7 Building Teams and Resolving Conflicts
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confrontation_and_conflict.docxABSTRACT
This study is a discourse analysis of how managers deal with conflict during Participative Decision-Making (PDM). Audio-taped recordings of 20 meetings in three banks in Hong Kong were analysed. Commonly used conflict-resolution strategies were found as actually diverting from conflict-generating strategies that are believed to be conducive to innovative change and organizational growth (Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Rancer, 1995). Outwardly, they appear to be just the managers' ingenious ways to resolve conflicts in a PDM context. The managers' hidden agenda is to reinforce control over their subordinates. But rather than being deliberately deceptive, managers appear to use thesestrategies because of the need to meet the competing organizational demands of acting both as a facilitator of PDM and as a gatekeeper of the management hierarchy.
In management literature, conflict is generally recognized to be an inherent and ubiquitous part of organizational life (Nicotera, 1995). According to management theorists, there are two contrasting ways of dealing with conflict (Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Argyris, 1992): the traditional conflict negative approach and the post-Fordist conflict-positive approach. The traditional approach regards conflict as basically negative and destructive. Conflict is to be avoided, suppressed, or resolved competitively. The post-Fordist approach, on the other hand, views conflict in a much more positive light. Open conflict is looked at as a sign of organizational health. Conflict is to be encouraged as it can bring hidden problems to the surface, solve mutual problems and allow for change by creating tension and removing complacency. While the former approach emphasises management control from the top down as a primary conflict-resolution method, the latter encourages bottom-up participation of employees in working out conflicts in a constructive way. While the former is usually practised in a traditional hierarchy, the latter can only take place in a participative environment.
Participative Decision-Making (PDM) is reported to have been widely adopted in organizations all over the world (Monge & Miller, 1988). As part and parcel of PDM, the constructive conflict-handling approach should be concurrently practised. There are certainly many PDM training programmes that have been introduced in organizations. Formal channels such as quality circles have also been set up for PDM. Nevertheless, in many cases, the traditional management hierarchy still remains, and the training programmes and PDM channels are mere adjuncts and new-fangled ideas. In such a scenario, there may be a lot of lip service paid to PDM and constructive conflict-handling styles, but unilateral top-down control may still be a predominantmanagement practice, especially in the resolution of conflicts. Fairclough (1990) suggests that because managers are trained in the use of PDMstrategies, the same strategies may well be deployed for authoritarian purposes. It would, therefore, be interesting to find out whether managers do use mixed strategies when they handle conflicts in PDM settings.
Constructive conflict-handling has been well theorized and its methods well documented in management literature (for example, Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Rancer, 1995). It has often been contrasted to the traditional approach to resolving conflicts. In positive conflict-confrontation, instead of the traditional method of avoiding conflict and suppressing dissent, there should be a full representation of diverse viewpoints and a thorough examination of issues. In particular, the underlying rationale of the official position should be brought to the surface instead of being taken for granted as unchallengeable. The philosophy and values behind different perspectives are to be taken into consideration in working out viable solutions. Instead of relying on the complacency of established practice, organizational rules and practices are subject to open critique and possible revision. While proposed solutions are carefully scrutinized, some objective rather than arbitrary standard is applied in their evaluation. Instead of the win-lose outcome in traditional competitive conflict-resolution, synergistic solutions accommodating mutual interests have to be arrived at. To ensure creative tension instead of unilateral top-down control, some egalitarian decision rule such as consensus should be enforced.
From the above, it can be seen that open confrontation as an approach to handling conflict presupposes a genuinely participative climate, where the participants are accorded with equal rather than hierarchical status. But as pointed out earlier, the vertical structure of management is basically left intact in many an organization where PDM has been introduced. As links in the hierarchical chain, middle and first-line managers only find it natural to play the role of gatekeeper for the establishment, exercising formal control over the subordinates. At the same time, they have to act as facilitators of PDM processes, ensuring that problems and conflicts are confronted openly and productively.
Placed under two very different sets of demands, it is perhaps inevitable that at least some managers engage in conflict-handling of the traditional kind even in formal PDM settings. It is also conceivable that they may have shaped conflict-handling strategies to give only an appearance of PDM, as postulated by Fairclough (1990). It is the aim of the present research to find out whether any, and if so, what conflict-handling strategies are used that satisfy PDM demands at least outwardly, while enabling the managers to retain absolute control over subordinates.
