WK5 For Proffesor Ryan

gusarman1

ares1.pdf

Home >Government homework help >WK5 For Proffesor Ryan

The Role of Narratives in Insurgent and Revolutionary Warfare: Examples from 24 Case

Studies Spanning 1962-2009

Chuck Crossett, Summer Newton, and Jason Spitaletta a

National Security Analysis Department

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

11100 Johns Hopkins Road, Laurel, MD 20723

(240) 228-5000

Wd Count: 8842

Much of the research supporting this article was funded by the U.S. Army Special Operations

Command (USASOC) and conducted by the National Security Analysis Department at The

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU-APL). Any opinions expressed

within are solely those of the authors and do not denote the official positions of USASOC or

JHUAPL. General inquires related to the Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare

Volume II 1962-2009 or the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies(ARIS) project

should be addressed to Chuck Crossett, JHU-APL ARIS Technical Lead

([email protected]) or CW4 (Ret) Paul J. Tompkins Jr, USA, SF—Chief USASOC,

G3X Special Programs Division ([email protected]). Inquiries related to this article

should be addressed to Jason Spitaletta ([email protected]).

a The authors would like to acknowledge the research and analytical contributions of JHU-APL ARIS research team members Nathan Bos, Ron Buikema, Matt Burger, Jerry Conley, Dru Daubon, Bryan Gervais, Bob Leonhard, Shana Marshall, Bill McDaniel, Maegen Nix, Sanaz Mirzaei,

and Steve Phillips. In addition to contributing to the research that supported this article, each has also made and continues to make substantive

contribution to the ARIS project.

mailto:[email protected]

ABSTRACT

The following analysis draws from research performed to develop a summary account of 24

insurgencies and revolutions from 1962-2009. The development and maintenance of broad-

based political support is a critical requirement of insurgent and revolutionary movements. A

successful movement relies on a narrative for recruitment, legitimacy and support that touches a

deep cultural, ethnic, or historical myth/memory within the population. Narratives reflect how

the insurgent group frames the political grievance through culturally nuanced messaging to

mobilize resources. The principal narratives employed by the protagonists in the 24 case studies

were analyzed using the source, content, audience, media, and effect (SCAME) approach. We

found the narratives employed by the group tended to be clustered around a series of themes

closely linked with their political objectives. At this level of abstraction the operational

relevance of narrative analysis is limited. However, when applied tactically by considering the

unique local manifestation of said narrative it can be an effective tool in determining how a

group frames a political grievance and seeks to mobilize resources to change the status quo. The

results highlight the need for thorough and accurate cultural intelligence in insurgent warfare.

INTRODUCTION

The following analysis draws from research performed to develop a summary account of

24 insurgencies and revolutions from 1962-2009. The ongoing project, entitled Assessing

Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS), is funded by the United States Army Special

Operations Command (USASOC) with the research, analysis, and publication performed by the

National Security Analysis Department of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics

Laboratory (JHU-APL). The first component of the broader study will be published as the

―Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II 1962-2009‖. 1

Initially, a subset of 24 case studies was selected from a list of the hundreds of

insurgences and revolutions that occurred after (or were occurring in) 1962. Many of these

revolutions are still active, some are increasing their operational tempo, some are in decline,

while others may be approaching resurgence. For the purposes of both the ―Casebook‖ and this

article, a revolution was defined as an attempt to modify the existing political system at least

partially through unconstitutional or illegal use of force or protest. Insurgency or revolutionary

warfare b describes the means by which a revolution is attempted or achieved. This definition

describes the desired end-state (a modification of the existing political system), as well as the

means by which an organization seeks to achieve that goal (unconstitutional or illegal use of

force or protest). Therefore, a revolution does not necessarily encompass the usurpation of

power by the insurgents but can be a modification of the existing system according to the group’s

demands. The revolution must also include some unconstitutional or illegal actions to achieve

that end-state. Revolutions are illustrative manifestations of contentious politics c , the

b Throughout this article, the terms insurgency and revolutionary warfare (as well as insurgent and revolutionary) are used interchangeably.

c Contentious politics is defined by Adams et al as "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least

one of the claimants."

employment of a set of disruptive techniques such as general strikes, civil disobedience, riots,

and even terrorism, to achieve political objectives. 2 These tactics can be considered interactions

whereby actors articulate a grievance relevant to the general populace that portrays the

government as logical targets. 3 This particular variant of socio-political movements has unique

psychological, sociological, and political requirements and mechanisms which make them a

compelling area of study.

Two principle takeaways from the ―Casebook‖ served as the basis for this article. First,

revolutionary objectives frequently define an identity group, either explicitly or by the nature of

its socio-economic or cultural framing. This partitioning is a critical component to validating

claims of grievance, support, and legitimacy. The more salient these categorical distinctions,

especially when based on cultural, ethnic, nationality, or class divisions allows the revolutionary

group to recruit, frame propaganda, and sanctify their operations against the specified out-

group d . Second, successful movements often rely on a narrative for recruitment, legitimacy, and

support that resonates with a deep cultural, ethnic, or historical myth/memory within the

population. Both takeaways implicitly identify the need to understand the influence of an

individual’s (or in-group’s) cultural background on their (or their in-group’s) behavior. The

ability to interpret unfamiliar and/or ambiguous behaviors in a meaningful manner (which is

cultural intelligence at the individual level) 4 is necessary to the both the practitioner engaged in

revolutionary or insurgent warfare as well as those studying the phenomenon from afar. A

manifestation of cultural background that can facilitate understanding (at individual, group, or

societal levels of analysis) is narrative analysis.

d An in-group is a social group toward which an individual feels loyalty and respect, usually due to membership in the group based on social or

familial ties. Correspondingly, an out-group is a social group toward which an individual feels contempt, opposition, or a desire to compete.

Commonly, in-groups include one’s family, team, professional organization, and those of the same race, culture, gender, or religion. This affinity

often manifests itself as an in-group bias, whereby individuals tend to look more favorably upon their in-group than members of an out-group.

