CS6803 Week 13
ProfArgeol
cs6803_wk13-dod.pptxInformation System Security Engineering and Management
Module 13, Overview of:
13a. Government Crypto Devices and Policies
13b. Physical Security
13c. Information Security Audits
Spring 2011
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Module 13a Objectives
To give an overview of some Department of Defense (DOD) networks, particularly the “Global Information Grid,” where crypto is used
To discuss
The general principles used in National Security Agency (NSA) crypto products
Some sample NSA crypto equipment
Government Key Management Policies and Practices
The focus of this talk in on topics for those who will be working for the US Government, particularly the DoD, intelligence agencies, etc.
This material is required for the 4011 and 4013 certifications
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Global Information Grid (GIG)
The GIG is essentially a secure intranet for the national security community, including DoD, the Intelligence Community (IC), etc.
From an NSA website describing the GIG and Information Assurance (IA):
The GIG will be a net-centric system operating in a global context to provide processing, storage, management, and transport of information to support all Department of Defense (DoD), national security, and related Intelligence Community missions and functions - strategic, operational, tactical, and business - in war, in crisis, and in peace.
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Global Information Grid (GIG)
The GIG concept has been in use since circa 2000, and is really an integration of many existing and planned networks
Integration is at the level of the communications networks, the information layer, and the management layer
IA is standardized, and is embedded into all aspects of the GIG
High assurance crypto on all links
Standard, high assurance multifactor authentication
Defense in Depth
NSA is responsible for GIG IA (security) through their GIG IA Portfolio Office (GIAP)
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Global Information Grid (GIG)
The GIG communications network includes very high bandwidth fiber backbone (both leased from commercial providers and government owned), satellite links, and terrestrial copper and wireless components to the individual user.
The network is all IP, including voice and other media.
Legacy networks have been, or will be, transitioned into the GIG architecture.
Note that “the grid” or “the global grid” has been adopted by many in popular culture to refer generically to a/the set of devices and sensors connected via the Internet
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GIG Vision
The following slides are from a public NSA briefing a few years ago, and provide more insight into the GIG vision
Also read the NSA page on the GIG in the webliography
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INTEGRATED
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
Information Services and transport
Service Agents
Intelligent, integrated communication intranetwork
Adaptive, dynamic resource management
Secure
NAVIGATION
GEO-POSITIONING
Robust
Distributed
Inexpensive
SURVEILLANCE
Continuous
Global
High Resolution Imagery
Day/Night/All Weather
WEAPONS
Remote/Local
Accurate
Responsive
Inexpensive
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Commanders Internet
Situation Monitoring
Planning and Replanning
FORCE ENHANCEMENT
Mobile
Lethal
Sustainable
Flexible
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Defensive IW
Offensive IW
Assurance
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Just Enough
Just In Time
Fully Visible
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An internet-like transport architecture between space, air and ground nodes
Integrated Space, Air and Ground Networks
Global access to deployed / mobile Users (COTM)
Timely delivery of air and space data to Theater and CONUS (AISR, SISR support)
Automated, dynamic, high assurance network operations
Increased capacity and connectivity: RF and laser communications network
Network of Networks
Enable Future Innovations and Growth Through A Flexible Yet Secure Network Architecture
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Integrates mobile/tactical users and global intelligence services via IP (optical comm links and EHF, Ka and X-band)
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Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols
The link and network layer protocols on fiber backbone networks are different from the familiar ethernet, 802.11n, etc. Protocols used on backbone fiber include:
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) at the link layer
Asynchronous Transport Mode (ATM) over SONET at the network layer (ATM is also used elsewhere)
Internet Protocol over fiber (usually IP over WDM or DWDM) for link and network layer
SONET and ATM are very common on high speed links, and require special encryptors
SONET and ATM are lower in the ISO protocol stack than IP, which is often carried on SONET and ATM, as well as Ethernet, WiFi, etc.
The next few slides discuss SONET and ATM very briefly
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Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols: SONET
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)
Primary link layer optical backbone technology deployed today
Paths are switched in multiples of 155 Mb/s (OC-3); 2.5 Gb/s (OC-48) and 10 Gb/s (OC-192) trunks are the norm, and 40 Gb/s (OC-768) trunks are being deployed now.
