Reading response

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Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness

C i t i z e n s h i p i s m a n ' s b a s i c right f o r i t is n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n t h e r i g h t t o h a v e r i g h t s . R e m o v e t h i s p r i c e l e s s p o s s e s s i o n a n d t h e r e r e m a i n s a s t a t e l e s s p e r s o n , d i s g r a c e d a n d d e g r a d e d i n t h e e y e s o f h i s c o u n t r y m e n . H i s v e r y e x i s t e n c e is a t t h e s u f f e r a n c e o f t h e s t a t e w i t h i n w h o s e b o r d e r s h e h a p p e n s t o b e . . . [ H j e w i l l p r e s u m a b l y e n j o y , a t m o s t , o n l y t h e l i m i t e d r i g h t s a n d p r i v i l e g e s o f a l i e n s , a n d l i k e t h e a l i e n h e m i g h t e v e n b e . . . d e p r i v e d o f t h e r i g h t t o a s s e r t a n y r i g h t s .

( E a r l W a r r e n , C h i e f J u s t i c e , U S S u p r e m e C o u r t , 1 9 5 8 ) 1

This b o o k is a b o u t citizenship rights - w h a t they are, h o w we think a b o u t them, why they are currently in peril. T h r o u g h a mix of historical, concep- tual, a n d epistemological lenses, I engage these questions by creating multi- ple genealogies of citizenship a n d statelessness - genealogies t h a t range from the story of Hurrican e K a t r i n a ' s racial apartheid to contested n a r r a - tives of civil society a n d the public sphere, from the T r o j a n horse of social capital t o historical epistemologies of concept formation a n d the m e t a n a r - rative of Anglo-American citizenship theory. C o m m o n t o all these are conflicts over the balance of power a m o n g the institutions, practices a n d discourses of states, m a r k e t s , a n d civil societies. W h e t h e r these conflicts result in regimes of relatively democratic socially inclusive citizenship rights or regimes of social exclusion a n d statelessness largely depends o n the ability of civil society, the public sphere, a n d the social state t o exert countervailing force against the corrosive effects of market-driven governance. M y central

' T h i s versio n of " t h e righ t t o h a v e r i g h t s " is t a k e n from a S u p r e m e C o u r t o p i n i o n w r i t t e n by Chief J u s t i c e E a r l W a r r e n in 1958. I n a case called Perez v. Brownell, t h e C o u r t n a r r o w l y u p h e l d a n o r d e r s t r i p p i n g a m a n of U n i t e d States citizenship. W a r r e n w r o t e a n i m p a s s i o n e d dissent, h o w e v e r , w h i c h o v e r t h e next t h i r t y years p r o v i d e d a basis for t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t t o shield n a t i v e - b o r n citizens f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s efforts t o " d e n a t i o n a l i z e 1 ' t h e m , a n d also t o p r o t e c t n a t u r a l i z e d citizens a g a i n s t efforts t o d e n a t u r a l i z e t h e m .

2 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

claim is tha t ideal-typical democratic a n d socially inclusive citizenship regimes rest on a delicate balance of powe r a m o n g state, market, and citizens in civil society, which is mediated t h r o u g h collective adjudications in the public sphere. D i s p r o p o r t i o n a te market p o w er disrupts this carefully con- structed balance, as the risks a n d costs of managin g h u m a n frailties under capitalism once shouldered by government a n d corporations get displaced onto individual workers a n d vulnerable families.

Rights imperiled

T o d a y , global society is drastically out of balance. With the United States in the vanguard, we are in a n era in which market fundamentalism - the drive to subject all of social life a n d the public sphere to m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s - h a s become the prevailing ideationa l regime. A h ideational regime is com- prised of those public narrative s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t have become widely taken for g r a n t e d in the political culture; it sets the p a r a m e t e r s for what c o u n t s as w o r t h w h i le a r g u m e n t in social a n d political debates . T h r o u g h the alarm of "citizenship imperiled," I caution t h a t the rise of m a r k e t fundamentalism to the p o s i t i o n of d o m i n a n t ideational regime has created a radically u n b a l a n c e d p o w e r d y n a m i c between the m a r k e t a n d state on the on e side, a n d civil society on the other. Inequality in America has reached a level n o t seen since the Gilded Age, as a once thriving middle class feels itself on t h e brink of collapse into the r a n k s of the invisible workin g p o o r . 2 Indeed, three decades of w h a t has become market-driven governance are t r a n s f o r m i n g growing n u m b e r s of once rights-bearing citizens into socially excluded internally rightless a n d stateless p e r s o n s . 3 A political culture that tolerates, even legitimates, these brut e disparities in life chances has a corrosive effect not only on citizenship a n d h u m a n rights, b u t equally on perceptions of what we owe each o t h e r as fellow h u m a n s .

T h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t force in this e r o d i n g of rights is w h a t I call the contractualization of citizenship - an effort to r e o r g a n i z e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the state a n d t h e citizenry, from n o n c o n t r a c t u a l rights a n d obligations to the principles a n d p r a c t i c e s of quid p r o q u o m a r k e t exchange. T h e c o n t r a c t u a l i z a t i o n of citizenship effectively collapses the b o u n d a r i e s t h a t p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c sphere a n d civil society from m a r k e t

" O n t h e c u r r e n t state of e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y in A m e r i c a , see American Prospect (2007), The Economist (2007), F r a n k (2007a), G r o s s (2007). K u t t n e r (2007), Mischei (2006), New York Times Magazine (2007), a n d U c h i t e l l e (2007).

J T h e post-9/11 surveillance society a n d 1he G . W . Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a v e intensified this trend d r a m a t i c a l l y . T h e y d i d n o t . h o w e v e r , c r e a t e it.

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 3

p e n e t r a t i o n . C o n t r a c t u a l i z i n g citizenship d i s t o r t s the m e a n i n g of citizen- ship from t h a t of s h a r e d fate a m o n g equals t o t h a t of c o n d i t i o n a l priv- ilege. T h e growin g m o r a l a u t h o r i t y of b o t h m a r k e t a n d c o n t r a c t m a k e s social inclusion a n d m o r a l w o r t h n o longer inheren t rights b u t r a t h e r earned privileges t h a t are wholly c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n t h e ability t o exchange something of e q u a l value. Thi s is the mode] by which the s t r u c t u r a l l y unemployed b e c o m e contractual malfeasants (see c h a p t e r 2).

M u c h of m a r k e t fundamentalism's great success has been facilitated by what Fred Block and I have dubbed conversion narratives. These are fear- inducing predictions intended to convert a culture's d o m i n a n t narratives from social to m a r k e t precepts by foretelling the dire moral and economic implications of continuing on the present social policy course. A m o n g the most effective of these conversion narratives have been the "Personal Responsibility C r u s a d e " (Hacker 2006) a n d "the Perversity Thesis" (Hirschman 1991; Somers a n d Block 2005). These are b o t h public discourses that reassign responsibility and blame for social problems from structural conditions to alleged defects of individual moral character, such as depend- ency, indolence, irresponsibility, lack of initiative, promiscuity, a n d p a r a - sitism o n the b o d y politic. A t the same time, m a r k e t fundamentalist conversion narratives have worked to substitute alternative understandings of reality, which aim to normalize and justify the m a r k e t ' s ever-increasing expansion into political, cultural, social, and civil sites once insulated from market penetration. T h e successful deployment of such conversion n a r r a - tives has enabled m a r k e t fundamentalist advocates over the last thirty-five years t o delegitimate once p o p u l a r legislative agendas that embodied a modest acceptance of the social ethos of shared fate, equal risk, a n d social justice, as well as a commitmen t to redressing centuries of gender a n d racial exclusions.

T h r o u g h o u t this v o l u m e I engage the epistemological aspects of b o t h citizenship rights a n d statelessness by d e c o n s t r u c t i n g n u m e r o u s p u b l i c discourses, disciplinary claims, a n d political c o n v e r s i o n n a r r a t i v e s . T o explore the epistemological consequence s of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m a n d the c o n t r a c t u a l i z a t i o n of citizenship, 1 p r o b e t h e shift from a p r i - marily sociologically driven k n o w l e d g e c u l t u re built on r e l a t i o n a l social a s s u m p t i o n s t o an economics-driven on e based on m a r k e t m o d e l s of s o c i e t y . 4 It is i m p o r t a n t to k e e p in m i nd t h a t t h e different types of regimes

4 In discussing e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l issues t h r o u g h o u t this v o l u m e , a n d in o t h e r w o r k . I u s e t h e term knowledge culture \o c h a r a c t e r i ze the same n o t i o n of a n o r t h o d o x s p e c t r u m of w h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d c o m p e t i n g t r u t h claims, r a t h e r t h a n a single h e g e m o n i c T r u t h . See especially c h a p t e r 7, as well as S o m e r s 1996a, 1998.

4 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

a n d spheres I discuss t h r o u g h o u t t h e b o o k are ideal types, n o t empirical claims a b o u t precise social entities. Empirically, in fact, civil societies, states, a n d p u b l i c spheres a r e never a u t o n o m o u s or u n p e n e t r a t e d by m a r k e t s , any m o r e t h a n a n y a c t u a l citizenship regime h a s o r will ever achieve a b s o l u t e s o l i d a r i t y, equality o r full social inclusion (Zelizer 1997, 2005; F r a s e r 1989). Least of all are m a r k e t s a u t o n o m o u s self-regulating entities; r a t h e r they are a t r o o t a set of social i n s t i t u t i o n s c o m p r i s i n g legal rules a n d relation s (e.g. c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s, legal e x c h a n g e s, p r o p e r t y rights), which s t r u c t u r e , o r g a n i z e , a n d legitimate c o m m o d i t y exchanges. As such, m a r k e t s a r e n o t merely e m b e d d e d in b u t actually c o n s t i t u t e d by political i n s t i t u t i o n s, social practices, a n d c u l t u r a l c o n - structs ( H o d g s o n 1988; K r i p p n e r 2 0 0 1 ; Sen 1981). F o r analytic a n d heuristic p u r p o s e s , h o w e v e r , as well as t o m e a s u r e changes a n d v a r i a t i o n s in the degree of their i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n , it helps to conceive of t h e political, e c o n o m i c , a n d social d o m a i n s as analytically s e p a r a t e spheres.

F o l l o w i n g in this vein, m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m is itself an i d e a t i o n al m o v e m e n t , n o t an empirically viable reality. I a c c e n t u a t e its ideational quality to u n d e r s c o re a p a r a d o x : on t h e on e h a n d , its ideology of a b s o l u t e m a r k e t freedom is a l m o s t totally at o d d s w i t h actually existing successful m a r k e t societies, which rely heavily o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s (e.g. laws a n d t a x codes) to p r o t e c t the rich from full m a r k e t e x p o s u r e while forcing m a r k e t " f r e e d o m s " o n the rest of u s . 5 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this distanc e from reality seems t o m a t t e r n o t a t all, b u t even t o c o n t r i b u t e to the beguiling n o t i o n t h a t p r o s p e r i t y is a s s o c i a t ed with complet e m a r k e t free- d o m . T h e visibility of so m u c h wealth, c o u p l e d with the invisibility of poverty a n d the p o o r , seems only to lend credibility to the m a r k e t a s the arbiter of m o r a l a u t h o r i t y - on e t h a t is r e c a l i b r a t i n g o u r n o t i o n s of citizenship rights a n d the citizen from t h a t of social inclusion, shared fate, a n d m e m b e r s h i p t o only c o n d i t i o n a l inclusion, q u i d p r o q u o exchange, a n d social exclusion for t h o s e w h o s e w o r t h falls s h o r t w h e n m e a s u r e d by m a r k e t m e t r i c s. M a r k e t - d r i v e n freedom m a y only b e a n illusion, b u t n o m a t t e r . As a c a p a c i o u s vision, it h a s c o n q u e r e d the c u r r e n t social i m a g i n a r y .

N o w h e r e has this c o n q u e s t been m o r e c o m p l e te t h a n in t h e U n i t e d States. T h u s m y a r g u m e n t s a b o u t m a r k e t i z a t i o n ' s w o r r i s o m e effects o n citizenship rights t e n d t o focus o n c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a . Y e t from its

5 See especially Sunstein (2004); Block (1990); Polanyi i ! 9 5 7 a . 1957b). T h i s of c o u r s e is the f o u n d a t i o n a l p r e c e p t of Polanyi-influence d i n s t i t u t i o n a l auulysis with its critique of the '"scarcity p o s t u l a t e " a n d t h e "self-regulating" m a r k e t , as well as of t h e field of e c o n o m i c sociology. See e.g. D o b b i n (2004); G r a n o v e t t e r a n d S w e d b e r g (2001); Smelser a n d S w e d b e r g (2005).

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness J

inception, A m e r i c a n society has been a c u l t u re divided by i n t e r n a ] b o u n - daries; the l a n d of self-evident e q u a l h u m a n rights has thrived uneasily on the b a c k s of p e o p l e considered n e i t h e r fully h u m a n n o r even p a r t i a l rights-bearers (Smith 1993, 1999; S h k l a r 1991). A n d j u s t as the p a r a m e - ters of the socially included are revealed only by d e m a r c a t i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s of the socially excluded, so t o o does the ideal of inclusive citizenship d e p e n d o n recognizing citizenship's stateless O t h e r s . A benign view of citizenship h a s p u r c h a s e only from t h e perspective of the insiders. It is t h e cold i n s t r u m e n t of exclusion t o those o u t s i d e its b o r d e r s , b o t h internal b o r d e r s b a s e d o n race a n d g e n d e r exclusion, as well as n a t i o n - state ones based o n x e n o p h o b i a a n d n a t i o n a l i s m . M a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l - ism h a s by n o m e a n s been the sole cause of t o d a y ' s social exclusions. Y e t since t h e 1970s it h a s served to radically e x a c e r b a t e t h e exclusions of race a n d class by first delegitimating affirmative a c t i o n a n d then grafting the i m p e r s o n a l cruelties of a " c o l o r - b l i n d " m a r k e t o n t o these preexist- ing " p r i m o r d i a l l y " defined differences. T h e o u t c o m e h a s been an ever- g r o w i n g superfluou s p o p u l a t i o n , n o longer a c c o m m o d a t e d by a regime in which m a r k e t value is the chief criterio n for m e m b e r s h i p . This p o p u l a - tion m a k e s u p A m e r i c a ' s socially excluded a n d internally stateless w h o have lost t h e r i g h t t o h a v e r i g h t s, a n d they figure greatly in m y o p e n i n g c h a p t e r s .

The right to have rights

Against t h e p e r i l o u s m o v e m e n t to organize society exclusively by m a r k e t principles, I a r g u e t h a t the fragile project of s u s t a i n i n g socially inclusive d e m o c r a t i c rights r e q u i r e s the c o u n t e r a c t i n g p o w e r s of a social state , a r o b u s t p u b l ic sphere t o h o ld it a c c o u n t a b l e , a n d a relationally s t u r d y civil society. R e c o n s t r u c t i n g the social, historical, a n d epistemological c o n - ditions t h a t s u p p o r t or disable this project m a k e s it possible t o t h e o r i z e m o r e generally a b o u t the cluster of rights a t the h e a r t of d e m o c r a t i c a n d socially inclusive citizenship regimes. Included a m o n g these a r e legal a n d civil freedoms, a n d e q u a l access to justice; p a r t i c i p a t o r y rights in d e m o - cratic g o v e r n a n c e ; a n d t h e social i nc l us i ona r y rights t h a t allow for the meaningful exercise of all the o t h e r s . Conceived as i n d i v i d u al posses- sions, h o w e v e r , these rights a r e ethereal. L i k e all r i g h t s, r a t h e r , they are public g o o d s , a n d t h u s can only b e s u s t a i n ed b y a n alliance of publi c p o w e r , political m e m b e r s h i p , a n d social practices of e q u a l m o r a l recog- nition. F o l l o w i n g Earl W a r r e n (1958) a n d H a n n a h A r e n d t ([1951] 1979), this m a k e s citizenship t h e right to have rights. T h e right t o h a v e rights is b o t h n o r m a t i v e a n d empirical. T h e t e r m p a r s es t w o distinct k i n d s of

6 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

rights. T h e first is a n existentially f o u n d a t i o n a l right, w i t h o u t which the second set of rights has no m e a n i n g . It entails b o t h de jure a n d de facto rights to m e m b e r s h i p in a political c o m m u n i t y - t h e scale of which can vary from local to n a t i o n a l to global ( A r e n d t herself was at once deeply skeptical a n d m e l a n c h o l i c a b o u t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , even while she was reluctantly resigned to it). In line with K a r l P o l a n y i ([1944] 2001) a n d T . H . M a r s h a l l ([1950] 1992), h o w e v e r , I s t i p u l a t e t h a t the first right t o political m e m b e r s h i p m u s t equally include the de facto right to social inclusion in civil society. By social inclusion I m e a n the right t o recog- nition by o t h e r s as a m o r a l e q u a l t r e a t e d by the same s t a n d a r d s a n d values a n d due the same level of respect a n d dignity as all o t h e r m e m b e r s . 6

T h e second b u n d l e of rights c o n t a i n s the civil-juridical ones , often s u m m e d u p in M a r s h a l l i a n terms as civil, political, a n d social rights, and recently e x p a n d e d l o include such rights as c u l t u r a l , e c o n o m i c , i n d i g e n o u s , a n d same-sex rights. I n a d d i t i o n , 1 insist t h a t b o t h k i n d s of rights m u s t include h u m a n r i g h t s, since they t o o require t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t only m e m b e r s h i p a n d social inclusion c a n ensure .

M y c o n c e p t i o n of citizenship as t h e right to have rights is a t once b o t h " t h i n n e r " a n d " t h i c k e r " t h a n m a n y m o r e familiar definitions. It is thinne r because, unlike o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s , for s o m e t h i n g t o c o u n t as citizenship I d o not require a f o u n d a t i o n of a n y p a r t i c u l a r civil-juridical rights, such as those of p a r t i c i p a t i o n o r i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y rights. M e m b e r s h i p a l o n e is the minimalist definition of citizenship. This allows me to t h i n k c o m - paratively a b o u t citizenship regimes as v a r i a b l e , a l o n g a c o n t i n u u m from lesser to greater degrees of d e m o c r a t i c a n d rights-based social inclusive- ness. At the same time my c o n c e p t i o n is thicker because it does require in the first instanc e the f o u n d a t i o n a l r i g h t to political a n d social m e m b e r - ship as well as b o t h de jure a n d de facto inclusion a n d r e c o g n i t i o n . So u n c o n d i t i o n a l is this p r i m a r y r e q u i r e m e n t of social a n d political m e m - b e r s h i p t h a t I ascribe to it a n o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s . It is only this p r i m a r y right of inclusion a n d m e m b e r s h i p t h a t m a k e s possible the m u t u a l a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of the o t h e r as a moral equal, a n d t h u s w o r t h y of e q u a l social a n d political r e c o g n i t i o n. A s p h i l o s o p h e r C h a r l e s T a y l o r p u t s it: " D u e r e c o g n i t i o n is n o t j u s t a courtesy b u t a vital h u m a n n e e d " (Taylor a n d G u t m a n n 1992).

T h e conflict between citizenship rights a n d h u m a n rights c a n to s o m e extent n o w be challenged. T o be sure, citizenship is a r e l a t i o n a l a n d inclusionary right w h o s e claim t o universality is only p a r t i a l a n d i n t e r n a l

6 T h e origins of " r e c o g n i t i o n e t h i c s " a r e in Hegel's f a m o u s discours e on the m a s t e r - s l a v e relationship in his Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1955).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p rights a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 7

as it has purchase only in the context of membership in a particular political and/or social body - usually, althoug h not necessarily, conceived as a nation-state. H u m a n rights, by contrast , are believed to be possessed by all h u m a n s for the simple reason of their being h u m a n . T h u s h u m a n rights are called natural (presocial and prepolitical), as they are justified by the existence of h u m a n i t y as such a n d n o t by any p a r t i c u l a r m e m b e r s h i p a t t a c h m e n t s . H u m a n / n a t u r a l rights theory stipulates t h a t to discover the ontological t r u t h of h u m a n i t y , a p e r s o n m u s t be stripped metaphorically of all political a n d social a t t a c h m e n t s , a n d considered in her n a t u r a l state in the perfect freedom of the "state of n a t u r e . " A c c o r d i n g to n a t u r a l / h u m a n rights theory, even when totally u n e n c u m b e r e d by all things social, this stateless p e r s o n is by n a t u r e still a rights-bearer. Such is the optimism of the t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t on which n a t u r a l rights t h e o ry rests its claims.

M y a p p r o a c h to citizenship t h e o r y , by c o n t r a s t , d r a w s from history , which is c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e revealing, t h o u g h m u c h less c o n s o l i n g . Indeed, as A r e n d t d e m o n s t r a t e s , the H o l o c a u s t p r o v i d e d us with a n a t - ural e x p e r i m e n t of w h a t h a p p e n s t o people w h e n they actually are s t a t e - less, r a t h e r t h a n simply m e t a p h o r i c a l l y so. A r e n d t explains h o w t h e N azis c r e a t e d the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t facilitated genocide. F i r s t , they r e v o k e d the citizenship of t h e G e r m a n Jews; then they expelled t h e m i n t o the c o n d i t i o n of statelessness. N o w divested of all political a t t a c h m e n t s a n d social identity, Jews b e c a m e u n r e c o g n i z a b l e as fellow h u m a n s . T h e y b e c a m e , in t h e w o r d s of G o e b b e l s , the "scu m of the e a r t h , " w a n t e d n o w h e r e , a n d easily r o u n d e d up a n d s h i p p ed to e x t e r m i n a t i o n c a m p s with virtually n o objection from the Western n a t i o n s . T h e lesson A r e n d t d r a w s is t h a t it is not freedom a n d a u t o n o m y from all social a n d political entities t h a t liberate us t o be r i g h t s - b e a r e r s . Bar e life ( A g a m b e n 1998) in fact m a k e s h u m a n s w h o are " n o t h i n g b u t h u m a n " as rightless as they are stateless ( A r e n d t 1979). I n s t e a d , it is e m b e d d e d n e s s , political m e m - bership, a n d social inclusion t h a t a r e necessary t o hav e a n y rights at all, especially the h u m a n right t o life itself. M y focus o n inclusion a n d m e m b e r s h i p as t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s for r e c o g n i t i o n b l u r s the radical d i c h o t o m y between h u m a n a n d citizenship rights. If r e c o g n i t i o n is the p r e c o n d i t i o n n o t only to citizenship b u t also t o h u m a n rights, a n d m e m b e r s h i p is t h e p r e r e q u i s i te to recognition, t h e n h u m a n rights a n d citizenship rights a r e both r o o t e d in t h a t which e n d o w s us with o u r h u m a n i t y - t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t comes only from a t t a c h m e n t s a n d inclu- sion. If we w a n t t o a d v a n c e t h e cause of a c t u a l ( r a t h e r t h a n m e t a p h y s i c a l ) h u m a n rights , we m u s t e m b r a c e them as being a n y t h i n g but n a t u r a l . A s E t i e n n e B a l i b ar h a s recently written " M a n [sic] d o e s n o t m a k e citizen- ship; citizenship m a k e s the m a n " (2004a: 35).

8 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

T h r o u g h o u t the b o o k I often use t h e t e r m the citizenship ethic o r ethos to d e n o t e n o t the a c t u a l i t y b u t t h e n o r m a t i v e ideal e m b o d i e d in t h e right t o have rights - the f o u n d a t i o n a l right to inclusion, m e m b e r s h i p , a n d recognition to which the term refers. But precisely because it is b u t a n ideal and an aspiration, the right t o have rights is sociologically incomplete unless c o m p l e m e n t e d by institutional f o u n d a t i o n s , b o t h historical a n d structural, that can explain the social requirements for its realization - o r not. T h u s my analysis of citizenship also contains a m e t h o d o l o g y for c o m p a r a t i v e empirical analysis. Specifically I deploy a structural m o d e l of a c o n t i n u o u s triadic assemblage a m o n g the institutions of state, m a r k e t , and civil society, with an internally free-floating public sphere. T h e model is situated on a c o n t i n u u m t h a t m a k e s it possible- t o measure h o w the relative levels of institutional powe r a m o n g co m p etin g institutions vary over time a n d space. I treat this m o d e l as the architectonics of different citizenship regimes, or the infrastructural design of h o w the p a r t s fit together into a complex whole. Explorin g the conditions a n d consequences of these spatial and t e m p o r a l shifts of p o w er m a k e s it possible to theorize the genealogies of different citizenship r e g i m e s . 7

T h e thesis I develop t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k is t h a t rights m u s t be recognized t o be p u b l i c g o o d s . A s such, socially inclusive d e m o c r a t i c citizenship regimes (including h u m a n rights) can thrive only to the extent t h a t egalitarian a n d solidaristic principles, practices, a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s of civil society a n d the p u b l i c c o m m o n s are able to act with e q u a l force against the exclusionary t h r e a t s of m a r k e t - d r i v e n politics. T o a c c o m p l i s h this, the e x p a n s i o n a r y drives of b o t h state a n d m a r k e t m u s t be i m p e d e d . Only in this way c a n m a r k e t - d r i v e n g o v e r n a n c e be p r e v e n t e d from c o n - verting civil society a n d the p u b l i c s p h e r e i n t o p a t h o l o g i c a l reflections of u n d u e m a r k e t w e a l t h a n d political p o w e r .

