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Reid Sawyer and Jodi M. Vittori 1

The Uncontested Battles

The Role of Actions, Networks, and Ideas in the Fight Against al Qaeda

Introduction On October 15, 2007, a controversial article in the Washington Post reported that some U.S. military officials considered al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) defeated. 2 While AQI is only one part of the Sunni extremist insurgency in Iraq, it has been the focal point for the broader al Qaeda movement both in terms of money3 and personnel. 4 Supporters across the Middle East, and increasingly in Europe, have developed strong networks that facilitate the move- ment of thousands of foreign fighters, supplies, and money to answer AQI's call to arms. In organizational terms, Iraq has acted as a terrorism Petri dish where AQI developed new tactics and measures to attack the United States-both in Iraq and around the world.

Yet sustained and continual pressure on AQI has degraded the organization and dis- assembled its support networks. Going forward, the ability for AQI to shape the future jihadist fight outside of Iraq will be limited. AQI will face obstacles obtaining funds, dis- tributing money across its network and maintaining a viable organization to attract recruits, for Iraq and for Islamist causes elsewhere. At a cursory glance, it could appear that the United States and its allies have achieved a strategic victory for the United States, and simultaneously, a substantial loss, not only strategically but also morally for the broader al Qaeda organization and its efforts to defeat the United States.

However, AQI is only one subset of a larger, more complex organization. There is no doubt that the potential defeat of AQI is significant, yet it is not clear how this will impede al Qaeda's future development and growth. For the United States and its allies' counterter- rorism efforts to succeed, al Qaeda must be understood both as a multifaceted organiza- tion and a global social movement. As this paper will demonstrate, al Qaeda's dual nature requires that the United States and its allies fight this war on three levels: a war of action, a war of networks and, the most difficult and intractable conflict, a war of ideas. Failing to recognize and address these three interrelated levels will ensure al Qaeda remains a resil- ient organization with an increasing capacity for violence.

To illustrate these concepts, this paper consists of three sections. The first section describes the state of the jihad and al Qaeda today. The second explains how al Qaeda simultaneously exists as both an organization and a global social movement, and how these aspects reinforce each other. Finally, the third section explores the three levels on which the conflict is being waged and discusses the implications of systemic failures to contest key battles on each level.

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The State of the Jihad Today Looking at the state of the jihad today there is both good and bad news. No doubt al Qaeda has suffered significant losses since 9/11: Numerous senior leaders, along with thousands of their foot soldiers, have been captured or killed and al Qaeda has lost the freedom of maneuver it once enjoyed in Afghanistan. In the past year alone, al Qaeda faced a number of serious setbacks, the most significant being the damage to the AQI. At the same time, though, al Qaeda has expanded its base of operations, allied with new organizations and increased its worldwide operational tempo.

The Good News

Perhaps the most significant and successful sustained counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda to date have taken place in Saudi Arabia. For three years, al Qaeda waged war against a variety of targets in Saudi Arabia ranging from attacks on Western housing com- pounds to Saudi Arabian targets. The resultant counterterrorism actions were staggering. "By the end of 2006 they had killed or captured over 260 terrorists including all but one of the most wanted top 26 in the country. According to the Saudis they foiled more than 25 major attacks."5 In 2007, security forces interfered with yet another al Qaeda-linked plot to attack oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, by arresting over 172 individuals operating in seven cells and seizing numerous weapons caches and over 5 million dollars. 6 Saudi Arabia has stepped-up efforts to impede the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and recently has reduced the ability for Saudi financiers to support al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda has also suffered setbacks in other key locations. The severe missteps made by Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon in May 2007 stopped the coalescence of al Qaeda in Lebanon. The resulting conflict in the Palestinian refugee camps between Fatah al-Islam and Lebanon's security forces prevented the use of Lebanese territory and its Palestinian refugee camps, at least in the near-term, as a training ground and strategic reserve for other Islamist conflicts.7

Despite repeated attempts, al Qaeda has also failed to establish any meaningful pres- ence in Egypt. A series of attacks in October 2004 and July 2005 focused on Egypt's tour- ist industry. However, "The Egyptian security apparatus successfully confined the threat to the Sinai and away from the center of the Egyptian political life. A cadre of terrorists and sympathizers almost certainly still exists in Sinai but it does not threaten the regime." 8

Nevertheless, Egypt will remain an attractive and important target for al Qaeda given al Qaeda's stated aims.

In a final example, the de facto government of the Islamic Courts in Somalia and its al Qaeda allies were defeated with U.S. assistance in December 2006. The defeat of these factions prevented al Qaeda from gaining any significant foothold in the Hom of Africa, an area al Qaeda has long desired sanctuary.9

The Bad News

Even with the pending defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq and continued setbacks in other loca- tions, the outlook for al Qaeda is far from bleak. The succession of arrests of key al Qaeda figures certainly represents tactical, and in some cases strategic, successes. 10 Yet it also

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demonstrates the depth of al-Qaeda's "bench" and the commitment of its members to step forward. The mere fact that al Qaeda has survived for the past six years is a testament to its strength and resilience. 11 This alone represents a substantial setback for counterterror- ist governments and an immeasurable moral victory for al Qaeda and its followers. But al Qaeda has done more than simply survive. It has undergone a resurgence. Al Qaeda has experienced unprecedented growth, both in its organization and its associated movements, since 9/11. The organization, and increasingly the movement, remains capable of high degrees of violence.