SONET “frames” carry telephone circuits, T1, T3, ATM, IP directly, and other protocols
Typically used to link facilities over dedicated or leased fiber links
Links may be the whole fiber or individual wavelengths (“lambdas”)
DoD facilities may be classified enclaves
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Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols: ATM
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)
“virtual circuits” (VCs) between endpoints (often routers, but also some end user devices, video, sensors, etc.)
56 byte “cells” (similar to packets, but fixed size and small)
Usually carried over SONET
ATM VCs carry telephone circuits, IP packets, other protocols
Commonly used for router to router links
Sometimes gets “closer” to the end user; multiple ATM end points may go out over the same SONET link
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Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications
Fiber backbone connects single security level enclaves at different locations: need Type I SONET, ATM backbone encryptors
IP encryptors also needed, especially when a facility is not at one security level
MLS is needed for MLS endpoints
Non-MLS used for single level endpoints and to link single level enclaves
Need higher speed IP encryptors in the near future
Current roadmap is a transition to IP directly over fiber with Wave Division Multiplexing (WDW) for different paths (router to router)
Will need very high speed IP encryptors for IP directly over fiber, which are in development
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SIPRNet, NIPRNet
Two longstanding networks still in use are NIPRNet and SIPRnet
NIPRNet is the Non-secure IP Router Network is for sensitive, but unclassified (SBU) data, such as personnel, medical, etc. data
SIPRNet is the Secure IP Router Network is for Secret data (but nothing higher)
Both are standard IP networks, and may connect to the public internet with firewalls
SIPRNet is used within classified environments, and uses NSA approved Type I encryption to tunnel through the internet where it is connected. It cannot communicate directly with any nodes that are not on SIPRNet
Both of these are run by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), essentially the IT organization for DoD.
Other special networks are used for TS and higher information
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Crypto for Classified Data
The rest of the slides in section a present an overview of government crypto, particularly NSA crypto for classified data.
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Trends in Government Cryptography & Key Management Technology and Policies
Evolving, particularly for classified information
Overall IT and network infrastructure is moving from expensive custom equipment to COTS (Commercial off the shelf) products and standards where feasible
Moving from point to point encryptors (T1, ATM, SONET, etc.) to more modern and dynamic environments (e.g. IP networks, SecureXML, etc.), but still using GOTS (Government Off The Shelf) crypto; may allow some COTS products for Secret soon.
Policies and implementation complicated by need for controlled sharing among very diverse military and intelligence coalitions
Also complicated by domestic homeland security coalitions (CIA/NSA/FBI/DHS, FEMA, local law enforcement, etc.)
Things change slowly, so there is still a lot of legacy equipment in use now and for the future
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Status of Government Cryptography & Key Management Policies
Recent “roadmaps” are being changed
Major technical and policy problems still unsolved, especially for coalitions
Patriot Act allows the data sharing issue among “intelligence community”, the FBI, DoD, and law enforcement, but they still have different definitions for S, TS, etc. and systems are not interoperable
A new “Information Sharing Environment” is under development to facilitate this.
Clearance and need to know are still important
Policies on data sharing and searching/correlating data from different organizations are still being developed
Technology to enforce security for such such data sharing is still needed
Crypto and PKI will have to fit into this environment
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CAVEAT
This talk has the most recent information released to the general public on the web
More information is available that can only be accessed from .mil or .gov domains: such information is not in this lecture
Some of the material is already out of date for new deployments
But basic design and policy principles are similar
Most of this is still currently in use in places
Lots of legacy crypto is still used
Different departments and agencies interpret and enhance security policies differently
When you start a federal job, find out what is in place for your organization at the time you start
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NSA Approved Cryptography
An NSA-approved cryptographic device consists of 3 certified components:
An approved algorithm
An implementation that as been approved for the protection of classified information in a particular environment
A supporting key management infrastructure
“Zeroize” button to securely erase keys and unencrypted information (even after power loss) in an emergency on most crypto devices
Cryptography and Key Management Policies
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Traditional NSA/NIST Encryption Classes
Type 1 - U.S. Classified
Type 2 - U.S. Federal Inter-Agency
For Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) government communications; “Warner Amendment” unclassified data
Type 3 - Interoperable Inter-Agency (Federal, State and Local) & Commercial Use
NIST-approved data encryption standards (DES, AES, etc.)