Multiple angles of vision: genealogy and history of the present

T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , I a p p r o a c h citizenship from diverse perspectives a n d multiple angles of vision. I n this i n t r o d u c t i o n , m y a i m is to signal t h e overall intellectual project a n d to p r e s e n t the unifying a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t guide my w o r k as a w h o l e a n d form t h e basis for a coherent intellectual a g e n d a . Thi s a g e n d a is to craft a social t h e o r y of citizenship a n d sociol- ogy of rights. It is a p r o j e ct of c o m p e l l i n g u r g e n c y in this age of i n c r e a s i ng h u m a n rights a b u s e s , global p o v e r t y , i n e q u a l i t y , a n d social e x c l u s i o n . 8

7 See S o m e r s ( 1 9 9 3 , 1994a) for e x a m p l e s of this m e t h o d o l o g y i n p r a c t i c e . s See Somers a n d R o b e r t s ( f o r t h c o m i n g 2009).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 9

In each of t h e c h a p t e r s I g r a p p l e w i t h a set of q u e s t i o n s t h a t increas- ingly h a u n t m e : W h y are d e m o c r a t i c citizenship regimes currentl y in peril? W h y a r e rights a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , long held to be self-evident characteristics of liberal d e m o c r a c i e s , u n d e r a t t a c k ? W h a t does citizen- ship imperiled look like? W h y are the risks of m a r k e t society (jobs, health, r e t i r e m e n t , e d u c a t i o n , etc.) shifting a w a y from g o v e r n m e n t a n d c o r p o r a t e responsibility o n t o the increasingly v u l n e r a b l e s h o u l d e r s of individual w o r k e r s a n d families? W h a t are t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of citizen- ship in peril? W h a t causes t h e differences in types of citizenship regimes? H o w a n d why are p e o p l e included or excluded from different citizenship regimes? W h a t sustains a n d legitimates practices of citizenship?

I explore these q u e s t i o n s by c o n s t r u c t i n g new stories a n d genealogies. G e n e a l o g y aims to t a k e u p " m i n o r " or repressed k n o w l e d g e - n o t to r e p r o d u c e d o m i n a n t m y t h o l o g i e s . F o u c a u l t describes it as the " i n s u r r e c - tion of s u b j u g a t e d k n o w l e d g e s " ( F o u c a u l t 1997b: 7). By subjugated k n o w l e d g e s , he m e a n s t h o s e ways of seeing a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e world which h a v e been disqualified for their suppose d lack of rigor or "scientificity," t h o s e k n o w l e d g e s t h a t h a v e been p r e s e n t b u t which a r e often m a d e i n v i s i b l e . 9 F o l l o w i n g this r e a s o n i n g , genealogies of citizen- ship s h o u l d l o o k very different w h e n they focus o n these " o u t s i d e r " p e r s p e c t i v e s . 1 0

D o i n g history as genealogy entails active practices of selection; like all p r a c t i c es these are driven by one"s place a n d concern s in the world. T h u s while m y analyses a r e infused by historical epistemologies , it is c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s of late t w e n t i e t h- a n d early twenty-first-century A m e r i c a a n d E u r o p e t h a t serve as p o i n t s of d e p a r t u r e in m o s t of the c h a p t e r s . M y a p p r o a c h is t h a t of a p r o b l e m - d r i v e n " h i s t o r y of the p r e s e n t . " It d r a w s its i n s p i r a t i o n from m a n y sources, i n c l u d i n g J a m e s Baldwin. "History,'" Baldwin writes, " d o e s n o t refer merely, o r even principally, t o t h e p a s t . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e g r e a t force of history comes from t h e fact t h a t we c a r r y it within us a n d a r e u n c o n s c i o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d b y it in m a n y ways, a n d history is literally p r e s e n t in all we d o . " 1 1 Also p r o m i n e n t in my t h i n k i n g is the F a u l k n e r i a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t "the p a s t is never dead; i t ' s n o t even p a s t . " A histor y of t h e p r e s e n t rejects the conceit t h a t it is possible t o tell t h e p a s t " a s it w a s , " i n d e p e n d e n t of

9 Oti g e n e a l o g y see D e a n (1994), F o u c a u l t (1979b). 1 1 1 I believe this is w h a t E n g i n Isin tries t o d o in his Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship

(2002). T h a n k s to D e b C o h e n for r e m i n d i n g m e of this p o i n t . 1 1 Baldwin , cited i n F o n e r 2 0 0 2, p . ix.

10 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n c e r n s . 1 2 N o story can be told n o r any t h e o ry p r o p o s e d t h a t is n o t r e s p o n d i n g t o p r i o r (implicit o r explicit) q u e s t i o n s , a n d o u r q u e s t i o n s are always t h e p r o d u c t s of o u r s i t u a t ed selves. T o be sure , historical writing m u s t refer to "events, i r r u p t i o n s , discourses, a n d social p r a c t i c e s " that occur within "a p a r t i c u l a r time-space." B u t this in n o way negates t h a t it is "in fact a n activity t h a t is irrevocably linked to its c u r r e n t u s e s " ( D e a n 1994: 14).

F r o m this p o i n t of view, it is folly to try t o m a k e sense of the p r e s e n t w i t h o u t recognizing the historical stories t h a t live withi n it. L o o k i n g a t the p r e s e n t social w o r l d t h r o u g h time a n d space c h a n g e s n o t only w h a t we actually can see, b u t also t h e m e a n i n g of t h a t w o r l d . W e c a n n o t l o o k forward until we l o o k b a c k to learn h o w we c a m e to be w h o we are, a n d until we k n o w w h a t we h a v e lost, o r g a i n e d . 1 3 This is t h e m e a n i n g of w h a t I call causal n a r r a t i v i t y : the p r e s e n t is always an e p i s o d e in a m u c h longer story; it is unintelligible w i t h o u t e x p l o r i n g the t e m p o r a l a n d spatial n a r r a t i v e s t h a t c o m e before a n d m i g h t c o m e after, t h e r e b y c o n s t i t u t i n g its inner life (Somers 1996a, 1998).

Some critics w o r r y t h a t a history of t h e p r e s e n t is the same t h i n g as teleology, in which the p r e s e n t is viewed as t h e i n e x o r a b l e purposefu l e n d - p o i n t of history , a n d t h e p a s t is t h e necessary p r o l o g u e to t h e p r e s e n t . B u t p r o b l e m - d r i v e n histories of t h e present such as m i n e are j u s t the o p p o s i t e . Like p a t h - d e p e n d e n c e , they ask h o w - given m u l t i p l e possible r o u t e s , times, places, a n d b r a n c h e s - o u r p r e s e n t social w o r l d was cre- ated. Indeed, in a f u n d a m e n t a l l y antiteleological m o v e , my strategy is t o d e n a t u r a l i ze the p r e s e n t - to sho w t h a t things we t a k e as self-evident a n d necessary a r e in fact b u t c o n t i n g e n t historical o u t c o m e s ; they simply t a k e o n the a p p e a r a n c e of b e i n g t h e only possible reality. These a r e the perspectives t h a t I h a v e used to fashion the b o o k ' s genealogies a n d n a r r a t i v e s of citizenship - genealogies a n d n a r r a t i v e s w i t h causalities a n d m e a n i n g s t h a t only e m e r g e by l o o k i n g a t t h e p r e s e n t t h r o u g h some very long a n d very wide lenses.

I n d e e d , u n d e r l y i n g all of my w o r k has been the c e n t r a l i n t e r p l a y between history, ideas, a n d t h e o r y . A l t h o u g h I h a v e tried t o m a k e t h e m s t a n d o n their o w n , m a n y of t h e theoretical c o n c e p ts a n d epistemological a r g u m e n t s I hav e d e v e l o p e d h a v e been driven by empirical historical puzzles. M y e x p l o r a t i o n , for e x a m p l e , of a "historical e p i s t e m o l o g y of

1 2 T h e r e is a n e n o r m o u s l i t e r a t u r e on F o u c a u l t ' s uses of " g e n e a l o g y " a n d ' ; h i s t o r y of t h e p r e s e n t . " F o r especially e n l i g h t e n i ng discussions see D e a n (1994); D a v i d s o n (2001); G u t t i n g (1989); H a c k i n g (1979, 1990b); Stoler (1995, 2002).

1 3 Daniel M e n d e l s o h n (2006).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 11

concept formation'" is i n f o r m e d by m a n y of the same historical m e t h o d s that I use in my m o r e recognizably empirical research, t h u s m a k i n g the theoretical project a t onc e a historical sociology. A n d b e c a u s e I believe that u n d e r l y i ng m o s t macro-level social theor y is a particularistic view of historical events a n d causa l processes in the m a k i n g of t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , I have consistently a r g u e d t h a t t h e o r e t i c al renewal in social theory requires a s i m u l t a n e o u s historical retelling of t h a t e m b e d d e d m e t a n a r r a - tive of " A n g l o - A m e r i c a n citizenship t h e o r y " (see c h a p t e r s 5 a n d 7). F o r a sociology of rights , it is n o t possible t o privilege either t h e o r y or h i s t o r y; b o t h m u s t p r o c e e d at once.

M y discussion of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a in c h a p t e r 2 reveals i m p o r t a n t lessons a b o u t p r o b l e m - d r i v e n n a r r a t i v e , genealogy, a n d the h i s t o r y of the present. A t t h e time of the t r a g e d y , t h e h u r r i c a n e was generally perceived as a s h o c k i n g a n d unexpected event c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a l m o s t incomprehensible i n e p t i t u d e of F E M A in p a r t i c u l a r , a n d , m o r e gener- ally, of all levels of g o v e r n m e n t - local, state , a n d federal. B u t decon- structing t h e traged y reveals it to h a v e been neither u n e x p e c t e d n o r a n o m a l o u s - however s h o c k i n g . H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a was ( a nd is) p a r t of an o n g o i n g story, n o t a single event. I t was a n episode, as m u c h as a long c h a p t e r , in a n a l m o s t four-decades l o n g genealogy entailing the steady d i s a r t i c u l a t i o n of citizenship rights a n d civil society from their n o n c o n t r a c t u a l f o u n d a t i o n s a n d r e a t t a c h i n g t h e m to the c o n t r a c t u a l requisites of a m a r k e t - d r i v e n politics. All of the critical ingredient s t h a t went i n t o m a k i n g the t r a g e d y h a d been n u r t u r e d over a p e r i o d of decades by the p o w e r s a n d effects of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . T h e sight of so m a n y f o r g o t t e n N e w O r l e a n i a n s w i t h o u t the resources t o e v a c u a te the city was b u t a m o m e n t a r y s n a p s h o t in a steady proces s of increasing social exclusion a n d a n eviscerating of the publi c s p h e r e . O n t h e surface it b e g a n w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t ' s failure t o a d e q u a t e l y c o n s t r u c t a n d m a i n - tain the city's levees. A t the core, however , it w a s driven b y a n i d e a t i o n a l assault o n the idea of p o v e r t y as a social p r o b l e m , a n d poisoned w i t h the stigmatizing v e n o m of p e r s o n a l b l a m e a n d cries of d e p e n d e n t i m m o r a l - ity. A m i l e s t o n e w a s reached in the 1996 welfare bill t h a t r e m o v e d m u c h of the r e m a i n i n g b a r r i e r betwee n u n p r o t e c t e d citizens a n d full e x p o s u r e to an u n f o r g i v i n g a n d often u n a t t a i n a b l e l a b o r m a r k e t . O n l y by recon- structing this m u c h longer story of the d i s p l a c e m e nt of the n o n c o n t r a c - tual principles of solidaristic social p r o v i s i o n i n g by t h o s e of m a r k e t a n d c o n t r a c t , can we u n d e r s t a n d h o w a n d why t h o s e left b e h i n d in New O r l e a n s t o face the s t o r m a l o n e were already a rightless, stateless, a n d e x p e n d a b l e p o p u l a t i o n deeme d u n w o r t h y of the m u t u a l recognition due m o r a l e q u a l s . T h a t ' s why they h a d been left b e h i n d in t h e first place.

12 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

Citizenship has t o d a y b e c o m e a topic of overwhelming urgency. T h r o u g h o u t this volume I engage t h a t urgency by moving from Locke' s revolutionary narrative social i m a g i n a r y to the recent tragedy of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a . T h e range of perspectives I take should not be surprising in light of the b r e a d th of citizenship's recent impact on the world scene in the post-Cold W a r period. These decades have been c a u g h t in the crossfire of globalization, immigration , multiculturalism, nationalist resurgences,, a n d m a r k e t - d r i v en pressures to increasingly privatize the public world of citizenship. T h e positio n I t a k e in this b o o k is that questions such as whether immigration a n d globalization will decouple the n a t i o n - s t a t e from citizenship, or h u m a n rights from citizenship rights, or h o w such a catastrophic a n d preventable tragedy as t h a t of K a t r i n a could have h a p - pened, can best be answered historically. It is a m a n d a t e for critically rethinking the genealogies of citizenship's ascendancy in t a n d e m with the currently imperiled condition of citizenship a n d h u m a n rights.

The rediscovery of citizenship

Since being a w a k e n e d from a long d o r m a n c y at the end of the twetitieth c e n t u r y , studies of citizenship h a v e been m a k i n g u p for lost time at a b r e a t h t a k i n g p a c e . O v e r the c o u r s e of a few y e a r s , the field h a s p r o d u c e d a staggering a m o u n t of researc h a n d theoretical i n n o v a t i o n . T h e redis- covery has been a p r o d u c t of h i s t o r y a n d s c h o l a r s h i p . A l t h o u g h h i s t o r y played the g r e a t e r p a r t , t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of s c h o l a r s h i p h a s n o t been negligible. While n o single intellectual process or any p a r t i c u l a r event can be singled o u t as the catalyzing "citizenship m o m e n t , " s h o r t l y after its initial b u r s t o n t o t h e scene it w a s clear we were witnessing t h e birth of a new field of citizenship studies}4

F r o m on e disciplinary p o i n t of view in t h e social sciences, t h e process b e g a n when historical sociologists b e g an t o be frustrate d by the lack of fit between their theories a n d the seemingly u n p r e c e d e n t e d w o r l d events of the 1980s a n d 1990s. T h e i r d o m i n a n t s t a t e centrism h a d a l r e a d y been propelling t h e m t o w a r d new q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p of political i n s t i t u t i o ns to the e c o n o m y a n d civil society. It was a s h o r t step from there to h y p o t h e s i z i n g the s t a t e as causally implicated in m a r k e t relations, or as K a r l P o l a n y i (2001) conceptualize d it, to recognizing the necessary centrality of i n s t i t u t i o n a l e m b e d d e d n e s s . T h e r e were d e e p affinities between P o l a n y i ' s e x p l a n a t i o n for the A m e r i c a n N e w D e a l

1 4 In 1997 the n e w flagship j o u r n a l Citizenship Studies began p u b l i c a t i o n . See also Isin a n d T u r n e r (2002).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 13

and M a r s h a l l ' s analysis of citizenship - specifically, their m u t u a l focus o n the necessary c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p o w e r s of politics a n d civil society to r e c o n - figure the m a r k e t - d r i v e n inequalities of social class. This a p p r o a c h also nudged welfare state s t u d i es t o w a r d a b r o a d e r causal c o n c e p t i o n of political/legal d y n a m i c s as m e c h a n i s m s of equality , as well as t o w a r d a more sociologically inflected c o n c e p t i o n of citizenship.

C o m p a r a t i v e - h i s t o r i c a l sociology's rediscovery of citizenship was sig- naled by t h e w o r k of t h e leading s t a t e - f o r m a t i o n t h e o r i s t s of the 1970s a n d 1980s - M i c h a e l M a n n (1986, 1987) a n d C h a r l e s Tilly (1995a), in p a r t i c u l a r . M a n n focused especially on the m e c h a n i s m s a n d c o m p a r a t i v e processes by which citizenship was extende d in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y by state a n d d o m i n a n t class elites, while Tilly developed an empirical a n d sociological definition of citizenship as t h e "rights a n d m u t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s b i n d i n g state a g e n t s a n d a c a t e g o r y of p e r s o n s defined exclu- sively by their legal a t t a c h m e n t t o the same s t a t e " (Tilly 1995: 369). S u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s were also m a d e by h i s t o r i a ns a n d social scien- tists w h o c o m b i n e d their focus o n state f o r m a t i o n with researc h on class f o r m a t i o n . I n s t a n t classics, such as G a r e t h S t e d m a n J o n e s ' s (1983) essay on n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y English C h a r t i s m , d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t even the most iconic of w o r k i n g - c l a s s m o v e m e n t s at t h e height of the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n was m o t i v a t e d by d e m a n d s for p a r t i c i p a t o r y political inclu- sion a n d the legal rights of citizens, neither of which were reducibl e to class interests a l o n e . T h e s e were historical a c t o r s driven by collective expectations of political a n d legal entitlements b o r n of w o r k e r s ' self- identities as " F r e e b o r n E n g l i s h m e n . ' " 1 5 I n h e r i t e d f o r m u l a t i o n s were i n a d e q u a t e t o c a p t u r e this kin d of political agency, yet state-centric c o m p a r a t i v e - h i s t o r i c a l sociology coul d n o t p r o v i d e the necessary degree of f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m u l a t i o n . F i n d i n g a v o c a b u l a r y for these politically driven m o v e m e n t s led t o an e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e of rights - s o m e t h i n g long o u t s i d e t h e intellectual v o c a b u l a r y of the empirica l social sciences. This triggered a recognitio n t h a t it was primarily t h r o u g h t h e prism of their rights as citizens t h a t w o r k e r s c a m e to discover a n d articulate their interests in the first place. F o r c o m p a r a t i v e - h i s t o r i c a l sociologists (along with o t h e r historically m i n d e d social scientists a n d theoretically o r i e n t ed h i s t o r i a n s ) in the late 1980s a n d early 1990s, rec- ognizing w o r k i n g - c l a ss social m o v e m e n t s as expressions in p a r t of

1 3 See T h o m p s o n (1963) for the definitive analysis of pre-Chartist English working-class con- sciousness. Polanyi also focuses on C h a r t i s m as a classic example of a non-interest-based social m o v e m e n t that sought to reclaim die institutional relationships tha t the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n w a s wrenching away.

14 Genealogies of Citizenship

citizenship identities b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the n o w well-accepted focus o n state f o r m a t i o n with the s t u d y of class f o r m a t i o n (Barbale t 1988; G i d d e n s 1982; S o m e r s 1992, 1993, 1996b; B. S. T u r n e r 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 6

In a kind of parallel universe t o t h a t of historical sociology, the field of political t h e o r y b e g a n forging its own p a t h t o w a r d the rediscovery of citizenship in the 1960s a n d 1970s with a series of r e m a r k a b l e c h a n g es oriented t o w a r d a rediscovery of politics, civil society, a n d r e p u b l i c a n - ism. Its i m p e t u s was a powerful c r i t i q u e of the h e g e m o n y of b o t h utilita- r i a n i s m a n d classical political liberalism for their c o m m o n e r a s u r e of politics a n d c o m m u n i t y t h r o u g h the p o s t u l a t e of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e - political a n d p r e s o c i a l i n d i v i d u a l ( W o l i n 1960; R a w l s 1971; Sandel 1982, 1984). By resurrecting t h e l o n g - b u r i e d tenets of r e p u b l i c a n i s m , political theorists shifted their focus t o political identities a n d practices b a s e d n o t on the isolated self b u t in the c o n t e x t of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , civil society, a n d , inevitably, citizenship a n d m e m b e r s h i p ( C o h e n 1982; C o h e n a n d A r a t o 1992; M a e l n t y r e 1981, 1989; Oldfield 1990; T a y l o r 1989; W a l z e r 1983, 1988, 2005; Wolin 1960). Several ancillary new trends developed t h a t dovetailed with citizenship's focus o n m e m b e r s h i p , such as the new " c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , " a l s o based o n a critique of liberalism's excessive fixation on the i n d i v i d u a l (Belfah et al. 1985; Etzioni 1997; M a c l n t y r e 1981; Sandel 1982, 1984).

Historical eruptions

D e v e l o p m e n t s in political t h e o r y a n d the logical m a t u r a t i o n of c o m p a - rative-historical sociology were o n l y p a r t of t h e story of the rediscovery of citizenship. T h e o t h e r necessary c o m p o n e n t was - with p o e t i c justice - history itself. W i t h n u m e r o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s available, it is n o t necessary t o rehearse all t h e possible c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of social, political, a n d eco- nomic c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c o m b i n e d t o trigger a new a t t e n t i o n to t h e issue of citizenship. I will simply t o u c h o n some of those issues t h a t m o s t d r a m a t i c a l l y illustrat e h o w b r o a d was t h e s p e c t r u m of c o n c e r ns t h a t catalyzed the new citizenship s t u d i e s .

S o m e credit the decline of t h e welfare state in the 1980s for reviving a t t e n t i o n to the significance of social citizenship rights that h a d long been

1 , 1 T h a t it w a s as early as 1982 t h a t G i d d e n s p u b l i s h e d his i m p o r t a n t article on the c e n t r a l i t y of p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of citizenship rights p o i n t s to j u s t h o w a h e a d of the c u r v e h e w a s w i t h respect t o an intellectual m o v e m e n t t h a t only b e c a m e f a s h i o n a b l e a d e c a d e later. I n r e t r o s p e c t a n d with j u s t a h i n t of w h a t w a s t o follow, G i d d e n s , a l o n g with M a n n (1986, 1987) a n d B. S. T u r n e r (1986), were clearly h a r b i n g e r s of a scholarly r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of citizenship in g e n e ral a n d M a r s h a l l in p a r t i c u l a r .

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 15

taken for g r a n t e d (Leibfried a n d P i e r s o n 1995; Pierson 1994; C r o u c h 2001; Eder et al. 2 0 0 1 ; E s p i n g - A n d e r s e n et at. 2002; F r e e d l a n d 2 0 0 1 ; Huber a n d S t e p h e n s 2 0 0 1 ; Pierson 2 0 0 1 ; Procacci 2 0 0 1 ; S o m e r s a n d Block 2005). O t h e r s p o i n t t o the radical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e federal judiciary over t h e last q u a r t e r - c e n t u r y in the U S . in which a successful assault h a s been l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t virtually all the civil rights t h a t Marshall m a d e f o u n d a t i o n a l to t h e very possibility of d e m o c r a t i c citizen- ship rights. A c c o r d i n g t o on e of t o d a y ' s m o s t acclaimed legal s c h o l a rs "[tjo a degree t h a t h a s b e e n insufficiently a p p r e c i a t e d, a n d is in s o m e ways barely believable, t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y federal c o u r t s are f u n d a m e n - tally different from the federal c o u r t s of j u s t t w o decades a g o " (Sunstein 2003: A 2 ) . A n d b e c a u s e they h a v e a causally reciproca l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o each o t h e r , these challenges t o civil a n d legal rights can in n o way b e separated from t h o s e of political a n d social rights. L o n g - t e r m a t t a c k s on welfare a n d o t h e r forms of e n t i t l e m e n t ( M e a d 1997; M u r r a y 1984; O l a s k y 1992) also placed t h e b l a m e o n a n "excess" of d e m o c r a c y for the reckless spread of a system of " h a n d o u t s " (Crozier et al. 1 9 7 5 ) . 1 7

A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t international factors were the striking new patterns of immigration a n d movements of guest workers a n d migrant labor t h r o u g h o u t the global labor market . Large numbers of immigrants and their descendants have become p e r m a n e nt denizens of advanced indus- trial societies, yet the status of full citizenship remains either beyond reach or available in a less t h a n complete form (Baubock 1991, 1994; Baubock et al 1998; J o p p k e 1998; Soysal 1994). T h e permutations of this peculiar diaspora continue t o be wide-reaching a n d include the effects of ethnic differences on full political inclusion (Benhabib 2001, 2004; O o m m e n 1997a, 1997b). Often characterized as a conflict of particularistic identity movements asking for inclusion in (or in some cases withdrawal from) a polity defined by universalistic politico-juridical criteria, this has been theorized - a n d criticized - as a conflict between states t h a t practice ethnic citizenship versus those t h a t are built u p o n civic citizenship (Benhabib 2007a; Brubaker 1992; Rex 1996; Rex a n d D r u r y 1994; Schnapper 1998).

Regardless of a n a t i o n - s t a t e ' s j u r i d i c a l practices with respect to citizen- ship, p o r o u s n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s a n d global l a b o r m o v e m e n t s of i m m i - grants from p o o r to rich c o u n t r i e s , from p o s t c o l o n i a l societies to the m e t r o p o l i s , h a v e m a d e m o s t a d v a n c e d W e s t e r n societies irreversibly

" This reference to t h e T r i - L a t e r a l C o m m i s s i o n u n d e r s c o r e s t h e facf t h a t t h e e m e r g e n ce of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m as a social a n d political m o v e m e n t b e g a n lon g before R e a g a n ' s presidential t e n u r e . F o r its even earlier E u r o p e a n r o o t s in t h e 1950s. see M i r o w s k i 2 0 0 5 ; Mitchell 2005; P e c k 2008).