A narrative has three distinct elements; 1) actors and the physical, social, and

informational environment within which they operate; 2) events along a temporal continuum,

and 3) causality or the attribution of cause and effect relative to the first two elements. 5 A

narrative serves as an organizing framework for individuals to make sense of their world. 6 This

search for reasonable and memorable plausibility and coherence seeks to bring one’s self and

social identifies into congruence within a specific context. Narratives facilitate this process

(called sensemaking) of interpretation and production of meaning whereby individuals and

groups decipher and reflect on phenomena. 7 Sensemaking enables individuals to conceive and

formulate their social environment though reality testing e , creating a shared worldview amongst

members of a particular in-group. f The subjective decision to participate in an insurgent

movement resides in three distinct yet highly integrated domains – the cognitive, social, and

informational – in which successful insurgent narratives resonate. Social movement theory is a

theoretical framework through which the importance of narratives in engendering political action

can be analyzed. This framework incorporates the psychological and sociological processes

whereby external social or political conditions motivate individuals to collectively challenge

and/or alter the status quo. 8 Insurgent movements are systems of self-conscious groups

connected by one or more specific types of interdependency (social networks g ) that coordinate

e Communicating and negotiating descriptive accounts of the social environment with others.

f The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland identified social inequities in society, beginning with unfair housing and employment

opportunities and ending with insecurity as violence escalated. The republican narrative clearly lays the blame for the inequities at the doorstep of

the out-groups--North Ireland Protestants and the British. The logic of the constructed world, whereby the political and economic domination of

Protestants and the presence of the British are responsible for the perceived inequities of the Catholic community, suggests particular sorts of

action, i.e., driving the British out of Northern Ireland and re-uniting with the Republic of Ireland to end Protestant domination. As events on the

ground unfolded, and sectarian violence increased, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) suggested methods of accomplishing these

political objectives. Violence became more attractive to many than, say, the legal/constitutional methods prescribed by moderate elements like

the Social Democratic Labour Party

g Those interdependencies may be friendship; kinship; common interest; financial exchange; group affiliation; dislike; social relationships, or

relationships of beliefs, knowledge, or prestige.

activities to challenge the prevailing social order. As networked social movements, revolutions

require resource mobilization, political opportunities, and framing. 9

Resource mobilization requires both the ability of a social actor to acquire resources and

employ them effectively in achieving its political objectives. 10

It is the process whereby

intermediate variables translate the subjective experience of relative deprivation h into political

action. 11

Analysis of resource mobilization focuses on how movements actively engage in

garnering support and enlarging their constituency and how social networks serve to define and

disseminate grievances. a The cognitive domain hosts mental functions such as memory,

attention, concentration, language, and executive functions, including the capacity to learn and

follow rules, anticipate outcomes, make sensible inferences, and perform accurate risk-benefit

calculations resides. 12

Within this domain, a narrative serves as an organizing framework 13

that

helps orient the individual in the current state of the world and provides structure to the complex

filtered arrangement that analyzes and synthesizes new information, genetic heritage, cultural

predisposition, and complex system of memory that comprise an individual’s cognitive

apparatus. 14

Goal-direction is often amplified by subjective sympathy with the cause as it is

framed by the insurgent group. If the sympathy value is high, the individual is more likely to

recognize the usefulness of the movement and its proscribed methods for achieving its

objectives.

A secondary motivator is that individuals strive to maintain or improve their self-esteem

through social identity; membership in a group that helps to define a person’s concept of self

and self-worth. An individual has multiple social identities, all of which help define who he or

she is relative to the society and provide a particular sense of self-worth through identification

h Relative deprivation theory states that the subjective sense of being deprived of certain needs or freedoms by a domestic or international

governing body can result in feelings of frustration, and when individuals can no longer bear this misery or indignity a rebellion ensues.

with a particular group or set of groups. 15

Developing self-worth through affiliative factors (or

one’s group identity) emphasizes the sociocultural context in which the individual and group

reside as these groups are associated with specific value connotations. 16

If individuals perceive

affiliation as beneficial to self esteem, their sympathy for the expressed grievance is high, and

the expressed goals of the organization are congruent with that of the individual; participation is

a logical, rational choice. Extensive data from social psychological research has identified that

most individuals are predisposed toward agreement within a small group, and thus opinions (and

their shared concomitant social value) tend to gravitate toward the center over time. 17

However,

when one’s social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive to exit the group, join another

group, or modify their existing group. 18

The cognitive domain is explicitly linked to the social

domain through the interaction of personal and cultural narratives. The social domain is critical

to insurgent and revolutionary movements, as the opinions of friends, family, and associates can

influence an individual’s decision to participate.

To understand why a narrative resonates with a specific target audience, one must

understand how members of that audience view themselves, their in-group, and relations

amongst the collective groups comprising society. Political movements arise not only because

they are able to mobilize resources, but also because the overall political or social conditions are

exploitable for successful and sustained contention. Political opportunities combine with the

organizational capacity for mobilization to allow for the emergence of the social movement. 19

Movements develop and succeed not because they emerge to address new grievances, but rather

because something in the larger political context allows existing grievances to become more

salient. These contextual dimensions include regime shifts, periods of political instability, or

changes in the composition of elites that may provide an opening for social movements. Beyond

the individual, at the group-to-societal level, a narrative is a simple, unifying, easily expressed

concept that organizes subjective experience and provides a framework through which one can

perceive his or her environment. 20

A well-crafted message that appeals to a variety of

vulnerabilities (sociocultural symbols, individual affective vulnerability, etc) within a selected

target audience will help create an environment that incentivizes participation. i The crucial

overlap between the social and information domain is where the nuance of narrative and counter-

narrative alike are heavily reliant upon accurate and thorough cultural intelligence.

Finally, framing describes the narratives social movements employ to engender support.

The presence or absence of political grievances is not the only salient factor prompting political

participation, the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of

those interpretations are contributory. 21

Collective political action requires a certain homeostasis

between the tension between operating within existing interpretive systems and a group’s

specific interpretation on extant systems. The process of managing this tension is frame

alignment, or the ―linkage of individual and [social movement organization] interpretative

orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values, beliefs and [social movement

organization] activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.‖ 22

Frames are

expressed, codified, and exemplified through narratives, 23

and used by insurgent groups to

describe their worldview in a manner that will resonate with the target audience. The

importance of the information domain on revolutionary and insurgent warfare cannot be

understated as it can concisely explain events through an insurgent group’s worldview. The

narrative becomes the moral center of gravity and serves as the foundation for policy, strategy,

i This is increasingly so in relatively closed environments in which it is more difficult to gain access to alternative explana tions through additional

information resources i or in environments where there is a social or historical predisposition (or bias) toward a particular interpretation.

and action. It not only serves as the framing mechanisms for the underlying grievances but also

as a framework through which those grievances are to be addressed. 24

Narrative analysis facilitates understanding of 1) recruitment occurring before the

consolidation of formal movement organizations; 2) the conditions under which movement

organizations are able to rebound from strategic setbacks; and 3) the impact of movements on

institutional policymaking. 25

Incorporating the approach as a precursor to the Tactical Conflict

Assessment Planning Framework (TCAPF) 26

can help determine how an insurgent or

revolutionary group seeks to define the most important problem to population, the cause of the

problem, and the recommended action to help the population j . While indirect (or remote)

assessment is no substitute for face-to-face evaluation, it can facilitate the comprehension of the

social and informational domains of the operational environment. Insurgencies are self-

organizing social systems that emerge when pre-existing elements (grievances, individuals,

weapons, and infrastructure) present themselves in new patterns of interaction resulting in

rebellion, terrorism, and/or other insurgent activity. 27

METHODS

The selection of groups for inclusion in the ―Casebook‖ was determined by three primary

factors. First was the desire to restrict the list to discreet cases where the revolution could be

distinguished from residual environmental factors and/or could be said to have reached a major

transition point in the success or failure of the movement. Because of high-interest in particular

revolutionary movements, some cases that are difficult to define independently and discreetly

were included. The justification was that they can provide illuminative value in various aspects

of the form and characteristics of modern insurgency. Representative diversity across multiple

j The second, third, and fourth questions of the TCAPF. While TCAPF is intended to solicit the input of individuals at the tactical (or local) level,

the approach can be extrapolated to the operational or strategic levels to identity incongruities in vertical integration in order to delegitimize a

negative actor and/or attempt to frame a counter-narrative.