A telling example of this bleak story is the proliferation of foreign fighters participat- ing in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The New York Times recently reported that roughly 100 to 300 of the combatants in Afghanistan were non-Afghans. 12 By all accounts, coalition forces are seeing "an unprecedented level of reports of foreign-fighter involvement." 13 The foreign fighters have proven to be even more extreme than local Tali ban militias. 14 In Iraq, the United States recently identified over 500 persons who had come to fight on behalf of al Qaeda and its associated movements from Libya, Morocco, Syria, Algeria, Oman, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. 15 With these additional fighters, al Qaeda has been able wage jihad on a number of fronts, including the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, among others.

The challenges facing counterterrorist governments today in combating al Qaeda are far greater than on September 12, 2001, as al Qaeda has also made three critical adaptations that have contributed to its survival over the past six years. First, al Qaeda has expanded its global presence and influence through mergers with like-minded groups. Second, the organization has incorporated existing technologies into new tactical applications. Third, the relative sanctuary that al Qaeda enjoys in both the developed world and failing states has provided the organization the critical breathing room necessary to recuperate.

Mergers

A number of organizations-with similar ideologies and goals-have combined efforts with al Qaeda, reaping the benefits of merged activities. These benefits include increased synergies through the sharing of strategic intelligence, resources, and tactical expertise; reinforcement of organizational functions (thus enhancing the durability and survivability of the overall organization); and an expanded global reach. In the past three years, "40 organizations have announced their formation and pledged their allegiance to bin laden, al Qaeda and their strategic objectives." 16 Many have mistakenly viewed al Qaeda's mergers as a sign of weakness, when nothing could be farther from the truth. The continued interest of organizations to join with al Qaeda reflects the significant appeal and pervasive nature of al Qaeda's ideology.

For example, in November 2006, al Qaeda completed a formal merger with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Islamist organization based in Algeria. While the two groups had been cooperating since 2005, in November 2006, GSPC changed its name to al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) and took up the al Qaeda ban- ner, launching attacks in Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and conducting its first ever attacks against U.S. interests. 17 Given the large North African Muslim diaspora in Europe, AQIM will continue to expand its existing networks there, enabling al Qaeda's leadership its recruitment, logistics, and propaganda infrastructure. 18

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Technical Innovations

AI Qaeda has displayed great deftness in the adoption and integration of existing tech- nologies into its tactics and operations. The use of technology has allowed al Qaeda to communicate with its members, to appeal to potential constituents and to increase its lethality. Through the use and adaptation of common technologies, al Qaeda has survived and evolved in an increasingly hostile security environment. The rapid diffusion and pro- liferation of new uses of technology has enhanced the ability of affiliated and home-grown terrorist cells to contribute to the global jihad more than before. Moreover, these technolo- gies, to a degree, have offset the significant advantage the United States possesses in this asymmetrical fight.

Perhaps more so than any other single technology, al Qaeda's use of the Internet has proved invaluable. 19 The virtual world, through chat rooms, password protected forums, and jihadist media sites, fosters relatively secure communication and interaction and cre- ates a supportive community for its members. The Internet offers distinct advantages to al Qaeda, which seeks to nurture and grow a powerful global social movement: first, in recruiting new members; second, in offering "distance learning" opportunities for potential jihadists; and third, by providing tools that enhance tactical operations.

First, al Qaeda utilizes the Internet to raise the consciousness of Muslims around the world. While the Internet is an important tool in the recruitment and radicalization of new members, the Internet has not opened the floodgates of new recruits. Instead, only a small number of individuals have been observed who have transitioned from inquisition to action due to either passive or active engagement with a jihadist forum on the Internet. 20

Person-to-person contact remains the predominant method of recruitment and radicaliza- tion.21 This having been said, however, by providing unfettered access to extremist lit- erature, discussions, and propaganda, the Internet provides the building blocks for those interested to become involved in the global jihad.

Second, the Internet provides a forum to educate and communicate with support- ers around the world without having to travel to a training camp. 22 The panoply of Web sites include: instructions for producing explosives, dissemination of training manuals, and ideological materials, such as martyr videos, videotaped beheadings and fatwas, are also available to bolster the movement. 23 However, efforts spawned by these "distance learning opportunities" are often less sophisticated and successful than operations centrally planned and executed by al Qaeda.24 Regardless of their efficacy, the value of increasing the reach of jihadist training and indoctrination to those who do not have access to experienced jihadists or training camps cannot be underestimated.

Third, the Internet provides tools for jihadists to protect themselves and plan future operations. Jihadists have taken advantage of the proliferation of commercially available encryption programs. 25 Captured materials reveal that al Qaeda members have employed encryption since the early 1990s. For example, Ramzi Yousef, the lead planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, encrypted files concerning the Bojinka plot to destroy elev- en U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific Ocean in 1995.26 Wadih el Hage, convicted for his role in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa, encrypted his e-mail com- munications prior to the attacks. 27 Additionally, the use of geospatial tools, such as Google Earth, enhances preoperational reconnaissance and targeting efforts. By using these tools, terrorists can improve target selection,28 focus reconnaissance efforts, and familiarize their

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operatives with a given target-all of which enhance operational effectiveness. 29 Al Qa- eda's technical innovations extend beyond the Internet however. The tactics continually evolve in order to maintain a level of fear in society, as society becomes accustomed to their tactics. For instance, in the early days of the Iraq insurgency, AQI used beheadings to instill fear in the population. The public gradually became immune to this gruesome tactic, so AQI switched its focus to improvised explosive devices that randomly kill large numbers of people. But the widespread use of improvised explosive devices ultimately de- sensitized the country to those attacks as well. Recognizing this, AQI recently began using chlorine designated for water treatment in improvised explosive devices to make chlorine bombs, with the intent to sicken or wound more individuals than explosives alone could ac- complish. 30 This use of chemical weapons once again ratcheted up the level of fear among the population. It is this continued learning and innovation that has kept al Qaeda tactics one step ahead of counterterror forces.