The best locale in which to study managers' strategies for handling conflicts with subordinates is arguably meetings held with the expressed purpose of using PDM. During PDM, subordinates are encouraged to voice their opinions even if they conflict with those of the management. They are also supposed to put forward suggestions even though they may be contrary to established practice. When the managers disagree with the subordinates and the latter hold on to their dissenting positions, the managers' conflict-handling approach is put to the test.
Twenty PDM meetings in three major banks in Hong Kong have been studied. In all of the organizations under study, PDM has been formally introduced, either as quality circles, or as staff meetings held for PDM purposes. During PDM meetings, the managers are expected to play the role of PDM facilitators, in addition to their traditional role as managers. As PDM facilitators, they are supposed to encourage their subordinates to make suggestions and voice their opinions concerning work procedures and organizational policies. But by virtue of their hierarchical positions, the managers often feel obliged to screen the subordinates' propositions, even if the formal channel exists to channel their subordinates' contributions up the managementhierarchy.
The meetings were personally observed by the researcher. They were also audio-recorded and the transcripts were analysed to identify the relevantconflict-handling strategies of the managers. In order to obtain a better understanding of the organizational context in which the discourse takes place, all the managers and some of the subordinates were interviewed either before or after the meetings.
Discourse analysis, as outlined by Heritage & Drew (1992), was used. In identifying relevant strategies, the discourse strategies postulated for both the traditional and open-confrontational types (Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Rancer, 1995) were used as reference points. The discursive features of the managers' conflict-handling talk were carefully compared with the theoretical categories to see exactly what discourse strategies they were employing.
A number of frequently used discourse strategies were identified. They show features of both the positive and negative modes of handling conflict(Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Rancer, 1995). The following is a list of the mixed modes found in the study:
1. Sympathetic representation of dissenting viewpoints as a pacifying gambit;
2. Defensive account-giving;
3. Presentation of ostensible choice;
4. Hedging opinions as a gambit to preface mandates;
5. Using double standards;
6. Avoiding using the outcome of open argumentation.
Examples are given below to demonstrate the patterns of the mixed strategies. For the purpose of presentation, the original Cantonese dialogues have been translated into English. (The Cantonese accounts were transcribed using the Yale system with a word-for-word English translation.) The relevantdiscourse features are underlined for highlighting purposes.
Sympathetic Representation of Divergent Viewpoint as a Gambit
When managers disagree with a subordinates' proposals, they usually go out of their way to show how much they appreciate the problems the subordinate refers to. Such a display of understanding and sympathy almost amounts to an endorsement of the subordinates' position. However, it may be being used only as a gambit[1] (Keller, 1979) to introduce another approach to the problem instead. Basically, the strategy is to show the subordinates that the problem is well understood but there may well be other circumstances that the subordinates are not aware of. Thus, the subordinates will not imagine that there is an unwillingness on the part of management to refuse to change the status quo. In short, the manager shapes the pattern of thediscourse in such a way that it may start with empathizing or sympathizing with the subordinates' viewpoint, but moves nevertheless onto a contrary position. To execute this shift, usually discourse controllers[2] such as metapragrnatic comments (MPCs),[3] metadiscoursal comments (MDCs)[4] or illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs)[5] (Thomas, 1988) are employed. Their function is to signal acknowledgement of the other's preceding viewpoint as a deja-vu, and at the same time introduce a redefinition of the issue.
In the following example, the manager not only repeats but actually further elaborates the reasons given by the subordinate to support her argument for a longer lunch hour. The repeated use of the question tag 'isn't it?' to indicate knowledge underlines the fact that he knows what argument the subordinate is using. He then proceeds to ask the 'why not' question that must be in the mind of the subordinate. At the same time, he points out the obviousness of themanagement answer that there has to be a reason for not adopting the suggested course of action. The metapragmatic comments, 'Of course there is a reason. It just couldn't be the case that there is no reason', underline the redundancy of having to articulate the official reason, thus implying its irrefutability, as well as an admonishment for challenging it. Also note the MDC, 'It can be put this way', and the MPC, 'Well, we are aware of this too'. The former indicates that the manager is about to reformulate the problem. The latter refers to the fact that even though he is well aware of the problem, he has to act otherwise, having considered other more important aspects of the circumstances.
Example 1
(One of the subordinates has asked for a longer lunch hour in the preceding dialogue.)