16 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

m u l t i c u l t u r a l ( B e n h a b i b 2002; H o l l i n g er 1995; L u k e s a n d J o p p k e 1999; R. Smit h 2003). A t t e n t i o n to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m has been triggered n o t only by new immigrant arrivals, but also by recognition of indigenous peoples a n d national minority groups w h o , despite having the formal status of citizenship, have nonetheless long been excluded from most of its rights and privileges (Benhabib 2004; J o p p k e 1998; Kymlicka 1995, 1997; Walzer 2005). T h e claims for full inclusion t h a t m a n y of these groups have expressed through social movements a n d other political activities often have been m a d e in terms of the rights a n d unfulfilled ideals a n d obligations o n the p a r t of the governing polity - a language immediately recognizable as t h a t of the inclusionary claims of citizenship (Alexander 2006; C o h e n and A r a t o 1992). W h e n specifically focused o n rights to an increasing share of the economic a n d social pie, these claims to redistribution have b r o u g h t atten- tion to Marshall's famous social citizenship (Fraser a n d G o r d o n 1998; H a n d l e r 2004, 2006; Kessler-Harris 2001; Twine 1994) in relationship t o the identity politics of recognition (Fraser 1997; F r a s e r a n d H o n n e t h 2003; Isin a n d W o o d 1999).

One of the m o s t interesting challenges for citizenship has been t h a t of "post-nationalism" (Bosniak 2006; Cohen 1999; Jacobsen; Sassen 1996, 1998, 2001, 2006a; Soysal 1994). Several iterations of the idea h a v e been generated by transformational dilemmas of the last decades. Should there be a new kind of citizenship t h a t attaches to the formation of the E u r o p e a n Union? Is there n o w such a thing as a " E u r o p e a n citizenship" (Balibar 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Bellamy a n d Warleigh 2001)? If so, should it endow dual citizenship to the holder w h o maintains her original nationa l status? As a "supranational" legal entity, should the E u r o p e a n U n i o n be able to t r u m p the citizenship laws, rights, a n d obligations of individual n a t i o n - s t a t e s ? 1 8 If so, what is left of the E u r o p e a n system (the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia) t h a t defined nation-states by their sovereign territorial boundaries a n d laws?

A second r e a s o n for t h e i n t e r e s t in p o s t - n a t i o n a l i s t citizenship is t h e far-reaching i m p l i c a t i o ns of g l o b a l i z a t i o n , m o s t i m p o r t a n t of which h a s been w h a t some believe t o be the shift of p o w e r away from n a t i o n - s t a t e s t o w a r d the a b s t r a c t , d e c e n t e r e d global m a r k e t p l a c e , w h e r e business a n d finance capital o p e r a t e in a z o n e outside the reach of any global polity or internationa l political/legal entity (Brysk 2004; Brysk a n d Shafir 2004; H a b e r m a s 2001; O n g 2003, 2006; Sassen 2001, 2006a, 2006b). Some scholars argue t h a t the global m a r k e t is functionally efficient n o t only for economic t r a n s a c t i o n s , b u t also for the well-being of citizens m o r e generally. T u r n e r (1990: 195), for example, writes t h a t "the p r o b l e m

1 8 T h i s is t h e w o r r y m a n y h a v e a b o u t t h e E u r o p e a n C o u r t of Justice in p a r t i c u l a r .

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness 17

with Marshall's theory is t h a t it is n o longer relevant to a period of disor- ganized capitalism since it assumed nation-state a u t o n o m y in which govern- ments were relatively i m m u n e from pressures within the world-system of capitalist nations." In response to this, there have developed theories of "cosmopolitan citizenship," w h a t H a b e r m a s (2001) calls a "post-national constellation," a n d Bosniak (2006) a "denationalized" citizenship (e.g. Archibugi a n d Held 1995; Benhabib 2007b; C o h e n 1999; H a b e r m a s 2001; Heater 1996; Held 1995, 1999; Held a n d M c G r e w 2002; Hutchings a n d D a n n r e u t h e r 1999; Kymlicka 1997; Linklater 1990, 2000; N u s s b a u m a n d Cohen 1996; Sassen 1996, 1998; Walzer 1997).

T h e explosive r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t we a r e living in a new w o r l d of m u l t i - culturalism h a s p o s e d a s t r o n g challenge to t r a d i t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of the rights a n d o b l i g a t i o n s of citizenship ( J o p p k e a n d L u k e s 1999; K y m l i c k a 1 9 9 5 ) . 1 9 W h i l e d e m a n d s for social inclusion h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y been m a d e in t h e n a m e of t h e p r i n c i p le of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n, m a n y new social m o v e m e n t s h a v e mobi l i z e d u n d e r t h e right to r e c o g n i t i on - t h e r i g h t t o b e acknowledged by o t h e r s as a m o r a l equal - despite g r o u p differences (Benhabib 2002; F r a s e r 1997; F r a s e r a n d H o n n e t h 2003; T a y l o r a n d G u t m a n n 1992). S u p p o r t e r s of these identity m o v e m e n t s a r g u e t h a t they are piercing t h e illusory veils of (false) universality a n d eq u al rights to reveal n o t M a r x ' s conflictual e c o n o m i c f o u n d a t i o n s b u t the d e e p fissures of r a c e, gender , sexuality, a n d ethnicity t h a t c o m p r i s e t h e fault lines of c o n t e m p o r a r y a d v a n c e d political cultures . I d e n t i t y politics, from this perspective, a r e rightly p u s h i n g the limits of political/juridical citizenship a n d forcing it t o a c c o m m o d a t e such novelties as group rights based o n g r o u p difference, the rights of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o practice diversity, and the rights t o r e c o g n i t i o n a n d p r o t e c t i o n for different expressions of sexuality ( B e n h a b i b 1996, 2002; F r a s e r a n d H o n n e t h 2003; F r a s e r 1997; K y m l i c k a 1995, 1997; N u s s b a u m 2000; O k i n et al. 1999; Y o u n g 1990, 2000). T h e new a t t e n t i o n to issues of inclusion, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d iden- tity has t h u s vastly e x p a n d e d t h e legitimate scope of citizenship studies to include g e n d e r , sexuality, r a c e, a n d even e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m - t o n a m e j u s t a few (e.g. Siim 2000; Isin a n d W o o d 1999; Lister 1997; V o e t 1998).

T h e intense a t t e n t i o n in the U n i t e d States t o recent S u p r e m e C o u r t decisions c o n c e r n i n g sexuality a n d racial diversity p r o v e j u s t h o w deep a

1 9 M a r s h a l l himself w a s not i n n o c e n t of these issues, d e s p i t e c l a i m s to t h e c o n t r a r y , a n d his essays in M a r s h a l l (1981) reveal t h a t h e h a d for y e a r s been c o g n i z a n t of h o w a t t e n t i o n to race a n d ethnicity w o u l d i m p o s e significant a d j u s t m e n t s o n his earlier w o r k . I n d e e d h e m a k e s s u c h a n a d j u s t m e n t i n s o m e of these l a t e r essays o n r a c e a n d p o w e r .

18 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

challenge these claims for recognition pose for existing definitions of citizenship. Critics of identit y politics (from b o t h the left a n d t h e right) are a l a r m e d by the specter of g r o u p rights; t h e focus o n difference a n d identity, they w o r r y , t h r e a t e n s t o tear a s u n d e r the principle of universality a n d e g a l i t a r i a n i sm t h a t forms the very f o u n d a t i o n of m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c citizenship ( S h a c h a r 2 0 0 1 ; W a l z e r 2005). T h e idea t h a t p r i - m o r d i a l a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loyalties to p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s could t r u m p the a t t a c h m e n t t o n a t i o n a l m e m b e r s h i p in a polity held in common is felt by m a n y liberals to t h r e a t e n a " n e o n a t i o n a l i s m " in which " q u e s t i o n s of identity eclipse t h o s e of citizenship a n d d e m o c r a c y " ( M o r l e y a n d R o b i n s 1995: 186). O t h e r s f a m o u s l y h a ve w o r r i e d t h a t s u p p o r t for m u l t i - cultur al i sm entails t h e "twilight of c o m m o n d r e a m s " (Gitlin 1995) a n d the "disuniting of A m e r i c a " (Schlesinger 1992, 1998). E v e n feminists with otherwise s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t s h a v e d e b a t e d this issue of "recog- nition versus r e d i s t r i b u t i o n " ( B e n h a b i b 1995; F r a s e r 1997; Y o u n g 2000). H o w e v e r o ne views t h e p h e n o m e n o n , a c e n t r a l issue has emerged in t h e field of citizenship studies. A c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p , if n o t an irresolvable conflict, exists between citizenship a n d identity a n d d e m a n d s d e e p intel- lectual e n g a g e m e n t (Isin 1992, 2002; Isin a n d W o o d 1999; Mouffe 1995; Preuss 1995; Procacci a n d S a l a m o n e 2000; R a j c h m a n 1995; T r e n d 1996).

One of the most significant catalysts to citizenship's rediscovery was the recuperation in the 1980s a n d early 1990s of the idea of civil society. T h e vehicles for this were b o t h practice-based and theory-driven (e.g. Alexander 1993, 2006; C a l h o u n 1993; C o h e n and A r a t o 1992; Janoski 1998; K e n n e d y 1990, 1991, 2002; Kymlicka a n d N o r m a n 1995; Seligman 1992; Somers 1995b, 1999, 2001; Taylo r 1990; Wolfe 1989). Revisionist approache s to West E u r o p e a n democratization focused new attention o n the i m p o r t a n c e of the three citizenship concepts - civil society, the public sphere, a n d civil political participation (Beiner 1995; H a b e r m a s [1962] 1989; P u t n a m 1993; Somers 1993, 1994a; Walzer 1995). T h e processes that captured the world's attention included the political a n d h u m a n rights achievements of the civil society movements in Latin America, the trade unionist Solidarity move- ment in Poland, C h a r t e r 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the widespread anti- authoritarian revolutions across Easter n Europe, m o r e broadly - especially the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, a n d the collapse of the Soviet state.

In all of these, civil society p l a y e d a role as b o t h a n o r m a t i v e ideal a n d a practical site for d e m o c r a t i c social a c t i o n . It was exciting to discover a political v o c a b u l a r y free of the m a n i c h a e a n a n d stifling Cold W a r d i c h o t - omies between state a n d m a r k e t . Civil society c a m e to be seen as a " t h i r d s p h e r e , " n o t reducible to either t h e r u t h l e ss i n d i v i d u a l i sm of u n r e g u l a t e d capitalism or t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c a p p a r a t u s of the c o m m u n i s t s t a t e . This

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 19

c o n t r i b u t e d mightily to a new a p p r e c i a t i o n of citizenship as a social p h e n o m e n o n , which b r o k e a p a r t seemingly i m m u t a b l e , age-old obstacles to a sociology of citizenship a n d m a d e available for future d e m o c r a t i z e r s an empirical e x p l a n a t i o n for t h e success of the r e v o l u t i o n s t h a t over- turned c o m m u n i s m . In this effort, civil society theorists p o i n t e d to the significance of social organization a n d associational life - b o t h formal (e.g. civic clubs) a n d i n f o r m a l ( u n d e r g r o u n d c o m m u n i t i e s of s h a r e d resistance) (see P u t n a m 2000; a n d c h a p t e r 6, this v o l u m e ) . T h e r e were social n e t w o r k s , l a b o r a s s o c i a t i o n s, a n d c o m m u n i t y solidarities t h a t provided b o t h the a c t u a l a n d the n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n s for the t h i r d sphere of civil society. It was p a r t of a r e i n v i g o r a t e d citizenship ideal associated with t h e " d y n a m i c s of c o n t e n t i o n " ( M c A d a m et al. 2001). It was a novel political a n d social t e r r a i n , on e t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e spring- b o a r d for those p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s a n d m u l t i p l e forms of m o b i l i z a t i o n that o v e r t u r n e d oppressive regimes in t h e n a m e of a p a r t i c i p a t o r y citizen- ship a n d d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c life.

Above all, then, it was t h e rediscovery of civil society b o t h intellec- tually a n d as a practical site for d e m o c r a t i c social a c t i o n that b r o k e a p a r t seemingly i m m u t a b l e , age-old obstacles to a sociology of citizenship. T h e hegemony of t h e great d i c h o t o m y between publi c a n d p r i v a t e gave way t o a long suppressed third sphere, a n d t h e r e emerged for social t h e o ry this new social site of citizenship p r a c t i c e s. E v e n m o r e significant is t h a t these practices were expressed in the voice of b o t h individual rights a n d civic p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e y were t a k e n from b o t h t h e liberal a n d r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s a n d reflected the voices of p e o p l e n o t as isolated individuals, but as citizens w h o s e identities were s h a p e d by their r e l a t i o n s h i ps t o others. O n l y from the site of t h e social coul d these voices be h e a r d w i t h - out being a b s o r b e d b a c k i n t o either the c o m p e t i t i ve c h a o s of m a r k e t governance or t h e d o m i n a t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a t e . A l a s , this was n o t to last; t h e lifespan of civil society as a q u a s i - a u t o n o m o u s third sphere was brief indeed. I n s h o r t o r d e r , as I a r g u e in c h a p t e r s 6 a n d 7, civil society as a t h e o r e t i c a l rallying cry r e t u r n e d t o its original r o o t s as a site of civic o p p o s i t i o n to t h e t y r a n n y of the c o m m u n i s t state (in Easter n Europe) a n d the welfare state (in the W e s t ) , a n d fully in alliance with the market.

Theorizing citizenship

In chapter 2 , 1 begin by suggesting tha t the story of Hurricane Katrina is a parable of citizenship in America today. Deconstructing Katrina - excavating the hidden stories of w h a t came before it, exposing the well-guarded

20 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

a s s u m p t i o n s a n d submerged practices th at belied the public alibis for so m a n y lost a n d a b a n d o n e d lives - reveals m u c h a b o u t the fragility of citizenship rights t o d a y a n d the costs of their erosion. But, as I h o p e will become evident, K a t r i n a also serves as a p a r a b l e for this b o o k ' s central theoretical precepts a n d for those concerns t h a t drive m y current explora- tions a n d theorizations. R a t h e r t h a n try to spell these o u t in a single g r a n d "theory of citizenship," here I simply highlight several aspects of my a p p r o a c h , e l a b o r a te on some of my theoretical precepts, a n d place them on the wider canvas of citizenship studies. A l t h o u g h it is entirely a r b i t r a r y , I have decided to focus o n five areas.

1. The question of borders. W h e r e a s citizenship research is usually divided between those w h o look a t the rights of citizens in the "soft inside," a n d those w h o focus on n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s a n d the "excluded h a r d o u t s i d e " faced by noncitizens, I emphasize internal border s of exclusion within the n a t i o n s t a t e . 2 0

2. Normativity and empirical social science. W h e r e a s citizenship studies often reflect a division of l a b o r between n o r m a t i v e philosophical scholarship a n d empirical social science, m y a p p r o a c h to citizenship a n d rights underlines their indivisibility; citizenship a n d citizenship rights are at once n o r m a t i v e a n d empirical.

3. What is citizenship? W h e r e a s m a n y theories of citizenship are o r g a n - ized a r o u n d a single n o r m a t i v e political theory (for example, liberal- ism o r republicanism), m y a p p r o a c h eschews a single th eo ry in favor of the capacious hybrid of the right to h av e rights.

4. What is civil society? As a n "essentially c o n t e s t e d c o n c e p t , " m u l t i p l e definitions of civil society h a v e vied to m a k e critical c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the new citizenship studies. I define civil society as " t h e site of citizenship," a n d discuss it in terms of " t h e fragile centrality of the social."

5. An architectonics of citizenship: a triadic variable for comparative empirical analysis. W h e r e a s m a n y empirical studies of citizenship p o r - tray it as a status constructe d o u t of a t w o - p a r ty relationship between the individual a n d t h e state, I argue, by contrast, t h a t citizenship is essentially the n a m e we use for a triadic assemblage of shifting institu- tional a n d discursive relationships a n d struggles for p o w er a m o n g state, m a r k e t a n d civil society.

B a l i b a r (2004b) a n d B o s n i a k (2006).

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness 21

Global, national, or internal borders?

Citizenship a t its m o s t basic is a m e c h a n i s m for inclusion a n d exclusion, and t h u s a m e a n s for establishing o r p r o h i b i t i n g m e m b e r s h i p in political entities t h a t v a r y in scale from s u p r a n a t i o n a l t o local. This m a k e s citizen- ship studies a " t w o - s i t e d " research field, w i t h m o s t s c h o l a r s h i p i n h a b i t i n g primarily on e or t h e o t h e r site. T h e first s t r a d d l e s a n d stretches a c r o s s the geopolitical a n d c o n c e p t u a l b o r d e r s of citizenship's exclusionary lines of d e m a r c a t i o n . This site is p o p u l a t e d inter alia by scholars of i m m i g r a t i o n , i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a b o r m i g r a t i o n , guest w o r k e r policies, p o s t - colonial e t h n i c m i g r a t i o n , g l o b a l i z a t i o n, p o s t - n a t i o n a l i s m , a n d t r a n s n a - tional citizenship. Call this t h e " i n s i d e / o u t s i d e " site of citizenship studies, for it focuses o n h o w citizenship serves as a m e c h a n i s m to d i s t r i b u t e people a m o n g political entities, as well as on h o w t h e criteria a r e e s t a b - lished for these rules a n d practices of d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d exclusion. Citizenship's second researc h site can loosely be called the "inside/ interior" one, for it asks the essential question of what is citizenship's meaning a n d w h a t are the substantive benefits a n d costs, the rights (if any) a n d obligations, that accrue to those w h o already possess its status - that is, those w h o are its legal citizen-members. With the exception of my attention to the epistemology of h u m a n rights, I focus o n the site of citizenship's interior meaning.

Let m e say i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t this division of l a b o r b e t w e e n citizenship sites is d e m o n s t r a b l y p o r o u s . It w o u l d be difficult, for e x a m p l e , for studies of "illegal" i m m i g r a n t s q u a w o u l d - b e citizens t o focus exclusively on m e m b e r s h i p criteria a n d exclusionary policies w i t h o u t a t t e n t i o n t o the benefits a n d r e s o u r c e s t h a t h o l d o u t such p r o m i s e t o the excluded. I n m y own w o r k , t h e division of l a b o r h a s b e c o m e even m o r e b l u r r e d , its p o r o u s n e s s m o r e p r o n o u n c e d , a s t h e exclusions of exteriority a t the b o r d e r s a r e increasingly b e i n g grafted o n t o i n t e r i o r m e m b e r s h i p sites. As I suggest in m y a r g u m e n t a b o u t h o w the citizens of N e w O r l e a n s were m a d e stateless by t h e m a n - m a d e t r a g e d y of K a t r i n a , the b o r d e r s a n d b o u n d a r i e s o n c e used solely as externa l d e m a r c a t i o n s designed t o exclude people from n a t i o n - s t a t e e n t r y are increasingly e x p a n d i n g to t h e center of o u r polities, c r e a t i n g s h a r p i n t e r i o r b o r d e r s of i n t e r n a l social a n d political exclusion (see especially B o s n i a k 2006; a n d B a l i b a r 2004b, for the E u r o p e a n d i m e n s i o n s of this p h e n o m e n o n , as well as the m a n y socio - logical analyses of the new p h e n o m e n a of g a t e d c o m m u n i t i e s in A m e r i c a ) . R e s e m b l i n g a fractal d e v o l u t i o n of n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s , this type of i n t e r n a l a p a r t h e i d is increasing in this age of g l o b a l i z a t i o n , when " w i n n e r s " a n d " l o s e r s " are d i s t r i b u t e d n o t exclusively between

22 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

n a t i o n - s t a t e s , b u t equally within single n a t i o n - s t a t e s . T h e r e is an i m p o r - tant i n t e r a c t i o n betwee n i n t e r n a l a n d external b o r d e r s , however, which c a n n o t be ignored since it further c o n t r i b u t e s t o i n t e r n al social exclusion. While empirical e c o n o m i c studies differ in h o w m u c h i m m i g r a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s to wage d e p r e s s i o n , t h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n b u t t h a t it is used as a check o n the p o w e r s of citizen-worker s t o organize i n t o u n i o n s , t o d e m a n d liveable wages, a n d to secure a m i n i m a l l y n o n d e g r a d i n g quality of life. While they of h a v e n o real r i g h t to have rights, illegal i m m i g r a n t s are still " w e l c o m e d " i n t o o u r e c o n o m y where their presence h a s the effect of suppressin g the rights of citizen-workers . T h e y are in effect i n d e n t u r e d servants - a t onc e rightless a n d exploited. C h a p t e r 2 engages these internal b o r d e r s of social exclusion that are being increasingly p r o d u c e d by the e x p a n d i n g m a r k e t i z a t i o n a n d c o n t r a c t u a l i z a t i o n of citizenship.

Normative, empirical, or both?

Citizenship studies t o d a y a r e n o t a b l e for j u s t h o w m u c h they are divided between t h o s e w h o p r i m a r i l y write n o r m a t i v e political t h e o r y , p h i l o s o - p h y , a n d legal t h e o r y, a n d those w h o s e w o r k is explicitly empirical. In general, n o r m a t i v e work tends to be driven by recurring concerns in moral a n d political p h i l o s o p h y , while empirical research is m o r e p r o b l e m - driven (which explains w h y it is less likely to have crisp philosophical moorings a n d m o r e likely to resemble a bricolage of history, political science, economics a n d sociology). In the social sciences, where there is a constitutive m a n d a t e t o avoid n o r m a t i v i t y , a n d by implication theories of rights, it is h a r d ly surprising t h a t sociologists tend to confine themselves t o generating causal e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d / o r cultural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of spe- cific empirical p r o b l e m s in citizenship f o r m a t i o n a n d rights m o r e gener- ally. This split between t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d the empirical s h o u ld n o t be overstated; the b o r d e r s between t h e m a r e also p o r o u s a n d there a r e of course those whose wor k e n c o m p a s s e s b o t h sites, especially E t i e n ne Balibar (1994, 2004a, b ) , Seyla B e n h a b i b (2001, 2004, 2007a, b), L i n d a Bosniak (2006), Engi n Isin (2002), Will K y m l i c k a (2001, 1995), B a n t i n g a n d K y m l i c ka (2006), Jeff A l e x a n d e r (2006), a n d Bryan T u r n e r (1993, 2 0 0 6 ) . 2 1 1 call a t t e n t i o n to this division of labor because it precludes m u c h

O t h e r leading voices in this g r o u p i n c l u d e C o h e n a n d A r a t o (1992), F r a s e r a n d G o r d o n ( 1 9 9 7 , 1 9 9 8 ) , Lukes (2004, 2006). a n d H a b e r m a s (1996. 2001). A m o n g the m o s t p r o m i n e n t empirical voices in citizenship studies a r e M a n n {1986, 1987), B r u b a k e r (1992). Soysal (1994). Sassen (2006), a n d Tilly f 1995. 199S).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 23

conversation between the two k i n d s of citizenship w o r k , which has left a m a r k e d imprint on t h e theoretical o u t p u t . T h e r e are exceptions, of course. Tilly r e c o u n t s an incident in which he c o m m e n t e d on R o b e r t D a h l ' s (2000) definition of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship by p o n d e r i n g w h e t h e r D a h l ' s philosophically n o r m a t i v e definition should be rejected because it was "empirically e m p t y , " in t h a t n o state or political c o m m u n i t y h a d ever fully met its r e q u i r e m e n t s . O r d o we justify it because it sets a s t a n d a r d against which we can a r r a y real political a r r a n g e m e n t s or even ask, " W h a t political a r r a n g e m e n t s are w o r t h sacrificing for?" (Tilly 1995: 3 7 0 ) . 2 2 This model of cross-conversational query could be m o r e frequently e m u l a t e d by social scientists.

M y own t h i n k i n g a n d writing has been equally shaped by n o r m a t i v e philosophy a n d by empirical analysts, which is evident in my efforts to speak in b o t h voices. B u t it is n o t only an a b s t r a c t c o m m i t m e n t t o bring them t o g e t h e r t h a t drives my a p p r o a c h . It is also because citizenship is, willy-nilly, b o t h a n o r m a t i v e a n d a n empirical c o n c e p t . 2 j Even t h o s e empirically drive n scholar s w h o q u e s t i o n t h e a d v a n t a g e s of i n t r o d u c i n g n o r m a t i v i t y i n t o citizenship studies usually c o n c e d e t h a i it is a l r e a d y there a n d c a n n o t be e x p u n g e d . Social action is shaped as m u c h by narratives, m y t h s , i d e a t i o n a l regimes, a n d c u l t u r a l codes as it is by sociology's m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l causal suspects, such as the e c o n o m y , t h e state, the class s t r u c t u r e , a n d so o n (Somers a n d G i b s o n 1994). T h e case for n o r m a t i v i t y is even s t r o n g e r when we recognize the causal force of n o r m a t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s . Citizenship, however m u c h an empirical insti- tution of g o v e r n a n c e , is perceived as a desideratum a n d a g o o d , a n d these n o r m a t i v e qualities h a v e causal p o w e r s .