Type 4 - Proprietary
Not a federal standard, not used for federal info
Exportable, for Commercial & International use
NSA is responsible for Type 1, 2; NIST for Type 3 standards (FIPS Standards)
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NSA Approved Type I Devices
Algorithms
Last 2 decades: Baton (crypto), Skipjack (crypto), Firefly (Key exchange) originally classified; some now declassified
Since 2003, AES is also allowed and recommended for new devices
128 bit and higher for Secret
192 bit and higher for TS and above
Keys
True random numbers needed
Generation based on physical phenomena; pseudo-random not strong enough
Historic: centrally generated and tested by NSA
Difficult distribution problem
Now used for special purpose keys
Session keys generated by NSA approved embedded hardware (e. g., leaky resistor for random noise generation) in crypto devices
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NSA Approved Type I Devices (continued)
Hardware design and implementation approved by NSA
Usually a separate hardware device (box, card) is required
Careful attention to “red-black” separation
Red == classified; black == unclassified (but classified information that has been encrypted with an approved algorithm is considered “black”)
Common Criteria Level 6 or higher (Orange Book B2) equivalent or better assurance level
Rigorous check for covert channels, “sneak circuits”
Rigorous check for cross-talk (EMSEC)
Failure modes cannot allow for information leak from red to black
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Government AES Usage Policy
NIST/FIPS approved for protecting sensitive (SBU) electronic data
Analyzed by NSA for use with classified data
Algorithm allowed for classified, unclassified, & commercial use
Crypto devices still need NSA approval for use with classified data
NSA policy for use of AES with classified data:
128-bit key & above are suitable for SECRET info
TOP SECRET info requires 192 or 256 bits
See webliography for full policy statement
New Type I encyptors being developed with AES as a built in option
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Sample Government Crypto Devices
The following slides and corresponding webliography links describe many of the crypto devices still in use, but it is a far from exhaustive list.
You may find this information interesting to scan or browse through, but it is not required for this course. This is just a bunch of snapshots in time (including one old snapshot of a 10 year old Navy web site listing the crypto gear that they used then).
Most of the links are to vendor web sites, so the gear there is still available, even though it may seem very dated. Upgrading systems can be a very long process in the government.
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Sample Type I Devices: Legacy
Link encryptors, e. g. KG-84, KG-192, KIV… for T1, etc.
Still widely used by DoD
e. g. Secure IP Router Network (SIPRNet)
New technology used to emulate old devices for compatibility
Smaller, lower power, more reliable, but still use the old protocols and algorithms so they interoperate with the old crypto's still in use
Still need to support older key distribution methods
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Recent Type I Devices: Network (SONET)
KG 189 SONET backbone encryptor (widely used, but GD has rolled SONET capability into the KG 75, which was originally only ATM)
KG 340 SafeNet SONET 10G encryptor (2008)
Note: SafeNet also sells a commercial SONET 10G encryptor which is only EAL4 (pending), FIPS 140-3 (pending) and not approved for classified material
KG-530 40G encryptor contract awarded 11/2009 (see webliiograph)
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Recent Type I Devices: Network (Examples)
KG 75 Fastlane Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) virtual circuit encryptor (see GD web site in webliography); new versions also support SONET
KG 175 Taclane series “classic” IP (200 Mb/s) (see GD web site in webliography)
KG 175D Taclane Micro—compact version of Taclane, also HAIPE compatible (see later slide)
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Recent Type I Devices: Endpoints (Examples)
KOV-26 Talon PCMCIA card encryptor (L3 Communications) (Eternet, wifi, HAIPE compliant)
SecNet WiFi card/encryptor (see Harris web site & look at the antenna on the card!)
