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Crowd Situations and their Policing from the Perspective of Finnish Police Officers—a Case Study of Finnish Police Knowledge KARI SAARI
Department of Social Policy and Social Psychology, University of Kuopio, Finland
Abstract
Introduction
The policing of crowd situations, especially
during protests and demonstrations, has
been a hot research topic amongst aca-
demics from various disciplines and
countries since the late 1990s. Much of
this research has primarily focused on
Western democracies (Sheptycki
2005:329), all of which have their own
national research traditions and historical
variations. Ever since the occurrence of a
few but spectacular protests in Seattle (in
1999), Gothenburg (in 2001), and Genoa
(in 2001), various models of public order
policing have become internationally pop-
ular and relevant as research themes.
Many studies (e.g. Waddington 1994;
della Porta 1998; della Porta and Reiter
1998; Fillieule and Jobard 1998; McPhail
et al. 1998; Winter 1998; Hall and de Lint
2003) have argued that public order
policing shifted in many Western countries
from repressive escalated force (brutal
policing) to more tolerant negotiated
management (soft policing) in the 1980s
and 1990s. Della Porta and Reiter
(1998:1–8) have summarized two general
shifts in policing: the softening and the
professionalization of public order poli-
cing. Softening refers to a more active use of
communication, negotiation, and co-oper-
ation, and minimal or at least more targeted
use of force as a last resort. Professionaliza-
tion refers to the parallel development of
specially educated and equipped units for
crowd control, trained in new and more
This study explores crowd situations from the perspective of the Finnish police. The qualitative data consist of focused face-to- face interviews with police officers (n ¼ 15). The results of these interviews indicate that special crowd control units have shifted from being an innovation to being an ordinary part of public order policing, despite the infrequent use of these units.
Furthermore, police knowledge concurrently involved diversity and polarity. Crowd situations vary from political protests to sporting events and street festivals, and the police play multiple roles and apply diverse measures and tactics depending on the situation. Polarity is linked to the way the police perceive different crowds and crowd events as ‘easy’ and ‘ordinary’ or
‘difficult’ and ‘deviant’. Finally, tension emerges between national and global aspects within police knowledge. This tension is linked to how police perceive crowd events and public order policing in terms of the past, the present, and the future.
KEY WORDS: Crowd control, Crowd situations, Finland, Police knowledge, Public order policing
102 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention ISSN 1404-3858 Vol. 10, pp. 102–119, 2009
DOI: 10.1080/14043850903320370 q Taylor & Francis
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effective measures and tactics for crowd
control, including physical force.
To some extent, the softening claim has
been called into question after the protest
in Seattle in 1999. Case studies from
Western Europe and North America (e.g.
Noakes et al. 2005; Vitale 2005; della
Porta and Reiter 2006; Noakes and
Gillham 2006) suggest that the golden era
of negotiated management is partly over
with regard to transnational protests.
These studies have also argued that the
return to more coercive, brutal, and less
tolerant policing of transnational events
has changed the policing of national events
within countries as well. In the European
Union, the transnationalization of Euro-
pean security politics has led to political
discussions concerning more active co-
operation between and harmonization of
different national policies and practices of
public order policing within the member
states (Reiter and Fillieule 2006).
The purpose of this study was to
determine the extent to which the above
trends in public order policing, and
especially crowd control, have affected
the reality of Finnish police officers. This
paper presents a case study from Finland
and provides the first empirical treatment
of this topic. A likely reason for the lack of
such studies in the Finnish context is that,
until now, Finnish crowd situations have
been less dramatic and conflict-oriented
(Siisiäinen 1990; Siisiäinen 1998) than in
other countries over the period extending
from the 1950s to the early 1990s. In
contrast, the period from 1917 to the late
1940s was an era of political and social
unrest and violence in Finland, involving
the Civil War of 1918, the era of political
violence organized by the extreme left- and
right-wing movements in the 1920s and
1930s, the Second World War, and the fear
of communist revolution in the years
1945–1949, during which the police
played the role of the strong arm of the
state (see Hietaniemi 1992).
However, since the 1950s, Finnish police
in crowd situations have tended to play the
role of Bürgerpolizei (Winter 1998:190),
i.e. the citizens’ police. This role has been
based on trust towards and co-operation
with citizens in policing. Korander has
argued that the culture and working ethos
of the police in Finland in the 1990s can be
termed a ‘welfare society’s police culture’,
in which the gap between the interests of
the police and civic society is relatively
minimal (Korander 2004:20–21). Levä
(2008) has also noted a change in Finnish
police culture from the 1930s to the 1990s,
which can be summarized as a transform-
ation in the societal role of police from a
‘steely nation-state superman to conciliator
of economical global empire’ as the study
was titled. In this latter role, the police try
‘to solve problems by negotiating with
clients instead of using excessive force’
(Levä 2008:323).
The peaceful history of Finland since the
1950s raises three questions: Why did the
Finnish police create specially educated
and equipped crowd control units in the
early 1990s, despite the earlier era of
peaceful crowd management? Has the
reality of crowd situations and their
policing changed remarkably over that
time? Have brutal methods of policing
finally arrived in Finland too?
