# Chapter 20

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# Implementing Strategy: The Diplomatic Tool

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*Nation states have at their disposal a wide range of tools available to them as they implement their grand strategies. Thomas R. Fedyszyn provides a survey of the non-coercive, or diplomatic, means with which states can use to influence or persuade others. He documents the instruments of statecraft—alliances, coalitions, international institutions—as well as the evolution of the diplomatic art, paying particular attention to the way these tools have been employed in the pursuit of American foreign policy goals. As the United States maneuvers during the global war on terror, it must especially take into account the growing importance of public diplomacy and the necessity to deal effectively with non-national entities. Has the phenomenon of globalization made the life of ambassadors more difficult? Do instantaneous global communications reduce or increase the likelihood of international violence? Does the United States conduct diplomacy and foreign policy differently than other world actors?*

Nation states, like all living organisms, are faced with myriad challenges as they navigate through the complex and ever-changing milieu of the international system. Focused on survival while protecting themselves from inimical forces within and without, nations aspire to improve peace and stability of the international system while also ameliorating the social and economic posture of their citizenry as part their mutual social contract. A nation state's game plan—or grand strategy—is designed to turn these objectives into reality. Since nations are sovereign within their own borders, they have access to the widest variety of tools—political, economic, military—as they proceed to realize these goals. We might consider these tools as an array of choices to "persuade," which we might commonly use in our daily human relations. When we deal with others (not necessarily friends or enemies) we might try to bend them to our will by the use of direct or indirect force. These coercive tools, while effective, usually bring with them the potential for long-term antagonisms and violent reaction. Alternatively, we may choose to communicate our positions and allow the force of the argument to win the day. Finally, we may simply attempt to persuade our

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associates by the sheer power of our example. As a rule in both interpersonal as well as international relations, a nation's choice of tools ought match the style, temperament, and power of the respective nation: the better the balance, the better prospect of success. This article will survey those national tools that are not materially coercive. We'll call these the *diplomatic* tools of grand strategy.

## What is Diplomacy?

As long as groups of individuals agreed that they had to communicate with one another *and* that it was better to hear the message than eat the messenger, there was an established need for diplomacy, or the "peaceful conduct of relations among political entities."[1] Scholars have taken both strict and expansive views of the meaning of this term, some restricting its usage to the formal communication among nations through diplomatic professionals, while others adopt an increasingly broad usage. In the study of national strategy, it is more useful to adopt the more expansive view, including in our definition "all those elements of national power which peaceably advance and defend one's national interests."[2] Thus, while the primary focus in diplomacy must center on the work of diplomatic professionals, its full range cannot be understood without also examining the wide range of activities performed by other governmental, nongovernmental, and even private officials.

State preservation and survival has always been at the root of diplomacy. Thus, its principal subject (at least since the 19th century) has been national security, centering on the prevention of war. However, as the amount and scope of relations between nations has expanded, *war prevention* is now treated as but one, albeit essential, element of modern diplomacy. Today, the majority of negotiations being conducted would fall under the categories of "economic," dealing with subjects of trade, natural resources, foreign assistance, and poverty, or "social," addressing items of health, education, and quality of life.[3]

The definition of diplomacy has become a moving target. Not only has its scope increased to include many new subjects, if viewed as a nation's ability to "peacefully persuade," its practitioners have also multiplied. Of the three fundamental tools available to the grand strategist, it is useful, therefore, to think of diplomacy as the wide spectrum of activities that relate to persuasion on behalf of one's nation, employing neither military nor economic *force.*

## The Evolution of Diplomacy

In a strict sense, "diplomacy" conjures up the notion of pinstriped bureaucrats seated in large mirrored conference rooms conducting negotiations between nation states. In fact, most Americans might adhere to the cynical perception, agreeing with either Sir Henry Wotton's well-known definition of a diplomat in

