605 WK7 for Professor Ryan

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Fixing the Facts or Missing the Mark?

Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq

Joshua Rovner

U.S. Naval War College

[email protected]

DRAFT: August 2011

Abstract

British and American intelligence agencies produced bad estimates of Iraqi capabilities before

the war in 2003. Why? Official postwar inquiries concluded that intelligence analysts fell

victim to a series of familiar pitfalls that caused them to draw false inferences from limited

information. Others blamed policymakers in London and Washington for pressuring intelligence

officials to exaggerate the threat. Both arguments are half-right. Analysts certainly began with

incorrect but plausible assumptions of Iraqi capabilities, meaning that their estimates were

always likely to conclude that Iraq possessed at least some latent unconventional capabilities.

Subsequent policy pressure, however, caused intelligence officials to lean toward worst-case

scenarios and stifle dissenting views. The politicization of intelligence also inhibited

reassessment in the months before the war, despite new information from UN weapons

inspectors that conflicted with standing estimates. This paper explores the evolution of British

and American assessments and the pattern of intelligence-policy relations in both countries. It

also explains why it is often impossible to understand the content of threat assessments without

understanding the political context in which they are written.

This paper is adapted from chapter 7 of Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Prepared for the Annual Convention of the American Political Science

Association, Seattle, WA, September 2011. The views expressed here are solely those of the author. They do not

necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the US Navy, or the Department of Defense.

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On March 17, 2002, an American satellite captured images of a white tanker truck at the

Al Musayyib Chemical Complex southeast of Baghdad. Some imagery analysts believed that

the truck was a chemical decontamination vehicle, and concluded that increased activity around

Al Musayyib was a sign that Iraq was trying to move and hide chemical weapons (CW). Others

were skeptical about drawing firm conclusions from data that was open to simpler explanations.

As one dissenting analyst from the State Department‟s Bureau of Intelligence and Research

(INR) pointed out, “Some of the same hazards exist with conventional munitions as they do for

CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck.” Throughout the spring and summer analysts

argued over what the imagery meant, and there is little evidence that they resolved the debate. In

October, however, a National Intelligence Estimate confidently declared that Iraq was actively

producing chemical weapons and already possessed 100-500 tons of chemical agent. This was a

significant jump from previous estimates, none of which had claimed that Iraq had more than

100 tons in storage. Intelligence officials later admitted that the upward revision was based in

large part on suspicious activity around chemical plants, and Secretary of State Colin Powell

used imagery of Al Musayyib in his UN presentation of the case against Iraq shortly before the

war. 1

A similar story played out on the other side of the Atlantic. On August 30, the British

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) issued a startling report from a senior Iraqi military source: Iraq

could prepare chemical and biological munitions for use in no more than 45 minutes. 2 This was

1 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence

Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004, pp. 195-204; http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html. Hereafter

the SSCI Report. INR analyst quoted at pp. 199-200. For Powell‟s presentation, see his Remarks to the United

Nations Security Council, “Iraq: Failing to Disarm,” February 5, 2003; www.state.gov/p/nea/disarm/ 2 Peter Gill, “Intelligence Oversight Since 9/11: Information Control and the Invasion of Iraq,” paper presented at

the “Making Intelligence Accountable” workshop in Oslo, Norway, September 19, 2003, p. 10; www.dcaf.ch; and

House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments (London: The Stationary Office, 2003), paragraphs 49-51.

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worrying news. It suggested that Iraq had available stockpiles of unconventional weapons as

well as ready plans to use them. The report was not yet corroborated, however, and new

intelligence on munitions was typically sent to specialists in the Defense Intelligence Service for

review. In this case the specialists were not consulted, for reasons that remain unclear.

Nonetheless, on September 9 the Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) assessed that “chemical and

biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes.” 3

Three days later the director of SIS briefed the prime minister on the new report, and two weeks

after the briefing it was declassified and released as part of the government‟s public dossier on

the Iraq threat. 4 In a matter of weeks a piece of raw, uncorroborated hearsay was published by

the government to justify a major shift in policy.

According to postwar inquiries in both countries, these episodes were illustrations of

analysis gone wrong under conditions of limited information and tight time-constraints.

Investigations by the U.S. Senate and a special presidential commission concluded that

intelligence agencies fell into a series of analytical traps that caused them to exaggerate the

implications of new data. They might also have fallen victim to what psychologists call

confirmation bias: the tendency to validate information, however tenuous, that confirms

preexisting views while discounting information that cuts in the other direction. British

investigations found that analysts leaned towards worst-case scenarios because their biggest

concern was underestimating the threat, and in cases like the 45-minute claim, they failed to

3 Gill, “Intelligence Oversight,” p. 10.

4 Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: The

Stationary Office, 2004), p. 139. Hereafter the Butler Report. Philip Davies argues that the exclusion of DIS

analysts stemmed from the long-term weakening of the requirements section in SIS, which was traditionally

responsible for processing raw intelligence. Although the decline of the requirements section is cause for concern,

the DIS analysts were still regularly employed to assess new information on foreign military activities. Moreover,

this was a critical piece of intelligence, and it is unlikely that it would have fallen through the cracks as a result of a

long-term institutional trend. Philip H.J. Davies, “A Critical Look at Britain‟s Spy Machinery: Collection and

Analysis on Iraq,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005), pp. 47-48.

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properly vet new information. Whether psychological biases or bureaucratic sloppiness were to

blame for these analytical failures, the result was that policymakers were ill-served by

intelligence.

Or was it the other way around? Did policymakers intentionally manipulate intelligence

in order to generate convenient estimates that supported the case for war? Did American and

British leaders bully intelligence agencies who would have concluded that Iraq did not have

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capabilities? Some intelligence officials said as much

after the war. “Never have I seen the manipulation of intelligence that has played out since the

second President Bush took office,” recounted Tyler Drumheller, a high-ranking CIA official. “I

watched my staff being shot down in flames as they tried to put forward their view that Saddam

Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction.” 5 Analysts noticed that their colleagues who

presented certain conclusions of the Iraqi threat were given preferential access to policymakers.

Leaders of the intelligence community also took note of pressure from the White House and

responded accordingly. Instead of rigorously protecting the integrity of intelligence estimates,

DCI George Tenet “fell into the beguiling trap that awaits any spymaster: White House

politics.” 6 Critics of the British government have also accused it of corrupting intelligence by

turning the assessment process into a propaganda exercise. Its effort to enlist top intelligence

officials for the purpose of public advocacy also ruined the prospects for an independent and

objective estimate of the Iraq threat. Just like George Tenet, critics say, British intelligence

5 Tyler Drumheller with Elaine Monaghan, On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House

Compromised American Intelligence (New York, NY: Carroll and Graf, 2006), p. 4. 6 Loch K. Johnson, “Congress, the Iraq War, and the Failures of Intelligence Oversight,” in James F. Pfiffner and

Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives

(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), pp. 172-190, at 181.

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chiefs may have failed to protect the objectivity of the intelligence process after they “entered the

prime minister‟s magic circle.” 7

The existing evidence, however, does not support either general argument about the

intelligence failure before the war. The flawed estimates were not simply the result of bad

analysis. Nor were they simply the product of policy bullying. As I demonstrate below, the

interaction between faulty intelligence assumptions and political pressure led to conclusions that

went far beyond what was actually known about Iraq.

I make four claims. First, policymakers in both countries did attempt to manipulate

intelligence on Iraq, and their efforts changed the content and tone of key estimates on Iraqi

capabilities and intentions. Intelligence analysts already suspected Iraq of possessing some

unconventional weapons, and policy pressure encouraged those suspicions while discouraging

critical analysis. Second, the politicization of intelligence was a response to domestic politics.

When policymakers made controversial public commitments, they pressured intelligence

agencies to join the consensus on the nature of the Iraqi threat and the need for military action.

Third, policymakers used intelligence to oversell policy decisions by invoking the aura of

secrecy. They pretended that there was broad agreement in the intelligence community about the

magnitude of the threat, and suggested that weaknesses in the public case against Iraq were the

result of necessary classification rules. Fourth, the politicization of intelligence prevented any

7 Rodric Braithwaite, “Defending British Spies: The Uses and Abuses of Intelligence,” The World Today, Vol. 60,

No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 13-16, at 15. Although the Butler Report did not blame politicization for the major errors

of analysis in British estimates, it did recommend that the post of JIC chairman should be held by “someone with

experience dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence.” This suggested

that the previous chairman had not been beyond influence and that some kind of politicization had occurred. When

asked about the logical gap between the report‟s conclusions and this recommendation, Lord Butler explained that

the committee did not want to veer from its mandate by addressing the policy process before the war. This is

understandable, but it also throws doubt on the committee‟s discussion of intelligence-policy relations. See Butler

Report, p. 144; and Mark Phythian, “Flawed Intelligence, Limited Oversight: Official Inquiries into Prewar UK

Intelligence on Iraq,” in Pfiffner and Phythian, eds., Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq, pp.

191-210, at 203-204.

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serious reassessment of standing estimates, even after a new round of international inspections

failed to discover any evidence of chemical, biological, or nuclear capabilities in the months

before the war. In short, the flawed intelligence estimates on Iraq were caused by a complete

collapse in intelligence-policy relations. Analysts began with plausible but erroneous

assumptions about Iraqi capabilities and intentions. Policy pressure subsequently encouraged

them to draw worst case scenarios based on these assumptions, while ignoring or stifling

dissenting views. The upshot was a series of estimates that presented certain conclusions about

the Iraqi threat, despite the weakness of the underlying information.

American Estimates and the Policy Response

Intelligence-policy relations in the United States fell into three phases before the war. In

the first phase, intelligence provided cautious estimates about Iraqi capabilities, noting the

thinness and unreliability of information. Policymakers were understandably skeptical about the

quality of intelligence and relied instead in their own assumptions about Iraq and beliefs about

the nature of the threat. The second phase began after the September 11 attacks and continued

until mid-2002. During this period policymakers asked intelligence agencies about possible

links between Iraq, unconventional weapons, and international terrorism. When they received

inconclusive answers, they went back to ignoring intelligence. The third phase began during the

summer, when bubbling antiwar sentiment led policymakers to worry that intelligence estimates

were going to play an important role in the public debate. At this point the White House stopped

ignoring intelligence and started pressuring it to toe the policy line.

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August 1998-September 2001. Intelligence on Iraq had two defining characteristics

before September 11. First, it was limited by a paucity of information. The regular reports of

UN weapons inspectors had provided the bulk of reliable information on Iraq during the 1990s,

but the inspectors left the country in 1998 on the eve of a four-day bombing campaign over

Baghdad and other suspected weapons sites. After the bombing stopped, analysts only had

sporadic access to sources inside the country, and were forced to rely on overhead imagery and

signals intelligence. Iraqi defectors offered lurid descriptions of Saddam‟s burgeoning weapons

infrastructure, but these reports were treated cautiously because analysts knew that defectors

were motivated to exaggerate the threat. Second, intelligence was based on circumstantial

evidence. Lacking firsthand knowledge, analysts tried to piece together Iraqi capabilities by

looking at its procurement efforts. This task was especially difficult because Iraq regularly

imported dual-use materials that could be used for commercial or military applications.

Because of the dearth of information and the dual-use dilemma, intelligence estimates

were conservative in the months following the departure of the UN Special Commission

(UNSCOM). Analysts generally agreed that Saddam Hussein sought to rebuild Iraq‟s chemical,

biological, and nuclear programs, but they did not believe that Iraq could achieve the industrial

scale production of banned weapons, especially as long as international sanctions remained in

place. The few remaining sources within Iraq gave differing accounts; for example, some

reported that the regime had continued with “low-level theoretical research” into chemical and

biological weapons while others were convinced that the program was completely “halted.” 8

8 NIC, Current Iraqi WMD Capabilities, October 1998; quoted in The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities

of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March

31, 2005, p. 55; http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/. Hereafter the WMD Report.

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Assessments of chemical weapons from 1998-2001 started with the assumption that Iraq

retained some amount of pre-Gulf War chemical agent and precursor material. Accounting gaps

in prior Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM, as well as Saddam‟s belligerent attitude towards

weapons inspectors, convinced U.S. analysts that Iraq maintained a small CW stockpile.

Estimates during this period also assumed that Iraq could convert the existing civilian chemical

industry for military purposes on relatively short notice. In June 1998, inspectors found traces of

degraded VX on fragments of an al-Hussein missile, confirming that Iraq had mastered some

fairly complex weaponization techniques before the Gulf War. One month later the UN

unearthed the so-called “Air Force Documents,” a group of records showing that Iraq had

expended fewer CW munitions in the Iran-Iraq war than previously believed. This reinforced the

belief that Saddam Hussein was not being forthright about the total number of remaining

munitions, and fueled the assumption of a lingering CW capability. 9 A community assessment in

late 2000 warned that the expansion of Iraq‟s civilian chemical industry could provide cover for

an offensive CW program. Although there was no sign of industrial-scale CW production, it did

not rule out the existence of a smaller ongoing effort, noting Iraq‟s increased procurement of

dual-use materials and equipment. The assessment concluded that Iraq had up to 100 tons of

chemical agent and precursor in bulk storage and in munitions. It assumed that most of the

stockpile was mustard, with smaller quantities of sarin and VX. 10

Biological weapons estimates focused mainly on Saddam‟s intentions and the dual-use

dilemma. As with assessments of CW, the lack of reliable information from within Iraq made

point predictions impossible. A February 1999 community assessment judged that Iraq had

9 CIA, Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: Status and Prospects, August 1998. See WMD Report, pp. 114-115; and

SSCI Report, p. 210. 10

Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; cited in SSCI

Report, pp. 144-145 and 196-197.