To answer these questions, I will describe
and analyse the construction of the police
reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966)
regarding crowd situations and their poli-
cing in Finland based on five research
questions:
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1. Why were the crowd control units/tac- tics created in Finland during the early 1990s?
2. How do Finnish police officers define crowd situations and the role of the police in such situations?
3. Has crowd control, as a new model and strategy for public order policing, chan- ged the way that police define policing and crowds?
4. Has crowd control made the Finnish police more offensive and brutal than earlier?
5. Have the transnational features and trends in the European Union had any impact on public order policing and crowd control in Finland and, if so, in what way(s)?
The concept of police knowledge and the methodology
As a theoretical tool for examining the
reality of Finnish crowds and their policing
from the perspective of the police, I will use
the concept of police knowledge. Police
knowledge has been defined as ‘the images
held by the police about their role and the
external challenges they are asked to face’
(della Porta 1998:229) and ‘the police’s
construction of external reality, collectively
and individually—which we consider to be
the main intervening variable between
structure and action’ (della Porta and
Reiter 1998:9). Police knowledge acts as a
filter between society (structural, insti-
tutional, and cultural elements) and police
action, in a two-way interaction between
both (see Figure 1). I will briefly examine
the constructions of police officers con-
cerning their own role(s) and action(s), and
the working environment(s) in society,
which create the mental tools that enable
police officers to do their job.
Della Porta (1998:229) defines the
concept as the entity of knowledge which
includes both the professional and environ-
mental culture of the police. It is the socio-
cultural reality (how individual police
officers and police organization see them-
selves and how they see society) that
provides a framework which guides police
officers in their work on the street. One
reason for using the concept of police
knowledge is based on the hypothesis that
a change in police culture (e.g. a new model
of crowd control) leads to reconstruction
of both policing practices and knowledge
at various levels of police organization (see
Chan 1996). Secondly, police knowledge is
not monolithic. It refers to a reality which
is ‘probably shifting and possibly contra-
dictory, different for different levels of
police hierarchy and for different police
branches’ (della Porta and Reiter 1998:27).
This allows the examination of plurality of
views within the police.
The empirical data consist of face-to-
face interviews with police officers
(n ¼ 15). All the interviewed Finnish police officers were or had been active members
of special crowd control police units/orga-
nization. The officers represented different
ranks within the units/organization and
were selected from three cities. Most of
these (10 officers) were from the capital
city area, where the activities of crowds
and police have been primarily focused in
Finland. All of the officers had practical
experience, which was a primary criterion
for inclusion into this study. The officers
Figure 1. Police knowledge, society and police action (cf. della Porta and Reiter 1998:10)
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were selected by using the snowball
method: a contact person from the police
administration gave contact details for the
leaders of crowd control units in certain
cities selected by the author. Each unit
informed the unit members about the
research project and named voluntary
officers to be interviewed.
The officers selected for the study
represent different age groups (from 28
to 57 years) and years of experience as a
police officer; several of the interviewees
had participated in the activities of the
units in various positions since the early
1990s, while some had experience of only
one or two years; nevertheless, the
majority of the informants (n ¼ 9) worked at street level as the commander of a
unit(s) or its subgroup. All informants
were male, which was pure coincidence.
On the other hand, the small number of
female officers in the units would have
made it difficult or impossible to guaran-
tee the anonymity of informants, as had
been promised at the beginning of the
study. To maintain anonymity, I refrained
from identifying in my report the officers
according to their ranks. The officers and
their views are represented as individual
cases for the construction of wider police
knowledge.
The officers were interviewed individu-
ally by the author over the period April
2004 to March 2005. The sessions lasted
from 60 to 150 minutes (average time was
85 minutes). The themes of the interviews
were selected using the logic of abduction,
where theories and studies were used as
guiding hypotheses to focus on hypotheti-
cally relevant themes. The themes focused
on personal experiences and the individual
view-points of the officers about crowds,
crowd situations, and their policing in
Finland (for example: What does crowd
control and public order policing mean to
you? Why were the units/tactics created in
Finland? Is it different from ordinary police
work, how? What different types of crowd
situations have you participated in? What
are Finnish crowds, and how you would
describe them? What do the police do in
such situations? What types of policing
methods and situations are easy and
difficult? What different types of meanings
do the police project into these situations,
and how are these meanings selected for
particular situations? How you would
describe the history of crowd control in
Finland—in the past, present, and in the
future?).
An applied version of the grounded
theory method was used for analysis of
the data: the data were coded and
conceptualized into qualitative thematic
‘micro’ parts, which were rearranged and
reconstructed into analytical ‘macro’ cat-
egories and subcategories via three stages
of analysis—open, axial, and selective
coding (e.g. Strauss and Corbin 1990).
This research does not rely on pure or
orthodox inductive theory building
through analysis of empirical data. In
contrast to the original method, this
research integrates empirical data, ideas
from theories and previous studies, as well
as the researcher’s own thoughts, both
throughout the analysis and reporting of
the research results.
The small number of informants in this
case study allows me to make only
analytical and theoretical generalizations
from the research results (Yin 1994:
30–32). Rather I present different quali-
tative themes from the data. However, I am
not claiming that my findings apply to all
police officers in Finland. I try to present
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the multiplicity of views inside the police,
not to estimate how common they are
inside the organization.