1664, as a "good man sent abroad to lie for his country,"[4] or Abraham de Wicquefort's 1680's characterization of a diplomat as an "honorable spy."[5] Indeed, diplomacy does compete as one of the world's oldest professions. Historians have unearthed voluminous accounts of diplomatic activity as early as the Greek city-states, through the Roman Empire and into the Renaissance period, when Northern Italian city-states, guided largely by the principles of Niccolo Machiavelli, were expected to be duplicitous agents for their respective Princes. Scholars commonly agree that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the creation of the contemporary international system ushered in the traditional (also known as "old" or "European") diplomatic system based on national sovereignty in an anarchic world. Well-educated, professional men of letters established the customs, traditions, and norms of diplomacy in the 17th century and conducted their communications largely in the french language, diplomacy's *lingua franca*. This system was marked by the creation of formal diplomatic missions, high levels of diplomatic protocol, secrecy, and honesty.[6] However, the Machiavellian world in which they fashioned national survival strategies around the European balance of power remained largely intact for over two centuries. This system, judged by Harold Nicolson as best adapted to the conduct of civilized states,[7] did a remarkably successful job of keeping order in the nascent European-led international system.

The end of World War I brought with it a revolution in diplomatic procedure, based on the belief that the secret machinations of the *Corps Diplomatique* were a central cause of Europe's bloodiest disaster. Now, international negotiations would be subjected to public scrutiny and permanent multilateral organizations would be established to facilitate the peaceful settling of national accounts. This "open" or "new" diplomatic style was made in response to cries of public opinion in the western democracies demanding more transparency in international relations. Diplomats began to evolve into articulate debaters as the written word took on less significance in the world of conferences. The scope of diplomacy grew to include strategic, economic, and fiscal policy, allowing technical experts to join the diplomatic corps of formally trained negotiators to best represent their nation's interests.

The end of the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War brought Heads of State and Government directly into the world of diplomacy, with the creation of *Summit* Diplomacy. The political leaders of the victorious side personally led the meetings leading to the future division of the world after World War Two. Subsequently, as the Cold War flourished, American and Soviet leaders met on numerous occasions to avert national security catastrophes as well as to chart strategies to ensure world peace and stability. This practice continued at the regional level, with Middle East leaders still regularly visiting Camp David.[8]

There was also a marked shift to "*Conference* Diplomacy"[9] in which large, multilateral agencies conducted negotiations on specialized topics. Organizations such as Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Civil Aviation Office

(ICAO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Global Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) recruited technical specialists to assist in the determination of international treaties and protocols on a vast array of issues.

## Recent Trends in Diplomacy

As we enter the 21st century, it certainly appears that we are expanding the scope of the "diplomat" even further. Thus, while the professional American diplomats—ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers—stand atop the diplomatic heap, they are accompanied and supported by a large mass of governmental and nongovernmental professionals engaged in the dynamic of persuading others to bend to the American will. In the old world of diplomacy, promulgating information—or propaganda—was considered inappropriate by embassy officials. Today, one function of the U.S. State Department is to communicate directly to the people abroad directly through the media of press, radio, and television."[10] Thus, "information" is now firmly on the official American Embassy agenda and the public promotion of national policies is part of an embassy's mandate. This new art form—communicating directly with overseas publics—required of American diplomats is commonly called "*public* diplomacy."[11] To underline its high priority, the Department of State has created an Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

On a daily basis there are vastly more *official* Americans in contact with people outside the United States than there are members of the State Department. The *soldier-diplomat*, for example, is becoming commonplace in a world where many American embassies have not only a full complement of military attachés, they also have large Offices of Defense Cooperation, engaged in the distribution of military assistance to host countries. American armed forces are even more likely found engaged in training and assisting local forces, as well as conducting peacekeeping missions around the world. All are equally *soldier-diplomats*. Other Federal agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Commerce, and even the Central Intelligence Agency, send more governmental officials abroad than the Department of State, all acting on behalf of American national interests.

Ultimately, it may even be argued that *private* American corporations, citizens (and even American culture), constitute the most potent instruments of American persuasive power around the world and must also be taken into account. Joseph Nye introduced the concept of "soft power"—or getting people to want what you want—to demonstrate the preference to co-opt rather than to coerce others.[12] Indeed, these "others" need not be nation-states, rather, any group or organization in a position to thwart or facilitate the accomplishment of the American national interests. Many experts consider American soft power as the most important tool available to sustain American power worldwide. In

fact, this *informal* brand of persuasion requires no speeches, proclamations, or monetary gifts. The goal of *cultural* diplomacy is to broadcast American Culture—freedom, democracy, respect for human rights along with economic prosperity and materialism—to the entire world and allow its inherent attractiveness to speak for itself. Helena Finn notes its current applicability in the war on terror because "the youth of the Muslim World, deeply confused about their identity and critical of their own corrupt and autocratic rulers, seek refuge in another extreme ideology that promises a better and more dignified life."[13]

