1967 and 1974 was characterized by tension

between the exiled PLO leadership and the West Bank's local political elite.35 PLO rivals

jockeyed for power and influence with their constituents. In order to contain rival

groups, the PLO sought to reduce their influence36or absorb them into the PLO's wider

movement. The two major groups were Fatah, a secret resistance group founded in 1954

by Yasser Arafat and George Habash's Christian-Socialist Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine. In 1967 Fatah joined forces with the PLO, followed by the PFLP

in 1968. 37

In 1969, Arafat was elected as the PLO's third chairman, and his support of

guerrilla warfare led to his exile from Tunisia in 1971. His exiled status and the

fragmentation of the PLO's leadership created obstacles towards gaining recognition and

momentum for the nationalist movement. Arafat's main objective was to maintain control

of the PLO and legitimize himself with the masses by developing extensive social

31 Alexander and Sinai, 9.

32 Ian Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 164.

33 Shaul Mishal, The PLO under Arafat, Between Gun and Olive Branch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 61.

34 Amos, 268.

35 Mishal, 97.

36 Amal Jamal, The Palestinian National Movement (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 30.

37 Amos, 39.

institutions, medical facilities, welfare and educational programs.38 His second objective

was to maintain a base of operations. Fatah's organizers believed that operating within

Israeli controlled territories made them susceptible to Israel's intelligence network and

effective countermeasures.39 In order to escape Israeli intelligence, Arafat operated

outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet political and military pressure from

neighboring Arab states did not protect Fatah’s leadership or communications network.

Instead, Arafat’s operations remained furtive and subtle.

This period saw a substantial progression in military strategic thought and force

planning. In 1965, the PLO created the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Originally

modeled after the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)'s conventional army, the

PLA looked to the Algerian revolution as an example of successful guerrilla warfare. By

1971 the PLO's official military organization had been divided into two major factions.

The bureaucratized faction of the PLA maintained links to Arab governments, and

desired a more Westernized approach to military organization. A second, subordinate

faction, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), organized into auxiliary commando

groups.40 The PLF looked to guerrilla strategists for strategy and doctrine. As the

bureaucracy grew, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)'s model for guerrilla

warfare began to compete with the Algerian model as an example for how to fight

revolutionary war. The Vietnamese model was aimed at common participation in armed

violence, where as the Algerians organized as a "closely knit cadre of revolutionaries."41

Most of Fatah's leadership preferred the Vietnamese model of recurrent strikes designed

at attacking enemy morale. The more revolutionary-minded PFLP did not believe the

region’s terrain or the PLO's resources were sufficient for sustained operations. They

preferred the Algerian approach of small-scale, efficient raids and quality operations.42

Arafat sided with the PFLP and chose the Algerian FLN's approach. During the

late 1960's and early 1970's the PLO authorized a large number of organized guerrilla

38 Amos, 154.

39 Ibid., 200.

40 Amos, 178.

41 Ibid., 41.

42 Ibid., 192 - 3.

attacks. Although the PLO had absorbed its two major rivals, the PFLP and Fatah, the

organization could not contain internal competition for power and control. In the early

1970's the PFLP authorized the skyjacking of several commercial aircraft and joined

more non-PLO radicals in a guerrilla campaign against the Jordanian Army. In order to

contain the internal rivals, PLO created its own terrorist cell, Black September. Black

September challenged the rivals by conducting their own spectacular terrorist attacks,

including several skyjackings and the murder of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics in

1972.

Externally, the post-1967 Middle East was influenced by Cold War balance of

power politics. The United States supported Israel, and the Egyptians and the Syrians

looked to the Soviet Union for support. In 1967 the UN issued Resolution 242, which

called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent

conflict."43 The PLO expressly rejected the resolution because it did not require the

Israelis to return all of the territory seized during the 1967 war.

In 1974, the PLO was recognized by the Rabat Arab Summit as the "sole

legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"44 and by the UN General Assembly as

the principal “party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East."45

Throughout this period, the PLO made official statements regarding their statehood and

sovereignty through annual meetings of their parliamentary body, the Palestinian

National Council (PNC) and at the UN, in which it was the only non-state actor to gain

observer status. 46 During the 1970's more nations had official diplomatic relations with

the PLO than with Israel, and in 1976, Palestine was admitted as a member of the Arab

League. In 1977, during the thirteenth session of the PNC, the PLO resolved, "to pursue

the struggle to recover our people's national rights, and first and foremost, their right to

43 Jewish Virtual Library, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,” [database on-line];

available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unres242.html; Internet; accessed 7 May 2006.

44 Mishal, 18.

45 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) on Palestinian's Rights, 1974.

46 Mishal, 149.

return, to exercise self-determination, and to establish their independent national state on

their own land."47

2. 1980 - 1992 The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism By 1980, the PLO had emerged as a legitimate actor in both the occupied

territories and a dominant force in world politics.48 Although the world recognized the

PLO as a true authority, internally the organization faced several challenges. Foremost

was the problem of the PLO's continually exiled leadership. This prevented the PLO

from directly pursuing operations against the Israelis and maintaining a day-to-day

presence with the Palestinian people. A second problem was the tension created by the

PLO's presence in Lebanon and Jordan. Arafat maintained legal bases of operation in

both countries, but waves of Palestinian refugees strained the two nations both

economically and politically.

By the early 1980's, the PLO appeared to be developing into a "regular" army.49

The PLO also instituted a system of ranks, modern organizational units and combat

doctrine. By 1982 the PLO had acquired a significant inventory of both light and heavy

weapons. These included assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, armored

vehicles, howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, personnel carriers and missile launchers.50

PLO members were also reported to have trained on Mig-23 and Mig-21 jet fighters in

Libya.51 Yet, in terms of force planning, the PLO's military doctrine was mainly reactive

and defensive. Despite substantial growth, the Palestinian military lacked the capability

to resist a modern conventional force. Their primary tactic was to launch rocket attacks

or guerrilla raids into Israel's northern settlements. The PLO lacked complete operational

control over its competing organizations and rival factions; the dispersed militia was

47 “Documents and Source Material, ‘Resolutions of the Thirteenth Palestine National Council Article

11,’” Journal of Palestine Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977):189.

48 Ibid., 150.

49 Yezid Saygih, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," Journal of Palestine Studies 12, no. 4 (Summer 1983): 23.

50 Ibid., 9 - 12.

51 Alexander, 37.

spread between multiple urban centers with "virtually no localized centralized

command."52

In June 1982, the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion into Lebanon. The "first

aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to

undermine it as a political organization."53 Operationally, the PLO demonstrated a lack of

command and control during the invasion.54 Furthermore, its "regular" army organization

did not match its revolutionary aims, which rendered the heavy weapons ineffective.55

After an intense bombing campaign and occupation, by September 1982 nearly all of the

PLO's leadership had been evacuated from their stronghold in Beirut.

After the Lebanese conflict, Arafat was exiled to Tunis. Arafat maintained

control of the PLO through a series of deft political maneuvers. Externally, he faced

pressure from his Arab neighbors. The Syrians attempted, unsuccessfully, to "set up a

puppet Palestinian organization."56 In order to balance Syrian antagonism, Arafat looked

to Jordan for support. In February 1985, Jordan's King Hussein and Arafat announced a

joint policy designed to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan

River. In November 1988, under Arafat's direction, the PNC proclaimed the

establishment of an independent Palestinian state.57

Within Palestine, a new politically elite class sought to counterbalance the PLO's

dominance in the region. These elite emerged out of a middle-class religious movement.

With origins in the doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood, the faction sought to revitalize

Islamic values into the everyday life of the Palestinian people. In a general sense, the

faction was apart of a broader movement, which the West has termed "Islamic

fundamentalism."58 The fundamentalist movement gained significance in the 1970's59

52 Saygih, 17.

53 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), 396.

54 Saygih, 18.

55 Ibid., 24.

56 Bickerton, 227.

57 Ibid., 233.

58 Frederick Mathewson Denny, An Introduction to Islam (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006), 187.

which may have been due to the concurrent resurgence in Christian fundamentalism in

the West and a coincident decline in the secularism of the modern nation-state. This

movement included ideas about "jahiliyya, of the indivisible sovereignty of God, and the

duty of jihad (struggle) to restore the shari'a (Islamic law) to its rightful place in

society."60 Most of the movement's religious scholars believed "the only authentic source

for survival, let alone revival, of Islam was the Qur'an."61 Within Palestine, the two

central parties that developed out of the Islamic fundamentalist movement were Hamas

and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Like their contemporaries across the Middle East,

these organizations fused religion and politics together. During the first Intifada, in the

late 1980's, Hamas and PIJ resorted to violence to achieve their goals. Due to their exiled

status, the PLO found it difficult to control the fundamentalist factions, and increasingly,

Hamas and PIJ competed with PLO-sanctioned military actions.

During the 1980’s the Middle East was subject to the ripple effects of a declining

Soviet Union. The waning Soviet empire looked to the United States for support, and

sought to distance itself from the radical Arab regimes it had propped up in the past.62

U.S. policy makers backed Israel, authorized financial support for Egypt and protected

the oil-rich countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The United States also supported the

settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. With only one superpower on the

scene, the PLO worked through the UN to condemn Israel's oppression and insist upon a

plan for peace. From a diplomatic standpoint, the PLO’s efforts were effective. By the

mid-1990's more states recognized the PLO's declaration of independence than

recognized Israel's right to exist.63 On the other hand, the PLO had little control over the

internal politics of the West Bank and Gaza strip during their exile. The surge in Islamic

fundamentalism, competition for power, and new rivals such as Hamas and PIJ

drastically altered the capability of the PLO to execute a single military strategy.

59 Denny, 340.

60 Charles Tripp, "Sayyid Qutb" in Pioneers of Islamic Revival ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 2005), 162.

61 Ibid., 344.

62 Bickerton , 255.

63 Ibid., 233.

3. 1993 - 2000 Failure of Oslo and the al-Aqsa Intifada During the 1990's Arafat once again emerged as the authoritative voice of the

Palestinian people.64 In 1993, the PLO began a series of secret meetings with the Israeli

government 65 and, under U.S. President Bill Clinton; the Americans resumed the role of

Middle East peace broker. In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and

Arafat signed letters of mutual recognition and an interim peace agreement known as the

Oslo Accords. The peace accord envisioned a timeline and plan for Israeli forces to

withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Palestinians to control public order

and security.66 The agreement also mandated that the Israelis would maintain

responsibility for defending the region against external threats, and that the Palestinian

National Authority (PA) would be held responsible for preventing acts of violence by

Palestinian militants. The Oslo process depended upon the “formula of peace-for-

security. That is, the process would continue as long as the Palestinian Authority cracked

down on terrorism and other political violence directed at Israel and the Israelis residing

in the territories.”67

Following the peace accords, the PA became the officially recognized

administrative body for the Palestinian people. The PA was designed to provide internal

oversight of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their main objective was to create police

and security forces. Arafat’s PLO remained in control of foreign relations and the PLA.

This year also marked a new era within Israel; the first suicide bombing within

Israel’s borders by an anti-Israeli, Palestinian organization. On April 16, 1993, a member

of the Hamas organization blew up his car next to an Israeli bus parked near a settlement

in the Jordan Valley.68 Between April 16, 1993 and the beginning of the al-Aqsa

Intifada, there were sixty one suicide terror attacks within Israeli territory.69 During this

64 Jamal, 121.

65 Bickerton , 266.

66 Ibid., 269.

67 Sergio Catignani, “The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicide Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1 – 2 (Winter 2005): 253.