" I d e a t i o n a l e m b e d d e d n e s s " is the term F r e d Block a n d I use to c a p t u r e the causal p o w e r s of ideas a n d i d e a t i o n a l regimes in e m b e d d i n g , c o n - structing, d e c o n s t r u c t i n g , a n d t r a n s f o r m i n g m a r k e t s , a n d m a r k e t rela- tionships (e.g. with t h e state), over the last four decade s (Somers a n d Block 2005). R e c o g n i z i ng t h e degree t o which i d e a s , beliefs, m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s , a n d p u b l i c n a r r a t i v e s actually inform the very " m a t e r i a l " d y n a m i c s t h a t we hav e t e nde d t o privilege in causal a r g u m e n t s allows me to d i s p o s e of the very distinctio n between " i d e a f a n d ' ' m a t e r i a F

F o r Tilly, " r i g h ts c\is1 w h e n o n e p a r t y can effectively insist thai .inoiher deliver g o o d s , services or p r o t e c t i o n s a n d third p a r l i e s will act t o reinforce (or ai least not to h i n d e r ) their delivery" (1998: 56). O n t h e n o r m a t i v i t y of the m a r k e t , see especially Zelizer (1997, 2005).

24 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

interests, a s s u m i n g the c o n c e p t of interest to d e n o t e a m o t i v a t i o n a l force inherent in a p e r s o n ' s s t r u c t u r a l location a n d practices of inten- tionality. T h e w o r k i n g - c l a ss social m o v e m e n t s for citizenship rights a t the h e a r t of my historical r e s e a r c h o n English citizenship f o r m a t i o n , for e x a m p l e, were m o t i v a t e d by n o r m a t i v e ideas of equality, freedom, justice, fairness, solidarity, a n d the equa l rule of law. T o be sure , the actual d e v e l o p m e n t a l processes of these m o v e m e n t s d e p e n d e d o n m a n y o p p o r t u n i t y s t r u c t u r e s , such as t h e p o r o u s " m u l t i p l e - u s e " s t r u c t u r e of English law, civil society's a u t o n o m y from the m a r k e t a n d state, a n d p a r t i b l e family i n h e r i t a n c e p a t t e r n s . B u t it is ideas a n d ideals t h a t m o v e people, a n d fighting to achieve t h e rights of citizenship is o ne way t o a t least partiall y realize those ideas/ideals . W i t h o u t such m o t i v a t i n g ideas and e x p e c t a t i o n s , these s t r u c t u r a l features w o u l d be causally inert. A t t e m p t i n g to p u r g e these p o w e r s from theories of citizenship w o u l d n o t only be futile; it w o u l d also m a k e t h e m less t h a n fully intelligible a n d incompletely t h e o r i z e d .

This n o r m a t i v e aspect of citizenship is m o s t a p p a r e n t in the d i m e n s i o n of identity f o r m a t i o n . A s a m e c h a n i s m of m e m b e r s h i p d i s t r i b u t i o n , citizenship has c u l t u r a l , i d e n t i t a r i a n , a n d practical i m p l i c a t i o n s . C u l t u r a l l y , m e m b e r s h i p a n d social inclusion give identity a distinct form a n d m e a n i n g . H e n c e M a r s h a l l (1992: 6, 8) c h a r a c t e r i z e s social citizenship n o t as i n c o m e t r a n s f e r s or quantifiabl e e c o n o m i c benefits b u t as a m a t t e r of social r e c o g n i t i o n a n d full inclusion in the b o d y politic. D i t t o J u d i t h S h k t a r (1991): in her discussion of the relative i m p o r t a n c e of the practical exercise of citizenship rights versus their c u l t u r al a n d symbolic i m p l i c a t i o n s for identity, she d e m o n s t r a t e s h o w the c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g of citizenship a n d t h e identity of inclusion they e n d o w a p p e a r t o significantly outweigh its p r a c t i c a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . P e o p l e a p p e a r t o b e m o t i v a t e d t o avoi d the s t i g m a of social exclusion associated w i t h being "second-class citizens"' w i t h o u t t h e right to v o t e , m o r e t h a n they a r e c o m m i t t e d t o a c t u a l ly exercising t h o s e rights t h a t citizenship c o n f e r s . 2 4

T h e voices of the Ieft-behind of N e w O r l e a n s tell us a lot a b o u t the s t r e n g t h of this n o r m a t i v e b o n d b e t w e e n identity a n d citizenship. F o r t h e K a t r i n a survivors interviewed by t h e m e d i a after their p r o l o n g e d o r d e a l s a n d days of a b a n d o n m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n w h a t so u n d e r s t a n d a b l y m i g h t have been a n g e r expressed as A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s betraye d by racism, the shock a n d d e s p a i r they expressed a t being a b a n d o n e d were those of citizenship b e t r a y e d . Jt a p p e a r s that at this m o m e n t of existential

In a d d i t i o n t o S h k l a r . S m i t h ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 9 9 9 ) a r g u e s t h a t slavery served 1 his c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e of creating i d e n t i t a r i a n feelings of inclusion o v e r a n d a g a i n s t these excluded o t h e r s .

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 25

crisis, their a t t a c h m e n t to citizenship-based identities t r u m p e d t h o s e of difference-based identities of race a n d class. T h r o u g h the concept of n a r r a t i v e identity, I a r g u e t h a t citizenship identities a r e s h a p e d t h r o u g h n a r r a t i v e s of m e m b e r s h i p rights o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h (or lost despite) strug- gle a n d h a r d s h i p ( S o m e r s 1992, 1994a). T h e K a t r i n a story gives heft to the p o w e r of n a r r a t i v e s to s h a p e o u r sense of w h o we are - especially the n a r r a t i v e of b e l o n g i n g t h r o u g h m e m b e r s h i p . I d e n t i t y is b o t h c o n s t i t u t i ve a n d a p r o d u c t of citizenship i n s t i t u t i o n s , practices, a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s , even w h e n - o r p e r h a p s especially when - the rights of citizenship are not delivered, as in N e w O r l e a n s , late A u g u s t 2005. Historically, n a t i o n and citizenship h a v e w o r k e d t o g e t h e r , or c o - p r o d u c e d , t h e k i n d of m e a n - ingful identification tied u p with political m e m b e r s h i p . In medieval cities and in the p e r i o d of E u r o p e a n n a t i o n - s t a t e f o r m a t i o n , citizenship d o m i - nated n a t i o n as t h e d o m i n a n t affective source of m e a n i n g (Somers 1994a, 1995c). A m o n g A m e r i c a ' s white p o p u l a t i o n t o d a y , a n d in c o n t r a s t t o the m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s , p a t r i o t i c a t t a c h m e n t to n a t i o n is increasingly displacing c o m m i t m e n t to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights as the p r i - m a r y source of m e a n i n g a n d identity f o r m a t i o n , as I discuss in c h a p t e r 3. E m b r a c i n g b o t h n o r m a t i v e a n d empirical a p p r o a c h e s allows me, for p u r p o s e s of analysis a n d clarity, t o d i s a r t i c u l a te i n t o distinct c o n c e p t s t h e t w o d i m e n s i o n s of m y definition of citizenship a n d citizen- ship rights.

What is citizenship? The right to have rights

In line with A r e n d t ' s m o s t D e l p h i c of p h r a s e s , citizenship is a b o u t h a v i n g the right t o h a v e rights - n o t any single civil, j u r i d i c a l , o r even social right, b u t t h e p r i m a r y r i g h t of recognition, inclusion, a n d m e m b e r s h i p in b o t h political a n d civil society. 1 read this as a r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the formal rights (e.g. civil r i g h t s, political rights) a t t a c h e d t o t h e legal status of citizen, versus t h e right t o h u m a n p e r s o n h o o d - r e c o g n i t i o n as a m o r a l e q u a l , t h a t is - e n d o w e d by full inclusion in a social a n d political b o d y . Implici t in this c o n c e p t i o n of citizenship is a c r i t i q u e of classical liberalism's c o n c e p t i o n of rights as possessions o w n e d by a l r e a d y fully c o n s t i t u t e d h u m a n beings - p e r s o n s whose o r i g i n a t i n g a n d s u s t a i n i n g o n t o l o g y r e m a i n s mysteriously a m b i g u o u s , w h e t h e r simply a given p a r t of the " s t a t e of n a t u r e , " o r a being whose r i g h t s - b e a r i ng s t a t u s is a d d u c e d by t h e L o c k e a n capacity t o "mix o n e ' s l a b o r w i t h t h e soil" ( S h a p i r o 1995). O n e t h i n g we d o k n o w is t h a t the r i g h t s - b e a r e r is ontologically presocial a n d prelegal a n d the rights r e m a i n " n a t u r a l , " w i t h o u t institu- tional f o u n d a t i o n s , w i t h o u t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w i t h o u t m e m b e r s h i p .

26 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

F o r A r e n d t the tragedy of this e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u ry liberalism is t h a t t h e statelessness t h a t p a v e d the w a y t o the actual historical N a z i genocid e also represent s liberalism's highest ideals of a b s o l u t e freedom from polit- ical belonging. A s she so p o i g n a n t l y explains, to effectively m a k e the w o r l d safe for genocide, the G e r m a n s c r e a t e d a p o p u l a t i o n of stateless people by deprivin g Jews of n a t i o n a l i t y a n d citizenship. Hence, they m a d e the N u r e m b e r g Laws o n e of their earliest o r d e r s of business. T h e Nazis u n d e r s t o o d all t o o well t h a t statelessness w o u l d deprive the Jews of m e m b e r s h i p in a political c o m m u n i t y . Statelessness also deprive d them of t h e very qualities t h a t m a d e them recognizably h u m a n . It w o u l d t r a n s f o r m t h e m from fellow h u m a n s i n t o the " s c u m of the e a r t h " - G o e b b e l s ' t e r m e v o k i n g n o n h u m a n slime, which A r e n d t uses purposively to p r o v o k e r e p u l s i o n a n d m i s r e c o g n i t i o n in her r e a d e r s , a n d so to prick the b u b b l e of denial t h a t safely insulate d t h e self-satisfied West from the c o n s e q u e n c e s of their o w n indifference. As " s c u m , " Jews would be u n w o r t h y of rescue by every Wester n c o u n t r y to which they pleaded for asylum. This is exactly w h a t h a p p e n e d . W i t h n o d i s t u r b a n c e w h a t s o e v e r t o t h e sacred R i g h t s of M a n a n d with their " n a t u r a l r i g h t s " fully in h a n d , the stateless were a n n i h i l a t e d with virtually no objection from the rest of the world ( A r e n d t 1979).

This story informs the conception of citizenship that I embrace in this book. I take the right to have rights to involve two analytic levels of rights. The first right is to m e m b e r s h i p in a political b o d y , a n d thus the right to be recognized by others as a m o r a l equal a n d full p a r t of the h u m a n c o m - munity. F o r A r e n d t this existential right to recognition a n d inclusion can only be conferred by a political b o d y , b u t she is deeply agnostic a b o u t the necessity of t h a t b o d y being a n a t i o n - s t a t e . Indeed as we will see clearly in my discussion of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a in c h a p t e r 2, de jure legal citizenship a n d formal n a t i o n - s t a te citizenship m a y hav e been necessary, b u t they certainly were n o t sufficient to secure the rights of the a b a n d o n e d of N e w Orleans. T h e t r e a t m e n t inflicted on those left behind teaches us that without de facto citizenship, possessing formal nation-state citizenship alone is an i n a d e q u a t e f o u n d a t i o n for being recognized as a fully rights- bearing person. Social inclusion in a r o b u s t civil society is also a p r e c o n d i - tion of the first right t o m e m b e r s h i p a n d belonging. Absent t h a t civil membership, so t o o will be recognition by others as a fellow h u m a n of equal worth a n d value.

Unlike belonging to a n a t i o n - s t a t e , h o w e v e r , where the q u e s t i o n of national citizenship is settled by d o c u m e n t s , t h e r e are n o p a s s p o r t s or p a p e r s that testify to m e m b e r s h i p in civil society. N o r are there c u s t o m s officials, 700-foot walls, or "Welcome to . . s i g n s to signify the boundarie s

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 27

demarcating w h e r e civil society e n d s a n d social exclusion begins. H o w then d o we d e t e r m i n e inclusion or exclusion from civil society? T h e d r a m a of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a reveals t h a t we d o n o t need to see any papers to identify the socially excluded. T h e y were d e m o n s t r a b l y t r e a t e d as the "scum of the e a r t h , " a n d were evidentially p u s h e d o u t s i d e the circle of h u m a n r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e i r formal n a t i o n - s t a t e m e m b e r s h i p n o t w i t h - standing, the left-behind of N e w O r l e a n s h a d b e c o m e de facto internally stateless superfluou s people. Right less ness a n d exclusion from civil society go h a n d in h a n d .

" By defining t h e r i g h t to h a ve rights as t h e h e a r t of my citizenship theor y 1 am bypassing t h e u s u a l a p p r o a c h in which citizenship is defined by a d o m i n a n t o r g a n i z i n g t h e o r y . D o m i n a n t organizin g theorie s a r e like m e t a t h e o r i e s , in t h a t they specify less a single causal e x p l a n a t i o n t h a n a whole set of interrelate d a s s u m p t i o n s , such as the m e a n i n g of agency, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of s t a t e a n d m a r k e t , a n d so o n . T h e a p p r o a c h is b o t h reasonable a n d useful, as these m e t a t h e o r i e s a r e c a p a c i o u s e n o u g h to be able to differentiate classes of citizenship regimes using only their own b u n d l e of a s s u m p t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t s t o a d d r e s s citizenship's m a i n concerns - the m e a n i n g of citizenship, its criteria for inclusion, a n d in w h a t p r a c t i c a l g o o d s it actually consists a n d delivers - to n a m e a few. If I were t o d o justice l o even a fraction of t h e theorie s t h a t hav e been d e p l o y ed to a d d r e s s these I w o u ld h a ve to include not only the s t a n d a r d ones of r e p u b l i c a n i s m , liberalism, c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , a n d p o s t - n a t i o n a l i s m , b u t also n e o u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , law a n d e c o n o m i c s , rational-choice t h e o r y , critical legal s t u d i e s / M a r x i s t critiques of rights, n e o r e p u b l i c a n i s m , civic h u m a n i s m , r e c o g n i t i on p o l i t i c s / m u l t i c u l t u r a l - ism/identity politics, discourse e t h i c s / p r o c e d u r a l t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y , and post-libera l rights theories . I will avoid t o r t u r i n g m y readers with a t h o r o u g h survey, especially since several of t h e m are the subjects of my c h a p t e r s .

Despite this a b u n d a n c e , several d o m i n a t e the field - liberalism, r e p u b - licanism, c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m a n d / o r e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m - a n d hence merit c o m m e n t . E a c h h a s a central organizing principle a n d c o n c o m i t a n t f o u n d a t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n s . F o r liberalism, it is liberty, a u t o n o m y , a n d n a t u r a l rights; for republicanism , it is equality a n d political participa- tion; for c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , it is m o r a l self-regulation a n d d u ty; a n d for e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m , it is ethnic belonging to the n a t i o n . N o t surpris- ingly, m a n y split the difference, mix a n d m a t c h , a n d reconfigure. H a b e r m a s (1996), most famously, invented " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m " to mix three of them, as well as ' ' p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y " to j o i n liberal- ism a n d republicanism . Etienne Balibar (1994, 2004a) does likewise with

28 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

his neologism " e q u a l i b e r t y ," while V a n G u n s t e r e n (1998) imaginatively theorizes " n e o r e p u b l i c a n i s m . "

I, t o o , plead guilty t o this desire t o c o m b i n e the best of all theories, a n d were [ to use t h e d o m i n a n t theor y a p p r o a c h to define citizenship I w o u ld t a k e my inspiration from B a l i b a r ' s (1994, 2004a) mixing of liberalism, c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , a n d republicanis m t h r o u g h t h e hybridity of equal - iberty. I n d e e d , I believe t h a t the r i g h t t o h a v e rights t a k e s the best of each theory a n d c o m b i n e s them i n t o o n e , using the principle t h a t each is "necessary b u t n o t sufficient." T h u s a l t h o u g h liberalism's d e d i c a t i o n to liberty a n d individual rights is a b s o l u t e l y necessary for a n y a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship r i g h t s, it is n o t sufficient. A n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m ' s focus o n equality, m e m b e r s h i p , a n d t h e principle of p a r t i c i p a t i o n (if n o t the unrealisti c A r i s t o t e l i an " t o rule a n d be ruled") is also necessary b u t n o t sufficient. F i n a l l y , c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m " s insist- ence on t h e s p h e r e of the social as a critical site of solidarity is also necessary, b u t insufficient.

My revised version of t h e right t o hav e r i g h t s , in effect, c o m b i n e s the necessary elements from each theor y while a b a n d o n i n g their less a p p e a l - ing auxiliary a s s u m p t i o n s , such as liberalism's insistence o n g r o u n d i n g liberty in the m a r k e t a n d rights in the state of n a t u r e . T h e resulting c o n f i g u r a t i o n s h o u l d be familiar: t h e right of m e m b e r s h i p a n d inclusion inherent in t h e r i g h t to h a ve rights c o m b i n e s aspects of r e p u b l i c a n i sm a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , while a t the same time it r e g r o u n d s the principle of i n d i v i d u a l liberty n o t in n a t u r e b u t in the solidarism a n d m e m b e r s h i p of civil society. A n d p a r t s of liberalism, r e p u b l i c a n i s m, a n d c o m m u n i t a r i - a n i s m all find their way i n t o t h e second g r o u p of s u b s t a n t i v e rights. In principle, the second g r o u p of rights could include as m a n y t h e o r e t i c a l principles as there are social c o n c e r n s a n d their associated claims to equality, recognition, a n d inclusion.

N o n e t h e l e s s , this u n d e r s t a n d a b l e impulse t o have it all ways p a y s t o o little a t t e n t i o n t o s o m e of the t h e o r i e s ' f u n d a m e n t a l a n d p e r h a p s even m u t u a l l y exclusive a s s u m p t i o n s . U n l i k e t h e e n o r m o u s a t t e n t i o n paid to the stark tensions between t h e two different political theories of r e p u b - licanism a n d liberalism, less h a s been directed t o h o w those tensions h a v e been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the seemingly u n p r o b l e m a t i c c o n c e p t of "citizen- ship r i g h t s . " In c h a p t e r 4, I identify the c o n s e q u e n t i n t e r n a l t e n s i o n s , destabilizing a p o r i a s , a n d o u t r i g h t n e g a t i o n s as s o m e of the m a n y "citi- zenship t r o u b l e s " to w h i c h I a t t r i b u t e the p r e c a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n of citi- zenship rights. T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t in classical liberalism, however g e n e r o u s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n we n o w read into it, t h e r e are n o citizens to be found, instead, there are only discrete rights-bearin g individual s

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness 29

w h o c o m e t o g e t h e r as p a r t i e s to a c o n t r a c t . T o a t t a c h citizenship to these a u t o n o m o u s r i g h t s - b e a r e rs is to graft a political m e m b e r s h i p - centered identity o n t o a view of the p e r s o n w h o originates in t h e p r e p o - litical state of n a t u r e - surely the recipe for a confused agent of political and m o r a l a c t i o n . In the right to h a v e rights, I h a v e posed an a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of b o t h citizenship a n d ( h u m a n ) rights t h a t overcome s this i n h e r e n t instability by g r o u n d i n g b o t h in a n o n t o l o g y of social inclusion. I n d o i n g so, however, I h a v e violated s o m e of the f u n d a m e n t a l precepts of b o t h liberalism a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m . W h e n A r e n d t a r g u e s t h a t the H o l o c a u s t c a n in p a r t be a t t r i b u t e d to w h a t she defines as the z e r o - sum r e l a t i o n s h i p between citizenship a n d t h e R i g h t s of M a n , she is p o i n t i n g to the antipolitic s t h a t the a b s t r a c t universalism of n a t u r a l rights t h e o r y requires, as I discuss in c h a p t e r 3. T h e o r i e s of citizenship may n o t h a v e to solve this i n t e r n a l conflict in citizenship r i g h t s ' h y b r i d mix of r e p u b l i c a n i s m a n d liberalism, but a t the very least, they s h o u l d engage it.

Civil society - the site of citizenship and the fragile centrality of the social

T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k I stress t h e centrality of civil society a n d social inclusion as a f o u n d a t i o n a l r i g h t a n d necessity for d e m o c r a t i c socially inclusive citizenship. Civil society has several c o n c e p t u a l histories, which explains w h y t h e r e are so m a n y c o m p e t i n g p o i n t s of origin in t h e effort to r e c o u p t h e p o w e r of its n a r r a t i v e p a t h . T h e L o c k e a n version of civil society is w h a t C h a r l e s T a y l o r (1990) calls t h e " L " s t r e a m - w h i c h c o n - veniently for him covers b o t h its n a m e s a k e a n d t h e classical liberalism that L o c k e a r g u a b l y did m o r e t h a n a n y o n e t o invent. As I c h a r t in c h a p t e r 7, in the classical liberal m e t a n a r r a t i v e , civil society exists in a z e r o - s u m d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with the state. It is the familiar story of civil society e m e r g i n g from t h e state of n a t u r e t o create a prepolitical, self-sufficient a u t o n o m o u s site entirely i n d e p e n d e n t of any a u t h o r i t y deriving from state i n s t i t u t i o n s , as t h e political state is the force which civil society h a s been invented to resist. O t h e r t h a n begrudgingly accept- ing t h e necessity of the s t a t e c a r r y i n g o u t m i n i m a l functions of security and p r o p e r t y p r o t e c t i o n , civil society q u a m a r k e t society focuses o n t h e singular t h r e a t of coercive state i n t e r v e n t i o n , w h e r e it is poised t o repel the i n e x o r a b l e t h r e a t of state c o l o n i z a t i o n . A s for t h e a c t u a l space of civil society, for the liberal n a r r a t i v e it is the site of b o t h p r o p e r t y exchange a n d individual freedom - which are causally i n t e r r e l a t e d . W h e n civil society a n d the site of the m a r k e t are conceived as o n e a n d the s a m e ,

30 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

then free and self-regulating m a r k e t s are considered t h e only requisites for individual rights a n d social j u s t i c e . This is t h e d o m i n a n t m e t a n a r r a - tive of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m a n d neoliberalism . T o d a y it is most c o m m o n l y expressed in the political discourse of s p r e a d i n g d e m o c r a c y a r o u n d the w o r l d ( H e r t z b e r g 2002).

T h e second v a r i a n t of civil society is t h a t which T a y l o r d u b s t h e " M ' 1

s t r e a m in recognition of M o n t e s q u i e u ' s earliest a r t i c u l a t i o n . It is most celebrated of c o u r s e in the writings of Tocqueville, a n d t o d a y is associ- ated with c o m m u n i t a r i a n t h e o r y . A g a i n civil society is in a z e r o - s um d i c h o t o m y with the s t a t e , only this time the m a r k e t is a m b i g u o u s l y hidden in t h e s h a d o w s . This time civil society is defined internally a n d exclusively by its a s s o c i a t i o n a l social practices, externally by its fiercely c o n s t i t u t e d o p p o s i t i o n to s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n . It is the a s s o c i a t i o n al s t r e n g t h of its practices a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s tha t e m p o w e r s civil society t o continuall y resist a n d p a t r o l a g a i n st the invasive designs of the state i n t o the site of the social. This is associated with struggles against c o m m u n i s m and d i c t a t o r s h i p , which explains w h y , in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s , the focus is placed entirely o n civil society's ability t o repel t h e state, usually w i t h o u t equal c o n c e r n expressed a b o u t t h e effects of e x t r e m e m a r k e t i z a t i o n ( P u t n a m 2000).

By c o n t r a s t , a " t r i a d i c " a p p r o a c h to civil society is best c h a r a c t e r i z e d by those who includ e the m a r k e t in this heuristic model , while preserving civil society as t h e space of social solidarity a n d o n g o i n g n o n c o n t r a c t u a l relationships. H e r e civil society represent s a " t h i r d s p h e r e " in between b o t h state a n d m a r k e t , c o n s t a n t l y engaged in resisting the imperial designs of the m a r k e t n o less t h a n t h o s e of the s t a t e . 2 3 A n o t h e r v a r i a n t of this triadic a p p r o a c h can be traced b a c k t o D u r k h e i m a n d is t o d a y m o s t dynamicall y a r t i c u l a t e d by Jeffrey A l e x a n d e r (2006). A l e x a n d e r identifies civil society as a site in perpetual struggle - a "people of individ- uals" striving for social solidarity while by necessity engaged in an inexhaus- tible effort t o sustain their a u t o n o m y from b o t h the utilitarianism of the m a r k e t a n d the coercive b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n of state power. Because it is comprised of inclusive d e m o c r a t i c structures and repressive vilifications, of practices of solidarity as well as those of exclusion, the civil sphere is where citizenship, solidarity, a n d justice are possible, b u t by n o m e a n s inevitable. According t o Alexander, civil society is a social world t h a t is a t once a p r o d u c t a n d p r o d u c t i ve of c u l t u r a l codes a n d n o r m a t i v e binaries - b o t h the " d a r k ' 1 a n d the "light" sides of democracy a n d politics, the

2 5 T o d a y ' s m o s t celebrated a d v o c a t e s of this a p p r o a c h are C o h e n a n d A r a t o (1992) and Jiirgen H a b e r m a s (1996).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 31

solidaristic and the repressive/exclusionary - that enmesh us n o less t h a n the r a t i o n a l discourses to which we m o r e willfully aspire. Civil society's normative ideal combines solidarity a n d rights, freedom a n d equality. All too easily, however, these can invert into exclusion a n d inequality.

