philosophy

The Ethics of the Family

Edited by

Stephen Scales, Adam Potthast and Linda Oravecz

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WHAT Is A FAMILY?

While the word "family" is recognizable to everyone, paradoxically, it can be difficult to come to a consensus on its definition for many reasons, Individuals tend to define family based on what they are familiar with. Experiences in our families of origin, the families we are born into, or families of procreation, those we form through marriage and the birth of children, color how we view what a family should be. For example, an only child raised by a grandparent is more likely to consider such a family structure as "normal" than someone from a more traditional, two-parent family.

Additionally, there are social and cultural biases concerning what a family is. In the United States, the cultural icon of family is that of the two parent household, male as breadwinner, female as homemaker and caregiver, and the preferred number of children, which is two. I While this family structure actually makes up less than 7% 20f families in the US, it is viewed as the cultural norm, and therefore a bias exists for the families falling outside of this "norm".

The meaning of family has varied over time and among groups. Cultures place different importance on a variety of family structures. Polygamy is commonly practiced in many Asian, Arabic and African nations. Asians are more likely than Anglo-Americans to live with their extended families3 Similarly, Latino infants and children are more likely than their Anglo counterparts to have active contact with mUltiple extended family members'

Family is also a political symbol, with both sides of the aisle claiming "pro-family" policies, in effect implying that the other party does not promote "family values". Conservatives favor policies that promote marriage among heterosexuals and discourage single parent families. Conversely, liberals are more likely to include gay and single parent

I Townsend, J. (2003). Reproductive behavior in the context of global population. American Psychologist, 58. 1 79-204. 2 United States Census Bureau (2002). Current Population Survey. Retrieved February 8, 2009 from http://www.census.gov!cps! 3 Knox, D., & Schacht, C. (2008). Choices in Relationships: An introduction to marriage ami the family. (9th Edition). CA: Wadsworth Publishing. 4 Garcia, C. ( 1 993). What do we mean by extended family? A closer look at multi generational Hispanic families. Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology, 8, 137-146.

Introduction 3

families, although even the current presidential administration is loathe to define marriage as anything other than that between a man and a woman.

There are several different bases of definitions for "family". One of the most common is the biological ties we have to another. We often refer to someone as a "blood" relative, and research suggests that in times of crisis, we are more likely to seek and receive assistance from biological family. 5 Other family members may be defined by their legal ties, i.e.: through marriage or adoption. According to this definition, a man and a woman are not family until they have a marriage license, and adoptive parents and child are not legally family until a judge finalizes the process.

Other bases by which family may be defined, but are much less recognized by those who are the gatekeepers of rights and responsibilities granted to family members, are emotional and affect�ve, or how �e fe�l about someone. For example, in African Ameflcan and Hlspamc communities, fictive kin, or non-relatives who are regarded as family members, often enjoy ties as strong or stronger than those established b y blood or marriage.6 Emotionally, we feel they are family, s o therefore, they are. Interaction patterns may also determine who is considered family, or "we do things for one another that only a family member would do".

While discussing the definition of family, it is important to contrast it with that of marriage. Marriage involves two individuals who usually choose one another, a monogamous sexual relation between spouses is expected, as is procreation. The marriage ends when one spouse dies or there is a divorce. On the other hand, family, according to some definitions, usually involves more than two people, and is the consequence of procreation. As any newlywed couple can attest, one of the questions that they will be asked repeatedly is "when are you going to start a family?", implying that a married couple in and of itself is not yet quite a family. Members are born or adopted into the family, by no choice of their own (as many an angry child will remind their parents), and the family continues beyond the life of the individual. Sex between near kin is neither expected nor approved.

Lastly, family is often defined on the basis of household arrangement. This classification has an Anglo bias, literally defining family by who IS

5 Burnstein, E., Crandall, c., & Kitayama, S. ( 1 994). Some neo-Darwinian decision lUles for altruism: Weighing cues for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the decision. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 773-779. 6 Dilworth-Anderson, P., Burton, W . . , & Turner, W. (1993). The importance of values in the study of culturally diverse families. Family Relations, 42, 238-42.

4 Chapter One

living under one roof. It is important to note that The U.S. Census Bureau defines family as: two or more people living together who are related by birth, marriage or adoption. Such a definition clearly excludes many who consider themselves to be family, and today we find many groups fighting to have their relationships recognized as such.

Definitions of family have important consequences for individuals, often determining which rights and obligations of family members are recognized. These definitions have both economic and social consequences. Economic benefits and assets are only available to those legally defined as family by the provider, i.e.: social security benefits or the ability to be on another's health insurance policies. If a family member dies intestate, the assets of that person will usually be distributed among legal or biological relatives, such as spouses or children. Social implications of family definition include the ability to make decisions for another, for example whether to continue life suppOli measures. Additionally, how we define family as a society affects the ability of a child to believe that their family, regardless of form, is "normal".

Federal and State definitions of marriage and family have a critical impact on policies affecting families. According to the 2000 Census, there are 594,000 same sex partner households, with children living in 27 percent of those households. Most of these families are unable to have married heads of household. The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 defined marriage under federal law as exclusively heterosexual, while declaring that states are not required to recognize same sex marriages performed in other states. At this writing, only the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Iowa recognize same sex marriage, while Vermont, New Jersey and New Hampshire offer legal unions which allow the same state (but not federal) rights and responsibilities of marriage to same sex couples. By not allowing same sex couples to marry, individuals are unable to: access partners Medicare or Social Security; file joint taxes; obtain death benefits when a partner dies; obtain health/retirement benefits; sponsor partner for immigration to the US; and divorce. Additionally, same sex partners are at risk of losing access to their children if only one partner has legal rights to the child and the couple separates.

One can imagine the challenge of defining family will only grow more complex as family structures continue to change and birth technologies progress. For example, in 2008, a transgendered male gave birth to a child, allowing the possibility for him to be the child's mother, father, or even

Introduction 5

both.' Reproductive technologies allow children to have multiple parents, often blurring the lines of "family" members, while gay people continue to fight for the right to both marry and adopt children. As these and other changes occur in the American family, it will become increasingly important to define what a family is.

7 Reuters. (2008). Transgender man reportedly gives hirth. http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN0326774720080704

AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS

We begin to look at the place of ethics in the family with a brief explanation of some basic and important concepts in ethics. Mora) Intuitions are our prephilosophical or prereflective views or feelings about rightness and wrongness (perhaps transmitted at mother's knee), For example', suppose I live in a rather sleazy part of town, and as I'm walking home one day, I come around a corner and suddenly see a bunch of young hoodlums pouring gasoline on a live cat and lighting it ablaze! "Oh, that is so wrong!", I say to myself, I have an immediate reaction of moral disapproval, a feeling of moral nausea or disgust. This is a moral intuition, Even if I can't yet say why what they are doing is wrong, I have the feeling that what they are doing is wrong. Moral intuitions are these gut reactions of approval or disapproval that we have to the various situations we encounter. Except, perhaps for some extreme sociopaths who are described as "without any conscience", we all have moral intuitions. According to some views, these intuitions provide the basic data that ethical theories are constructed to explain and/or revise. Considered Moral JUdgments are particular moral judgments justifiable by appeal to principles, If I say, "It would be wrong to set that cat on fire because it's an instance of causing unnecessary suffering", then I have a particular moral judgment. More general moral rules like, "Don't kill people for profit", or "It's wrong to cause unnecessary suffering" are used to justify such judgments, But what will we use to justify such general rules? For this, we appeal to Ethical Principles, the most general ultimate or first principles of ethical theories. For example, "Maximize net aggregate social utility" is the first principle of utilitarianism. Or, the first principle of Kantian ethics tells us that we must "Always act so that you could at the same time will that the maxim of your action should become a universal law of nature", Finally, Ethical Theories are these principles, rules, and judgments together (hopefully in some kind of agreement with our most fundamental moral �ntuitions) and the arguments in support of

j The example is due to Gilbert Harman's description in The Nature of Morality (Oxford UP, 1977), chapter 1; reprinted as "Ethics and Observation" in James Rachels, ed, Ethical Theory, vol. 1 (Oxford UP, 1998),

Introduction 7

them, Some examples of ethical fheories that we will look at include Utilitarianism, Contractarianism, Divine Command Moral Theory, etc.