68 Kimhi, 817.

69 Ibid.

period only two groups, the Islamic-fundamentalist groups Hamas and PIJ, conducted

suicide attacks.

After the Israeli-PLO peace accord was negotiated, Arafat returned to Palestine.

Upon his return, Arafat and the exiled leadership of the PLO once again faced resistance

from the resident governing elite, now in the form of radical Islamic factions, as well as a

movement within his own Fatah party called “tanzim.” Tanzim’s cadre had maintained

Fatah’s political and military base during their exile. With Arafat’s return, this group

“led the crusade against general corruption, mismanagement and lawlessness of the PA’s

governance”70 and alienated Arafat’s core support base. This period saw a notable

increase in the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA. The widening

gulf between the secular-nationalist Fatah and the religious-Islamic elites under Hamas

severely impacted Arafat’s strategy to maintain power.71 Arafat’s disillusioned and

fragmented Fatah party was wed to the tenets of the Oslo Accords, whereas rival parties

had the flexibility to promote their own, more radical, agendas.

During the 1990’s, Hamas’s growing strength and popularity began to diminish

Fatah’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1994, the PA’s

chief economic advisor, Ahmed Qurei, announced that Fatah was bankrupt.72 The

financial crisis forced Arafat into a cycle of less than ideal courses of action. In order to

remain in power, Arafat had to seek aid from outside sources. The West was willing to

negotiate, but only if he enforced the provisions agreed to at Oslo. Each concession

Arafat made to the West furthered Fatah’s alienation from the Islamist factions.

In 1994, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli radical that opposed the

signing of the Oslo Accords. After Rabin’s death, the position was filled by Shimon

Peres, who was voted out of office only one year later and replaced by the right-wing

Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s tenure in office saw the expansion of Israeli

settlements into the West Bank and a significant decrease in Palestinian suicide

70 Graham Usher, “Fatah’s Tanzim: Origins and Politics,” Middle East Report 217 [journal on-line];

available from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_usher.html; Internet; accessed on 29 July 2006.

71 Jamal, 169.

72 Said Aburish, Arafat; From Defender to Dictator (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998), 266.

bombings.73 The Israeli political electorate shifted back to the left in 1998 with the

election of Ehud Barak. Barak initiated a follow-on round of negotiations with the

Palestinians. In July 2000, Barak, Arafat and Clinton met at Camp David to negotiate a

permanent peace accord. The talks broke down over the issue of who would control the

Temple Mount, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and territorial concessions. At

one point during negotiations, Barak conceded the Palestinians full control over the Gaza

Strip, most of the West Bank and custodial sovereignty over the Temple Mount.74 Arafat

would not negotiate until the Palestinians were guaranteed full control of the West Bank

and Gaza Strip. He also refused to allow the Israelis control over the Temple Mount,

which is not only the holiest site in Judaism, but is also on the land that surrounds the al-

Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam.

On September 28, 2000, Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple

Mount in an effort to show its significance to Judaism. His visit spawned the beginning

of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank

and Gaza Strip and response to the mounting frustration over the failure of the Oslo

Accords and break down at Camp David. That year, the Israeli electorate shifted once

again, and in January 2001, Sharon took office as Prime Minister.

The al-Aqsa Intifada is marked by a significant increase in the number of suicide

attacks against Israeli non-combatants and support for those attacks by Palestinian public

opinion.75 Furthermore, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians were exposed to

multiple attacks against known PLO leaders and the assassination of dozens of suspects

affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP. 76 In return, these groups responded

with violent counter-attacks and suicide bombings.

73 Horovitz, 78.

74 Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 94.

75 Kimhi, 818.

76 Ibid.

C. MAJOR ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the resistance movement against Israel was led by

several organizations that have been, or are currently listed on the U.S. State

Department's index of terrorist organizations. The major groups include, but are not

limited to: the PFLP, Hamas, PIJ, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Fatah's militant branch)

and Hezbollah. The tactics and goals of these groups vary. Occasionally these

organizations work together to carry out an attack. Some of the groups are rivals of each

other.

1. Characteristics and Tactics of the Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist Organizations

The central characteristic shared by each of these groups, is a willingness to

target non-combatants. The Israeli Institute for Counterterrorism reports that although

there have been more Palestinian than Israeli causalities during the al-Aqsa Intifada, as of

March 2003 nearly 70% of the Israeli fatalities were non-combatants as opposed to only

16.6% of the Palestinian causalities.77 Another characteristic shared by each of these

organizations is a propensity to use suicide tactics as a method of terror and destruction.

Suicide tactics were used extensively by the Lebanese Hezbollah following the 1982 war

with Israel. Hezbollah was successful at embracing the growing radicalization of Islam

and turning the Shiite notion of martyrdom “into the doctrinal template for a general

mobilization against social injustice.”78 Two decades later, during the al-Aqsa Intifada,

each of these groups has embraced Hezbollah’s methods of suicide terror. The Journal of

Palestine Studies reports that there were 219 Palestine suicide attacks (bombing and non-

bombing) from September 2000 through September 2004.79 Of the 219 attacks, 135 were

suicide bombings and 84 were non-bombing suicide attacks. The non-bombing suicide

attacks included infiltrations and attacks with small arms.

77 Institute for Counterterrorism, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada- and Engineered Tragedy," [database on-

line]; available from http://www.ict.org.il/; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006.

78 Kepel, 125.

79 Michele K. Esposito,"The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations and Losses in the First Four Years.” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005).: 104.

From an economic point of view, suicide terror is a rational default for

organizations that lack a formal military infrastructure. Sources disagree about the cost

of conducting a suicide attack. Some claim one mission costs as little as $150, where as

others claim it could cost anywhere from $3,500 to $50,000.80 At any rate, the cost is

substantially less than maintaining a robust military capability or modern armed force.

For non-state actors, like the Palestinian political factions, suicide bombing and terror

tactics are economically rational alternatives to raising an armed force. The cost of a

suicide attack being not only substantially less than the cost of an armed force, but also

an effective tactic for killing a great number of people. According to the RAND/MIPT

terrorism knowledgebase, the total number of terror attacks in Israel and the Occupied

Territories from 2000 to 2005 was 2,345.81 These attacks killed a total of 1,260 people.

The knowledgebase shows that there were 141 suicide bombing attacks in Israel and the

Occupied Territories from 2000 – 2005, killing 705 individuals. While only accounting

for 16.6% of the terrorist incidents during this timeframe, suicide bombers were

responsible for over half of the deaths due to terrorist incidents.82 On average, five people

died for every one attack.

Of the 2,345 terrorist incidents in Israel and the Occupied Territories from 2000 -

2005, the top five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations only claimed responsibility for 797.

The remaining incidents were not claimed by any organization, but most are attributed to

one of the top four or five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. Nearly two-thirds of the

claimed attacks were from Hamas. Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade claimed

responsibility for over 18% of the attacks, PIJ accounted for nearly 13%, the PFLP

accounted for 5% and Hezbollah accounted for less than 1%.

Although suicide attacks have claimed the greatest percentage of terrorist

incidents within Israel, several of these organizations have also perpetuated a “war-like”

80 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 54.

81 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Terrorist incident Reports," [database on-line]; available from http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

82 Bruce Hoffman,"The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 5, June 2003 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200306/hoffmann; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006. As of 2003, suicide bombers accounted for less than 50% of the fatalities due to terrorist incidents in Israel and the Occupied Territories. This figure increased to almost 60% by 2006.

stance against the Israelis through the use of conventional arms. The number of mortar

and rocket attacks increased significantly, from only four rockets fired and 512 mortar

shellings in 2001, to 232 rockets fired and 1139 mortar shellings in 2004.

Figure 1. Mortar and Rocket Attacks during "Ebb & Flow" 2001 - 2004(information

from the Israeli Defense Force, 2004)83

2. Ideology and Actions of the Major Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist Organizations, 2000 – 2005 a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) The PFLP is best known for a series of airline hijackings throughout the

1960's and 1970's, but during the al-Aqsa Intifada the organization was a relatively minor

player in the resistance movement.84 Since PFLP’s founding in 1967, 40% of its targets

83 Israeli Defense Forces, "Mortar and Rocket Attacks During “Ebb & Flow" [database on-line];

available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

84MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," [database on-line]; available from http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

have been against private citizens or property.85 Currently, the PFLP has approximately

800 members and, like Arafat’s Fatah party, the group maintains a nationalist-separatist

ideology, but with a Marxist-Leninist social doctrine. PFLP leaders also rejected the

tenets of the Oslo Accords because Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist.

In 2001, Israeli security forces fired a missile into the Palestinian

controlled city of Ramallah in the West Bank. The attack killed the PFLP’s Secretary

General, Abu ‘Ali Mustafa. After his death, the military wing of PFLP was given his

namesake.86 In retaliation for the death of their Secretary General, the PFLP assassinated

Israel’s minister of tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi.87 After Ze’evi’s death “the Israeli security

cabinet approved Sharon’s request to launch ‘all-out war on the terrorists, those who

collaborate with them, those who send them’”88 The Israelis also began to hold the PA

more responsible for the actions of terrorist organizations operating within the Occupied

Territories.

In January 2002, a part of an effort to crack down on anti-Israeli militants,

the PA arrested the PFLP's new Secretary General, Ahmad Saadat, and four other ranking

members of the organization. This action strained the relationship between Arafat’s

Fatah party members and PFLP’s leaders89 as well as the disconnect between the PA’s

actions and Palestinian public opinion. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the number of

bombings conducted by the PFLP rose sharply in relation to its other tactics:

assassination and armed attacks, however, the total number of incidents conducted by the

PFLP remained relatively low compared to the other anti-Israeli organizations. In 2003

the number of bombings and assassination attempts fell, only to sharply rise again in

85 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine."

86 Amnesty International, “ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Without distinction - attacks on civilians by Palestinian armed groups,” [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020032002; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

87 Esposito, 89.

88 Ibid.

89 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).”

2004 and 2005 after Saadat’s arrest. The number of bombings increased significantly,

from only one in 2003 to 15 in 2005.

Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 - 2005

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

Arm ed Attack

As s as s ination

Bom bing

Figure 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 – 2005 (from the

RAND/MIPT database, 2006)

b. Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

In 1987, PIJ formed as an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood. PIJ espouses

a Sunni religious ideology, and has been closely associated with Hamas. The group’s

central leadership resides in Syria and Lebanon and has fewer than 1000 members. PIJ

has conducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli citizens,

and since its founding, 71% of PIJ attacks have been against private citizens or

property.90 It is estimated that PIJ receives approximately $2 million from Iran annually91

and continuous logistical support from Syria. From 2000 to 2004, the PIJ increased its

90 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” [database on-line];

available from http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=82; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

91 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”

number of lethal strikes, and the group tends to rely upon suicide bombing and attacks

with firearms.92 In April 2004, PIJ worked in conjunction with Hamas to attack IDF

soldiers in the Gaza Strip. In May, the IDF retaliated by destroying between 80 and 120

homes of homes of suspected PIJ and Hamas members.93 The next year there was a

remarkable increase in the number of PIJ-related bombing incidents against Israeli

targets. In 2005, the number of bombings had increased to 45, up from only four in 2004.

