6-7 page paper on Lebanon government Instructions are below -- we will discuss price

· All political regimes need citizens need to follow the rules (citizens obedience)

· Various ways to achieve the outcome

· These methods (like the varieties of autocracies) also matter’

Coercion and Surveillance

· What we commonly think of as means of control

· Observation, force, torture, harassment

· Or widespread purges, indiscriminate terror

· Secret police as political tool to enforce

Why don't all autocracies use coercion

· Not a moral or ethical objection

· Rather, a cost-benefit analysis

· Coercion is effective but costly

· Better to somehow convince people to follow rules on their own

· Creation of political legitimacy

· Other forms of control rely on legitimacy instead of coercion (highly effective, costly, inefficient) – for more non-democracy has more to do with

Cooptation

· Bringing potential challengers into a dependent relationship

· To appropriate as ones own

· pre-empt a challenge

· Recognize someone who feels different in a certain issue, you coop them

· Helps avert threats to regime stability or existence

· Co-opt rival political leaders

· Co-opt citizens (dependent on regime for provision of key benefits

· Present in democracies, but widespread in nondemocratic rule

Methods of cooptation

· Corporatism

· Limited number of state-sanctioned organizations

· Private organizations allowed

· Organizations connected directly to state

· Clientelism

· “Patron client relationships”

· Less structured method

· Public exchanges political support for specific favors or benefits

· Rent-seeking: parts of state “rented out” to supporters

· Can degenerate into “kleptopcracy”-rule by theft- steal

Why do non-democracies persist?

· A preliminary caveat

· What does this question about the “natural state” of the world?

· Is this so?

· Turn our theories o democratization around to ask why non-democracies might persevere

· Modernization and Nondemocratic Rule

· Lipset reversed

· Emerge: lack of sufficient preconditions

· Endure: poor democracies unlikely to last

· Alternative versions

· Been thinking about “democracy” but we should care about “stability”

· Is the degree more important than form?

· Modernization is uneven and causes instability

· Instability creates openings for strong leaders who can institute nondemocratic regimes to restore order

· Always probabilistic theories

Historical Institutionalist

· Emphasis on how coalitions among groups or classes shape regimes

· Emphasizes “agency” in regime outcomes – the decisions people make

· Elite centered explanations

· Highly unequal societies often reinforce nondemocratic rule

· Larger gulf between rich and poor makes democracy “more dangerous” for the rich

· Basis in u.s political development

Elite arguments, cont:

· Elite capture of economic “rents” limits democracy- excess returns to profit

· “Resource curse”

· Sometimes they collect revenues they do not earn

· Boston tea party in reverse

· Basis for provision of goods and services without taxation

· No need for modern economy or middle class, thwarting modernization

· Facilitate repression

Collective Action Theories

· Rational calculations and personal incentives can explain persistence of repressive regimes

· Individuals have a few incentives to risk repression

· Might even have strong incentive to not participate

· “free rider” problems – individuals have an incentive to let other people do all the work for them – do not engage

· In absence of effective coordination, regime remains intact

Why do dictators try so hard to look like democrats?

Elections in Dictatorships

· Many dictatorships spend a great deal of effort establishing (what look like) the institutional features of democracy

· Some of these efforts are comical…

· But others are not so transparent…

· Malaysias one party autocracy wins only 56% of vote in 1999

· Zimbabwe’s Robert MUgb

· Either way, this is a puzzle

· Perhaps elections are just “window dressings”

· But even so, why do some autocrats choose to dress their windows

· How do autocrats manage the electoral process so tht they can still win?