## Forms of Diplomacy: Unilateral, Bilateral, or Multilateral

There is no general rule as to the balance between reliance on going it alone, pairing off with close friends, or joining large international clubs with participants of all shapes and sizes. In diplomacy, as in food preparation, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Whatever means best serve the achievement of American national interests and are best suited to the nation's grand strategy are "correct."

First, we should deal with perhaps the oxymoronic notion of *unilateral* diplomacy. It might be argued that this amounts to a conversation with oneself: perhaps useful, but hardly a conversation. However, accepting the premise that diplomacy is about persuasion, it is altogether reasonable that a nation, by its actions (and its individual pronouncements) alone, can be classed a unilateral diplomatist.

The more conventional and ubiquitous forms of diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, have long been part of the landscape of statecraft. The traditional, or European system of international politics revolved exclusively around *power* and its diplomacy was conducted exclusively by the nation-state, with nation-states. Not only would nations conduct their negotiations and communications with their national peers, individual ambassadors were commonly given wide authority in the determination of national positions. The rise of instantaneous communications early in the 20th century removed these prerogatives from ambassadors and acted as a tool allowing national capitals to retain stricter centralized control over their foreign policy machinery. Nonetheless, bilateral diplomatic relations remain a staple of international relations. The United States maintains *bilateral* embassies in most of the world's capitals and conducts daily communications with the host's Foreign Office using diplomatic notes, letters, memoranda, and *aides memoirs*. In those unfortunate instances when required to protest the actions of a host, an embassy official will deliver a written protest or *demarche*, to his counterpart.

Relations among nations, even in the 19th century, were hardly limited to bilateral interchanges. With the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, European capitals were drawn toward the building of *multilateral alliances* in attempts to balance the power of potentially ascendant and aggressive rivals. These alliances, or

concerts,[14] had no formal agendas but continued to operate to assure unity of purpose and solidification of a status quo determined to prevent another Napoleon-like challenge. At the same time, the American experience was one of fear of "entangling alliances," which could only draw our fledgling nation into war and peril.

Alliances take many sizes and shapes, ranging from secret, bilateral pacts of nonaggression to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the archetypal alliance of the latter half of the 20th century. Originally designed as a collective defense pact against the Soviet threat to Europe, NATO has demonstrated that alliances can grow into decidedly more than that. NATO's crown jewel, the Defense Planning Committee, is one of scores of standing committees created to improve cooperation and interoperability in everything from armaments development through the Role of Women in Society. Further, NATO is now the world's test case to determine if alliances can change not only their size and shape but also their enemy and *raison d'etre.*

Purely as guarantors of security, relatively few formal multilateral security alliances have been concluded in recent years, with the principal exception the Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981.[15] To what do we attribute this phenomenon? Are alliances now best suited for reasons other than national survival and security? Steven Walt examines these issues and provides an insightful discussion of not only why alliances persist, but also what might signal their death knell.[16]

The evolution of *multilateral* diplomacy is also closely linked to the nation-state system. Although a number of congresses and international organizations existed by the end of the 19th century (for example, the first Permanent Court of Arbitration),[17] the first permanent multinational organization organized to stabilize the international system and prevent future wars was the League of Nations, established by the "Great War"'s eventual victors. The United Nations was created in 1945 with a similar intent. The U.N. Charter, similar to the League's, was designed to provide security to member states acting in concert to control or limit the use of military force. Its principal organs—the Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, and Trusteeship Council—were similar to its predecessor.