Sanctuary

Al Qaeda enjoys relative sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in western Pakistan. From this secure location, al Qaeda leadership "have reestablished sig- nificant control over their once-battered worldwide terror network and over the past year has set up a band of training camps[ ... ] near the Afghan border." 31 The return of the region to prominence for training terrorists accomplishes two goals for al Qaeda. First and most important, the continued presence of training camps signal to al Qaeda's worldwide sup- porters that it remains a vibrant organization, and creates a physical place that supporters can point to as an example of resurgence. Second, the camps provide a physical location for jihadists around the world to gather, train, perpetuate their virulent ideology, and plan for new attacks. These camps are particularly significant for European jihadists, who come to be trained and indoctrinated, and then return home with enhanced ''street credibility." With this training and newfound credibility, they become "cell-builders," who now have the luxury to build cells and train those who could not attend such camps. 32

The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that the FATA sanctuary has allowed al Qaeda to regenerate "key elements of its Homeland attack capability."33 While this safe haven may not remain indefinitely, it presently is an important factor in al Qaeda's contin- ued resiliency and success as well as its ability to reassert itself as an organization and not simply serve as an inspiration for jihadists around the world.

The Two Dynamics of al Qaeda's Success Despite being the target of the greatest onslaught of military, law enforcement, and intel- ligence operations ever brought against a terrorist group, al Qaeda remains a vibrant and robust organization. The vitality of al Qaeda today begs for an explanation of its resiliency and adaptability in a tremendously hostile security environment. The fact that al Qaeda has survived and, in many respects, flourished, reflects two sets of dynamics: al Qaeda's organizational dynamics and the movement associated with al Qaeda. First, we will dis- cuss the dual nature of al Qaeda, and how this increases its ability to withstand the West- ern onslaught. Second, we will assess the shortcomings of current U.S. counterterrorism strategies, and how these failures have undoubtedly contributed to al Qaeda's continued survival, and indeed, success.

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AI Qaeda, the Organization, and al Qaeda, the Movement

Lee Hamilton of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars has stated that "The mere fact that five years after 9/11 we are still struggling to define the enemy and understand why it hates us is indicative of the vast challenge we face, because if you can't define your enemy with precision, it's very hard to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy."34 As Mr. Hamilton recognized, efforts to define al Qaeda have largely failed, thereby precluding analytical clarity of the issue and a thorough understanding of its con- sequences.

AI Qaeda has been described as an organization comprised of multiple networks and also as an ideology that has transcended the organization resulting in a distributed social movement. While both of these descriptive labels may be technically true, neither accurately reflects the dual nature of al Qaeda. Instead, al Qaeda needs to be understood as possessing aspects of both an organization and a movement, and that the relationship between these aspects reinforces and bolsters the overall strength of al Qaeda. Overlooking the relationship between these two aspects results in a misunderstanding of the threat and inhibits the formation of effective counterterrorism strategy.

The Organization

Governments traditionally treat al Qaeda as a networked organization with a command- and-control structure, some level of hierarchy (however loose it may be), foreign fighter fa- cilitation networks, operational cells, logistical support elements, and regional "franchised" organizations. These networks present identifiable command-and-control structures that can be observed and targeted by governments through law enforcement or military opera- tions. Such an approach is appealing and makes sense to intelligence and government offi- cials because viewing al Qaeda in this manner facilitates organized attacks on the network. It also provides a mechanism to measure progress by "subtracting" the targeted elements from the sum total of the organization.

However appealing the organizational view of al Qaeda may be, this approach pres- ents an incomplete and somewhat inaccurate picture of al Qaeda. Viewing al Qaeda as an organized network overlooks the very essence of the organization that has provided al Qaeda with its resilience and lifeblood over the past six years: its broad and geographically diverse movement. Furthermore, this approach suggests that the threat can be defeated or managed by attacking organizational elements, but ignores the fact that as long as the al Qaeda's ideology remains attractive and individuals see incentives to answer the call to arms, al Qaeda will continue to survive.

The Movement

The social movement that is al Qaeda is multigenerational, without a geographic center, transnational in nature, virtual in design, and exceptionally difficult to detect and interdict. The movement is neither organized nor directed by the existing al Qaeda leadership, but rather, is inspired and sustained by al Qaeda's ideology, the perceptions of U.S. and West- ern occupation of Iraq and a pervasive hatred of the United States. The movement is com- prised of supporters, sympathizers, and inspired "home-grown" operational terrorist cells representing a spectrum from the most dedicated adherents of al Qaeda's ideology to those

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who conveniently use portions of al Qaeda's teachings to serve their own interests but that do not necessarily subscribe to the end state of a global caliphate. The movement provides al Qaeda with its recruits and supporters and is, in short, the engine driving regeneration within al Qaeda.

The core of this larger movement emanates from the small Salafist sub-sect of Islam. This sub-sect encompasses many groups who consider the world to be in a state of jahaliyya (a world in chaos) like that which existed before the establishment of Islam. All Salafists reify the concept of tawhid (the unity of God), that God is supreme and unique and that any traditions or other religious aspects that have occurred after the Prophet Mo- hammad and his four successors (the Rashiduun) are un-Islamic. While most Salafists seek to convert society to their view of Islam through education or politics, the jihadists focus on the need for warfare and revolution to promote the Salafist cause. 35 As such, Salafism in general, and the subset of Salafist-jihadists in particular, form a larger movement of ideologues and potential sympathizers to support al Qaeda.