STE (L3 Communications) encrypting phone/fax/modem; secure mobile phones for CDMA, GSM, satellite phones
Sectera (GD) series: wireline, GSM wireless, Sectera Edge Smartphone
Fortezza PCMIA card for crypto & credentials (holds multiple keys, identity info, and has crypto engine, all in a tamper resistant package)
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Some NSA Approved Crypto Products (Graphic Circa 2001, But Devices Commonly In Use Today)
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Fortezza® Card
PCMCIA hardware token for crypto processing and key storage
Implements NSA/NIST-compliant crypto standards for network security
11 character PIN; card disabled after 3 consecutive wrong pins
“tamper-resistant”: destroys key if tampered with
Fortezza Plus card for secret level keys and encryption
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Secure Terminal Equipment (STE)
ISDN phone (fax and modems also available)
Key materials & crypto hardware on Fortezza Card
Approved for Classified use
Phone not classified when card is removed
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Sectera Edge Smartphone
Wireless voice to Top Secret; reportedly used by Obama
Wireless data access to SIPRNet (Secret IP Router Network—only to Secret level)
$3500
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Sample Type I Devices: Recent and Projected
High Assurance IP Encryption (HAIPE) program
Multiple products exist now and more are in development, going to very high data rates: trend for most new crypto
NSA adaptation of IPSEC protocol for session setup, mutual authentication, key exchange, and headers
“Hardened” protocol stack and Type I crypto algorithms
IPv6 versions under development: see webliography
L3 KG-245 series 1 Gb/s and 10 Gb/s products available now.
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Sample Type I Devices: Recent and Projected (continued)
Secure VoIP phones
Lots of issues and different architectures proposed
Voice over Secure IP (i. e., VoIP on an already secure network)
Secure Voice over IP (i. e., a secure version of VoIP over an unsecured network)
Some Voice over Secure IP already deployed
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Classification of Keys
All key material (keys, seeds, etc.--collectively called keys in this lecture) are classified using the same classification scheme as other data data, and may include additional codewords (e. g., “COMSEC”)
Key classification is primarily about access rights, not key length/strength, although there are some broad policy rules given later
All keys used for Secret and above data come from NSA or approved NSA equipment
Any equipment loaded with keys is classified at the level of the highest level key (join of all the levels if non-linear ordering)
Classified keys, keyed equipment, and anything with keys are handled and stored as other classified equipment
Labeling
Physical access control, with storage in approved containers or facilities
Inventory management
Possible compromises reported to ISSO
Approved destruction
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Classification of Keys (continued)
Key use:
Key must have classification level not lower than information encrypted
Crypto device must be of the appropriate class (Type 1, Type 2, etc.) or stronger required for the level of the information
Key Management: key issuer and key user must have classification level not lower than the key
When cryptos set up a secure communication path, endpoint crytpos mutually authenticate and ensure that the other end is using a key of the same classification level
When equipment can set up multiple communications paths (e. g., a KG-175 ATM encryptor), and the equipment is NSA endorsed as MLS, different paths may be at different levels; then a key for a path’s classification level is used for that path, and is verified by both endpoints
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Key Storage on Cryptos
Most cryptos have multiple keys loaded, including
Authentication keys
“Key encryption keys” (KEKs) used only to encrypt keys for local storage or transfer
Multiple communication keys
Currently active session keys
Keys are changed on a regular basis, and future keys may be preloaded on the crypto
Emergency keys that are used in a crisis situation in place of the current key
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Key Transfer: Physical Devices
Paper (human transcription), paper tape, mag tape (not used any more)
Electronic data storage examples
DS 101 Fill Device
Small device used to hold keys that plugs into a special socket on the the front panel of a crypto; think of it as a pre-cursor to a USB thumb drive for keys (but not using USB)
Used to load new keys from NSA
Used to reload keys in case they are zeroized
CIK--Crypto Ignition Key
Looks like a plastic key with metal contacts
“split key”: CIK is matched to a device, and half the key is stored on the device, half on the CIK
Device is not classified when CIK is not loaded
Used on earlier secure phones, etc.; some still in use
Fortezza PCMCIA card
Stores multiple keys for various purposes
Used to store keys for current secure ISDN phones
DoD Common Access Card (SBU, unclassified only)
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Key Transfer: OTAR
OTAR (Over the Air Rekeying)
Sending new keys to a remote crypto over the communications link
Keys are encrypted with the KEK for transmission
Keys are automatically loaded onto the crypto devices
Typical method in recent and future cryptos
DS101 still used for initial keying and key backup
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Government Identity Cards