Numbe r of Te rrorist Incide nts by Cate gory, PIJ 2000 - 2005

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

Arm ed Attack

Bom bing

Kidnapping

Figure 3. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PIJ 2000 – 2005 (from the

RAND/MIPT database, 2006)

c. Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is a secular, nationalist-separatist

organization that formed in 2000. Since its inception, 95% of their attacks have been

against private citizens or property.94 The al-Aqsa Marytrs Brigade is closely linked to

Arafat’s Fatah party, which provides most of its financing. In 2002, the number of

92 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Group Profile: Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade," [database on-line];

available from http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

93 Esposito, 95.

94 Ibid.

terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade spiked. That year

Arafat is reported to have issued a statement urging the Palestinians to “comply with its

decision to refrain from carrying out any operation against Israeli civilians inside Israel

[emphasis added] even if they were in reprisal for the crimes of the occupation against

Palestinian civilians.''95 Fatah was unsuccessful at preventing Hamas or PIJ from

continuing terror attacks and accept a cease-fire agreement with the Israelis.

Contradicting their policies, later that year Fatah’s leadership adopted suicide bombing as

a "legitimate tactic in its strategy.'96 Because of this, Arafat was perceived by the Israeli

government as either not being able to control his people or playing a "dual game."

Furthermore, the Israeli government found it difficult to negotiate with Arafat on

conditions for a ceasefire.97 In January 2002, over 50 tons of weapons and explosives

aboard the Karine-A freighter were seized by Israeli forces. The freighter was believed to

be of Iranian origin, and destined to supply Fatah with enough explosives and rockets to

“the potential to imperil every city in Israel.”98 The affair resulted in a diplomatic

severance between the United States government and the PA. One month later, Israeli

Prime Minister Sharon visited the White House, and President George Bush issued the

following public statement,

Mr. Arafat has heard my message. I can't be any more clear about it, that he must do everything in his power to reduce terrorist attacks on Israel. And that -- at one point in time, he was indicating to us that he was going to do so, and then all of a sudden, a ship loaded with explosives show up that most of the world believes he was involved with.99

95 Amnesty International, “ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Without distinction - attacks on civilians by Palestinian armed groups” [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020032002; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

96 Jamal, 160.

97 Ibid.

98 “Arafat fires official over arms ship,” CNN, 28 January 2002, [on-line news]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/01/28/mideast/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 August 2006.

99 The White House, “President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon Discuss Middle East” [ database on- line]; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.html; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

From that point forward, the United States government, as well as the

Israeli government, held Arafat responsible for the violence perpetrated by all anti-Israeli

Palestinian terrorist organizations. Terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa

Martyr’s Brigade declined significantly in 2003, but resurged once again in 2004 and

2005.

Terrorist Incidents by Fatah by Category, 2000 - 2005

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

Arm ed Attack

As s as s ination Bom bing

Kidnapping

Other

Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Fatah 2000 – 2005 (from the

RAND/MIPT database, 2006)

d. Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas) Hamas formed in 1987 as an offshoot of the Sunni-dominant Muslim

Brotherhood. Literally meaning “zeal” in Arabic, Hamas opposes the recognition of

Israel as a state and urges a radical Islamic jihad. Although Hamas views the Israeli

problem as primarily religious, part of their strategy is purely social; the organization

advocates spreading knowledge about Israeli’s oppression though mosques and

educational institutions. Hamas also places an emphasis on “social solidarity” and has

capitalized upon a number of charitable organizations, wealthy donors and state-sponsors

to build up extensive social services.100

Since Hamas’s founding, 84% of their attacks have been against private

citizens or property.101 Hamas defines Israel and Western colonialism as “the enemy” of

the Palestinian people. Hamas leaders have continuously stated that they deny Israel’s

right to exist, and has refused to negotiate with the “Zionist” state.

Since 1993, Hamas has been a staunch opponent of the Oslo peace

process, and led the Palestinian resistance movement during the al-Aqsa Intifada in both

the number of successful attacks and the number of murdered Israelis. In order to entice

potential suicide bombers and terrorists, Hamas’s cadres have promised monetary

rewards and financial incentives to martyrs and their families. The Israeli government has

reported that “families of Hamas activists killed or wounded while carrying out terror

attacks – and those imprisoned for their involvement in such attacks typically receive an

initial one-time grant of between $500 and $5000, as well as a monthly allowance of

approximately $100.”102

It is estimated that Hamas’s budget ranges from $30 million to $90 million

per year.103 Hamas receives most of its funding from Iran, but its constituency is actively

involved in garnering financial support from charitable organizations, state-sponsors and

wealthy individuals. The organization also receives funding from the mosques, hospitals

and social institutions they support and protect. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas

offered medical support and assistance to Palestinian non-combatants caught in the

crossfire and left unaided by the bankrupt PA. During this period Hamas’s popular

support increased dramatically because they could be relied upon to bring relief and aid

to desperate Palestinian citizens.

100 Baumgarten, 40.

101 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hamas,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

102 Baumgarten, 59.

103 Levitt, Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad, 54.

From 2000 through 2005, Hamas's military branch, the Izz al-Din al-

Qassam Brigades, conducted assassinations, kidnapping, firebombing, arson and property

damage, as well as mortar shellings and Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli citizens.104

Hamas also authorized shootings, suicide bombings and standoff mortar-and-rocket

attacks against Israeli military targets.105 The incident that killed the most Israelis during

the al-Aqsa Intifada was a Hamas suicide bomber that killed 30 Israelis “at a Passover

meal in Netanya on 28 March 2002.”106 In 2004, the number of terrorist incidents

conducted by Hamas against Israeli targets increased over three-fold from the previous

year. This increase came primarily from a sharp rise in the number of bombings directed

at Israeli non-combatants. In 2003, Hamas claimed responsibility for 32 bombings,

where as in 2004, they claimed 198.107

Numbe r of Te rrorist Incide nts by Cate gory, Hamas 2000 - 2005

100

150

200

250

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

Arm ed Attack

As s as s ination

Bom bing

Kidnapping

Figure 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Hamas 2000 – 2005 (from the

RAND/MIPT database, 2006)

104 Institute for Counterterrorism, "Hamas," [database on-line]; available http://www.ict.org.il/ Internet; accessed 10 March 2006.

105 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hamas.”

106 Graham Usher, “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections” Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 35.

107 Ibid.

e. Hezbollah Hezbollah literally means “party of God” in Arabic. The organization

formed in 1982, and its main base of operation is in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is a

radical, Shiite organization, aimed at the destruction of Israel. Its primary sources of

financing come from Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is categorically unique from the major

Palestinian resistance groups in that it operates from outside of Israel and the Occupied

Territories. Since its founding, only 7% of Hezbollah’s attacks have been targeted

against private citizens or property.108 Hezbollah is credited with reintroducing suicide

bombing as a terror tactic when they directed a major attack against American and French

peacekeeping forces in Beirut in 1983, and continued to target the IDF in southern

Lebanon.109 “Lebanese Hezbollah had forced Israel to leave Lebanon by using suicide

bombers; the same tactic would now be applied in the al-Aqsa Intifada.”110 Unlike the

other anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, most of Hezbollah’s targets are either military or

diplomatic.111 Hezbollah is also well known for "its skill at manufacturing and placing

sophisticated roadside bombs."112 As Hamas does in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

Hezbollah provides extensive social services and pubic welfare projects for the residents

of southern Lebanon. Although Hezbollah was not a directly responsible for a wide

number of terrorist incidents during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the organization is credited with

providing indirect financial, logistical and intellectual support to the Palestinian

resistance movement. Hezbollah backed a number of terrorist incidents, and without

their contributions, many of the incidents could not have taken place.

108 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Group Profile: Hezbollah," [database on-line]; available from

http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 12 July 2006.

109 Shaul Kimhi and Shemuel Evan, "Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?" Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 816.

110 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 333.

111 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hezbollah.”

112 Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the Terror: Identifying and Countering the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups," SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 36.

D. CONCLUSION For the duration of the Palestinian resistance movement, the outcome of the

Palestinian leadership’s decision-making was governed by a complex process of

interrelated objectives. Overtime, and especially throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the

tension between secular movements and the Islamic fundamentalist organizations created

chaos and a lack of control over political outcomes. This tension was only exacerbated

by the continuous ousting of Palestinian leadership. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the

secular-nationalist Fatah party and the Islamic-fundamentalist Hamas and PIJ factions

continued to jockey for control of Palestinian public opinion. The lack of control over

internal decision-making has been perceived by the Israelis the Palestinians’ inability to

govern their own people, when in actuality, frustrated Palestinians simply sought political

control over the Israelis as well as themselves.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the top four anti-Israeli terrorist organizations

contributed to a significant proportion of the terrorist incidents within Israeli territory. At

times, these groups competed with each other over the number of terrorist incidents they

could impose on the Israeli people. By group, Hamas caused the greatest number of

incidents, followed by Fatah, PIJ and the PFLP (Figure 5). Hezbollah has contributed to

the funding of many of the incidents, but was not held directly responsible for any

significant events during the 2000 through 2005 timeframe.

Numbe r of Te rrorist Incide nts in Israe l by Ye ar

100

150

200

250

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

al-Fatah

Ham as

PIJ

PFLP

Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization September

2000 – December 2005 (information from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. ISRAELI STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL- AQSA INTIFADA

What is at stake today is nothing less than the survival of our civilization.

- Benjamin Netanyahu113

A. INTRODUCTION This chapter describes strategies and tactics used by the Israelis to counter

terrorist activity during the al-Aqsa Intifada. It opens with a background on Israel’s

comprehensive defense strategy and the Israeli government’s philosophy on

counterterrorism technique and practice. In terms of tactics, this chapter addresses the

Israeli polices of targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments,

administrative detention and prosecution, border controls, technological advances, and

controls on terrorist financing. It concludes with a generalization of Israeli

counterterrorist efforts in terms of official policies, authorized actions and organizational

effectiveness.

In order to survive as a nation-state, the Israelis have developed a distinctly

aggressive defense posture. In order to prevail, the nation seeks to avoid war by political

means and a credible deterrent posture, to prevent escalation, to determine the outcome of

war quickly and decisively, and to keep casualties low.114 The nation has a two to three

year mandatory conscription for all citizens (male and female) aged 18 and over.

Citizens remain in reserve status for 25 years after their service obligation has been

fulfilled, and in essence, nearly the entire country could be mobilized for war.

Furthermore, the Israelis have built a social structure upon which there is “extensive

participation of civilians in the military effort.”115 Thus, the civil-military relationship in

113 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), xii.

114 Israeli Defense Force, “Doctrine.”

115 Daniel Maman, et. al, Military, State, and Society in Israel (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 402.

Israel is intertwined in such a manner that it has become an attribute of the Israeli

national character.116

The Israelis have developed a number of strategies and tactics to counter the

Palestinian resistance movement and terrorist threats from outside organizations. One of

the basic tenets of Israeli military doctrine is that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is

postured to combat terrorism.117 Israel's perception of the Palestinian resistance

movement is that some organizations loyal to the Palestinian nationalist movement or in

opposition to Israel in general are conducting "terrorist" attacks.