In historical hindsight, the United Nations has played only a marginal role in safeguarding its members against foreign aggression. Had the Soviet Union not

To learn more about the following organizations see:
U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm
United Nations
http://www.un.org/aboutun/index.html
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
http://www.nato.int/structur/home.htm

been boycotting the U.N. Security Council on July 7, 1950, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, authorizing U.N. military action in Korea, would not have been passed. In fact, the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council minimized the importance of this multilateral forum throughout the Cold War. It wasn't until the crumbling of the Soviet Empire that the U.N. rushed into its new principal role in *crisis* diplomacy—acting as the buffer in response to civil wars within states or the disintegration of states. Although the U.N. Security Council had authorized peacekeeping missions prior to the end of the Cold War, in five short years thereafter, the number of active missions had quadrupled along with a nearly ten-fold increase in the number of U.N. enforcement personnel, while budgets increased by a factor of thirteen.[18] Viewed either as a substitute for enforcing collective security or as a growing new mission, the United Nations now plays a leading role in what is commonly called "peace operations."

While the Cold War may have played a large role in relegating the U.N. to a secondary role in international system stability, an array of issues driven by technology, trade, and communications thrust the U.N. onto the center stage. Issues like world hunger, medical epidemics, and environmental pollution were not only increasingly complex, but they lent themselves to multilateral solutions. The drive toward global prosperity demanded multilateral organizations empowered to manage trade, tariffs, and international monetary policy across national borders. Multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund joined other *intergovernmental organizations* (IGOs). Together with *nongovernmental organizations* (NGOs) such as *Medecins sans Frontiers* (Doctors without Borders), these multilateral groups (sometimes called Private Volunteer Organizations) addressed issues that span what today we call "human security" issues.[19] As a consequence, especially as manifested in the United Nations, this expansion of agenda "broadened the tasks of the diplomatic profession" subtly altering the methods of diplomacy.[20] An excellent summary of the contemporary charter of the United Nations—to fight poverty, prevent conflict, or cure disease—is provided by its Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001.[21]

An interesting diplomatic variant is posed by Richard Haass, a former member of both Bush administrations (first on the National Security Council staff, then as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department). He contended that the United States should match its diplomatic strategy to the circumstance and that either a unilateral, alliance or supranational (United Nations) approach may each be useful in the appropriate circumstance. However, he acknowledged that the first Bush administration introduced a variant of multilateralism he labeled "foreign policy by posse."[22] This approach, commonly called "coalitions of the willing," rejected the formal relationships of alliances and allowed its participants to move collectively toward a single objective, without yielding sovereignty to supranational authority. These coalitions normally disbanded after the

objective had been achieved, but retained the ability to pursue an issue (perhaps, North Korea's nuclear program) over protracted periods of time. The coalitions led by the United States in the two Gulf Wars serve as good examples of this diplomatic phenomenon.

## Types of Formal Diplomacy

The adjectives placed before the word "diplomacy" would fill an appreciable portion of any thesaurus, yet they tend to confuse as much as enlighten. While it may be amusing to know the stories behind its "ping pong" and "shuttle" variants, to paraphrase Crash Davis, Kevin Costner's character in "Bull Durham," formal diplomacy is a "very simple game." To follow on with another allusion to American pop music culture, formal diplomacy is predicated on the notion of Phil Specter's 1958 sepulchral hit, that "To Know Him, Is to Love Him," rather than the antithetical aphorism, "familiarity breeds contempt." *Normal peacetime* diplomacy, therefore, is merely good and thorough intergovernmental communication resulting in optimal transparency among nations. Its cornerstone is that honest, law-abiding states whose intentions are clear not only present less of a threat, but are also more likely to be known and understood better by the international community. Although mundane and at times *pro forma*, it constitutes the vast majority of a diplomat's workday and lends predictability to bilateral and multilateral relations. While virtually all *nonvital* issues are treated *normally*, many important issues of national security are also ameliorated and solved by the improved transparency and understanding provided through this quotidian mechanism. Even in peacetime, nations may yet be involved in disputes, but they value the avoidance of conflict enough to *talk* their way to resolution. In addition, the manifold and personal ties created by the numerous diplomatic interchanges facilitate peaceful resolution of these disputes.