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some material that could be used in biological weapons, as well as personnel and equipment that

could be used to revive an offensive BW program. 11

In May, the National Intelligence Council

mentioned that there were indications of biological activities, but it could not verify that Iraq had

restarted BW production. Instead, it offered the hedging judgment that Iraq was “probably

continuing work to develop and produce BW agents.” 12

A National Intelligence Estimate later

that year came to the same conclusion. 13

The assumptions about Iraqi intentions led analysts to

fear a revived BW effort, but the dearth of sources prevented more definitive judgments.

Analysts were forced to rely on technical collection assets like overhead imagery, which could

not penetrate the Ba‟ath regime or offer many insights into Iraqi intentions. The NIC also noted

that imagery was of little use in identifying dual-use materials that were being diverted for

military purposes. Analysts had no way of knowing the purposes behind increased activity at

possible BW facilities like pharmaceutical plants and medical research institutes. 14

The quantity of information appeared to increase in 2000, when a new source revealed

Iraqi efforts to deploy mobile BW facilities. This source, code named CURVEBALL, reported

to German intelligence, who forwarded his information to U.S. representatives. Although U.S.

intelligence officials lacked access to CURVEBALL, the information he provided began making

its ways into formal estimates. The DIA circulated more than 100 papers on his reporting in

2000-2001, and the cumulative weight of this new information led to heightened fears of Iraqi

progress. 15

In December, an updated NIE on worldwide BW proliferation concluded:

11

Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox; in SSCI Report, p. 143. 12

NIC, Worldwide BW Programs: Trends and Prospects; in WMD Report, p. 82. 13

NIE 2000-12HCX: Worldwide BW Programs: Trends and Prospects, October 1999; in SSCI Report, p. 143. 14

NIC Memorandum, Iraq: Post-Desert Fox Activities and Estimated Status of WMD Programs, July 1999; in SSCI

Report, p. 143. 15

Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 78. For a comprehensive treatment, see Bob Drogin, Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the

Con Man Who Caused a War (New York: Random House, 2007).

10

Despite a decade-long international effort to disarm Iraq, new information

suggests that Baghdad has continued and expanded its offensive BW program by

establishing a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production

capability. We judge that Iraq maintains the capability to produce previously

declared agents and probably is pursuing development of additional bacterial and

toxin agents. Moreover, we judge that Iraq has BW delivery systems available

that could be used to threaten US and Allied forces in the Persian Gulf Region. 16

Accompanying reports reiterated that the NIE relied on a single source, but judged that he was

credible. CURVEBALL raised concerns that Iraq‟s covert BW production effort could

eventually yield several hundred tons of unconcentrated biological agent. 17

One scholar has

recently concluded that CURVEBALL‟s reporting, in the absence of information from UN

inspectors, caused intelligence estimates to go from “hypothetical to projected to definitive.” 18

In fact, estimates were nowhere near definitive at this point. CIA officials were suspicious about

the quality of CURVEBALL‟s information, partly because the Germans were reluctant to let

U.S. officials speak with him. Only one American intelligence officer was able to interview

CURVEBALL, who was apparently suffering from a hangover during their meeting. 19

In

addition, the community was unable to corroborate his information on mobile BW facilities from

other sources.

Intelligence on Iraq‟s nuclear program was also thin and circumstantial. In June 1999,

the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee stated that the departure of UN inspectors might

give Saddam Hussein an opportunity to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program, but it

16

NIE 2000-12HCX, Worldwide BW Programs: Trends and Prospects Update, December 2000; quoted in SSCI

report, p. 144. 17

WMD Report, p. 82; and SSCI Report, pp. 144-155. 18

Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 2009), p. 184. 19

German intelligence had a history of difficult relations with the CIA, which was one likely reason that it was

reluctant to give U.S. officials access to its source. Drogin, Curveball, pp. 14-36. See also Drumheller, On the

Brink, p. 78.

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acknowledged that there was no evidence that had had done so. 20

A community-wide

assessment in December 2000 came to the same basic conclusion. Although Saddam still had

nuclear aspirations, no current information suggested a revived nuclear program. 21

The

intelligence picture changed in April 2001, when the CIA learned that Iraq sought to procure

60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes from Hong Kong. The Agency determined that the tubes

were probably intended for use as uranium enrichment centrifuges; however, it noted that the use

of aluminum rather than more advanced materials represented a step backwards for Iraqi nuclear

designers. 22

Centrifuge engineers at the Department of Energy (DOE) immediately disputed the

CIA findings, arguing that the specifications of the tubes were not consistent with known

centrifuge designs. They noted that that the dimensions were precisely the same as the motor

casings in Italian 81mm artillery rockets, and Iraq had previously declared its intention to

manufacture similar rockets at the Nasser metal fabrication plant in Baghdad. 23

DOE and INR

analysts also argued that the aluminum tubes were unlikely to withstand the stress of the

enrichment process, in which tubes were spun continuously at extremely high speeds. Finally,

they noted that Iraq had specifically requested tubes with an anodized surface. This was useful

to prevent corrosion against the elements, but not for enrichment cascades that were maintained

indoors in clean environments. (Some British analysts separately pointed out that the chemical

used to anodize the tubes would react poorly with uranium hexafluoride and would have to be

20

The JAEIC is a community-wide forum on all aspects of nuclear intelligence. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S.

Intelligence Community, 5 th

ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), pp. 260-261. 21

WMD Report, p. 55. 22

A full-fuel cycle requires mining uranium ore, converting it into gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UH6), and

enriching it to weapons-grade quality. Centrifuges spin UH6 at high speeds to separate differently weighted

isotopes. Sending the gas through several centrifuge cascades produces a high concentration of the isotope U 235

,

which is usable for nuclear weapons. 23

The CIA‟s conclusion was certainly plausible. The Army‟s National Ground Intelligence Center, which contained

experts in artillery, apparently missed the similarity between the tubes and the Italian system. Jervis, Why

Intelligence Fails, p. 143.

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stripped before the tubes could be put to use for enrichment.) The CIA and DOE issued dueling

assessments throughout the summer. 24

In sum, U.S. intelligence agencies generally agreed that Iraq wanted to rebuild its

chemical and biological weapons programs, and that it could hide many of its activities through

dual-use procurement. On the other hand, there was no reason to believe that Iraq was close to

achieving an industrial-scale production capability, and there was no indication that Iraq

maintained significant quantities of weaponized toxins or pathogens. Most of its CBW had been

destroyed after the first Gulf War in 1991. 25

The community was also divided over Iraq‟s

nuclear efforts. The CIA feared that Iraq was trying to import specialized equipment for uranium

enrichment, but this was fiercely disputed by analysts in DOE and INR. Analysts were generally

suspicious about Saddam Hussein, given his use of unconventional weapons in the 1980s and his

obstinate behavior towards UN weapons inspectors in the 1990s. But even the worst-case

estimates did not argue that he was not on the verge of acquiring a significant chemical,

biological, or nuclear capability.

Intelligence-policy relations were strained during the first several months of the Bush

administration. Senior policymakers had long been suspicious of the intelligence community;

many hawkish critics of the CIA going back to the 1970s were now in the Bush administration or

close to the White House. Neoconservatives held the CIA in particularly low esteem. Richard

24

Senior Executive Intelligence Briefing, April 10, 2001; DOE, Daily Intelligence Highlight, “High-Strength

Aluminum Tube Procurement,” April 11, 2001; DOE, Daily Intelligence Highlight, May 9, 2001; CIA, Senior

Publish When Ready, June 14, 2001; and DOE, Technical Intelligence Note, “Iraq‟s Gas Centrifuge Program: Is

Reconstitution Underway?” August 17, 2001. Discussions of these analyses are in SSCI Report, pp. 88-92; WMD

Report, pp. 56 and 200, note 37; and David Barstow, William J. Broad, and Jeff Gerth,

“The Nuclear Card: How the White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence,” New York Times, Oct. 3,

2004, p. 1. 25

Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and

Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 16.

13

Perle, the head of the Defense Science Board and an associate of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, later

said that the CIA‟s analysis “isn‟t worth the paper it‟s printed on.” 26

In addition, White House

priorities that summer centered on domestic legislation. As a result, the intelligence community

had little success gaining the trust of its main policy consumers, even on issues like the rise of al

Qaeda, which the CIA had been watching closely for several years. 27

Some accounts paint a

picture of severe dysfunction between intelligence officials and the administration. According to

Ron Suskind, the president assumed that CIA warnings about possible terrorist attacks were

simply efforts to insulate the intelligence community from future criticism. In August, the CIA

sent a group of analysts to brief the president on the spike in ominous intelligence suggesting an

al Qaeda attack. “Alright,” Bush told them afterward, “you‟ve covered your ass now.” 28

September 2001-June 2002. The situation improved after September 11. Intelligence

officials had more reliable access to senior administration officials who were sensitive to any

indication that al Qaeda was preparing another attack. The White House was also impressed by

the CIA‟s plans to aggressively track and destroy al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. The CIA

quickly established positions in Afghanistan, exploiting longstanding relationships with anti-

Taliban groups and laying the groundwork for the insertion of U.S. forces. Its performance

helped blunt criticism of the intelligence community for its apparent failure to prevent the

26

Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, “The First Casualty,” The New Republic, June 23, 2003, pp. 14-25, at 17. 27

See Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, “Correspondence: How Intelligent is Intelligence Reform?” International

Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 196-203; and Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 2004), pp. 12, 24. 28

Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 1-2.

14

September 11 attacks. The White House was also desperate for information about possible

future attacks, giving the Agency a seat at the table. 29

Neoconservatives in the administration had long been intrigued by the notion that

Saddam Hussein played a role in the first bombing of the World Trade Center, and wanted to

know if he was connected in any way to 9/11. 30

According to counterterrorism chief Richard

Clarke, Pentagon officials seemed fixated on Iraq, despite the early indications al Qaeda alone

was responsible. 31

The intelligence community had previously assessed this claim, but never

found evidence of Iraqi complicity in the first attack. But after September 11, policymakers

asked intelligence officials to revisit the question. The CIA concluded that Iraq had nothing to

do with the attacks. It briefed the president on September 21, restating its assessment that Iraq

was uninvolved in 9/11 and that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were longtime rivals. 32

Policymakers were not satisfied with this assessment, especially neoconservatives in the

Department of Defense. But they made no effort to pressure the intelligence community to

change its view. Instead, the Pentagon created a new analytical unit to revisit the question of

Iraq‟s relationship with al Qaeda. This outfit, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group

(PCTEG), began assembling information that suggested an operational link between Saddam

29

The chief of the CIA‟s Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black, promised the president that the terrorists would

“have flies walking across their eyeballs.” Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, p. 15. See also Woodward, Plan of

Attack, pp. 67-68. 30

Laurie Mylroie, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War against America (Washington, DC: AEI

Press, 2000). For a discussion of neoconservative interest in Mylroie‟s theory and a trenchant critique of the book,

see Peter Bergen, “Armchair Provocateur,” The Washington Monthly (December 2003);

www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.bergen.html. 31

Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 30-

31; and James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New

York: Doubleday, 2004), p. 285. 32

Murray Waas, “Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept from Hill Panel,” National Journal, November 22, 2005.

15

Hussein and Osama bin Laden. 33

It culled vast amounts of intelligence data in an effort to find

connections between Iraq and the September 11 attackers. It also relied on information provided

by Iraqi exiles who were eager to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and provided some of its reports

to the media to keep alive the idea that Iraq was allied with al Qaeda. PCTEG was used for

public relations, but it was not initially an instrument of politicization. Indeed, there is no

indication that the administration tried to manipulate intelligence before summer 2002. Instead,

it relied on ad hoc analysis shops, Iraqi dissidents, and friendly journalists to make the case

against Saddam Hussein. It was perfectly willing to tolerate dissent from the intelligence

community. 34

Nor did it try to politicize estimates on Iraqi unconventional weapons programs, despite

the fact that intelligence continued to offer ambiguous findings about Iraqi activities.