criteria was also a consideration and thus the cases included span major geographic regions of

the world, cover each decade from the 1960s to the 2000s, involve at least five different primary

motivations for their existence, and proffer a wide range of outcomes from complete success to

near annihilation. Such a wide range of cases allowed for more interesting comparisons and

analysis of variation. The final criterion was that there was sufficient source material in the

unclassified academic domain on the particular movement to allow for sufficient analysis in each

section of the research framework. Therefore campaigns that were more minor or quickly

resolved were not considered. The authors wish to caution any reader from considering this

sample to be representative of the set of insurgencies during this time period. The selection

criteria for this article were the total set (n=24) k of cases that made the initial inclusion criteria

for the ―Casebook‖.

Although a variety of methods may be employed in the analysis of narratives, the source,

content, audience, media, and effects (SCAME) approach used by Psychological Operations

(PSYOP) l personnel is a useful analytical framework. The SCAME approach

m determines the

source of a message, the message content, the audience the message reached, the specifics of the

medium used to send the message, and any observed effects of the message on the target

audience. Source determination is crucial in a counter-propaganda effort, however, for the

purposes of the paper, the focus is on a group’s publically acknowledged message (white

PSYOP, strategic communications, etc) and therefore the source is the group

headquarters/leadership element and/or a designated media entity. Of note, some modern

k The Basque separatist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), was initially included amongst the list of twenty-four case studies; however, it will not be published in the Casebook. Since the research on the case has been performed, it was decided to include the appropriate data in this

article.

l The term ―Psychological Operations‖ or ―PSYOP‖ is currently being phased out in US military doctrine in favor of ―Military Information

Support Operations‖ or ―MISO‖.

m It is unknown how widely the SCAME approach is employed outside the military, however, for the purposes of this paper it was considered a

viable option for categorizing the information included in the 24 case studies.

insurgencies (e.g., Al Qaeda and the KLA) have incorporated or contracted media specialists or

media wings into their inner-circles of planners and advisors. The professionalization of

information warfare by non-state actors has evolved considerably during the later part of the

twentieth century.

Content analysis evaluates the predominant theme of the narrative in order to determine

the source’s motive and goals. Content analysis reveals the meaning of the message, the reason

it was disseminated, and its intended purpose. This analytical component identifies how a group

is attempting to frame the grievance and/or mobilize political resources. Audience analysis

entails studying the population (and its corresponding demographics) reached by the message in

order to determine the reasons why that particular audience was selected. Media analysis

determines what media capabilities were employed, the consistency of the message and the

dissemination method employed. Effects analysis is conducted to determine the overall results

of the message. 28

The predominant focus for this paper was the message content and its use (essentially an

amalgamation of audience and media) as a thorough effects analysis would be beyond the scope

of this topic. From each case study, the predominant narrative was culled and analyzed using the

SCAME approach. The results were aggregated then analyzed. A set of content codes that

identify the main, prevalent, or superior theme of a particular narrative was established, and then

a set of use codes or how the narrative was employed was determined (included in the below

figure) . The alphanumeric combination of content and use codes created an operational code,

the results of which are included in the corresponding section.

Content Codes Use Codes

1 Oppressive state A Recruiting

2 Illegitimate state (ideological difference) B Engender popular support

3 Illegitimate state (political difference) C International strategic communications

4 Illegitimate state (lack of services) D Psychological warfare

5 Illegitimate state (lack of security) E Cultivate alliance with non-state actor

6 Illegitimate state (foreign influence on leader) F Cultivate alliance with third party state actor

7 In-group self-determination

8 Reform (economic)

9 Reform (religious inclusion)

10 Reform (institutional)

11 Reform (anti-secularism)

12 Reform (anti status-quo)

13 Separatism (autonomy)

14 Separatism (separate state)

15 Religious exclusionism

16 Expel foreign power and reform

17 Expel foreign power and reestablish status-quo

18 Domestic

19 Transnational

20 Heroic dynamics

21 Martyrdom

22 Self-interest (material)

23 Self-interest (psychological)

24 Inherent nobility of cause and/or participants

25 Moral center of gravity

Figure 1 Insurgent Narrative Content and Use Codes

The first content code, ―Oppressive state,‖ indicates a theme that frames the government

as one unconcerned with the human and/or civil rights of its citizens. The next five codes deal

with themes intent on delegitimizing the government; ―Illegitimate state (ideological difference)‖

deals with the fundamental philosophical or religious difference between the insurgent group and

the government, ―Illegitimate state (political difference)‖ is a difference involving the form

and/or function of how the government is and should be run, ―Illegitimate state (lack of

services)‖ addresses the failure of the current state to provide sufficiently for its citizens,

―Illegitimate state (lack of security)‖ deals with the inability of the state to secure its borders

and/or protect the people, and ―Illegitimate state (foreign influence on leader)‖ delegitimizes the

government as a puppet of a third country actor. ―In-group self-determination‖ addresses the

belief of the revolutionary group that it is there inherent and unalienable right to govern

themselves and not be subjugated by the current order. The next five codes deal with various

reform themes, each of which does not explicitly advocate a change in the regime leadership or

in the type of government, (those aspects are covered by other codes). ―Reform (economic)‖

incorporates the desire to change the existing economic policies, ―Reform (religious inclusion)‖

implies a sense of disenfranchisement of a particular religious groups that seeks greater

representation/participation in the government, ―Reform (institutional)‖ is a desire for structural

or functional change within the current state system, ―Reform (anti-secularism)‖ is a religious

fundamentalist theme that seeks to institute a theocratic policy within the confines of a given

system, and ―Reform (anti status-quo)‖ is essentially a generalized advocacy for change of any

sort. The next two codes reflect the desire for a group to govern itself in a specific operational

environment. ―Separatism (autonomy)‖ is the desire to remain within the current governmental

system as a federated state while ―Separatism (separate state)‖ seeks recognition of a group as an

independent nation. ―Religious exclusionism‖ is a fundamentalist theme that advocates one

specific interpretation of a system of faith and rejects all others. The next two codes address

insurgencies who seek to remove a third-party state (or non-state) actor; ―Expel foreign power

and reform‖ seeks to expunge the outsider and change the type of government while ―Expel

foreign power and reestablish status-quo‖ seeks to return to the ways things were prior to the

intervention. The codes, ―Domestic‖ and ―Transnational‖ refer to the operational focus of the

group; 23 of the 24 cases (all but al Qaeda) sought an objective within the confines of their own

nation or indigenous ethnic region while al Qaeda was a multinational network with objectives

throughout the world. ―Heroic dynamics‖ refers to a unique manifestation of filial piety whereby

young men (in particular) are taught to hold great reverence for their martial predecessors and

ensure their conduct in war meets the unimpeachable standards of their predecessors. 29

―Martyrdom‖ is a theme that venerates those who wittingly (or unwittingly) sacrificed or seek to

sacrifice their lives for a particular cause. The next two codes involve individualized and

organizational selfishness; ―Self-interest (material)‖ is the improvement in one’s financial or

social resources or standing while ―Self-interest (psychological)‖ address increased self-esteem.

