Guaranteed Only - Strategic Counterintelligence
iega13l3
harber.pdf
This article was downloaded by: [68.7.43.36] On: 18 February 2013, At: 09:01 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20
Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non- State Actors Justin R. Harber Version of record first published: 12 Mar 2009.
To cite this article: Justin R. Harber (2009): Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 22:2, 221-236
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600802698200
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
...
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
...
...
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
... ...
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
O ffensive C o unte rinte llig e nc e
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
Ta ilo re d C o unte rinte llig e nc e Tra ining a t Ho m e
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
C o unte rintellig e nc e Tra ining w ith Lia iso n Pa rtne rs
The post-9=11 world demands closer intelligence links with foreign services. But how can the U .S. continue to protect its own intelligence assets when it m u st co lla b o r a t e wit h ser vices fr o m a b r o a d t h a t m igh t b e less t h a n completely reliable? The challenge for the U .S. is to maintain the favorable b a la n ce b et ween sh a r in g in t elligen ce o n t h r ea t s o f mu t u a l in t er est wit h other governments, while simultaneously protecting U .S. assets.50 The U .S. ca n but t r ess t hese a llia nces t hr ou gh t r a in in g fo r eign ser vices o n h ow t o practice better CI in their own organizations.
Counterintelligence training across international boundaries can take on a ra nge of forms—from better information technology security, to interna l in vest iga t ion s, a n d t o cla ssified ma t er ia l sa fegua r d s. A n y cr oss-t r a in in g program should account for the nature of the intelligence relationship, and ta ke into considera tion t he st rengths, vulnera bilit ies, size, a nd threa ts to t h e p a r t n er ser vice. M a n y o f t h e U .S.’s a llies co u ld p a r t icu la r ly b en efit fr o m t r a in in g t h a t d ea ls wit h t h e in t elligen ce t h r ea t s fr o m h o m egr o wn in su r gen cies o r h o st ile N SA s—esp ecia lly sin ce sever a l o f t h ese p a r t n er states in Africa and the M iddle East face such challenges today.
Critics may denigrate such programs as revealing valuable secrets about h o w t h e U .S. I C go es a b o u t p er fo r min g it s in t elligen ce d u t ies. I n fa ct , however, the U .S. has helped to train other foreign services on a range of intelligence-rela ted t opics,51 a nd cooper a tion on CI ma t ters is simply a n extension of this relationship. Building up the CI capa bility of America’s security partners not only helps the U .S. IC to protect its own assets and t hose of it s allies, but may also serve a s an a ddit iona l excha nge t hrough which to bolster trust in such alliances.
Tra c k All Ac c e ss to C la ssifie d M a te ria l
In 1989, the CIA discovered that F elix Bloch, a diplomat with the U .S. State D ep a r t men t , wa s a mo le wor kin g for t he So viet K G B.52 A s fed er a l la w d ict a t es, t h e C I A a ler t ed t h e F BI t o Blo ch ’s sp yin g a ct ivit ies a n d t h e Bureau immediately began its investigation. Once R obert H anssen became a wa r e o f Blo ch ’s d et ect io n t h r o u gh t h e F BI ’s A u t o ma t ed C a se Syst em (A C S), h e a ler t ed h is R u ssia n h a n d ler s, a n d u lt im a t ely sq u a sh ed t h e investigation against the State D epartment mole.
H anssen’s case is not an isolated incident. Both Leandro Aragoncillo and N ada N adim Prouty abused their government access to perform searches on classified information irrelevant to their jobs. These cases illustrate the urgent need for a tracking mechanism for classified material. The D epartment of J u st ice’s I n sp ect o r G en er a l m a d e sim ila r r eco m m en d a t io n s t o t h e F BI following H anssen’s arrest, but the extent to which Sentinel the Bureau’s successor to the ACS will perform this function remains unclear.53
THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT FROM NON-STATE ACTORS 231
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 22, NUMBER 2
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
D o
w nl
o ad
ed b
y [
68 .7
.4 3.
36 ]
at 0
9: 0
1 18
F eb
ru ar
y 2
01 3