Intelligence analysts remained concerned about Saddam Hussein's desire to reconstitute an

offensive CW program, but they generally agreed that the international efforts had succeeded and

that existing stockpiles were militarily insignificant. In the absence of reliable human sources,

different agencies could not agree on whether imagery intelligence of increased activity at

chemical plants was cause for concern. As discussed above, some analysts were particularly

33

Department of Defense Inspector General, Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy, February 9, 2007; http://www.dodig.mil/fo/Foia/pre-iraqi.htm. 34

Robert Dreyfus and James Bamford have argued that the alternative analysis centers were created to pressure the

intelligence community into taking a harder line. This was not the case in the first half of 2002. In fact, Pentagon

briefers did not share their analyses with the CIA until mid-August. See Bamford, Pretext for War, pp. 287-290 and

317-318; and Dreyfuss, “The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA.” For other accounts, see Eric Schmitt, “Aide Denies

Shaping Data to Justify War,” New York Times, June 5, 2003, p. A20; and Seymour M. Hersh, “Selective

Intelligence,” The New Yorker, May 12, 2003. For a description of the August meeting with Pentagon

representatives, see George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York:

HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 347-349.

16

worried about activity at facilities like al Musayyib. But others were cautious about drawing

firm conclusions from spotty information, especially analysts from the DIA. 35

Estimates of biological capabilities were becoming more ominous, even though analysts

expressed serious reservations about available information. In October 2001, the CIA asserted

that Iraq “continued to produce” at least three biological agents and maintained delivery systems

that were more capable then in the pre-Gulf War era. 36

A December assessment claimed a 40-

60% chance that smallpox was part of Iraq‟s offensive BW program, but it warned that “credible

evidence is limited” and the “quality of information is poor.” 37

The DIA concurred with the

assessment that parts of the BW program were larger and more sophisticated than they had been

in the 1980s, judging that Iraq was capable of weaponizing BW on a “moderate range of delivery

systems.” 38

But it doubted some of the lurid stories that began to circulate about Iraqi progress.

In February, the exile group Iraqi National Congress (INC) provided a defector who supposedly

corroborated intelligence on mobile BW facilities. The Defense HUMINT Service was

skeptical, as it was clear that he had been coached. The Pentagon cut off contact after a couple

of months because he was embellishing his reports in ways that seemed incredible, and the DIA

issued a fabricator notice in May. 39

Estimates of nuclear weapons were much the same: worrying indicators of Iraqi progress

were mixed with serious concerns about the reliability of new intelligence sources. Late in 2001

the CIA heard from a foreign intelligence service that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium ore

35

For estimates during this period, see SSCI Report, pp. 197, 209-211. 36

CIA, Iraq: Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability, October 21, 2001; in WMD Commission

Report, p. 83. 37

Intelligence Community Report ICB 2001-34HC, Smallpox: How Extensive a Threat?, December 2001l in SSCI

Report, p. 145. 38

Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs:

Post-11 September, January 2002; in SSCI Report, pp. 185-186, 210. 39

SSCI Report, pp. 160-161.

17

(“yellowcake”) from Niger. 40

The Agency was initially skeptical, partly because Iraq did not

have the domestic facilities to reprocess the yellowcake. The U.S. Embassy in Niger

subsequently discounted the report because the French consortium that operated the mines

observed strict security requirements and cooperated closely with the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). Analysts at the State Department roundly rejected the theory. A senior

analyst warned the Secretary of State that the intelligence was not credible, and INR circulated

its dissent on March 1. 41

George Tenet was not concerned enough to include the details in his

annual threat briefing to Congress. 42

Other agencies were more alarmed. The Directorate of Operations (DO) in the CIA

issued two more reports on Iraq‟s suspected attempts to acquire yellowcake from Africa in 2002.

On February 5, it provided a detailed account based on Italian intelligence, including the text of a

suspected agreement between Niger and Iraq. A subsequent assessment held that the agreement

would have included the transfer of 500 tons of yellowcake each year had the deal gone

through. 43

Although no uranium was ever transferred, this was taken as an ominous sign of

Saddam‟s commitment to reconstituting his nuclear program. The DIA wrote a parallel

assessment on the basis of this reporting, which caught the attention of the White House. 44

Vice

President Cheney received a briefing on the Niger claim in mid-February, and asked for the

40

For an extended treatment of the yellowcake controversy, see Peter Eisner and Knut Royce, The Italian Letter:

How the Bush Administration Used a Fake Letter to Build the Case for War in Iraq (New York: Rodale, 2007). 41

INR Assessment, Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely, March 1, 2002; in SSCI Report, p. 42. On INR‟s

warning, see Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 305. 42

The closest he came to mentioning the controversy was his comment that the “Intelligence Community remains

concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons

program.” Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 2002;

http://www.docuticker.com/?p=876. 43

SSCI Report, pp. 37-38, 47. The Senate report redacted the name of the foreign intelligence service that informed

the CIA assessment. Eisner and Royce confirm that it was the Italian intelligence agency, SISMI. The Italian

Letter, p. 67. 44

DIA Report, “Niamey signed an agreement to sell 500 tons of uranium a year to Baghdad,” National Military

Joint Intelligence Center, Vol. 028-02, February 12, 2002. See also SSCI Report, pp. 38-39.

18

CIA‟s view. Agency representatives told Cheney that the foreign intelligence service was

reliable, but that it “lacked crucial details” and contradicted the opinion of the U.S. embassy. 45

During the first half of 2002, the White House was slowly beginning to build the case

that Saddam Hussein was actively reconstituting his unconventional weapons program.

Policymakers were interested in intelligence that supported these views, and frustrated by

intelligence judgments that reflected uncertainty and doubt. As one critic put it, “The collective

output that CIA puts out is usually pretty mushy. I think it‟s fair to say that the civilian

leadership isn‟t terribly cracked up about the intelligence they receive from CIA.” 46

In fact, the

intelligence picture was mushy, and the lack of consensus within the intelligence community

spoke to the fundamental ambiguity of the data. Nonetheless, its conflicting and conditional

conclusions reinforced the stereotype among some members of the Bush administration that

intelligence agencies were feckless and risk-averse. Instead of trying to pressure intelligence to

change its conclusions, the administration created ad hoc analysis centers like PCTEG, and

turned to exile groups like the INC for damning information on Saddam Hussein.

June-December 2002. Although information remained scarce, the tone and substance of

estimates became more ominous in the second half of 2002. Senior intelligence officials

subdued their own doubts and signed off on firmer estimates of the Iraqi threat. Dissenters

remained vocal within the community, but their views were increasingly marginalized. Different

interpretations were downplayed in the National Intelligence Estimate sent to Congress in

October 2002, and almost completely removed from the declassified version of that document

that was published shortly thereafter. This shift in intelligence was the result of a fundamental

45

SSCI Report, p. 43. 46

Reuel Marc Gerecht, quoted in Dreyfuss, “The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA.”

19

change in the character of intelligence-policy relations. Before the summer policymakers had

been perfectly willing to ignore contrary views. Now they began to pressure intelligence to join

the policy consensus on Iraq, which was moving toward the position that the Iraqi threat was

unacceptable. And while the administration was laying the rhetorical groundwork for war, the

Senate was beginning to show signs of skepticism and the public was showing signs of

uncertainty. 47

The confluence of an increasing public commitment in the face of growing public

unease gave the White House large incentives to politicize intelligence. Because intelligence

agencies control secret information, they are powerful vehicles for policy advocacy. Leaders are

more persuasive if they attach the imprimatur of intelligence to their policy decisions; doing so

helps convince domestic skeptics that there are acting on the best available information.

Enlisting intelligence leaders in the public debate before the war would prove to be important for

overcoming domestic opposition.

Public comments from the White House that summer left little doubt that Saddam

Hussein had an active unconventional weapons program, and were vague enough to suggest that

he was somehow associated with al Qaeda. The administration claimed with increasing

frequency that the intelligence was damning and irrefutable, despite the fact that estimates were

inconclusive and the intelligence community was divided on key issues. Vice President Cheney

stated that Iraq was “clearly pursuing these deadly capabilities”; Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld said that there was “no question” that Iraq was reconstituting its production

capabilities; and Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that Iraq was diverting oil revenues to

develop new chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. 48

The president also previewed a new

47

On the changing domestic political situation during the summer, see Fixing the Facts, pp. 156-162. 48

Vice President‟s Address to the National Association of Home Builders, June 6, 2002;

www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020606.html. Powell is quoted in a CTV

20

military doctrine that aimed to prevent “unbalanced dictators” from supplying such weapons to

terrorists. 49

Indirect politicization took the form of repeated questioning on the same issues, which

led some analysts to suspect that they were fishing for answers that reflected their own beliefs.

The process sent clear signals to the intelligence community about policy preferences, and

analysts found themselves under pressure to deliver certain conclusions. Former CIA official

Vincent Cannistraro notes that “analysts are human, and some of them are also ambitious…If

people are ignoring your intelligence, and the Pentagon and NSC keep telling you, „What about

this? What about this? Keep looking!‟ – well, then you start focusing on one thing instead of the

other thing, because you know that‟s what your political masters want to hear.” 50

Paul Pillar,

who served as National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East until 2005, said that this kind of

indirect politicization was routine before the war, especially regarding the question of Iraq‟s

connection to al Qaeda. Top-down pressure caused analysts to draw inferences that were not

supported by the underlying intelligence, turning assumptions about Saddam Hussein‟s motives

into firm conclusions about his behavior. “When policymakers repeatedly urge the intelligence

community to turn over only certain rocks,” Pillar later concluded, “the process becomes

biased.” 51

In June, the vice president and his chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, began making

regular visits to CIA headquarters in Langley. Some analysts believed that these visits were

interview, June 13, 2002; www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/11104.htm. Rumsfeld is quoted in

Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “Al Qaeda Active, Rumsfeld Says,” The Washington Post, June 4, 2002, p. A1. 49

Joseph Curl, “Bush Promises to Preempt Terrorist Plans,” The Washington Times, June 2, 2002, p. 1. See also

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002;

www.whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf. 50

Quoted in Dreyfuss, “The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA.” 51

Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006).

See also James Risen, “C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports,” New York Times, March 22, 2003, p.

B10.

21

intended to signal the administration‟s displeasure with the content of the analysis. One

intelligence official said the visits created a “chill factor” that discouraged anything that ran

counter to the administration‟s public rhetoric. 52

Another sensed that the vice president was

indirectly politicizing intelligence by sending “signals, intended or otherwise, that a certain

output was desired.” 53

Cheney never tried to force analysts to produce propaganda, but his

regular presence “had the effect of underscoring his unblinking conviction and unshakeable

commitment to the idea that Iraq was an immediate threat.” 54

Cheney and Libby were

particularly interested in any intelligence that tied Iraq to al Qaeda. This was not surprising,

given that the possible nexus between rogue states, fanatical terrorists, and unconventional

weapons was at the heart of the administration‟s rationale for a doctrine of preventive war.

According to a participant at a later meeting, the discussions turned into something like a

courtroom prosecution:

Scooter Libby approached it like an artful attorney. An analyst would make a

point and Libby would say, okay this is what you say. But there are these other

things happening. So if this were true, would it change your judgment? And the

analysts would say, well if that was true, it might. And Libby would say, well if

that‟s true, what about this? And six „if that were trues‟ later, I finally had to stop

him and say, „Yes, there are other bits and pieces out there. We‟ve looked at

these bits and pieces in terms of the whole. And the whole just does not take us

as far as you believe.‟ 55

Nonetheless, the Agency took the argument further than ever. Since the previous year, the

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and the Near East and South Asia office (NESA) had both been

working on the problem of state-sponsored terrorism. CTC aggressively looked for connections

52

Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, “The Operator,” The New Republic, September 15, 2003. 53

Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, “Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure from Cheney Visits,” Washington Post, June 5,

2003, p. A1. 54

Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 43. See also John Aloysius Farrell, “Cheney‟s Intelligence Role Scrutinized,”

Denver Post, July 23, 2003; and John Prados, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War

(New York: New Press, 2004), p. 34. 55

Quoted in Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 344.

22

in order to discover useful information for ongoing counterterrorist operations, while NESA was

more conservative. Because NESA was not trying to generate “actionable” intelligence against

moving targets, it could afford to be more skeptical about sources and to require corroborating

reports before making firm conclusions. 56

On June 21 the agency published a lengthy

assessment, Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, based on the CTC approach.

In the preface it explicitly stated that its approach was “purposefully aggressive in seeking to

draw connections, on the assumptions that any indication of a relationship between these two

hostile elements could carry grave dangers to the United States.” NESA analysts complained

that the assessment represented a one-sided view. 57

Other intelligence assessments began to change to accommodate political realities. While

internal assessments continued to reflect the ambiguity of the underlying data, the intelligence

community began offering policymakers less equivocal judgments about Iraqi capabilities. A

classified DIA paper on CW flatly stated, “There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is

producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has-or will-establish its chemical

warfare agent production facilities.” 58

A DIA “contingency product” published later in the

summer, which was unlikely to have circulated among policymakers, was similarly careful about

making firm judgments without better data. 59

But estimates for policymakers were less cautious,

56

SSCI Report, p. 305. 57

Quoted in SSCI Report, p. 305. The Senate intelligence committee concluded that the visits were not

inappropriate, and that policymakers did not try to exert influence over estimates of Iraqi-al Qaeda ties (pp. 361-

363). Senior intelligence officials have changed their views about whether or not the meetings constituted

politicization. The head of the CIA‟s Directorate of Intelligence, Jami Miscik, initially expressed concern that

policymakers were pushing analysts towards a predetermined conclusion. Later, however, she attributed their

complaints to “hurt feelings” in NESA because the Murky Relationship paper adopted the CTC methodology. SSCI

Report, p. 361. See also Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 342-350. 58

Ackerman and Judis, “First Casualty,” p. 15. 59

DIA Contingency Product, Iraq – Key WMD Facilities: An Operational Support Study; in SSCI Report, p. 209.