DoD Common Access Card (CAC)
Required for all DoD personnel
“Smart Card” for Identification, physical access, and computer/NIPERNet network access
Includes human readable and machine readable information, certificate for PKI
See CAC Home Page, CAC FAQ, Jan. 2006 news story cited in the webliography
NIPRNet is the primary DoD network for unclassified information
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Government Identity Cards
HSPD 12 (2004) (see webliography)
Mandated a common ID card for all government employees and contractors
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card now being deployed in response to HSPD-12
Functionally similar to CAC: for ID, physical access, computer/network access
Smart card, human and machine readable; has certificate for PKI
Not CAC interoperable; move to a common standard for both
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Federal Government PKI
Strong push to use PKI for all user access to federal systems
DoD requires the use of the Common Access Card (CAC) token (PKI) for access to the Non-Classified Internet Router Network (NIPRNet)
PIV for all civilian government employees, contractors
Separate Public Key Infrastructure policies for DoD (including classified) and unclassified federal agency information
Both based on X.509 certificates
See webliography for detailed DoD and Federal policy documents
DoD has established four certificate assurance classes to be used in various environments, with different policies for each class
Major points are summarized in the next slide
Details for some are in the following slides
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000
Still on the web, but due for a publicly released update :-)
Basic concepts and designs still operative
Progress along the roadmap has been made
Part of the overall DoD Key Management Infrastructure (KMI)
KMI also includes generation and distribution of classified keys for Type I encryptors
A framework for generation, production, distribution, control, revocation, recovery, & tracking of public keys (certificates) & their corresponding private keys
Uses CAW & Fortezza® cards for a X.509-based PKI
Specially designed to suit DoD needs, maintained by DoD
Being implemented in phases
See webliography for roadmap details
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DoD Certificate Assurance Classes
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Key Management Life Cycle For PKI
The next few slides go through the primary steps in the key management life cycle for a certificate in a PKI, with comments on the specific policy considerations in DoD and other federal agencies
The basic principles are applicable to civilian and commercial PKI
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User Registration
User register with a “Registration Authority” (RA, also called Local Registration Authority, LRA) which is responsible for verifying the identity of the user and the user’s need for a certificate
Identity verification is a key issue for any PKI or Identity system (such as passports, drivers license, etc.)
This is the potential week spot in any PKI or Identity system not just DoD systems
DoD identity verification policy depends on certificate Class, with in person registration required for Class 3 and higher.
Forms of identification that are acceptable (military ID, federal ID, multiple non-federal IDs, etc.) are spelled out in the policies
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Key and certificate generation
The RA transmits the registration information to the Certificate Authority (CA)
The public/private keys are generated and certificates are created and digitally signed by the CA
The signing key is a critical information asset; if it is compromised all certificates signed by that CA should become invalid, and digital signatures from prior user certificates can be forged
DoD class 4 and 5 CAs use the high assurance Certificate Authority Workstation (CAW)
The certificate provides a cryptographic binding of the user ID to the public key
The certificates are issued to the user
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Key Registration
The identity and public key information care registered and can be distributed
The public key information is posted to the appropriate directory services
The private key may be archived for key recovery; CAW and DoD policy mandate this
The archive may be at the CA or as a separate service
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Operational Use
The certificate is on HardWare or SoftWare token
Class 5 on HW token (e. g., Fortezza Plus) (Fortezza can hold multiple keys from mutliple CAs)
Class 4 on HW token (e. g., Fortezza, CAC)
Class 2, 3 on SW token
PIN/Passphrase or biometric is used for certificate access control
Class 4, 5: system generated
11 digit pin on Fortezza
Automatic lockout after 3 successive failed attempts
Class 2-3: user selected PIN/passphrase
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Key Storage and Update
Storage of Key Material
PIN/passphrase or biometric protection for key material on tokens
Fortezza Plus is not classified when not activated by the PIN
A Fortezza Plus not in a workstation is, by default, not activated by the PIN, so it is unclassified and may be carried around
Key Update
Keys, certificates have expiration dates built in
Life depends on policy; typically 1 year for class 4-5
Update for hardware tokens requires in person visit to CA
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Key Recovery and Revocation
Key Recovery
If token is “locked” due to repeated false authentication attempts, CA can “unlock” it; for FORTEZZA, a CAW must be used.
