QA

Strategies for Answering Discussion and Essay Questions

Chapter 1

I: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 1 (See pages 30-31

in the textbook)

A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 1

4. Gotterbarn’s arguments are well constructed, and Gotterbarn makes a plausible case for

why computer ethics should be conceived of as field of professional ethics. In defense of

Gotterbarn’s position, we must concede that an understanding of professional-responsibility

issues is critical to an adequate understanding and analysis of computer ethics issues. In the

period of computing preceding the World Wide Web, Gotterbarn’s argument for why the field

of computer ethics should be conceived of as an area of professional ethics (whose primary

concern was for computer professionals) was plausible. At that time, many (if not most) of the

ethical issues involving computers directly affected the computing profession. Since then,

however, two important factors have influenced the field. First, a new (and broader) wave of

computer-related ethical issues emerged when the Internet became accessible to ordinary

people. Second, most people who currently use computers, either for work or for recreational

purposes, are not computer professionals. So, it would seem that we need a much broader

conception of the field than the one proposed by Gotterbarn. However, we also saw that

Gotterbarn’s view may ultimately turn out to be correct as more and more traditional

computer-ethics issues, such as those involving privacy, property, speech, and so forth,

become folded into “ordinary ethics.”

6. If we apply the first two-steps of the methodology described in Sec. 1.6 (entitled “A

Comprehensive Strategy for Approaching Cyberethics Issues”), we must first identify what

the ethical issues are in this case. Here, issues involving the personal privacy of Internet users

would seem to be apparent; so we have identified at least one ethical issue. Next, we need to

see whether there are any “policy vacuums” associated with this particular issue. There would

indeed seem to be a policy vacuum in the sense that neither ISPs nor ordinary users have a

clear understanding of a law or a policy for determining whether personal information about a

user’s online activities can be given to a non-law-enforcement organization merely because

some organization suspects one or more subscribers to an ISP of having violated copyright

laws. Consider that the RIAA is not a law enforcement agency. So, a policy vacuum

regarding cybertechnology once again emerges, and this vacuum or void needs to be filled

with a clear and explicit policy.

B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 1

1. As we saw in this chapter of the textbook, a relatively recent practice that has generated

considerably controversy involved the way that the Recording Industry Association of

America (RIAA) pursued individuals it suspected of exchanging copyrighted music files on

the Internet. For example, we saw that the RIAA monitored the amount of “traffic” of

unauthorized music files that was routed through the computer systems of users’ systems. In

order for the RIAA to get the information it needed about the users who operated these

computer systems, the Recording Industry requested that ISPs provide to them the names of

individuals that corresponded to certain IP addresses.

Were the ISPs obligated, either legally or morally, to provide the RIAA with the actual names

of individuals, which are normally protected under the anonymity of IP addresses? On the one

hand, ISPs are required to comply with law enforcement authorities in cases where criminal

activities are suspected of taking place in their online forums. On the other hand, having P2P

software installed on one’s computer system is not in itself illegal. And even if having

unauthorized copyrighted music on one’s computer system is illegal, one could still question

whether the means used by the RIAA to track down suspected violators falls within the

parameters of what is morally (and even legally) acceptable behavior.

If we apply the first two-steps of the methodology described in Sec. 1.6 (entitled “A

Comprehensive Strategy for Approaching Cyberethics Issues”), we must first identify what

the ethical issues are in this case. Here, issues involving the personal privacy of Internet users

would seem to be apparent; so we have identified at least one ethical issue. Next, we need to

see whether there are any “policy vacuums” associated with this particular issue. There would

indeed seem to be a policy vacuum in the sense that neither ISPs nor ordinary users have a

clear understanding of a law or a policy for determining whether personal information about a

user’s online activities can be given to a non-law-enforcement organization merely because

some organization suspects one or more subscribers to an ISP of having violated copyright

laws. Consider that the RIAA is not a law enforcement agency. So, a policy vacuum

regarding cybertechnology once again emerges, and this vacuum or void needs to be filled

with a clear and explicit policy.

2. Theoretically, one could envision cyberethics issues being examined from an indefinite

number of perspectives. For example, we could conceivably analyze these issues from the

vantage point of political science, economics, history, and so forth. However, the three

perspectives that we have laid out in Chapter 1 are fairly exhaustive in their scope. Consider

that the professional-ethics perspective addresses many of the concerns faced by software and

hardware engineers, computer science professionals, and information-technology and library-

science professionals in their roles as professionals. The descriptive-ethics approach, which is

empirically-based, addresses concerns that are of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, and

psychologists (and thus indirectly addresses the interests of related groups such as political

scientists, economists, historians, and so forth). And the philosophical-ethics approach

examines cyberethics issues from a perspective that is both normative (as opposed to

descriptive) and conceptual/analytical (as opposed to empirical).

We saw that the Amy Boyer case was interesting because it could be analyzed from all three

perspectives. While not all cyberethics issues are analyzable from each of the three

perspectives, many are capable of being analyzed from two vantage points. For example, the

Napster case can be examined from the perspectives of descriptive ethics (i.e., its sociological

impact) and philosophical ethics (i.e., normative questions having to do with fairness and

moral obligation).

4. Some computer scientists have suggested that because: (a) Cybertechnology is relatively

new; (b) Cybertechnology raises ethical issues; it follows that (c) Cybertechnology has raised

new ethical issues. They point out, for example, that recent technologies such as data

encryption raise certain kinds of social and ethical concerns that did not exist prior to the

introduction of that technology.

Some computer scientists and philosophers have also argued that because computer

technology has had a global impact with respect to ethical issues, a new global (or universal)

theory of ethics is needed. In other words, Western ethical theories such as utilitarianism are

no longer adequate to deal with ethical issues that are global in scope.

Other philosophers have taken a slightly different tack to show why a new ethical framework

is needed. Philosophers Hans Jonas (2006) and Luciano Floridi (1999) have argued,

independently of one another, that modern technology has introduced new “objects of moral

consideration.” For example, recent work in the fields of artificial intelligence has contributed

to the creation of software robots (“softbots”); and developments at the intersection of

cybertechnology and biotechnology has made possible the creation of certain kinds of objects,

entities, or “creatures” that appear to be human-like. As a result, some philosophers argue that

we need to expand our sphere of moral consideration to include such objects and entities; and

in the process, we will also likely need a new ethical framework.

In our analysis of question of whether any computer ethics issues are unique (in Chapter 1),

however, we saw that our existing ethical framework is fairly robust. We also that if we make

certain adjustments to the standard, three-step method used in applied ethics, then we can

avoid having to construct a new ethical framework For example, if we include the

recommendations suggested by James Moor and Philip Brey, we can proceed with our

existing set of ethical theories. Following Brey, we would first need to identify and disclose

any embedded values in technology (i.e., either transparent or non-transparent moral values);

and following Moor, we need to identify and resolve any policy vacuums and conceptual

muddles that arise, before we can apply the traditional ethical theories.