The genius in al Qaeda's ideology is that it allows disparate groups and individu- als to locate their particular grievances in a larger framework that transcends any local or national concerns. The deterritorialized nature of Islam combined with al Qaeda's reinter- pretation of religious principles and the reimagination of history has created a poignant and appealing story for many. Al Qaeda's leadership understands the need to remain rel- evant and continue to fight for increased "market share." For instance, second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri, in an interview with the al-Sahab media network on May 5, 2007, at- tempted to appeal to African Americans, American Indians, and Hispanics in terms of oppression and not religion, by invoking the image of using Malcom X. 36 By emphasizing factors of oppression instead of framing the conflict in religious terms, he tailored his mes- sage to new audience segments. 37

While government officials and intelligence analysts recognize the existence of a movement surrounding al Qaeda, these same officials prefer to avoid viewing al Qaeda as a diffuse social movement. Insofar as al Qaeda is a movement-an amorphous, undefined, transnational collection of people and ideas that lacks definable structure or borders-it becomes difficult to identify and target key nodes. Furthermore, there is no assurance that targeting these nodes would have any effect on the overall movement. This leaves govern- ment officials without clear and discernable metrics to gauge the success or failure of their efforts against al Qaeda.

The Dynamic Between the Organization and the Movement

An appreciation that the two dimensions of al Qaeda exist in a mutually reinforcing manner will help governments avoid the dilemma of choosing between a myopic focus on the orga- nization and a broader and potentially ineffective framework for combating the movement. Figure 1 highlights this interaction between these two dimensions:

This model depicts the principal component parts of the organization and the move- ment. For the organization to be effective, it requires leadership, networks, and the resources. The leaders of an organization are responsible for selecting subordinate leaders within the organization, setting direction and priorities and managing the organization through cri- ses. It is the leadership that enables groups to plan, coordinate, and execute their attacks. 38

Without good leadership, the personnel, training, and expertise will be useless. Moreover,

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Violence Ideology

Figure 1. AI Qaeda's Enabling Components

Rohan Gunaratna has described al Qaeda as a "network of networks." 39 The ability to cre- ate, maintain, and leverage multiple networks enables the organization to remain viable and evade elimination. Without such diverse networks, al Qaeda would present counterterrorist forces with either a single target, or there would be such an exceptionally disconnected set of disparate groups that there would be no global jihad.

For the movement to be effective, its message must remain relevant, it must possess a dynamic method of communicating its ideology, and it must be able to continue to radical- ize potential recruits. Despite al Qaeda's relatively small size, its radical interpretation of history and Islamic theology has had a disproportionate influence on both the fundamental- ist and mainstream discourse. AI Qaeda's ability to keep its message relevant is a factor that cannot be overstated. As Mr. Gunaratna [to be consistent with other names] has noted, as long as al Qaeda can appeal to Muslims worldwide to share its ideas, aims, and objectives, then support and operational cells can regenerate. 40 Were al Qaeda to become irrelevant, it would quickly find itself threatened by other organizations and leaders for primacy within the larger jihadist movement. This, in turn, would invariably lead to a decline in recruit- ment, and eventually, the organization would disappear. Equally as important as the mes- sage is the means to communicate that message to a diverse and geographically dispersed audience. As such, it is the ideology, communicative capability, and relevance that facili- tate the contribution of resources to the organization, and it is the resources the organiza- tion expends through "propaganda by deed" that keeps the movement invigorated.

The grounds well of the supporting movement thus increases the resource base avail- able to the organization. All terrorist organizations require resources to acquire or build weapons; to provide monetary support for compartmented terrorist cells, travel expenses, logistics operations; and to gain access their targets. As with any skill-intensive organiza- tion, the most important resource is human capital. The radicalization efforts within the

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movement directly dictate the regenerative capacity of the organization. Finally, the more resources the organization can generate over time, the less pressure its leaders will face from within the organization for reform, the more the organization can withstand external pressures and the greater ability to prosecute its terror campaigns.

Additionally, two critical and related elements connect the organization and the movement: violence and ideology. For al Qaeda, violence is the currency of the organiza- tion. Through violence, al Qaeda communicates with a number of audiences-the direct target of the violent act, the wider community of actors threatened by al Qaeda, its sup- porters, and even the organization's own members-keeping the organization relevant both in terms of its enemies and its supporters. In this way, violence serves three functions for the organization. First, violence is used for instrumental reasons41-to create fear among a population, to provoke an overly severe response by counterterror governments, or to co- erce governments to change some policy. Second, violence serves organizational purposes by promoting it as the authentic vanguard of the people it purports to represent. 42 Third, violence can be performative or symbolic, communicating a larger message to a variety of audiences. 43 It is al Qaeda's violence that keeps them in the headlines, without which it is just another activist group that would gradually face from the public's priorities.

If violence is the currency of the organization, then ideology is the connective tissue binding the disparate members of the movement together as well as connecting the move- ment with the terrorist organization. Ideology "frames organizational structure, leadership and membership motivation, recruitment and support, and shapes the strategies and tactics adopted by the group."44 Additionally, the ideology legitimizes al Qaeda's violence, by presenting the need for violence as a religious duty.