Finally, before moving on to a map of the most prominent ethical theories, we ought to say something about "Reflective E�uilibriu�". "Reflective Equilibrium" is a term which comes out of a partIcular ethlc�l theory we will examine (thc contractarian approach of John Rawls), But It is useful to introduce it at the beginning of our InveStlgatlOn because It may serve as a kind of check on which ethical theories we are willing to accept. In discussing his own contractarian :riew, Rawls. points out that our thinking about ethics may often lead us mto what mIght be termed, "Cognitive/Emotional Dissonance", This is a sort of dIsharmony between the moral intuitions I actually feel (my gut) and the pnnclples I am prepared to rationally defend (my head), It is the grappling with this sort of disharmony that constitutes a great deal of the work we do In ethics, How does Rawls say that we ought to ovcrcome such cognitive/emotional dissonance? He says that v:e mo."e .back. and forth between intuitions and principles, sometimes altenng prmcipies III order to hold onto our most fundamentally felt. intuitions, sometimes giving up weakly held intuitions in order to hold onto powerful and useful principles,

For example, suppose that one of the ethical theones we wIll look at (a crude version of act utilitarianism) tells us that the nght thmg to do IS whatever will maximize happiness in a given situation. That doesn't sound like a crazy theory right off the bat. Now let's say that you are a doctor and that there are three very sick patients on your ward III the hospit�l. One needs a new heart; one needs a

. new l��er, and on� needs a

new pancreas. Each one is dying and theIr fanulles and fnends. are extremely distraught. Suppose that in off the street comes a new patIent, Adam. After a brief examination, you discover fhat Adam has a mIld ear infection, which should be cleared up with a course of antibiotics, But suppose that you also discover that Adam just happens to be a perfect genetic match for all of the three dying patients on your ward, �et' s also suppose that you could do whatever you want to Adam and there s almost no likelihood that anyone will ever find out about It. Now you have a choice, You could give Adam the antibiotics and send him on his way, This option would increase utility slightly: Adam will feel better and he'll stop complaining to his friends and family, Alternatively, you could knock Adam out with a sedative, carve him up and dlstnbute hIS parts to the other patients on your ward, This would increase utility greatly: Sadly, Adam will meet his untimely demise (all lives are presumed to have positive utility value), and his friends and family will be distraught, but the other three patients on your ward will now become healthy, happy,

8 Chapter O ne

productive members of society. All of their family and friends will be overjoyed! What would the crude act utilitarian say is the right thing to do? Carve Adam up! If we were ever tempted to become crude act utilitarians, I hope that this case illustrates just why we shouldn't. Here, the practical entailments of the theory are in such violent conflict with some of our most fundamental moral intuitions that the theory simply has to give way to the power of our intuitions. My conviction that murdering people in order to distribute their organs to others is wrong is simply too fundamental for me ever to give it up. Hence, what we've discovered is that crude act utilitarianism is a terrible ethical theory according to the requirement to move to a reflective equilibrium.

On the other hand, there may be cases where I would be willing to give up weak intuitions in order to save a theory. For example, suppose that initially, I have a weak prephilosophical intuition against physician­ assisted suicide; it makes me feel morally queasy. But suppose that I come upon a very powerful theory in medical ethics which allows me to explain lots of other intuitions I have, and provides guidance on a host of difficult cases, but which also entails that physician assisted suicide is morally permissible. It may be that I would be willing to give up my weak intuition against physician assisted suicide in order to hang on to this powerful and fruitful theoretical approach. Hence, Rawls instructs us to move back and forth between intuitions and principles, sometimes giving up theory to save deeply held intuitions, and sometimes giving up weakly held intuitions in order to save theory, until we arrive at a fit between them. This peace between intuition and theory is the state that Rawls refers to as "reflective equilibrium". It is the solution to the cognitive/emotional dissonance discussed above, and it requires both that we learn the principles of various ethical theories and that we work through real-world applications in order to achieve the goal of peace between our (cognitive) heads and our (emotional) guts.

It may be that this peace is the best we can hope for in evaluating the ethical theories we will look at and in applying them to the world of the family. This is our goal for all students of ethics: to achieve internal consistency, coherence, conciliance, and excellence of theory (to overcome cognitive/emotional dissonance), to become better able to rationally defend your ethic,al views (to learn to make an argument for your position), and to become better able to understand and respect other ethical views (by seeing which principles and arguments lie behind them). Now we will look at some of the major ethical theories that have been advanced in the history of ethics.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME PROMINENT ETHICAL THEORIES

There are a number of ways to divide and categorize ethical theories; here is what we think is a useful way to do so. We can divide all ethical theories into two major camps: the consequentialist camp, and the nonconsequentialist camp.

In ethical deliberation, it is common to think that what make my actions right or wrong are the consequences of those actions. If one tends to act in ways that create large amounts of bad consequences (suffering) for no good reason, it is hard to defend these actions as ethical. Similarly, the great ethical triumphs of the past (good consequences such as ending legalized slavery, limiting infectious disease and hunger, giving citizens a say in their government) tend to be those that limit suffering and lead to greater happiness. Broadly consequentialist theories all evaluate conduct as right or wrong based solely on the value of the consequences of the conduct. On this approach, the Right is defined in terms of the Good; the right thing to do is to aim at maximizing good consequences. An Egoist approach says that the right thing to do is to maximize my own good; a tribalist approach says that the right thing to do is to maximize the good of some group, and a utilitarian approach says that the right thing to do is to maximize the good of all. Broadly nonconsequentialist views evaluate conduct as right or wrong based on factors in addition to the value of the consequences of the conduct. On this approach, the Right is defined independently of the Good (Rightness depends on motives, procedures, divine will, etc). Here is an outline of the major consequentialist and nonconsequentialist positions we will touch upon:

Consequentialist Views

1) Ethical Egoism: The right thing to do is to maximize my own good. a) Crude Hedonistic Egoism: Always act so as to maximize my own

short-term pleasure b) "Enlightened" Egoism: Always act so as to maximize my own

long-term rational self-interest 2) Tribalism: The right thing to do is to maximize the good of some group (nation, family, etc.)

1 0 Chapter One

3) Utilitarianism: The right thing to do is to maximize the good of all (net aggregate social utility).

a) Act Utilitarianism: Always act so as to maximize net aggregate social utility (e.g., maximize the net balance of pleasure over pain for all: The Greatest Happiness Principle).

b) Rule Utilitarianism: Always act in accordance with a rule (set of rules, moral code, ete.) which, if generally followed, would maximize net aggregate social utility.

Nonconsequentialist Views

1) Divine Command Moral Theory: The right thing to do is to obey the will of God. 2) Kantian Deontological Ethics: The right thing to do is to act only upon maxims that we could will to serve as universal 1aws 3) Contractarianism: The right thing to do is to abide by principles which free and rational individuals would enter into from some initial contract situation 4) Virtue Ethics: The right thing to do is to display virtuous states of character in our actions 5) The Ethics of Care: The right thing to do is to build caring relationships and to respond to the needs of those with whom we stand in relationship

Egoism and Tribalism

The view that the right thing to do is to maximize one's own good is known as ethical egoism. To some people, this sounds like just the opposite of ethics, but it is a possible position in ethics and has been advocated by a ratherfamous author (Ayn Rand, who refers to her view as "objectivism", but it is really a form of enlightened egoism). Hence, we would rather discuss its strengths and weaknesses rather than simply ignoring the view altogether. There are two possible varieties of this approach: one could adopt either a "crude" or an "enlightened" version of egoism. On the crude version, the right thing to do is to maximize one's own short-term pleasure. Jt's easy to see why there are no famous advocates of this position. After all, shooting heroin is said to produce very intense short-term pleasure for those who do it. But the long-term outcome of such an approach is often deadly. Hence, despite the fact that this sometimes seems to be the preferred ethical theory of certain college students, we will pass over any further discussion of it.

Introduction 11

The enlightened egoist urges that the right thing to do is to maximize one's own long-term rational self-interest. This view promotes selfishness as a virtue, and condemns altruism (the view that the right thing to do is to be willing to sacrifice one's own interests for the interests of others). There are several arguments that might be offered in support of this view.

Arguments for Ethical Egoism'

1) Altruism is self-defeating: Since we know our own interests best, we are well suited to pursue them. But since we know the interests of others only imperfectly, we would likely bungle the job of pursuing theirs. Furthermore, the policy of looking out for others may b e seen as an offensive intrusion into their privacy. And charity may be degrading t o other people; it robs them o f their individual dignity and self-respect.

But is giving food to starving children really inept, intrusive, or degrading? Most of us (including, especially the starving children) would say that it isn't. Hence, although we ought to be careful t o be competent and sensitive when we take the interests of others into consideration in our moral deliberations, it doesn't seem that the best policy in every case is to ignore them completely.

2) Ayn Rand's Argument: One's life as a rational being is all one has; it is supremely valuable. The ethics of altruism regards the life of the rational individual as something that one must be ready to sacrifice for the good of others: it does not take seriously the value of the human individual. Ethical egoism does take that (highest) value seriously. Hence, we should be egoists.

But this argument presents egoism and altruism as the only two possible ethical positions. Perhaps both are false. Maybe neither one's own interests nor the interests of others should be ignored in ethical reasoning. This leads us into a problem which can be seen to trouble all consequentialist positions other than utilitarianism: The Problem of Arbitrary Distinction.

Let us first try to explain this problem as a criticism of some tribalist views, and then perhaps we can see how it applies to egoism as well. Racists and sexists draw a circle around a certain group of people and then claim that the interests of the people inside the circle count for more

1 Summarized from Rachels, James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Fourth i Edition), Chapter 6 (Boston, McGraw Hill, 2003)

12 Chapter One

(morally) than the interests of the people outside of the circle. Since moral claims are always supposed to be backed by good reasons, we may ask the

�exlst, for exampl�, just why the interests of men are more morally lffiportant than the mterests of women. At first, the sexist might try to present some reasons why we ought to take men's interests are more �mpo�tant than women's interests. He might say that men are always more IntellIgent than women, or that women are incapable of rational thought at all. Or he mIght say that all and only men are capable of guiding their lIves accordmg to moral principle, and that women are simply incapable of bemg moral agents. All of these claims have actually been advanced in the history of sexist thought. But eventually, all of these claims have been shown to be empirically false. Now what is the sexist len to do? If he wants to remain a sexist (giving greater moral weight to the interests of men ov�r those of women), all he is left to say is that men's interests ought to be gIven greater moral weight simply because we are men. But that is not a reason at all; it is just a restatement of sex (or gender) differences. Hence, the sexist is trapped: he wants to make a moral distinction but his distinction is entirely arbitrary; there is no reason behind it at all! The same problem plagues many other tribalist views, e.g., racism, nationalist chauvinism, etc.

