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David Hume
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume
Historical Context
Hume belongs to the tradi<on of Bri<sh empiricism that includes: Francis Bacon (1561-‐1626) John Locke (1632-‐1704) George Berkeley (1685-‐1753)
Historical Context
Common to this tradi<on is the view that knowledge is founded upon sense-‐percep<on, which the human mind passively receives. But whereas Locke and Berkeley believe that human knowledge can go beyond sense-‐experience, Hume contends in the Introduc<on of his Trea<se that our knowledge is limited to sense-‐ experience, and so offers an empiricism that he argues is more consistent than those of his Bri<sh predecessors.
Historical Context
But whereas Locke and Berkeley believe that human knowledge can go beyond sense-‐ experience, Hume contends in the Introduc<on of his Trea<se that our knowledge is limited to sense-‐experience, and so offers an empiricism that he argues is more consistent than those of his Bri<sh predecessors.
David Hume (1711-‐1776)
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU). This PowerPoint is a selec<ve summary of: Sec<on I: Of the Different Species of Philosophy (ed. Steinberg, pp. 1–9), Sec<on II: Of the Origin of Ideas (pp. 9–13) and Sec<on III: Of the Associa@on of Ideas (pp. 14–15). Sec<on IV: Skep<cal Doubts Concerning the Opera<ons of the Understanding (pp. 15-‐25)
What is the goal of the EHU?
To overcome “abstruse ques<ons” (that are discussed in metaphysics, which is, to a considerable degree, “not properly a science” or that are objects of “popular supers<<ons”, p. 5), by enquiring “seriously into the nature of human understanding”, and by showing “from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fibed for such remote and abstruse subjects” (p. 6).
What is the goal of the EHU?
David Hume (1711–1776) wishes to accomplish a similar progress in philosophy as Isaac Newton (1642–1721) achieved in the field of physics by his discovery of the laws of gravita<on, thus finding a simple theory to explain the interac<on between masses, a theory which considerably simplifies cosmology. Referring to Newton, Hume says that “there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy” (p. 8).
The theory of the origin of ideas
By explaining how ideas arise in our mind and how they interact with each other, Hume hopes to “render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them” (p. 13).
The theory of the origin of ideas
To explain the origin of ideas, Hume divides all percep8ons of the mind into thoughts or ideas on the one hand and impressions on the other.
The theory of the origin of ideas
What dis<nguishes ideas from impressions is that impressions are more lively than ideas (p. 10). Example: to be angry (“feel anger”) vs. to think about anger; to be in love vs. to hear of someone else that he or she is in love (p. 10).
The theory of the origin of ideas
Are there any more differences between ideas and impressions?
The theory of the origin of ideas
One difference seems to be this: ideas and thoughts can make up things that don’t exist (monsters, golden mountains, virtuous horses) by “compounding, transposing, augmen<ng, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience” (p. 11).
The theory of the origin of ideas
Yet, Hume argues that even these thoughts are dependent on impressions. He claims (as the most important statement of Sec<on II) that “all the materials for thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sen<ment: The mixture and composi<on of these belongs alone to the mind and will. … [A]ll our ideas or more feeble percep<ons are copies of our impressions or more lively ones” (p. 11).
The theory of the origin of ideas
Two proofs for his claim: (1) Hume shows that even the idea of God (which seems far away from impression) can be derived by the impressions we have of “wise” and “good” and by augmen<ng them infinitely un<l we receive the idea of an infinitely good and wise being (p. 11)
The theory of the origin of ideas
(2) He further argues that where there is no sensa<on, there is no corresponding idea: a blind man cannot form the no<on of colors, a deaf man cannot have the no<on of sounds. (p. 12).
Ideas and Impressions
Ideas are epistemologically inferior to impressions, and the secondary status that Hume gives them stands in marked contrast to a long tradi<on in Western philosophy since Plato which asserts that universal ideas—not singular sense impressions—are the proper objects of the human intellect.
The associa8on of ideas
Hume not only wants to explain how we abain ideas (as copies of our impressions), but also how we associate ideas, i.e. how we get from one idea to the other.
The associa8on of ideas
The associa<on of ideas is what happens when we infer the existence of one thing from something else. According to Hume, there are “three principles of connec<on among ideas, namely Resemblance, Con@guity in <me or place, and Cause and Effect” (p. 14).
The associa8on of ideas
Examples: • a picture leads to the thought of its original (resemblance)
• the idea of an apartment in a building leads to the idea of other apartments (con<guity)
• the idea of a wound leads to the idea of the pain which it causes (cause and effect). (p. 14.)
Sec<on IV: Part I
Knowledge is either about rela<ons of ideas or mabers of fact (p. 15).