Manager:
It can be put this way. Everybody wants a longer lunch hour. We all do. You and I do, because it's more comfortable, more relaxed, there is no need to rush, isn't it ? You don't need to gobble up the food that fast. We are aware of this too. In this neighbourhood, there are plenty of people going to lunch at noon. So everybody is fighting for a seat and queui up. It's a terrible waste of time. So, so why do we still have a 45-minute lunch break? Of course there is a reason. It just couldn't be the case without a reason.
(The manager continues to elaborate the reason for his policy which overrides the subordinate's request to reconsider the problem and work out a solution.)
In the conflict-positive literature, repeating the opposing viewpoint is seen as part of the dialectics of thoroughly examining the issues. In the present context, however, the strategy of repetition merely functions as a way to silence the subordinates into passive acceptance of the management position. Instead of acting as the precursor to a full-blown debate, the discourse controllers are used by the managers to turn off further discussion. If successful, over time, the use of such a strategy may even have the effect of shutting up the subordinates' feedback channel altogether.
Defensive Account-giving
Conversation analysts (Antaki, 1988; Heritage, 1988) have pointed out that when a projected or expected response is not forthcoming, the respondent often feels a compulsion to account for it. Similarly, when the managers have to reject the subordinates' proposition, an explanation is usually given accounting for the rejection. In contrast to debating in open confrontation, account-giving is designed to persuade the subordinates to accept denial. In spite of its rational facade, it is a type of close-ended discourse.
The accounts managers give, usually include justifications such as 'normative appeal' (Antaki, 1988), showing of concern for the other's interest and relaying the background and rationale for forming an alternative opinion which supersedes that of the staff.
Normative appeal can become a kind of rectificatory lecturing aimed at re-educating the staff about organizational decision premises (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985; Bullis, 1991). When using normative appeal, managers usually assume that the subordinates lack the necessary institutional knowledge to draw valid inferences according to organizational principles and reach the right decisions. But by so doing, the managers also risk ruling out any novel approaches to existing problems.
In making normative appeals, the strategy used need not be a crude appeal to an organizational rule in order to exert pressure. As mentioned earlier, it can be an attempt at persuasion by laying bare the rationale of the policy the managers advocate. But what is challenging is to align the subordinates' 'aberrant' viewpoint with the organizational decision premise and to do this so that subordinates submit willingly.
In the following example, note how the manager makes explicit the reasoning behind the action he advises. Particular attention should be paid to hedging qualifters such as 'I think' and concessionary gambits such as 'even if it's very repetitive and obviously very wasteful of manpower, we'll still have to do it'. These are rhetorical devices used to repress non-preferred responses such as request denials (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Heritage, 1988). Similarly, the repeated use of the singular and plural first person 'I' and 'we' indicates how he is putting himself in his subordinates' shoes in the reasoning process and identifies with their interests.
Example 2
(In the preceding dialogue, the subordinates have bitterly complained about the cumbersome procedure of the present system for dealing with letters of credit. In their opinion, it is inefficient, time-consuming, and a complete waste of manpower. The manager has tried to explain the pragmatic reasons for following the official procedure. Now, he concludes on the rationale of the official policy at a more general level.)
Manager:
But now, I think, I think the spirit of it should be like this. Saving manpower is the next step. The most important reason why Head Office issues such a rule is to avoid errors and also to tighten up control. I'd do it [according to the rules] first. And then, I'd take my time to think about how to save manpower. But sometimes, how to save manpower is not something we can make a decision about. We can't say we want to do it and we'll do it. Head Office will probably say we're wrong. For the time being, even if it's very repetitive, very redundant, obviously very wasteful of manpower, we'll still have to do it. The first priority is to avoid errors and have tight control. Later on, I hope Head Office will suggest [a change].
Obviously the strategy of account-giving depends on the use of reason and understanding. It even involves going into the underlying assumptions behind the officially held position. But in contrast to open debate which leads to refutation by logic, account-giving is basically defensive. In open confrontation, the underlying assumptions are subject to challenge and revision. In defensive account-giving, on the other hand, the underlying rationale is the bottom line. As such, it is to be held sacred.