Returning to the egoist, we might ask: why should my interests be WeIghted more heavily than the interests of others in my moral delIberatIOns? What IS the egoist going to say here? What possible trait that I have could justify giving greater weight to my interests than to the lnterests of every other person in the world? I mean I realize that I am devastatingly �andsome, have a quick wit, and cook wonderful lasagna. But Jude Law IS more handsome; Steve Martin is funnier, and Julia Child makes better lasagna. What is the egoist left to say here? It seems that he �s i� the same positio� as the

. sexist d�scussed above; alI he has left to say

IS, Just because they re my interests '. But again, that is not a reason at all; just like the tribalist views, egoism seems to fall prey to the problem of arbitrary distinction.

Utilitarianism

This problem leads us naturally into consideration of one of the major ethlCal theOrIes we wIll look at: utilitarianism. Utilitarianism makes no arbitrary distinction between the interests of groups of people. According to utIhtar�ams�, every person's interests are to be weighed equally in our moral delIberatIOns. Everyone is to count for one and none for more than one. Like the varieties of egoism discussed above, utilitarianism also

Introduction 1 3

requires that we maximize expected utility, but instead o f doing so for oneself or one's tribe, w e are required to do it for everyone.

So if one can ultimately alleviate more suffering by helping strangers than one could by helping family members, we are required to help the strangers. (This assumes that one has a stark choice between the two options. Often in real choices this is not the case.) Of course the other side of the coin to this decision holds as well: if one can ultimately alleviate more suffering by helping family members than one could by helping strangers, then one is required to help those family members. And in fact we find that this will often be the case, since ordinary people's actions frequently have a greater effect on those close t o them than those who are farther away. We can send money to aid organizations who help those starving overseas, but we can cook someone a meal or teach them to cook if they are closer to home. Utilitarian ethical theories tend to be very sensitive to the facts of particular situations. Occasionally this may mean overriding traditionally accepted obligations when the results will lead to greater happiness and reduced suffering overall.

We've already seen a thought experiment involving one form of utilitarianism: act-utilitarianism in the example of Adam going into the hospital. Jeremy Bentham was an early advocate of the act utilitarian approach. He developed what has been called the Hedonic Calculus, according to which we ought to take the intensity, duration, speed, fruitfulness, purity, and extension of pleasures into account in our moral thinking, and we should aim to maximize expected utility o r happiness (for Bentham, this was just pleasure and the absence of pain) in all of our actions.

Since we've already discussed a case that seems to show this form of act utilitarianism to be seriously faulty (the doctor case above), let us move ahead to look at John Stuart Mill's rule utilitarian position. In the selection from Utilitarianism excerpted below, John Stuart Mill says, "In the case of abstinences indeed- of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial- it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to b e consciously aware that the action is of a class which, i f practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.." I n other words, Mill is aware that there are times when I could generate more expected utility by carving Adam up, but that this action is of a class (murder) which, if people generally practice it, would cause utility to go down, which is a good reason we shouldn't do it. Hence, Mill is adopting what is referred to as a rule utilitarian approach.

1 4 Chapter One

We ought to conform our actions to those rules which, if generally practiced would maximize utility for all. According to Mill, we should conform our actions to rules which, i f generally practiced, would maximize net noble pleasures. That is, aside from being a rule utilitarian, Mill also makes a qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures. According to Mill, some pleasures are base and some are noble. Those pleasures which make use of what Mill calls our "higher faculties" (these being reason and sensibility) are nobler or better pleasures than those which do not. Mill says, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they know only their side of the question." How do we decide which pleasure is better, according to Mill? He says that we should ask people who have experienced both pleasures; whatever the majority of these people choose is the better (higher, nobler) pleasure. What matters for Mill is the amount of noble pleasure which can reasonably be expected to result from the adoption of a particular rule, or set of rules. He tells us that these rules are "signposts" on the way to utility. In the following selection, Mill addresses some criticisms of his view and explains it in more detail.

One possible criticism of rule utilitarianism to keep in mind when reading Mill is what has been called The Collapse or Rule-Worship Prohlem. Suppose that the rule-utilitarian urges that we should follow the rule "Don't lie" because if such a rule were generally followed, then the net aggregate social utility would be greater than if it were not followed. And suppose that we come upon a case where my lying to a mad nuclear bomber would save millions of lives. Now the rule utilitarian can either A) urge that we modify our rule (to something like "Don't lie unless you can save millions of lives by doing so"), or he can B) say "bite the bullet", accept the counter-intuitive implications of the claim and urge us to stick with the original rule. If he urges that we modify the rule because we can get more utility in this one case, then what about saving 10 lives? What about one life? What about just making someone feel better (by telling a "white" lie)? If the reason that we should modify the rule in the first case is that we will achieve greater utility, then (by the same reasoning) we should modify our rules in every case where we can get more utility by doing so. But this kind of thinking seems to have collapsed into act utilitarianism, which is what rule utilitarians were trying to get away from in the first place. On the other hand, if he urges that we should refuse to modify the rule, then this rule utilitarian can be accused of "rule worship" at the expense of

Introduction 15

what utilitarianism is all about: utility. Indeed, in such a case, it is not even clear that he deserves to b e called a utilitarian anymore. After all, rules are supposed to b e merely "signposts" on the road to greater utility for the rule utilitarian. If we can clearly see that a sign that says "ThIS way to Disneyland" will actually lead us away from Disneyland mto a bIg dItch full of mud, we would b e foolish to follow it.

FROM UTILITARIANISM BY JOHN STUART MILL!

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappilless, pam, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; ill partJcular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanatiOns do not affect the theory of life on whieh this theory of morahty IS grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only thmgs deSlfable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous In the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit they designate as utterly mean and grovellmg; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously hkened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assaIlants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is �ot the�, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading lIght; SInce the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an ImputatIOn; for If the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean hfe to that of beasts IS felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pl�asures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human bemgs have facu�ties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made consciOUS of them, do not regard anything as happiness which I Excerpted from http://www.gutenberg.orglebooksI11224

Introduction 17

does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out theIr scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than t o those of mere sensation.

It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, �tc., ?f

. the

, f�rmer- that IS, III

their circumstantial advantages rather than III theIr mtnnslc nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely a� a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one pOSSIble answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not reSIgn It for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.

Now it is 1m unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs t?eir higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to b e changed 1Oto any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to b e a fool, n o instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feelIng and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his

18 Chapter One

lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have m common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of un�appmess so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange thelf lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more POInts, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grad� of eXIstence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillinoness' we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminat:ly t� some

. of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which

mankmd are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal mdependence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective m.eans for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excilement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but ils most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human bemgs posses� III one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, prop?ftlOll to their

. higher faculties, and which is so essential a part

of the happmess of those m whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts wIth It could be, otherwIse than momentarily, an object of desire to them.

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happmes�- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances is not �appter than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas' of ha�pll1ess, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacitie� of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a hIghly endowed bemg wIll always feel that any happiness which he can I?ok.

for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear Its lffiperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make hIm envy the bemg who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualIfy. It IS better to be a h�man being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dIssatIsfIed than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pIg, are

. a dIfferent opinion, it is because they only know their own ;ide

of the questIOn. The other party to the comparison knows both sides

, , It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pl�asures,

occasIOnally, .

u�der . the Influence of temptation, postpone them to the

lower. But thIS IS qUIte compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic supenonty of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make theIr electIOn for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and thIS no less when the choice is between two bodily

Introduction 19

pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual

indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is

the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful

enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into

indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this

very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of

pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote

themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of

the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tcnder

plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of

sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if

the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the

society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable t o keeping that

higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose

their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for

indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not

because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only

ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer

capable of enjoying. It may he questioned whether any one who has

remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly

and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken

down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can

be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two

pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the

feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the

judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they

differ, that of the majority among them, must b e admitted as final. And

there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the

quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even

on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is

the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations,

except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither

pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous

with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is

worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and

judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and

judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to b e

preferable in kind, apart from t h e question of intensity, to those o f which

20 Chapter One

the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entItled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conceptIOn of UtIlity or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happmess, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and If It �ay pOSSIbly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happIer for Its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people hapPIer

: and that th� world in general is immensely a gainer by it. UUlitanalllsm, therefore, could only attain its end by the general CUltl��tlOn of nobleness of character� even if each individual were only benefrted by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enUnCIatIOn of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous,

. According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the

ultImate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things afC deslr�ble (w�ether we are considering OUf own good or that of other peo�le), �s an �xlstencc exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as pOSSIble m enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of qualIty, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by th�se wh? 10 their opportunities of experience, to which must be added theIr

. habIts of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best

furlllshed wIth the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utthtanan OpInIOn: the �nd of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; whIch may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has be�n described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankmd; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.

� m�st again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the JustIce to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utIlltanamsm reqUlres hIll to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spmt of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by d t I .