The key results: Finnish police perspective on crowd situations and their policing
The key results can be summarized in
three themes. Firstly, crowd control as a
new kind of policing has shifted from the
innovative to mundane police work.
Secondly, police knowledge of crowd
situations and their policing involves
both diversity and polarity at the same
time. Finally, the knowledge involves a
tension between national and global
perspectives.
Crowd control units—from innovation to
ordinary policing
Crowd control came to Finland later than
to some other European countries, and its
introduction was also different. As noted
earlier, the iron fist was put into a velvet
glove during the 1990s (King and Brearley
1996:5) in many Western countries—i.e.
public order policing was softening. At the
same time, Finnish police began to adopt a
new policy to complement the decades-
long tradition of negotiated management
(velvet glove).
Interviewed police officers maintained
that one reason for the delay in adopting a
heavier approach was the relatively peace-
ful and non-violent history of Finnish
crowd situations and their policing from
the Second World War to the early 1990s.
Crowd control was criticized by some
police officers, because it was seen as an
imported, alien, and mysterious elite police
work method which was unnecessary and
inappropriate in Finnish police culture and
society. The new policy contained a tension
between normal and special police roles
and methods, especially during the early
years. Today, however, officers see it as an
ordinary part of police work.
The police began to create the first crowd
control units1 in Helsinki in the early
1990s. Most informants perceived the
beginning as a mission led by police leaders
in Helsinki and in the national police
administration. Some informants thought
that the leaders of the time saw that there
was a need for specially trained and
equipped units capable of working as
disciplined groups and of using more
coercive measures in crowd situations
when necessary. One low-ranking police
officer explained why the units were
considered to be necessary:
I think that it was considered that the
police couldn’t survive any more with
the traditional measures of policing
in situations where bigger crowds start
to behave in unacceptable ways. (P22)
Most of the interviewed officers thought
that leaders in the early 1990s perceived
that there was an acute need for proactive
and preventive policing to control any
future unacceptable crowd behaviour in
Finland. The roots of such unacceptable
behaviour were seen to be mainly inter-
national:
We had more and more international
meetings here [in Helsinki] which
might attract foreign protesters to
1 Currently, a crowd control unit consists of 25 specially educated and equipped police officers and a leader. A wider organization of the units (a network of several units) has commanders in three levels. This is similar to the Public Support Units (PSUs) in the UK (see Waddington 1991:140–143; King and Brearley 1996:10, 13). 2 All interviews for the study are coded randomly as P1, P2, P3, and so forth. All selected interview citations have been translated from Finnish to English by the author and Vivian Paganuzzi.
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demonstrations here . . . Football
matches had become more violent
throughout the world . . . . There were
signs of organized trouble-makers, who
were travelling around causing problems
in different kinds of situations. And that
was what at the beginning we wanted to
be prepared for. (P5)
It seems then, that some police officers
perceived that the new threats (e.g. football
hooliganism and mass demonstrations)
would come to Finland from abroad.
On the other hand, some informants also
mentioned some unusual cases in Finland
which were seen as signs of a forthcoming
shift in the relatively peaceful tradition of
Finnish mass events (e.g. Siisiäinen 1990;
Siisiäinen 1998). According to these offi-
cers, the youth riot in Oulu in 1990, the
protest by Kurds near the Iraqi embassy in
Helsinki in 1991, and the mass demon-
stration of unemployed people in front of
Parliament during the Finnish economical
depression in 1993 had nearly slipped out
of control because the police were still
using ‘traditional’ methods.
All this suggests that the police perceived
that Finnish society was becoming more
insecure and uncertain. As a reaction to
this shift, the police were proactively
preparing themselves for new roles and
measures to cope with the changes and
threats in society. Such proactive reorgan-
ization of the police and creation of
paramilitary units in the name of forth-
coming threats of political violence hap-
pened in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway
in the 1960s (Lorentzen 1980). In Britain,
in contrast, the creation of crowd control
units was a reaction to already existing
problems in crowd situations (Reiner
1998:45–46).
Despite of these fears, almost all the
interviewed police officers thought that the
perceived threats had not come to pass.
They claimed that in general Finnish
crowds were and are still extremely peace-
ful and self-controlled, and that crowds
avoid both conflicts with the police and the
use of violence at mass events. Despite a
more active use of passive civil disobe-
dience in a few minor demonstrations and
protests, the majority of informants per-
ceived that the worst-case scenarios have
not been realized on the street.
However, several officers reported that
crowd control was perceived by the police
as an ordinary part and style of policing,
like an officer described it:
Our crowd control is in practice the
same as basic police work. Those are
ordinary police officers who work in
crowd control. It is a basic idea that any
officer would be able to do that job. (P5)
It seems then, that the exceptional had
been normalized (cf. Flyghed 2002). Firstly,
crowd control organization is currently a
nation-wide network of territorial units
and a permanent part of police organiz-
ation. Secondly, the officers now consider
crowd control as ordinary police work,
despite the special features involved.