See also DIA Information Paper, Iraqi Interest In Smallpox as a Biological Warfare (BW) Agent; in SSCI Report, p.

186.

23

as Tenet admitted later. 60

On August 1, for example, the CIA delivered a comprehensive

estimate of the aluminum tubes issue for senior administration officials entitled, Iraq: Expanding

WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat. Although it had not gathered any additional evidence

that the tubes were part of an enrichment program, the agency confidently declared it to be the

case. The secrecy surrounding the project, as well as the design specifications in the

procurement order, convinced some Agency analysts that the tubes were part of a covert nuclear

effort. 61

The CIA also revisited its conclusions about Iraq and al Qaeda. The Murky Relationship

paper published in June had accommodated the White House, but had also contained caveats

about the limits of available intelligence, warning that “Our knowledge of Iraqi links to al-Qa‟ida

still contains many critical gaps.” 62

On August 15, representatives from the DOD‟s Policy

Counterterrorism Evaluation Group briefed the CIA on its findings, and criticized the Agency for

not connecting the dots between al Qaeda and Iraq. Although the briefing infuriated Tenet and

other intelligence officials, the CIA began to downplay the lack of information and offer more

support for the administration‟s claims. 63

Tenet later argued that evolving assessments were

based on fresh intelligence, including information on the movement of al Qaeda operatives in to

Baghdad and the establishment of an al Qaeda affiliate in northeastern Iraq. 64

But officials with

access to the assessments were unimpressed. According to one congressional staffer, the agency

60

Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 370. 61

SSCI Report, p. 93; and James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration

(New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 87. 62

SSCI Report, p. 306. 63

One of the briefers has refuted Tenet‟s highly critical account of the meeting. According to Christina Shelton, a

DIA analyst seconded to Feith‟s office, her briefing simply “summarized a body of mostly CIA reporting…that

reflected a pattern of Iraqi support for al-Qaeda.” See Christina Shelton, “Iraq, al-Qaeda and Tenet‟s Equivocation,”

The Washington Post, June 30, 2007, p. A21. See also Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 346-348. 64

Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 349-355.

24

“didn‟t do analysis. What they did was they just amassed everything they could that said

anything bad about Iraq and put it into a document.” 65

As with written estimates, the tenor of intelligence briefings to White House officials also

changed. According to an intelligence community inquiry after the war, oral briefings became

more certain about Iraqi capabilities and intentions, despite continuing doubts among analysts.

Accompanying materials, including the President’s Daily Brief, lacked the caveats about

ambiguous and limited information that were present in other estimates. 66

Because the intelligence community sensed that war was coming, analysts felt an

obligation to provide worst-case scenarios to military planners, who feared that invading troops

would be exposed to chemical or biological attack. The operational planning process exposed

how little was actually known. For example, the military‟s expansive “weapons of mass

destruction master list” contained 964 sites, but it was based on a potpourri of old HUMINT

reports, imagery, and blueprints. Planners had no obvious way to tell which sites needed to be

preserved in order to demonstrate Iraq‟s possession of banned weapons, and which sites needed

to be destroyed in order to prevent the regime from transferring weapons to terrorists. 67

One

officer provided his own blunt appraisal of the intelligence: “It was crap.” Planners had seen a

great deal of imagery of suspect buildings. “What was inside the structure was another matter.” 68

The most important intelligence document was the National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s

Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The NIE was finished on October 1,

65

Ackerman and Judis, “First Casualty,” p. 18. 66

Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas, Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for

the Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, p. 11; reprinted in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No 3 (2005). The

Kerr report was an internal CIA investigation of pre-war analysis. See also Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp.

369-370; and SSCI Report, p. 14. 67

Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

(New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), pp. 80-81. 68

Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 143.

25

just over a week before Congress voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq. The estimate

began with a clear statement of the problem:

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical

and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN

restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this

decade. 69

The estimate fleshed out these statements in some detail, emphasizing issues that were

particularly worrisome. For example, advances in unmanned aerial vehicles meant that Iraq

could threaten its “neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the

United States, the US Homeland” (italics in original). Because UAVs were intended to deliver

chemical and biological weapons, the estimate served to heighten the sense of an imminent threat

against the United States.

The NIE judged that all the elements of Iraq‟s supposed program were growing. It

confidently declared that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons and possessed 100-500

tons of agent, including mustard, sarin gas, cyclosarin, and VX. This was a significant jump

from previous estimates, none of which claimed that Iraq had more than 100 tons in storage.

Indeed, the intelligence community was never able to distinguish the civilian chemical industry

from the suspected CW program, much less determine whether activity at military bases was

related to conventional or unconventional weapons. Ultimately, the decision to set the upper

bound at 500 tons was based on the size of the Iraqi stockpile before the first Gulf War. 70

69

NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, p. 5. A redacted

version was declassified in April 2004: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/nation/nationalsecurity/documents/nie_iraq_wmd.pdf. The following quotations are all from the “Key

Judgments” section, pp. 5-9. 70

SSCI Report, pp. 195-204.

26

The NIE judged that Iraq had managed to build a sprawling clandestine biological

weapons infrastructure, and could evade detection by using mobile production facilities. Iraq

had stockpiles of “lethal and incapacitating” BW agents, including anthrax and possibly

smallpox, and had mastered the ability to produce dried agent, which was easier to disseminate

and had a longer shelf-life. This was the first time an estimate had definitively stated that Iraq

actually possessed biological weapons. Earlier estimates, including the DIA contingency

products that were published while the NIE was being drafted, would not support such a

conclusion without information from more reliable sources. 71

The NIE also judged that the

regime was probably incorporating genetically modified pathogens into its offensive BW arsenal.

When it decided to use pathogens, it could choose from an array of delivery vehicles, including

“bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.” Despite the certainty of the language

in the estimate, none of these conclusions were based on corroborated information. In fact, the

judgment that Iraq had the indigenous capacity to produce biological weapons was based on just

two sources: CURVEBALL and a journal article about Iraq‟s biotech industry. 72

The NIE‟s judgment of Iraq‟s nuclear program included a worrying discussion of the

erosion of UN sanctions. The estimate concluded that international controls were not enough to

prevent Iraq from acquiring a nuclear capability sometime before 2010. Iraq‟s attempts to

procure high-strength tubes and other machinery demonstrated a clear interest in uranium

enrichment, even though it was a long way from achieving an indigenous full-fuel cycle. But if

Iraq was able to surreptitiously acquire weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, which was

71

The SSCI Report notes that the main text of the estimate included some caveats about the lack of information

about the production output at certain facilities. Most of the estimate remains classified. SSCI Report, pp. 162-166. 72

The conclusion that Iraq had mastered the ability to produce dried agent was also based on flimsy intelligence.

Intelligence officials relied on fourteen human source reports on Iraq‟s attempts to import drying and milling

equipment, but only one of these sources – again, CURVEBALL – tied these attempts to a BW program. SSCI

Report, pp. 178-182, and 148-152.

27

not unrealistic given the apparent breakdown in the sanctions regime, the timeline would be

measured in months not years As with the sections on chemical and biological warfare, this

estimate was primarily based on worst-case assumptions about Iraqi intentions: “Although we

assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he

remains intent on acquiring them.” 73

While assessments for policymakers were becoming less equivocal about the Iraqi threat,

assessments for public consumption left no doubt at all. On October 4, the CIA published a

declassified white paper based on the NIE. 74

The paper had the feel of a brochure, complete with

color photos of Gulf War-era chemical munitions and satellite imagery of suspected BW

production facilities. The public version of the estimate removed caveats and qualifying phrases

like “we judge” and “we assess.” It also played down the deep divisions in the community on

important issues. For example, it stated that “most intelligence specialists” agreed that the high-

strength aluminum tubes were intended for nuclear use, while “some believe that these tubes are

probably intended for conventional weapons programs.” 75

The tone suggested that the

opposition consisted of a few disgruntled skeptics. In reality, most qualified centrifuge engineers

thought that the tubes were wholly unsuited for enrichment. Portraying the dissent as a

disagreement among individuals also obscured the fact that whole agencies rejected key

judgments in the NIE. Finally, the white paper suggested that the underlying intelligence was

abundant and conclusive, and that any gaps were the result of Iraqi deception and denial. 76

73

NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq’s Continuing Programs, p. 1, italics in original. 74

Director of Central Intelligence, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (October 2002);

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#01" 75

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 5. 76

For an analysis of the white paper, see Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 49-110. See also Jessica Tuchman Matthews and

Jeff Miller, “A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2004;

www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=15179.

28

Congressional reaction to the NIE caused the administration to apply direct pressure to

intelligence officials to join the policy consensus. Skeptical congressmen noticed some apparent

differences between classified intelligence judgments and the declassified white paper. Sens.

Bob Graham (D-FL) and Carl Levin (D-MI) requested the release of certain sections of the NIE

that were left out of the white paper. These passages concluded that Saddam Hussein was

unlikely to sponsor a terrorist attack on the continental United States for fear of inviting

retaliation, and that he would only join with Islamic extremists to exact revenge for a U.S.

invasion. Tenet complied three days later, declassifying brief passages from the NIE as well as

accompanying testimony provided by intelligence officials in closed congressional hearings. In

a letter to Graham, deputy director of central intelligence John McLaughlin tried to explain that

the passages did not undermine the basic conclusion that Iraq was building a formidable arsenal

of unconventional weapons. He also added some unsolicited information about “senior-level

contacts going back almost a decade” between Iraq and al Qaeda. 77

Notwithstanding McLaughlin‟s cover letter, the declassified passages did seem to

undercut the administration‟s claims of an imminent threat, which was based on the supposed

connection between tyrannical states, transnational terrorists, and unconventional weapons. The

declassification of portions of the NIE led to news reports of a split between the administration

and the intelligence community, and policymakers scrambled to preserve the image of

consensus. 78

On October 9, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer argued that there was

77

Bob Graham, with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of

America’s War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 183-189; Alison Mitchell and Carl Hulse, “C.I.A.

Sees Terror After Iraq Action,” New York Times, October 8, 2002, p. 1; Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris:

The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York, Crown Publishers, 2006), p. 142;

Ackerman and Judis, “First Casualty,” p. 18; and Bamford, Pretext for War, pp. 317-318. 78

See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Aides Split on Assessment of Iraq‟s Plans,” New York Times,

October 10, 2002, p. 1.

29

broad agreement between administration statements and the NIE. 79

The articles also prompted a

“frantic call” from National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who urged Tenet to “clarify the

issue” with reporters. Rice‟s actions forced the DCI to publicly pledge that the intelligence

community supported the president, when in fact there was some distance between President

Bush‟s unequivocal position on the Iraqi threat and the intelligence community‟s divided stance.

Tenet contacted a New York Times reporter to assure him that “there was no inconsistency in the

views in the letter and those of the president.” The DCI later regretted his decision to speak with

the Times reporter, admitting that it “gave the impression that I was becoming a partisan

player.” 80

To ensure continued support from the intelligence community, the administration

pressured CIA leaders during a White House briefing on December 21. Tenet attended the

meeting, along with Bush, Cheney, Rice, and chief of staff Andrew Card. McLaughlin led off

with a methodical and dry overview of the current intelligence picture on Iraq. The president

was unhappy. “Nice try,” he said to McLaughlin. “I don't think this is quite - it's not something

that Joe Public would understand or gain a lot of confidence from.” Tenet stepped in to support

his deputy, assuring Bush that the intelligence was solid and that he would help create a more

compelling presentation for the White House. According to Washington Post reporter Bob

Woodward, Tenet told the president that the case against Iraq was a “slam dunk.” The DCI

vehemently denied using the phrase, but acknowledged later that he agreed to declassify

intelligence that would make public statements more convincing. 81

79

Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, October 9, 2002. Full text available at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The

American Presidency Project (online); http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. 80

Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 335-336. 81

Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 247-250; and Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 359-363. See also Jeffrey

Goldberg, “Woodward vs. Tenet,” The New Yorker, May 21, 2007.

30

Supporters of the administration have used the “slam dunk” meeting as evidence that the

president acted against Iraq on the basis of the best possible intelligence. 82

Appearing on Meet

the Press in 2006, Cheney suggested that the briefing was critical:

…George Tenet sat in the Oval Office and the president of the United States

asked him directly, he said, „George, how good is the case against Saddam on

weapons of mass destruction?‟, (and) the director of the CIA said, „It‟s a slam

dunk, Mr. President, it‟s a slam dunk.‟ That was the intelligence that was

provided to us at the time, and based upon which we made a choice. 83

In reality, the session at the White House was nothing more than a “marketing meeting,” as

Tenet acknowledged later. 84

The administration had privately decided on regime change long

before December 2002; more than a year had passed since the president directed the military to

begin planning for a conventional assault. 85

British intelligence officials who traveled to

Washington months earlier left with the impression that the president “wanted to remove

Saddam through military action,” and that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the

policy.” 86

Operational planning intensified during the summer and fall, convincing Army

officers that war was inevitable. 87

The notion that bad intelligence was foisted upon an unwitting

administration is not plausible.