―Inherent nobility of cause and/or participants‖ is the overt advocacy and near-glorification of

the legitimacy of the movement and the importance of those who willingly partake. The final

code, ―Moral center of gravity‖ is the elevation of a leader to near cult of personality to the

extent that he or she becomes the source of power with the inherent capability to accomplish the

movement’s political objective. 30

The use codes address why (or in what capacity) that narrative was employed.

―Recruiting‖ is the overt solicitation of support by a selected target audience. ―Engender popular

support‖ is a generalized call for ideological and/or material contributions by the citizens of the

specific state. ―International strategic communications‖ is the overt messaging used to raise

awareness for the cause, promote the legitimacy of the movement, and/or serve as a generalized

form of informational public diplomacy. ―Psychological warfare‖ refers to the tactical and

operational employment of the narrative against the adversaries of the group and/or unsupportive

civilian audiences. The final two codes deal with messaging designed to connect the group to

independent sources of power. ―Cultivate alliance with non-state actor‖ seeks to connect with

sub-national or supra-national organizations while ―Cultivate alliance with third party state

actor‖ seeks to connect with a sovereign state.

RESULTS

Figure 2 is a summary table of the coding process; the data is organized by the type of

movement and group with the applicable operational codes included in the right-hand column.

There were no upper or lower limits of operational codes established, thus certain groups such as

the PIRA and Al Qaeda have considerably more than do the Orange Revolution or the Hutu-

Tutsi genocides. This is not to suggest those cases with a greater number of codes were either

more important or more reliant on a narrative but rather the results presented reflect the relative

fidelity of the data gathered and in some cases the extended length of the insurgency.

Furthermore, in certain cases, such as the Chechen Revolution, the narrative evolved from one

focused on driving out a foreign power (in this case Russia) to one with more Islamic

fundamentalist themes.

The ―Illegitimate state‖ content codes (2-6) predominated amongst the ―Revolution to

Modify the Type of Government‖ groups while the ―reform‖ content codes (8-12) were most

often applied by the ―Revolution For Modernization Or Reform‖ groups. The only non-

alphanumeric code was AD* in the FARC to identify their use of surrender/recruiting appeals to

members of the Columbian armed forces. There was insufficient data to support the content

code of 22 ―Self-interest (material)‖ or 23 ―Self-interest (psychological)‖; therefore, it was

decided to acknowledge the presence of the tactic without misattributing content.

Type of Movement Group Operational Codes Revolution To Modify

The Type Of

Government

New People’s Army (NPA) 2A, 2B, 2D, 4A, 4B, 6A, 6B

FARC and the ELN 8A, 8B, 10A, 10B, 22A, 22E, AD*

Sendero Luminoso 2A, 2B, 6A, 6B, 10C, 25A, 25B

Iranian revolution of 1979 1B, 2B, 4B, 6B, 6C, 21B, 25B

FMLN of El Salvador 1A, 1B,A, 2B, 2D, 3C, 4A, 4B, 22C

Karen National Liberation

Army (KNLA)

1C , 7B, 7C, 1B, 14A, 14B, 14C, 20A, 24A, 24B

Revolution Based On

Identity Or Ethnic Issues

Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE)

1A, 1B, 5D, 7C, 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D, 20A, 20D, 21A,

21B, 24B

Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO)

1C, 2D, 5D, 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D,

14E, 17B, 17C, 21B, 21C

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA

)

7A, 7B, 7D, 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D, 20A, 24A

Hutu-Tutsi genocides 5B, 7B, 24B

Kosovo Liberation Army in

(KLA)

1C, 1F, 5B, 5F, 7A, 7B, 7C, 14A, 14B, 14C

Provisional Irish Republican

Army (PIRA)

1A, 1B, 1C, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B,7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7F, 16A,

16B, 16C, 20A, 21B, 21C, 21D, 22E, 22F, 24A, 24B,

24C

Revolution To Drive

Out A Foreign Power

Afghan Mujahedeen 16A, 16B, 16C, 16E, 16F, 19A, 19C, 24A, 24B, 24C,

24F

Vietcong (VC) 3A, 3B, 3D, 4A, 4B, 6D, 16A, 16B, 16C, 16D, 16F,

20A, 20B, 24A, 24B

Chechen Revolution (CR) 13A, 13B, 13C, 13E, 15A, 15B, 15C, 15E, 16A, 16B,

16C

Hizbollah 16A, 16B, 16C, 16E, 16F, 21A, 21B, 21C, 21D, 24A,

24B, 24C

Hizbul Mujahedeen 16A, 16B, 16F, 24A, 24B

Revolution Based On

Religious

Fundamentalism

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 1C, 2A, 3D, 6C, 11B, 11D, 15A, 15D, 15E, 21A, 24A,

24E

Taliban 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B, 6B, 6C, 15C, 16A, 16B, 16C, 16D,

16E

Al Qaeda (AQ) 3D, 11A, 11B, 11C, 15A, 15C, 16C, 19A, 19B, 19C,

19D, 19E, 19F, 21C, 24A, 24C

Revolution For

Modernization Or

Reform

Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND)

4B, 8A, 8B, 8C, 22A, 22E

Orange Revolution of Ukraine 10B, 10C, 24B

Revolutionary United Front

(RUF)

3A, 3B, 3C, 4B, 8C

Solidarity 8B, 8C, 10B, 10C, 10E, 24B, 24C

Figure 2 Insurgent Narrative Coding Summary Table

Figure 3 is a frequency distribution of content codes aggregated by the type of

movement. The modal content code was ―Inherent nobility of cause and/or participant―

appearing in 13 of 24 cases (54.17%) followed by ―Expel foreign power and reform‖ and

―Oppressive state‖ each appearing in 8 of 24 cases (33.33%). The ―Revolution To Modify The

Type Of Government‖ category saw a multi-modal distribution with 4 of 6 cases (66.67%) each

including ―Illegitimate state (ideological difference)‖, ―Illegitimate state (foreign influence on

leader)‖, ―Illegitimate state (lack of services)‖ and ―Oppressive state‖ content codes. The modal

content code in the ―Revolution Based On Identity Or Ethnic Issues‖ was ―In-group self-

determination‖ occurring in 6 of 6 cases (100%). The modal content code for the ―Revolution to

Drive out a Foreign Power‖ group was "Expel foreign power and reform‖ present in 5 of 5 cases

(100%). In ―Revolution Based On Religious Fundamentalism‖, the modal content code was

another multi-modal distribution with ―Reform (anti-secularism)―, ―Religious exclusionism―,

―Illegitimate state (political difference)‖, ―Illegitimate state (foreign influence on leader)‖,

―Martyrdom―, ―Expel foreign power and reform‖, and ―Inherent nobility of cause and/or

participants‖ each occurring in 2 of 3 cases (66.67%). The final category ―Revolution For

Modernization Or Reform‖ saw another multi-modal distribution with ―Reform (economic)―,

―Self-interest (material)―, ―Reform (institutional)―, ―Inherent nobility of cause and/or

participants‖ each occurring in 2 of 4 cases (50%).