According to the informants, the guiding
principles and legislation for crowd control
and ordinary police work are the same
(i.e. officers act peacefully, try to avoid or
minimize the use of force in events, and try
primarily to negotiate and co-operate with
citizens). The special features concern
different kinds of protective equipment,
education and organization, a (para)
military-style co-ordination through a
hierarchical command and control struc-
ture, and acting as disciplined units
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controlled by superiors. However, some
officers recalled that in the early 1990s the
new kind of special police units and their
gear and practices were seen as ‘strangers’
or ‘aliens’ in the police organization, but
they emphasized that now these are
perceived as an ordinary part of police
work and its culture, like an officer recalled
the difference:
When we sat in a basement for the first
time and some new gear was introduced
for us, it all was strange business.
We thought then that never for us. But
nowadays I think that it all is just an
ordinary part of this job. (P7)
The interviewed officers had a positive
attitude toward these paramilitary features
of Finnish crowd control. For them it
means, as it does for Waddington, just a
more disciplined way of operating, merely
an organizational matter (Waddington
1991:140–141; Waddington 1993:353; cf.
Jefferson 1987; Jefferson 1993). So far, the
(para)military image and equipment have
been limited to the use of special protection
(e.g. helmets, Plexiglas face-masks and
body shields, and protective clothing), not
offensive technology (e.g. tear-gas, rubber
bullets, fire-arms, or water cannons). Most
informants said that the police had to avoid
creating a military image of the units and its
officers. Two officers said it:
It is quite a good decision, so that
civilians don’t see a difference . . . They
[the officers] just have helmets and
protective clothing on, and just look
bigger than usual. I think it is an
intentional choice and a good decision,
which doesn’t feed provocation. (P8)
Apart from the helmets and shields, they
look the same as normal police. (P6)
However, despite these officers’ views,
there are three reasons for thinking that
crowd control in Finland is exceptional
rather than normal. Firstly, the unit
members are selected from volunteers on
the basis of mental and physical criteria.
Thus, only a limited number of officers get
special education for crowd control
measures and practices. In other words,
membership of the units is strictly limited.
Secondly, the crowd control system is
exceptionally secretive even today, when
other aspects of police work are open to
scrutiny. For example, the police have not
published the total or territorial numbers
of crowd control police officers in Finland.
Thirdly, the units have been very rarely
used, mostly in the capital area and in
protest events. An officer summarized well
the street reality in the capital:
[There are] over 100 demonstrations a
year. Most involve 10–20 people, and
one police patrol goes there and checks
the scene. The crowd control may be
involved in about 10 bigger cases per a
year . . . But in most of these cases the
units are just reserved for the event.
The units are in the front line and in
contact with people in very few cases a
year. (P12)
Plurality and polarity of crowd situations
and public order policing
The plurality of police knowledge. Police
knowledge of crowd situations and their
policing involve simultaneously both
plurality and polarity. Plurality meant for
the police officers that crowd situations
vary from protests and demonstrations to
sporting events and street festivals.
Moreover, they said that the police have
multiple roles and apply different measures
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and tactics according to the situation. An
officer put it this way:
The police can have many roles in these
cases, from observing from a distance to
actively interfering in something. It
varies from one extreme to another.
(P11)
From the data I constructed six ideal
roles of Finnish police in crowd situations,
each with its own special features:
(1) External observer: The role is an example of extreme co-operation between the police and a crowd. Informants defined this role as a form of everyday police work rather than crowd control. Police officers are just passively observing a crowd at a distance, and try to stay as invisible as possible. The crowd is self-controlled and does not give any cause for police intervention:
Our tactic has been strongly non-
interference—we do nothing, we only
observe the situation. (P7)
(2) Hidden reservist: The role is relatively common in Finnish crowd control and it has also been used in other countries (e.g. Waddington 1994:157; della Porta 1998:234). It means that the crowd control officers are in standby position and hide from the public. In practice, for the officers it meant passive waiting:
. . . a very large part of it [crowd control]
is waiting, being in standby position and
killing time, and the real action is in fact
just a small part of the whole business.
(P12)
(3) Helpful partner: The role is based on collaboration between the police and crowd, and an inconspicuous police presence. In della Porta’s (1998:250)
terms, this is a model of co-operation. The informants claimed that the role is commonly used in most Finnish crowd situations, from political protests to sports events and street festivals. The police officers are servants of the citizens who help the organizers with various practical arrangements before and during an event:
We are there for them [the crowd] so
that they can act as planned . . . . The
police are not there because something
might happen. We are there to see that
everything goes well from the crowd’s
view-point. (P14) Waddington (1994:69–103, 189) has
argued critically that such ‘help’ or ‘service’ offered by the police is in many cases both a hidden use of power and a method of the police’s self-protection, i.e. an attempt to prevent or minimize the need for other policing methods in an event. It means that the police as ‘helpers’ or ‘partners’ try to achieve more extensive control and power over the situation and crowd. Police officers take control of the situation in the name of help (Waddington 1994:101).
