QAs

Strategies for Answering Discussion and Essay Questions

Chapter 6

VI: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 6 (See pages 197-

198 in the textbook)

A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 6

2. Any attempt to strike an appropriate balance between security and convenience will always

be controversial. For one thing, people often have very different beliefs about where the

default should lie – i.e., should we presume in favor of security or of convenience, as a

starting point? If we opt in favor of more secure computer systems, then the likely result will

be a loss of some convenience for users. If we presume in favor of convenience, on the other

hand, then certain aspects of security can be compromised. As computer systems become

increasingly vulnerable to attacks from “malicious” programs, more and more ordinary users

may be willing to tolerate less convenience and ease of use in order to achieve greater

security.

B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 6

1. This question presents us with a case for examining moral relativism, described in Chapter

2. You may want to review that discussion on pages 50-52 in the textbook. Those subscribing

to the Hacker Code of Ethics may believe that “innocent” or non-malicious hacking is

acceptable. But the broader community has not been as sensitive to the distinctions that

computer enthusiasts draw when it comes to hacking. So, it would seem that from the point of

view of descriptive ethics, we have two different moral systems. But it doesn’t follow that

members in each group are free to act as they please. The hacker community is clearly a sub-

group in the population. As such, it can work to change laws, as well as attitudes, toward non-

malicious hacking. However, to embrace its own standards for hacking as an acceptable

alternative to the general laws and policies for hacking would also be to embrace a form of

moral relativism.

2. Unfortunately, Spafford’s position might seem inconsistent because he claims that one is

doing “the right thing” by breaking into the hospital computer system to save a life, even

though breaking into computer systems is “unethical” because break-ins always cause harm.

However, we also noted that Spafford’s position can be justified on a version of Act

Deontology, as described in Chapter 2. There we saw that it is the agent’s actions, not the

consequences that result from actions, which need to be assessed in moral dilemmas. So,

Spafford could consistently argue that, all things being equal, it is wrong to break into a

computer system, and he can also make exceptions on nonconsequentialist grounds for when

such a break-in is justified. You may want to review David Ross’ version of Act Deontology

(pages 55-57 in the textbook).

3. Once again, we have a question about whether the ends (desired) justify the means (used to

achieve the ends). In this particular case, the injured candidate would seem to have a

presumptive right to know whether the person who had defamed him or her on the Internet

was indeed a rival political opponent. However, if we allow the breach of anonymity in this

case, why shouldn’t we allow it in other cases involving on-line defamation? But why stop

with defamation? We see that we may encounter a slippery-slope line of reasoning (see

Chapter 3). An important question here, at the general level, is: When should an ISP be

required to reveal the identity of one of its subscribers to some external source? Consider, for

example, the incident in which the RIAA solicited from ISPs the names of individual

subscribers that it suspected to be illegally sharing copyrighted music via P2P systems.

Should ISPs comply with these requests in such cases, even when no direct warrants have

been issued by law-enforcement organizations?