In c h a p t e r 2, I d e m o n s t r a t e t h r o u g h the s t o r y of the a b a n d o n e d H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a victims the degree to which m u c h of h u m a n freedom is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the existence of a t h r i v i n g civil society - o n e fully capable of resisting t h e e x p a n s i o n i st drives of b o t h state coercio n a n d m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . A t t h e same t i m e , a h e a l t h y civil society is n o t a u t o n o m o u s of m a r k e t s a n d states. I n d e e d the c o n t r a r y is true; civil society's very c a p a c i t y for resistance a g a i n s t e x t e r n al m a r k e t incursion s requires s u p p o r t from the state in the form of m a r k e t r e g u l a t i o n s , social insurance policies, publi c services, redistributive t a x schemes, a n d legal mechanisms t o institutionaliz e a n d enforce the rights t o livelihood. Recalling t h a t a f o u n d a t i o n a l element of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship is the right to freedom from the t y r a n n y of w a n t , so t o o m u s t civil society be s u p p o r t e d by access to living-wage e m p l o y m e n t , especially t o those l a b o r m a r k e t s which a r e willing a n d / o r able t o b u c k t h e pressure s of t h e globa l economy (Sunstein 2004). In alliance w i t h these institutionalized rela- tionships of b o t h s u p p o r t a n d resistance, a n d in t a n d e m w i t h the e q u i - table rule of law, it is o n a b a l a n c e of p o w e r a m o n g civil society, m a r k e t , and s t a t e - m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h the site of t h e p u b l ic sphere, in which pressure o n t h e state from d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n is n u r t u r e d - t h a t citizenship d e p e n d s . Only t h r o u g h social inclusions in civil society can the r i g h t to h a v e rights be sustained.

H o w e v e r , t h e r e is also a duality t o civil society's cent rarity, as well as t o its c o n c o m i t a n t fragility. In the first i n s t a n c e , its centrality is m e t a p h o r i - cally s p a t i al a n d refers t o its place in r e l a t i o n s h i p to o t h e r spheres of society. Civil society, in my view of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, m u s t thrive as the social site s i t u a t e d between t h e m a r k e t a n d t h e state, albeit fully i n d e p e n d e n t of neither. By d i s r u p t i n g w h a t w o u l d otherwise be only a dyad of state a n d m a r k e t , civil society is t h u s c e n t r a l to t h e b a l a n c e of power in t h e t r i a d i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n of state , civil society, a n d m a r k e t . B u t it is also c e n t r a l in a second sense of ethical significance. Civil society is critically i m p o r t a n t to the m a k i n g a n d the survival of eg alitarian citizen- ship regimes. I n the interest of d e m o c r a c y , it is critical in a n empirical a n d sociological sense t h a t civil society a n d its i n d e p e n d e n t egalitarian a n d solidaristic e t h o s survive at the center of state a n d m a r k e t , where it m u s t prevent t h e spilling over or b o u n d a r y transgression s into civil society of either m a r k e t or state p o w e r s . Only then can it thrive as a site t h a t s u p p o r t s practices a n d precepts t h a t are neither m a r k e t - n o r

32 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

p o w e r - d r i v e n . As the only site in which p e o p l e c o n s t i t u t e themselves as citizens a n d as " a p e o p l e , " an i n d e p e n d e n t civil society is t h u s necessary for s i t u a t i ng the social m o v e m e n t s t h a t are called u p o n t o defend society as a w h o l e.

By n o w it s h o u l d be evident t h a t the c e n t r a l i ty of civil society, in all of these senses, is deeply fragile. Historically, it has b e e n the first sphere to be c o n q u e r e d a n d c o r r o d e d by b o t h or either m a r k e t o r state. A n d the d u a l i t y of its fragility parallels t h e d u a l i t y of its centrality. I n t h e first case, as I show in c h a p t e r 6, its place in the center in between m a r k e t a n d state can be t o o easily displace d by the p o w e r s of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m to d o m e s t i c a te it i n t o social c a p i t a l , a n d t h u s to c o n q u e r its a u t o n o m y . If this h a p p e n s , the t r i a d i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n will collapse i n t o a n u n e q u a l d y a d in which p o w er is c o n c e n t r a t e d in a m a r k e t - d r i v e n s t a t e a n d a g o v e r n a n c e - d r i v e n m a r k e t . H a v i n g lost its a u t o n o m y , civil society can n o longer d o the b o u n d a r y w o r k of p r o t e c t i n g t h e n o n m a r k e t sites of society from illegitimate m a r k e t invasion, n o r facilitate t h o s e social m o v e m e n t s so necessary for society t o defend itself.

Parallel d e v e l o p m e n t s in social t h e o r y reflect equally this fragility, as talk of the social a n d r e c o g n i t i o n of the constitutiv e r e l a t i o n a l i t y of society, i n d e e d of t h e very idea of "society," is t o o often dissolved i n t o c o n t r a c t u a l m o d e l s of utility-maximizing individual s r e s p o n d i n g t o m a r k e t - d r i v e n (or perverse) incentives, a view m o s t famously associated with M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r in t h e 1970s a n d 1980s. T h e o r i e s of o u r social universe h a v e m o r p h e d i n t o perspectives informed by social n a t u r a l i s m , the scarcity fiction, a n d the discipline of e c o n o m i c s . P o v e r t y , for e x a m - ple, once t h e p r o v i n c e of sociological analysis h a s over the last decades been a l m o s t entirely a p p r o p r i a t e d by e c o n o m i s t s a n d e c o n o m i c p r e c e p t s based o n stern incentive m a n a g e m e n t of w h a t are n o w considered indi- vidual b e h a v i o r a l " c h o i c e s . " E c o n o m i c s , however , is n o t the only t h r e a t to the social. A s we saw u n d e r c o m m u n i s m , civil society a n d social t h e o ry are equally a t risk of being s q u a s h e d by state t y r a n n y . W h e t h e r the t h r e a t is e c o n o m i c o r political, t h e social perspective o n t h e w o r l d is critical t o a d v a n c e the rights a n d n o r m s of civil society as a w h o l e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e interests of either m a r k e t o r state, which a r e served by the disciplines of e c o n o m i c s a n d political science respectively.

But p e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t t h r e a t to the i d e a t i o n a l centrality of civil society a n d social analysis is t h a t of the i n t r a c t a b l e s t a y i ng p o w e r of what Bobbio (1992) calls the "great dichotomy * of social a n d political theory, namely the dichotomy between the mutually exclusive spheres of public versus private. This enduring conceptual divide has proved to be intransigent in the ability of its binary representation of state versus m a r k e t

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness 33

to dominate the entire conceptual landscape of social a n d political life, thus crowding out all c o m p e t i n g representations. A s I discuss in c h a p t e r 7, the problem for civil society as the " t h i r d " sphere in between state a n d market is t h a t of placing three pegs i n t o two holes. In this struggle for dominance, the dyad of public versus private has consistently been the winner. In the process of driving o u t the triadic perspective it has t o o often eliminated civil society entirely by r e t u r n i n g it t o its L o c k e a n r o o t s as p a r t of private m a r k e t society.

These a r e s o m e of the reasons for t h e fragile centrality of civil society and the idea of t h e social. Identifying fragility as a n essential c h a r a c t e r - istic of civil society might once hav e p r i m a r i l y served as a n o r m a t i v e cry of a l a r m - a d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t is also a prescriptive w a r n i n g . N o m o r e . Its fragility is a p o s t - h o c tragic o b s e r v a t i o n - m a d e real, increasingly, by history itself.

... and the inclusion/exclusion of the citizenship ethic

At the c o r e of civil society a r e c o m p e t i n g political a n d k n o w l e d g e cultures, as well as ideational regimes. A s I discuss in chapter 7, these are made u p of a mix of b i n a ry a n d narrative logics. While Alexander (2006) points to the c u l t u r a l o p p o s i t i o n of the sacred versus the polluted, I focus on the b i n a ry logic of social naturalism, an epistemological c o n s t r u ct of the seventeenth- a n d eighteenth-centur y scientific revolution a n d nineteenth-century positivism. Social n a t u r a l i s m divides the social world into those practices a n d entities t hat conform t o the self-regulating laws of n a t u r e , a n d those t h a t fall u n d e r the rubric of n o n n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a . It then assigns epistemological privilege a n d ontological superiority to those entities deemed n a t u r a l , such as t h e m a r k e t , a n d d e m e a n s all t h a t is deemed u n n a t u r a l , such as the state. T h e critically i m p o r t a n t struggle for the soul of civil society as a site of the social, especially its a u t o n o m y from t h e m a r k e t , is a t stake in the distribution of entities across the binar y divide between t h e n a t u r a l a n d the n o n n a t u r a l . M a r k e t fundamentalism strains to subject civil society exclusively to the side of the n a t u r a l , hence as its o w n auxiliary. Civil society, to m a i n t a i n its n o n c o n t r a c t u a l core, strains against this naturalistic subjection - b u t in a zero-sum binary, the only alternative is the n o n n a t u r a l side of the state. Civil society struggles t o establish itself as the third site of the social in a binary universe that is limited to the m u t u a l l y exclusive d i c h o t o m o u s sites of m a r k e t a n d state.

T h e n o n c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s of civil society a r e n o t n a t u r a l , of c o u r s e , b u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l . Access to p u b l i c services a n d social i n s u r a n c e a r e

34 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

institutionalized expressions of rights i n t e r n al t o the inclusionary ethic of citizenship a n d t h e c o m m o n g o o d . T h e n o n c o n t r a c t u a l citizenship e t h o s differs from c o n t r a c t u a l logic in t h a t t h e r e is n o a s s u m p t i o n t h a t on e h a s t o exchange c o m m e n s u r a b l e q u i d p r o q u o s to be t r e a t e d as a v a l u ed m e m b e r of civil society w h o is entitled to p r o t e c t i o n as a right of m e m b e r s h i p . In s o m e theories of citizenship, m e m b e r s h a v e rights because of their o b l i g a t i o n t o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e c o m m o n project of "ruling a n d being r u l e d " o r t o c o n t r i b u t e in ways t h a t a r e neither c o m - m e n s u r a b l e n o r c o n t r a c t u a l ( p a y i n g taxes, for e x a m p l e , or serving in the military, raising c h i l d r e n, a n d so o n ) . But as I define it, citizenship is a distinct ethos precisely b e c a u s e the right to h a v e rights does n o t d e p e n d on individual capabilities o r o n t h e c a p a c i t y for p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; n o r does it require passing any o t h e r kin d of litmus test of m o r a l w o r t h i n e s s . 2 6 T h i s citizenship ethic is manifeste d in the idea of social insurance - social, because as H a c k e r (2006) r e m i n d s us, t h e "social" in social i n s u r a n c e derives from the principl e of " s h a r e d fate. " It is a principle t h a t leads to the conviction t h a t inevitabl e t h r e a t s to well-being, which include "sick- ness, injury, disability, u n e m p l o y m e n t , p e n u r i o u s old age - [are] n o t the responsibility of individual s a l o n e . T h e y [are] a widespread a n d often u n a v o i d a b l e feature of an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t i n d u s t r i a l society. A n d b e c a u s e they [are], t h e costs of these risks sho u ld be d i s t r i b u t ed widely a c r o ss the citizenry, n o t c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h o s e u n l u c k y e n o u g h t o experience t h e m . " W h e r e a s t h e w e a l t h y c a n a l w a y s t a k e for g r a n t e d basi c e c o n o m i c security (in large p a r t because of c o r p o r a t e a n d business t a x b r e a k s a n d safety nets), the citizenship ethic of social i n s u r a n c e "extend[sj e c o n o m i c security to t h o s e least c a p a b l e of o b t a i n i n g it on their o w n - namely t h o s e with m o d e s t m e a n s o r a high p r o b a b i l i t y of needing a s s i s t a n c e " ( H a c k e r 2006: 4 1 - 3 ) . T h e ethic of citizenship requires a c o n c e p t u a l site of civil society where principles of social i n s u r a n c e are p r o t e c t e d from m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s . 2 7

Citizenship's conceptual architecture: a triadic variable for comparative empirical analysis

T h e right to hav e rights is a n ideal a n d an a s p i r a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , it needs to be c o m p l e m e n t e d by e m p i r i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s t h a t specify t h e social

2 6 C o n t r a s t this n o r m a t i v e view thai, p r o h i b i t s b a r g a i n i n g over rights to Tilly's (1998) empiri - cal a r g u m e n t t h a t it is precisely b a r g a i n i n g t h a t answers t h e q u e s t i o n of " w h e r e d o rights c o m e f r o m ? "

2 7 See also A l e x a n d e r (2006).

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 35

r e q u i r e m e n t s for its realization . T o t r a n s l a t e the right t o h a v e rights i n t o a c o n c e p t u a l t o o l for sociological a n d historical analysis, a n d t o explore the s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e n a b l e or disable varyin g types of citizen- ship regimes, I h a v e d e v e l o p e d a n architectonics of citizenship - an infra- s t r u c t u r a l design t h a t m o d e l s h o w t h e p a r t s fit t o g e t h e r. M e t a p h o r i c a l l y , it is a c o n t i n u o u s r e l a t i o n a l t r i a d i c assemblage a m o n g t h e s t a t e , m a r k e t , and civil society, in which the site a n d d i r e c t i o n of p o w e r is the object of c o n s t a n t struggle - a struggle m e d i a t e d t h o r o u g h t h e p u b l ic s p h e r e . T h i s shifting m o d e l represent s t h e a n a l y t i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a t t h e h e a r t of m y citizenship t h e o r y . It r e p r e s e n t s the m o r p h o l o g y of citizenship - the m e t a p h o r i c a l s h a p e t h a t citizenship t a k e s w h e n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i ps a m o n g the i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d practices of each of these three sites are configured d i a g r a m m a t i c a l l y . E x p l o r i n g the c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h e co n seq u en ces of these shifts of p o w e r a n d place c o n s t i t u t es t h e historical w o r k - t h e genealogizing - of t h e o r i z i n g citizenship.

D r a w i n g from P o l a n y i ' s (1957b) f a m o u s f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e " e c o n o m y as a n i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e s s , " I define citizenship as a n " in stitu ted p r o c e s s " t o capture its i n h e r e n t t e m p o r a l i t y , as well as t h e c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g b a l a n c e of p o w e r a m o n g its i n s t i t u t i o n a l s i t e s . 2 8 Citizenship is a t h e a r t a m a t r i x of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , technologies, political i d i o m s , a n d rights-claiming practices t h a t a r e always d y n a m i c a n d c o n t i n g e n t . 2 9 A s an i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e s s , it is c o m p r i s e d of m e m b e r s h i p rules a n d political cultures s h a p e d by c o m p e t i n g n a r r a t i v e s of e g a l i t a r i a n i s m a n d social inclusionary rights in o p p o s i t i o n to b o t h unfettered m a r k e t i z a t i o n a n d to h y p e r - s e c u r i t i z a t i on by the g o v e r n m e n t . D e p l o y i n g this a n a l y t i c heuristic of citizenship as a three-sided i n s t i t u t e d process allows m e t o examine over time the c o n t i n u o u s struggles for d o m i n a n c e a m o n g these i n s t i t u t i o n a l sites. Citizenship c a n at times b l u n t the m a r k e t ' s i n h e r e n t drive t o c o n v e r t n o n c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o c o n t r a c t u a l ones , b u t this d e p e n d s o n the shifting b a l a n c e of p o w e r a m o n g the three sites. Struggles for p o w e r a m o n g these sites are c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c sphere, t h e o u t c o m e s of which set t h e p a r a m e t e r s of a n y given citizenship regime a n d alert us as t o w h e t h e r we are m o v i n g t o w a r d o r a w a y from p e r i o d s of m o r e o r less m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . This a p p r o a c h s u p p o r t s my view t h a t citizenship is very m u c h a practice. T h e s e practices a r e also a source of identity , or w h a t S h k l a r (1991) calls o n e ' s " s t a n d i n g " relative t o

2 8 T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n a n d its empirical a p p l i c a t i o n is m o s t explicitly d e m o n s t r a t e d i n S o m e r s ( 1 9 9 3 , 1994a).

2 9 T h i s r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n d o v e t a i ls w i t h social science's m o v e a w a y from c a t e g o r i e s a n d a t t r i b u t e s , t o w a r d s r e l a t i o n a l i t y , n e t w o r k s , a n d n a r r a t i v e s (see S o m e r s 1994b).

36 Genealogies of Citizenship

o t h e r citizens a n d noncitizens . H o w a n d w h e t h e r they will t r a n s l a te i n t o rights d e p e n d s on their c o n t e x t s of a c t i v a t i o n.

M y triadi c scaffolding of state , m a r k e t , a n d civil society c o n t r a s t s with the prevailing view of citizenship as a t w o - p a r t y r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e individual a n d the p o l i t y . 3 0 T o be sure, in the n a r r o w e s t sense of formal legality, an i n d i v i d u a l ' s citizenship s t a t u s is strictly g r a n t e d by t h e s t a t e . But this can mislead us i n t o t h i n k i n g t h a t citizenship can be u n d e r s t o o d , even in p r e l i m i n a r y terms, w i t h o u t recognizin g the e c o n o m i c a n d m a r k e t d i m e n s i o n a l r e a d y e m b e d d e d w i t h i n the p u b l ic s p h e r e a n d the s t a t e . M o r e o v e r , it tells us little t o n o t h i n g a b o u t h o w citizenship actually w o r k s , not de jure "on the b o o k s " b u t de facto " o n the ground,'" w h e r e m a r k e t r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d civil societies a r e always p r e s e n t a n d entangled with q u e s t i o n s of equality a n d inclusion - or exclusion. Since c o n t r a c t u a l a n d p r o p e r t y rights are i n c l u d e d a m o n g the essential g u a r a n t e e s of civil citizenship, m a r k e t s a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e t o its w o r k i n g s . A s l o n g as h u m a n - ity's survival includes the need t o secure livelihoods a n d t o allocate g o o d s , as long as m e m b e r s h i p a n d inclusio n a r e in p a r t tied n o t j u s t to the fruits of p a i d l a b o r b u t t o t h e inclusion a t t a c h e d t o a c t u a l e m p l o y - m e n t , a n d as long as we accept t h a t politics a n d civil society a r e in p a r t constituted by m a r k e t s , a focus o n t h e individual a n d state a l o n e will be w r o n g h e a d e d . T o be sure , for p u r e l y a n a l y t i c r e a s o n s we m u s t c o n c e p t u - alize the spheres of t h e e c o n o m i c , t h e civil/social, a n d the p o l i t y as s e p a r a t e sites; w i t h o u t t h a t h e u r i s t i c step, v a r i a t i o n s in h o w they actually interact u n d e r different c o n d i t i o n s a r e i m p o s s i b l e t o establish. It is t h e varying b a l a n c e of p o w e r a m o n g all t h r e e sites, a n d h o w t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e negotiates a n d m e d i a t e s t h a t struggle, t h a t set the p a r a m e t e r s for w h a t kind of citizenship regime will p r e v a i l , including t h e q u e s t i o n of the d o m i n a n t i d e a t i o n a l regime, a n d w h e t h e r we are m o v i n g in the d i r e c t i o n of a r o b u s t social i n c l u s i o n a r y o r a n a t t e n u a t e d m a r k e t - d r i v e n c i t i z e n s h i p . 3 1

C o n s t r u c t i n g the a r c h i t e c t o n i c s of citizenship in a triadic c o n f i g u r a t i o n is especially valuabl e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y for the task of identifying why a n d h o w we h a v e different citizenship regimes. A three-sided i n s t i t u t i o n a l

T h e exception to this is w h e n social or w h a t is s o m e t i m e s called e c o n o m i c citizenship a l o n e is t h e subject of analysis

3 ' H e r e I agree with Allen H u n t e r , w h o suggests t h a t t h e spatial m e t a p h o r of s p h e r e s s h o u l d be c o m p l e m e n t e d by either a t e m p o r a l m e t a p h o r o r by types o r m o d e s of practices t h a i a r c differentially d i s t r i b u t e d s p a t i a l l y a n d o v e r t i m e .

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 37

configuration in c o n t i n u a l struggle for d o m i n a n c e helps to explain variations in citizenship regimes - from t h o s e with t h e m o s t expansive rights, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d capacities for solidarity, t o t h o s e w h e r e m e m - bership exists in n a m e only, h a v i ng been o v e r w h e l m e d by m a r k e t princi- ples o r a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t . By developin g different m o d e l s of citizenship regimes in t e r m s of c h a n g i n g balances of p o w e r , we a v o id the d a n g e r of confusing ideal types with empirical v a r i a t i o n s . I n d e e d , here it is w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t t h e models I devise of b o t h socially inclusive citizenship regimes a n d those of d y s t o p i a n social exclusion a r e empirical fictions. T h e U S version of inclusive citizenship is especially a t variance with my ideal-typical c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , even in its most inclusive years. T o theorize t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e n a b l e a n d disable m o r e o r less inclusive citizenship regimes, it is still useful to identify t h e ideal-typical architectonics u n d e r l y i n g the t w o distinct poles of a c o n t i n u u m t h a t stretches betwee n m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m a n d a socially inclusive citi- zenship. In reality, of c o u r s e , citizenship regimes d o n o t t r a n s f o r m from one to the o t h e r , like b l a c k to white, w i t h o u t s t o p p i n g a t m a n y shades of gray a l o n g the way. T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in the balance of p o w e r occur a l o n g the c o n t i n u u m , c r e a t i ng g r a d a t i o n s of practices, r a t h e r t h a n c h a n g i n g from on e distinct a n d discrete type i n t o a n o t h e r . T o u n d e r s t a n d a n d explain why a n d h o w t h e m e a n i n g a n d extent of citizenship a n d rights vary over time, we m u s t r e c k o n w i t h the multiple forces a t w o r k in this process, identify where a n y p a r t i c u l a r citizenship regime is s i t u a t e d on t h a t c o n t i n u u m , a n d d e t e r m i n e in w h a t direction it is m o v i n g . H e r e I sketch o u t t w o c o n t r a s t i n g models : first, t h a t of d y s t o p i a n citizenship imperiled; a n d second, t h a t of citizenship e x p a n d i n g t o w a r d g r e a t e r social inclusion.

A dystopian m o d e l of citizenship imperiled: c o n d i t i o n s , consequences and conversions

T o m a r k e t i z e a n d c o n t r a c t u a l i z e citizenship, p r a c t i c a l a n d i d e a t i o n a l changes m u s t c o n v e r t the e t h o s of a socially i n c l u s i o n a r y citizenship t o one of c o n t r a c t u a l m o r a l i t y . These c o n v e r s i o n s a m o u n t to a c o m p l e t e inversion: from a t r i a d i c b a l a n c e of p o w e r , in which t h e social state protects citizens in civil society a g a i n st full e x p o s u r e t o t h e m a r k e t , to one in which citizenship collapses i n t o a dyadi c i n s t r u m e n t of u n b a l a n c e d p o w e r pitting an alliance of state a n d m a r k e t a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a ls - n o w bereft of b o t h s t a t e p r o t e c t i o n a n d m e m b e r s h i p in civil society. W h a t occurs in the d o m a i n s of the m a r k e t , the state , a n d civil society t h a t causes citizenship t o m o r p h into such a d y s t o p i a n regime?

38 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

The market An inclusive citizenship regime requires t h a t t h e m a r k e t be socially e m b e d d e d in t w o different ways - it m u s t be r e g u l a t e d by laws, rules, a n d ethics t h a t c o n s t r a i n its practices , a n d it m u s t be restricted from o v e r - e x p a n d i n g its scope. M a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m viola- tes b o t h forms of c o n s t r a i n t . F i r s t , t h r o u g h m a r k e t - d r i v e n g o v e r n a n c e and the conques t of regulative agencies, business is able to " u n d o " those existing regulative practices i n s t a n t i a t e d by t h e social state , a n d rewrite t h e m t o s u p p o r t m a r k e t principles - e.g. using incentives to reduce c a r b o n dioxide v o l u n t a r i l y, r a t h e r t h a n regulating it directly. A t the same time, m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' s C o n g r e s s i o n a l b r a n c h of lobbyists writes the very s t a t u t e s signed off by politicians - e.g. the energy policy w r i t t e n by Vice-President C h e n e y a n d the oil i n d u s t r y . Finally, the busi- ness world ignores its o w n ethics a n d fair business practices, a n d invents m o r e convenient ones of its o w n , such as stock o p t i o n salary c o m p e n s a - tion a n d b a c k d a t i n g a c c o u n t b o o k s .