Figure 3 Frequency Distribution of Content Codes

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Separatism (autonomy)

Expel foreign power and reestablish status-quo

Reform (anti-secularism)

Religious exclusionism

Moral center of gravity

Reform (economic)

Self-interest (material)

Illegitimate state (political difference)

Reform (institutional)

Illegitimate state (ideological difference)

Illegitimate state (foreign influence on leader)

Separatism (separate state)

Heroic dynamics

Illegitimate state (lack of security)

In-group self-determination

Martyrdom

Illegitimate state (lack of services)

Oppressive state

Expel foreign power and reform

Inherent nobility of cause and/or participants

Frequency Distribution of Content Codes

Overall

Revolution For Modernization Or Reform Revolution Based On Religious Fundamentalism Revolution To Drive Out A Foreign Power

Revolution Based On Identity Or Ethnic Issues

Figure 4 is a frequency distribution of operational codes aggregated by the type of

movement. The modal operational code was 24A ―Inherent nobility of cause and/or

participants‖ used in recruiting appearing in 9 of 24 cases (37.5%). That was followed by 16A,

B, and C ― Expel foreign power and reform‖ used in recruiting , to engender popular support and

international strategic communications and 4A ―Illegitimate state (lack of services)‖ used in

recruiting; each of the four operational codes occurred in 7 of 24 cases (29.17%). Next were 4B

―Illegitimate state (lack of services)‖ used in international strategic communications and 7B ―In-

group self-determination‖ used in international strategic communications; each occurring in 6 of

24 cases (25%). The next eight codes occurred in 5 of 24 cases (20.83%); 1C ―Oppressive state‖

international strategic communications, 7C ―In-group self-determination‖, 14A-C ―Separatism

(separate state)‖ recruiting, engendering popular support, and international strategic

communications, 20A ―Heroic dynamics‖ used in recruiting, 21B ―Martyrdom‖ used to engender

popular support and 24C ―Inherent nobility of cause and/or participants‖ used in international

strategic communications.

Figure 4 Frequency Distribution of Operational Codes

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11A

11D

13B

13E

15D

17B

20D

22F

16D

22A

10C

15A

16E

22E

16F

14A

14C

21B

16B

24A Frequency Distribution of Operational Codes

Overall

Revolution To Modify The Type Of Government

Revolution Based On Identity Or Ethnic Issues

Revolution To Drive Out A Foreign Power

Revolution Based On Religious Fundamentalism

Revolution For Modernization Or Reform

Figure 5 is a matrix of operational codes that shows the intersections between groups; the

blank cells (or null set) indicate that those two particular groups do not share any operational

codes. This figure represents the totality of intersecting operational codes amongst each of the

cases.

Figure 5 Intersections of Operational Codes amongst the 24 Cases

Figure 6 is a summary table that displays the ranked order of groups by the number of

shared codes, the respective code types, and the Spearman correlation (the top three of which are

emboldened and italicized). The PLO and PIRA have the most operational codes in common

(9). However; the KNLA & KLA have the greatest statistical similarity (in the form of a

Spearman correlation value of 0.7688). Only groups with at least four common operational

codes are displayed

N ew

P eo

pl e’

s Ar

m y

(N PA

)

FA RC

a nd

t he

E LN

Se nd

er o

Lu m

in os

Ir an

ia n

re vo

lu ti

on o

f 1 97

FM LN

o f E

l S al

va do

Ka re

n N

at io

na l L

ib er

at io

n Ar

m y

(K N

LA )

Li be

ra ti

on T

ig er

s of

T am

il Ee

la m

(L TT

Pa le

st in

e Li

be ra

ti on

O rg

an iz

at io

n (P

LO )

Eu sk

ad i T

a As

ka ta

su na

(E TA

)

H ut

u- Tu

ts i g

en oc

id es

Ko so

vo L

ib er

at io

n Ar

m y

in (K

LA )

Pr ov

is io

na l I

ri sh

R ep

ub lic

Ar m

y (P

IR A)

Af gh

an M

uj ah

ed ee

Vi et

co ng

(V C)

Ch ec

he n

Re vo

lu ti

H iz

bo lla

H iz

bu l M

uj ah

ed ee

n (H

M )

Eg yp

ti an

Is la

m ic

J ih

ad (E

IJ )

Ta lib

Al Q

ae da

(A Q

)

M ov

em en

t fo

r th

e Em

an ci

pa ti

of t

he N

ig er

D el

ta (M

EN D

)

O ra

ng e

Re vo

lu ti

on o

f U kr

ai ne

Re vo

lu ti

on ar

y U

ni te

d Fr

on t

(R U

So lid

ar it

New People’s Army (NPA) *

FARC and the ELN *

Sendero Luminoso 2A,2B,6A,

6B *

Iranian revolution of 1979

2B,6B 2B,6B,25B *

FMLN of El Salvador 2B,2D,4A,

4B 2B 1B,2B *

Karen National Liberation Army

(KNLA) *

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE)

1B,21B 1B

7B,7C,14A

,14B,14C,

20A *

Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO)

2D 21B 2D

1C,7B,7C,

14A,14B,1

5D,7B,7C,

14A,14B,1

4C,14D,21

B *

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA )

24A

7B,14A,14

B,14C,20A

7B,14A,14

B,14C,14D

,20A

7A,7B,14A

,14B,14C,

14D *

Hutu-Tutsi genocides

7B 7B 7B *

Kosovo Liberation Army in (KLA) 1C,7B,7C,

14A,14B,1

7B,7C,14A

,14B,14C

1C,7A,7B,

7C,7D,14A

,14B,14C

7A,7B,14A

,14B,14C 7B *

Provisional Irish Republican Army

(PIRA)

4A,4B 22E 21B 4A,4B,24A

1C,7B,7C,

20A

1A,7B,7C,

14B,20A,2

1C,7A,7B,

7C,7D,14B

,14C,21B,

21C

7A,7B,14A

,14B,14C,

20A,24A 7B

1C,7A,7B,

7C,7D *

Afghan Mujahedeen

4A,24A, 24A

4A,16A,16

B,16C,24A

,24C *

Vietcong (VC)