In special cases that draw nations perilously close to the use of force, however, we need to examine two special cases of formal diplomacy. *Preventive* diplomacy is the art of dealing with potential conflicts before they erupt. Former U.N. Secretary General Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali popularized the term when he identified it as one of the U.N.'s principal instruments of action to establish peace and security. It may be argued from a Marxian perspective that the best preventive medicine against violence is the amelioration of the social conditions breeding instability. However, Michael S. Lund examines this concept more narrowly and suggests a range of diplomatic techniques to be used by either states or multinational organizations to help defuse tensions and avoid conflict, which he labels *preventive* diplomacy.[23] Another good example of preventive diplomacy is the series of annual meetings between the U.S. and Soviet (Russian) navies since the 1970s involving *Incidents at Sea*, in which the two navies developed improved communications and *confidence building measures (CBMs)* in an effort to reduce

**Figure 1**
**Diplomacy Spectrum**




the likelihood of warships colliding at sea while still engaging in the tense cat-and-mouse games of the Cold War.

Alternatively, a nation-state (or groups of states) may wish to persuade an adversary to stop or reverse an action. It may choose to engage in *coercive* diplomacy, a term approaching (or perhaps even pushing through) our artificial ceiling of "peaceful" when we discuss diplomacy. Similar to Thomas Schelling's concept of "compellence,"[24] which suggests the use of *threat* of force to influence the conduct of an international actor, coercive diplomacy invariably employs economic and military instruments of national power. Alexander L. George uses the term as a defensive strategy designed to "deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor."[25] However, similar techniques addressed in George's article could readily be used offensively by any aggressive state. As an example of a defensive strategy, consider the series of threats of force, economic sanctions, and ultimatums presented to Saddam Hussein prior to the U.S.-led gulf Coalition immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Unfortunately, coercive diplomacy doesn't always work. Figure 1 depicts the

level and type of diplomatic effort made by a nation-state in a representative international crisis.

## Relating Strategy and National Style to Diplomacy

While each representative grand strategy under scrutiny relies to some extent on diplomacy, it should be clear that there will be huge variations in each nation's diplomatic style. To determine how reliant the United States is on its diplomacy, we must revert to the recurrent question: does America act alone or with others?[26] Although we may have been tempted to conclude that neo-isolationist and primacist grand strategies were polar opposites in many respects, they take on a similar hue as we consider diplomacy. Both strategies derive from the philosophy that the United States need not seek further guidance or approbation from the rest of the world in the conduct of its foreign relations. This attitude need not be driven by arrogance or dismissiveness, but rather by a sense of moral superiority and self-efficacy.[27] Other grand strategies such as selective engagement and cooperative security rely more heavily on collective action and will necessarily place heavier reliance on formal diplomatic tools such as alliances and regional security organizations, in achieving foreign policy objectives.

The United States, newly arrived on the international scene in the 20th century, brought with it a distrust for international politics and a strong streak of isolationism even as it was preeminent in world affairs for most of the century.[28] Even George Kennan, America's most famous diplomat of mid-century and author of the U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union, was suspicious of international organizations such as the United Nations. He characterized the U.N. as a body in which all questions, "regardless of whose responsibility was primarily engaged and of who must deal the main burden of execution, were decided by momentary majorities composed of states of unequal size and interests."[29] As recently as 1995, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995, an outgrowth of the Republican Party's Contract with America, severely limited American funding to the United Nations.[30] Thus, it should not be surprising that many Americans continue to adhere to an instinctive unwillingness to employ international institutions as a first choice in American diplomacy.

Following decades of preeminent power and membership in many of the world's diplomatic institutions, American diplomats have grown more self-assured and comfortable with power. While it is commonplace at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, for American representatives to be considered pushy and intractable, it is equally obvious that many European allies expect that we adopt these characteristics of leadership as we implement Allied foreign policy.

The most important element of national diplomatic style relates to the ultimate goals of American foreign policy. Traditionally, the objectives of diplomacy were very closely circumscribed within the limits of the state system. Hans

Morgenthau, frequently dubbed the father of American Diplomacy, represented the *realist* school when he described diplomacy as "nothing but the symptom of the struggle for power among sovereign nations."[31] He contended that sovereign nations, because they existed in an anarchic world full of untrustworthy neighbors, had to "persuade, negotiate and exert pressure upon each other,"[32] in the unceasing quest for survival. There is undoubtedly a tendency for American diplomats to be guided by the realist logic of the zero-sum game: whatever enhances my power diminishes yours. Whether diplomats believe that human nature is driven by a "will to power" and are predisposed to aggressive behavior or that states merely aim to survive,[33] *power* remains their watchword as they conduct negotiations on subjects seemingly far removed from national survival. This logic, long held by European diplomats, has become part of the American diplomatic view of how the world operates during the 20th century.