Shortcomings in Counterterrorist Efforts

The success that al Qaeda has realized in the past six years is not wholly attributable to its foresight, strategic planning, or organizational design. In reality, many of al Qaeda's achievements are a result of the shortcomings in counterterrorism strategies and the fail- ure to challenge al Qaeda across the entire spectrum of conflict. Four principal areas of counterterrorism strategy will be discussed in this article. First, as discussed above, current counterterrorism efforts are focused almost exclusively on al Qaeda as an organization, often ignoring the widely distributed social movement. Second, the continued conflict in Iraq has provided jihadists around the globe a renewed focus and commitment to target the United States and coalition partners. Third, counterterrorism efforts have been too narrowly focused on tactical objectives at the expense of the operational and strategic objectives. Fourth, the failure to contest key battles-geographical, ideological, and organizational- has allowed al Qaeda unprecedented access to new and expanding resources including sanctuaries, the power of the dominant Salafi-jihadist narrative, and advantageous mergers with other extremist organizations.

A Myopic Focus As discussed above in some detail, al Qaeda today is both an organization and geographi- cally and ethnically diverse movement. However, most current counterterrorism strategies do not take into account both aspects of al Qaeda's existence, preferring to focus on only

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organizational qualities. Effective counterterrorism strategies must account for al Qaeda's dual nature. Failure to include the less-well-defined social movement in the equation will result in an incomplete strategy, skewed to tactical counterterrorism operations while ig- noring the broader, more complicated social dimensions of the threat. The ultimate conse- quence is that such a narrow view will only prolong the life of al Qaeda and increase the danger to the United States and its interests around the world.

The War in Iraq

The war in Iraq creates challenges for counterterrorist strategies. The recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate indicated that "[al Qaeda's] association with AQI helps al Qa'ida [sic] to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks."45 Morally, AQI has been a clarion call for those who are fighting in the name of Islam. The occupation and perceived neocolonial designs of the United States in Iraq have had a decided impact on world opinion, and particularly the Sunni extremist community. "1\vo new studies, one by the Saudi government and one by an Israeli think tank ... found that most foreign fighters in Iraq were not terrorists before the Iraq war, but were 'radicalized by the war itself.' "46

The failure of AQI to achieve a decisive victory against the United States in Iraq and the likely defeat of the organization may not have resulted in the desired strategic impact. The defeat of AQI is an important achievement, yet it is unclear that the defeat of AQI will significantly hurt the progression of the broader al Qaeda movement. While the fear of "bleed-out" of fighters from Iraq remains, the real danger arises from the tactical lessons learned by al Qaeda in the course of fighting the United States over the past four years in Iraq. Undoubtedly, al Qaeda will disseminate this knowledge with extremists far and wide. Examples have already been witnessed of technology transfer from Iraq to other theaters of operationY Additionally, Sunni extremists will frame AQI's defeat in ways to promote their views. For them, it will serve as U.S. hegemony and of the U.S.'s desire to destroy Sunni Islam. They will also highlight the loss of life and tremendous expense incurred by the United States as an example of what can be accomplished by motivated Islamic fighters.

Unbalanced Approach to the Fight

This perhaps is the single greatest contributing factor aiding al Qaeda's resurgence. It is a conceptual failure to view the struggle against al Qaeda as a singular conflict, rather than three distinct yet related efforts. While it is indeed a war consisting of tactical operations, it is also a war against regional and global jihadist networks and, perhaps most importantly, a conflict of ideas and ideologies. Since al Qaeda's declaration of war against the United States in 1996, al Qaeda has been waging this struggle across all three of these levels. Bin Laden and his lieutenants presciently understood that operations at each level reinforced efforts on the other levels. The initial failure by the United States to recognize these three distinct levels and the subsequent failure to develop a multifaceted counterterrorism strat- egy to address them has permitted al Qaeda to conduct a global terror campaign unabated and virtually unchecked.

The first level is a war of action. 48 It is the war that Americans are most familiar with; it is predominantly pursued using the military and intelligence instruments of na- tional power. Fought by al Qaeda and governments alike, the war of action consists of

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premeditated, preemptive, and preventative strikes and is measured in minutes, hours, and days. For al Qaeda and its affiliates, this level is comprised of individual bombings and coordinated attacks, in other words, tactical operations. For the United States, this level of war involves intelligence operations to find individuals or cells associated with al Qaeda, and either capture or kill them. As such, success in this arena tends to erode the organiza- tional aspects of al Qaeda: its resources (including recruits) and its leadership. Certainly, enough success on the tactical level will eventually degrade al Qaeda's ability to recruit and remain relevant, but only so long as new recruits are not available.

The mid-term fight, the war of networks, 49 is waged in terms of months and years. These battles focus on the extensive network structure of the organization that is al Qaeda, its affiliated organizations such as AQI or AQIM and the al Qaeda movement. This aspect of the conflict focuses not only on the organization, but also on elements of the broader movement. Beyond targeting the command-and-control elements of the operational cells, the war of networks must be also aimed at the multiple and overlapping support networks that facilitate the recruitment, radicalization, and movement of foreign fighters; the acqui- sition and distribution of chemical precursors for conventional explosives; and communi- cations. These networks can be small and geographically limited to a particular province or transnational. The complexity of network operations explains the fact that it can take months, or even years, to realize success. Still, despite the difficulty, the war of networks is where counterterrorism forces can best constrain the terrorists' strategic operating environ- ment, thus limiting their effectiveness.