4A,24A 20A 20A 20A,24A

4A,16A,16

B,16C,20A

,24A

4A,16A,16

B,16C,16F

,24A *

Chechen Revolution

16A,16B,1

3A,3B,16A

,16B,16C *

Hizbollah

21B, 24A 21B 21B,21C 24A

16A,16B,1

6C,21B,21

C,21D,24A

,24C

16A,16B,1

6C,16E,16

F,24A

16A,16B,1

6C,16F,24

A,24C

16A,16B,1

6C *

Hizbul Mujahedeen

24A 24A

16A,16B,2

16A,16B,1

6F,24A

16A,16B,1

6F,24A 16A,16B

16A,16B,1

6F,24A *

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

2A 2A 6C, 24A 1C 1C 24A 1C 1C,24A 24A

3D,16A,16

B,24A

15A,15E,1

6A,16B 21A,24A 24A *

Taliban

4A,4B,6B 6B 6B,6C 4A,4B,24A

4A,4B,5A,

5B,16A,16

4A,16A,16

B,16E

4A,16A,16

B,16D 15C

16A,16B,1

6E 16A,16B *

Al Qaeda (AQ)

24A

16C,24A,2

4C 16C,24A

3D,16A,16

B,16C,24A

,24C

15A,15C,1

6A,16B,16

16C,24A,2

4C 24A

3D,6C,11B

,15A,15C,

24A 15C *

Movement for the Emancipation of

the Niger Delta (MEND)

4B,6B

8B,22A,22

E 6B 6B,6C 4B 7E 21C

4B,16C,21

C,22E 16C 16C 16C 16C,21C 4B,6C *

Orange Revolution of Ukraine

10B 10C *

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

4A,4B 22E 4A,4B 3C

4A,4B,22E

,22F 4A 3A,3B,4A 3A,3B,3C 4A,4B 4B,8C,22E *

Solidarity

8B,10B 10C 4A 4A,24C 4A 4A,24C 24C 4A 24C 8B,8C 10B,10C 4A *

Groups Code-type

Codes

Spearman

PLO & PIRA 1C,7A,7B,7C,7D,14B,14C,21B,21C 9 0.1189

LTTE & PLO 5D,7B,7C,14A,14B,14C,14D,21B 8 0.4908

PIRA & Hizbollah 16A,16B,16C,21B,21C,21D,24A,24C 8 0.3414

PLO & KLA 1C,7A,7B,7C,7D,14A,14B,14C 8 0.7025

ETA & PIRA 7A,7B,14A,14B,14C,20A,24A 7 0.0836

Afghan Mujahedeen and Hizbollah 16A,16B,16C,16E,16F,24A 6 0.6927

Afghan Mujahedeen and Vietcong 4A,16A,16B,16C,16F,24A 6 0.5622

EIJ & Al Qaeda 3D,6C,11B,15A,15C,24A 6 0.4153

KNLA & KLA 1C,7B,7C,14A,14B,14C 6 0.7688

KNLA & LTTE 7B,7C,14A,14B,14C,20A 6 0.5864

KNLA & PLO 1C,7B,7C,14A,14B,14C 6 0.5228

LTTE & ETA 7B,14A,14B,14C,14D,20A 6 0.5255

LTTE & PIRA 1A,7B,7C,14B,20A,21B 6 0.0143

PIRA & Afghan Mujahedeen 4A,16A,16B,16C,24A,24C 6 0.3008

PIRA & Taliban 4A,4B,5A,5B,16A,16B 6 0.1495

PIRA & Vietcong 4A,16A,16B,16C,20A,24A 6 0.1495

PLO & ETA 7A,7B,14A,14B,14C,14D 6 0.4622

Vietcong & Al Qaeda 3D,16A,16B,16C,24A,24C 6 0.2096

Vietcong and Hizbollah 16A,16B,16C,16F,24A,24C 6 0.3082

Chechen Revolution & Al Qaeda 15A,15C,16A,16B,16C 5 0.2664

ETA & KLA 7A,7B,14A,14B,14C 5 0.5568

KNLA & ETA 7B,14A,14B,14C,20A 5 0.6126

LTTE & KLA 7B,7C,14A,14B,14C 5 0.3990

Vietcong & Chechen Revolution 3A,3B,16A,16B,16C 5 0.3854

Afghan Mujahedeen and Hizbul Mujahedeen 16A,16B,16F,24A 4 0.2039

Afghan Mujahedeen and Taliban 4A,16A,16B,16E 4 0.3012

Chechen Revolution & EIJ 15A,15E,16A,16B 4 0.0594

Hizbollah & Hizbul Mujahedeen 16A,16B,16F,24A 4 0.5573

KNLA & PIRA 1C,7B,7C,20A 4 0.1347

NPA & FMLN 2B,2D,4A,4B 4 0.5048

PIRA & MEND 4B,16C,21C,22E 4 -0.0038

PIRA & RUF 4A,4B,22E,22F 4 0.0836

Vietcong & EIJ 3D,16A,16B,24A 4 0.0120

Vietcong & Hizbul Mujahedeen 16A,16B,16F,24A 4 0.5573

Vietcong & Taliban 4A,16A,16B,16D 4 0.1929

Figure 6 Summary Table of Common Code-Types and their Corresponding Spearman ρ

Figure 7 is a principle components factor analysis graph which displays the relative

similarity of the operational codes for each case. The analytical method of principle components,

and the associated factor analysis provides a data exploration tool that attempts to take many

variables related to a set of subjects and distill from them the data that best distinguishes the

subjects. Principle component analysis is used to derive the variables and values in a set of data

that are of most importance in distinguishing the elements described by the data. It does this by

determining the correlations among the many variables and using these statistics to create a

smaller set of new variables that are composites of the original variables. These new variables

each account for some of the variation in the data, with the first variable accounting for the most

variation, the second accounting for as much of the remaining variation as possible, and so on.

This method also reorients the data to make the distinctions among the subjects as clear as

possible, both visually and mathematically. The subset of the correlations values used to plot

Figure 7 can be found in the far-right hand column of Figure 6, however, only the top 35

(determined by number of common operational codes) of 276 possible pair-wise comparisons are

displayed.

Figure 7 Rotated Factor Pattern of Insurgent Narrative Operational Codes

DISCUSSION

The first group ―Revolution to Modify the Type of Government‖ comprised of the New

People’s Army (NPA), FARC and the ELN, Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path), the Iranian

Revolution of 1979, the FMLN of El Salvador, and the Karen National Liberation Army

(KNLA) is the best understood category from an academic research standpoint. These groups

are highly dependent on a large or powerful segment of the population not having its

socioeconomics needs being met by the current governmental system as well as a mature

ideological alternative system to propose. Class arguments are easy to articulate and quite

prevalent in these cases, but a local understanding of the issues is required to comprehend the

nuance. The predominance of the ―Illegitimate state‖ content codes amongst these groups is

expected given the salience of a legitimate political grievance that serve as a source of these

movements. The intensity of delegitimization (the degree to which a group challenges the

legitimacy of its opponents) is a risk factor for violence; the more intense the delegitimization,

the greater the risk for violent behavior. 31

If the group increasingly believes that change is not

possible in existing society and that a dramatic change is necessary, they are more likely to

engage in political violence. Additional signs of delegitimizing an adversary include the group’s

advocacy for and legitimizing of violence against enemies, specifies targets with explicit detail

or expands the spread of targets from specific to general, n emphasizing the historical sins of a

designated out-group, and characterizing in-group members as righteous and uniquely

empowered to rectify the perceived ills of society. An insurgent group can delegitimize the out-

group by idealizing the goals and means of the in-group’s revolutionary nation or leaders

associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution. 32

Eliminating the KNLA from the data set

comprised of these groups yields a degree of clustering in the lower left quadrant of Figure 7.