As the United States took center stage in the diplomatic scene in the 20th century, however, there were few manifestations of any other factors beyond those of *Realpolitik* with which diplomats had to deal. In 1919, American President Woodrow Wilson brought to the Versailles Peace Conference a radically different set of goals for international diplomacy. He felt that nations (and their respective diplomats) answered to a calling higher than that of national power. Statesmen should be bound by universal principles, such as representative democracy, in the determination of international agreements.[34] This view of diplomacy is associated with the *liberal* (or idealist) school of foreign policy and is still commonly called "Wilsonian."

It should come as no surprise that this radical turn in direction for the *goals* (that is, power vs. values) of diplomacy were injected by an American political leader. Long frustrated with the European notion of "balance of power" politics and possessing a more optimistic, even messianic, view of international affairs, Americans naturally gravitated in this *liberal* direction. A review of the current Bush administration National Security Strategy reveals sections devoted to both the pursuit of American *power* and *values*, employing diplomatic tools associated with several types of grand strategies.[35] Here we have a classic case of a nation's diplomatic style following its political culture, although John Mearsheimer has argued that the value-laden public pronouncements of American diplomacy are mere rhetoric for public consumption in a world actually driven by *realist* logic.[36]

## Diplomacy's Current Challenges

Diplomacy is commonly perceived as a bastion of conservatism, changing only grudgingly over the centuries. Forces now at work in the 21st century, compounded by the aftermath of the 2001 World Trade Center disaster, however, are testing the abilities of the world's diplomats to respond to unprecedented levels of change. Globalization, fed by technologies like the global news media,

Internet, and mobile phones are guaranteeing that there is no place on the planet that can be assumed either quiescent or unimportant, especially in an information age where world public opinion takes on greater importance. In particular, parts of the world such as the Middle East, despite their relative poverty and technological backwardness, are now the principal objects of the American diplomatic effort. America's challenge is not only to create and manage peace as the world's leading power, but also to defend and explain its position in a large part of the world whose stereotypes of Americans are as "arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive and unwilling to engage in cross-cultural dialogue."[37] These challenges require a continuing deftness in both *preventive* and *coercive* diplomacy while placing significantly more emphasis on all aspects of American *public* diplomacy. "Winning the hearts and minds," a slogan popularized in the Vietnam War era, applies directly to American foreign policy toward the Muslim World. Diplomacy is at the center of this struggle.

The other novel challenge confronted by contemporary diplomats is the ascendance of diplomatic actors other than nation-states. Traditionally, the only collectives *permitted* to act in the international arena were *sovereign* entities. While numerous NGOs have facilitated the work of diplomats in international fora and in the delivery of valuable end products of diplomacy, today NGOs are also acting as forces for destabilizing the international system. Witness the power of transnational protest groups whenever the World Trade Organization meets to discuss further expansion of free trade. Mark Leonard estimates that there are more than 20,000 transnational NGO networks, a vast majority of them created within the last 30 years,[38] and that many of them could be made more useful in the conduct of American public diplomacy. Perhaps the most pressing consideration in this regard, however, is the rise of NGOs acting as if they were sovereign—organized terrorist groups. Without the daily concerns faced by traditional political leaders, such as providing public services and defending territorial boundaries, and without the need for winning elections, they are free to use coercive means to disrupt international stability without any accountability. Although Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization is at least available to conduct negotiations, most terrorist groups follow the lead of Osama bin Laden and communicate publicly only through interviews and sound bites on selected transnational media outlets. Thus, they remain impervious to traditional diplomatic tools, limiting American responses to the coercive portion of the policy spectrum.

Diplomacy can be viewed as both an art and a science, in which one's luck improves with effort and expertise. However, even the "luckiest" diplomat is not carrying out his charter if he does not recognize that his main weapons—words and cogent arguments—are merely means to ends. A nation's grand strategy

must remain the independent variable in every equation while a nation's diplomacy wages the battle to achieve the strategy's avowed objectives.