Since 2001, counterterrorism forces have achieved some significant success in the war of networks. Al Qaeda has been forced from its sanctuary in Afghanistan while large numbers of al Qaeda's senior leaders and even greater numbers of its fighters have been captured. Yet, as important as these victories have been, the impact of these actions in the larger picture is limited. The resurgent foreign fighter network in Afghanistan is an impor- tant reminder of this dilemma. Ultimately, no matter the successes on the tactical level, the failure to succeed across all levels of this fight will allow al Qaeda to respond and adapt. It is a biological truth that if an organism is not stressed enough, for long enough, it will grow stronger. The evolutionary process has been kind to al Qaeda.

The war of ideas50 is the most complex and difficult for counterterrorist governments to comprehend, and it will be a long-term fight waged over years and decades. Al Qaeda has masterfully conducted an ideological campaign over the last decade and set the agenda with regards to the role of Islam versus secular ideas throughout the Islamic world. Unfor- tunately, the United States, and the West overall, have yet to contest this battle space, al- lowing al Qaeda's narrative to become the dominant, and in many cases the sole, narrative. This is the realm where the movement portion of al Qaeda is at its zenith-where the ideas of al Qaeda's extremist version of Islam collide with those of the majority of Muslims as well as those of the West. The United States has assumed that it is communicating a mes- sage of democracy, capitalism, the rule of law and civil liberties, and that this automatically resonates with all of humanity. Unfortunately, centuries of Western foreign policy, and the last 40 years of U.S. foreign policy, have given these terms negative connotations in the region.

It is this realm that is the proverbial "long war"-a war not unlike that of the Cold War. While there was certainly a great deal at stake militarily, economically, and diplomatically,

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in the end, the Cold War was about a battle of ideas-whether capitalism and democracy would win out over totalitarianism. In the end, sometimes through intentional planning by leaders in the West, and other times, through simple luck and a desire for individual dignity and rights, the Western narrative eventually won. Now a similar battle is raging. Again, it is a battle between those espousing individual civil liberties, democracy, capitalism, and the rule of law versus totalitarianism. However, unlike in the Cold War, the United States and the West is not aggressively pursuing its narrative, which leaves al Qaeda's as one of the few voices being heard.

These three wars are inexorably linked together and cannot be separated. Victories by al Qaeda in the war of action allow the organization to mobilize greater resources and build more comprehensive networks. The stronger the networks become, the more they reify al Qaeda's ideology and allow for new members to participate in the fight. 51 In tum, this reified ideology brings new recruits and resources for future al Qaeda actions. As such, all three levels are mutually reinforcing.

The Conceded Battles The above sections identified three areas where counterterrorism governments are less than effective, and, which together, lead to the fourth and final area-the conceded battle- grounds. There is an imbalance between the attention paid to terrorism within declared combat zones (Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Hom of Africa) and that directed outside of these zones. While it is easy to argue that this is to be expected, this is an insufficient answer and points to the obvious imbalance between military means and the other instruments of national power. Contesting the wars of actions and networks within the declared combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan is not enough. Al Qaeda must also be aggressively chal- lenged in other key locations and on other key issues. A quick tour around unchallenged aspects of the jihadist diaspora will illustrate the gravity of the situation:

• Al Qaeda has established relative sanctuary in Pakistan for the senior leadership and reestablished training camps in the surrounding areas.

• It has conducted a merger with an Algerian organization (AQIM), subsequently gaining access to European and North African networks.

• Al Qaeda established a limited relationship and presence inside of Lebanon.

• Al Qaeda may be working with and potentially merging with LIFG.52

• Al Qaeda has reestablished a limited presence in Yemen.53

In fact, even a cursory investigation of these events reveals, in the majority of cases, there was ample reporting and warning of these events in the media prior to their coming to fruition. There are two principal uncontested areas that we will address: geographical and ideological factors.

Contesting Geography

Typically, counterterrorism fights are defined by nature of the enemy and less defined by geography. The relatively high degree of security al Qaeda enjoys in the FATA reminds us that even terrorists exist in physical space and must reside somewhere. The expansion of jihadist forces in Lebanon is a prime example of our failure to act.

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AI Qaeda has long identified states of central concern-Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen-in their writings and has worked to establish active presence in all of these locations at one time or another. However, the periphery of the jihadist diaspora is equally important, if not more so, to al Qaeda's long- term future. The ability for al Qaeda to gain a foothold in the periphery, either in terms of sanctuary or in terms of alignment with local groups, would serve to provide access to new "markets" in the hope of gaining new constituents. 54 Peripheral states such as Nigeria hold special promise for al Qaeda.

The openings for terrorist infiltration cannot be overlooked. Osama Bin Laden himself listed Nigeria as a priority target. So far, there is no indication that terrorist networks have taken hold in Nigeria nor that even many radical Islamic figures have contem- plated a policy of violence. But Nigerians have already been found within the ranks of the GSPC [now AQIM] and the potential for linkages between terrorist groups and Nigeria's already well developed criminal and drug trafficking groups is a worrisome prospect. 55

Even states, such as Bangladesh, that may not normally be thought of as al Qaeda strong- holds present risks for U.S. interests. In Bangladesh, the formation of an

umbrella group [that] advocates an extremist jihadist rhetoric that closely resonates with bin Laden's line. The movement seeks the creation of a transnational caliphate that will eventually take in all of Bagladesh, Assam, north Bengal, and Burma's Arakan province, and has been identified as a key propaganda and logistical conduit for a! Qaeda in South Asia. Indian and Western intelligence sources fear that many of the a! Qaeda and Taliban members who entered the country between 2001 and 2002 are now training the [umbrella group] and may be seeking to establish the group as a concerted operational wing for cross-regional attacks in South Asia. 56

All of these examples point to the very real challenges faced by the United States or any counterterror government-combating al Qaeda within sovereign states requires the assis- tance and permission of these states. There are no easy or quick answers to this challenge but the difficulty does not permit us to concede the future.