If the token is lost/destroyed, keys can be recovered from registration information to decrypt existing documents
CAW provides key recovery services
Key Revocation
Keys may be revoked if a user’s classification level or need to know change, if the user is no longer trusted, or if the token thought to be lost or compromised
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are distributed
Timely distribution of CRLs is an issue
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000
The following slides are graphics taken from the Roadmap document
There are also two graphic slides on the overall Key Management Infrastructure of NSA
Reminder: these are not new documents, but are the latest available to everyone. If you start a job with the federal government, check for the current information
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 PKI System Context in DoD
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 PKI System Elements
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Architecture
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Deployment
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DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Roles
DOD PKI
Web-Based
Cert Auth (CA)
DOD
Directory
Services
LRA
User
1
User Registration
Web-based
2
Password
Relying
Party
Local Registration Authority
5
Pull
Cert
4
Auto
Cert
Private
Key
3
Key
Web-based
Public
Key
Cert
Cert
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NSA
Commercial
Class 3 and below PKI
Physical
Manual
Systems
KMI PRSN Pilot
High Grade Electronic Applications
EKMS
Operations
DISA
Current DoD Class 3 PKI
Root
X.509 Certificate
Based Applications
Current Class 4 PKI
(DMS)
Root
Recent KMI Architecture
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i
l
KMI
Managers
Medium Assurance
ROOT
NSA
High Assurance
ROOT
CF, Tier 0
Manual Systems
REGIONAL
SITES
(Servers)
Medium Assurance
Certification Authorities
Tier 1
High Assurance
Certification Authorities
KMI
Management
Servers
Networks/Web
BASE/POST
ACCOUNT
(Client Workstation)
d
i
i
a
l
D
E
C
1
0
0
0
0
d
g
i
t
a
Commercial
Certification Authorities
KMI Architecture Vision
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Information System Security Engineering and Management
Module 13b:
Physical Security
(Government Focus)
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Module 13b Objectives
To discuss the basics of physical security
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Physical Security
Physical security is critical to the protection of sensitive information
DoD has detailed policies on the physical security of classified materials
The policies depend on the classification level of the materials
Policy topics are discussed, but not specific policy parameters
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Layered Physical Security
Physical security is done in layers:
Facility security (ground, buildings)
Restricted area security (part of a building specifically for classified materials)
Locked “containers” or “safes” to store classified materials
Computers with classified information
Physical security also includes personnel security, which is not covered here
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Facility Clearances
A facility Clearance (FCL) is required for any facility that will contain classified materials or where classified work will be done
An FCL does not mean that classified materials or work can be anywhere
Restricted areas are areas (possibly the entire facility) where classified materials can be stored or classified work can be performed; restricted areas meet further requirements
Every facility with a FCL is required to have a Facility Security Officer (FSO) who is responsible for ensuring that the facility security policies are enforced
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Facility Clearances Requirements
The activities at the facility must require access to classified information for legitimate U.S. Government needs
The facility must have a reputation for integrity and lawful conduct in business practices (e. g.., if there are compromises of classified information, or if security policies are violated, the FCL may be revoked)
The facility must not be in under foreign ownership, control, or influence, to the extent that granting FCL would be inconsistent with national interest
The Facility Security Officer (FSO) must be a U.S. Citizen employee
Senior Management and the FSO must have a Personal Clearance
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Facility Perimeter Considerations
Stand-off zones to restrict proximity to facility
Barriers
Eliminate potential surveillance from outside perimeter (trees, fences, other buildings, etc.)