Second, t h e m a r k e t ' s principles a n d m e c h a n i s m s e x p a n d b e y o n d their place in the e c o n o m i c s p h e r e to convert o t h e r n o n m a r k e t spheres of life to their organizin g logic. T h e sites of m a r k e t " i n v a s i o n " are p r i m a r i l y t h e state a n d civil society a n d their i d e a t i o n a l a n d discursive regimes. This drive t o invade a n d c o n v e r t n o n c o n t r a c t u a l sites entails m a r k e t i z a t i o n , c o n t r a c t u a l i z a t i o n , a n d p r i v a t i z a t i o n . Since m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m is a regime o n t h e m o v e , it is always involved in a n effort to gain t h e b a l a n c e of p o w er by subjecting b o t h p o l i t y a n d civil society to c o n t r a c t u a l p o w e r s a n d principles. T h e c o n t e n t of these invasive m a r k e t principles a n d discourses, for the sake of simplicity, can be g r o u p e d into three categories:-''2

1. T h e market is the most efficient, just, a n d natural form of social interaction, which is organized by multiple n a t u r a l acts of buying and selling, and in which prices are set n o t by external factors (e.g. need) b u t according to w h a t the m a r k e t will bear a n d the constraints of generating profits.

2. C o n t r a c t u a l quid pro q u o exchange, in which there can be n o expect- ation of c o m m e n s u r a t i o n o r b a l a n c i n g of a c c o u n t s , displaces o t h e r kinds of reciprocity (Lukes 2004: 305).

3. Incentives, as m a r k e t - m o d e l t o o l s , increasingly become the d o m i - n a n t i n s t r u m e n t for o r g a n i z i n g social p r o g r a m s ( F r a n k 2007b). Politicians develop a deus ex machina a p p r o a c h to tax c r e d i t s a n d

3 2 T h a t there a r e m a n y o t h e r m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e s, such as t h e place of p r o p e r t y , of efficiency, wealth, etc. s h o u l d go w i t h o u t saying.

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p f i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 39

incentive m a n a g e m e n t as " t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of m o d e r n life" (Levitt a n d D u b n e r 2005), based on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t "instead of t a k i n g c h a r g e of p r o b l e m s a n d p u t t i n g real m o n e y a n d p r o g r a m s behind t h e m , g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d deploy incentives to gently p r o d the n a t u r a l forces of the w o r l d in the direction we w a n t t h e m t o g o " (Schmitt 2007a: 9). Thi s fixation is based n o t only on m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' s social n a t u r a l i s m . It also takes o n b o a r d t h e conservative public-choic e a p p r o a c h t o politics, which stipulate s t h a t " p e o p l e are homo economicus, always c a l c u l a t i n g their deci- sions based on r a t i o n a l a n d fully informed analyses of their eco- n o m i c utility" (Schmitt 2007a; 9). Inversely, the c o n c o m i t a n t claim is t h a t liberal social i n s u r a n c e p r o g r a m s for p r o t e c t i o n a n d inclu- sion policies will always i n s t a n t i a t e perverse incentives a n d m o r a l h a z a r d s (e.g. social welfare. F E M A ) , a n d so m u s t be eliminated o r c o n t r a c t u a l i z e d . T h e incentives a n d sanction s of c o m p u l s o r y w o r k - fare, for e x a m p l e , a r e central t o the l a n d m a r k 1996 welfare reform bill (the P e r s o n a l Responsibility a n d W o r k O p p o r t u n i t y Act [ P R W O A ] ) ( H a n d l e r 2004).

W h e n these m a r k e t - o r g a n i z i n g logics a r e able to c a p t u r e n o n m a r k e t sites, t h e r e a r e at least four results:

1. Because in the m a r k e t the highest recognition, rewards, power, a n d influence go to those w h o accumulate great wealth, financial assets a n d property, this same m a r k e t metric of power a n d influence displa- ces a n d replaces civil society's n o n m a r k e t criteria for recognition.

2. T h e newly d o m i n a n t m a r k e t ethos c a p t u r e s the rhetori c of efficiency, moral goodness, justice, freedom, and prosperity. Inclusion, m o r a l w o r t h , a n d recognition in civil society n o w become conditional on successful c o n t r a c t u a l behavior, such as e m p l o y m e n t o r workfare for the p o o r .

3. T o force the u n e m p l o y e d t o w o r k , incentives are reorganized a n d restructured to reimpose scarcity a n d h u n g e r as n a t u r a l conditions that c a n only be eliminated by w o rk - wor k that often is n o t available or that pays t o o little for a living wage.

4. M a r k e t fundamentalists claim that power is always coercive, resides exclusively in the state, a n d is a force that must be resisted a n d mini- mized. M a r k e t fundamentalism justifies its invasion of the political sphere on the g r o u n d s that governmental power is d a n g e r o u s for liberty, causes m a r k e t inefficiencies, a n d s u p p o r t s a system of morally c o r r u p t i n g social giveaways. By cont rast, the m a r k e t is defined as a self-regulating n a t u r a l system entirely devoid of power.

40 Genealogies of Citizenship

The state: market-driven big government U n d e r m a r k e t f u n d a- m e n t a l i s m the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the state a r e c o n q u e r e d by p o w e r s c o n s t i - tuted in the e c o n o m i c s p h e r e t h a t h a v e crossed the b o u n d a r y i n t o the polity, where m a r k e t p o w e r is illegitimately exercised. T h e extension of m a r k e t principles i n t o t h e polity t r a n s f o r m s it i n t o a m a r k e t - d r i v e n s t a t e . T h e m a r k e t ethic of c o n t r a c t displaces t h a t of the social s t a t e , a n d t r a n s - lates t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between citizen a n d s t a t e into o n e of c o n t r a c t u a l quid p r o q u o c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . In t h a t c o n v e r s i o n the s t a t e ' s m e d i a t i n g p o s i t i o n between citizens a n d m a r k e t is dissolved. As a result:

• political powe r becomes a reflection of economic wealth a n d m a r k e t power;

• the rule of law is p e n e t r a t e d by the rules of the m a r k e t ; 0 the state's role in social citizenship is restructured from that of p r o v i d -

ing p r o t e c t i on a n d social i n s u r a n ce to its citizens into t h a t of d e m a n d - ing quid p r o q u o obligations in exchange;

9 at the level of the polity the result is a two-track displacement of democratic citizenship, led by a t w o - t r a c k public narrative: 1. "Big-government" is dangerous, so we must "starve the beast. " T h e

social state, locus of social i n s u r a n c e a n d o t h e r regulative agencies that protect people a g a i n st full exposure to the m a r k e t a n d the risks of m o d e r n capitalism, is c o n q u e r e d by c o n t r a c t u a l principles of quid p r o q u o exchange. This a m o u n t s n o t to a smaller state (as promised) b u t t o " m a r k e t - d r i v e n big g o v e r n m e n t " which in actual- ity simply shifts its provision of p r o t e c t i o n, monopolies, a n d wel- fare t o c o r p o r a t e a n d global capital, leaving full exposure to h a r s h m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n for everyone else (Schmitt 2 0 0 7 b ) . 3 3 It is, in effect, socialism for the rich, a n d capitalism for everyone else. U n d e r the narrative of t h e necessity of liberating society from "failed social p r o g r a m s " a n d into the "ownershi p society," the state shifts tax b u r d e n s from wealth to wages. These government policy changes in t u r n c o n t r i b u t e to an e n t r e n c h m e n t of internal borders based o n social exclusion.

2. The rise of the security state. W a r is the essential stance of the military a n d security state. T h e rise of the security state s u p p o r t s unchecked a n d u n a c c o u n t a b l e executive power, a n d legitimates t h e suspension of civil a n d legal rights. It also divides a p o p u l a t i o n between those included b y virtue of patriotic acceptanc e of

3 3 See D e a n Baker. T h e C o n s e r v a t i ve N a n n y State,'' available at: conservativenaiiny5tate.org (accessed D e c e m b e r 2006) a n d American Prospect 2005.

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 41

unchecked executive powers versus those "America-haters'" w h o d o not accept the tradeoff. These internal cultural b o r d e r s d o n o t m a p neatly o n t o the internal borders based on market-drive n inclusion a n d exclusion. A s I argue in c h a p t e r 3, cultural inclusion t h r o u g h the m a n t l e of loyal Americanis m often compensates t h e white middle classes for their increasingly precariou s economic condition, thus mitigating the possibility of p o p u l a r unrest.

The dark side of civil society: competing narratives T h e effect of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m o n civil society is disabling in several ways . T h e conversion of civil society's citizenship ethic i n t o t h a t of c o n t r a ctualiza- tion is facilitated by t h e shift in the d o m i n a n t k n o w l e d g e c u l t u re from a social p r o b l e m s a p p r o a c h t h a t valorizes the c o m m o n g o o d , to e c o n o m i cs and a m a r k e t m o d e l of h u m a n o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e consequence s for civil society a r e several.

First, p o w e r accrued in the m a r k e t is converted illegitimately into power a n d hierarchica l influence in civil society. M a r k e t success spills over t o civil society w h e r e it is able to b u y o u t r i g h t o r to influence the media, universities, d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , political p a r t i e s , a n d the judiciary. M a r k e t logic displaces civil society's ethic of inclusion, member- ship, solidarity, a n d egalitarianism. Civil society's distribution of rights, inclusion, moral worth, a n d recognition, are restructured a n d recalibrated to coordinate with m a r k e t value. Absent a r o b u s t civil society, social move- ments to resist m a r k e t penetration c a n n o t be organized.

Second, with the casualties of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m increasing - surging i n e q u a l i t y , decreases in a b s o l u t e wages of all b u t the rich, a n d a d i s a p p e a r i n g j o b m a r k e t - civil society becomes m o r e exclusionary o n t r a d i t i o n a l ascriptive g r o u n d s ( F r a n k 2007a). It n o longer h o l d s o u t the n o r m a t i v e p r o m i s e of universal a n d equa l citizenship. X e n o p h o b i a a n d a n t i - i m m i g r a n t talk b a l l o o n s ; affirmative action for w o m e n a n d African- A m e r i c a n s is b l a m e d for white middle-class t r o u b l e s . T h e exclusionary anti-universalistic d a r k side of civil society b e c o m e s increasingly p r o m - inent, a n d increasingly n a t u r a l i z e d ( A l e x a n d e r 2006; K u t t n e r 2007).

T h i r d , as t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the citizen a n d t h e state t u r n s i n t o a c o n t r a c t u a l o n e , citizens a r e c o n v e r t e d i n t o q u a n t i t i e s a n d qualities of h u m a n c a p i t a l , while families a n d c o m m u n i t i e s are increasingly viewed as sources of social c a p i t a l . T h e i r w o r t h , value, a n d inclusion are accordingl y d e t e r m i n e d by c o n t r a c t u a l successes or failures in rela- t i o n s h i p t o utility. T h o s e w i t h o u t m a r k e t a b l e skills o r t h o s e for w h o m j o b s are n o longer available b e c o m e i n c a p a b l e of engaging in con- t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h in t u r n m a r k s t h e m as m o r a l l y u n w o r t h y .

42 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

W i t h increasing c o r p o r a t e layoffs, even e d u c a t i o n a n d skills c a n n o t save middle-class professionals from b e c o m i n g disposable factors of p r o d u c - tion (Bernstein 2007; Uchitelle 2006). B o t h k i n d s of "failure" lead to social exclusion.

F o u r t h , in the a b s e n c e of access to l a b o r m a r k e t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d when the m a r k e t - d r i v e n state n o longer assumes its obligatio n to protect civil society from full e x p o s u r e t o the m a r k e t , the result is a destabilized civil society t h a t b e c o m e s isolated from t h e m a r k e t , the b o d y politic, a n d the public s p h e r e.

Fifth, unlike the state, which is c o n q u e r e d b u t left structurally i n t a c t to benefit t h e m a r k e t regime, civil society a n d its i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t survive except as m a r k e t a n d s t a t e auxiliaries. I n s t e a d of relying o n the state , individuals are directed to exploit their o w n social c a p i t a l - i.e. their n e t w o r k of a d v a n t a g e o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s . ("Public schools are i n a d e q u a t e ? G e t h o m e - s c h o o l e d . " ) P o o r c o m m u n i t i e s fail o n t h a t c o u n t , as they d o not h a r b o r a d v a n t a g e o u s c o n n e c t i o n s , n e t w o r k s , or r e l a t i o n s h i p s. Because civil society is t h e site of p r i m a r y m e m b e r s h i p , p o o r c o m m u n - ities are perceived as w i t h o u t w o r t h . In c o m m u n i t i e s of distress, civil society disintegrates , leaving few o p p o r t u n i t i e s for meaningfu l d e m o - cratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p o p u l a r resistance, asso ciatio n al o p p o s i t i o n a l net- w o r k s , or even incipient social m o v e m e n t s . N e i t h e r citizens n o r their civil societies can survive o r t h r i ve in a setting t h a t is viewed by the larger political c u l t u r e as w i t h o u t m o r a l w o r t h i n e s s . Social exclusion from the m a i n s t r e a m is t h e h a n d m a i d e n of a civil society reduced to social capital.

Genealogizing a d e m o c r a t i c socially inclusive citizenship: conditions a n d consequences of its m a k i n g

Just as identifying t h e c o n d i t i o n s of citizenship's e r o s i o n gives us the m a t e r i a l s for c o n s t r u c t i n g a n a b s t r a c t m o d e l of w h a t a d y s t o p i a n citizen- ship regime l o o k s like, by i n v e r t i n g t h e b a l a n c e of power a m o n g t h e t h r e e sites we can also d e d u c e the c o n d i t i o n s for s u s t a i n i n g a n d e n h a n c i n g healthy pluralist d e m o c r a t i c citizenship regimes. In direct c o n t r a s t to a m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o n e , a d e m o c r a t i c citizenship r e g i m e r e q u i r es a r e c a l i b r a t e d b a l a n c e of p o w e r in which t h e s t a t e , m a r k e t , a n d civil society all coexist in a p l u r a l i s t u n i v e r s e , each able to s u s t a i n its o w n discursive logic. T h e on e twist is t h a t the discourses a n d p r a c t i c es of civil society m u s t be a little " m o r e e q u a l " t h a n t h o s e of m a r k e t a n d s t a t e . I n o r d e r to r e s t r a i n the i n h e r e n t l y e x p a n s i o n a r y tendencies of class a n d political p o w e r , the c i t i z e n s h i p ethic m u s t h a v e n o r m a t i v e influence

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 43

over b o t h m a r k e t e o n t r a c t u a l i s m a n d stale b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n a n d militarization.

The state: The power of the public sphere U n d e r pluralist socially inclusive citizenship the state h a s to o b s t r u c t t h e m a r k e t ' s potential for u n d u e influence in g o v e r n a n c e a n d its illegitimate incur- sions i n t o civil society. T o d o so, it m u s t exercise p o w e r as a c o u n t e r - vailing force t o the m a r k e t . T o m a k e this kind of p o w e r p r o d u c t i v e , n o t merely coercive, it m u s t be subject to t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r e s s u r es of civil society a n d t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e . 3 4 Political p o w e r can be mobilized in t h e service of j u s t i c e a n d citizenship, r a t h e r t h a n ceding it t o the unforgiving power of m a r k e t forces. T h e state b u r e a u c r a c y w ou l d still function, j u s t as w o u l d the o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t , b u t they would n o t function as a u t o n o m o u s i n s t r u m e n t s of rationalizing c o n t r o l , nor as shelters for a m a r k e t - d r i v e n politics. D e m o c r a t i c pressures on the state m u s t be guided by w h a t A l e x a n d e r (2006) calls the "civil p o w e r " of solidarity, equality, a n d rights, a n d w h a t I called earlier the citizenship ethic. Civil society's r e s u s c i t a t i o n w o u l d be especially critical for the i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d agencies of social citizenship, w h e r e social i n s u r a n c e a n d o t h e r n o n m a r k e t m e a n s to protect citizens are s i t u a t e d . W h e r e the m a r k e t has t a k e n over the state's o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d agencies, it w o u l d be displaced by i n s t i t u t i o n s of social i n s u r a n c e , p r o t e c t i o n , a n d p r o v i s i o n - ing. In the n o r m a t i v e e t h o s of social inclusion, it is the s t a t e ' s r e s p o n s i - bility to p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l s a n d families w i t h o u t the r e s o u r c e s needed t o p r o t e c t themselves.

I n c o n t r a s t t o the d o d d e r i n g a n d decrepit m a r k e t - d r i v e n social state (the victim of decades of s t a r v a t i o n , p r i v a t i z a t i o n , m a r k e t invasion, d e g r a d a t i o n , a n d vilification) t h a t I depict in c h a p t e r 2's discussion of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a , a s t r o n g d e m o c r a t i c citizenship r e q u i r e s a regulative state i n s t i t u t i o n a l ly r o b u s t e n o u g h t o i m p o s e rules a n d r e s t r a i n t s o n the expansive g o v e r n i n g a s p i r a t i o n s of global m a r k e t s , a n d s t r o n g e n o u g h t o p r o v i d e protective security to civil society. A t t h e same t i m e , it m u s t be sufficiently r u l e - b o u n d to be s u b o r d i n a t e to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule, t o civil society's regulative i n t e r v e n t i o n s , a n d to m u s c u l a r d e m o - cratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n from civil society. Only by being b o u n d t o such rules of law a n d d e m o c r a t i c e m p o w e r m e n t will the state be forced t o s u p p o r t ( r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t to a p p r o p r i a t e ) an a u t o n o m o u s publi c

F o l l o w i n g P o i a n v i (2001), P a r s o n s j 1969), itnd F o u c a u l i (1977b, 19^0). Sec also K u t t n e r (2007) a n d S t a r r (2007).

44 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

sphere - w i t h o u t which the delicate b a l a n c e of p o w e r favoring social inclusion w o u l d collapse.

Democratizing the market D e m o c r a t i c citizenship requires the active presence of m a r k e t s t h a t are r u l e - b o u n d internally , restricted in scope, and m e d i a t e d by the s t a t e a n d civil society. T h e capacity to contain m a r k e t i z i n g impulses d e p e n d s on a pluralist regulated state held legally a n d d e m o c r a t i c a l ly a c c o u n t a b l e by the p u b l ic s p h e r e a n d a r o b u s t n o n - subjugated civil society. U n d e r m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , p l u r a l i s m and i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a l a n c e s of p o w e r a r e e r o d e d by t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i z a t i o n of citizenship - citizenship reverses from s t a t u s t o c o n t r a c t , its rights become c o n d i t i o n a l o n quid p r o q u o o b l i g a t o r y e x c h a n ge (usually of l a b o r ) , a n d its m o d a l i t i e s of policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n c o n v e r t to m a r k e t - driven technologies ( a n d s a n c t i o n s ) of incentive m a n a g e m e n t . U n d e r an ideal-typical d e m o c r a t i c socially inclusive citizenship regime, civil society practices a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t m a i n t a i n a n d deflect m a r k e t i n t r u s i o n s while s u p p o r t i n g its basic allocative functions.

Building a citizenship-guide d m a r k e t entails m o r e t h a n simply apply - ing the c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y to e c o n o m i c s , d e m o c r a t i z i n g t h e work- place, or including the right t o a decent living a m o n g citizenship's b u n d l e of rights - a l t h o u g h it certainly is all of these. R a t h e r , it is t h e c o m m i t - m e n t to w h a t B I E N (Basic I n c o m e E a r t h [formerly E u r o p e a n ] N e t w o r k ) , a g r o w i ng i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t , calls a basic income right, o r a citizen income, a n d which I d u b as t h e right to a citizenship livelihood}* B o t h w o r d s are critical: livelihood - b e c a u s e the rights of social p r o v i s i o n - ing entail n o t only t h e rights d u e to t h o s e w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in income- generating activity, b u t also t h e rights d u e to children, the elderly, the disabled, t h e chronically u n e m p l o y e d ; rights, in other words, t h a t cannot be stigmatized by means-testing, or the epithets of "dependency," "charity- case" and other w o r d s of social exclusion (Fraser and G o r d o n 1997, 1998). One of the goals of a socially inclusionary citizenship, moreover, would be to t r a n s f o r m t h e livelihood p a r a d i g m in such a way as t o n o r m a l i z e a n d valorize m o n e t a r y r e w a r d for m u c h of w h a t is c u r r e n t l y u n p a i d a n d devalued l a b o r (e.g. raising c h i l d r e n, d o i n g h o u s e h o l d w o r k , u n p a i d childcare). In t h e m e a n t i m e , the c u r r e n t l y n o n - i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g s t a t u s of u n p a i d b u t essential h o u s e h o l d l a b o r c a n n o t be used t o justify c o n t i n u i n g the h i e r a r c h y of m o r a l w o r t h between "gainful" e m p l o y m e n t a n d u n p a i d l a b o r .

3 j See for e x a m p l e , Citizen's Income Newsletter 2001-2007, a n d BIEN Newsletter.

Theorizing citizenship rights and statelessness 45

The first w o r d of t h e r i g h t to a citizenship livelihood is equally critical. The precepts of citizenship e m p h a s i ze w h a t is t r u e of all social c o n c e r n s related to livelihood - n a m e l y , t h a t p r o t e c t i o n s a g a i n st the risks of life in market society represent m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s we have to each o t h e r . T h e s e are. as I a r g u e d a b o v e , less a b o u t i n c o m e levels o r e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s p e r se than they are a b o u t social inclusion a n d recognition of all p e o p l e as moral e q u a l s . This is w h e r e citizenship's n o r m a t i v e ideal of solidarity meets its challenge in t h e t o u g h realities of o u r political c u l t u r e , which has, since t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y specter of p a u p e r i s m a n d M a l t h u s i a n warnings of t h e link betwee n p o o r relief a n d socially perilous p o p u l a t i o n growth, divided t h e " d e s e r v i n g " from the " u n d e s e r v i n g " beneficiaries of social relief - a distinction based o n an illegitimate c o n v e r s i o n of m a r k e t value (work effort) i n t o civil society's m o r a l metrics ( M a l t h u s [1798] 1992). M o r e o v e r , the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of " u n d e s e r v i n g " is consistently used t o describ e a n d d e n i g r a t e those g r o u p s of people w h o have l o n g suffered exclusion b a s e d o n the n o n m a r k e t discourses of r a c e, gender, and ethnic p r i m o r d i a l i s m , exclusions justified by t h e same d i s t o r t i o n s t o the v o c a b u l a r y of m o r a l i t y as the m a r k e t - d r i v e n o n e s . I n h e r c u l t u r a l a p p r o a c h to citizenship, J u d i t h S h k l a r (1991) lays b a r e h o w the d e e p exclusionary r o o t s of chattel slavery, w h i c h denied to A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s the "right t o e a r n , " c o n t i n u e s to fuel t o d a y ' s m o r a l c o n d e m n a t i o n of those u n a b l e t o e a r n . She a t t r i b u t e s to the specter of slavery the m o r a l j u d g m e n t s p e o p l e a t t a c h t o e m p l o y m e n t s t a t u s - j u d g m e n t s m o s t c o m - monly i n v o k e d by t h o s e a n x i o u s t o d i s t a n c e themselves from slaves w h o were denie d j u s t t h a t right. D u r i n g the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n , despite wide- spread s t r u c t u r a l u n e m p l o y m e n t , A m e r i c a n s w i t h o u t w o r k "still regarded b o t h their lack of i n c o m e a n d their need t o rely o n some form of assistance as a shameful loss of i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d b e n e a t h the dignity of a citizen" ( S h k l ar 1991: 22). E v e n t o d a y , despite efforts o r i e n t ed t o treating u n e m p l o y m e n t as a social p r o b l e m , L o u i s Uchitelle h a s discov- ered t h r o u g h i n - d e p t h interviews t h a t when one is laid off o n e loses o n e ' s moral s t a t u r e in A m e r i c a (Uchitelle 2006). W o r s e off a r e t h e l o n g - t e r m u n e m p l o y e d w h o a r e " t r e a t e d as less t h a n full m e m b e r s of society. In effect, the p e o p l e w h o b e l o ng to the u n d e r - c l a s s are n o t q u i t e citizens" (Shklar 1991: 22). As H a n d l e r (2004), w h o a r g u e s a l o n g the same lines, writes: " a l t h o u g h ostensibly a b o u t w o r k effort, these m o r a l j u d g - ments [about u n e m p l o y m e n t ] involve race, ethnicity, gender, family responsibilities, sexuality, a n d v a r i o u s forms of d e v i a n t behavior . T h u s , citizenship is also used in an ideological s y m b o l i c sense - to distinguish people from either within t h e b o r d e r s o r from t h o s e w h o are outside . . . it is [therefore] often used as a term of exclusion, of m o r a l

46 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

superiority, a c o n s t r u c t i o n of the ' O t h e r ' " (2004: 10; see also F r a s e r a n d G o r d o n 1997, 1998; G o r d o n 1990).