' an a. Dve your neIghbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of

�tI1ltarla. n

. moralIty. As the means of making the nearest approach to this

Ideal, utilIty would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should

Introduction 2 1

place the happiness, o r (as speaking practically i t may b e called) the

interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the

interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which

have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to

establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association

between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between

his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and

positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only

he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself,

consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a

direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one

of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith

may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient

existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their

own minds in this its, true character, I know not what recommendation

possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting

to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature

any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of

action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving

effect to their mandates. The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with

representing it in a discrcditable light. On the contrary, those among them

who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested character,

sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act

from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this

is to mistake the very meaning of' a standard of morals, and confound the

rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us

what are our duties, or b y what test we may know them; but no system of

ethics requires that the sale motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty;

on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from

other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn

them. It is the more unjust t o utilitarianism that this particular

misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as

utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that

the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much

with the worth of the agent. H e who saves a fellow creature from

drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive b e duty, or the

hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts

him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object b e to serve another friend to

whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done

22 Chapter One

from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a �msapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as Implying that people should iix their minds upon so wide a generality as �he world, or SOcIety at large. The great majority of good actions arc mtended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of whIch the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most vIrtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of any one else, The multiplication of happiness IS, accordmg to the utlhtanan ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an

. extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but

exceptIOnal; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to, Those alone the influcnce of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed- of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences m the particular case might be beneficial- it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the actIOn IS of a class

. which, if practised generally, would be generally

mJunous, and that thIS IS the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of �egard for the public interest implied in this recognition, is no greater than IS demanded by every system of morals, for they all enjoin to abstalll from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society.

Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such ObjectIOns as thlS- that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happmess, ThIS IS exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to gUlde

. our cond�ct by C?ristianity, because there is not time, on every

occasIOn on whIch anythmg has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample hme, namely, the whole past duration of the human species, During all that tIme, mankmd have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of hfe, are dependent. People' talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering f()f the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness, Even then I do not think that he would find

Introduction 23

the question very puzzling; but, at all events, the matter is now done to his hand. It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion, There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better,

That philosophers might easily do this, even now, on many subjects; that the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right; and that mankind have still much to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happiness, I admit, or rather, earnestly maintain, The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on. But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another, Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment, Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy. because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their . minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish, And this, as long as foresight is a human quality, it is to be presumed they will continue to do, Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against any one in particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained till

24 Chapter One

now, and always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy. The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature, and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their course through life. We are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules, and, when under tempt.ation, will see a utility in the breach of a rule, greater than he will see in its observance. But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil dojng, and means of cheating our own conscience? They are afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of conflicting considerations; which all doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons. It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made, self­deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome practically, with greater or with less success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be pretended that any one will be the less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at all; while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims to preeedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and unless determined, as they generally are, by the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility, alIord a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if only one, there can seldom be

Introduction 25

any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognised.

BROADLY NONCONSEQUENTIALIST VIEWS: THE DIVINE COMMAND MORAL THEORY

At a Michigan campaign event on January 1 4ili, 2008, presidential candidate: Governor Mike Huckabee explained why he wanted to amend the Constitutwn of the United States in order to outlaw abortion and gay marfiage. He sUld, "I have opponents in this race who do not want to chang� t?e Const

. itution. But 1 believe it's a lot easier to change the

CO�StitutlOn than It would be to change the word of the living God. And that s what we need to do is amend the Constitution so it's in God's stan�ards rather than trying to change God's standards so it lines up with some contemporary VIew of how we treat each other and how we treat th family."' . Huckabee obviously believes that his religious views tell hi� what is the nght thmg to do. He may subscribe to a view called Divine Command Moral Theory (DCMT), According to this view, the right thmg to do is to tollow (obey) the will of God. And Huckabee isn't the only one who might believe this; on the contrary, it seems to be an extremely popular view in America in the 21 Sf century. According to Pew Research Center, almost 50% of Americans say that belief in God is necessary to be a moral person2, 61 % say that children are more likely to becomc moral adults if they have a religious upbringing, 5 1 % say that the biggest lesson of the 9/ 1 1 attacks is that there is too little religion in thc world3, and 25% believe that "The government should take special steps to make our country a Christian country

,,4.

: ? ttp;1 lfirstread. msnbc. msn. corn! archi vel200S/O 1 I 1 515 79265 .aspx News Release: Amencans Struggle with Religion' s Role at Horne and Abroad" at htt�://pewforum.?r:!ypu?lications/reports/po1l2002.pdf. For an interesting contrast to thiS �opular opmlOn .m the U.S., see Gregory Paul's article, "Cros s -National Correla�lOn� of QuantIfiable Societal Health with Popular Religiosity and Seculansm m the Prosperous Democracies" in The Journal of Religion and Society (Volume 7: 2005), where Paul establishes that, "In general, higher rates of belief in and WorShl� ?f a creator

. co

, rre�ate with higher rates of homicide, juvenile and early a�ult mortalIty, ST� mfectton rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion in the

pmsperous democraCIes". " News Release: Americans Struggle with Religion's Role at Home and Abroad at �t�p:llpewforum.orglpub1ications/reports/po112002.pdf

SeparatIOn of Church and State," Pew Research Center, 2007-0CT-05 t' http://pewresearch.orgl , a .

Introduction 27

In the following excerpt from John Arthur's "Does Morality Depend on Religion?", Arthur considers three ways in which some people might think that religion is necessary for morality: some see it as necessary for moral motivation; some see it as necessary for moral guidance; and some see it as necessary in order for objective morality to exist at all. Arthur first defines a moral code as "a tendency to evaluate (perhaps without even expressing it) the behavior of others and to feel guilt at certain actions when we perform them." And he defines religion as "A system of belief in supernatural power(s) that created and perhaps also control nature, along with a tendency to worship and pray to those supernatural forces or beings." Arthur then considers the three ways in which people might think that religion is necessary for morality.

With regard to moral motivation, he points out that there are other motives which might (and actually do) lead us to do the right thing. Although Arthur provides no empirical data to back up his claim that "When it really gets down to it, most of us don't give much of a thought to religion when making moral decisions", this claim does seem to be borne out by casual unscientific surveys we take in our classes.

With regard to using religion for moral guidance, he points out that in order to follow Divine Command Moral Theory (DCMT), we would need to know what the will of God is. In order to know this, we would have to answer three questions which seem to make this a very difficult task. First, we would have to answer the question: "Which God should we follow?" There are perhaps thousands of Gods that have been described and worshipped by human societies over the centuries of recorded history. Which one is the true God of the universe? Note that this wouldn't be a problem if all the Gods told us to do the same thing. But they don't: some command that we not eat certain kinds of meat; some command that we pray five times every day; and some demand human sacrifices to the Sun. Of all the Gods that have been described, which one is the God that we should follow? In answering this question, it won't do to simply follow the God that my parents followed. I mean my parents are perfectly nice people, but neither one of them has any special insight into which is the true God of the universe. Hence, it seems that, until we can Hnd a principled and reasonable way to figure out which is the God that DCMT instructs us to follow, it's useless to us as a moral guide.

But suppose that we could (somehow!) solve this "Which God?" problem. The second problem for DCMT to overcome might be summed up in the question, "Which expression of His will?" Even people who agree that (for example) Jesus is the true God of the universe disagree about which set of signs we ought to take as the true expression of His

28 Chapter One

will. Some say that the Holy Bible is enough; others say that certain apocryphal writings which were excluded from the Bible ought to have been included; others say that the Holy Bible plus the Book of Mormon is the true expression of God's will; still others think that natural signs (hurricanes, rainbows, etc,) are part of the communication of God's will. Here, again, it seems that we need a principled and reasonable method to determine which set of signs we ought to take as the true expression of God's will.

But suppose that we could (somehow!) solve that problem, The third question that Arthur raises might be summarized as "Which interpretation?" Even people who agree that (again, for example) Jesus is the true God and who also agree that (for example) the Holy Bible together with the Book of Mormon are the veridical signs of God's will may still disagree about how to interpret those signs, The Bible tells us, "Thou shalt not kilL" But what does it mean? Does it mean that we shouldn't kill people? What about other animals? Insects? Microbes? If it is referring to killing people, does it mean that we can't kill even in self-defense? What about during a time of war? What about killing as a form of capital punishment? The point is that even people who agree about which is the true God and which set of signs is the true expression of His will still have serious disagreements about how to interpret those signs. When we put these three questions together, it begins to look as if DCMT does not provide the simple moral guidance that we thought it might give us, Indeed, Arthur suggests that we would probably be better off trying to figure out right and wrong on our own, rather than trying to figure out how to answer all of these metaphysical questions in order to get any reliable moral guidance,

Arthur also addresses the view that religion is needed in order for there to be any objective morality at all. According to this view, if there is a moral Law, then there must be a moral Legislator, the originator of the moral Law, and this moral legislator is God. In response to this view, Arthur raises what might be called Tbe Problem of tbe Eutbypbro, This is a problem which comes from the Platonic dialogue, Euthyphro, in which Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing piety (or holiness), Since Euthyphro is a sort of priest, Socrates first asks him if he knows what picty is, Euthyphro responds that he does, and Socrates asks him for a definition of piety, To the question "What is piety"", Euthyphro offers various answers, but finally settles on saying that "piety is what all the gods love," To this, Socrates asks Euthyphro whether the gods love pious things because they are pious, or whether the pious things are pious because the gods love them. Arthur suggests that a similar question may be raised against those who see God as a moral legislatoL With regard to

Introduction 29

the things that God commands, are they comman ded by God because they

are right, or are they right because he commands them ?