But for many dictatorships…

· Elections retain an element of competition

· Raises a series of important questions

1. How should we describe authoritarian regimes with democratic features

2. Why do such features exist

Russia under Vladimir Putin helps answer these questions

1. How do we describe these regimes?

· Zakarias opening story.. moment of democratic triumph

· Yelstin gave Russia elections, but also…

· Fired regional governors

· Undercut courts…

· Weakened the legislative branch

· Appointed Vladimir Putin as acting president, rendering scheduled elections meaningless

· A new model: the popular autocrat (picture)

· Illiberal democracies: mixing elections with authoritarianism

· Deomocratic mechanisms exist, but are weakly institutionalized

· Parties, elections and individual rights and liberties exist (in varying degrees) but are not the ‘only game in town’

· Executives ten to hold tremendous power

· Turkeys first president Erdogan

· “Powers a Latin American Dictator could only dream of” (opposition party leader)

· Politicization of state institutions and media

· Argentina- has had persistent financial diffuclites for last 15years

· Critical economist audited 4 times in 5 years

· Had to correct $160 of expense reimbursements

· Venezuela

· Independent television news station was refused renewal of operating license

· Critical newspaper bought in hostile takeover by business leader with close ties to government

· The “rule of law” is weak

· Selective avoidance

· Regime insiders above the law

· Selective enforcement

· “for my friends, anything. For my enemies, the law” (perus president Benavides, mid 20th century)

· In Russia- pass a new law that if you attend an unsanctioned demonstration you have to pay a fine of $9,000 of U.S

· NGO’s who receive foreign funding must register as “foreign agents”

· Constitutions not binding

· Constitutionalism under fire in Russia

· Prohibition on more than two consecutive terms

· Existence of dual-executive system enables Putin to install crony, yet keep reigns of power

· In 2012, Putin elected to third, but non-executive term as President

· Legal by the letter of the law though not the spirit

· A puzzle…

· Puttins main aim is clear- to retain power

· Yet there are easier ways to do this than hold regular, relatively competitive elections

· Moreveer, Putin has shown willingness to use coercion, cult of eprsonaluty tatcics

2. Why do dictators even bother with democratic institutions

· Elections as a tool of co-optation

· …of opposition leaders

· forcing opposition party to play by the rules (and lose) helps manage the threat

· …of opposition of citizens

· Generates information about citizens’ preferences

· Useful for targeting/punishing particular blocks of voters

· Russian govt transfers examples

· An example from Venezuela

· In 2003 petition drive to recall Presiden Hugo Chavez

· Chavez wins his recall vote

· Petition names become part of “Maisanta” list, which is widely circulated as “enemies list”

· Managing the uncertainty of election outcomes

· Core features of illiberal democracies helps ensure victory, even if election I competitive

· Campaigning advantages

· High barriers to entry and control over candidate selection

3. what explains the rise of illiberal democracies?

· Russia specific explanations

· Legacy of authoritarian rule limits pro-democratic developments

· One thousand years of authoritarian rule?

· Tsarism (derived from Ceasar)

· “your majesty’s lowliest slave” –peter the Great, late 1600s

· continues under Volsgeviks in Russian Revolution (1917) and the USSR

· Political culture effects?

Explanations of Russia’s Illiberal Democracy

More generally…

· Liberal democracies require genuine economic development

· Modernization theory and its nuances

“rents” and Authoritarianism – oil rents gone up- quality of Russian democracy gone down

Are these regimes democratizing “backwards”?

· Two components to liberal democracy

· Historical sequence? Liberal to competitive

· Illiberal democracies sequence?

China: the persistence of one-party rule

Very Different Styles of Non-Democracy

· One-party rule- power concentrated in hands of single party

· Chinese communist party (ccp)

· Today, very little evidence of “cult of personality”

· How does the system work? And how does this matter?

Brief Back ground..