Contesting Ideology

Defeating a cell or a network does not constitute long-term success. Terrorism "is a vicious by-product of ideological extremism [as such] government and society must develop an ideological response to make it difficult for terrorist groups to replenish their human losses and material wastage."57 As intimated in the discussion on the war of ideas above, counter- terror governments have failed to contest this space. Instead, their actions have often been counterproductive and have only worsened the situation.

Most "studies of terrorism frequently address the concept of target audiences, groups generally defined as those whom terrorists seek to intimidate or influence through vio- lence. However, it is also important to understand terrorists' other target audience-the aggrieved populations that they purport to represent."58 Counterterrorism is a fight not only with the terrorists but also for the uncommitted population, which is a far broader group that "has the power to confer a degree of legitimacy on the terrorists simply by responding positively to [al Qaeda's] tactics."59 Counterterror governments must appreciate what they

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can and cannot influence within the narrative space. The division of the narrative space in such terms allows for the development of a sophisticated and nuanced approach to counter- ing the narrative. For those areas in which governments can compete, they should focus on separating the terrorists from their message. Governments should challenge the terrorists' assertion that they alone represent and speak for the people. Perhaps more important, gov- ernments must recognize where they cannot directly affect or shape the narrative and set enabling conditions for other agents to work to counter al Qaeda's narrative.

Fighting this battle will not be easy. "Friendly governments wishing to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues may be constrained by domestic percep- tions. It is fundamentally difficult for non-Muslims to influence perceptions about their own religion. Only Muslims themselves have the credibility to challenge the misuse of Islam by radicals."60 Nonetheless, governments cannot abdicate their role in contesting this vital space.

We must be careful not to leave the reader with the impression that al Qaeda is a hyper-capable organization that is successfully executing a global grand strategy. In fact, we argue that even the resurgent al Qaeda is far from this caricature. While al Qaeda may not be capable of launching and executing a global grand strategy, their actions have been "good enough." In other words, for al Qaeda to "succeed," it does not have to be perfect, invincible, or even dominant. Instead, al Qaeda only has to stay relevant and survive. The future demands that we look across the three levels of this conflict and expand our horizons to better anticipate potential events and opportunities where al Qaeda could claim a "vic- tory" and take action to challenge these contests. When the United States and its allies do not even "show up" to play, one should not be surprised when al Qaeda "wins."

Conclusions and Some Recommendations Al Qaeda's ability to change and adapt both in anticipation of, and in reaction to, the changing security environment provides a great deal of insight about the organization and its associated movement. Organizations that fail to adapt to external changes become obso- lete or worse. Yet, despite the loss of their dedicated sanctuary in Afghanistan, the inability to operate training camps "openly," and the loss of critical networks in key locations such as Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda today is stronger and more powerful than at any other time since 2002. The declassified Key Judgments of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate stated that

Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extrem- ist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.61

Yet, as discussed above, al Qaeda's resurgence is not due solely to the al Qaeda's actions. Its success or failure also hinges on our actions or inactions. Principal among these is the inability to fashion an effective and responsive counterterror strategy that organizes governmental forces effectively across the three wars and integrates their actions into a

The Uncontested Battles 639

comprehensive, forward-looking strategy. The unfortunate reality exists that the war against al Qaeda has been primarily fought along the war of action level. This is not to say that the war of networks has been ignored. Yet, outside of the declared combat zones of Af- ghanistan and Iraq, it is hard to find evidence of a coordinated interagency effort to combat al Qaeda's extensive networks. Given these issues, we advocate the following two policy prescriptions: unity of command and a more comprehensive and nuanced informational campaign.

First, there must be unity of command in the fight against Salafist jihadists that en- compasses all the instruments of United States power: military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and so forth. With this unity of command must come a "forc- ing function"-one agency or individual who has the ability to create an overall counter- jihadist national strategy, and then implement those actions across the relevant government agencies. With this would come a greater capability for the United States to fight across the spectrum of conflict, rather than focusing almost solely on the aspects of the war of action. As this forcing function would facilitate the integration of these aspects, it would also cre- ate more efficiency and effectiveness.

Second, the United States has failed to galvanize our resources to contest the war of ideas; this is the singular most important battle that we are not fighting. The United States should not be afraid to let the realities of the Salafist jihadists speak for themselves. These groups have produced a myriad of CDs, DVDs, and Internet media for their own propa- ganda purposes. On such media, they proudly display the beheading of hostages, torture of university students, stoning of women, and the like. Realizing that much of what the United States and West says is immediately suspect in much of the world, why not let the actions of movements associated with al Qaeda speak for themselves? While such acts may not deter hard-core adherents to this ideology, it may take some of the "wind out of the sails" of the more passive supporters of the movement. After all, militias and former insurgents in Iraq have not begun to rally to the American and allied forces because of a sudden love of the United States, but rather, because compared to the violence perpetrated by al Qaeda-associated forces, the U.S. side became the better option. By not restricting al Qaeda's propaganda, al Qaeda would be forced to defend their actions. While a dominant narrative, it is ultimately self-defeating. In areas around the world where al Qaeda has attempted to gain a foothold-Bosnia, Chechnya, western Iraq-they have been rejected by the people in each of these locations. As such, they would be forced to either explain their actions, modify their actions and demands, or face the commensurate loss in public sympathy.