82

See, for example, Rich Lowry, “George Tenet‟s Slam Dunk,” National Review Online, May 1, 2007. 83

Transcript of NBC Television, Meet the Press, September 10, 2006; www.msnbc.com/id/14720480/. 84

Tenet defended his participation by arguing that “intelligence was going to be used in a public presentation and it

was our responsibility to ensure that the script was faithful to what we believed to be true.” Tenet, At the Center of

the Storm, p. 362. 85

On the early military preparations, see Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, pp. 17-23; and Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco:

The American Military Misadventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 32-34. 86

Michael Smith, “Blair planned Iraq war from start,” The Sunday Times (London), May 1, 2005. 87

Ricks, Fiasco, pp.76-83.

31

British Estimates and the Policy Response

The pattern of intelligence-policy relations in the United Kingdom was remarkably

similar, despite the fact that the organization of the U.S. and British intelligence communities is

vastly different. Intelligence analysts in both countries labored to interpret patchy and unreliable

information about Iraq. They remained suspicious about Iraq‟s intentions but were very candid

about how little they actually knew. But in the summer of 2002, policymakers in both countries

intervened to manipulate the tone and content of intelligence in order to overcome domestic

political opposition to war. The Bush administration politicized intelligence after the surprising

rise of domestic criticism to its plans. In contrast, domestic criticism was always intense in the

United Kingdom, and the Blair government was much more hesitant to publicly commit to war.

When it finally did, it intervened to make sure that intelligence estimates painted an ominous and

unequivocal portrait of the Iraqi threat. 88

As in the United States, British intelligence analysts generally assumed that Iraq wanted

to rebuild its unconventional weapons capability. Assessments by the Joint Intelligence Council

suspected that Iraq had managed to hide small quantities of chemical and biological agent from

UNSCOM, and that it was importing dual-use materials to reconstitute its production

capabilities. Analysts also believed that Iraq was attempting to achieve an independent nuclear

weapons capability, even though it faced significant obstacles in the way of a full-fuel cycle.

Until the summer of 2002, however, British analysts were forthright about the large gaps in

available data and the JIC moderated its conclusions.

88

On British politics and Blair‟s increasing commitment to war, see Fixing the Facts, pp. 171-177.

32

In early 1998 the JIC was confident that UNSCOM had succeeded in “destroying or

controlling the vast majority of Saddam's 1991 weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

capability.” 89

Nonetheless, it worried that he retained some chemical precursors, as well as small

quantities of agent, and that he could probably regenerate a chemical warfare capability in the

absence of international inspections and sanctions. This was consistent with earlier JIC

assessments that concluded that Saddam would enjoy a latent CW threat as long as Iraq

maintained a civilian chemical industry. 90

In April 2000 the JIC noted the lack of solid

information on Iraqi CW activities since the departure of UNSCOM, but concluded that some of

its 1980s era stockpile had not been destroyed by UN personnel. As a result,

Iraq could have hidden dual use precursor chemicals, and production equipment,

since the Gulf War. Using these we continue to assess that, even with

UNMOVIC and other UN controls, Iraq could produce mustard agent within

weeks of a decision to do so. Iraq could produce limited quantities of nerve agent

within months of such a decision. 91

In May 2001 it repeated the judgment that Iraq could pursue chemical weapons with dual-use

equipment and materials, and speculated that Iraq was pursuing some research and development

activities. SIS had cultivated sources that attested to a three-year old program to fill artillery

shells with the nerve agent VX, and had discovered activity an Iraqi facility that formerly

produced chemical precursors. Beyond that, intelligence on Iraqi capabilities was based almost

exclusively on beliefs about Iraq‟s intentions. 92

Intelligence on biological weapons also focused on the dual-use problem. JIC

assessments between 1994 and 1998 concluded that Iraq probably retained small quantities of

89

JIC Assessment, February 4, 1998; quoted in Butler Report, p. 47. 90

JIC Assessment, September 8, 1994, in Butler Report, pp. 46-47. 91

UNMOVIC was the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. JIC Assessment, April

19, 2000, in Butler Report, p. 57. 92

JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, pp. 57-58.

33

pathogens, even though most had been destroyed. As with CW, however, the more relevant

problem was that Iraq could convert its medical industry for the purpose of an offensive

biological warfare. 93

This concern was heightened in April 2000, when the JIC assessed that

Iraq could restart agent production within weeks if sanctions were lifted. The new assessment

stemmed from a report from an allied intelligence service that had information that Iraq had

begun small-scale production in mobile BW facilities. One such facility had apparently

produced 20-30 tons of material in four months. 94

As more information arrived from the liaison

service, the JIC revised the time line for renewed “significant” BW production from weeks to

days, and concluded that “Iraq currently has available, either from pre-Gulf war stocks or more

recent production, anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and possibly plague.” 95

The JIC was fairly sanguine about Iraq‟s nuclear prospects until 2001. British

intelligence was surprised at the progress Iraq had made towards a nuclear weapon after the first

Gulf War, but was satisfied with the efforts of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). In 1998 it concluded that international agencies had destroyed the pre-war

nuclear infrastructure, and estimated that Iraq would need at least five years to re-acquire a

nuclear weapons capability in the absence of sanctions and other international controls. 96

However, the departure of UN inspectors led to fears that Iraq would exploit dual-use imports for

nuclear purposes. Thus the JIC was particularly alarmed by the seizure of a shipment of high-

strength aluminum tubes bound for Iraq in spring 2001. While some analysts argued that the

specifications were inappropriate for a uranium enrichment program, a JIC assessment in May

93

JIC Assessments, September 8, 1994 and September 24, 1994; in Butler Report, pp. 46-49. 94

JIC Assessment, April 19, 2000; in Butler Report, pp. 127-128. 95

JIC Assessments, February 27, 2002, and March 15, 2002; in Butler Report, pp. 59-60, and 136. The JIC was

unsure about the presence of plague in Iraq‟s nascent BW arsenal, and removed it from later assessments. See

Butler Report, pp. 134-136. 96

JIC Assessments, August 24, 1995, and February 4, 1998; in Butler Report, pp. 44-45.

34

concluded that they were “similar to those that can be used for a first generation centrifuge.” 97

British intelligence also described “unconfirmed” information that Iraq was seeking to import

uranium ore from Africa, which could theoretically be converted to gas and enriched to weapons

grade material. 98

JIC assessments were cautious about inferring too much about Iraq‟s nuclear activities

from partial and second-hand data. Although they generally supported the view that the

aluminum tubes were part of a uranium enrichment effort, they also noted that Iraq would need

to substantially re-engineer the tubes to achieve the desired result. Iraq had demanded extremely

tight design tolerances in its procurement order. If it wanted to use them a centrifuge enrichment

program, why ask for strict specifications that would need to be changed later? This puzzle led

the JIC to consider the possibility that the tubes were not intended for enrichment but instead

would be used for conventional military purposes. Although it leaned towards the nuclear

explanation, it held open other possibilities, noting that there was “no definitive intelligence” one

way or the other. 99

This was characteristic of JIC assessments up to mid-2002. Although British intelligence

believed that Saddam Hussein wanted unconventional weapons, it was consistently forthright

about the lack of information on all aspects of the Iraqi infrastructure. “We have an unclear

picture of the current status of Iraq‟s nuclear program,” the JIC admitted in May 2001. 100

Similarly, concerns about Iraqi BW were based on Iraq‟s intransigent attitude towards the UN,

not on any current intelligence suggesting a renewed production capacity. In April 2000 the JIC

prefaced its judgment of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare activities by stating, “Our picture

97

JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 131. 98

JIC Assessment, December 1, 2000; in Butler Report, p. 55. 99

JIC Assessment, March 15, 2002. For a fuller discussion of the tubes issue, see Butler Report, pp. 130-134. 100

JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 86.

35

is limited.” 101

The situation did not improve the next year, when the JIC admitted, “Our

intelligence picture of Iraq‟s BW programme is unclear.” 102

While intelligence officials believed

that Iraq was interested in banned weapons, they conceded that there was “no clear intelligence”

to support this judgment. 103

In August 2002, a month before the British government published

its dossier on the Iraqi threat, the JIC stated bluntly that “we have little intelligence on Iraq‟s

CBW doctrine, and know little about Iraq‟s CBW work since late 1998.” 104

A JIC assessment in March 2002 summarized intelligence judgments on Iraq‟s

unconventional weapons since the departure of UN inspectors in 1998. Although it concluded

that Iraq was eager to reconstitute its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities, it

was extremely candid about the limits of intelligence. On nuclear weapons: “there is very little

intelligence (but) we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.” On

chemical weapons: “there is very little intelligence relating to it.” On biological weapons: “there

is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but one source indicates that Iraq may

have developed mobile production facilities.” 105

In sum, the thrust of JIC assessments during

this period was based not on existing information but on an assessment of Saddam Hussein‟s

past behavior. It did not exaggerate the quality or amount of intelligence on Iraqi activities. The

report also made clear that the available intelligence would not be enough to convince the

members of the UN Security Council to support a resolution authorizing regime change. 106

101

JIC Assessment, April 19, 2000; in Butler Report, p. 59. 102

JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 60. 103

JIC Assessment, May 12, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 55. 104

JIC Assessment, August 12, 2002; in Butler Report, p. 81. 105

JIC Assessment, March 15, 2002; in Butler Report, pp. 67-69. 106

Mark Phythian, “The British Road to War: Decisionmaking, Intelligence, and the Case for War in Iraq,” in F.

Pfiffner and Phythian, eds., Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq, pp. 85-105, at 90.

36

Policymakers appear to have accepted these judgments at least until early 2002. For

several months after 9/11, Prime Minister Blair treated Iraq as a secondary problem. Terrorism

and the Arab-Israeli peace process were far more pressing. 107

At the same time, he was aware of

the Bush administration's desire for a stronger policy towards Iraq. Blair outlined his own

position in a March 2002 message to cabinet ministers. The message was wholly consistent with

the parallel JIC assessment that month, and Blair seemed to be comfortable with the fact that

intelligence on Iraq was ambiguous and uncertain. His strategy relied on containment, which

Blair presented as the least-worse option for dealing with Iraq. The prime minister accurately

summarized the general thrust of intelligence over the past several years, and argued that efforts

to contain Iraq had largely succeeded. International efforts had “frozen Iraq's nuclear program…

(and) prevented from rebuilding its chemical arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels. Biological warfare

programs had also “been hindered... (and) Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his

neighbors.” The prime minister believed that Iraq was continuing to seek unconventional

weapons, but he admitted that “our intelligence is poor.” He did not suggest that Saddam

Hussein had any strategic plans to threaten Great Britain, concluding that he would only use such

weapons “if his regime were threatened.” 108

The documentary record for this period is far from complete, of course, but there is

nothing to suggest tension between policymakers, the JIC, and the individual intelligence

agencies. The recently published diary of Alastair Campbell, the communications director for

the prime minister, describes general policy satisfaction with intelligence after the September 11

107

Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years: The Alastair Campbell Diaries (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 570.

See also Rupert Cornwell, “Blair Says Middle East Peace is Key to Winning the War on Terrorism,” The

Independent, October 12, 2001; George Jones and Inigo Gilmore, “Blair Backs Call for Palestinian State,” Daily

Telegraph, October 16, 2001l and David Hirst, “The Palestine Question is Central,” Christian Science Monitor,

October 17, 2001. 108

Butler Report, pp. 65-67.

37

attacks. On the day itself, Campbell described briefings given to Blair by JIC Chairman John

Scarlett and Director General Stephen Lander of MI5. “Scarlett and Lander were both pretty

impressive,” Campbell wrote. “(They) didn‟t mess about, thought about what they said, and said

what they thought.” 109

The next day he praised Lander and the head of SIS, Sir Richard

Dearlove, as “very good on big picture and detail.” Blair was also satisfied by the intelligence

officials‟ “meticulous presentations.” 110

There is similarly no indication that intelligence officers

were unhappy with policymakers.