Hedging
In a climate of open discussion where participants are free to exchange views on an equal footing, opinions are subject to critical scrutiny and refutation. Under such circumstances, it is expected that hedging of opinions occurs frequently in the talk of the participants. Furthermore, in open encounters between superior and subordinates, because of the unequal power relationship, the superior should feel the need to dissociate himself or herself from the authority position if genuine dialogue and argumentation is to take place. Hedging has to do with the toning down of certainty, which is associated with power in a direct relationship (Givon, 1989). Managers practising PDM should feel the need to hedge their talk. In the managers' account-giving talk in the present corpus, hedging is indeed a frequent feature. However, it is very often used as a gambit to test the ground and blunt adverse response before unleashing the full force of the mandatory speech.
The following prefacing talk contains discourse controllers which apparently disclaim the validity of the forthcoming opinion. But obviously the hedges (in italics in the text below), cannot simply be taken at face value. They are rather the thin end of a wedge to usher in the manager's contrary but authoritative position. As it turns out in the subsequent discourse, it is a position not only expounded at length by the manager, but also defies any challenge from the subordinates:
Example 3
Manager:
Look, you can look at it this way. I was thinking. Just take it as a very subjective opinion on my part in listening to what you've said. What I think is, personally...
(The manager then goes on to give a speech on how the staff have been taking the wrong approach to the problem and enters into a very defensive argument with them.)
Presentation of Ostensible Choice
As part of an ostensibly rational strategy to convince the staff of the wisdom of dropping their proposal, the managers may concede to the staff that there is indeed a problem with the system as the staff have suggested. On the other hand, they can point out that there is also a potential problem with the staff's suggested course of change. The calculated effect of this is that they are trying to hold a balanced view of the issue in coming to a decision, even if that decision means that on balance, it is a safer move to preserve the status quo.
The following is an example of the above strategy. Note that the situation is presented by the manager as a predicament, where either the present policy or the suggested change would constitute a problem. It follows that the way out of this is to listen to the manager's advice, which, interestingly, turns out to be in essence just keeping the problematic status quo. But an ostensible look at both sides of the question enables him to put a seemingly objective question of choice to the subordinates further down the line of the argument.
Example 4
(The manager reacts to the subordinate's proposition by speculating what would happen if the subordinate's proposal were adopted.)
Manager:
As a matter of fact, if as you say, supposing the main branch does what you suggested, there will still be a problem, sometimes. If it's your main branch, and not the Bills Centre that calls the customer directly, probably the branch, our Headquarters, and the sub-branch don't know what's happening. So, you get landed with this kind of problem instead. In other words, it seems that no matter what you do, you'll still have a problem. Now, from our point of view, I hope that no matter what you do, we will follow whatever Headquarters chooses to do, regardless.
(The manager further justifies his view that under the present circumstances, it is premature to talk about change. Then, he puts the vital question.)
Manager:
So, which of these do we choose? Which one do we choose?
It can be seen from the above that the manager is loading the scale. If innovative problem-solving is the goal, then the purpose is defeated. Further exploration of a satisfactory solution is foreclosed and the staff are subtly coerced into accepting the status quo, however unsatisfactory it is.
Using Double Standards
In the example below, the manager offers a compromise solution of adhering to the formal organizational principle on the one hand, and allowing the staff to follow their own inclination to act as they see fit when they come across problems. Since the compromise is premised on double standards, the manager is apologetic about his decision. However, the staff agree to this arrangement:
Example 5
Manager:
It's better that we think about it simply. In principle, do everything in the same way [according to the rule book]. On the other hand, when you come across some big deals: large amounts, urgent, the quotations are changing, etc., etc., and it's urgent, then you, being the executive, should use your wisdom to improvise. (The subordinates laugh.)
It's the only way out under the circumstances. It's so difficult at the moment. But our working principle is fixed in such a way that we have to do the transactions by going through layer after layer.
Staff 1:
Do the transaction for him (the client) directly.
Staff 2:
[If] it's only a difference of a few cents, close the deal [without going through the layers].
It can be argued that the adoption of double standards would still maintain a positive tension between the mandatory and discretionary in an organization (Pascale, 1991). Nevertheless, as the above case illustrates, using double standards is an uneasy compromise. The staff's choice is between following the rule and doing the job inefficiently or bending the rule for greater efficiency. In practice, if the rule has to be bent all the time, which seems to be the case (as revealed in the conversation preceding the decision), a more radical change and creative solution is probably called for.