At the strategic level, the Israelis exhibit three central characteristics.118 First, the

Israelis maintain a position of strength. This is typically characterized by a robust

defense capability and military infrastructure.119 The Israelis have also built a system of

"passive" defense. This involves the "extensive use of watchmen and undercover security

personnel, careful scrutiny of all individuals approaching likely targets. . .on-site security

systems, and heightened alertness of the civilian population."120 The nation’s perimeter

defense system includes fortified outposts, minefields, and IDF patrols along

transportation routes.121 The nation’s passive defense also includes an extensive network

of human intelligence (HUMINT). This network of spies and collaborators provides

early warning to the IDF on potential attacks.122 Second, the Israelis maintain constant

pressure on terrorist organizations. From a military standpoint, the pressure typically

comes in the form of frequent air raids and ground attack operations. Last, the Israelis

have a history of only coming to the bargaining table when the terrorist elements are in a

116 Maman, 410.

117 Israeli Defense Forces, "IDF Doctrine" [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il;

Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

118 Shlomo Gazit, "Israel" in Combating Terrorism, Strategies of Ten Countries ed. Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 233.

119 Ehud Barak, "2010: The Challenges to Global Security,”Janes Defense News, December 22, 1999, [journal on-line]; available from http://www.janes.com/defence/news/2010/991222_f_barak.shtml; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

120 Netanyahu, 27.

121 Catignani, 250.

122 Ibid.

weakened state.123 Consequently, the Israeli leadership tends to negotiate with the

Palestinians only after a series of IDF counterattacks.

At the tactical level, official Israeli policies vary. Several of the tactics used by

IDF soldiers and security police are condemned by the international community because

of their severity. The most common Israeli tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada included

targeted assassinations, the demolition of Palestinian homes in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip, administrative detention, border control mechanisms, defensive technological

advances and controls on terrorist financing.

B. ISRAELI TACTICS 1. Targeted Assassinations

Israel has a long history of state-authorized, targeted assassinations. Dozens of

militants and innocent bystanders have been killed in this way since 2001, when Israel

first officially acknowledged its "liquidation" of terror suspects as a state policy.124

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli military forces killed dozens of suspected terrorists

affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah, and the PFLP.125 The exact data on the number of

Palestinians that have been assassinated varies by source. According to the Journal of

Palestine Studies, during the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis

assassinated a total of 273 individuals and killed an additional 170 bystanders during

assassination attempts.126 The Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, reported that

from 29 September 2000 through 14 March 2006, 338 Palestinians were killed during the

course of a targeted killing while only 215 Palestinians were the actual subject of a

targeted killing.127 According to the Journal of Palestine Studies, by group, during the al-

Aqsa Intifada the IDF killed 119 Hamas members, 96 affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyr's

Brigade or al-Fatah, 35 PIJ members and 23 from either the PFLP, PA intelligence or

123 Gazit, 233.

124 UN Human Rights Watch News, "Israel: End 'Liquidations' of Palestinian Suspects (29 January 2001),” [database on-line]; available from http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2001/01/29/isrlpa204.htm; Internet; accessed 12 July 2006.

125 Ibid.

126 Esposito, 121.

127 B'Tselem, "Statistics: Fatalities," [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

another affiliation.128 The U.N.’s Human Rights Watch estimates that in 2005, over 20

Palestinians were killed in assassinations or extra-judicial killings.129

In August 2001, IDF used Apache helicopters to kill PFLP leader Abu ‘Ali

Mustafa.130 The attack was a direct response to a Palestinian attack on IDF soldiers in the

Gaza Strip, and the PFLP’s purported history of car bombings and armed attacks in the

West Bank. After Mustafa’s death, the PFLP renamed its military branch in honor of the

slain leader, and retaliated by killing the Israeli minister of tourism. Mustafa’s death was

the first assassination of a major Palestinian leader during the al-Aqsa Intifada. His death

marked a series of Palestinian retaliations, and Israeli counterattacks on high-profile

Palestinian leaders.

During the next two years, the Israelis continued to assassinate lower-level

members of terrorist organizations. The next major attack on a Palestinian core leadership

was took place in 2003. In September of that year, Israeli F-16's dropped a quarter-ton

bomb in the Gaza Strip, trying to target Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.131 This

incident was perceived to be a retaliation for a Hamas attack on a ship in the Israeli port

of Ashdod. Hamas’s attack, funded by Hezbollah, killed 10 Israeli civilians, but was

designed with the intent to kill several hundred more. The incident provoked the Israeli

government into targeting all of Hamas’s leadership. In March 2004, Yassin and seven

others were killed when an Israeli helicopter launched Hellfire missiles into the al-Sabra

neighborhood in Gaza City.132 The next month, Israeli security forces killed Hamas's

spiritual figurehead Abdel Aziz Rantisi.133 In September 2004, Hamas political official

128 Esposito, 121.

129 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2005 [book on-line] (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 455; available from http://hrw.org/wr2k5/; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006.

130 Michele Esposito, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations and Losses in the First Four Years,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005):114.

131 "Sheikh Ahmed Yassin” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2005 [online news]; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/review/people_full_story.asp?service_id=7499; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

132 "Game Time in Gaza,” Al Jazeera, October 4, 2005 [online news]; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_ID=9738; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

133 Jewish Virtual Library, "Abd al-Aziz Rantissi," [database on-line]; available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Rantissi.html; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

Izz al-Din al-Sheikh Khalil "was killed in a bomb blast in his car in Damascus."134 Later

that year, the IDF also killed prominent Hamas political and military leaders: Mahmud

Zahar,135 Imad Abbas 136 and Adnan al-Ghoul.137

Israel’s policy of targeted assassinations has come under severe scrutiny by

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Moreover, scholars and Arab

politicians have also denounced the West’s support of Israel, despite the Israeli

government’s refusal to abandon the policy. The assassinations have not thwarted

number of attacks by the host organizations, nor do they have history of ending the

terrorist organization’s existence. To the contrary, the attacks may have provoked an

even stronger response by Palestinian terrorist organizations.

2. Home Demolitions and Collective Punishment

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has responded to Palestinian

attacks with several large-scale military operations designed to destroy homes and places

of business. Part of those operations included incursions into the Gaza Strip and West

Bank to destroy the homes of families of suicide bombers. The program also included

imposed closures and curfews as well as random checkpoints in Palestinian-controlled

areas.

The first major military operation designed at curtailing Palestinian terror attacks

was launched in March 2001.138 Code named "Operation Bronze," the plan was designed

to bulldoze Palestinian land, quarantine "troublesome" areas, restrict Palestinian

movement and strengthen Israeli settlements.139 From February 2002 through October

2004, the IDF conducted 13 major operations and incursions into Palestinian population

134 "Hamas member escapes Damascus attack,” Bahrain Tribune Daily News, December 12, 2004

[online news]; available from http://www.bahraintribune.com/ArticleDetail.asp?CategoryId=2&ArticleId=54303; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

135 Esposito, 119.

136 Uri Dan, "Blast Master Killed," New York Post, 22 October 2004, p. 16.

137 Ibid.

138 Esposito, 87.

139 Ibid.

centers. The military endeavors were designed to demolish terrorist infrastructures in the

West Bank and southern end of the Gaza Strip near Egypt.140 During the operations the

IDF destroyed hundreds of homes, businesses, agricultural lands and roads.

The actual number of homes that have been demolished is disputed. According to

the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, from

October 2001 through January 2005 "Israel demolished 668 homes in the Occupied

Territories as punishment."141 In contrast, the United Nations Human Rights Watch

(HRW) and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA) estimates that from 2000 - 2004 the Israeli military demolished over 2,500

Palestinian homes in Gaza Strip alone.142 In economic terms, the total Palestinian losses

from the damage are estimated to be between $3.2 billion and $10 billion.143

Israel has also used a tactic of "collective punishment" in order to retaliate against

Palestinian terrorists. According to the United Nations, collective punishment involves

being "punished for an offense. . .not personally committed"144 and "collective penalties

and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."145 In response to

a terrorist attack during the Israel Passover holiday in 2002, the IDF launched a

"collective punishment" code named Operation Defensive Shield. Operation Defensive

Shield involved the mass arrest of suspected terrorists from the West Bank towns of

Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah. Many of the suspects were then held in military

prison camps or detainment facilities without trial.

While issuing the collective punishments, the Israelis have also killed numerous

non-combatants. On September 29, 2004, the IDF launched a three-week incursion into

140 UN Human Rights Watch, "Missing Rafah, Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip," [database

on-line]; available from http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/gaza/#_ftnref3; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

141 Ibid.

142 UN Human Rights Watch, "Missing Rafah, Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip."

143 Health Development and Information Project (HDIP), "Four Years of Intifada; Statistical Overview (29 September 2004)," [database on-line]; available from http://www.hdip.org; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

144 International Committee of the Red Cross,"International Law Resources, 4th Geneva Convention."

145 Ibid.

the Gaza Strip designated Operation Days of Penitence.146 According to the Israelis the

operation was a response to a Qassam rocket attack against the Israeli city of Sderot.147

Hamas purported that the Israeli operation was designed to kill Palestinians in the Gaza

Strip, and that they did not launch any Qassam rocket attacks until October 7, 2004 after

nine days of resistance.148 During the operation, Hamas claims to have killed 41 Israelis

by Qassam rocket attacks.149 The IDF is estimated by the MIPT Terrorism knowledge

base and Hamas to have killed 132 Palestinians150 but of the 132, only 68 were believed

to be members of a terrorist organization.151

Israel's home demolition policies and collective punishments are in violation of

international law. According to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is

prohibited from destroying Palestinian property.152 Furthermore, Article 53 states that

"any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging

individually or collectively to private persons…is prohibited."153 In 2005, the Israeli

Minister of Defense announced the "cessation of punitive house demolitions" 154 but

thousands of Palestinians were still left without a place to live. This policy has also

exacerbated the refugee problem, and it causes economic hardship on the countries that

accept Palestinian refugees. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits the detention of

146 Ben Lynfield, "Gaza clash tests withdrawal plan," Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 2004, 6.

147 Ibid.

148 Palestinian Information Center, “Hamas Statements 2004,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.palestineinfo.info/arabic/hamas/statements/2004/15_10_04.htm; Internet; accessed 12 September 2006.

149 Ibid.

150 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Israel: 2004 Overview," [database on-line]; available from http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

151 Ibid.

152 International Committee of the Red Cross, “International Law Resources, 4th Geneva Convention,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.icrc.org/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

153 Ibid.

154 B'Tselem, "House demolitions as punishment," [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/English/Punitive_Demolitions/Statistics.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

individuals without trial; therefore the Israel government’s mass arrest of suspected

terrorists is also a clear violation of customary international law.

3. Administrative Detention and Prosecution According to Amnesty International, administrative detention "is a procedure

under which detainees are held without charge or trial. No charges are filed, and there is

no intention of bringing a detainee to trial."155 The Israelis have a policy of administrative

detention in order to curtail terrorist attacks. Amnesty International reports that, as of

March 14, 2006, over 600 Palestinians were being administratively detained.156 "Most

of them are held in military camps such as the Ofer Military Camp, the Ansar 3 Ketziot

Military Camp157 and the Megiddo prison camp.158 Until recently, most of the detention

camps were being run by the IDF.159 There have been also reports that the prisoners are

not being held in accordance with international legal standards. Moreover, the Israeli

Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories has documented

several cases of abuse and torture.160

In terms of how to treat detainees, the UN has developed an international standard

in its Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment (CAT). The CAT was ratified by Israel 1991.161 This treaty states that “no

exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal

political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of

155 Amnesty International, "Administrative Detention," [database on-line]; available from

http://www.amnesty.org; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Tidhar Ofek, "Megiddo Prison expansion unlocks door to Christian past," Jerusalem Post, 6 November 2005, p. 1.