Intelligence-policy relations began to change in April 2002. Although Blair had told the

cabinet that British strategy towards Iraq was based on containment, he knew that the United

States was moving towards a more aggressive posture, and he did not want to damage US-UK

relations by publicly breaking with the Bush administration. Blair also felt that by aligning with

the White House he could influence its behavior. President Bush was deeply unpopular in the

United Kingdom, however, and Blair did not want to risk domestic isolation by aligning too

closely with US foreign policy. 111

His solution was to pledge a policy of containment while

simultaneously arguing that Saddam Hussein‟s ambitions were intolerable. On February 28 he

appeared on ABC news in the United States to voice strong support for the White House, but on

the same day he told his cabinet that any change in policy towards Iraq was “a long way off.” 112

Blair finessed the apparent contradiction again in April, trying to assuage growing domestic

concerns about a war in Iraq while offering rhetorical support to the Bush administration:

109

Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 560-561. 110

Quoted in Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 563. See also pp. 567, 571, 574-575, 578, and 587. See also Times of

London editorial, “Evidence of Saddam‟s Menace Far from Clear,” July 17, 2002, p. 4. 111

David Coates and Joel Krieger, Blair’s War (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), pp. 44-45 and 110-112. Blair called

this “the usual conundrum – do I support totally in public and help deliver our strategy, or do I put distance between

us and lose influence?” Campbell, Blair Years, p. 612. 112

Campbell, Blair Years, p. 607.

38

As for Iraq, I know some fear precipitate action. They needn‟t. We will proceed, as we

did after September 11, in a calm, measured, sensible but firm way. But leaving Iraq to

develop weapons of mass destruction, in flagrant breach of no less than nine separate UN

Security council resolutions, refusing still to allow weapons inspectors back to do their

work properly, is not an option. 113

This statement seemed to offer a middle-ground between the status quo and a military

confrontation, allowing Blair to make blunt comments about Iraqi capabilities without

committing Great Britain to war. For example, in April he told NBC News, “We know that he

has stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons, (and) we know that he is

trying to acquire nuclear capability.” 114

But Blair believed that sufficient pressure, including

credible threats of force, would cause Saddam Hussein to allow inspectors back into Iraq and that

a reinvigorated inspections regime would control his aspirations indefinitely. 115

In hindsight, it

appears that he underestimated the Bush administration's determination to topple the regime.

The irony was that Blair may have thought that his public rhetoric was the first step towards a

peaceful solution. In fact, it helped the White House lay the groundwork for war.

For the government, however, the immediate issue was domestic apathy. Neither the

public nor the ruling Labour Party was particularly concerned about Iraq. In order to overcome

domestic opposition to a more aggressive policy, the government needed to present the case that

Iraq‟s growing aspirations represented a growing threat to British interests. It also needed

support from the United Nations, preferably in the form of a new UN Security Council

113

Coates and Krieger, Blair’s War, pp. 50-51. 114

Phythian, “British Road to War,” p. 95. 115

For a similar argument about the impact of the US-UK alliance on Blair‟s foreign policy, see Tim Dunne,

“`When the Shooting Starts‟: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5

(October 2004), pp. 898-909. Other observers believe that Blair decided on regime change based on a reasonable

assessment of the threat at the time, and that alliance concerns were secondary. See Christoph Bluth, “The British

Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (October 2004), pp.

871-892; and Paul D. Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2004 (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2005).

39

resolution. Unfortunately, as the British ambassador told Wolfowitz in March, regime change

would be “tough sell for us domestically and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe.” 116

Conscious of these domestic political realities, the Blair administration enlisted the JIC to

help it build the case against Iraq. On April 23 Campbell met with Scarlett, Thomas McKane

from the cabinet office, and Martin Howard from the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The goal of

the meeting, according to Campbell‟s notes, was “to go through what we needed to do

communications-wise to set the scene for Iraq, e.g. a WMD paper and other papers about

Saddam.” The meeting set in motion the government public dossier on Iraq, which was

published in September. Scarlett apparently had no compunction about the use of intelligence

for the purposes of public advocacy, or the effects on the objectivity of JIC assessments.

Campbell thought Scarlett was a “very good bloke.” 117

The first draft of the dossier, “British Government Briefing Papers on Iraq,” was

circulated on June 20. 118

Despite the innocuous title, the draft was far less equivocal about Iraq‟s

current capabilities than previous assessments. The JIC prepared a cover letter for ministers to

sign declaring that “Saddam Hussain (sic) has dangerous chemical weapons and is seeking to

acquire nuclear weapons,” and that “he will be prepared to use these weapons…against his

neighbours and our friends and allies.” The main text declared that Saddam not only had

stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, but that the military “maintains the capability to

use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.” Papering over

116

Phythian, “British Road to War,” p. 91. 117

Campbell, Blair’s War, p. 618. 118

CAB/33/0005, “British Government Briefing Papers on Iraq,” in Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the

Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. (January 2004), appendix; http://www.the-hutton-

inquiry.org.uk/content/report/index.htm. The document was actually a compilation of three papers. The first was on

Iraqi WMD, the second on the history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, and the third on human rights abuses by

the Ba‟athist regime. Versions of these papers were released separately from September 2002 – January 2003.

40

the large gaps in the intelligence picture on Iraq, it suggested that information was reliable and

abundant, but explained that the government could not reveal all the details due to concerns over

the safety of sources. The draft did not mention the lack of information on Iraqi nuclear

activities that was revealed in the JIC‟s comprehensive March 15 assessment. It also argued that

the limited knowledge about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons was proof of Saddam's

refusal to provide a complete accounting of his pre-war arsenal. It simply interpreted the lack of

data as evidence of an active but covert CW and BW program. 119

Finally, the paper adopted more menacing language than had previously been the case.

This was unsurprising, given its purposes. Parts of the draft were purely intended to evoke an

emotional response, including passages on the physical effects of chemical and biological agents

like botulinum toxin (“paralysis leads to death by suffocation”) and anthrax (“death is

common”). 120

The document was not a clinical analysis of Iraqi capabilities. The point was to

convince readers, as it declared in the cover letter, that “Doing nothing is not an option.”

But if doing nothing was not an option, what actions were required? Although Blair tried

to keep his policy options open, he created public expectations that he would declassify

intelligence to support a more aggressive policy against Saddam Hussein. “Be in no doubt at all

that he is certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear

capability,” he said. “If the time comes for action, people will have the evidence presented to

them.” 121

Ratcheting up the rhetoric was part of Blair‟s attempt to pressure Iraq to readmit

weapons inspectors, but it also put pressure on intelligence analysts. Indeed, the steady

drumbeat of public accusations about Iraq also represented a steady stream of signals to the

119

“Briefing Papers,” pp. 9-13. 120

“Briefing Papers,” p. 11. 121

Peter Riddell, “Danger of Saddam Still in Doubt,” Times of London, July 25, 2002, p. 11.

41

intelligence community about what policymakers expected to hear. The policy climate during

the summer produced “immense indirect pressure to provide intelligence to please,” according to

the Butler report, and JIC assessments began to tend towards worst-case scenarios. 122

An

assessment in late August “reflected more firmly the premise that Iraq had chemical and

biological weapons and would use them in a war,” even though the JIC acknowledged that it had

little intelligence on Iraq‟s CBW doctrine. 123

The government ordered the JIC to produce a declassified version of the dossier on

September 3. Scarlett and Campbell met two days later to discuss the editing process. Although

Campbell insisted that the document should be based on intelligence, he also told Scarlett that it

had to be “revelatory and we needed to show that it was new and informative and part of a bigger

case.” 124

Such policy direction ensured that the product would not reflect the existing

intelligence picture, gaps and all, because the inclusion of headline-grabbing revelations would

inevitably dominate the public reaction. Indeed, the decision to enlist intelligence in the process

of policy advocacy by definition ruled out the possibility of a neutral assessment. Policymakers

sensed this contradiction but pressed forward. Alastair Campbell told Scarlett that the dossier

must have the appearance of objectivity. “The drier the better,” he said, “cut the rhetoric.” At the

same time, Campbell thought that his office could help lend rhetorical punch to the final product.

122

Davis and Persbo, “After the Butler Report.” 123

Butler Report, p. 72. 124

Campbell was mainly concerned that the public would view the dossier as government spin instead of impartial

intelligence. He does not seem to have been concerned that policy input would actually bias the product. Campbell,

Blair Years, pp. 634 and 637-638. The foreign office raised similar concerns. See Mark Sedwill to Charles Gray,

Edward Chaplin, Ed Owen, David Manning, Matthew Rycroft, and Alistair Campbell, “COF: Dossier 10/9 Version -

Comments,” September 11, 2002, in Hutton Inquiry appendix. All of the correspondence cited below is taken from

the Hutton Inquiry appendix, unless otherwise noted.

42

His editorial board would review evolving drafts and comment on the style and presentation of

the dossier. “JS to own,” he concluded, “AC to help.” 125

The JIC turned around the government‟s request quickly, updating the dossier with two

recent assessments of Iraqi diplomatic options and doctrine for the use of unconventional

weapons. 126

The revised draft was circulated around the government for two weeks before the

final dossier was released. Campbell‟s staff in the communications office took a direct role in

editing intelligence during this period, sending comments on various iterations of the dossier,

and encouraging Scarlett to change the language of the dossier to emphasize that the cumulative

impact of intelligence was an incontrovertible case against the Ba‟ath regime. One staffer,

Daniel Pruce, stressed the basic purpose of the dossier: “Our aim… (is to) convey the impression

that things have not been staid in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and

relentlessly pursuing WMD…the dossier gets close to this but some drafting changes could bring

this out more.” 127

Campbell argued that it should appeal to the general public and steer clear of

technical arcana. 128

To that end Pruce suggested replacing all references to Iraq with Saddam

Hussein in order to “personalize the dossier” and create a villain for public consumption. 129

125

Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 636-637. Campbell also wrote to Scarlett, “It goes without saying that there should be

nothing published that you and (your colleagues) are not 100% happy with.” Campbell to Scarlett, September 9,

2002. 126

JIC Assessments, “Saddam's Diplomatic and Military Options,” August 21, 2002, and “Iraqi Use of Chemical

and Biological Weapons - Possible Scenarios,” September 9, 2002. See Butler Report, p. 72. 127

Daniel Pruce to Campbell, Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, and Godric Smith, “Draft Dossier (J Scarlett Version

of 10 Sept),” September 11, 2002. 128

Campbell, for instance, asked for comments of one of his colleagues not familiar with intelligence and defense

matters. She recommended that the dossier should avoid passages that “only made sense to Jane‟s Weekly.” Ed

Owen to Scarlett, Campbell, Sedwill, Pruce, Kelly, Edward Chaplin, Richard Stagg, William Ehrman, Charles Gray,

Stephen Pattison, Tim Dowse, Mark Matthews, Andrew Patrick, Julian Miller, and eight others (redacted), “Iraq -

Dossier,” September 17, 2002. 129

Pruce to Mark Matthews, Rycroft, Paul Hamill, Smith, and Campbell, “Dossier,” September 10, 2002. See also

Campbell to Scarlett and Miller, “Another dossier memo!” September 18, 2002. One FCO officials opposed this

recommendation, suggesting the use of “the regime” instead. The final version used “Iraq,” “Saddam,” and “the

regime” interchangeably. Sedwill to Gray, et al., “COF: Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments,” September 11, 2002.

43

Other aides suggested releasing raw intelligence to demonstrate that the government had secret

information that went beyond open-source estimates.

The communications staff was disappointed with the section on Iraq‟s nuclear activities,

where intelligence was particularly ambiguous. “Sorry to bombard you on this point,” Campbell

wrote to Scarlett on September 18, “but I do worry that the nuclear section will become the main

focus and as currently drafted, is not in great shape.” 130

The standing JIC assessment held that

Iraq would find it very difficult to achieve a nuclear full-fuel cycle as long as sanctions remained

in place, and the first draft concluded that it would take at least five years to produce a nuclear

weapon even after sanctions were lifted. 131

This seemed to reduce the sense of an imminent

threat, and Campbell suggested adding that Iraq could possess nuclear weapons in as little as one

year if it was able to acquire fissile material from overseas. 132

The final draft emphasized Iraqi

procurement efforts and Saddam's obvious interest in reviving the nuclear program. Nonetheless,

the staff was disappointed that they could not make a more compelling case. One of them

complained about “our inability to say that he could pull the nuclear trigger any time soon.” 133

Cabinet ministers also commented on the dossier, increasing the pressure on the JIC to

deliver a more damning assessment. The Defense Secretary complained to Scarlett that it was

“insufficiently dramatic.” 134

The Foreign Secretary wanted a “killer para on Saddam‟s defiance

of the UN.” 135

Of course, there is nothing untoward about ministers commenting on JIC

assessments. Coordination between policymakers and intelligence officers helps to ensure that

130

Campbell to Scarlett and Miller, "Another dossier memo!" September 18, 2002. 131

“Briefing Papers on Iraq,” p. 10. 132

Campbell to Scarlett, Manning, Powell, and Miller, “Nuclear Section,” September 19, 2002. 133

Tom Kelly to Campbell, Smith, and Pruce, "Tuesday core script," September 19. 2002; and Pruce to Kelly,

Campbell, Smith, and Tanya Joseph, “Dossier - 16 September draft,” September 17, 2002. 134

Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies, Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government, and the Hutton

Inquiry (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2004), p. 42. 135

Sedwill to Charles Gray, Manning, Rycroft, Campbell, Chaplin, Owen, Miller, Scarlett, and Pruce, “URGENT:

Iraq Dossier 10/9 Version - Foreign Secretary's Comments,” September 11, 2002.