· Ancient and successful civililzaition, but by 1800’s global power receding

· Key debate becomes “How should China modernize”

· Two opposing views

· Nationalis view

· Communist party (ccp)

· Chinese civil war in 1940s results in CCP victory

· Mao Zedong

China under Mao and his successors

· China today looks very different form Mao’s vision

· Mao- periods of revolutionary change and embrace of communist economic development

· Some successes but not notable disasters too

· Maos successors reverse course when it comes to economics

Chinas Political Institutions

1. Parallel organization

a. Duplication of agencies (govt and party) – it is the party side prevails

b. CCp side prevails

i. General secretary

ii. Politburo standing committee

iii. Politburo

iv. Nomenklautra – to million posititions

c. Examples

i. Xi Jinping

1. Pres of the prc

2. General sec of the ccp

ii. Li keqiang

1. Premier

a. State council standing committee head

2. Top-raking member of Politburo standing committee

iii. From which position do they derive their power? Postion in the communist party not the govnt

2. Power flows from the top down

a. Examples

i. “if all goes as planned…” Xi JInping will be general secretary

ii. Politburo “elections” are uncontested

iii. National party congress elect 370 central committee members… out of a pool of about 370 candidates

Will China Democratize?

· For some versions of Moderniation theory, Chinas stuborn authoritarianism is a puzzle

· Economic progress is uneven- and associated with rising in equality.

Mexico and the Breakdown of One –Party Rule

One –Party Rule comes in a variety of flavors

· Many ways a single political party can monopolize power

· Banned? Excluded in some other fashion?

· Degree to which party relies on cooptation versus coercion (or other methods)

· C-optation

· Making people dependent on organization for benefits

· Degree to which it co-exists with variety of institutionalized democratic mechanisms

Mexico’s One party Rule

· Institutionalized Authoritarianism in Mexico

· Mexico- formal democratic institutions strengthen non-democratic one-party rule

· Driven by a single party

· Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI)

· 71 years in power (1929-2000)

Was Mexico a democracy under PRI?

· On paper- yes

· Constitutional structure

· Elections and turnout

· Rights, liberties, relatively strong human rights

· In practice- No

· Competitive struggle for peoples vote?

· Presidential elections 1917-1988- average of 89% for PRI

· Political rights

· A few notable exceptions

“The Perfect Dictatorship”

Who wielded the power in Mexico?

· US style institutions

· In practice- extreme power in the office of the president

· Super-Presidentialism

· Domination of Congress, legislative process and courts

· Until 1990s, Congress never rejected a Presidential bill

What explains Super-Presidentialism?

1. Single-term Congressional Elections

a. Would you care about your own constituency or your future?

2. President always chooses successor

a. The “dedazo” or “big finger”

b. Historical legitimacy

3. Presidential power of appointment

a. Federalism but power to appointment state officials

4. More generally : co-optation of elites and citizens

a. Elites who broke mold punished

b. Citizens increasingly dependent on regime for public goods, services; becomes politicized process

The Breakdown of One Party Rule

No such images in Mexico

· Two general typs of transitions

· Abrupt vs. evolving

· Mexicos type?

Key question: why did the PRI stop winning elections?

1. Modernization, economic development, and declining effect of co-optation – they’re less dependent

2. Periodic economic crisis – they became better off – what did Huntington say about 3rd wave of legitimacy – bargain between govt and citizens

3. Demonstration effect

a. By 1990- almost every Latin American country held competitive elections

4. Electoral and Political reform

a. 1977- Reform part creation rules

b. Reserved legislative seats for opposition

c. Lowered the cost of entry for new parties

d. Motives?

1988 Presidential Election

· Sitting President –Miguel de la Madrid

· Neo-liberalism splits the party

· “the dedazo” -> Carlos Salinas

· A challenger – Cuahtemmoc Cardenas

· Song of past president

· Former PRI member

· Took advtange of economic situation and created own party

· Cardenas polling extrmeley well

· “technical difficulties” delayed announcement

· Recount impossible because ballots “misplaced”

Fraud for the first time

· Even so, Salinas onlywon about half of all votes

· Leads to the creation of independent federal election commission

· Decades later, Madrid admits fraud

· Autobiography

Democracy in Mexico

· PRI loses 2000 Presidential election

· Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party (PAN)

· 2006 Presidential elections

· Contentious election, disputed result

· 2012 elections…the PRI wins

Comparative lessons between China and Mexico?

· Chinas sequencing more favorable than model of illiberal democracy?