Avoiding Using the Outcome of Open Confrontation
Although many of the strategies listed above are designed to ultimately hold the official line, they are none-the-less rational strategies. As such, they rely on the working of reason and are conducive to rational argumentation. Because of this, they do not always work as foolproof defensive strategies. In a number of instances, the subordinates make a come-back to confront the managers. For example, the sympathetic representation of the subordinates' dissenting views gives the subordinates the hope that their position is being appreciated. Similarly, by giving an honest account of the reasons behind a policy, the managers may open the floodgate of doubt and challenge. For this reason, the managers sometimes have to adopt strategies to avoid accepting the outcome of an open confrontation and argumentation with the subordinates. This is particularly so if endorsing the logical conclusion of rational argumentation means they have to deviate from the official position. One such strategy is the delaying tactic. Another one is avoiding using the outcome of the open arguments.
(a) Delaying tactic. The delaying tactic consists of passing the buck of final decision to upper management. It is used by the managers to pass on the unpleasant job of denial. The managers can then avoid the overt use of positional power to turn down what may turn out to be a not unreasonable proposition from the subordinates. On the other hand, they can be seen as channelling communication up the hierarchy. On both counts, they conform to the tenets of PDM.
In the example below, the manager has been locked in an extended argument with the subordinates over their proposal. He has obviously failed to convince them about the wisdom of sticking to the official line. But he does not wish to appear unreasonable by imposing an unpopular decision on his subordinates. To get off the hook, he uses the strategy of passing the decision up the management hierarchy. Although he claims to be neutral on the issue, it is predictable as to what the management's decision will be. He also betrays his own view by elaborating on the advantages of the official policy only. It is obvious that he is using the higher authorities as a subterfuge of denial.
Example 6
(The subordinates have argued that the superannuation deducted monthly should be stopped and the funds should be distributed now because of the uncertain political future of Hong Kong. The manager finds the view a valid one, but nevertheless it is contrary to the organization's policy.)
Manager:
Well, regarding this one, we can also make suggestions to management for their consideration. But I believe either way has its own advantage. May be if you take the longer-term view, you'll see the salary deduction should be made. If you work slightly longer, you'll find it's more to your advantage to have a deduction. In fact, a much bigger advantage.
(b) Having the final say. This strategy is also a delaying tactic. It is to avoid participating in open confrontation with the subordinates during the cut and thrust of group discussion. It involves delaying the adverse opinion until after the discussion is over. The advantage of having the final say at the end of the meeting is that the others are deprived of an opportunity to respond adequately. Needless to say, the final say coming from someone in a position of power carries a great deal of weight.
In the following example, the manager remains very much in the background until after the meeting closes. He then gives his concluding speech. By way of summing up, he points out the subordinates' lack of a comprehensive viewpoint in tackling the problem. He gives them a lecture on the rationale and functions of the system the subordinates are trying to improve. The following dialogue shows how he goes on to advise them about how to approach the problem. By so doing, he indirectly dismisses the subordinates' proposal.
Example 7
Manager:
So, concerning the EIS and the system, there have been suggestions put forward. But I think, I hope that we'll think it over again. Before we know for sure, is the problem we observe and think is the problem really the problem? May be not too much... I probably don't ... If I don't understand the problem too clearly and don't know where it lies, or I don't know the details, it's somehow better to have somebody, for instance, to wait and see, to suggest bringing someone in or something. You consult someone first, to see what the problem is, define the problem, write down the problem that you think affects our system's integrity. Perhaps it's a security problem to a certain extent. Eh, it may be a potential problem. Eh, so it's not simply by introducing a form or amending a form that a problem can be solved. There is probably a loophole there.
The conflict-handling strategies examined above do differ from the open conflict-handling strategies highlighted in the literature. The differences are sometimes very subtle, but they are nevertheless there. For example, managers hedge their opinions not so much to indicate flexibility of view in open discussion but to soften the denial. They show sympathy for their subordinates' viewpoints only to prove that they have thoroughly considered their contrary positions before final rejection. Analysis of these approaches also indicates that they are derived from PDM rather than strictly authoritarianconflict-handling strategies. For example, presenting a choice to subordinates in a group decision-making situation comes &om the managers' desire to secure consensus, even if the choice is framed as a loaded question. In fact, many of the mixed strategies would not be conceivable in a strictly authoritarian management framework. Although the mixed strategies are ultimately aimed at control over the subordinates in defence of the establishment, it does not seem fair to say that these strategies are deliberate attempts on the part of the managers to give PDM a poor reputation. The managers are obviously driven by mixed motives. On the one hand, they wish to foster PDM and encourage contributions from subordinates. On the other, they have to play gatekeepers of the organization's established practice because of their positions on the hierarchy. The dual role inevitably puts them in a predicament.