44

assessments are policy relevant, and ministers regularly participated in JIC meetings. But in this

case their recommendations show that they were trying to push the product in a specific direction

instead of trying to help the intelligence community sharpen its estimate.

The communications office worked closely with the JIC as the publication date

approached. Campbell wanted to focus attention on the dossier on the eve of a parliamentary

debate on the government‟s Iraq policy, and was concerned that early press leaks would dilute its

impact. “We have to be disciplined in holding the line until publication,” he reminded all

involved in the editing process. 136

The complexity of the dossier, which combined technical

intelligence on various weapons programs as well as assessments of Iraqi military doctrine and

strategic intentions, meant that the media could choose among many possible story lines.

Communications officials wanted the dossier to emphasize key points in order to influence

coverage after its release. As one press aide put it in a memo to Campbell and Scarlett, “What

will be the headline in the Standard on the day of publication? What do we want it to be?” 137

Politicization worked. Weeks of pressure on the JIC led to a final draft that went far

beyond the actual content of intelligence. The published dossier differed from earlier JIC

assessments in tone and substance. It presented judgments with no uncertainty. Caveats about

intelligence gaps which has appeared only weeks before disappeared. For instance, the

September 9 assessment, which was part of the basis for the dossier, included an important

disclaimer about intelligence on Iraqi CBW: “Intelligence remains limited and Saddam's own

unpredictability complicates judgments about Iraqi use of these weapons. Much of this paper is

necessarily based on judgment and assessment.” The JIC had made this point in several

136

Campbell to Scarlett, et al., September 9, 2002. 137

The actual headline, “45 Minutes from Attack.” Powell to Campbell, and Scarlett, September 19, 2002; and Alex

Danchev, “The Reckoning: Official Enquiries and the Iraq War,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 3

(Autumn 2004), p. 446.

45

classified assessments in 2001-2002, but removed it from the declassified dossier. 138

Other

changes served to downplay doubts about the meaning of partial information. The section on

aluminum tubes included no reference to possible conventional military applications, even

though it admitted that “there is no definitive intelligence that (they) are destined for a nuclear

program.” Following Campbell‟s recommendation, the dossier included the judgment that Iraq

could acquire nuclear weapons in 1-2 years if it acquired fissile material and enrichment-related

equipment from abroad. It also emphasized Iraq‟s procurement efforts, including its attempt to

import “significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” Put together, these details made the

original five year estimate look like wishful thinking. 139

The most noteworthy revelation had to do with Iraqi readiness for launching

unconventional attacks. As discussed above, the dossier claimed that military officers could

launch a chemical or biological attack within 45 minutes of receiving the order to do so. This

conclusion was highlighted in the Prime Minister‟s foreword and three times in the main text, in

order to emphasize the imminent threat to British security. But the dossier obfuscated the fact

that the intelligence had to do with battlefield weapons, not long range missiles. The JIC

assessments staff believed it would take no more than 45 minutes to move CW or BW shells

from forward depots to pre-designated military units. 140

This interpretation was not included in

the dossier. Instead, it implied that the short timeline was related to strategic weapons:

Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against

his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his

WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as

138

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September 24, 2002, pp. 17-24;

http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2002/09/24/dossier.pdf. See also Davies and Glees,

Spinning the Spies, p. 47; Davies, "A Critical Look," pp. 49-52; and Butler Report, pp. 73-75. 139

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 24-26. 140

Butler Report, pp. 126-128; and Intelligence and Security Committee Report, pp. 26-27.

46

vital to his strategic interests. And the document discloses that his military

planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of the order

to use them. 141

This was a substantial sin of omission. Moreover, as described in the introduction, the judgment

was based on a piece of new intelligence that was not properly vetted.

The dossier also included background information designed to raise fears that Iraq's

arsenal of unconventional weapons was really capable of causing mass destruction. It went

further than the earlier drafts in describing the physical effects of chemical and biological

weapons. VX could cause “rapid death”; exposure to aflatoxins could lead to “stillborn babies

and children born with mutations”; and ricin could “cause multiple organ failure leading to death

within one or two days.” 142

To drive the point home it included pictures of Kurds who were

killed in a CW attack in 1988, with the caption: “Among the corpses at Halabja, children were

found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with

corpses.” 143

The dossier also included some crude calculations about the effects of a 20-kiloton

nuclear explosion over an urban center. These passages had nothing to do with current

intelligence on Iraq, which had no 20-kiloton weapons available to explode. They were included

solely for the purpose of rousing public and parliamentary concern about Iraq. The dossier was a

public relations vehicle, and the JIC had become a policy advocate. 144

The character of intelligence-policy relations fundamentally changed during the summer

of 2002. Before, the government had accepted the content of intelligence on Iraqi weapons

programs, along with the caveats about the lack of information about current activities.

141

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 3-4. None of the other references to the 45-minute claim fill in the

appropriate context. See pp. 5, 17, and 19. 142

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 11-12. 143

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 15. 144

For a similar argument, see Phythian, “Flawed Intelligence, Limited Oversight,” pp. 191-210, at 210.

47

Policymakers participated in JIC meetings, but there is nothing to suggest that they tried to

manipulate assessments. Nor did the government have any interest in using the JIC as a policy

advocate. Its decision to do so, as the Butler Report concluded, was unprecedented:

The dossier broke new ground in three ways: the JIC had never previously

produced a public document; no Government case for any international action had

previously been made to the British public through explicitly drawing on a JIC

publication; and the authority of the British intelligence community, and the JIC

in particular, had never been used in such a public way. 145

Because the dossier was meant to justify a shift in policy rather than to provide an objective

assessment, it contained unambiguous conclusions that were not supported by the available

intelligence, and used language that overstated the certainty of the case.

Intelligence as Policy Oversell

The U.S. and British cases reveal similar motives for politicization. They also

demonstrate the use of intelligence as an effective form of policy oversell. By publicly bringing

intelligence into the policy consensus, both governments were able to overcome significant

domestic opposition. This was no small task, given that preventive wars are typically unpopular

in democracies. 146

Policymakers in Washington and London used public intelligence in four

ways. First, they downplayed dissent among analysts and obscured the genuine ambiguity of

existing information. Second, they exaggerated the certainty of future threats. Third, they

145

Butler Report, p. 153. Some observers suggest that the open use of intelligence was the culmination of a decade-

long governmental effort to make the intelligence community more transparent. Before the 1992 the government

did not formally acknowledge the existence of SIS, much less use its product in public. See Len Scott, “Sources and

Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April

2007), pp. 185-205; and Nigel West, “The UK‟s Not Quite So Secret Service,” International Journal of Intelligence

and Counterintelligence, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), pp. 23-30. 146

Randall Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics,

Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269.

48

exploited on the aura of secrecy that surrounds intelligence agencies by partially releasing

information on Iraqi capabilities, and by suggesting that additional classified information was

even more compelling. Fourth, they argued that policy options were self-evident in the face of

such overwhelming intelligence.

Downplaying dissent and ambiguity. The White House oversold policy by obfuscating

controversies in the intelligence community about the quality of information and the reliability of

its sources. It suggested that there were ties between al Qaeda and Iraq, despite serious doubts

among analysts that there was any operational relationship. 147

It increased the estimate of the

Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile, despite a near total lack of intelligence on the location or

amount of mustard, sarin, and VX. It repeatedly used information from defectors on Iraqi mobile

BW facilities, even though some of them had been revealed as fabricators. 148

The administration

also downplayed dissent over estimates of Iraq‟s nuclear program in order to preserve the image

of consensus. After the New York Times reported the internal dispute over the aluminum tubes, a

White House official stated that the “best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories

like Oak Ridge supported the CIA assessments.” 149

In fact, DOE experts had disputed the claim

for over a year.

The most egregious misrepresentations occurred at moments of intense domestic

controversy. Rising Senate opposition in September 2002 led the Bush administration to badly

overstate the quality of the information on Iraqi weapons programs. Donald Rumsfeld provided

a list of “facts” about Iraq to the Senate, including intelligence that the Ba‟ath regime was

“determined to acquire the means to strike the U.S., its friends and allies with weapons of mass

147

See especially the president‟s press conference, March 6, 2003; UCSB Presidency Project. 148

SSCI Report, pp. 160-161. See also Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 29. 149

SSCI Report, p. 94.

49

destruction.” 150

Condoleezza Rice told the PBS Newshour that Iraq was providing chemical

weapons training to al Qaeda. 151

Most importantly, the administration authorized the release of

the CIA white paper on the eve of the congressional vote on the use of force. As described

above, the white paper removed dissents that were present in the classified NIE, as well as

estimative language that suggested ambiguity or uncertainty. The paper also included maps of

Iraq, complete with radiation symbols marking the location of suspected nuclear facilities. Sen.

Graham called it a “vivid and terrifying case for war.” 152

The Blair government also used intelligence in public without mentioning the flimsiness

of the underlying information. The September dossier included ominous intelligence on all

aspects of its unconventional weapons programs, and suggested that that Iraq could launch

attacks on British interests at a moment's notice. Speaking to the House of Commons on the day

of publication, the prime minister declared that the intelligence picture was “extensive, detailed,

and authoritative.” 153

Exaggerating the future threat. Policymakers justified military action on both preemptive

and preventive grounds, using intelligence to exaggerate the future threat if the Ba‟ath regime

was allowed to stay in power. American officials used terrifying metaphors to emphasize the

danger. “There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly (Saddam Hussein) can

acquire nuclear weapons,” Rice told CNN, “but we don't want the smoking gun to be a

mushroom cloud.” The accumulated intelligence seemed to be overwhelming. Cheney admitted

that “what we know is just bits and pieces gathered through the intelligence system… (but) we

150

Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 98. 151

PBS, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, September 25, 2002; www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-

dec02/rice_9-25.html. 152

Quoted in Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, p. 138. See also Graham, Intelligence Matters, pp. 181-183. 153

Gill, “Intelligence Oversight,” p. 10; and Butler report, p. 79.

50

do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the

equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” Rumsfeld told the

Senate Armed Services Committee that all the Ba‟athists needed was fissile material, and “they

are, at this moment, seeking that material.” According to administration officials, the intelligence

on Iraq‟s procurement activity was bulletproof. 154

Prime Minister Blair also used the shadow of the future to emphasize the need for action,

and utilized current intelligence to envision worst-case scenarios. In a November 2002 speech,

for instance, he massaged the distinction between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden by

referring to proliferation and terrorism as “linked dangers.” Blair asked a series of rhetorical

questions to convince his audience that catastrophe awaited if nothing was done: “Would al

Qaeda buy WMD if it could? Certainly. Do they have the financial resources? Probably.

Would they use them? Definitely.” 155

The aura of secret intelligence. Policymakers oversold the threat of Iraq by selectively

releasing intelligence data, and by suggesting that even more compelling information was still

classified. During a widely publicized speech in October 2002, for instance, President Bush

claimed that Iraqi UAVs were specifically intended to launch chemical and biological weapons

attacks on the United States, and accused Iraq of providing CW training to al Qaeda.

Immediately following the speech, the White House released satellite images of a suspected

nuclear facility that was extensively rebuilt after it was bombed in 1998. The use of actual

154

Cheney is quoted in Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth from 9/11 to

Katrina (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 59. Rice and Rumsfeld are quoted in Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 26 and

29. 155

Address to the Lord Mayor‟s Ball, November 11, 2002; www.pm.gov.uk/output/page1731.asp

51

intelligence data added weight to the administration‟s familiar warnings about the Iraqi nuclear

peril. 156

In reality, the case against Iraq remained largely circumstantial, but the administration

was able to preemptively deflect criticism by invoking the aura of secret intelligence.

Administration officials dismissed skeptics because, as Cheney put it, they had not “seen all the

intelligence that we have seen.” 157

Colin Powell made the point again during his UN

presentation. “I cannot tell you everything that we know,” he began, “but what I can share with

you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.” A

week later George Tenet supported the secretary in his annual threat assessment to Congress,

declaring that the case against Iraq was “based on a solid foundation of intelligence.” In addition

to providing judgments on Iraqi CW and BW, Tenet suggested that the U.S. intelligence

community had assembled a comprehensive picture of Iraq‟s uranium enrichment program.

“Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine procurements designed to reconstitute its nuclear

weapons program,” he said. “These procurements include-but also go well beyond-the

aluminum tubes that you have heard so much about.” 158

In London, the prime minister‟s office worked to ensure that the Iraq dossier would lead

readers to conclude the worst. Staffers were aware of gaps in the intelligence picture, and

worried that the dossier would look like an argument by assertion. They also worried that the

dossier would resemble existing open source analyses, such as a September 9 report prepared by

the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Their solution was to remind readers that the

government had unique access to secret intelligence. “In the public's mind the key difference

156

David E. Sanger, “Bush Sees „Urgent Duty‟ to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq,” New York Times, October 8, 2002, p. 1. 157

Ricks, Fiasco, p. 51. 158

DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,”

February 11, 2003; https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html.

