Critique a professional journal in the field of philosophy for an article based on "the exixtence of god"

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Int J Philos Relig (2012) 72:85–88 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9318-1

A RT I C L E

God, ignorance and existence

Giovanni Mion

Received: 21 February 2011 / Accepted: 23 August 2011 / Published online: 30 August 2011 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

In Theory and problems of logic, Nolt et al. (1998, p. 203) claim that the following argument forms are fallacious:

(a) It has not been proved that p. Therefore, ∼ p. (b) It has not been proved that ∼ p. Therefore, p. Accordingly, they argue that the following instances of (a) and (b) are also fallacious.

(ai) No one has ever proved that God exists. Therefore, God does not exist. (ai) No one has ever proved that God does not exist. Therefore, God exists.

Nolt/Rohatyn/Varzi’s verdict on arguments from ignorance is acceptable: “Nothing about the existence of God follows from our inability to prove God’s existence or non- existence (i.e., from our ignorance about the matter)” (p. 203). However, since their analysis glosses over the role played by our epistemic efforts, their example might lead one to believe that theism and atheism are in the same predicament. Nevertheless, as I am about to argue, the weakness of the known arguments in favor of the existence of God coupled with the existence of an asymmetry between positive and negative empirical existential propositions determines a presumption in favor of the atheist that Nolt/Rohatyn/Varzi’s sketchy analysis of arguments from ignorance obscures.1

In order to support my case, I will first distinguish between the following two argument forms:

1 Current literature on reasoning is often welcoming to arguments from ignorance. For example, both Walton (1992, 1996), and Groarke and Tindale (2008) defend their correctness in certain contexts. I do share their optimistic outlook. However, like Nolt, Rohatyn and Varzi, they all fail to appreciate the importance of the existence of an asymmetry between positive and negative existential propositions for arguments from ignorance.

G. Mion (B) Via Della Rocca 21/A, 10123 Turin, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

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(I) In spite of our efforts to establish p, we have no proof (knowledge, evidence) that p. Therefore, ∼ p.

(II) In spite of our efforts to establish ∼ p, we have no proof (knowledge, evidence) that ∼ p. Therefore, p.

Then, I will attempt to show that their reasonableness depends upon the logical struc- ture of p. And, finally, I will maintain that while the atheist can reasonably argue according to (I), the theist cannot argue according to (II).

Notoriously, unrestricted universal empirical propositions can “easily” be dis- proved: a single counterexample will suffice. However, they are impossible to prove. For example, in order to prove the proposition “All crows are black” we would have to look at all past, present and future crows, which is physically impossible. Yet, given the absence of contrary evidence, we can provisionally assume that all crows are in fact black. As a result, the following argument form appears to be correct:

(IIi) In spite of our genuine efforts to establish that ∼∀x�x is true, we have no proof (knowledge, evidence) that ∼∀x�x is true. Therefore, ∀x�x is true.2

In contrast to universal empirical propositions (falsifiable, but not verifiable), exis- tential empirical propositions cannot be falsified, but only verified. For example, in order to conclusively prove/verify the existence of Pegasus, we should simply point at it: “This is Pegasus. Pegasus exists”. However, in order to disprove/falsify the prop- osition “Pegasus exists”, we would need to look everywhere all at once, which is physically impossible. Accordingly, in “On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics” (1958), Popper writes:

A strict or pure existential statement applies to the whole universe, and it is irrefutable simply because there can be no method by which it could be refuted. For even if we were able to search our entire universe, the strict or pure existential statement would not be refuted by our failure to discover the required [object], seeing that it might always be hiding in a place where we are not looking (Popper 1958, p. 265).

Likewise, in Proof and Disproof in Formal Logic (2005), Richard Bornat wonders:

But how could I disprove the existence of somebody, like Santa Claus, who nobody has ever seen and who most of us believe doesn’t exist? With great dif- ficulty: I would have to look everywhere and fail to find him anywhere. I would have to look everywhere all at once, because he might flit from place to place, evading my search. But even if I discount flitting—after all, he is supposed to sleep most of the year—we haven’t yet looked everywhere […], and in practice we never could. So we can’t in practice disprove the existence of Santa Claus (Bornat 2005, p. 103).

Alternatively, in order to falsify an existential proposition, we might attempt to verify its negation: “Pegasus does not exist”. But this is also impossible. Whereas

2 Obviously the inference in question is not classically valid. However, it could be valid in a non-monotonic system. Notoriously, in non-monotonic systems, evidence previously unknown might call into question a previously obtained conclusion.

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Int J Philos Relig (2012) 72:85–88 87

dinosaurs left evidence of their existence, unicorns cannot leave traces of their lack of existence.

Yet, in spite of the fact that the proposition “Pegasus exists” cannot be conclusively falsified, given the absence of evidence in its favor, we can provisionally assume it to be false. As a result, the following argument form appears to be correct:

(Ii) In spite of our genuine efforts to establish that ∃x�x is true, we have no proof (knowledge, evidence) that ∃x�x is true. Therefore, ∼∃x�x is true.

The fact that a positive universal is equivalent to a negative existential and a positive existential to a negative universal explains why positive universals (“Everything is red”) and negative existentials (“Pegasus does not exist”) are both unverifiable but falsifiable, while positive existential (“Pegasus exists”) and negative universals (“Not everything is red”) are unfalsifiable, but verifiable. Moreover, since the interdefinabil- ity of the universal and existential quantifiers depends upon the use of negation, we can appreciate why arguments from ignorance come in two distinct schemas (I and II) and why their reasonableness depends upon the logical structure of p.

Finally, let us consider the following instance of (II):

(IIii) In spite of our genuine efforts to establish that God does not exist (∼∃x�x), we have no proof (knowledge, evidence) that God does not exist. Therefore, God does exist (∃x�x).

(IIii) is clearly fallacious. Arguments against the existence of God are countless. Some are stronger than others. Yet no one has succeeded in disproving the exis- tence of God. Nevertheless, from such failures, we do not infer that God does exist. Accordingly, a theist who infers God’s existence from the fact that he or she cannot be proven wrong (“If you cannot prove me wrong, I must be right!”) would be guilty of fallacious reasoning. But an atheist that employs the same reasoning would not be mistaken: “Since there is no conclusive evidence for the existence of God, I can rightly (although only provisionally) infer that God does not exist”. Likewise, since there is no evidence for the existence of Pegasus, we can rightly infer that it does not exist.

Obviously, some theists believe that they have good reasons to believe in the exis- tence of God and therefore that I cannot compare God with Pegasus. However, even if for the sake of argument, we assume that there exists genuine reasons to believe in the existence of God, the believer and the non-believer would always be in an asymmetri- cal position. In fact, given the semantic disparity between the claims in question, while the theist needs some kind of supporting evidence for the existence of God, the atheist can defend his or her position solely by systematically undermining the arguments of the theist.

References

Bornat, R. (2005). Proof and disproof in formal logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Groarke, L., & Tindale, C. (2008). Good reasoning matter!. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nolt, J., Rohatyn, D., & Varzi, A. (1998). Theory and problems of logic (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Popper, K. (1958). On the status of science and of metaphysics. In Conjectures and refutations. The

growth of scientific knowledge (pp. 249–271). London: Routledge; 2002.

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Walton, D. (1992). Non fallacious arguments from ignorance. American Philosophical Quar- terly, 29(4), 381–387.

Walton, D. (1996). Arguments from ignorance. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

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