Rela<ons of Ideas
Rela<ons of ideas (e.g. 3 x 5 = 30 ÷ 2) are intui<vely or demonstra<vely certain. (Note that Hume has a stricter sense of “demonstra<on” than we have.) They “are discoverable by the mere opera<on of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe” (p. 15). Rela<ons of ideas we find in Geometry, Algebra, and Arithme<c.
Mabers of Fact
Mabers of fact are not intui<vely or demonstra<vely certain. “The contrary of every maber of fact is s<ll possible” (p. 15).
Mabers of Fact
From a logical point of view, the affirma<on “the sun will rise tomorrow” makes as much sense as the proposi<on “the sun will not rise tomorrow”.
Mabers of Fact
When my friend is in fact in France, it is s<ll conceivable that she be not in France. We cannot demonstrate the falsehood of either proposi<on, because we can only demonstrate the falsehood of that which implies a contradic<on (in other words, we can demonstrate that there is no “squared circle”).
If reasonings concerning maber of facts are not discoverable by thought alone, how do we get knowledge and cer<tude about them?
We have two ways in which we can obtain knowledge about mabers of facts. Either (1) through the present tes<mony of our senses or (2) by reasonings.
“All reasonings concerning mabers of fact seem to be founded on the rela<on of Cause and Effect” (p. 16). I can conclude from the effect to the cause: I receive a leber from my friend in France, and I infer that, as a maber of fact, my friend is in France. But I could never know anything about a maber of fact (the existence or non-‐existence of something) by mere thought:
“I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposi<on, which admits of no excep<on, that the knowledge of this rela<on is not, in any instance, abained by reasonings a priori ; but arises en<rely from experience, when we find, that any par<cular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. … causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason, but by experience ” (p. 17).
A Priori/A Posteriori
The word “a priori” occurs several <mes in the EHU and plays a fundamental role in it. It is to be dis<nguished from “a posteriori” – a word that Hume does not use in this context.
A Priori/A Posteriori
Reasonings a priori are “prior” to knowledge from experience; reasonings a posteriori are “posterior” to or ater knowledge from experience. We know a priori that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees, but we know a posteriori if at a specific <me and in a par<cular place the Giants won the World Series.
Why can’t we conclude a priori from the effect to its cause? Hume answers: “… every effect is a dis<nct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first inven<on or concep<on of it, a priori, must be en<rely arbitrary” (p. 19).
For example, Adam, before knowledge from experience, could not have concluded from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him, or that milk and bread nourishes him (see p. 17).
Or if Adam were created with perfect ra<onal facul<es, prior to experience he s<ll could not tell from the proper<es of water that it would suffocate him.
Part II
“What is the founda<on of all conclusions from experience?” (p. 20). Hume only says what it is not: “… even ater we have experience of the opera<ons of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasonings, or any process of the understanding” (p. 21).
Cause and Effect?
The problem is that we conclude from past experience to future events (see p. 21). We think that the sensible quali<es that look like bread (of which we assume that it nourishes us) will always nourish us, without understanding what it is in the bread that has the “secret powers” of nourishing us (p. 21). “From causes, which appear similar, we expect similar effects.” (p. 23). But “the course of nature might change” (p. 22).
“[A]ll our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposi<on, that the future will be conformable to the past” (p. 23). This supposi<on is made by the mind, it is not evident from the pure observa<on of reality.
Therefore, Hume assumes that the consequence from the cause to the effect is not drawn from the knowledge of the cause, but drawn from the mind (p. 22). The inference from the cause to the effect is neither intui<ve, nor demonstra<ve, “[F]or all inferences from experience suppose, as their founda<on, that the future will resemble the past” (p. 24).
It is not an explana<on to say that sta<s<cal (experimental) evidence allows us to know, i.e., to understand the effects. If we understand the rela<on between cause and effect, we don’t need experimental evidence at all (e.g. bread nourishes, because in many instances it did). We could understand immediately, at the first instance, why something is the case, e.g. why bread nourishes (see pp. 23–24).
So all that experience establishes concerning causal rela<onships is that the cause is prior in <me to and con<guous with its effect. Experience cannot establish a necessary connec<on between cause and effect, because we can imagine without contradic<on a case where the cause does not produce its usual effect.
For example, we can imagine that a cue ball violently strikes another billiard ball and then, instead of causing the billiard ball to move, the cue ball bounces off it in some random direc<on.
The reason why we mistakenly infer that there is something in the cause that necessarily produces its effect is because our past experiences have habituated us to think in this way.
That is, because we have seen in the past that B frequently follows A and never occurs without it, our mind associates B with A such that the presence of one determines the mind to think of the other.