The KNLA alone was rather divergent from the remainder of the group. This is likely the result

of the preeminence placed on ethno-national self-determination and in-group identity by the

Karen over the course of their 60 plus year insurgency. The KNLA were tightly clustered with

the KLA, PLO and LTTE; groups whose identity as members of the in-group is highly salient.

n The perversion or misapplication of the law of social substitutability (which holds that the killing of any member of a segment is considered a

group offense and can be avenged by the killing of any member of the offender’s segment greatly expands the threat assessment associated with

the particular group.

The next group, ―Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues‖ is comprised of the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Euskadi

Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Hutu-Tutsi genocides, the Kosovo Liberation Army in (KLA), and the

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). These types of movements occur where colonialism

or war has artificially combined various ethnic or identity groups into the same government, with

one side having preferential treatment, over-representation or dominant political voice. A

contributing factor is also the current governmental system’s fragility or constraints for

accommodating concessions or evolution to a more egalitarian system. The important factors

within this type are the creation/use of a narrative that distinguishes the disaffected group from

the ruling group as a unique cultural/social unit. These groups serve as interesting applications

of social identity analysis as the individual and group narratives incorporate similar symbology

and thematic logic. As the data suggests, these groups advocate strongly for self-determination

and/or preservation of their heritage. This group (with the addition of the KNLA but the absence

of the PIRA) was very tightly clustered along the right horizontal radial of Figure 7 indicating

not only their relative similarly but also the thematic divergence from the remainder of the data

set. The recurrence of the ―In-group self determination‖ content code in each of the cases and

the ―Illegitimate state (lack of security)‖ code appearing in five of the six (83.33%) help account

for the degree of similarity. Furthermore, there were only four unique (or single occurrence)

content codes in this group or an average of 0.67 per group (compared to 1.16 for ―Revolution

To Modify The Type Of Government‖, 1.2 for ―Revolution To Drive Out A Foreign Power‖, and

1.33 for ―Revolution Based On Religious Fundamentalism‖) o resulting in a higher metacontrast

o The ―Revolution for Modernization or Reform‖ group had a ratio of 0.25 per group, however due to the relative paucity of content codes in that

group, the result is biased.

ratio. p In these groups, counter-narrative development would be highly nuanced and heavily

reliant on accurate and thorough cultural intelligence.

―Revolutions To Drive Out A Foreign Power‖ represented by the Afghan Mujahedeen,

Vietcong (VC), the Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, and Hizbul Mujahedeen result from a

segment of the population trying to oust a foreign occupier, colonial ruler, or a foreign military

presence. The presence of a foreign military or the dependence of a regime upon overt and

pervasive foreign military support often sparks opposition groups that are able to utilize this fact

as a unifying narrative. This type of insurgency is dependent on a sufficient distinction of the

out-group as evil, barbaric, harmful or otherwise malignant to the host nation. These revolutions

are clustered along the vertical axis of Figure 7 extending upward from the center. Though the

Chechen Revolution is more tightly coupled with Al Qaeda (likely due to the adoption of Islamic

themes in the latter stages) it is still more closely aligned with this cluster than is any other

group.

―Revolutions Based on Religious Fundamentalism‖ which include Egyptian Islamic Jihad

(EIJ), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda, were made into an explicit section due to their current

relevance, but there are some unique aspects of motivation and operations. While all three

examples used in the ARIS study were Islamic, it is not restricted solely to the desire to institute

Shari’a or reestablish the caliphate. The groups were selected for their operational relevance and

not the particular system of faith to which each group ascribes. These insurgency types are

heavily dependent on religious scholarship, both in terms of motivation as well as legitimacy and

incorporate appropriate themes and symbology into their narratives. They tend to derive

legitimacy from their adherence to a particular interpretation (not necessarily a widely or

p The average of intragroup differences over the average of intergroup differences.

academically accepted interpretation) of their faith. They are dependent on a strict

interpretations of the in-group (faithful) and out-group (non-believers) and the definition of the

threat, whether the apostate local regime or a more global nefarious power. They tend to use fear

for motivation as well as the allure of providing a more secure environment than the government

can provide. The salient social identity of group members is often their association with said

faith. The intensity with which they delegitimize the state is often greater than with other

groups, a trend evident in the psychological warfare tactics of both EIJ and Al Qaeda. The

willingness to negotiate (at the strategic level) with the state is considerably less and is often on

terms deemed unreasonable by the state. Religious fundamentalist groups also tend to rationalize

terroristic and/or immoral/illegal acts claiming operational necessity through religious

obfuscation. q These three groups were allayed along a similar vector in Figure 7, however, the

clustering was not as tight as it was with other groups. This finding was surprising provided that

much of the core leadership of EIJ served in a similar capacity with Al-Qaeda and the groups

officially merged in June 2001. The ideological interrelationship amongst EIJ, the Afghan

Mujahedeen, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban was hypothesized to be congruent and while the data

(both qualitative and quantitative) do not refute that, their respective similarity was not as great

as some other groups.

The final category, ―Revolutions for Modernization or Reform‖ comprised of Movement

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and Polish Solidarity is categorically the least similar, but all

q This aspect of violent religious fundamentalist groups can be considered a misapplication of the law of social substitutability. This

anthropological concept which holds that the killing of any member of the in-group is considered a group offense and can be avenged by the

killing of any member of the offender’s out-group. For example, members of the Abu Nidal Organization justified the skyjacking and execution

of hostages on an EL AL airline because Israel required compulsory military service. The individuals were therefore members of the military and

thus legitimate targets. This rationalization has been further extrapolated by Al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks to include American citizens,

who, as taxpayers, support the U.S. government’s oppressive and exploitive policies toward the Muslim world.

movements share aspects relating to weakening states and their disintegration of powers and

services. Segments of the population can be easily recruited or enticed into weak support for the

revolution. The ―Casebook‖ included two principal types of examples – one in which

commercial interests provide the incentive to violence, and another set where non-violence was

used to achieve a change for a stronger system. r These groups tend to employ narratives that

address a particular political issue (e.g. ―Illegitimate state (lack of services)‖) to engender

support but not necessarily to incite violence. They rarely wish to acquire the responsibility of

governance but rather want a degree of policy reform or political inclusion. Although these

groups were relatively clustered in the lower left-had quadrant on the rotated factor pattern graph

(Figure 7), though they are more loosely clustered than some of the other groups. The looseness

of this cluster could be a result of the diversity of the groups themselves or a function of the lack

of operational codes assigned to the group as whole (a total of 9 content codes or 2.25 per group

compared to 25 for the ―Revolution To Modify The Type Of Government‖ or 4.167 per group,

33 for the ―Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues‖ or 5.5 per group, 15 for the

―Revolutions To Drive Out A Foreign Power‖ or 3 per group, and 18 for ―Revolutions Based on

Religious Fundamentalism‖ or 6 per group).