However, not only must the United States advocate its message to foreign audiences, but it must communicate the message here at home. As economist Friedrich Hayek noted at the end of World War II, as the West and USSR were beginning to square off for what would become the Cold War:

It is a lamentable fact that democracies in their dealings with dictators before the war, not less than in their attempts at propaganda and in the discussion of their war aims, have shown an inner insecurity and uncertainly of aim which can be explained only by confusion about their own ideals and the nature of the differences which separated them from the enemy. 62

638 Chapter 10 Winning the War on Terrorism

Fighting this battle will not be easy. "Friendly governments wishing to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues may be constrained by domestic percep- tions. It is fundamentally difficult for non-Muslims to influence perceptions about their own religion. Only Muslims themselves have the credibility to challenge the misuse of Islam by radicals." 60 Nonetheless, governments cannot abdicate their role in contesting this vital space.

Conclusions and Some Recommendations AI Qaeda's ability to change and adapt both in anticipation of, and in reaction to, the changing security environment provides a great deal of insight about the organization and its associated movement. Organizations that fail to adapt to external changes become obso- lete or worse. Yet, despite the loss of their dedicated sanctuary in Afghanistan, the inability to operate training camps "openly," and the loss of critical networks in key locations such as Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda today is stronger and more powerful than at any other time since 2002. The declassified Key Judgments of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate stated that

The Uncontested Battles 639

First, there must be unity of command in the fight against Salafist jihadists that en- compasses all the instruments of United States power: military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and so forth. With this unity of command must come a "forc- ing function"--one agency or individual who has the ability to create an overall counter- jihadist national strategy, and then implement those actions across the relevant government agencies. With this would come a greater capability for the United States to fight across the spectrum of conflict, rather than focusing almost solely on the aspects of the war of action. As this forcing function would facilitate the integration of these aspects, it would also cre- ate more efficiency and effectiveness.

Second, the United States has failed to galvanize our resources to contest the war of ideas; this is the singular most important battle that we are not fighting. The United States should not be afraid to let the realities of the Salafist jihadists speak for themselves. These groups have produced a myriad of CDs, DVDs, and Internet media for their own propa- ganda purposes. On such media, they proudly display the beheading of hostages, torture of university students, stoning of women, and the like. Realizing that much of what the \Jn\\~1.\ 'S\a\~'i. ani.\ "N~<i.\ 'i.<l'Y'-' '-'-' \mmen\a\e\-y ':SUS-pee\ 1n muc'n ot \'ne wor\<1, w'ny not \et fue actions of movements associated with al Qaeda speak for themselves? While such acts may not deter hard-core adherents to this ideology, it may take some of the "wind out of the sails" of the more passive supporters of the movement. After all, militias and former insurgents in Iraq have not begun to rally to the American and allied forces because of a sudden love of the United States, but rather, because compared to the violence perpetrated by al Qaeda-associated forces, the U.S. side became the better option. By not restricting al Qaeda' s propaganda, al Qaeda would be forced to defend their actions. While a dominant narrative, it is ultimately self-defeating. In areas around the world where al Qaeda has attempted to gain a foothold-Bosnia, Chechnya, western Iraq-they have been rejected by the people in each of these locations. As such, they would be forced to either explain their actions, modify their actions and demands, or face the commensurate loss in public sympathy.

640 Chapter 10 Winning the War on Terrorism

This is not to argue that the American public must be made paranoid, looking for a terror- ist behind every tree. Nevertheless, fighting this war requires some sacrifices, including spreading the costs amongst society. For instance, this may require reevaluating of foreign policy initiatives and the alignment of those initiatives with the message being communi- cated to these populations. It also means reducing the U.S. reliance on oil.

In conclusion, currently, through a combination of strategic planning, trial and error, and luck, al Qaeda is changing at a faster pace than that which the United States is willing to adapt. As such, while it has suffered some devastating losses, including its former sanc- tuaries in Afghanistan and western Iraq, it has demonstrated the operational durability to adapt and still move forward. Only through coordinated efforts by the United States with regards to its own actions can the United States adapt as needed. Only in doing so can the United States, along with close cooperation with our allies, hope to respond, and better yet, aggressively attack al Qaeda throughout its organization and movement and along all three planes of warfare. Only then will the organization and movement no longer be able to regenerate itself forcing it into decline. Doing so will be the only means for an already long war to be that much shorter.

Major Reid Sawyer, a career military intelligence officer, is the former Executive Director and founding member of the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. He is currently a fellow with the Center and an adjunct assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, where he teaches a graduate seminar on terrorism studies. As an intel- ligence officer, Major Sawyer previously served in a variety of special operations assignments. Major Sawyer earned his undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and holds a masters of public administration from Columbia University where he is completing his doctorate degree. Major Sawyer has lectured widely on the topic of terrorism and counterterrorism. He is also the co-editor of Defeating Terrorism.

Major Jodi M. Vittori is a PhD candidate at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies. She previously served as an instructor in the US Air Force Academy's Department of Political Science, as well as thirteen years as an intelligence officer, including assignments in the Middle East, Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Republic of Korea. Recent publications include "The Business of Terror: AI Qaeda as a Multinational Corporation" in lnternationale Politik Transnational Edition 6 No. 3, Summer 2005, "Gambling With History: The Making of a Democratic Iraq" in Air and Space Power journal Chronicles, june 2004 (with Dr. Brent Talbot), and "The Gang's All Here: The Globalization of Gang Activity" in The journal of Gang Research, Spring 2007.

Notes 1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy,

the Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

2. Thomas E. Ricks and Karen DeYoung, "AI Qaeda in Iraq Reported Crippled," Washington Post, October 15, 2007.