(4) Negotiating mediator: The key difference in this role is that police officers play a more active role and have a visible presence in an event. Informants said that the police try to keep order by communicating and negotiating with the crowd. It is the key role in the negotiated management policing style in Finland, as well as in other countries (e.g. Waddington 1994:69–103; della Porta 1998:236– 238; Fillieule and Jobard 1998:76–80; McPhail et al. 1998:50–56). In crowd events, the police work as objective mediators between various interests, such as protesters, target(s) of protest, and outsiders. The main purpose of the police is to help in making agreed rules
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for an event via negotiation(s) with the different parties:
Finding a compromise to the
situation . . . The police often have the
role of mediator, which is often quite
demanding. You have to find a solution
so that the parties don’t turn against the
police, and all leave with a smile. (P12)
(5) Referee–peace officer: All the informants claimed that this role is extremely uncommon, and that the police try to minimize its use as far as possible. Police officers work more as controllers than as servants. The referee–peace officers do not just talk anymore but also act. In extreme cases, officers may use physical force to control an event. One officer put it: ‘you have to draw a line to somewhere, and when we are near that line it usually means conflict’ (P11). The role is highly visible and the police officers are usually members of the crowd control units. The role involves two subcategories, which della Porta terms ritualistic stand- off and total control (della Porta 1998:250). The former means that the police show, in a massive way, their potential for using force, but at a distance from a crowd (see also Fillieule and Jobard 1998:83), whereas the latter means using force in contact with a crowd. It is the same in football: if someone breaks the rules, the referee takes control of the game:
Within the legal boundaries everyone
can do whatever they want. But finally
we are like referees and also like peace
officers. If someone steps over the line,
then we have to actively interfere in the
situation. (P13)
(6) Under-achiever: This is the role that police officers are forced into if they have failed in the other roles. It means
that the police have lost control over the situation. The role has three subcategories—a fool, an enemy, and a victim—all of which were experienced as unpleasant or uncomfortable by the officers. One officer expressed the attitude: ‘I don’t think that we should be there [in the streets] just to be beaten up or to be made fools of’ (P12). The informants thought that the role of enemy and open conflict with a crowd were disappointments, even though such cases are very rare in Finland. The officers felt that usually they have had very co-operative relationships with citizens. As the same officer as above puts it:
Citizens trust the police very much and
do not see the police as an enemy. There
is no motivation to go out and resist the
police. (P12)
The polarity of police knowledge. Polarity
in police knowledge concerned two
aspects: how the informants perceived
measures and tactics of public order
policing, and how they perceived crowds
in Finland. The first aspect means that the
tools of the police, e.g. the measures and
tactics of Finnish public order policing,
can be divided on the basis of the data in
hidden (backstage) and visible (stage)
types. The contents of these categories
have been noted earlier by other researchers
(e.g. della Porta 1998:231–241, 250;
Fillieule and Jobard 1998:74–84):
(1) Hidden (backstage) measures and tactics involve intelligence and information gathering, negotiation, planning, and preparation;
(2) Visible (stage) measures and tactics consist of guiding and commanding, showing and using force, and public communication.
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The informants said that the public order
policing of crowd situations in Finland is
based mostly on hidden measures and
tactics. This means that most police work is
done before a crowd event and mainly out
of sight. The police try to stay as invisible
as possible during events, and visible
actions and the use of force are extremely
uncommon. This suggests that current
public order policing and crowd control
in Finland are based on a policy of soft,
preventive, and negotiated management.
Moreover, other researchers (e.g. della
Porta and Reiter 1998:1–8; della Porta
and Reiter 2006:176) argue that preven-
tive, persuasive, and information strategies
are typical of ‘soft policing’. Information
gathering and intelligence work have
become key elements in policing, as one
officer summarized:
In such events, gathering intelligence
beforehand is the key point for all.
The gathering of information is an issue
of prevention, in other words we have to
have information . . . . By gathering
intelligence beforehand we can try to
be a step ahead of the crowd. (P5)
Clearly, then, the informants perceived
the role of the police in Finnish crowd
events as relatively invisible and passive.
A common reason for this was that crowds
usually exercise high self-control, and both
crowds and the police are peaceful and
non-violent, and avoid conflicts with each
other. In fact, the use of visible or coercive
crowd control is exceptional in Finland.
We will return more closely to this
exceptionality later.
The second aspect of the polarity in
police knowledge was linked to the way the
officers perceive crowd situations. Based
on the data, the police perceive crowds as
being one of two types: most crowds are
‘easy’ and ‘ordinary’ crowds, while a
minority are ‘difficult’ and ‘deviant’
crowds. This polarization has also been
noted in other studies (e.g. Waddington
1994:112–113; della Porta 1998:241–
245, 250; Stott and Reicher 1998:516–
517; Noakes et al. 2005:247–248). Wad-
dington (1994:107) has argued that the
police use a kind of ‘stereotypic “recipe”
knowledge’ to define different crowd
situations and crowds, and that this guides
their choice of policing method(s) in those
situations. This also seems to be the case in
Finland.