, If h thc

h se thlllgS ��

anded by God because they are (independently) rtg t, t en It wou co,: that rightness exists independently of the will of God and that see , ,

G d' 11 DCMT is leading us in the wrong direction by pOlO ling us

to 0 S WI

for moral guidance. On this view, God seems to become an unn�cessary

middleman between us and morality, If, on the other hand, the thm gs that

are right are right just because God commands them, then It looks as If

God's commands must be absolutely arbitrary and that God could c hange

h' mind and make murder and rape right if he chooses to do so, Hence

. , m . .

either way, Arthur suggests that DCMT has some senous questI Ons to

answer.

FROM "DOES MORALITY DEPEND ON RELIGION?" By JOHN ARTHUR 1

The issue which I address in this paper is the nature of the connection, if any, between morality and religion. I will argue that although there are a variety of ways the two can be connected, in fact religion is not necessary for morality, either logically or psychologically. First, however, it will be necessary to say something about the subjects: just what are we referring to when we speak of morality and of religion?

A useful way to approach the tirst question-the nature of morality-is to ask what it would mean for a society to exist without a moral code. What would such a society look like? How would people think? And behave? The most obvious thing to say is that its members would never feel any moral responsibilities or any guilt. Words like duty, rights, fairness, and justice would never be used, except in the legal sense. Feelings such as that I ought to remember my parents' anniversary, that he has a moral responsibility to help care for his children after the divorce, that she has a right to equal pay for equal work, and that discrimination on the basis of race is unfair would be absent in such a society. In short, people would have no tendency to evaluate or criticize the behavior of others, nor to feel remorse about their own behavior. Children would not be taught to be ashamed when they steal or hurt others, nor would they be allowed to complain when others treat them badly.

Such a society lacks a moral code. What, then, of religion? Is it possible that a society such as the one I have described would have religious beliefs? It seems clear that it is possible. Suppose every day these same people tile into their place of worship to pay homage to God (they may believe in many gods or in one all-powerful creator of heaven and earth) . Often they can be heard praying to God for help in dealing with their problems and thanking Him for their good fortune. Whenever a disaster befalls them, the people assume that God is angry with them; when things go well they believe He is pleased. Frequently they give sacrifices to God, usually in the form of money spent to build beautiful temples and churches.

J From Morality and Moral Controversies, 2nd edition, John Arthur, ed. (Prentice­ Hall, Inc., 1986), pp. 10-15. Copyright John Arthur 1986, reprinted by permis sion of Amy Shapiro, [email protected].

Introduction 31

To have a moral code, then, is to tend to evaluate (perhaps without even expressing it) the behavior of others and to feel guilt at certain actions when we perform them. Religion, on the other hand, involves beliefs in supernatural power(s) that created and perhaps also control nature, along with the tendency to worship and pray to those supernatural forces or beings. The two-religion and morality-are thus very different. One involves our attitudes toward various forms of behavior (lying and killing, for example), typically expressed using the notions of rules, rights, and obligations. The other, religion, typically involves a different set of activities (prayer, worship) together with beliefs about the supernatural.

We come, then, to the central question: What is the connection, if any, between a society's moral code and its religious beliefs? Many people have felt that there must be a link of some sort between religious beliefs and morality. But is that so? What sort of connection might there beo In what follows I distinguish various ways in which one might claim that religion is necessary for a moral code to function in society. I argue, however, that such connections are not necessary, and indeed that often religion is detrimental to society's attempt to encourage moral conduct among its members,

One possible role which religion might play in morality relates to motives people have. Can people be expected to behave in any sort of decent way towards one another without religious faith? Religion, it is often said, is necessary so that people will DO right. Why might somebody think that? Often, we know, doing what is right has costs: you don't cheat on the test, so you nunk the course; you return the lost billfold, so you don't get the contents. Religion can provide motivation to d? �he right thing. God rewards those who follow His commands by provldmg for them a place in heaven and by insuring that they prosper and are happy on earth. He also punishes with damnation those who disobey. Other people emphasize less selfish ways in which religious motives may encourage people to act rightly. God is the creator of the umverse and has ordained that His plan should be followed. How better to live one's life than to participate in this divinely ordained plan? Only by living a moral life, it is said, can people live in harmony with the larger, divinely created order.

But how are we to assess the relative strength of these various motives for acting morally, some of which are religious, others not? Ho:" important is the fear of hell or the desire to live as God wishes m motivating people? Think about the last time you were tempted to do something you knew to be wrong. Surely your decision not to do so Cif that was your decision) was made for a variety of reasons: "What if I get

32 Chapter One

caught? What if somebody sees me-what will he or she think? How will I feel afterwards? Will i regret it?" Or maybe the thought of cheating just do�sn't OCCur to you. You

, were raised to be an honest person, and that's

what you want to be-penod. There are thus many motives for doing the rIght thIllg which have nothing whatsoever to do with religion. Most of us III fact do worry about getting caught, about being blamed and looked down on �y others. We also may do what is right just for that reason, because It s our

. d�ty, or because we don't want to hurt others. So to say

that we need relIgIOn to act morally is mistaken; indeed it seems to me that most of us, when it really gets down to it, don't give much of a thought to reh,glOll when making moral decisions. All those other reasons are the ones WhlC,h we tend to consider, or else we just don't consider cheating and stealing at

, "ll. So far, then, there seems to be no reason to suppose that

people can t be moral yet irreligiOus at the same time.

. Another oft-heard argument that religion is necessary for people to do

nght questiOns whether people would know how to do the right thing without the gllldance .of religion: In other words, however much people may want to do the nght thmg, it is only with the help of God that true moral understanding can be achieved. People's Own intellect is simply lfladequ�te to thIS task; we must consult revelation for help,

AgaI�, however, this argument fails. Just consider what we would need to know III order for religion to provide moral guidance. First we must be sure that there is a God. And then there's the question of which of the

�any relIgIOns IS true. How can anybody be sure his or her relicrion is the nght one? After all, if you had been born in China or India or

� Iran your

relIgIOus VIews ,:ould almost certainly not have been the ones you now hold. And even if we can somehow convince ourselves that the Judeo­ Chflstian God is the real one, we still need to find out just what it is He wa?ts us to do. Revelat�o� comes in at least two forms, according to thersts, and not even ChrIstians agree which form is real. Some hold that God tells us what He wants by providing us with His words: the Ten Com�andments arc an example. Many even believe, as Billy Graham once SaId, that the entire Bible was written by God using 39 secretaries. Others doubt that every word of the Bible is literally true, believing Instead that It IS merely a� historical account of the events in history whereby God revealed Himself. So On this view revelation is not u�der��ood as statements mad� by �od but, instead as His intervening into histoncal events, such as leadmg HiS people from Egypt, testing Job, and sendmg HiS son as an example of the ideal life. But if we are to use r�velatlOn as a gUIde we must know what is to count as revelation-words given us by God, events, or both? Supposing that we could somehow solve

Introduction 3 3

all those puzzles, the problems of re lying on revelation are still not over.

Even if we can agree on who God i s and on how and when He reveals

Himself we still must interpret that revela tion. Some feel that the Bible

justifies various forms of killing, including war and capital punishment, on

the basis of such statements as "An ey e for an eye." Others, emphasizing

such sayings as "Judge not lest ye be jud ged" and "Thou shalt not kill,"

believe the B ible demands absolute pacifis m. How are we to know which

interpretation is correct? Far from providing a short-cut to moral unde

rstanding, looking to

revelation for guidance just creates more ques tions and problems. It is

much simpler to address problems such as ab ortion, capital punishment,

and war directly than to seek answers in re velation. In fact, not only is

religion unnecessary to provide moral unders tanding, it is actually a

hindrance. (My own hunch is that often those who are most likely to

appeal to Scripture as justification for their mor al beliefs arc really just

rationalizing positions they already believe.)

Far from religion being necessary for people to d o the right thing, it

often gets in the way. People do not need the mo tivation of religion; they

for the most part are not motivated by religion as m uch as by other factors,

and religion is of no help in discovering what ou r moral obligations are.

But others give a different reason for claiming morality depends on

religion. They think religion, and especially God, is necessary for morality

because without God there could B E no right or w rong. The idea was

expressed by Bishop R. C. Mortimer: "God made us and all the world.

Because of that He has an absolute claim on our obe dience .... From [ this)

it follows that a thing is not right simply because we think it is .... It is right

because God commands it.'" What Mortimer has in mind can best be seen by comp

aring moral rules

with legal ones. Legal statutes' we know, are created b y legislatures. So if

there had been no law passed requiring that people l imit the speed they

travel then there would be no such legal oblig ation. Without the

commands of the legislature statutes simply would not exist. The view

defended by Mortimer, often called the divine comm and theory, is that

God has the same relation to moral law as the legisla ture does to statutes.

Without God's commands there would be no moral rules .

Another tenet of the divine command theory, besides the belief that

God is the author of morality, is that only the divine c ommand theory is

able to explain the objective difference between righ t and wrong. This

2 R. C. Mortimer, Christian Ethics (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1950), pp. 7-8.

34 Chapter One

point was forcefully argued by F. C. Copleston in a 1948 British Broadcasting Corporation radio debate with Bertrand Russell.