The clustering of narratives around a set of themes identifies referent trends; however,

this is done so at a level of abstraction for ease of analysis and not operational relevance. The

idiosyncratic application of each of these narratives is where comprehension of the local culture,

symbology, and customs differentiates the individual movement from their group. To consider

the FARC a Marxist group would be accurate but incomplete. The FARC did not rigidly adhere

to Marxist-Leninist ideology, their pragmatism in dealing with farmers and narcotraffickers alike

r Of the 24 cases included in this research effort, only two (the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and Polish Solidarity) were non-violent; both of which were included in the final category.

was mare more capitalist. Their ideologically evolution to Bolivarianism indicates an

intellectual and cultural adaptability that for which a broader classification cannot account.

Furthermore, the PIRA was not a religious fundamentalist organization but their recognition of

Catholic symbolic reference for those willing to sacrifice themselves for the larger good was

clearly indicated during the hunger strikes. Organizations/movements such as Hizbollah and Al-

Qaeda that have a presence (however small) in many locations throughout the world retain a

unifying strategic narrative but employ a far subtler and nuanced approach depending on their

geographic location and functional responsibility. A Hizbollah operative recruiting in Lebanon

will likely make the imminent threat of Israel more salient than a financier soliciting donations

from the Lebanese diaspora in the Tri-Border Region of South America. Likewise, the

franchised component of the Al Qaeda social movement that emerged from the Maktab al-

Khidamat (Services Bureau) during the Afghan resistance explicitly tailored their recruiting and

fundraising themes to the local target audience. The individual manifestation were unique yet

each was vertically integrated with the obligation to support their fellow Muslims defend their

ancestral homeland and way of life from a foreign power.

While the strategic and tactical narratives are nested, the distinctive application is

sufficiently adaptable to incorporate culturally (and individually) resonant themes and symbols.

Thus, one cannot rely on broad categorizations or abstract analysis alone to understand the theme

of a particular narrative, the mechanism of its employment, or the effect within a defined set of

parameters. These latter three factors are heavily dependent on thorough and accurate cultural

intelligence.

CONCLUSION

All revolutions are local affairs. While national or international contexts may play a role

in setting the motivations, support structures, and other elements of a revolution, local issues

such as culture, history, demographics, social networks, economics, and pre-existing conditions

play an even greater role in the development, execution, and eventual success of a movement.

Narrative analysis can be a useful component to analyzing revolutionary and insurgent warfare.

Comprehending the operational environment prior to a revolution is necessary to the

understanding of any case study, and the authors’ hope is that this essay has shown that the study

of those underlying factors is as important as studying the conduct of the war itself. Thorough

and accurate cultural intelligence is essential in counter-narrative targeting. Without

understanding the underlying political grievance, the resonant cultural symbology, and the

mechanism by which the insurgent actor intends to mobilize the populace an effective antithesis,

one will not understand ―how‖ and more importantly, ―why‖ a movement develops. While the

results presented in this paper indicate that one cannot necessarily classify a type of group or

develop an effective counterinsurgent strategy by narrative analysis alone, aggregate

classifications can be useful if augmented by cultural intelligence.

1 Crossett C. (Ed) Casebook on insurgency and revolutionary warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009. In press.

2 Adams D, Tarrow S, Tilly C. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001. pg. 5.

3 Tarrow, S. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

4 Earley PC, Mosakowsi E. Cultural Intelligence. Harvard Business Review. 2004; 10: 139-146.

5 Shenhav SR. Political Narratives and Political Reality. International Political Science Review. 2006; 27; 3: 245–262.

6 Brown AD, Stacey P and Nandhakumar J. Making sense of Sensemaking narratives. Human Relations. 2008; 61: 1035-1064.

7 Brown A.D., Stacey P and Nandhakumar J. Making sense of Sensemaking narratives. Human Relations. 2008; 61: 1035-1064.

8 Dalgaard-Nielsen A. Studying violent radicalization in Europe I: The potential contribution of social movement theory. DIIS Working Paper no.

2008/2; 2008. 9 Beck C J. The contribution of social movement theory to understanding terrorism. Sociology Compass. 2008: 2; 5: 1565–1581.

10 Gurr T. Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1970.

11 Gurr T. Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1970.

12 Lezak MD. (1995). Neuropsychological assessment (3rd ed.) New York: Oxford University Press.

13 Brown AD, Stacey P and Nandhakumar J. Making sense of Sensemaking narratives. Human Relations. 2008; 61: 1035-1064.

14 Osinga FPB. Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. New York: Routledge; 2006.

15 Arena MP, & Arrigo, B A .The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat. New York: New York University Press; 2006.

16 Hoffer E. The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: Harper and Rowe Perennial Library; 1951.

17 McCauley C & Moskalenko S. Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and political violence. 2008: 20;

3: 415–433.

Arena MP, & Arrigo, B A .The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat. New York: New York University Press; 2006. 19

Beck CJ. The contribution of social movement theory to understanding terrorism. Sociology Compass. 2008: 2; 5: 1565–1581. 20

Killcullen DJ. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010. 21

Snow DA, Rochford J, Burke E. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American Sociological Review.

1986; 51:4: 464-481. 22

Snow, DA, Rochford J, Burke E. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American Sociological

Review. 1986; 51:4: 464-481. 23

Polletta P. Contending Stories: Narrative in Social Movements. Qualitative Sociology. 1998; 21;4: 419-446. 24

Amend K. Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat. Orbis. 2010; 54; 2: 215-231. 25

Polletta P. Contending Stories: Narrative in Social Movements. Qualitative Sociology. 1998; 21;4: 419-446. 26

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html (Accessed 10/10/2010). 27

Killcullen DJ. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010. 28 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-05.301 Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; 2007. 29

Alexander C. The War That Killed Achilles: The True Story of Homer's Iliad and the Trojan War. New York: Viking Press; 2009. 30

Strange J and Iron R. Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the

Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting, no. 4, 2d ed. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association: 1996. 31

Post JM, Ruby KG, & Shaw ED. The radical group in context 1: An integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. Studies

in conflict and terrorism. 25: 73–100. 32

Post JM, Ruby KG, & Shaw ED. The radical group in context 1: An integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. Studies

in conflict and terrorism. 25: 101-126.

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html