The informants perceived most crowds
in Finland as ‘easy’ and ‘ordinary’. They
said that events organized by such crowds
did not need active police intervention—
the events are self-controlled and self-
policed by the crowds. The informants
described such events as peaceful, highly
organized and non-violent, and organized
by ‘respectable trade unions’, ‘official
organizations’, ‘ordinary family men and
women’, and ‘working people’. The infor-
mants perceived the ‘ordinary’ Finns as
highly law-abiding and calm:
In Finland you can trust that most
people don’t want to hurt police
officers on purpose. (P8)
Finns as protesters and more generally in
mass and sport events are very cool-
headed . . . . The key feature of most
events here is the calmness of Finnish
mass behaviour and of our crowd
control. (P11)
The informants perceived ‘difficult’
crowd events as exceptional, and that
they were severally protest events. Several
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officers mentioned as examples 5–10
demonstrations from the mid-1990s to
2005 in which the police had shown or
used force and/or faced conflicts with a
crowd. These events received a lot of
publicity in the media and as a result have
become cultural icons of difficult cases in
Finnish police knowledge. Many infor-
mants mentioned these examples although
they had not personally participated in the
events. Some officers also mentioned the
events as a reason why crowd control units
and practices are needed in Finland. The
crowds had—in one way or another—
broken the Finnish norm of non-violent,
peaceful, and law-abiding crowd beha-
viour. The officers perceived the norm-
breakers as ‘deviant’ and ‘difficult’, whose
political ends, values, and motives were
questionable. I term these ‘bad citizens’,
while other researchers use terms such as
‘violent minority’ (Stott and Reicher
1998:516–517), ‘bad demonstrators’
(della Porta 1998:241–245, 250), or
‘opposition’ (Waddington, 1994:113).
The ‘bad citizens’ were described by the
informants as hooligans, trouble-makers,
young political radicals, agitators, and
professional protesters. However, they
were perceived to be a small minority in
Finland. Some informants connected such
groups to political ideologies such as
anarchism, anti-globalization and anti-
liberalism, and ecological and animal
rights activism. The following two cita-
tions demonstrate that officers perceived
the ‘trouble-makers’ to be easily identified:
There are always a few pin-heads who
want to turn up . . . They think it’s a
public party and they can do whatever
they like. Sometimes they call themselves
anarchists and sometimes they use
a different name. It is a small group of
a few key persons who generally use any
opportunity to present their view . . .. We
can recognize them, the same people
keep turning up. (P9)
From our perspective it is a small hard-
core group, from 10 to 20 individuals,
who cause the most serious problems
there. But usually it seems that they are
able to get some others in a crowd to join
them, and sometimes other people
spontaneously join them too. (P11)
The officers did not trust such trouble-
makers. One reason for this is that the ‘bad
citizens’ had behaved in an unpredictable
way in some event which was seen as
‘difficult’ and ‘uncertain’ by the officers
because of the element of surprise. Other
studies (e.g. Waddington 1994:136–139;
Fillieule and Jobard 1998:75) have stated
that the police try to avoid surprises in
crowd situations. However, sometimes it is
not possible to avoid them. Some infor-
mants said that one reason for surprises is a
failure in the police’s negotiation with the
Finnish ‘hard-core group(s)’:
In my experience, it’s impossible to make
any deal with the hard-core group we
have here in Helsinki. Or you can make
a deal, but they never keep their
promises . . . . It’s useless to make any
deals. It’s just wasting time. (P7)
Another reason for the police’s mistrust
of the ‘bad citizens’ is that ‘hard-core
groups’ have resisted the police, which is
unusual in Finland. The informants said
that the resistance took the form of passive
civil disobedience and/or verbal assaults on
the crowd control police officers. In a few
cases, the police had also faced physical
resistance and violence (spitting, hitting,
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punching, and throwing various things).
Most informants said that aggression and
acts of violence caused the worst experi-
ences in the ‘difficult’ events:
All the bad experiences are connected
with violence towards the police.
I haven’t heard complaints about
anything else . . . . Officers feel it’s totally
unacceptable if there is violent action
towards the police . . . . Like during the
last Independence Day [2003] when we
were there, we were hit by flying objects
and we were spat on. (P8)
I argue the concept of ‘bad citizens’ in
Finnish police knowledge has been, is, and
probably will be used a justification for the
‘iron fist’ measures and policy in Finland. A
similar argument has been made concerning
thesituationinothercountries.Forexample,
Hall and de Lint (2003:232) and della Porta
and Reiter (1998:30–31) have noted that
brutal and repressive styles of policing have
survived in the era of negotiated manage-
ment. However, these styles are now used
moreselectivelyandtowardasmallminority
of crowds. On the basis of my data I argue
that this perceived minority, the ‘bad
citizens’, is the main target of crowd control
in Finland. The minority of ‘bad citizens’
plays an important role in Finnish police
knowledge injustifying the use of the police’s
‘iron fist’ inside the traditional ‘velvet glove’.
It seems that the police perceive crowd
control as a kind of insurance which they
need because of their bad experiences and
their fear of threats in the future.
Tension between global and national
realities
The Finnish police knowledge also involves
a tension between global and national
perspectives on crowd situations and their
policing. The tension is linked to the way
that police officers perceive the reality of
crowd situations and their policing now
and in the future. There are two types of
tension, one concerning crowds and the
other concerning their policing.