E c h o i n g S h k l a r ' s c a u s a l linkag e between fair e m p l o y m e n t a n d the " s t a n d i n g " of inclusive citizenship, Alice K e s s l e r - H a r r is (2001) has recently a r g u e d t h a t for w o m e n "access to e c o n o m i c e q u a l i t y " t h r o u g h decent a n d dignified w o r k is " a necessary c o n d i t i o n of citizenship." She stipulates t h a t it begins " w i t h self-support , generally t h r o u g h the ability to w o r k a t the o c c u p a t i o n of o n e ' s choice, [but] it does n o t e n d t h e r e. R a t h e r , it r e q u i r e s c u s t o m a r y a n d legal acknowledgment of personhood, with all t h a t implies of e x p e c t a t i o n s , t r a i n i n g , access t o a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of re s o u r c e s, a n d o p p o r t u n i t y in the m a r k e t p l a c e " ( K e s s l e r - H a r r i s 2001: 283, 1 2 - 1 3 , m y italics). Similarly, C a r o l e P a t e m a n writes t h a t " p a i d e m p l o y m e n t h a s b e c o m e t h e key to citizenship, a n d the r e c o g n i t i o n of a n i n d i v i d u al as a citizen of e q u a l w o r t h t o o t h e r citizens is lacking when a w o r k e r is u n e m p l o y e d " ( P a t e m a n 1989: 1 0 ) . 3 6 N o t h i n g g u a r a n t e e s social exclusion m o r e t h a n t h e inability t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the r i g h t to livelihood or being forced to live, as R i c h a r d Sennett (2006) so aptly p u t s it, u n d e r t h e "specter of u s e l e s s n e s s . " 3 7

U n d e r socially inclusive citizenship, t h e n , t h e l a b o r m a r k e t plays a critical p a r t in s u p p o r t i n g the r i g h t t o a citizenship livelihood. T h e social inclusion a n d m o r a l w o r t h o n w h i c h citizenship d e p e n d s requires access t o a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of e a r n i n g a n d p r o v i d i n g by which livelihood is p r o c u r e d . Y e t several c a v e a t s are necessary lest this discus- sion of the link between full citizenship r e c o g n i t i o n a n d the right t o e a r n t o o easily be m i s r e a d as c o n d o n i n g the obligation t o w o r k as a c o n d i t i o n of full citizenship, especially t h r o u g h such punitive m e a s u r e s as w o r k - fare; or being forced t o accept a n y available j o b regardless of c o n d i t i o n s or circumstances . Le t m e a d d r e s s briefly these c a v e a t s .

T h e long s h a d o w of r a c i s m in A m e r i c a s u p p o r t s a political c u l t u re t h a t c o n t i n u e s to m a k e e m p l o y m e n t a c o n d i t i o n subject to m o r a l j u d g m e n t by o t h e r s . " W h e n they cease t o e a r n w h a t e v e r the c h a r a c t e r of their work , A m e r i c a n s lose their s t a n d i n g in their c o m m u n i t i e s " ( S h k l a r 1991: 98). But it w o u l d n o t m a k e sense to imply, conversely, t h a t e m p l o y m e n t leads t o social a p p r o b a t i o n a n d political inclusion regardless of t h e kind of w o r k . F o r there is w o r k , a n d t h e n t h e r e is w o r k t h a t veers t o o closely to t h a t specter of slavery. F r o m the f o u n d i n g of t h e c o u n t r y , A m e r i c a n s b o t h e n d o r s e d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery as well as held c o n t e m p t for those

3 6 Cited in B o s n i a k (2006: 105-6). 3 7 This is n o t to m i n i m i z e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e right to livelihood m o r e generally, especially

t h r o u g h such strategies as d e v e l o p e d by BTEN.

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 47

unable to achieve the i n d e p e n d e n c e t h a t only p a i d l a b o r coul d p r o v i d e . Since r e p u b l i c a n ideology valorized only the i n d e p e n d e n t p r o d u c i n g citizen, t h e u n p a i d w o r k of slavery further justified excluding all African-Americans from r e c o g n i t i o n as citizens. Even freedmen h a d n o standing within t h e polity, b o t h before a n d after e m a n c i p a t i o n . This was a political c u l t u re in which t h e c o n d i t i o n s of w o r k m a p p e d o n t o the exclusions of race a n d gender t o define p e r s o n h o o d , which in t u r n delimited political rights. A m o n g white w o m e n a n d t h e newly i n d u s t r i a l - ized w o r k i n g classes, this c o n j u n c t u r e of slavery, lack of i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d political exclusion i n e x o r a b l y linked the fact of slave l a b o r to their status as b o t h e a r n e r s a n d political beings. W o m e n m o r e often t h a n n o t rejected the a s s o c i a t i o n of their u n p a i d h o u s e h o l d w o r k w i t h slavery, as they felt d e g r a d e d a n d s h a m e d by being likened to slaves. By c o n t r a s t , in deploying the r h e t o r i c of "wage slavery," the i n d u s t r i a l w o r k i n g classes used the discourse of s h a m e a t t a c h e d t o u n p a i d w o r k to o r g a n i z e a g a i n s t the p i t t a n c e of a w a g e they were e a r n i n g a t the h a n d s of factory o w n e r s . T h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y of the l a b o r m o v e m e n t , in fact, t h e cry of "wage slavery" b e c a m e a c o n s t a n t r h e t o r i c a l refrain in t h e a s s o c i a t i o n t h e t e r m conjured between exploitative wage levels a n d exclusion f r o m full citizen- ship. T o d a y t h e d e g r a d a t i o n i m p o s e d o n t h e w o r k i n g p o o r by a n i n d e - cently l o w m i n i m u m w a g e m a k e s it clear t h a t it is n o t e a r n i n g per se t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e r i g h t s of citizenship, b u t only being able t o e a r n a living wage u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of d i g n i t y . 3 8

This m a k e s the heavily sanctioned workfare requirements of the P R W O A seem all the m o r e mean-spirited in its straightforward prioritization of "personal responsibility" t h r o u g h work a t even the most degrading of low- wage j o b s , over any c o m m i t m e n t to reducing poverty or inequality. D u b b e d welfare reform, the P R W O A h a d only one overriding goal: t o reduce a n d eventually eliminate altogether the welfare rolls. Absen t from the A c t ' s presuppositions was acknowledgment t h a t it is poverty th at leads people to request public assistance. R a t h e r , the bipartisan m a r k e t fundamentalist stipulation tha t propelled the P R W O A t o victory under the D e m o c r a t i c Clinton administratio n was that it is the lack of personal responsibility a n d the refusal t o work t h a t underlies the t u r n to welfare. T h e requirement to take any j o b , regardless of its conditions, along with disallowing the j o b training or education t h a t might prepare for better j o b s - in short, the reality of being coerced t o participate in workfare - invokes the specter of slavery and indentured servitude a m o n g welfare recipients. F o r the welfare reform- ers, however, the beneficiaries' alleged "culture of dependence" m o r e t h a n

See T o n y A t k i n s o n (2002) o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e l a b o r m a r k e t as right of citizenship.

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justifies revoking their rights to civic equality a n d the independence of citizenship. After all, as Shklar reminds us, workfare has nothing to do with economics or m o n e t a r y self-sufficiency. It is a b o u t mora l j u d g m e n t - a p a e a n to the long-standing principle t h a t able-bodied adults w h o d o not earn are undeserving of full citizenship. Workfare is a punitive measure intended to instill "acceptable s t a n d a r d s of civic c o n d u c t" (1991:97-8). That m o r e t h a n a decade after its passage, the P R W O A has increased r a t h e r than decreased the level of poverty a m o n g ex-recipients is rarely acknowledged; what matters is that the welfare rolls have been drastically reduced (Handler 2006). Clearly, workfare c a n n o t be p a r t of any p r o g r a m for a socially inclusive citizenship regime.

Civil society D e m o c r a t i c citizenship regimes require r o b u s t civil societies, which are deeply entangled with b o t h the state a n d the market, while still doing the b o u n d a r y w o r k necessary to protect their o w n integrity. It is in civil society tha t citizens constitute themselves as such, a n d it is in civil society tha t Polanyi's "counter [market]-movements" of social protection are nurtured, just as are social a n d labor movements m o r e generally (trade unions, environmentalism, civil rights movements, feminism, gay rights, etc.). And it is in civil society t h a t social movement s develop the capacities t o pressure the state to build a d e q u a t e social insurance p r o g r a m s and non- contractual policies t o protect against market-generated risks to health, retirement, education, a n d social life. A t the same time, a strong civil society also depends o n access to the l a b or market, especially to a full range of employment opportunities for all levels of skill a n d education.

Civil society is always t h r e a t e n e d by r a d i c a l i m b a l a n c e s of m a r k e t a n d / or state p o w e r , to the p o i n t w h e r e society as a whole is a t risk (Polanyi 2001). Since m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m does not recognize this t h r e a t , seven decades a g o the N e w D e a l t o o k o n the role of h o u s e b r e a k i n g laissez- faire capitalism - a n d saved capitalism from itself. T o p u t a canonical twist on it, o n e c o u l d say t h a t social d e m o c r a t i c state policies added a n unexpected c o d a t o t h e f a m o u s n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y teleology of m o d e r n i z a t i o n - a r e i n v a s i o n of a n (inegalitarian) m o d e r n c o n t r a c t by t h e egalitarianis m of s t a t u s . 3 9 It is in civil society t h a t social m o v e m e n t s a n d o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c forces cultivate the p u b lic n a r r a t i v e s t h a t p r e s s u r e the " h o u s e b r e a k i n g " t o w a r d s o l i d a r i s m a n d inclusion. T h e D u r k h e i m i a n (1984) n o n c o n t r a c t u a l i s m of c o n t r a c t is an essential element of this w o r k , n o t only for the sake of social solidarity but also for the survival of the m a r k e t itself, which c a n n o t r u n recklessly a l o n g its o w n i n s t r u m e n t a l

O n civil society i n v a d i n g t h e m a r k e t s p h e r e , see E s t l u n d (2003).

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tracks w i t h o u t risking t h e survival of the social tout court. A s A l e x a n d e r (2006: 173) e l a b o r a t e s , t h e c o u r t s recognized this as early as 1889 when a N!ew Y o r k c o u r t ruled t h a t even c o n t r a c t law m u s t s u b m i t t o eg alitarian moral m a x i m s w h e n civil solidarity is a t stake. Justice Felix F r a n k f u r t e r in the case of United States v. Bethlehem Steel m o s t eloquently stated the ethos of civil society in r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e m a r k e t a n d the state :

Is there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice? More specifically the courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a "bargain" in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of [the] other. (Frankfurter, cited in Alexander 2006: 175)

By p r e v e n t i n g t h o s e w h o exercise m a r k e t p o w e r from using the law as an " i n s t r u m e n t of i n e q u i t y a n d injustice," F r a n k f u r t e r is flexing the muscle necessary t o fortify t h e b o u n d a r y t h a t p r o t e c t s civil society against political o r m a r k e t i n v a s i o n. Civil society d e p e n d s o n this k i n d of b o u n d a r y p a t r o l to sustain its ballast in the always-unsettled contest of power a m o n g s t a t e , m a r k e t , a n d civil society.

M u c h of civil society's b o u n d a r y w o r k t h u s entails d e m o c r a t i z i n g the law to prevent t h o s e w h o wield outsized i n s t r u m e n t s of m a r k e t p o w e r (corporate assets, p r o p e r t y , a n d w eal t h) from c o n v e r t i n g these i n t o mechanisms of civil d o m i n a t i o n . Conversely, law c a n b e mobilize d to prevent m a r k e t "failures" such as p o v e r t y , p r o p e r t y l e s s n e s s, a n d lack of marketable skills from spilling over i n t o civil society t o b e c o m e a d d e d instruments of powerlessness a n d social exclusion, t h e r e b y further deny- ing access to the only i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t inclusion, social dignity, and m o r a l w o r t h - e.g. e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h care, a n d decent e m p l o y m e n t . As if this were not e n o u g h , civil society m u s t also be c o n s t a n t l y alert to the p r o p e n s i t y of t h e m a r k e t to use civil society as a d u m p s i t e for its own externalities a n d privatizing fiascos (as I discuss in c h a p t e r 6). A n d , finally, civil society m u s t p a t r o l a g a i n st the s t a t e ' s security-driven i m p e - rial aims, which t h r e a t e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s o n which civil society d e p e n d s . T h e s e a r e civil society's n o r m a t i v e ideals in a d e m o c r a t i c and p l u r a l i st citizenship regime. T h e y r e p r e s e n t a p i c t u r e of civil p o w e r that is an increasin g distanc e from o u r c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n .

Three muses and three principles

The a r g u m e n t s a n d t h e o r e t i c al perspectives in this b o o k clearly wear more t h a n on e disciplinary h a t , j u s t as the s u b s t a n t i v e r e a c h of my

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m a t e r i a l crosses disciplinary b o u n d a r i e s . B o t h attest to the p l u r a l i s t cast of m i n d this project d e m a n d s . Still, t h e r e is a unifying m e a n i n g to my multiplicity. I h a v e been inspired a n d m o t i v a t e d by years of engagemen t with three towering intellects of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , each of whose life's w o r k was d e d i c a t ed to h u m a n e m a n c i p a t i o n a n d to the responsi- bility of d i s s e m i n a t i ng a publi c sociology: K a r l P o l a n y i, the great founder of m o d e r n e c o n o m i c sociology a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y ; H a n n a h A r e n d t , post- H o l o c a u s t r e p u b l i c a n political t h e o r i s t, h i s t o r i a n , a n d m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r of t h e polity; a n d T. H . M a r s h a l l , w h o s e small b o o k established the very possibility of a sociology of citizenship a n d rights.

Stimulated by these m u s e s I have been w o r k i n g my way t h r o u g h a research p r o g r a m in which I a t t e m p t to theorize the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c o n s t r a i n a n d / o r e n a b l e g r e a t e r degrees of social justice a n d a d e m o c r a t i c culture of h u m a n rights. A s w i t h P o l a n y i , A r e n d t , a n d M a r s h a l l , this effort entails c o n t i n u o u s l y i n t e r r o g a t i n g the deep c o n u n d r u m s a n d liabil- ities, the c u l t u r a l a n d politica l m e a n i n g s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s , of classical political a n d e c o n o m i c liberalism - in p a r t i c u l a r , its tendencies t o enable m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , to conflate m a r k e t s a n d civil society, a n d to systematically d e g r a d e the political. A t t h e s a m e time, like m y muses, I h a v e recognized, a d m i r e d , a n d explored t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e p o t e n t i a l - ities a n d promises i n h e r e nt in liberalism's rule a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s of law, as well as its n o r m a t i v e c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n rights ( S t a r r 2007; E . P . T h o m p s o n 1975b).

T h u s inspired by a n a d m i x t u r e of P o l a n y i t e , A r e n d t i a n , a n d M a r s h a l l i a n a s s u m p t i o n s , I h a ve b r o u g h t t o b e a r o n all my w o r k some v a r i a n t of three principles : (1) the a u t h o r i t y a n d powers of k n o w l e d g e , c u l t u r e , a n d i d e a t i o n a l regimes; (2) a critique of social n a t u r a l i s m ; (3) a c o m m i t m e n t t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i sm in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s . 4 0 F r o m these principles I hav e assembled a n d woven t h r o u g h m y w o r k the following h y p o t h e s i s : t h a t p e o p l e ' s life-chances, their access to e q u a l i t y , to social inclusion, t o t h e dignity of recognition , i n d e e d their very r i g h t t o h a v e rights, are all d e p e n d e n t on usin g the p o w e r s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m to demystify social n a t u r a l i s m - the idea t h a t certain social entities a r e in fact p a r t of n a t u r e a n d subject to its laws such as the "self-regulating'" m a r k e t , free v o l u n t a r y c o n t r a c t u a l e x c h a n g e , n a t u r a l rights, a n d t h e self-motivating agency of h u m a n n a t u r e . M y belief is t h a t these n a t u r a l i z e d objects m u s t be d e n a t u r a l i z e d by those

a " T h e r e a r e actually four f o u n d a t i o n ^ principles. B u t since 1 deal so extensively in the c h a p t e r s with the necessity of power and die public sphere, I h a v e decided n o t t o include the fourth in this i n t r o d u c t o r y d i s c u s s i o n.

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social i n s t i t u t i o n s which are in fact the least n a t u r a l a n d require the greatest degree of h u m a n a n d social i n t e r v e n t i o n : specifically, the insti- tutions a n d practices of h u m a n rights a n d citizenship, the rule a n d rules of law, the solidarism of civil societies a n d of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r u n d e r democratic c o n t r o l . I will say a bit a b o u t t h e origins of this h y p o t h e s i s in thinking t h r o u g h t h e t h r e e f o u n d a t i o n a l p r e c e p t s I h a v e associated with Arendt. P o l a n y i , a n d M a r s h a l l .

The authority and powers of knowledge and ideational regimes

To avoid the idealism t h a t the social sciences were b o r n to refute, sociol- ogists h a ve a long h i s t o r y of dismissing o r explaining ideas as reflections of deeper e c o n o m i c a n d / o r political forces. Over the last several decades I have been p a r t of an ever-enlarging g r o u p of c u l t u r a l sociologists t h a t has been m o u n t i n g a d e t e r m i n e d - a n d I believe a r e m a r k a b l y successful - effort t o u n d o this sociological m i s t a k e . Like all such c o h o r t s , t h a t of cultural sociology h a s its f o u n d i n g m o t h e r s a n d fathers - D u r k h e i m , Weber, F o u c a u l t a n d B o u r d i e u being t h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t of w h a t can already be called a c a n o n . Virtually unrecognized by this new c u l t u r al sociology, however, is the w o r k of P o l a n y i , A r e n d t , a n d M a r s h a l l , for whom t h e causal p o w e r s of liberalism's epistemologies a n d i d e a t i o n a l practices were a t t h e very core of their t h e o r i z i n g .

Like all ideas, those a t w o r k in the genealogies of citizenship are n o t isolated signifiers of m a t e r i a l objects; r a t h e r , they are p a r t of m u c h larger c o n c e p t u a l n e t w o r k s . T h a t w h i c h is considered true k n o w l e d g e is c o n t a i n e d within the p a r a m e t e r s of w h a t in c h a p t e r 7 I call a k n o w - ledge c u l t u r e . Since k n o w l e d g e is t h a t which claims scientific g r o u n d s for its t r u t h s , a t t a c h i n g c u l t u r e to k n o w l e d g e t r a n s f o r m s t h e n o r m s of s t a n d a r d epistemology as well as the m e a n s by w h i c h k n o w l e d g e qua t r u t h is r e p r e s e n t e d , expressed, a n d c o n v e y e d . 4 1 K n o w l e d g e can b e represented in n u m e r o u s c u l t u r a l forms, including public, symbolic, m e a n i n g - d r i v e n c o n c e p t u a l stories, b i n a r y codes, c u l t u r a l m y t h s , and u n c o n s c i o u s discursive a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h e c u l t u r a l expressions t h a t

In a d d i t i o n lo P o l a n y i a n d A r e n d t , m y use of t h e k n o w l e d g e c u l t u r e c o n c e p t is loosely associated with t h e B o u r d i e u i a n / F o u c a u l d i a n "new c u l t u r al h i s t o r y " as reflected in t h e w o r k of H u n t (1989a); D u r k h e i m i a n / S a u s s u r i a n c u l t u r a l sociology, e.g. A l e x a n d e r (198&); A l e x a n d e r And S m i t h (1993); H a c k i n g (1990b). See also B o u r d i c u (1984), B o u r d i e u a n d W a c q u a t u (19921, S a u s s u r e ([1916] 1959), D u r k h e i m ([1912] 1995). a n d D u r k h e i m a n d M a u s s ( [ 1 9 0 3 ] 1963).

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d o m i n a t e the k n o w l e d g e c u l t u r e s in m y researc h a r e t h o s e of public n a r r a t i v e s , b i n a r y c o d e s , a n d the m e t a n a r r a t i v e s a n d m a s t e r n a r r a t i v e s whose social n a t u r a l i s m gives t h e m e n o r m o u s epistemic privilege.

Social naturalism

T h e r e is o ne idea that 1 give p r i de of place for its p e r n i c i o us effects on rights a n d citizenship. This is social n a t u r a l i s m - a way of organizing societal k n o w l e d g e a n d p e r c e p t i o n s a r o u n d t h e schematic worldview t h a t h u m a n society is subject t o the same laws of n a t u r e as the n a t u r a l world. Social n a t u r a l i s m is n o t j u s t an epistemological stance; it is also an o n t o l o g y - a theor y of being - in which t h e characteristic s of the n a t u r a l o r d e r are m a p p e d o n t o a n d conflated with t h o s e of the social o r d e r . As an o n t o l o g y it s h o u ld n o t be confused with the m o r e familiar m e t h o d o l o g y of n a t u r a l i s m - the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e t h a t because n a t u r e a n d society exhibit the s a m e k i n d s of regularities (for a n y n u m b e r of r e a s o n s ) , there s h o u ld be a unified m e t h o d applicable t o b o t h . Social n a t u r a l i s m , by c o n t r a s t , c o n c e p t u a l l y s u b o r d i n a t e s society t o n a t u r e : society is not 'Tike" the n a t u r a l world; the social a n d n a t u r a l w o r l d s are on e a n d the s a m e , a n d t h u s subject t o t h e s a m e laws a n d exigencies. F o r P o lan y i this t r a n s l a t e d into t h e " s t a r k Utopia" t h a t t h e m a r k e t is driven by self- r e g u l a t i n g n a t u r a l laws a n d tha t this n a t u r a l i s t ic "self-regulating" m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s h o u ld g o v e r n m a r k e t society as a w h o l e in the interest of social h a r m o n y a n d p r o s p e r i t y . F o r A r e n d t , it is the false security offered by the R i g h t s of M a n ( n a t u r a l rights) t h a t is partiall y responsible for the a b a n d o n m e n t of the Jews of E u r o p e t o their genocidal fates. F o r b o t h P o l a n y i a n d A r e n d t . the c u l t u r al o p p o s i t i o n between so-called n a t u r a l a n d n o n n a t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o ns is a t once the m o s t i m p o r - t a n t a n d t h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s a s p e c t of classical liberalism's i d e a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d k n o w l e d g e c u l t u r e .

P o l a n y i identifies t h e i n v e n t i o n of social n a t u r a l i s m as the necessary factor in the birth of classical political e c o n o m y - in m a n y ways the forbearer of t o d a y ' s m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . A n d like the science of political e c o n o m y overall, social n a t u r a l i s m ' s significance for citizenship a n d rights was a n d c o n t i n u e s t o be in its f a r - r e a c h i ng political implica- tions. Since n a t u r e is a self-regulating system with which we w o u l d not t h i n k of interfering, social n a t u r a l i s t s ask why t h e n d o we h a ve so m a n y laws a n d policies t h a t interfere with t h e self-regulating e n t i ty of society? A n d w h y d o we e n d e a v o r to help the p o o r ? Scientific i g n o r a n c e a n d r a t i o n a l i s t h u b r i s is t h e a n s w e r offered by M a l t h u s a n d R i c a r d o , the p i o n e e r s of classical political e c o n o m y . A n d they l a b o r e d tirelessly in

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their efforts t o convince politicians a n d intellectuals t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l rules a n d political r e g u l a t i o n s inevitably s a b o t a g e the m a r k e t .

Social n a t u r a l i s m has implication s n o t j u s t for h o w we t h i n k a n d know a b o u t society as a w h o l e. It is also the basis of o u r p e r c e p t i o n s of individual agency a n d ( m o r e accurately , in t h e l a n g u a g e of social n a t u r a l i s m ) of individua l b e h a v i o r . W i t h the line between a n i m al a n d h u m a n i t y erased, social n a t u r a l i s m reduces p e o p l e to their biologically driven instincts a n d needs for food a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n . It in t u r n t a k e s o n b o a r d t h e n a t u r a l i s t p o s t u l a t e t h a t h u m a n society, like n a t u r e , is f u n d a- mentally c o n s t r a i n e d by the scarcity p o s t u l a t e - the c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d p e r m a n e n t c o n d i t i o n of m a t e r i a l scarcity. T h e c o m b i n a t i o n of scarcity and b i o l o g i z a t i o n leads t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e secret to societal o r d e r and p r o s p e r i t y is to m a i n t a i n a t all costs this c o n d i t i o n of scarcity, for only t h e biological drive to e a t can discipline the social masses into voluntarily t a k i n g u p the bitter t a s k of c o n s t a n t l a b o r . W i t h o u t scarcity the h u n g e r - d r i v e n discipline to e a r n o n e ' s k e e p will also dissolve. The policy i m p l i c a t i o n s are direct: r e m o v e t h e t h r e a t of h u n g e r from the p o o r by p r o v i d i n g them with the m o r a l perversity of p o o r relief (welfare), a n d so t o o the incentive to w o r k d i s s o l v e s / T h e m o r a l of the story is tha t m e d d l i n g with n a t u r e t h r o u g h state i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d welfare relief will h a ve perverse u n i n t e n d e d consequences of w o r s e n i n g the very p r o b l e m it w a s i n t e n d e d to s o l v e . 4 2 N o o n e has c a p t u r e d this o n t o l o g y m o r e brilliantly t h a n P o l a n y i : " H o b b e s h a d a r g u e d the need for a d e s p o t b e c a u s e m e n were like b e a s t s ; T o w n s e n d insisted t h a t they were actually beasts a n d t h a t , precisely for t h a t r e a s o n . . . [n]o g o v e r n m e n t w a s needed t o m a i n t a i n this b a l a n c e; it w a s r e s t o r e d by t h e p a n g s of h u n g e r on the on e h a n d , the scarcity of foo d o n t h e o t h e r " (Polany i 2 0 0 1 : 119; emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . 4 3 In a s t r o k e , social n a t u r a l i s m dissolves the

4 2 W h e n n a t u r e will govern a n d p u n i s h for u s , it is a very miserable a m b i t i o n to wish t o snatch t h e r o d from her h a n d s , a n d d r a w u p o n ourselves t h e o d i u m of executioner. T o t h e p u n i s h m e n t therefore of n a t u r e he should b e left, t h e p u n i s h m e n t of severe w a n t . H e h a s erred in the face of a m o s t clear a n d precise w a r n i n g , a n d can have n o j u s t r e a s o n to c o m p l a i n of a n y person but himself w h e n h e feels the consequences of his error. All parish assistance should b e denied bim; a n d h e should b e Jeft t o t h e u n c e r t a i n s u p p o r t of p r i v a t e charity. H e s h o u l d b e t a u g h t t o k n o w , that the laws of n a t u r e , which a r e the laws of G o d , h a d d o o m e d h i m a n d his family t o suffer for disobeying their repealed a d m o n i t i o n s ; t h a t h e h a d n o claim of right o n society for the smallest p o r t i o n of food, beyond t h a t w h i c h his l a b o u r w o u l d fairly p u r c h a s e ; a n d t h a t if h e a n d his family were saved from feeling the n a t u r a l consequences of his i m p r u d e n c e , h e w o u l d owe it lo t h e p i ty of some k i n d benefactor, to w h o m , therefore, h e o u g h t to b e b o u n d by the strongest ties of g r a t i t u d e. ( M a l t h u s 1992: 2 6 2 - 3 )

4 3 J o s e p h T o w n s e n d is usually a t t r i b u t e d (including, eventually, by M a l t h u s himself) as t h e i n s p i r a t i o n b e h i n d M a l t h u s ' s e m b r a c e of social n a t u r a l i s m a n d his b a t t l e t o abolish all forms of welfare o r p o o r relief.