· Pre-existing (and, for the most part, well functioning) democratic institutions aided Mexico’s transition

Personal Rule and Neo-Patrimonialism in Africa

· “Africa is a nation tat suffers from incredible disease”

· “Africa was a country on the brink of complete meldown”

Of course, Arica is not a country!!!!!!!! It is a continent

· A regionally dominant form of non-democracy

· Personal Rule, or neo-patrimonialism

· Commonality lets us talk Regionally

Politics in Africa: Regional Trends

What Kind of non-democracy did (does?) Africa have…

· In general, authoritarianism has been “personal”

· Power concentrated in individual leader

· Absence of both constitutionalism/rule of law and democratic mechanisms

· Classic form of non-democracy

· Ceasers, Tsars,Kinds , Emperors

· Africa -> “Big Man”

· Reflects a very different way of creating political legitimacy

Webers three types of legitimacy

1. Rational –legal legitimacy- based on system of laws and procedures

a. Not the person but the office that matters

2. Traditional- historical myths and legends tie the past to present

3. Charismatic – individual magnetism that creates following through ideas

Personal rule is not drive by legal-rational legitimacy

· A tradition argument

· “Democracy is not for Africa. There was only one African chief and he ruled for life” Mobutu (1984)

· A charismatic argument …

· Julius Nyerete, Leopold Senghor (Tansania Senegal)

· Most often, personal rule in Africa was driven by logic of patrimonialsm

Patrimonialism, defined

· An example from your own life…

· Create legitimacy (and authority) through personal position, power

· Ordinary people treated as extensions of “big mans” household

· Authority is in the person, not office

· Often unpredictable

Patrimonialism vs. Neo-Patrimonialism

Julias ceaser vs.

How did Neo-patrimonialism work in Africa?

1. Move towards presidentialism

a. Formally- eliminate legislative action, replaces PMs with Presidents

b. Rise of dictatorships

1. cont.

· Informal elements of poltical centralization

· Rise of “personality cults”

· Kwame Nkfrumah (Ghana)- “the blessed redeemer”

How did Ne0-patrimonialism work in Africa

· Personality cults as tool of authority

2. Clientelism

· Patron-clien relationships

· Patrons award jobs, resources to clients

· Clients return the favor with political support

· Notion of patronage(those in power give to those who support them) - the fuel with which patrimonial regimes depend on for their survival -

3. Use of state rescources as personal account

· Completely blurred lines

· Funded patronage

· Natural recourse sector

· Spent lavishly on wasteful projects

Describe what is meant by logic of patrimonialism – everything that belongs to the household and everything is an extension of that fathers control- idea of the basis of non-democracy to a system of government- not derived from legal sense- inditividual citizens are extensions of the leaders household- neo patrimonialism is different

Something fundamental changes….

· 198501989: 9 countries hold competitive multiparty elections

· 1989-200: 70 different presidential elections across sub-Saharan Africa, in mot 48 countries

· 42 legislative elections

· 39 of 48 national lefislatures had more at least 2 parties

· “small in comparison, but represents huge shift”

· Notion of “Afircas second independce”

Hwat explains Africas Second Indepenece

· Combination of domestic and international factors

· Domestically:

· Authoritarian leaders presided over economic disaster

· Rise of popular protests against regimes

· Internationally

· Timing with end of Cold War not a coincidence

· Soviet union and United States both had “clients

· “ They may be thugs, but they are our thugs”

Cold War Issues replaced

· Human rights, democracy move to forefront

· Authoritarian leaders no longer protected, and served no purpose for Western world

· Decline of aid (which made economic problems worse)

· “conditionality” of reforms

How did the Second independence occur?

· Africas “democratic experiments” unfolded in diverse ways

· The “China Model” and the Beijing

Consensus ----- the performance legitimacy –

The mesanto list- voting against – signed a recal petitition for venezlua to have a recall shavaz

· Culture and non-democracy (national

culture vs. "only game in town" theory)

· International explanations of non-

democracy (war, weak states, international support for non-democracies)

----- in text- theories that emphasize culture