RUSSELL. But aren't you now saying in effect "I mean by God whatever i s good or the sum total of what i s good-the system of what i s good, and, therefore, when a young man loves anything that is good he is loving God." Is that what you're saying, because if so, it wants a bit of arguing. COPLESTON I don't say, of course, that God is the sum total or system of what is good . . , but I do think that all goodness rcHeers God in some way and proceeds from Him, so that in a sense the man who loves what is truly good, loves God even if he doesn't advert to God But still I agree that the validity of such an interpretation of man's conduct depends on the recognition of God's existence, obviously .... Let's take a look at the Commandant of the [Nazi] concentration camp at Belsen. That appears t.o you as undesirable and evil and to me too. To Adolph Hitler we suppose it appeared as something good and desirabJe. I suppose you'd have to admit that for Hitler it was good and for you it i s evil. RUSSELL. No, I shouldn't go so far as that. I mean. I think people can make mistakes in that as they can in other things. If you have jaundice you see things yellow that are not yellow. You're making a mistake. COPLESTON. Yes, one can make mistakes, but can you make a mistake if it's simply a question of reference to a feeling or emotion? Surely Hitler would be the only possible judge of what appealed to his emotions. RUSSELL. ... you can say various things about that; among others, that if that sort of thing makes that sort of appeal to Hitler's emotions, then Hitler makes quite a different appeal to my emotions� COPLESTON. Granted. But there's no objective criterion outside feeling then for condemning the conduct of the Commandant of Belsen, in your view .... The human being's idea of the content of the moral law depends certainly to a large extent on education and environment, and a man has to use his reason in assessing the validity of the actual moral ideas of his social group. But the possibility of criticizing the accepted moral code presupposes that there is an objective standard, that there is an ideal moral order, which imposes itself . . . . It implies the existence of a real foundation of God .'

God, according to Copleston, is able to provide the basis for the distinction, which we all know to exist, between right and wrong. Without that objective basis for dcfining human obligation we would have no real reason for condemning the , behavior of anybody, even Nazis. Morality would be little more than an expression of personal feeling.

3 This debate was broadcast on the Third Program of the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1948.

Introduction 35

Before assessing the divine command theory. let's first consider this last point. Is it really true that only the commands of God can provide an objective basis for moral judgments? Certainly many philosophers . . . have felt that morality rests on its own, perfectly sound footing; to prejudge those efforts or others which may be made in the future as unsuccessful seems mistaken. And, second. if it were true that there is no nonreligious basis for claiming moral objectivity, then perhaps that means there simply is no such basis. Why suppose that there must be such a foundation?

What of the divine command theory itself? Is it reasonable, even though we need not do so, to equate something's being right with its being commanded by God? Certainly the expressions "is commanded by God" and "is morally required" do not mean the same thing; atheists and agnostics use moral words without understanding them to make any referenee to God. And while it is of course true that God (or any other moral being for that matter) would tend to want others to do the right thing, this hardly shows that being right and being commanded by God are the same thing. Parents want their children to do the right thing, too, but that doesn't mean they, or anybody else, can make a thing right just by commanding it!

I think that, in fact, theists themselves if they thought about it would reject the divine command theory. One reason is because of what it implies. Suppose we grant (just for the sake of argument) that the divine command theory is correct. Notice what we have now said: Actions are right just because they are commanded by God. And the same, of course, can be said about those deeds which we believe arc wrong. If God hadn't commanded us not to do them, they would not be wrong. (Recall the comparison made with the commands of the legislature, which would not be law except for the legislature having passed a statute.)

But now notice this. Since God is all-powerful, and since right is determined solely by His commands, is it not possible that He might change the rules and make what we now think of as wrong into right? It would seem that according to the divine command theory it is possible that tomorrow God will decree that virtues such as kindness and courage have become vices while actions which show cruelty and cowardice are the right actions. Rather than it being right for people to help each other out and prevent innocent people from suffering unnecessarily, it would he right to create as much pain among innocent children as we possibly can! To adopt the divine command theory commits its advocate to the seemingly absurd position that even the greatest atrocities might be not only acceptable but morally required if God were to command them.

36 Chapter One

Plato made a similar point in the dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates is asking Euthyphro what it is that makes the virtue of holiness a virtue, just as we have been asking what makes kindness and courage virtues. Euthyphro has suggested that holiness is just whatever all the gods love.

SOCRATES. Well, then, Euthyphro, what do we say about holiness? Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition? EUTHYPHRO. Yes. SOCRATES. Because it is holy, or for some other reason? EUTHYPHRO. No, because it is holy. SOCRATES. Then it i s loved by the gods because it is holy: it is not holy because it is loved by them? EUTHYPHRO. It seems so. SOCRATES .... Then holiness is not what is pleasing to the gods, and what is pleasing to the gods is not holy as you say, Euthyphro. They are different things. EUTHYPHRO. And why. Socrates? SOCRATES. Because we are agreed that the gods love holiness because it is holy: and that it is not holy because they love it.4

Having claimed that virtues are what is loved by the gods why docs Euthyphro so readily agree that the gods love holiness because it's holy? One possibility is that he is assuming whenever the gods love something they do so with good reason, not just arbitrarily. If something is pleasing to gods, there must be a reason. To deny this and say that it is simply the gods' love which makes holiness a virtue would mean that the gods have no basis for their opinions, that they are arbitrary. Or to put it another way, if we say that it is simply God's loving something that makes it right, then what sense does it make to say God wants us to do right? All that could mean is that God wants us to do what He wants us to do. He would have no reason for wanting it. Similarly "God is good" would mean little more than "God docs what He pleases." Religious people who find this an unacceptable consequence will reject the divine command theory.

But doesn't this now raise another problem? If God approves kindness because it is a virtue, then it seems that God discovers morality rather than inventing it. And haven't we then suggested a limitation on God's power, since He now, being a good God, must love kindness and command us not to be cruel? What is left of God's omnipotence?

But why should such a limitation on God be unacceptable for a theist? Because there is nothing God cannot do? But is it true to say that God can

4 Plato, Euthyphro, tr. H. N. Fowler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 947).

Introduction 37

do absolutely anything? Can He, for example, destroy Himself? Can God ake a rock so heavy that He cannot lift it? Or create a universe WhICh :as never created by Him? Many have thought that God's inability to do

these sorts of things does not constitute a genuine limitation on His p�wer because these are things which cannot logically be done. Thomas Aqutnas, for example, wrote that, "whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done than that God cannot do them.'" Many theists reject the VIeW that there is nothing which God cannot do.

But how, then, ought we to understand God's relationship to morality if we reject the divine command theory? Can religious people co.nsi�tentl.

Y maintain their faith in God the Creator and yet deny that what IS fight IS right because He commands it? I think the answer to this is "yes." First, note that there is still a sense in which God could change moralIty (assuming, of course, there is a God). Whatever moral code we decide is best (most justified), that choice will in part depend on such factors as how we reason, what we desire and need, and the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Presumably, however, God could have constructed us or our environment very differently, so that we didn't care about freedom, weren't curious about nature, and weren't influenced by other's suffering. Or perhaps outr natural environment could be altered so that it is less hostile to our needs and desires. If He had created either nature or us that way, then it seems likely that the most justified moral code might be different in important ways from the one it is now rational for us to support. In that sense, then, morality depends on God whether or not one supports the divine command theory.

. In fact, it seems to me that it makes little difference for ethIcal

questions whether a person is religious, The atheist will treat human nature simply as a given, a fact of nature, while the theist may regard it as the product of divine intention. But in any case the right thing to do is to

. follow the best moral code, the one that is most jusrified. Instead of relying on revelation to discover morality, religious and nonreligious people alike can inquire into which system is best.

In sum, I have argued first that religion is neither necessary nor useful in providing moral motivation or guidance. My objections to the claim that without God there would be no morality are somewhat more complex. First, it is wrong to say that only if God's will is at its base can morality be objective. The idea of the best moral code-the one fully rational persons

5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q, 25, Art. 3.

38 Chapter One

would support.-may prove to provide sound means to evaluate one's own code as well as those of other societies. Furthermore, the divine command theory should not be accepted even by those who are religious. This is because it implies what clearly seems absurd, namely that God might tomorrow change the moral rules and make performing the most extreme acts of cruelty an obligation we all should meet. And, finally, I discussed how the theist and atheist might hope to find common ground about the sorts of moral rules to teach OUf children and how we should evaluate each other's behavior. Par from helping resolve moral disputes, religion does little more than sow confusion. Morality does not need religion and religion does not need morality.

KANTIAN ETHICS

Often when people think about ethics, they think about what cannot possibly be justified. Torture, for instance, is completely abhorrent to some people. It doesn't matter to them if great happiness could be gained or great suffering alleviated by torturing another human being; it simply should not be done. This kind of non-consequentialist ethical thinking finds its most systematic defense in the system detailed by Immanuel Kant starting in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Kantian ethical theories are deontological, concentrating on the concepts of duty and obligation as opposed to the consequences of an action (though modern forms of Kantian ethics often make some room for consequences alongside duty and obligation).

In the Groundwork, Kant defends the view that what is truly valuable in human life is a good will. The moral worth of an action depends not on its consequences but on whether the action arises from the motive of duty, which shows that the action comes from a good will. Kant contrasts the motive of duty with what he calls "inclination", or simple desire. One acts from inclination when one helps someone across the street solely because it makes one happy, for instance, but that does not yet give one's action moral worth. Kant believed that unlike acting from inclinations, duty arose from the faculty of practical reason, which moved the will by invoking principles rather than simple desire. Thus, for Kant the principle behind the action-Kant calls this a "maxim"-is the source of morality.

