see the attached

profiletonnysmall
sample_hypothesis_1.docx

Central Question : What are the more plausible explanations for the variation in timing, scale, duration and lethality of the political unrest in the Middle East that flowed from the so-called ‘Arab Awakening’?

I offer two hypotheses as the basis for your brief to be written this week. Follow the instructions in the discussion guide I posted for last week’s lecture (pg. 14-16). H1 is a typical neorealist explanation. H2 leans towards a more constructivist explanation. Take the time to understand how you would “know it if you saw it” for each of the hypotheses. You need to have empirically-based tests to evaluate the relevance of the evidence you seek.

There is no ‘right answer’. I want you to evaluate BOTH hypotheses thoroughly. I want to see you thoughtfully evaluate BOTH hypotheses. Avoid the temptation to try to persuade me that one is better than the other. You are looking for which one has the LEAST AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE AGAINST IT. That is a very different standard than ‘this hypothesis is correct because I biased the evidence in favor of it.’ You are dispassionate analysts not op-ed writers.

H1 - The ‘Arab Awakening’ is Driven by Long-Standing Material Factors : The notion of a ‘third wave of democracy’ sweeping through the region due to the enduring appeal of democracy is a fiction. The countries in the MENA are fundamentally different in too many ways (politically, culturally, etc.) such that the transfer of ideas/norms as profound as democracy (especially a Western notion) via ‘demonstration effects’[footnoteRef:1] is not possible. The variation in timing, scale, duration and lethality of the political unrest in the Middle East is best explained by material factors that are largely peculiar to the state in which it is occurring (e.g., poverty, unemployment, overpopulation, long-standing power struggles between political rivals) or material factors in the international system that are accounted for in neorealist theories (e.g., anarchy, balance of power). [1: That is, the success of the success of a rebellion/uprising in one state leads to the attempts to imitate that success in another. For example, the success of rebellion in Tunisia leads to rebellion in Libya and Egypt and so on.]

H2: The Arab Awakening is a Function of the Spread of Ideas AND Political Openings – There has been a strong desire in the masses across the region to move beyond the “ruling bargain”[footnoteRef:2] that autocrats had made with the masses since the end of the colonial era. There is a widely-held belief across the region that the ‘old ways are no longer acceptable’ and that there is a need for a fundamental change in the governing model. The variation in timing, scale, duration and lethality of the political unrest in the Middle East can largely be explained the exclusion from power of a key portion of society by the state, the spread of the ideas that democracy is a viable approach to government AND political openings (i.e., that the state is unredeemable[footnoteRef:3] and vulnerable to attack). [2: Democracy and pluralism have not emerged broadly in the Middle East due largely to the ability of authoritarian governments to sustain a ‘ruling bargain’ with the masses that exchanges state jobs, subsidies and a modicum of social order in return for political acquiescence.] [3: That is, perceived unwillingness of the state to compromise regarding credible access to power. ]