54 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

E n l i g h t e n m e n t t r a d i t i o n t h a t distinguished h u m a n s from a n i m a l s by their capacity for r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t .

Social n a t u r a l i s m h a s further implications for the theorie s driving policy. As I d e m o n s t r a t e in c h a p t e r 7, as a c o n c e p t u a l schema it divides the w o r l d i n t o a z e r o - s u m logic a n d m a p s m a r k e t liberalism's n o r m a t i v e b i n a r y between n a t u r a l a n d u n n a t u r a l o n t o the categories of the social world. On the on e side, grafted u n d e r the r u b r i c of things " n a t u r a l " is found the m a r k e t i z e d version of civil society, which m i r r o r s the freedom of the " s t a t e of n a t u r e " r e o r g a n i z e d i n t o the p r i v a t e sphere of m a r k e t e x c h a n g e . A s p a r t of n a t u r e , the m a r k e t is in t u r n privileged with t h e self- r e g u l a t i o n , c e r t a i n t y, a u t o n o m y , a n d t h e predictability of the laws of n a t u r e - a " s p o n t a n e o u s o r d e r " ( H a y e k 2007) c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e magic of A d a m S m i t h ' s "invisible h a n d . 1 ' On the o t h e r side, by c o n t r a s t , are society's political a n d legal i n s t i t u t i o n s , n o w grafted t o t h e c a t e g o r y of u n n a t u r a l , a r b i t r a r y , a n d c o n t i n u i n g t h r e a t s to the "system of n a t u r a l liberty" (Smit h 1976). By this logic, state i n t e r v e n t i o n in civil society violates t h e laws of n a t u r e a n d p o s e s a clear a n d p r e s e n t political d a n g e r to the freedoms e n d o w e d t o us by t h e power-free s p o n t a n e o u s o r d e r of the m a r k e t . In the age of the scientific r e v o l u t i o n , a cleverer way of achieving the shamelessly political goa l of d e r e g u l a t i ng m a r k e t s , abolish- ing p o o r relief, a n d c r e a t i n g a c u l t u r e of a n t i s t a t i s m could h a r d l y be imagined.

This comprise s a c u l t u r a l logic a n d a goal t h a t are still with us t o d a y . P o s t u l a t i n g the m a r k e t as a self-regulating n a t u r a l system, t o d a y ' s m a r - ket f u n d a m e n t a l i sm h a s inherited a n d n u r t u r e d social n a t u r a l i s m ' s claims t o law-like necessity a n d n a t u r a l i z e d policy m a n d a t e s . It is easy to u n d e r s t a n d h o w i m p o r t a n t a c u l t u r a l c o n s t r u c t social n a t u r a l i s m is for m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' s efforts t o delegitimate t h e political inter- ventions of socially inclusive citizenship . T h e n a t u r a l law t h a t govern- m e n t interference always t h r e a t e n s liberty reinforces the default p o s i t i o n t h a t m a r k e t s o l u t i o n s a r e in c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the laws of n a t u r e , a n d a r e therefore always t h e preferabl e o n e s .

It is t h e epistemic privilege t h a t social n a t u r a l i s m e n d o w s t o m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t social policies - its r e m a r k a b l e i m m u n i t y to empirical d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n , its claim to scientific veracity based o n t h e hidden laws of n a t u r e , a n d its a s s u m p t i o n of a u t o n o m y from social and political interference - t h a t e a r n s it special c o n d e m n a t i o n . Social n a t u r a l i s m has for two centuries been giving cover t o a story a b o u t h o w m a r - ketization is a n a t u r a l , necessary , a n d inevitable process b e y o n d o u r c o n t r o l . If p r o b l e m s o c c u r a l o n g the w a y, the a r g u m e n t goes, the fault c a n n o t lie w i t h m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ; after all, it is b u t a reflection

T h e o r i z i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a n d s t a t e l e s s n e s s 55

of n a t u r e ' s design. I n s t e a d the p r o b l e m s a r e a t t r i b u t e d t o s o m e interfer- ence with this design t h a t has mistakenl y shielded s o m e aspect of t h e social o r d e r from the m a r k e t ' s logic, t h u s i m p a i r i ng a n d violating the self-regulating m a r k e t l a w s . 4 4

Social n a t u r a l i s m w a s originally m a d e u p o u t of thin air, b u t t h a t in n o way mitigates either its capacity to influence social a n d political policies or its p o t e n t i a l l y c a t a s t r o p h i c consequence s for h u m a n i t y . A m o n g its most w o r r i s o m e qualities, social n a t u r a l i s m m a k e s i n s t i t u t i o n s the e n e m y of rights a n d freedom, a n d bases h u m a n a u t o n o m y o n t h e g r e a t e s t degree of a b s t r a c t i o n from politics a n d society. O n e of the central aims of this book is to e x p o s e j u s t h o w d a n g e r o u s for citizenship a n d rights h a s been social n a t u r a l i s m ' s antipolitical r o u t e to freedom, a n d j u s t h o w m u c h of a t h r e a t it c o n t i n u e s to r e p r e s e n t . 4 "

Institutionalism

The c u r e for social n a t u r a l i s m is i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , as it p u t s h u m a n i t y , social a c t i o n , a n d social artifice, r a t h e r t h a n n a t u r e , biology, a n d n a t u r a l laws, a t the c e n t e r of its epistemology a n d o n t o l o g y . I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m is thus the infra s t r u c t u r a l stuff of citizenship. I n s t i t u t i o n s a r e o r g a n i z a - tional a n d symbolic p r a c t i c e s t h a t o p e r a t e within n e t w o r k s of rules, s t r u c t u r a l ties, p u b l i c n a r r a t i v e s , a n d b i n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r e e m b e d d e d in time a n d space. T o call s o m e t h i n g an i n s t i t u t i o n is simply to say tt is rule-driven. I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m is the t h e o ry t h a t most things a r e in p a r t (not entirely) c o n s t i t u t e d a n d regulate d by t h e rules t h a t organize t h e m , a n d t h u s t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g it is necessary - t h o u g h rarely sufficient - t o identify a n d i n t e r p r et t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d the effects of t h o s e rules. I especially like F r i e d l a n d a n d Afford's (1991: 243) definition of a n i n s t i t u t i o n as " s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m a t e r i a l a n d ideal, systems of signs a n d symbols, r a t i o n a l a n d t r a n s r a t i o n a l . . . s u p r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of h u m a n activity by which i n d i v i d u a l s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s p r o d u c e a n d r e p r o d u c e their m a t e r i a l subsistence and organize time a n d space . . . they a r e a l s o s y m b o l i c systems, ways of o r d e r i n g reality, a n d thereby r e n d e r i n g experience of time a n d space m e a n i n g f u l . "

R u l e s c a n n o t be f o u n d in n a t u r e ; they c a n only be m a d e by w h a t A r e n d t (1979) calls h u m a n "artifice" - the activities a n d i n t e r v e n t i o ns

4 4 T h i s p a r a g r a p h is d r a w n from S o m e r s a n d Block (2005). ^ Since it is the subject of c h a p t e r 3, this discussion of social n a t u r a l i s m neglects A r e n d t ' s

(1979) critique of h o w t h e n a t u r a l i s m s of b o t h t h e R i g h t s of M a n / n a t u r a l rights a n d e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m were m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r s to t h e c o n d i t i o n s tha t m a d e possible the H o l o c a u s t .

56 G e n e a l o g i e s o f C i t i z e n s h i p

of real h u m a n beings. T h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t c o m p r i s e political, civil, a n d - yes, even e c o n o m i c - society are social (not n a t u r a l ) artifacts. T o say that m o d e r n i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e rule-driven, however, does n o t m e a n they are r a t i o n a l or logical, c o n t r a m u c h of t h e writing of M a x W e b e r . It simply m e a n s t h a t they hav e social regularities t h a t give t h e m a likely continuit y t h r o u g h time a n d space. B u t i n s t i t u t i o n s can a n d d o c h a n g e , a n d those changes can only be c a u s e d by h u m a n activities. A n d a n y t h i n g that is h u m a n is as driven by t h e n o n r a t i o n a l as it is by logical m e a n s - e n d t h i n k i n g .

I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m challenges the idea t h a t m a r k e t s a n d e c o n o m i e s exist o u t s i d e of i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d cultural r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d so reiects social n a t u r a l i s m ' s c o n c e p t i o n of b o t h society a n d individual a c t i o n . W h e r e a s social n a t u r a l i s m first i m p u t e s t o e c o n o m i es a n d m a r k e t s the self-regulating c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of n a t u r e , a n d then uses t h e m a r k e t as the model for all of society, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , by c o n t r a s t , rejects r e d u c i n g society to t h e m a r k e t , a s well as r e d u c i n g the m a r k e t t o the self-regulating o n t o l o g y of n a t u r e . F r o m t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l perspective, for m a r k e t s to function a t all they m u s t be e m b e d d e d in r e g u l a t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t define the rules of m a r k e t i n t e r a c t i o n , even if the rules are " n e g a t i v e , " e.g. legally p r o t e c t e d free m a r k e t s . Bui I t a k e institutionalism even further. R a t h e r t h a n c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g m a r k e t s as distinct entities s u r r o u n d e d by o r e m b e d d e d in i n s t i t u t i o n s , I believe t h a t m a r k e t s are socially, cultur- ally, politically, a n d i d e a t i o n a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d artificial i n s t i t u t i o n s . As an analytic c o n s t r u c t , t h e idea of t h e m a r k e t is i n d i s p e n s a b l e ; b u t e m p i r i- cally, it is a complex of r u l e - d r i v en i n s t i t u t i o n s . 4 6

H i s t o r i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i sm simply m e a n s t h a t all i n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e histories. So t o o d o their rules. It is t h u s necessary n o t only t o identify b u t also to historicize i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d their rules. F o r h o w s o m e t h i n g c a m e to be tells us a g r e a t deal, t h o u g h by all m e a n s n o t everything, a b o u t w h a t it is n o w . T h e laws of n a t u r e , by c o n t r a s t , c a n n o t b e historical; by definition they a r e o u t s i d e of social time a n d space. This is n o t to say t h a t theories of n a t u r a l entities never c h a n g e ; t h e idea of gravity h a s a h i s t o r y , of course, but as a n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n gravity does not a n d c a n n o t be affected by time a n d p l a c e . By c o n t r a s t , historical i n s t i t u t i o n a l i sm i n h a b - its a k n o w l e d g e c u l t u r e t h a t insists t h e r e is n o t h i n g h u m a n t h a t is n o t historical, despite the m a n y ideas a b o u t h u m a n s t h a t m a k e them a p p e a r n o t to be - to wit, social n a t u r a l i s m ' s claims a b o u t social b i o l o g i z a t i o n . Historical i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m a n d p a t h d e p e n d e n c e have a n elective affinity

4 f i T h i s is what F r e d Block m e a n s w h e n he s p e a k s of t h e "always e m b e d d e d e c o n o m y " (Block 2003).

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with the P o l a n y i te version of i n s t i t u t i o n a h s m 1 h a v e been describing, as they all s h a r e a respect for the p o w e r of i n s t i t u t i o n s to e n d u r e over time, such t h a t the c o u r s e of their d e v e l o p m e n t s u b s e q u e n t l y shape s the c o u r s e of their f u t u r e.

O u t s i d e of e c o n o m i c sociology, this c o n c e p t i o n of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m is rarely include d in general overviews of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m, which t e n d to be limited to r a t i o n a l - c h o i ce i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m o r sociology's "new institu- t i o n a l i s m . 1 , 4 7 O n e r e a s o n m i g h t be t h a t it has been m o r e or less conflated with e c o n o m i c sociology m o r e generally. But e c o n o m i c sociology is b o t h m u c h m o r e , a n d m u c h less, t h a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . It is m o r e , b e c a u s e economic sociology covers a wide r a n g e of a p p r o a c h e s t o e c o n o m i c processes, i n c l u d i ng r a t i o n a l - c h o i c e theor y a n d o t h e r m i c r o a n a l y s e s of social action, b o t h of which a r e f o u n d e d o n neoclassical economic s - the very t h e o r y t h a t P o l a n y i developed his i n s t i t u t i o n a l i sm t o negate . B u t it is also less, b e c a u s e e c o n o m i c sociology has t o o c o m m o n l y limited its focus exclusively to s t r u c t u r a l m e c h a n i s m s of e m b e d d e d n e s s , t h u s neglecting what Polanyi himself u n d e r s t o o d so clearly - t h a t ideas, c u l t u r a l beliefs, a n d practices, even r h e t o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e s (such as n a t u r a l - ism) a r e j u s t as powerful in s h a p i n g , c o n s t r u c t i n g , a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i n g m a r k e t s .

Overview of the book

T o catalyze m y inquiries i n t o the genealogies of citizenship, c h a p t e r 2 begins w i t h a n e x p l o r a t i o n of w h a t we h a v e c o m e t o call the disaster of H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a - t h e terrible G u l f C o a s t s t o r m of A u g u s t 2005, considered one of the greatest n a t u r a l disasters in A m e r i c a n history. This m i g h t strike some as a n o d d i n t r o d u c t i o n to a w o r k of historical sociology. But the traged y of K a t r i n a was neither an isolated instanc e of g o v e r n m e n t m i s m a n a g e m e n t n o r a n a t u r a l disaster, as it h a s often been p o r t r a y e d . R a t h e r it w a s j u s t o ne especially d r a m a t i c episode in a m u c h longer n a r r a t i v e a b o u t w h a t h a p p e n s when m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m grafts its h i g h - m i n d e d m a r k e t discourse of universalism o n t o the deeply e n t r e n c h e d inequalitie s w r o u g h t by centuries of b o t h legal a n d c u l t u r a l racial exclusion. L o n g before the s t o r m , m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m h a d been steadily delegitimating the w o r k of redressing t h e w r o n g s of racial exclusion a n d replacing it with a b s t r a c t principles of " c o l o r - b l i n d " indi- vidual rights . T h e s t o r m did n o t cause the terrible exclusions; it served

See T h e l e n {1999) for o n e overview.

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r a t h e r as the catalyst t o e x p o s e a n d publicize what h a d so long been h i d d e n - years of increasing e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y a n d social exclusion. T h a t so m a n y N e w O r l e a n i a n s b e c a m e the left-behind w a s t h u s the o u t - c o m e of a previous story, n o t an a n o m a l o u s fluke caused by the onset of a h u r r i c a n e . H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a was viewed as a crisis because it exposed the terrible costs of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m - costs t h a t include the imperilment n o t j u s t of citizenship rights b u t of h u m a n rights m o r e generally, as large classes of h u m a n i t y were d e m o n s t r a b l y treate d as d i s p o s a b l e . In the c o u r s e of the crisis the h o r r o r s of w h a t we witnessed in the C o n v e n t i o n C e n t e r, in t h e S u p e r d o m e , a n d o n the r o o f t o p s of New O r l e a n s , were those of a p e o p l e being refused the m o s t basic r i g h t of all - that of recognitio n as m o r a l e q u a l s .

C h a p t e r 3 theorizes the social n a t u r a l i s t i c r o o t s of a society t h a t is increasingly being rent a s u n d e r by internal b o r d e r s t h a t isolate our internally stateless citizens from the rest of us. These are the socially excluded w h o are citizens in n a m e only, a n d t h u s have been r o b b e d of their right to hav e rights - t h e right to be fully included in a social a n d political c o m m u n i t y , w i t h o u t which they c a n n o t exercise any of the formal civil a n d political rights t h a t they, in principle, still possess. H a n n a h A r e n d t ' s classic text o n " T h e Decline of t h e N a t i o n - S t a t e a n d the En d of the R i g h t s of M a n " (1979) is the i n s p i r a t i on for this c h a p t e r ' s analysis, in which she d e m o n s t r a t e s h o w i n t e r w a r statelessness a n d the j o i n t tyrannie s of political n a t u r a l i s m a n d e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m set the c o n d i t i o n s for E u r o p e a n g e n o c i d e d u r i n g W o r l d W a r I I . While m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m does n o t e n g a g e in i n t e n t i o n a l genocidal practices, it is nonetheless the case t h a t i n t e r n a l statelessness a n d t h e c o m p e n s a t o r y a t t a c h m e n t to n a t i o n j u s t as surely subvert t h e right to h av e rights - rights w i t h o u t which , a s the story of K a t r i n a so d r a m a t i c a l l y illustrates, the socially excluded h a v e n o m o r e in the w a y of g u a r a n t e e s of the right, t o live t h a n did A r e n d t ' s i n t e r w a r stateless p e o p l e s .

G e n e a l o g i e s of citizenshi p m u s t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of w h y we t h i n k a b o u t citizenship a n d r i g h t s in certai n ways a t c e r t a i n times. In the c o n t e x t of its explosive r e a p p e a r a n c e in t h e l a t e 80s a n d 90s, chapter 4 takes o n citizenship as a conceptual object with T. H. Marshall as its most influential theorist. T h e c h a p t er begins with the p r o b l e m a t i c of citizenship's long a n d puzzling absence from social research. I argue that m u c h of the e x p l a n a t i o n for the strange career of the citizenship concept can be explained by a mix of the peculiarities of social science research in the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era with its focus o n m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory, with w h a t I call the "troubles of citizenship." These troubles are based inter alia on the c o n t r a d i c t o r y a n d competin g trajectories of

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rights-based versus c i t i z e n s h i p - b a s e d genealogies. While the two can a r g u a b l y be seen as c o n s t i t u t i v e l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , w h a t they s h a r e m a y be even m o r e i m p o r t a n t : b o t h t h e liberal a n d r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s a r e organized by the z e r o - s u m p a r a m e t e r s of the g r e a t d i c h o t o m y between public a n d p r i v a t e , s t a t e a n d e c o n o m y . This b i f u r c a t i o n n e g a t e s t h e place of civil society as a n i n t e r m e d i a t e t h i r d s p h e r e . T h i s a b s e n c e of the "soul of t h e s o c i a l " in ci t i zenshi p's d o m i n a n t t r a d i t i o n s s h o u l d be a source of g r e a t c o n c e r n in t h e c u r r e n t c l i m a t e of o v e r b e a r i n g s t a t e p o w e r on t h e o n e side a n d the h e g e m o n y of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m o n t h e other.

C o n t i n u i n g in the vein of investigating t h e influence of ideas a n d knowledge c u l t u r e s, c h a p t e r 5 examines the i m p a c t of the English t r a n s - lation of H a b e r m a s ' s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). T h e c h a p t e r begins by observin g h o w t h e w i d e s p r e a d e m b r a c e of H a b e r m a s ' s concept of the p u b l i c sphere converged with the revival in the social sciences m o r e generally of the political culture c o n c e p t originally associated with P a r s o n i a n m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y of t h e 1950s a n d 1960s. Surprisingly, H a b e r m a s ' s M a r x i s t - i n f o r m e d a c c o u n t of t h e W e s t e r n b o u r g e o i s p u b l i c sphere h a s m u c h in c o m m o n with the P a r s o n i a n polit- ical c u l t u r e c o n c e p t . In b o t h cases they are used in w ay s t h a t, p a r a d o x i - cally, a r e n e i t h er p u b l i c , political, n o r c u l t u r a l . I n s t e a d , b o t h political culture a n d the publi c sphere are a p p r o p r i a t e d by the p r i v a t e side of t h e p u b l i c / p r i v a t e divide in political theory. T o explain this peculiarity I suggest t h a t the c o n c e p t s themselves are b o t h e m b e d d e d in a historically c o n s t i t u t e d political c u l t u r e , here d u b b e d a c o n c e p t u a l n e t w o r k , which I define as a s t r u c t u r e d web of c u l t u r a l discourses t h a t I call " A n g l o - A m e r i c a n citizenship t h e o r y . "

I n c h a p t e r 6 I examin e the social science c o n c e p t of social c a p i t a l , so p o p u l a r t o d a y a m o n g a c a d e m i c s , policy m a k e r s , a n d the W o r l d B a n k . I d o so by l o o k i n g a t h o w social capital is used ( b o t h wittingly a n d unwittingly) to s u p p o r t m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' s a s s a u l t o n citizen- ship r i g h t s . T h e o r i e s of social capita l are especially a t t r a c t i v e to sociolo- gists, w h o see its use by e c o n o m i s t s as an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t t h a t social relations c o n t r i b u t e n o less t h a n e c o n o m i c factors to prosperit y a n d m a r k e t p e r f o r m a n c e , I a r g u e , however, tha t this sociological belief in t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of the social o n t h e p a r t of e c o n o m i s t s is illusory. M o r e likely, the social capital c o n c e p t reflects economists" successful a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the social to their o w n imperial a i m s (see especially Becker 1990).

T h e r e a r e also u n f o r t u n a t e political consequence s of t h e w i d e s p r e a d i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h social c a p i t a l . I t s a d v o c a t e s suggest t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i v e

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utility s t r e a m s a t t r i b u t e d t o n e t w o r k s of social relations greatly e m p o w e r civil society against the state. But utility p r o d u c t i o n is n o t the same as rights; a n d s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e m a r k e t - f r i e n d l y w o r k of social c a p i t a l for the d e m o c r a t i c rights-driven w o r k of civil society devalues t h e publi c sphere. In fact, it is the rule of law, citizenship rights, c o m p u l s o r y a s s o c i a t i o n s , political i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d large-scale civic m o v e m e n t s like P o l a n d ' s Solidarity, n o t social c a p i t a l policies, t h a t are the real historical g u a r a n - tors of individual freedoms a n d social p r o s p e r i t y .

C h a p t e r 7 begins with the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t despite its p o p u l a r d e m - o c r a t i c references, t h e c o n c e p t of civil society t o d a y seems to hav e been a p p r o p r i a t e d by t h e m a r k e t . T o explain this peculiarity I h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t c o n c e p t s are e m b e d d e d in historically c o n s t i t u t e d epistemic cul- tures a n d n e t w o r k s . T h e c h a p t e r t a k e s o n the truly puzzling q u e s t i o n of h o w the g r a n d n a r r a t i v e of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n citizenship t h e o r y with its m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s u b p l o t h a s , despite significant p e r i o d s of r e t r e a t , survived a n d thrive d well over a period of t w o centuries. T o m a k e sense of all this, I e n g a g e in t h e project of unthinking liberalism's k n o w l e d g e c u l t u r e by m e a n s of a historical sociology of concept forma- tion. This entails d e v e l o p i ng a historical epistemology - t h e t a s k of subjecting theories of t r u t h t o historical analysis. A s a publi c discourse A n g l o - A m e r i c a n citizenship t h e o r y s h a r e s m a n y of the n a t u r a l i s t i c a t t r i b u t e s of a p a r a d i g m - w h e n confronted with i n c o n v e n i e n t d a t a , c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence s u d d e n l y loses evidential s t a t u s . In p r a c t i c e , t h e a p p r o a c h entails c o m i n g t o t e r m s with h o w it is t h a t so m u c h of m a r k e t f u n d a m e n t a l i s m h a s h a r d e n e d i n t o p a r a d i g m s a n d k n o w l e d g e p o s t u - lates. I ask h o w it h a s b e e n able t o carve the social universe i n t o p u b l i c a n d private, m a r k e t a n d state, such t h a t the world a p p e a r s to actually be divided i n t o the spheres of p r i v a t e ( m a r k e t ) a n d p u b l i c (state). H o w a n d why does the m a r k e t seem to really be p a r t of t h e privileged d o m a i n of n a t u r e , while the sites of the social a n d t h e publi c s p h e r e t a k e o n t h e c h a r a c t e r of being u n n a t u r a l a n d t h u s devalued? R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t these theories are historical artifacts r a t h e r t h a n t r u t h s of n a t u r e is the key t o their u n t h i n k i n g .