159 Yigal Grayeff, "IDF turns over control of Ketziot to Prisons Service," Jerusalem Post, 2 March 2006, p. 7. The Megiddo prison camp was turned over to the Israeli Police Service (IPS) in February 2005, and Ketziot camp was turned over to the IPS in March 2006.

160 The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, "Torture of Palestinian Minors in the Gush Etzion Police Station (July 2001),” [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/Download/200107_Torture_of_Minors_Eng.doc; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

161 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (9 June 2004),” [database on-line]; available from http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; accessed 18 March 2006.

torture.”162 In terms of prosecution, some legal scholars argue that terror suspects should

be denied habeas corpus. Others claim that no individual should be denied the right to a

fair trial. The UN has also developed an international standard in regards arrest and trial.

ICCPR states that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." Further, the

ICCPR states that, "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and

shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."163 The Israelis ratified the

ICCPR in 1992.164 Israeli standards at the detention camps and the denial of habeas

corpus have the nation in violation of several international legal standards. To the

contrary, the UN has not instituted a legal consensus on what precisely constitutes

torture. This gap allows the Israelis to claim that they are following their own

interpretation of the law. According to Israeli domestic law and the law applying to the

Occupied Territories, "administrative detention is lawful."165 The Israelis claim that

suspects are taken to a judge within eight days of arrest, and a judge then decides whether

or not to prolong the detention.166

4. Border Controls The Israelis have been reluctant to negotiate on the status of their borders. This is

due to several religious, military and economic reasons. The Israelis claim a religious

affiliation with the Holy City of Jerusalem as well as the surrounding territory. For

religious reasons, they believe that they have a legitimate claim to rule over the land. The

Temple Mount in Jerusalem is the holiest site in Judaism and the entire region has

historical significance to the Jewish people.

162 United Nations Treaty Series, “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part I, Article 2, 26 June 1988,” in National Security Law Documents ed. John Norton Moore, et. al. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1995), 613.

163 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9," [database on-line]; available from http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; Internet; accessed 18 March 2006.

164 Ibid.

165 B'Tselem,"Administrative Detention," [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp; Internet; accessed 18 March 2006.

166 Ibid.

From a military standpoint, loosing control over any border puts the small nation

into a vulnerable position. For instance, relinquishing the Golan Heights to neighboring

Syria could jeopardize the Israelis' ability to conduct an early-warning system against a

surprise attack. The nation has built radars on Mount Hermon, the highest point in the

Golan Heights region. "If Israel withdrew from the Golan and had to relocate these

facilities to the lowlands of the Galilee, they would lose much of their strategic

effectiveness."167 From a military point of view, the West Bank is important because of

its central location. If Israel were to completely surrender the West Bank to the

Palestinians, it would limit the Israelis' access to the Jordan River and drastically reduce

the nation's constricted width. The Gaza Strip is important because of its proximity to the

Egyptian border. The Israelis believe they need control of the area in order to curtail

arms trafficking and weapons distribution to militant Palestinian organizations.168 Israeli

access to the Gulf of Suez in the south is a strategic military and economic position. From

an economic point of view, Israel’s desire to control the headwaters of the Jordan River

in the north has been source of tension for its neighbors.

The Israelis are world renowned for their border control inspectors, agents and

their ability to manage the movement of individuals, conveyances and vehicles inside

their territory. One border control mechanism the Israelis have implemented as a result

of the al-Aqsa Intifada is a wall along the Green Line that separates the West Bank from

the rest of Israel. First proposed in June 2002, the wall was designed to curtail the ability

for suicide bombers to come into Israel from the West Bank. It was also designed to help

the Israelis find a way to "keep a Jewish majority within its borders."169 The border

mechanism was intended to “be a combination of fences, walls, ditches, patrol roads and

electronic surveillance devices."170 The wall has carved off about 2% of the West Bank

from the Palestinian side of the Green Line. According to the World Bank, this land

167 Jewish Virtual Library, "Defensible Boundaries," [database on-line]; available from

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Boundaries.html; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

168 Moshe Sharvit, "The Military and Security Implications of Israel's Disengagement from the Gaza Strip," Strategic Assessment 8, no. 3 (November 2005): 9.

169 David Makovsky, "How to Build a Fence," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 50.

170 "Israel building fence along the West Bank,” CNN, June 18, 2002 [online news]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/17/mideast/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

contained approximately 16 Palestinian villages and 12,000 residents. Thus, the wall

traps Palestinians between Israeli territory and the Green Line, it restricts freedom of

movement, and it annexes Palestinian lands and water resources.171

Another border control mechanism is a policy of restricted zones. In March 2002,

following an escalation of Palestinian violence, the IDF turned many West Bank towns

into "restricted military zones, with residents under sustained curfew for days at a

time."172 The economic affect was daunting- "all non-humanitarian goods had to be off-

loaded from incoming trucks and re-loaded onto local trucks at eight checkpoints near

major West Bank cities."173 This took additional time and manpower. The restrictions

also applied " more rigorously to manufacturers and traders attempting to move goods out

of Palestinian cities than to those bringing goods in from Israel."174 The checkpoints

restrict the freedom of movement from homes to places of work, and force the

Palestinians to rely upon the Israeli security guards for passage into other areas.

5. Technological Advances Not all of the Israelis' counter-terror measures have been offensive in nature.

There are a number of technological advances the Israelis have made in countering

terrorism in a defensive manner. Northrop Grumman developed a Mobile Tactical High-

Energy Laser (M-THEL) designed to protect Israel from Hezbollah’s Katyusha-type

171 PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “Israel’s Wall,” [database on-line]; available from

http://www.nad-plo.org/facts/wall/WallMagazine%207-2005.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 July 2006.

172 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months -- Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment [book on-line] (Jerusalem: World Bank, 2003), xiii; available from http://lnweb18.worldbank org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/27+Months+of+Intifada,+Closures/$File/27+months+Intifada,+Closures... An+Assessment.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006.

173 Ibid., xiii.

174 Ibid.

rockets fired from inside Lebanon.175 During the M-THEL's testing phase, it shot down

25 Katyusha rockets before they hit their targets.176

Israeli scientists have also proposed technological initiatives to track the

movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals. Israel has adopted biometric

passports which "free travelers from the need for a signature and identifying themselves

with an electronic chip."177 Israeli scientists have also developed devices that can identify

an explosive commonly used by bomb makers. The device can detect a chemical

component common in bombs developed by Palestinian terrorists. The U.S. government

has done extensive work with the Israelis in testing the explosive trace detection

technology. The Israelis have successfully implemented the explosive trace detection at

border checkpoints to thwart potential terrorist attacks by suicide bombers.

6. Controls on Terrorist Financing A second defensive measure at countering terrorist activity is to "constrict the

operating environment in which terrorist raise funds."178 Terrorist financing typically

comes from charitable donations or state sponsors. In order to coerce the PA into

submission, in 2002, Sharon began restricting the amount of tax revenue they received

back from the Israeli government.179 The Israeli government also increased the tracking

on terrorist financing and each organization's access to economic resources. In 2002, the

IDF "hauled tons of documents from Palestinian government offices, homes, businesses,

and local charities, and then shared the papers with other governments and media."180 The

175 Steve Rodan, "THEL hits Katyusha-type rocket in first Test" Janes Defense News [journal on- line]; available from http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw000612_1_n.shtml; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

176 Defense Update, "Mobile/Tactical High Energy Laser (M-THEL) Technology Demonstration Program," [database on-line]; available from http://www.defense-update.com/directory/THEL.htm; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006.

177 Zvi Singer, "Israel Adopts Biometric Passports," Israel Business Arena, 24 March 2005, p.45.

178 Levitt, Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad, 33.

179 Catignani, 255.

180 Marc Perelman, "Hamas's Banking Handmaidens," National Journal 38, no. 11 (March 2006): 46.

documents revealed "a sophisticated financial infrastructure that reached from Saudi

Arabia to Ramallah via Europe and the United States."181

Due to the complexity of terrorist financing, controlling it requires extensive

involvement with other nations. For instance, in 2003 the United States and several

European countries froze the assets of a Hamas front organization, the al-Aqsa

International Foundation, because it was funding Palestinian resistance fighters.

Furthermore, a number of charities and companies are under investigation in the United

States and Europe for their suspected involvement in funding Palestinian

organizations.182 State support of terrorist organizations is more difficult to control.

Some nations simply provide safe havens or logistical support to terrorist enclaves.

Others give direct funding.183 Most of the funding for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations

comes from Iran. It has not been possible for the West to negotiate with the Iranian

regime, thus anti-Israeli terrorist organizations have had unrestricted access to their

funds.

C. ISRAELI STRATEGY 1. General Policy and Outcomes Israel's counter-terrorist policies can be categorized as a hard-line, and a form of

war. Israel's policies do little to address the "root causes" of terrorist activity. Instead,

the Israeli government takes a proactive stance in response to terrorist activities. The

Israeli strategy throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada has been an “ad hoc” approach, and

retaliatory method of responding to the terrorist threat using the IDF and launching a

series of military operations.

The Israeli government has implemented a number of specific policies designed

to counter terrorist activity. The Israeli government has instituted the use of security

forces and moderate political reforms. To the contrary, the Israelis have done little in the

way of ceasefires, negotiations or improving economic conditions. There has been little

done in the way of official ceasefires or negotiations during al-Aqsa Intifada because the

181 Perlman, 46.

182 Ibid., 53.

183 Levitt, Hamas, 33.

PA's leadership is unable to control the terrorist factions and Israeli policy makers do not

negotiate with terrorist organizations.

The economic conditions in the Occupied Territories are grim. After the outbreak

of the al-Aqsa Intifada, economic development plans for the West Bank and Gaza Strip

that were conceived during the Oslo peace process were hindered by Israeli security

procedures.184 According to the World Bank, from 2000 to 2003 the Palestinian

population increased from 3.1 million to 3.4 million. On the contrary, gross national

product (GNP) decreased from $5.2 billion to $3.8 billion. Gross national income (GNI)

per capita decreased from $1,750 to $1,120 over the same period.185

The Israelis have made several legal changes during the al-Aqsa Intifada. In

terms of changes in legislation, the Israel court approved a governmental policy to

transfer family members of those involved in terrorism from the West Bank to the Gaza

Strip.186 The Israelis also adopted a Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law, where

Palestinians who live under "Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

are considered residents of a "conflict zone." As such, they are denied the right to claim

liability for death, injury, or damage to property inflicted on them by Israeli forces."187

2. Organizational Effectiveness One method of measuring a government’s effectiveness is to assess, "overall

command and coordination structure, legitimizing measures must be taken by the

government to build public trust and support, coordination between intelligence service,

and foreign collaboration among governments and security forces."188 This approach

measures the performance of the counter-terrorist organization as a precondition for the

effectiveness of a specific policy.

184 Peter Lagerquist, “Privatizing the Occupation: The Political Economy of an Oslo Development

Project,” Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 5.

185 World Bank Group, "West Bank and Gaza Data Profile," [database on-line]; available from http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

186 Kenneth Mann, "Judicial Review of Israeli Administrative Actions Against Terrorism: Temporary Deportations of Palestinians From the West Bank to Gaza," Middle East Review of International Affairs 8, no. 1 (March 2004): 25.

187 Amnesty International, "Israel/Occupied Territories: Amnesty International condemns discrimination passed by the Israeli Knesset (28 July 2005)," [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org; Internet; accessed 27 July 2007.