52

between this text and the IISS text will be the access to intelligence material,” said Daniel Pruce,

who recommended including details on the structure of the JIC to reinforce the point. 159

Another

argued for the selective release of intelligence, “with names, identifiers, etc., blacked out.” 160

Persuading skeptics to buy into a circumstantial argument also required invoking the

authority of official intelligence agencies. Pruce raised the issue when he asked, “Who will issue

the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don't we issue it in the name of the JIC? Makes it

more interesting to the media.” He also predicted that readers would be drawn to the sections on

new intelligence: “The draft already plays up the nature of intelligence sourcing. I think we

could play this up more. The more we advertise that unsupported assertions…come from

intelligence, the better.” 161

The final version of the dossier emphasized the intelligence mystique.

The executive summary highlighted “significant additional information…available to the

Government” that set it apart from other publicly available estimates. The prime minister‟s

introduction went further, suggesting that any gaps in the dossier were necessary to protect

intelligence agents inside Iraq. Blair explained that the government could not publish everything

it knew without risking sources and methods. 162

He invoked the aura of secret intelligence again

when he delivered the dossier to Parliament. He reminded MPs that the JIC‟s work is “obviously

secret,” but that the seriousness of the issue was enough to justify the extraordinary step of

publishing its assessment. Readers were left to assume that the JIC assessment was the reasoned

opinion of analysts with a complete view of the classified intelligence. 163

159

Pruce to Matthews, et al., September 10, 2002. 160

Bassett to Smith, et al., September 11, 2002. 161

Pruce to Campbell, et al., September 11, 2002. He had good reason to be concerned. As Richard Aldrich has

noted, “journalists trust spies (more) than spin doctors.” Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War,” p. 79. 162

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 6. 163

Prime Minister‟s Statement to Parliament, September 24, 2002; www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1727/asp.

53

Self-evident responses. Finally, policymakers argued that intelligence left them with no

choice but to pursue an aggressive strategy towards Iraq. President Bush used intelligence to

demonstrate that Iraq wanted to expand its capability, and that it would use unconventional

weapons against the United States. Saddam‟s belligerence towards the United Nations and

history of duplicity meant that international sanctions and inspections were not reliable. Regime

change by force was the only option. The president had been building this argument for months,

and offered a summary in his address on the eve of the war:

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq

regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever

devised…The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It

has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained, and

harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al Qaida. The danger is clear: Using

chemical, biological, or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq,

the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of

thousands of innocent people in our country or any other…Instead of drifting

along towards tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of

horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed. 164

Note that Bush‟s argument ultimately rested on the belief that intelligence was irrefutable.

Indeed, he stressed that intelligence left “no doubt” about Iraqi capabilities and intentions. The

use of intelligence helped the president argue that the danger was real, and that only military

action could solve the problem. To do anything else would be to drift towards tragedy.

Prime Minister Blair likewise claimed that intelligence left him with only one choice.

During the preparation of the first dossier, one staffer argued that Blair should portray his actions

as the only responsible course of action. He suggested including a passage along these lines:

“Something like, „I am today taking the exceptional step of publishing the JIC‟s advice to

me…When you have read this, I ask you to consider what else a responsible (prime minister)

164

President‟s Address to the Nation, March 17, 2002; UCSB Presidency Project.

54

could do than follow the course we have in the face of this advice?” 165

Blair used this logic to

push for a tougher inspections regime and ultimately to justify the war. “Imagine you are PM,”

he said to a Labour Party conference after the invasion, “and you receive this intelligence. And

not just about Iraq. But about the whole murky trade in WMD…And I see the terrorism and the

trade in WMD growing….So what do I do? Say, „I‟ve got the intelligence but I‟ve a hunch its

wrong?‟” 166

Politicization and Analytical Sclerosis

Despite fundamental differences in organizational structure, the pattern of intelligence-

policy relations was the same in the United States and Great Britain. Policymakers in both

countries pressured intelligence to join the policy consensus after making public commitments in

the face of domestic opposition, using intelligence to oversell the need for military action. The

long-term consequences are still unclear, although scholars have noted that the political use of

pre-war intelligence might make it more difficult to rally international support for strategies

requiring multilateral cooperation. For example, multilateral non-proliferation regimes require

faith in the quality of intelligence, but that faith has surely eroded. 167

In addition, politicization

has exacerbated mutual antipathy and mistrust between policymakers and intelligence officials.

Furious analysts have berated policymakers for manipulating their work, and policymakers have

come close to accusing analysts of subversion. Richard Betts argues, with considerable

165

Powell to Campbell and Manning, September 17, 2002. 166

Coates and Krieger, Blair’s War, pp. 126-127. 167

For a more general argument about the effects of the Iraq war on intelligence, see Lawrence Freedman,

“Restoring Trust in Intelligence,” in Graham F. Walker, ed., The Search for WMD: Non-Proliferation, Intelligence

and Pre-emption in the New Security Environment (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2006),

pp. 182-191.

55

justification, that the episode marks a nadir in the history of U.S. intelligence. 168

The same is

true in the United Kingdom, where intelligence agencies and policymakers have suffered through

a series of painful inquiries into the reasons for their collective failure.

But there were more immediate consequences. The process of politicization that began in

2002 led to analytical sclerosis in 2003. By December, policy pressure had encouraged analysts

to take their assumptions about Iraq to logical extremes, and estimates became increasingly

ominous. Not only did they conclude that Iraq possessed significant stockpiles of

unconventional weapons, but they also asserted that information gaps were the result of Iraqi

concealment and deception. 169

Moreover, by publishing estimates, intelligence agencies were

disinclined from revisiting their conclusions, because doing so would have constituted a public

admission that their earlier work was radically wrong. As a result, neither British nor American

intelligence seriously reconsidered their leading assumptions, even after inspectors started

sending back data for the first time since 1998. The fact that the UN and IAEA reported no signs

of a reconstituted program had no apparent impact on intelligence analysis. 170

Why not? The Butler Report‟s answer was that UNMOVIC‟s reports were not definitive

because the inspectors had not visited all of the suspect sites. Nonetheless, the report called it

“odd” that that the JIC produced no assessments after December 2002, suggesting that it doubted

its own explanation. Both U.S. and British postwar inquiries speculated that some kind of

168

Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 91-98. 169

Tenet made this point in his annual threat assessment to Congress on February 11, 2003. It is unclear whether

rank-and-file analysts agreed with his conclusions about Iraqi deception or whether they were simply resigned to the

reality of the coming war. Policymakers reinforced this conclusion as well. See Blair, “Engaging with Syria”; and

Condoleezza Rice, “Why We Know Iraq Is Lying,” New York Times, January 23, 2003, p. 25. On Tenet‟s threat

assessment, see Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 257-258. 170

Hans Blix, Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC, March 7, 2003;

www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm; and Mohamed ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in

Iraq: An Update," March 7, 2003; www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtm.

56

groupthink was at work, but this argument rings hollow. 171

The evidence shows that there was

considerable disagreement among analysts on both sides of the Atlantic throughout 2002, and it

strains credulity to imagine that skeptics would succumb to groupthink as the public debate over

the war became more intense in early 2003. Robert Jervis offers a more plausible argument:

convinced that war was on the horizon, intelligence analysts may have decided that reassessing

Iraqi capabilities was the analytical equivalent of tilting at windmills. Although Jervis discounts

the effects of politicization in general, he concedes that the Bush administration‟s determination

to proceed with the invasion caused some analysts to “shut down” in the months before the war.

According to this argument, political pressure did not affect the content of estimates in 2002, but

it may have indirectly stifled analytical imagination in 2003. 172

Jervis is correct that the process of politicization was not continuous before the war. As

discussed above, the quality of intelligence-policy relations deteriorated badly in 2002-2003. He

is also right to note the stultification of analysis in the immediate run-up to the war, despite an

increasing amount of apparently disconfirming evidence from weapons inspectors in Iraq. The

problem is that this argument discounts the cumulative pressure on analysts to support a

particular view of the Iraq threat. The drumbeat of war began in January 2002. Indirect pressure

to bring assessments in line with policy statements began in the spring, and direct politicization

occurred in the summer and fall. All of this contributed to analysts‟ growing belief that

reassessing Iraqi capabilities would be futile. In addition, disillusionment must have increased

after top intelligence officials swayed to policy pressure in the fall of 2002. The analytical

171

Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp. 129-130; and Phythian, “Official Inquiries,” pp. 206-207. 172

Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp. 135-136.

57

sclerosis Jervis observes in the weeks before the war was the result of politicization many

months before. 173

By the time that IAEA and UN inspectors reported that they were unable to find large

stockpiles of unconventional weapons, would-be dissenters faced political and institutional

pressure to ignore them. Richard Aldrich notes that in the UK, most analysts developed “almost

an ideological conviction…that all militarist dictators wish to acquire WMD and that they are all

working busily to do so.” 174

Analysts who let this conviction determine their conclusions were

well received by policymakers as well as their supervisors. Skeptics found it difficult to argue a

contrary position, despite the lack of information one way or the other. In the United States,

dissenters had trouble finding institutional backing to pursue alternative hypotheses. Tyler

Drumheller, the European division chief in the CIA, tried for months to track down a well-placed

source who claimed that Iraq did not have an active unconventional weapons program. The

source was no less than Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, who had been recruited by French

intelligence. 175

Sabri reported through intermediaries that Iraq had no mobile BW facilities; that

it would at least 18-24 months to build a crude nuclear warhead even if it was able to import

fissile material; and that Saddam‟s government had no relationship with al Qaeda. But according

to Drumheller, agency officials had no interested in pursuing these leads because they were

convinced that war was inevitable. One of his subordinates was denied a meeting at CIA

173

For a specific discussion about the cumulative effects of politicization on estimates of Iraqi BW, see Koblentz,

Living Weapons, pp. 191-193. 174

Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War,” p. 77. 175

James P. Pfiffner, “Decisionmaking, Intelligence, and the Iraq War,” in Pfiffner and Phythian, eds., Intelligence

and National Security Policymaking on Iraq, pp. 213-232, at 224-225.

58

headquarters to review the new information. “It‟s time you learn it‟s not about intelligence

anymore,” he was told. “It‟s about regime change.” 176

Intelligence officials also stopped trying to restrain policymakers from using dubious

information in public. In October 2002, for example, the White House wanted to include the

yellowcake story in a major speech on Iraq, even though the CIA was highly skeptical. 177

While

some agencies believed the intelligence was credible, CIA analysts noted that Iraq already

possessed 550 metric tons of yellowcake and could not confirm reports about additional

procurement. The mines in question were operated by a French consortium rather than the

government of Niger, one of them was flooded, and the logistical realities of transferring large

amounts of uranium made it highly unlikely that such a deal could take place covertly. 178

Tenet

persuaded the White House to remove the claim from the speech.

Still, the idea that Iraq was on the verge of importing uranium was an irresistible selling

point. Apparently forgetting the earlier warnings about the flimsiness of the underlying

intelligence, White House speechwriters included the story in several early drafts of the State of

Union Address in January 2003. A senior staff member on the National Security Council called

Alan Foley, director of the CIA‟s Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control

Center (WINPAC), to see whether the speech would pass muster. Despite deep divisions in the

community over the quality of the information, Foley agreed that it would be technically correct

176

Drumheller, On the Brink, pp. 91-98, quoted at 95. See also Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, pp. 200-201; and Walter

Pincus, “CIA Learned in ‟02 That Bin Laden had No Iraq Ties, Report Says,” The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 2006,

p. A14. 177

Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 124-127. 178

Eisner and Royce, Italian Letter, p. 39; and Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar

Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments,

September 8, 2006, p. 13; www.intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf.

59

to include the claim as long as it was not cited as U.S. intelligence. 179

Speechwriters changed the

text accordingly. Tenet received a draft of the speech before delivery, but did not proofread it to

ensure that the intelligence was reliable. Whether he was unwilling to take on the administration

or too tired to fight, the DCI inadvertently allowed bogus intelligence into the State of the

Union. 180

The yellowcake debacle was a microcosm of the collapse in intelligence-policy relations

before the war. Intelligence agencies erred by clinging to the assumption that Saddam Hussein

was determined to acquire unconventional weapons, and took seriously any information that

seemed to confirm their existing beliefs. Analysts failed to revisit their conclusions, even after

the emergence of disconfirming information, and dissenters operated without institutional

support. Policymakers encouraged these errors by openly favoring intelligence that supported

the case for military action. They also removed any incentives for self-criticism by enlisting

intelligence agencies in the public relations campaign before the war. The result, in both the

United States and the United Kingdom was a wildly inaccurate estimate of Iraqi capabilities.

179

WINPAC came closer than other analytic units in the agency to accepting the Niger story. Anonymous officials

later accused Foley of bending under the weight of policy pressure. WINPAC analysts told Senate investigators that

they took the reporting seriously because they had seen past indications that Iraq sought to import fissile material

from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Eisner and Royce, Italian Letter, p. 119; and SSCI Report, pp. 57-

66. 180

David E. Sanger and James Risen, “C.I.A. Chief Takes Blame in Assertion on Iraqi Uranium,” New York Times,

July 12, 2003, p. 1; and SSCI report, pp. 64-66.