Firstly, the Finnish police knowledge
involves national and global perspectives
on crowds. From the national view-point,
the police officers defined Finland as a
relatively peaceful and stable (i.e. status
quo or consensus) society, which is mostly
secure from threats. The national frame is a
construction of reality that is based on the
experiences of the police officers from their
work on the streets. As one officer said:
Violent riots and hooliganism, which
you can see on the news, are not a part of
Finnish society. They do not suit the
character of Finns. (P12)
However, from the global view-point,
the policing of crowd events outside Fin-
land was perceived by most informants as
chaotic, risky, and uncertain phenomena.
Most officers follow events in other
countries more closely than before because
they fear that similar events may happen in
Finland. The most serious future threat
scenario for the informants was a possible
shift towards more violent behaviour of
crowds in Finland, as one officer explained:
There’s an increase in different kinds of
violent acts, sometimes even towards the
authorities. Yes, there are a lot of
examples of such acts in other
countries . . . Yes, that is the biggest
threat scenario . . . . I hope that these
scenarios will never be realized in
Finland. Unfortunately it’s changing all
the time and not necessarily in a good
direction. (P14)
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Many informants thought that global
threat scenarios of violence could be
realized in contexts of international politi-
cal events and protests. I divide the threats
into two categories. The first category
concerns large international meetings, such
as European Union (EU) summits,
arranged in Finland. Such events are
policed by the local police, even though
for example Ericson and Doyle (1999) and
Sheptycki (2005) have noted that especially
policing of transnational protests have
lately become more and more transna-
tional than a purely local issue of policing.
One informant perceived the local risk of
one then-forthcoming international meet-
ing thus:
The Asia-Europe Meeting in 2006,
which is the biggest international
meeting that has been arranged in
Finland, is a totally new kind. It
involves real threats of international
protests . . . Such meetings are for sure
full of surprises . . . . In future there will
be more and more large-scale meetings
in Finland. Yes, these meetings will
always cause extra pressure on the
police. (P12)
The second category involves events
where Finnish local politics could become
a global issue. A couple of informants
mentioned that Parliament’s decision to
build a new nuclear power plant in Finland
was an example of one such threat
scenario:
The worst threat is the construction of a
new nuclear power plant because that
will attract millions of people within the
EU area . . . activists from Germany,
Central Europe, and elsewhere who are
ready for tough action . . . . This will for
sure lead the Finnish police to new
situations, and we have to think
seriously about what we do now and
how we do it. (P12)
Why do international issues seem to play
a more important role in the Finnish police
knowledge than before? One answer is a
wider transnationalization of security pol-
icies and policing (see Sheptycki 1998;
Loader 2002; de Lint and Virta 2004).
Reiter and Fillieule (2006) have noted that
formal and informal co-operation in public
order policing has become more intensive
and active within the European Union since
the protests in Seattle, Gothenburg, and
Genoa. I argue that such international
co-operation has influence on various levels
of governance and planners in Finland so
that they take into consideration the threat
scenarios, but the experience of officers on
the street is different.
The second tension between national
and global concerns how Finnish police
officers perceived the tactics and measures
of crowd policing. The informants said
that, in the early 1990s, crowd control
units and policy were created on the basis
of selected models from other countries.
In particular, the models of Swedish and
English police forces were used as
examples in Finland. However, most
informants emphasized that the final out-
come was a unique Finnish model, as one
officer said:
We didn’t have such policing in Finland,
so we had to look for models in other
countries . . . . I think that we are very
close to the Swedish way of thinking, but
also the English non-armed model . . . .
So we have been forced to take some
ideas from one country and some from
another. I think that we succeeded
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in modifying these foreign elements to fit
both Finnish legislation and police
culture. (P5)
The informant said that the impacts of
the English model were mainly organiz-
ational. The English and Finnish models
for crowd control units are remarkably
similar. For example, most of the time
officers of the units work in ordinary
policing at the local level, the organization
is nation-wide and divided into territorial
units, the chain of command has three
levels, and separate territorial units can
function as one if needed (Waddington
1991:140–141; King and Brearley
1996:13; Reiner 2000:67).
All informants said that they think the
unique Finnish model should be preserved.
They perceived that the police should
respect the individuality of Finnish crowd
control policy (e.g. tactics, measures,
and equipment) and the police should
be critical of transnational policies of
policing:
We must use a very effective and big
filter all the time for what we pick
up from abroad because most practical
ways of policing used in other
countries don’t suit Finland, and we
don’t want them here . . . . The Finnish
model is the one and only way to
keep these events in Finland
peaceful . . . [and] under the police’s
control, and first and foremost to
keep trust in the police and its role
in this society as high as it is now.
(P12)
However, some informants thought that
transnational co-operation between differ-
ent police forces was already a part of
everyday reality in the European Union.
The independence of Finnish policies had
been lost to some extent:
Yes, Finland is part of Europe [the
European Union] and we share common
view-points. There is a regular exchange
of information with other European
countries and we even try to harmonize
our approaches to public order policing.
(P6)
Even so, most of the informants said that
operational co-operation is far more
difficult at the transnational level, and
that the operational co-operation involves
various problems concerning principles
and practices of policing. One informant
expressed mistrust and scepticism towards
co-operation:
It is a big issue, how you can fit
together the policing practices of two
or three different countries so that
they are in balance. It is quite risky if
we start to operate beyond borders in
ordinary policing . . . . From my point
of view, operational policing must
continue to be a national issue, based
on our own tradition of policing.