188 Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, v.

In terms of bureaucratic competence, the Israeli government has demonstrated

superior organizational effectiveness. The Israelis have instituted a parliamentary

democracy, which operates under a unicameral legislature and a Prime Minister. The

Israelis have a functioning command and coordination structure, which acts to detect,

track and preempt attacks. The Israelis also have one of the most sophisticated armed

forces in the world. In 2005 the Israeli government spent approximately 7.7% of its GNP

($9.45B in defense spending).189 The Israelis are world renowned for the effectiveness of

their intelligence services, their foreign collaboration among governments and their

ability to exploit human intelligence and disseminate that information amongst all their

security services.

In terms of legitimizing measures taken by the government to build public trust

and support, the Israelis have not demonstrated the same amount success as they have in

other areas. In order for a state that in order for a government to build public confidence

in counter-terror activities, ‘legitimizing’ measures must be taken. These include

measures such as, “political concessions to ethnic or religious minorities, economic

measures to ameliorate housing and employment inequities or deficiencies; [and]

defensive steps to protect the public from terrorist reprisals.”190 These measures “deprive

the terrorists of their legitimacy, undermine their claims as a viable alternative to the

government, negate popular support or sympathy for the terrorists, [and] redress popular

grievances that may directly fuel unrest or be exploited for antigovernment purposes.”191

D. CONCLUSION During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli tactics and strategies varied. Several of the

Israeli tactics were in clear violation of international law. Amnesty International and the

UN Human Rights Watch Commission have condemned the Israeli government for their

practices of detaining suspected terrorists without trial and demolishing the homes of

Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Israeli defensive

countermeasures, such as biometrics and high-energy lasers, are some of the most

189 CIA World Fact Book, “Israel.”

190 Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, 4.

191 Ibid.

sophisticated and advanced pieces of technology in the world. Israel’s overall

counterterrorism strategy during the al-Aqsa Intifada was organized, sophisticated and

well-monitored. The Israelis have put a great deal of effort into their counterterrorism

program, and are likely to continue to do so into the future.

IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

- T.E. Lawrence, 1920192

A. INTRODUCTION This chapter gives a background on the general methodological approaches which

have been designed to measure counter-terrorism’s effectiveness. It then uses the Israeli

case to measure their government’s effectiveness during the al-Aqsa Intifada. First it

assesses three qualitative measures of effectiveness. These include: the overall number

of terrorist incidents, a quantitative assessment suicide bombers that were apprehended

by Israeli defense or security forces before they acted and injury and fatality rates. The

next section looks at three qualitative indicators of government effectiveness. These

include: social attitudes in Palestine and Israel, decisions by the terrorist organization to

abandon their strategy, and alterations in terror tactics. This chapter concludes with an

assessment of whether or not the Israelis have been successful or unsuccessful at their

counterterrorism efforts according to quantitative and qualitative indicators.

B. BACKGROUND Several methodological approaches have been designed to measure counter-

terrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which approach is most

valid. A November 2005 U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed the

challenge of measuring effectiveness. The author of the report states that governments

may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators to access effectiveness, while

ignoring qualitative indicators.193 The report shows that the problem with quantitative

indicators is that they do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying

sentiments of a terrorist organization). Quantitative indicators also fail to capture the

192 T.E. Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Devon, UK: 1920),

37.

193 Perl, 7.

asymmetry of terrorist attacks. For instance, the volume of attacks may decrease, but the

number of people killed may still be disproportionately large. Furthermore, an over

reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-like changes in terrorist

organizations. On the other hand, qualitative indicators are difficult to measure and may

not be as reliable or precise.

C. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS 1. Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents The reliance on quantitative indicators is apparent in the scholarly literature on

general measures of effectiveness. Intuitively, quantitative indicators are a logical

method of determining whether or not terrorist incidents have increased or decreased, and

are a first resort to determine whether or not counterterrorist measures have been

successful. Quantitative indicators can be used to measure counterterrorism's

effectiveness using a time-series analysis.194 According to some researchers, if the

amount of terrorist violence decreases over time, then counterterrorism policies have

been successful. Taking this approach, and looking at the Israeli situation from 2000

through 2005, there have been "ebbs and flows" in the number of general terrorist attacks,

but the overall number of attacks has gone down since peaking in 2002. According to the

MIPT terrorism knowledgebase, there were 19 incidents in 2000, 85 in 2001, 108 in

2002, 75 in 2003, 30 in 2004 and 76 in 2005 (Figure 6). The year 2002 saw the greatest

number of terrorist incidents, followed by a decline in 2003 and 2004, and a slight rise

again in 2005.

Looking at the number of terrorist incidents, year by year, suggests that the

Israelis may have implemented some effective countermeasures in 2003 and 2004, but

that those measures were no longer as effective in 2005. On the other hand, it is difficult

to ascertain whether or not the Israelis have been actually effective or not by simply

looking at the data. This is because, although the number of actual incidents has varied,

it is impossible to know how many incidents were actually stopped before the incident

took place. For instance, the as a total percentage of terrorist attacks, in 2005 the Israelis

194 Perl, xii.

may have thwarted a greater number that year than in 2004, although the total number of

incidents that year increased.

Figure 7. Total Number Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year, 2000 – 2005 (data compiled from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

The data on attempted and thwarted terrorist attacks is limited; however, the

journal Terrorism and Political Violence kept a record of the number of attempted attacks

by Palestinian suicide bombers from September 2000 through May 2004. According to

the journal, there were 274 attempted terrorist attacks during this timeframe. Out of the

274 attempts, only 142 actually blew themselves up. The remaining 132 bombers were

captured by Israeli security personnel before they acted.195 Likewise, the IDF made a

direct correlation between their military operations Defensive Shield and Determined

Path, taken in March/April 2002, and the immediate decrease in the number of successful

terrorist attacks. The IDF also believes that their security barrier in the West Bank also

may have been tactical success at thwarting suicide operations by Palestinian terrorists.

195 Kimhi, 817.

After the initial construction of the fence began, the number of suicide attacks intercepted

by the IDF increased and the number of victims of suicide attacks decreased (Figure 7).

Figure 8. Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts October 2000 -

November 2004 (information from the Israeli Defense Force, 2006) 196

2. Injuries and Fatalities A second quantitative indication of whether or not a counter-terrorism strategy or

policy has proven successful is a decline in the number of casualties and death rate due to

terrorist incidents. The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied

Territories (B’Tselem) shows a similar pattern in the frequency of Palestinian attacks on

Israeli civilians that resulted in a death. B’Tselem’s data shows that, in total, 662 Israeli

196 Israeli Defense Forces, "\Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts " [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

citizens were killed by Palestinian terrorists from September 29, 2000 through December

31, 2005.197 The Center’s reports show that there were 151 Israeli civilian deaths in

2001, 272 in 2002, 129 in 2003, 69 in 2004 and 41 in 2005. To the contrary, the MIPT

Terrorism knowledgebase shows there were 110 fatalities due to a terrorist incident in

2001, 329 in 2002, 174 in 2003, 65 in 2004 and 27 in 2005. Although there is some

variation in the numbers, the databases show a similar pattern. The number of Israeli

fatalities due to terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and continued to decline over the next

three years. The MIPT terrorism knowledgebase also shows a similar patter in the

number of Israeli injuries due to terrorist incidents. The number of injuries peaked in

2002, followed by a sharp decline during the next three years.

Buy simply looking the time-series, quantitative analysis of fatalities and injuries;

it appears that whatever strategies the Israelis were using, they were effective. The

number of fatalities and the number of injures due to terrorist incidents declined.

Moreover, these numbers continued to decline in 2005, even though there was an

increase in the number of terrorist incidents that year.

197 B'Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities."

Number of Israeli Fatalities and Injuries due to Terrorist Incidents

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of P

eo pl

B'Tselem (civilian fatalities)

MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase (fatalities) MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase (Injuries)

Figure 9. Number of Israeli fatalities and injuries due to terrorist incidents, January 2001 - December 2005 (information from the B'Tselem Israeli Information Center for Human

Rights in the Occupied Territories and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, 2006)

A decline in the number of injuries or fatalities will not necessarily correspond to

a decline in the overall number of terrorist incidents, as one incident may injure a wide

number of individuals. For this reason, in order to assess counterterrorism’s

effectiveness, one may also look at “the number of deaths related to the number of

incidents.”198 Using that approach, and assessing the four major anti-Israeli terrorist

organizations during the al-Aqsa Intifada (Hamas, PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP), there is a

remarkable decline in the average number of fatalities per terrorist incidents in Israel over

the 2001 through 2005 time period. The ratio of fatalities to incidents for each of the

major terrorist organizations peaked in 2002, and each declined significantly in the years

following (despite increases in the number of incidents during the same period). This data

suggests that the Israelis have not only been the volume of attacks, but indicates they may

have been able to thwart the effectiveness of the attacks.

198 Bonner, 200.

Ratio of Fatalities per Terrorist Incident

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of F

at al

iti es

p er

In ci

de nt

Fatah Hamas PIJ PFLP Total

Figure 10. Ratio of Israel Fatalities to Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and

Organization, January 2001 – December 2005 (information compiled from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

This data shows that Hamas, the leader the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations in

the number of attacks it conducted during the al-Aqsa Intifada, was also the most

effective. In 2002, Hamas killed an average of 10.2 Israelis per terrorist incident, where

as the average number of deaths per incident for all anti-Israeli terrorist organizations that

year was roughly seven. From 2001 through 2005, Hamas killed an average of 5.58

Israelis and injured an average of 27.3 per terrorist incident. This compares to an overall

average of 4.36 Israeli deaths and 22.5 injuries per terrorist incident over the same period.

D. QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

A second major category in terms of analyzing a nation’s counter-terror methods

is to assess measures of effectiveness from a qualitative point of view. Due to the nature

of these types of indicators, they are difficult to quantify. Qualitative measures of

effectiveness include normative social behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of

organizational disintegration.

1. Social Attitudes

Social attitudes can be assessed by looking at the “negative psychological or

behavioral impact of terrorism on a society, loss of public confidence in governments, or

in their security measures, and the degree to which terrorists are able to radicalize and

polarize.”199 The JCSS’s public opinion data is available for the 2000 through 2003 time

period. The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) and the Palestinian

Center for Public Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) have collected data regarding

general Palestinian attitudes and trends during the al-Aqsa Intifada, and their data is

available for the timeframe between 2000 and 2005.

Two questions that JMCC has asked the Palestinians consistently during the 2000

through 2005 timeframe include: “In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel

towards the future?” and “Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose,

or strongly oppose the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip?” Overtime, there were only slight variations in the ways the Palestinians responded

to the questions. According to the data collected by the center, the Palestinians felt the

most pessimistic about the future in December 2003. They felt the most optimistic about

the future in December 2005, but the data was relatively unchanged. Palestinian

responses to the second question also varied, but over time, support for the al-Aqsa

Intifada waned slightly and opposition slightly increased. On the other hand, according to

PCPSR, there was a dramatic shift in Palestinian public support of the groups conducting

the terrorist incidents. Palestinian public support for the more radical Islamic political

parties, Hamas and PIJ, was approximately 17% in 2000, before the al-Aqsa Intifada.

That figure increased to 35% by the summer of 2004.200 During that same period, support

for Arafat's secular Fatah party decreased from 37% to 28%.201 This suggests that during

the al-Aqsa Intifada the Islamist groups gained more legitimacy and popular support with

the Palestinian masses.