It is not enough, though, to say that moral worth lies in principles rather than consequences. Kant must also say what kind of principle behind an act gives that act moral worth. Not just any principle can count as the motive of duty. Kant believed that the only principle sufficiently compelling to serve as the source of all moral action is the so-called Categorical Imperative. Two main forrnulatjons of the Categorical Imperative are worth covering here:

The Universal Law Formulatiou: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that should become a universal law. (G 42 1 )

The Formulation of Humanity: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means. (G 429)

40 Chapter One

Kant believed these were essentially formulations of the same command, but it can be difficult to see why he believed that. The first formulation expresses the idea that the principle behind one's action should be a principle that could serve as an actual law of nature. This was important to Kant because laws of nature were universal-binding on everyone regardless of individual circumstances-and the moral laws we gi:rc .

ourselve� resemble natural laws in their universality. Thus, the pnnclplcs behmd our actions should be principles that everyone could have behind their own actions. They should be what ethicists call universalizable.

Many people find Kant's second formulation more intuitive. What makes the will so valuable for Kant is its ability to set ends for itself. Robbing it of this ability, then, whether the will is yours or another's wiJI be forsaking something of ultimate value. This is supposed to amo�nt to the same set of morally acceptable actions as the first formulation. Ultimately treating someone else as a mere means to your own ends is trying to force a principle of action that he or she could not reasonably accept. As Illustrated below, making a false promise seems to be a clear example of a case where a borrower completely disregards whatever purpose the lender has for his or her money, thus treating the lender as a mere means. Considering everyone as an end rather than a mere means is considering what would happen if one's maxim were to become a universal law.

Kant believed that the categorical imperative gave us two kinds of dut!es. If an action's maxim could not be universalized at all, Kant beheved we were never allowed to act on it. He called duties like these perfect duties. Some maxims may be universalizable, on the other hand, but stIli unable to be willed to be universal laws. These duties he called imperfect duties. We are still required to act on imperfect duties, but not wlth the kind of rigidity that perfect duties require.

Kant's critics point out that taking a hard line like this on morality would lead to extremely undesirable states of affairs, like the consequences of rule worship described above. If lying to someone prevents them from murdering a friend or family member and has no other bad consequences, it can be difficult to appreciate Kant's point. Kant hl

, mself conSIdered this objection in a short piece called On a Supposed

RIght to LIe from Philanthropic Concerns and famously holds tight to the Idea that one shou�d not lie even to thwart someone planning a murder. Most modern Kantlans do not consider a hard line like this to be required by Kant' s system.

Introduction 4 1

Christine Korsgaard, for instance, argues that a Kantian could adopt two sets of rules: one for the non-ideal world and one for the ideal world. In the non-ideal world, she thinks, we do not commit a moral wrong by lying to the murderer. In the ideal world, though, we would not be permitted to lie.

Others have raised concerns that Kant's ethical system places too much emphasis on the dictates of reason as opposed to feelings and emotions, leading to the problem of inappropriate motives. Recall the example above about helping someone to cross the street because it makes one happy. According to Kant, the good nature of the action does not give the action moral worth. It is a choice with moral worth only if it comes from the motive of duty-if the motive behind it is that one must help. This foundational part of Kant's theory is in tension with common-sense views of morality that see positive emotions as contributing to the moral worth of an action. Visiting a sick family member or friend at a hospital because one figures it is one's duty seems somehow worse than doing it out of love for the person. Since familial bonds are frequently based on complicated sets of emotion, this can make Kantian perspectives on ethics difficult to integrate into discussions of ethics and the family.

In Kant's defense, he does not say that actions done from inclination are worthless, just that they lack moral worth. Kant associates moral worth with the idea of moral obligation and whether or not one agrees with this association, it would be even stranger to argue that one is morally obligated to have particular feelings when acting. So visiting someone out of a sense of duty has moral worth whether or not one likes it. If it makes one feel good, so much the better.

In the following excerpts, Kant lays out the two formulations of the categorical imperative and applies them to particular situations:

FROM FUNDA MENTA L PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

BY IMMANUEL KANT1

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i,e" have a wilL Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason, If reason infallibly detennines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e" the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e" as good, But if reason of itself does not suftlciently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the ease with men), then the actions which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obli oatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the co;;'mand is called an imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely

1 Excerpted from http://www.gutenberg.orglebooks/5682 . Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott ( 1 829- 1 9 1 3 ) .

Introduction 43

subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.

A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to objective laws (viz., laws of good), but could not be conceived as ohliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives arc only formulae to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective impetfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., the human will.

Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account� for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, aU imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.

Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be good and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good, whether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason.

Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. In the first case it is a problematical, in the second an assertorial practical principle. The categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e., without any other end, is valid as an apodeictic (practical) principle.

Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous, All sciences have a practical part,

44 Chapter One

�onsisti?g of �roblems expressing that some end is possible for us and of Impera.tlves dlre�ting how it may be attained. These may, therefore, be called III general llllperatives of skill. Here there is no question whether the end IS ratIOnal and good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a pOIsoner to ensure ce�tain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each serves to effect Its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life parents seek to have their children taught a great many things, and provid� for their skill In the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they determine whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil, but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and thiS anxiety IS so great that they commonly neglect to form and correct theIr Judgment on the value of the things which may be chosen as ends.

There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such to all ratlOn�l bemgs (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz., as dependent bemgs), and, therefore, one purpose which they not merely may have, but which we may With certainty assume that they all actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. The hypothetical imperative whIch expresses the practIcal necessity of an action as means to the advancement of happin�ss is assertoriaL We are not to present it as nec

, essary for an uncertalll and merely possible purpose, but for a purpose

whIch w.e may presup�ose . with certainty and a priori in every man,

because It belongs to hiS bemg. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called prudence, in the narrowest sense. And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the actJO? IS not com�anded ,

absolut�ly, but only as means to another purpose. Flllally, there IS an Imperative which commands a certain conduct

imn:ediatel�, �it?o�t havi�g �s its condition any other purpose to be attallled by It. fhIS Imperative IS categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it IS Itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of morality.

There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these three sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think they would be most suitably named III theIr order If we SaId they are either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands (laws) of morality. For it is law only that involves

Introduction 45

the conception of an unconditional and objective necessity, which is consequently universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. Counsels, indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a contingent subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatic (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to morals).

Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the conception of actions necessary to this end. Synthetical propositions must no doubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object and its realization. E.g., that in order to bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended operation can be performed, then to say that, if I fully will the operation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as acting in this way.

If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case as in that, it could be said: "Whoever wills the end, wills also (according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable means thereto which are in his power." But, unfortunately, the notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the

46 Chapter One

�lernents which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical, I.e., they must be borrowed from experience. and nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now it is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most powerful being (supposed finite) should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which already give him concern enough. Would he have long life? who guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at least have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to faU? and so on. In short, he is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any definite principles to secure happincss, but only on empirical counsels, c.g. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, etc., which experience tcaches do, on the average, most promote weJl-being. Hence it foJlows that the imperatives of prudence do not, strictly speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present actions objectively as practically necessary; that they are rather to be regarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts of reason, that the problem to determine certainly and uni versaJly what action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, and consequently no imperative respecting it is possible which should, in the strict sense, command to do what makes happy; because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that these should define an action by which one could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is really endless.

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims2 shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions

2 A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on which the subject acts; but the law is the

Introduction 47

restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time wilJ that it should become a universal law.

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly caJled nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be exprcssed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.3

] . A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: " From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist

objective principle valid for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative.

3 It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a future metaphysic of morals; so that I give it here only as an arbitrary one (in order to aTI'ange my examples). For the rest, I understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of inclination and then I have not merely external but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend to justify there, as it is all one for my purpose whether it is admitted or not.

'"

48 Chapter One

as . a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a

umversal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent wIth the supreme principle of all duty.

2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he WIll not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to hIm unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He deslres to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask hir:rself: "Is it .

not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a dIfficulty m thIS way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I WIll borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare" but t�e questi�n now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self� love mto a umversal law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that it could never �old as a u�ive�sal 1aw of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposmg It to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as ,:c11 as the end.

that one might have in view in it, since no one would consIder that anythmg was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.

. 3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture mIght make hIm a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreemg With hIS lllclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with sueh a umversal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, an? prop

. agation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but

he cannot possIbly WIll that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such bi a natural instinct. For, as a rational bei�a he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve hi;'and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

Introduction 49

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might oecur in whieh one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the same principle.

If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a llniversal law� for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination. Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own- will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not

50 Chapter One

be universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the umversahty of the principle is changed into a mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way, Now, although thIs cannot be justified in our own impartial judgement, yet it proves that we do really recognise the validity of the categorical ImperatIve and (wIlh all respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from us . . .

The question then is this: "Is it a necessary law for all rational beinos that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which th�y can t�emselves wIll that they should serve as universal 1aws?" If it is so, then It must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the WIll of a ratIonal bemg generally. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphYSIC of morals, In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to happen, even although it never does, i,e" objective practical laws, there it is ll?t necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or dIspleases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constItute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the phIlosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws, But here we are concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the rel�tIon of the WIll to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case

. wha�ever has re�erence to anything empirical is necessarily

excluded; SInce If reason of Itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the po�si�ility of this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a pnon.

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws, And such a faculty can be found only lfl ratIOnal belllgs, Now that which serves the will as the objective ground �f its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, It must hold for all rational beings, On the other hand, that whIch merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which

Introduction 51

the effect is the end, this is callcd the means, The subjective ground of the desire is the spring. the objective ground of the volition is the motive' hence the distinction betwe�n subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for evcry rational being, practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material whcn they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action, The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only theIr relatlon to the partIcular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws, Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end, All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sourc�s of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them, Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their ver� nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something whIch must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect), These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

52 Chapter One

If then there is a supreme practical principle or� in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.