(P12)
The data strongly suggest that the co-
operation in public order policing within
the European Union has influenced the
way that the police perceive crowd
events and their policing in Finland. So
far, however, the transnational style of
policing—e.g. zero tolerance orientation,
the massive use of force, deterrence of
crowds, low trust in negotiation,
massive intelligence, and alarmist use
of information (della Porta and
Reiter 2006:176–186; see also Vitale
2005; Peterson et al. 2006)—has not
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been realized at street level.3 The
harmonization resulting from the
co-operation has been a question of
operational preparation, planning, and
education for policing in the future.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the article I reviewed
earlier studies of public order policing and
crowd control in Western countries.
The main argument of the previous studies
was that the policing of crowds became
softer, more co-operative and professiona-
lized, and negotiation-oriented after the
1980s. This means that the police put its
‘iron fist’ into a ‘velvet glove’ (King and
Brearley 1996:5). Some of the studies (e.g.
Noakes et al. 2005; Vitale 2005; della Porta
and Reiter 2006; Noakes and Gillham
2006) also noted that after the short golden
era of negotiated crowd management, there
has been a new wave of more coercive,
brutal, and less tolerant policing since the
protests of Seattle, Gothenburg, and Genoa.
The aim of this study was to determine the
extent to which the above trends in public
order policing, and especially in crowd
control, have been a part of the reality of
Finnish police officers. Moreover, the study
explored whether the traditional Finnish
‘velvet glove’ (see Korander 2004; Levä
2008) was taken off the ‘iron fist’ policing in
Finland in the early 1990s, when new crowd
control policy began.
The study showed that the Finnish police
knowledge involves at the same time the
international elements of ‘iron fist’ and the
national elements of ‘velvet glove’ policing.
Firstly, the police knowledge of national
street-level policing is mainly based on a
policy of ‘soft’ and negotiated manage-
ment. Moreover, the police perceive the
majority of Finnish crowds and crowd
situations as peaceful, non-problematic,
and orderly. The street reality of most
crowd events is and has been the main
argument for ‘soft’ public order policing
and crowd control in Finland. The police
prefer policies of traditional ‘velvet glove’
than ‘iron fist’ policing on the street in
Finland. This view-point was shared by all
the interviewed crowd control officers.
Crowd control and the extreme appli-
cations of an ‘iron fist’ policy have not
played an important role in Finnish public
order policing.
Secondly, however, transnational issues
now play a more important role in Finnish
police knowledge. Transnational issues
mostly concern the way the police perceive
the future shifts in crowd situations in
Finland. They fear that the political
violence, hooliganism, and conflicts
between the police and crowds which
have happened in many other countries
will also come to Finland. Thus, the police
are preparing themselves to cope with such
threats with policies of ‘iron fist’ policing,
even if the threat is now more ‘what if’ than
street reality. Briefly, crowd events and
3 The case of the Smash ASEM protest organized during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in September 2006 raises doubts about this argument. As noted earlier, the interviewed police officers perceived the forthcoming meeting as potentially threatening a year or two beforehand. The Smash ASEM protest was the only conflict between the police and protesters during the meeting. The police blocked and surrounded the protesters (roughly 300 protesters and bystanders; almost all of them were Finns) in a street in the centre of Helsinki using buses and about 200 crowd control police officers. The police arrested 136 individuals within the police circle. The policing during the event was an example of Vitale’s ‘command and control’ policing in a Finnish context (Vitale 2005:292–295). This was the first and so far only case of such policing in Finland, so no conclusions can be drawn based on it. Hypothetically, it can be interpreted as an example of a shift in Finnish public order policing tradition in an unusual context (cf. the case of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Canada 1997 (Ericson and Doyle 1999)).
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their policing are increasingly perceived by
the police as a global issue, which
emphasizes the importance of international
co-operation between national police
forces concerning policies of crowd man-
agement and control. Hence, the argu-
ments presented by other academics (e.g.
Sheptycki 1998; Loader 2002; de Lint and
Virta 2004) concerning the transnationali-
zation of policing and security politics are
supported by the findings of this study.
However, the officers interviewed have a
critical approach towards the idea of
transnational policies for public order
policing if they were to transform radically
the current models of the policing of crowd
events in Finland.
The Finnish case suggests that it is
important to study local and transnational
aspects of national police knowledge of
crowds and their policing. So far, these two
realities have been more or less separated
by researchers (e.g. della Porta and Reiter
1998; della Porta and Reiter 2006), but this
study shows how important it is to unify
these two perspectives in future studies.
Moreover, this case study showed that, on
the other hand, studies of police knowledge
should examine the police forces of
different countries separately and compare
them. In this way, it is possible to find both
general and special features of crowd events
and their policing. One example of a study
that does this is ‘The Policing of Transna-
tional Protests’ (Peterson et al. 2006), but it
is mainly focused on cases of transnational,
not national, protests and their policing.
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KARI SAARI
Senior Lecturer in Sociology (act.)
Department of Social Policy and
Social Psychology
University of Kuopio
P.O. Box 1627
FI-70211 Kuopio
FINLAND
Email: [email protected]
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