199 Perl, 11.

200 Khalil Shikaki, "The Future of Palestine," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004): 46.

201 Ibid., 46.

During the first three years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the JCSS tracked

several Israeli social attitudes. These include, but are not limited to: policy statements by

Israeli political figures, Israeli opinions on the likelihood of war and peace, the mood

over public safety, opinions on the condition of the country, and general agreements

regarding peace treaties. Like the data on Palestinian public opinion, much of the Israeli

public opinion remains unchanged during the first few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For

instance, the JCSS’s data shows that in 2001, 60% of Israelis believed a Palestinian state

would be established within the next five years. That number only increased by one

percentage point by 2003.202 Similarly, Israeli attitudes regarding perception of public

safety and bureaucratic competence only vary by a few percentage points during the first

few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the other hand, Israeli public opinion shows a large

shift in how they view government policy in the Occupied Territories. In 2002, 57% of

Israelis thought government policy was “too soft;” 9% thought it was “correct” and 34%

thought it was “too harsh.” One year later, only 29% thought the policy was “too soft;”

13% thought it was “correct” and 58% thought it was “too harsh.”203 This shows that,

within a one year period, nearly one-quarter of the Israeli population shifted to believe

their government’s policy in the Occupied Territories was “too harsh.” In these surveys,

the second largest shift came in Israeli public opinion when asked whether or not the

peace process should be abandoned even if it might lead to war. In 2000 this figure was

24%; by 2002 this number had gone up to 27% and fell to 18% by 2003. In a one year

period, between 2002 and 2003, nearly one in 10 Israelis changed their mind on the issue

of whether the peace process should be abandoned. More believed that it should not be

abandoned.

2. Alterations in Terror Tactics One method of determining whether or not counter-terror measures have had an

impact on an organization is to look for alterations in terrorist tactics. A change in tactics

indicates organizational adaptation or adjustments. According to the RAND/MIPT

database, the proportion of terrorist attacks on Israeli targets from 2000 through 2005

202 Arian, 12.

203 Ibid., 34.

altered significantly. The number of armed attacks and assassinations peaked in 2002,

where as the number of bombings increased eight-fold over the same period. This could

indicate that bombings were successful; therefore they became more popular as a terror

tactic. It could be also an indication that the other methods were costly, or difficult to

implement, or that the Israelis became successful at thwarting armed attacks,

assassinations and kidnappings, but were less successful at stopping bombers.

Figure 11. Major Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Tactic, 2000 – 2005 (Information complied from the information from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

3. Organizational Disintegration Counterterrorism policies that are successful at the tactical level often have a

negative long-term impact at the strategic level. One way to measure whether or not a

counter-terror policy has been effective is to look at whether or not the targeted

organization still has the “ability to attain its stated political ends."204 A second method

along this line of reasoning is to assess whether or not there has been a "physical defeat

of the extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and

204 Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 31.

Major Terrorists Incidents by Tactic

100

150

200

250

300

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

N um

be r

of In

ci de

nt s

Armed Attack Assassination Bombing Kidnapping

organizational disintegration."205 By this measure of effectiveness, the Israelis have not

been successful because none of the major terrorist groups were completely destroyed.

To the contrary, despite several years of collective punishments, administrative

detentions, targeted assassinations and home demolitions, Hamas, Fatah, PIJ, the PFLP

and Hezbollah continue to conduct routine attacks against Israeli citizens.

E. CONCLUSION It is difficult to state whether or not the Israelis’ counterterrorism strategies and

tactics, as a whole, have been successful or unsuccessful. The quantitative and

qualitative measures of effectiveness indicate several trends. First, the overall number of

terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and declined during the next three years. The overall

number of terrorist incidents by terrorist organization also peaked that year. Injury and

fatality rates also follow the same trend line. Both peaked in 2002, and declined

thereafter. Israeli defensive measures, like the wall, appear to have thwarted a large

number of attacks, but it did not prevent the Palestinians from attempting to carry out an

attack. To the contrary, 2003 saw the greatest number of attempted attacks.

In terms of qualitative measures, during the al-Aqsa Intifada Palestinian public

opinion shifted in favor of the more radical, Islamic organizations. Likewise, during this

timeframe, there were no solid decisions by the terrorist organizations to abandon their

strategies. This indicates that the organizations did not disintegrate, but that they remain

active. Israeli public opinion remained relatively unchanged, but a significant proportion

of the Israelis believed that their government’s actions were “too harsh.” The al-Aqsa

Intifada also saw significant alterations in the tactics used by the terrorist organizations.

Bombing and suicide-terror increased as tactics, although overtime those tactics became

relatively less effective.

205 Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 70.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins? - Sun Tzu206

A. INTRODUCTION This study offered a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and

tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005. It then analyzed Israel's

specific strategies and tactics against scholarly measures of effectiveness in order to

generalize the Israeli approach to counterterrorism. The analysis done in this case study

revealed that the Israelis are generally “hard-liners” when it comes to their counter terror

strategy. Instead of looking at “root causes” they tended to respond to actions taken by

the terrorist organizations with counterattacks. The Israelis typically view

counterterrorism as a military matter, and they have an “ad-hoc” approach towards their

military planning. This study also assessed data concerning major terrorist attacks and

how government decision making and the military response mechanism has thwarted

potential attacks. Specifically, it looked at the range of Israel's counter terror policies and

how they measure in terms of both tactical and strategic categories and quantitative and

qualitative measures of effectiveness. This study found that the number of terrorist

attacks, as well as the number of Israeli causalities and fatalities peaked in 2002. The

number of attacks fluctuated over of the next three years, however; the number of Israeli

casualties and fatalities both decreased over the same period

B. FINDINGS During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis used a broad range of tactics and

strategies. The Israeli case offers several insights regarding counter-terror strategy and

tactics. Due to the scope, intensity and length of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a study of the

206 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 92.

Israeli’s strategies and tactics would be a valuable to any other government involved in

countering terrorist threats, guerrilla or subversive war or sustained, unconventional

warfare.

At the tactical level, the Israelis can provide some insights with regard to

countering a resistance movement. Israel’s border controls and offensive operations

appear to have limited the number of suicide bombers that were able to carry out an

attack. Barriers between regions and security checkpoints are often effective in the short

run. The lessons learned in Israel may be applied in other regions. For instance, U.S.

forces are struggling to counter the terrorist threat from radical Islamic organizations like

al-Qaeda. From a strategic point of view, the sectarian violence in Iraq and Afghanistan

does not match the Israeli-Palestinian model. Iraq and Afghanistan are also much larger

territories, and U.S. forces, for the most part, are not indigenous to those areas. On the

other hand, there are some tactical similarities between the two situations. Iraqi

resistance forces are fighting from urban centers, and by relying on suicide bombings and

improvised explosive devises their actions do have some semblance to the tactics used by

the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations.207 Policy makers and government officials could

benefit from research on defensive measures such as technological initiatives, like the

explosives detection portals developed by General Electric and Smiths Detection.208

Advances in technology, such as the M-HETL, explosive trace detection and biometrics

may also prove to be effective tactics, in the short run.

C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas led the Palestinian resistance movement in

terms of the volume of attacks, and the number of Israelis they killed. In 2006, the

political party Hamas won a majority 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats in the PA's

207 Council on Foreign Relations, "Iraq: Quelling the Insurgency (23 September 2004),” [database on-

line]; available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/7635/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Kenneth Katzman is quoted as stating that "The insurgency is now driven mainly by Islamists. There are some foreign fighters, but the engine of this is Iraqi Islamists mirroring the tactics of al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.”

208 Glenn Johnson, interview by author, transcript, Monterey, CA, 5 April 2006. MAJ Glenn Johnson is in the U.S. Army's Special Forces. He worked with the U.S. government's Technical Support Working Group, explosive subdivision.

parliamentary elections.209 The political success of Hamas was a strategic

accomplishment for the organization; it legitimized their claims as representatives of the

Palestinian people and brought international attention to their victory. Hamas’s victory

also marked the triumph of Islamic fundamentalism over national-secularism. Hamas is

now demonstrating many state-making characteristics that the PLO once held:210 war

making (demonstrated in armed resistance against rival organizations), state making (in

terms of social services provided to the Palestinians), protection (as shown in the

protection of the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression) and the extraction of

monetary resources though international financing, charitable donations and terrorist

networks.

The Palestinians’ move away from a secular-nationalist ideology and towards one

that promotes jihad, is a dangerous situation for the Israelis. As a radical Islamist

organization, Hamas's 2006 political victory constitutes one of the biggest obstacle to

peace in the region. Not only has Islamic fundamentalism's growth and radicalization

presented one of the most significant challenges to modernity and globalization, as well

as the social order established democratic countries, but it has undermined the spread of

secularization and modernity. Hamas has refused to accept the preeminence of the PA in

decision making.211 As a terrorist organization, the main difficulty for the newly elected

Hamas government will be in dealing with Western policy makers. The Hamas

government faces grim political consequences, as many Western democracies also adhere

to a doctrine of not negotiating with terrorists. In doing so, they are inclined to cut off

economic aid and political support to terrorist regimes. In Palestine, this many only serve

to intensify, and further radicalize, the resistance movement.

209 Aaron D. Pina, "Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality," CRS Report for

Congress, 3 March 2006.

210 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In eds. Theda Skocpol, et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181. In this article Tilly lists several characteristics of a "state." Tilly shows that a state typically engages in: war making, state making, protection and extraction.

211 Samah Jabr, "New Hamas Government Trumps Old PLO," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 25, no. 4 (May/June 2006): 13 – 14.

D. CONCLUSION As the Israelis have shown, short term tactical effectiveness does not solve the

root causes of the terrorist problem. When thwarted, terrorist organizations will look for

an alternate means of attacking a superior power. Israeli's two most extensive military

operations, Defensive Shield and Determined Path, appeared to be tactically successful

because of the subsequent reduction in the frequency of Palestinian attacks. On the other

hand, while the measures that the IDF took were mostly designed to counter suicide

bombers, the number of mortar and rocket attacks from the West Bank increased over the

same period. This may have been because the suicide attackers were being thwarted, so

an alternate method of attack was implemented. Likewise, in 2004, the IDF targeted a

significant proportion of Hamas’s core leadership. Despite the loss of their top leaders,

Hamas won political elections only two years later. Israeli actions during the al-Aqsa

Intifada are a clear indication that successful tactical measures are not necessarily

successful strategically. There is little reason to assume that any of the tactics the Israelis

have used will undermine the will of resistance fighters in the long run. In order for

tactical measures to be successful, there must also be a parallel strategy that addresses the

root causes of the conflict.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Aburish, Said. Arafat; From Defender to Dictator (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998).Amnesty International. "Administrative Detention." [database on-line]; available from http://www.amnesty.org; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. __________. "Israel/Occupied Territories: Amnesty International condemns discrimination passed by the Israeli Knesset (28 July 2005)." [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org; Internet; accessed 27 July 2007. __________. “ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Without distinction - attacks on civilians by Palestinian armed groups.” [database on-line]; available from

http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020032002; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

Amos, John. Palestinian Resistance, Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New

York: Pergamon Press, 1980). “Arafat fires official over arms ship.” CNN, 28 January 2002 [on-line news]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/01/28/mideast/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 August 2006. Arian, Asher. “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002,” (Tel Aviv, Israel:

Jaffee Center For Strategic Studies, 2002). __________. “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003,” (Tel Aviv, Israel:

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003). Barak, Ehud. "2010: The Challenges to Global Security.” Janes Defense News, December

22, 1999. Journal on-line. available from http://www.janes.com/defence/ news/2010/991222_f_barak.shtml; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

Baumgarten, Helga. “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948 – 2005.”

Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no.4 (Summer 2005). Bickerton, Ian J. and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). Bloom, Mia. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Bonner, David. "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism." Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992).

Brown, Derek. "Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi: Leader of Hamas for just 25 days, he fought for a free Palestine" The Guardian, 19 April 2004, Guardian Leader Pages, p. 19. B'Tselem. "Administrative Detention." [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp; Internet; accessed 18 March 2006. __________."House demolitions as punishment." [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/English/Punitive_Demolitions/Statistics.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006. __________."Statistics: Fatalities." [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Catignani, Sergio. “The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicide Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1 – 2 (Winter 2005). CIA World Fact Book. “Israel.” [database on-line]; available from

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html#Geo; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006. __________. "West Bank and Gaza Strip.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006. Council on Foreign Relations, "Iraq: Quelling the Insurgency.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/7635/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Crenshaw, Martha. "How Terrorism Declines." in Terrorism Research and Public Policy ed. Clark McCauley, (Portland, OR: Cass, 1991). __________."Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." Journal of Strategic Studies (Special Issue) 10 (1987): 13-31 __________."The logic of terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a product of strategic choice." in Origins of Terrorism, Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1992). Crelinsten, Ronald D and Alex P. Schmid. "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty- Five Year Balance Sheet." Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992).

de Wijk, Rob. "The Limits of Military Power" in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004). Defense Update. "Mobile/Tactical High Energy Laser (M-THEL) Technology Demonstration Program." [database on-line]; available from http://www.defense- update.com/directory/THEL.htm; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006. Della Porta, Donatella "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case." in Western Responses to Terrorism eds. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinstein (London: Cass, 1993). “Documents and Source Material, ‘Resolutions of the Thirteenth Palestine National Council Article 11.’” Journal of Palestine Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977). Esposito, Michele K. "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations and Losses in the First Four Years.” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005). Gal-Or, Noemi. "Countering Terrorism in Israel" in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in 6 Countries. ed. David A. Charters (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994). "Game Time in Gaza.” Al Jazeera, October 4, 2005 [online news]; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/cgibin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?servic e_ID=9738; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006. Ganor, Boaz. "A New Strategy Against the New Terror." Policy View (Jerusalem: The Shalem Center, 1995), 7 - 10. __________. “Israel’s Counterterrorism Policy: 1983-1999” PhD Dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2002. Gazit, Shlomo. "Israel" in Combating Terrorism, Strategies of Ten Countries ed. Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005). "Hamas member escapes Damascus attack.” Bahrain Tribune Daily News, December 12, 2004 [online news]; available from http://www.bahraintribune.com/ArticleDetail. asp?CategoryId=2&ArticleId=54303; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006. Health Development and Information Project (HDIP). "Four Years of Intifada; Statistical Overview." [database on-line]; available from http://www.hdip.org; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

Hewitt, Christopher. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).

Hoffman, Bruce and Jennifer Morrison Taw. "A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992). Hoffman, Bruce."The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 5, June

2003. Journal on-line. Available from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200306/ Hoffmann; Internet: accessed on 17 July 2006.

Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2005.” [database on-line];

(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), available from http://hrw.org/wr2k5; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

__________. “Razing Rafah Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip,” Database on-line. Available from http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/gaza/; accessed on 10 March 2006. Institute for Counterterrorism. "Hamas." [database on-line]; available from http://www.ict.org.il; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006. __________. "The Al-Aqsa Intifada- and Engineered Tragedy." [database on-line]; available from http://www.ict.org.il/ Internet; accessed 10 March 2006. International Committee of the Red Cross. “International Law Resources, 4th Geneva Convention Article 53.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.icrc.org/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. "Israel building fence along the West Bank.” CNN, June 18, 2002 [online news]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/17/mideast/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006. Israeli Defense Forces. "IDF Doctrine." [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006. Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. "Torture of Palestinian Minors in the Gush Etzion Police Station.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.btselem.org/Download/200107_Torture_of_ Minors_Eng.doc; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Hanieh, Akram. “The Camp David Papers,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001).

Jabr, Samah. "New Hamas Government Trumps Old PLO." The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. 25, no. 4 (April/May 2006). Jamal, Amal. The Palestinian National Movement (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 2005). Jewish Virtual Library. "Abd al-Aziz Rantissi." [database on-line]; available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Rantissi.html; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006 __________. "Defensible Boundaries." [database on-line]; available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Boundaries.html; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006. __________."United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.” [database on-line];

available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unres242.html; Internet; accessed 17 May 2006.

Joes, Anthony James. Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1992), 5. Johnson, Glenn, Major US Army. Interview by author, 5 April 2006, Monterey.

Transcript. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2003). Kimhi, Shaul and Shemuel Evan, "Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?" Terrorism and Political Violence, 16, no. 4 (Winter 2004), 816. Lagerquist, Peter. "Privatizing the Occupation: The Political Economy of an Oslo Development Project," Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003), 5. Lawrence, T.E. "Evolution of a Revolt" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Devon, UK: 1920). Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). __________. "Untangling the Terror: Identifying and Countering the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups" SAIS Review 24, no.1 (Winter 2004), 36. Makovsky, David. "How to Build a Fence" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004). Maman, Daniel. et. al, Military, State, and Society in Israel (New Brunswick: Transaction

Publishers, 2001).

Mann, Kenneth. "Judicial Review of Israeli Administrative Actions Against Terrorism: Temporary Deportations of Palestinians From the West Bank to Gaza" Middle East Review of International Affairs 8, no. 1 (March 2004). MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “Group Profile: Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade” [database on-line]; available from http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3855; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006. __________. “Group Profile: Hamas.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006. __________. "Group Profile: Hezbollah." [database on-line]; available from http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 12 July 2006. __________."Israel: 2004 Overview." [database on-line]; available from http://www.mipt.org; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. __________. “Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=82; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006. __________. “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)." [database on-line]; available from http://www.mipt.org ; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006. Mishal, Shaul. The PLO under 'Arafat, Between Gun and Olive Branch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986). Navot, Suzie. "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War against Terror" European Public Law 9, no. 3, (July – September 2003). Netanyahu, Benjamin. Fighting Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9." [database on-line]; available from http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; accessed 18 March 2006. __________. "Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; accessed 18 March 2006.

Palestine-UN. “Statement of Proclamation of the Organization (28 May 1964).” [database on-line] available from http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/doc_three.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006. Palestinian Information Center. “Hamas Statements 2004,” [database on-line]; available from http://www.palestineinfo.info/arabic/hamas/statements/2004/15_10_04.htm; Internet; accessed 12 September 2006. Perelman, Marc. "Hamas's Banking Handmaidens" National Journal 38, no.11 (March 2006), 46. Perl, Raphael. "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness" CRS Report for Congress 23 November 2005. Pina, Aaron D. "Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality" CRS Report for Congress 3 March 2006. PLO Negotiations Affairs Department. “Israel’s Wall.” [database on-line]; available from http://www.nad-plo.org/facts/wall/WallMagazine%207-2005.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 July 2006. Quainton, Anthony C. "Terrorism: Policy, Action and Reaction" in Perspectives on Terrorism. eds Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985). Riley, Jack and Bruce Hoffman. Domestic Terrorism, A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). Rodan, Steve. "THEL hits Katyusha-type rocket in first Test." Janes Defense News

[journal on-line]; available from http://www.janes.com/defence/news/ jdw/jdw000612_1_n.shtml; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

Rodman, David. "Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview" The Middle East Review of International Affairs 5 no. 3 (September 2001). Russak, Crane. Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: Taylor & Francis Inc., 1989). Sharvit, Moshe. "The Military and Security Implications of Israel's Disengagement from

the Gaza Strip." Strategic Assessment 8, no. 3 (November 2005). "Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2005 [online news]; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/review/people_full_story.asp?service_id=7499; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

Shikaki, Khalil. "The Future of Palestine" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004).

Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,

2001). Sun Tzu. The Art of War trans Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). “The Speech of Yasser Arafat, Palestine at the United Nations.” Journal of Palestine Studies 4, no. 2 (Winter 1975): 192. The White House. “President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon Discuss Middle East” February 2002 [database on-line]; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.html; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006. Tilly, Charles. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” in Bringing the State Back In. eds. Theda Skocpol, et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). “Transcript: Ariel Sharon Interview.” FOX News, January 2, 2002, [on-line news];

available from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,41997,00.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006.

Tripp, Charles. "Sayyid Qutb" in Pioneers of Islamic Revival ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 2005). UN Human Rights Watch News. "Israel: End 'Liquidations' of Palestinian Suspects (29 January 2001).” [database on-line]; available from http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2001/01/29/isrlpa204.htm; Internet; accessed 12 July 2006. __________. "Missing Rafah, Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip." [database on- line]; available from http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/gaza/#_ftnref3; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006. United Nations Treaty Series. “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Part I, Article 2. 26 June 1988, ed. John Norton Moore, et. al. National Security Law Documents (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1995), p. 613.

United Nations. “Geneva Conventions, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,” Article 17. 12 August 1949, ed. John Norton Moore, et. al. National Security Law Documents (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1995), p. 199. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) on Palestinian's Rights, 1974. U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). U.S. Department of State. Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism; 1985 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986). U.S. Joint Forces Command. Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2004). Usher, Graham. “Fatah’s Tanzim: Origins and Politics,” Middle East Report 217 [journal

on-line]; available from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_usher.html; Internet; accessed on 29 July 2006.

__________. “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections,” Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 35. World Bank. Twenty-Seven Months -- Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic

Crisis: An Assessment [book on-line] (Jerusalem: World Bank, 2003), xiii; available from http://lnweb18.worldbank.org; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006.

World Bank Group. "West Bank and Gaza Data Profile." [database on-line]; available from http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bishop, Joseph W. "Legal Measures to Control Terrorism in Democracies," in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed. International Terrorism: Challenge and Response (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981). Cohen, Eliot. Knives, Tanks & Missiles, Israel’s Security Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998). Cordesman, Anthony H. The Military Balance in the Middle East: The Arab-Israeli Balance. (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). Davis, Paul K.and Brian Michael Jenkins. Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2002). Farrell, William Regis. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism, In Search of an Effective Strategy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). Heymann, Philip. Terrorism Freedom and Security, Winning Without War (Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press, 2003). Horovitz, David. Still Life With Bombers (New York: Random House, 2004). Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Berkeley,

CA, 1985). Karsh, Efraim. Between war and peace: dilemmas of Israeli security (Portland, OR: F.

Cass, 1996). Laquer, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2003). Martin, John R. Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002). Maoz, Zeev Defending the Holy Land? A Critical Assessment of Israel’s National Security and Foreign Policy, 1949-2004. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005). Peretz, Don. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

Pillar, Paul. Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001). Quainton, Anthony C. "Terrorism: Policy, Action and Reaction" in Perspectives on Terrorism. eds Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985). Riley, Jack and Bruce Hoffman. Domestic Terrorism, A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). Rodman, David. "Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview" The Middle East Review of International Affairs 5 no. 3 (September 2001). Tal, Israel. National Security: The Israeli Experience (Westport, CT: Preager, 2000). Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” from Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California

3. Institute for National Security Studies United States Air Force United States Air Force Academy, Colorado