C ONTRACTARIANISM

According to the contractarian tradition, the right thing to do is to abide by principlcs that rational people (would) have freely adopted (contracted into) from within some initial situation. The early advocates of this view are referred to as social contract theoflsts. Some of the most prominent social contract theorists were Thomas Hobbes ( 1 588-1 679), John Locke ( 1 632- 1 704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( 1 7 1 2 - 1 778). We present a very attenuated overview of the views of Hobbes and Lo�ke solely in order to introduce the work of one of the greatest contractanan thinkers of the 20'h century, John Rawls ( 1 92 1 -2002).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) Thomas Hobbes lived through some very turbulent times in the history

of England, including the English Civil War ( 1 642-1649). Hobbes was struck by the contrast between the sharp disagreement in political matters all around him, as compared to the vast and deep agreement on mathematical and scientific matters in his era. Hobbes had a thoroughly materialistic view of humanity and of the rest of nature. For him, everything is just matter in motion. In his mechanistic and deterministic view, there are no immaterial Gods or ghosts or souls or spirits. His materialistic philosophy of mind led him to want to construct a materialistic political philosophy. He reasoned that if he could formulate a political theory with the same logical precision found in tbe sciences (explaining the cause of the state in terms of the motions of bodies, making politics into a branch of physics), then men would be more likely to agree and achieve peace and order. Hence, in 1651, he produced his most well-known book, Leviathan.

Leviathan gives us a description of what Hobbes called The State of Nature (the condition of men before there is any government or civil society). He describes this state as a state of (rough) equality between men, and of relative scarcity. According to Hobbes, these characteristics lead to competition and diffidence between men. Indeed, without a common power to overawe them all, men exist in a state of war of all against all. Since they have nothing to fear from violating the covenants they might make with one another, such covenants are void (meaningless) in the state of nature. Hence, according to Hobbes, people existing in this amoral and warlike state miss out on all of the advantages that could come

54 Chapter One

from cooperative hving, and their lives are, "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish, and short." Given the obvious incentive to try to escape from the state of nature, it's fortunate that reason suggests a path by which they can do so; the institution of a commonwealth. Their desire for a better (more cooperative) life leads them to give up all of their rights to a ruler (sovereign) who can keep the peace and enforce order among them. Hobbes says, "Before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant. . . . and such power there is none before the erection of a COMMONWEALTH." According to Hobbes, the social contract has the following form: "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on thIs condItIOn, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner." This renunciation is absolute: he says that the only way t� secur� our�elves is to give all of our rights to the Sovereign; the SovereIgn wIll gIve us back whatever he thinks best for the preservation of peace and security. Hence, Hobbes is sometimes called the father of modern totalitarianism; we might contrast the view of John Locke, according to whom, because we lack security in the State of Nature, we would be rational to give up some of aUf rights to a State, but the government should be limited in its powers and we should retain the right of revolt if it fails to protect our lives, liberty, or property. Locke' s view, according to which the legitimacy of government can only be founded upon the (express or tacit) consent of the people, became the basis of social and political philosophy for generations, and we can see his influence in the founding documents of the United States government.

John Rawls: A Theory of Justice (1971) In 1971, John Rawls, a professor at Harvard University published a

book which has since caused a revolution in the fields of political phllosophy and ethIcs. The book is entitled A Theory of Justice, and its ma�n aim, ac�ording to Rawls was "To present a conception of justice whIch generalIZes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract ,as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant:' Although Rawls is grounded in the contractarian tradition, the hypothetical con

. tract that he describes is not a contract to set up a particular civil

SOCIety, but rather, an agreement on the principles of justice for the basic structure of society. Rawls' argument relies upon an claim that we should all accept principles which free and rational persons would accept in an

Introduction 55

initial position of equality, but these principles are not the particular laws of a civil society; they are the principles of distributive justice which can be used to judge the worth of any civil society.

What is it that Rawls is concerned with the distribution of? He refers to the goods he is focusing on as "primary goods". These are things that any rational person is presumed to want because the possession of these primary goods makes it easier to get anything else. There are two kinds of primary goods, according to Rawls: natural primary goods, and social primary goods. Natural primary goods include things like health and vigor, native intelligence and imagination, strength, beauty, etc .. It may be that one day we will have it in our power to determine the distribution of these goods (i.e., if we perfect genetic screening techniques so that we become able to produce "designer babies"), but since we don't (yet) have the power to determine the distribution of these goods, we can put them to the side and focus upon the social primary goods. There are four categories of social primary goods that Rawls outlines. They are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, wealth and income, and the social bases of self-respect (forms of social recognition). Now how does Rawls suggest that we determine a just distribution of these social goods?

The name that Rawls gives to his theory is "Justice as Fairness"; though this is not meant to imply that justice and fairness are to be equated in Rawls' view. There are two central parts to this theory:

1 ) A description of the initial contract situation and of the problem of choice we face there.

2) A set of' principles which (he argues) would be agreed to.

Part One: The Original Position

Rawls refers to the first part of this scheme as "The Original Position." This is a hypothetical situation of equality, in which rational deliberators are to choose principles of justice upon which to base a society. The people in the OP are narrowly rational beings (they choose the most effective means to given ends), and mutually disinterested (they are just looking out for their own interests. Rawls describes them as having all the knowledge we possess about what people are like, what they desire, what they fear, etc. They might be described as knowing all we know about people except one thing; which one they are. Rawls says that in order that the people in the OP will choose principles ofjustiee in a fair and unbiased way, they should choose from behind what he calls "The Veil o f Ignorance." Hence, people in the O.P. are to be deprived of knowledge of their place in society, class, position or social status, natural assets and

56 Chapter One

abilities, intelligence, strength, conception of the good, and special psychological propensities, This ignorance is meant to exclude bias from the choice of principles of justice in the original position.

Which principles does Rawls believe would be chosen from within this elaborate hypothetical situation? He argues that his two principles of justice would be chosen. Here is one formulation of those two principles.

Part Two: The Two Principles of Justice as Fairness

1) The Principle of Equal Rights and Liherties: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."

2) The Difference Principle and the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."

Rawls stresses that we are to understand these two principles as lexically ordered. That is, the first principle must be fulfilled before we go on to the second one; it won't be allowed to sacrifice the rights and liberties guaranteed under the first principle in order to give citizens a greater share, for example, of wealth and income.

Why would rational deliberators in the original position choose these two principles? Rawls argues that under conditions of uncertainty as to the probabilities of outcomes, where the risk is high and I may not get what I want, rational deliberators would employ the Maximin Strategy: This strategy of rational choice ranks alternatives by their worst possible outcome, and prescribes that we are to adopt the alternative the worst possible outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.

As an example of this "play it safe" strategy at work, consider The Pri�oner's Dilemma: You and your drug-dealing partner are arrested in possession of a very tiny amount of cocaine, The police only have enough evidence to send you both away for one year each. The guards put you in separated rooms and offer you the following deal (and they tell you that they are offering your partner the same deal). "Squeal" means that you confess, tell the police where your stash is, and testify against your partner. You don't know what your partner is going to do (you haven't known him that long and in the world of high-stakes drug-dealing, people often find it healthier to maintain a "strictly business" relationship). Thus, you must choose under conditions of uncertainty, What do you do?

Introduction 5 7

Assume that there are n o adverse consequences connected to. the act of

"squealing" itself (i.e., your partner won't send some of hiS fnends after

you or your family, you won't have to drop out of the drug-dealmg

business, etc.).

Squeal

Prisoner B

Don't Squeal

Squeal

A: 5 Years B: 5 Years

Prisoner A

A: Probation B: 20 Years

Don't Squeal

A: 20 Years B: Probation

A: 1 Year B: 1 Year

Rational choice theory tells us that when we are confronted with a dangerous and uncertain situation like this, the rational strategy to employ is maximin strategy. Since the worst thing that can happen to me If I squeal is 5 years in prison, and the worst thing that can happen if I don't squeal is 20 years in prison, the rational thing for me to do under the�e circumstances is to squeal. Of course, my partner, If he IS ratIOnal, Will employ the same kind of thinking. Notice that this does not yield the optimal outcome for my partner and me: if we both were to choose not to squeal, we would spend a total of 2 years in prison, whereas if we both squeal, we spend a total of 10 years in prison. And, mdeed: m sltuatrons where we imagine people playing this game more than once m success lOn, different strategies might be more rational (e.g., a retaliation strategy where I don't squeal until my partner does, then squeal i n retaliation, then go back to not squealing, etc.). But the choice that Rawls

. outlines in the

OP is made only once, and the deliberators behllld the vell 01 Ignorance have no knowledge of any likelihood that they might be rich, poor, male, female, etc.; furthermore, they know that some possible outcomes would be simply unacceptable for them (a set of principles which allowed some people to be slaves, for example). Hence, Rawls �gues that this kind of "play it safe" strategy would be the one that the dehberators would employ and it would lead them to his two principles of justice.

The theory Rawls that outlines has proven to be an extremely powerful one for analyzing many different moral issues. One especially

. str�ng

application of the theory concerns the problem of intergeneratlOnal justrce.

58 Chapter One

If we imagine people in the original position as ignorant not only about their race, sex, social status, etc., but also about to which generation they belong, we may be able to arrive at a new understanding of what would be required by intergenerationally just policies regarding the use of renewable and nonrenewable environmental resources. The applications to the ethics of the family may also be particularly useful, as some of the pieces in this collection demonstrate. Here is an excerpt from Rawls major work, A Theory a/Justice.