To utilize the creative tension of the paradoxical situation (Pascale, 1991), managers would have to play a more active role in facilitating change. For example, instead of engaging in account-giving to defend a management position, they would have to play the devil's advocate in challenging the subordinates' propositions for change. Rather than strictly gatekeeping, they could make use of their vantage point of institutional knowledge in guiding the subordinates to seek viable channels for change. But managers using mixed strategies of conflict-resolution described in the previous section choose to come down on the side of the status quo. The difficulty with this approach is that while opting for the comfort of certainty, they may also perpetuate the problems that lead to the conflict in the first place.
In using mixed strategies for handling conflict, the managers are in fact practising PDM, albeit to a limited degree. Overt use of power is certainly avoided. Various verbal tactics such as hedging are used so as to be on a par with the subordinates and in order to have a dialogue with them. There are also attempts to adopt the subordinates' points of view in argumentation. This modicum of PDM can be attributed to the PDM expectations of the subordinates. It is also reliant on the realization by management that the continued maintenance of the status quo depends on the understanding and willing co-operation of their subordinates.
However, these strategies are not always successful. For example, the subordinates may feel emboldened by the managers' sympathetic representation of their viewpoints. Consequently, they will insist on their demand and ignore the fact that the managers' show of sympathy is only a gambit. More important still, the mixed strategies are arguably mutated from strategies of open argumentation and problem-solving. Being basically rationallyoriented, they seem to have a life of their own Jn following through with the logic. As the discussion unfolds, it often becomes clear to all what the logical conclusion should be even if it is contrary to the management position. But as has been shown in the previous section, the managers have also developedstrategies for dealing with such unwelcome situations. However, if subordinates start to feel that they are repeatedly let down by such PDM pretensions, and continue to get mixed signals from these strategies, there may come a break point when they are totally disillusioned about PDM.
Overall, it appears that managers adopt mixed conflict-resolution strategies mainly because of the demand coming from the management hierarchy. Analysis of the discourse at the meetings covered in the study shows that managers receive mixed messages from the top about the roles ofmanagement control and PDM. Unless control is loosened from the top to make way for innovation and change, such mixed strategies are likely to continue to be developed.
On the basis of the data presented in this study, there is indeed evidence that managers use strategies which resemble open conflict-handlingstrategies during PDM meetings with subordinates. Commonly-used strategies include account-giving, group choice, sympathizing with dissenting viewpoints, hedging and attending to multiple standards. But these strategies divert from the conflict-generating strategies (Pascale, 1991; Tjosvold, 1991; Rancer, 1995) used for the thorough examination of issues related to innovative change. Consciously or unconsciously, they are just ingenious ways of resolving conflict in an outwardly PDM context. The hidden agenda appears to be reaffirming management control over subordinates. In terms of formal features, they have much in common with verbal strategies for open argumentation. For example, the use of tentative markers for presenting propositions in open discussion, the use of the rhetoric of reason instead of power, and the presentation of choice in decision-making.
There are, however, other features of discourse such as discourse controllers which signal the managers' wish to control subordinate responses and to ensure a biased outcome of the discussion. At the same time, the discourse context reveals that the conflict-resolution strategies are PDM in form only. The dialogue preceding and following the use of such mixed strategies certainly shows them to have what are ultimately authoritarian ends. But it would be too much to say that these strategies are cold-blooded, calculated attempts to fool subordinates into believing managers' bogus participative intentions. Rather, they appear to develop out of the dire necessity for managers to be participative and yet maintain absolute control over the subordinates. As such, they may well be common practice in organizations where some limited form of PDM has been introduced into the managementhierarchy.
[1]. A gambit can be defined as a conversational strategy to introduce a viewpoint by preparing the listener for what is about to come, with a view to making him or her more receptive to the forthcoming idea.
[2]. Discourse controllers are devices used to regulate the development of the ongoing discourse between participants.
[3]. Metapragmatic comments are those used to control or forestall the listener's likely reactions.
[4]. Metadiscoursal comments are comments intended to keep the listener's contribution to the discourse within the limits prescribed by the speaker or to set new discursive boundaries for the speaker.
[5]. Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices are declarations of the speaker's intended speech act. They are used to indicate and control the purpose and limits of the subsequent discourse.
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