## Notes

1. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, Routledge: London, 1995. p. 1.
2. Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy," in Johnson, E. A. J. *The Dimensions of Diplomacy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964. p. 121.
3. R. P. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, London: Longman, 1988, p. 6. Of course, taking an expansive view of the concept of "security," these subjects easily fit into what is commonly known as "human security."
4. Cited in Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002, Introduction p. xxi.
5. Hamilton and Langhorne, p. 189.
6. G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, London: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 2–5.
7. Harold Nicholson, *Diplomacy*, London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1939, chap. III.
8. The case against summit diplomacy is espoused largely by professional diplomats who see political leaders as dangerous in this regard because they possess both sovereign power and ignorance of details. See, for example, G. R. Berridge, p. 81. An amusing anecdote along these lines is found in W.H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, New York: Norton, 1981, p. 124, where he details a meeting of President Jimmy Carter and the Shah of Iran. The Shah told the president that he considered the Organization of African Unity an 'impotent' body, and the president—a southerner—agreed that the OAU was indeed 'impohtant' .
9. Adolf A. Berle, in E. A. J. Johnson, "Diplomacy and the New Economics," p. 108.
10. Trask, 1981, p. S33, cited in Berridge, p. 48.
11. Public diplomacy is fast becoming an important topic in the conduct of international relations. See, for example, Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 27–83. Its utility in the Global War on Terror is highlighted in Peter G. Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5, Sept/Oct 2002, pp. 74–94 and David Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2, March/April 2002, pp. 83–95.
12. Joseph P. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 9.
13. Helena K. Finn, "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, p. 15. See also Mark Leonard, "Diplomacy by Other Means," *Foreign Policy*, Sept/Oct 2002, pp. 48–56.
14. The term "concert" was derived from the Italian "concerto." Since the 16th century the term was used in diplomatic circles to depict nations acting in harmony. Following the defeat of Napoleon, the term took on a sense of permanence, in that its members saw the concert as serving their security interests in time of peace. See Hamilton and Langhorne, p. 90.
15. Barston, p. 191.
16. Steven M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156–179.
17. JoAnn Fagot Aviel, "The Evolution of Multilateral Diplomacy" in Muldoon, J. P. et al, *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 9.
18. Tamara Duffey, "United Nations Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era" in Jones/Kennedy-Pipe, p. 117.
19. For an excellent discussion of "human security," see Peter Liotta, "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," *Security Dialogue*: SAGE Publications, Vol. 33(4), December 2002, pp. 474–488.
20. James P. Muldoon, *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today*, Westview Press, Boulder, p. 2.
21. Kofi Annan, "Nobel Lecture," December 10, 2001.
22. Richard N. Haass, "Foreign Policy by Posse," *The National Interest*, No. 41, Fall 1995, Washington, D.C.
23. Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996, pp. 31–33.
24. Thomas A. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 2–3.
25. Alexander L. George, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 7–21
26. Robert W. Tucker, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6. "Alone or with Others" p. 15.
27. Peter J. Spiro, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6. "The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its false Prophets."
28. For a strongly divergent opinion of the American attitude toward isolationism, see William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York: Dell, 1978, pp. 105–159.
29. George Kennan, cited in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946*, II, pp. 15–23.
30. Jason Ralph, "Persistent Dilemmas: U.S. National Security Policy in the Post Cold War Era," in Jones and Kennedy, p. 39.
31. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. pp. 584–591. In this piece Morgenthau offers his four fundamental rules of diplomacy along with his five prerequisites for compromise.

32. Ibid.

33. This concept known as "defensive realism" was popularized by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1979.

34. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Touchstone, 1994. p. 248. See also, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002, which has dedicated chapters to the pursuit of "human dignity" and "building the infrastructure of Democracy." pp. 3–4, 21–23.

35. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C.: September 2002.

36. John J. Mearsheimer, "Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking," *University of Chicago Magazine*, February 2002 issue, pp. 24–28.

37. Peter G. Peterson, "Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, p. 75. In the article, Peterson cites survey data from five sources, which show that Middle Eastern nations have a decidedly hostile attitude toward America. Other survey research has also indicated that the previously positive public opinion ratings of America by Europeans have also turned negative subsequent to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

38. Mark Leonard, "Diplomacy by Other Means," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, p. 54.