Guards, patrols, lighting
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Restricted Areas
Rooms, suites, floors, whole buildings, or whole facilities where classified work is performed
Different restricted areas may be needed for different security levels
Multiple restricted areas within one facility are often used for different levels, different codewords, etc.
Restricted areas may be nested, e. g., a TS restricted area inside a Secret area
A Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF) is a restricted area for highly classified (e. g., TS/codeword) materials
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Perimeter Control for Restricted Areas
Clearly defined perimeter – No barriers necessary (but are usual)
Access control to the area
Policy may dictate “two person rule” for some highly sensitive areas: one person cannot be in the area alone
Personnel within the area are responsible for challenging all individuals who may lack proper authority
Inspections must be done randomly
All individuals are subject to inspection
Must be done within facility grounds
Inspections are not necessary for highly personal – purse, wallet, clothing etc.
Inspections on entry and exit
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Automated Access Control System
Automated access control systems may be used for entry to restricted area (no physical guard to check ID, although one might be nearby)
Two factor ID normally used:
ID badge (smart card, mag strip, RFID)+ PIN
ID badge+ biometric
“Piggybacking” (admitting more than one person on one ID) not allowed
Both IDs must be used to open door if a “two person” rule is in effect
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Automated Access Control System (continued)
Typically used for “inner” areas with guards at outer perimeter
Manufactures must meet the following requirements
Chances of unauthorized access are no more than one in 10,000
Chances of authorized access being rejected in no more than 1 in 1,000
Locations of access must be protected
Tamper alarm protection is mandatory for Top Secret Closed Area
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“Uncleared” Visitors in Restricted Areas
Cleared personnel may escort uncleared personnel into a restricted area (depending on policy)
All classified information must be stored in an approved safe and all classified discussions stopped while an uncleared visitor is present
Visual or audible warning are often used as a reminder while uncleared are present, e. g., flashing red light on ceiling
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Other Restricted Area Policies
Policies depend on classification level
TEMPEST protection
Electronic
Audio
Visual
Wall materials/strength/thickness
Door materials/strength
Window materials/strength (if permitted at all)
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Other Restricted Area Policies (continued)
Locks (type, strength)
Intrusion detection systems (motion, audio, thermal, vibration sensors
Alarms
Use of insecure phones
Restrictions on removing storage media (disks, tapes, CDs, USB drives, etc
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Storing Classified Information
When not in use classified information is kept in approved safes (“containers”) with combination locks
Safe construction practices defined by government policy based on classification level
Safe can ONLY be used for classified information
End of Day Security Checks –
At the close of each day – ensure all classified data is securely stored
At the end of each shift – ensure all classified data is securely stored except when facility is in continuous operation
Checks may be performed by security guards on a daily basis
Checks may include looking through unsecured materials (desk top, unsecured desk drawers, unsecured cabinets, etc.) to ensure no classified material has been left unsecured
Clean Desk Policy may be in effect
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Protection of Combinations
Record of names with combinations maintained by Site Security Office in locked safe
Combinations selected by Site Security Office
Combinations cannot be shared
Combinations cannot be written down by the user
All containers are locked if not under the direct supervision of an authorized person
Combination is dependent upon classification of contents, upgrade in classification requires a new combination
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Changing Combinations
Combinations are changed in the following circumstances:
Assignment of safe to a new person
Assignment of safe to new security level
Termination of employee
Withdrawn, suspended or revoked clearance
Compromise of security container
Unlocked and unattended safe
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Protection of Classified Information on Computers
Computers with classified information must be in a restricted area with a security level at least as high as the information on the computer
Laptops with classified information must have that information encrypted with approved Type I encryption when the laptop is removed from the restricted area
Other protection mechanisms (use depends on classification level, policy)
Removal or disabling of writable media drives
Removal or disabling of ports (USB, firewire, etc.)
Disable booting from removable media
Forced use of password on startup, after idle period
Encryption of disk contents
Locking to desktop
Periodic checking for keystroke loggers, etc.
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Information System Security Engineering and Management
Module 13c:
Information Security Audit
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Module 13c Objectives
To understand the principles of the security audit:
What is a security audit?
The goal of the security audit
What organizations are involved
How an audit is conducted
The outcome of an audit
This module is about the process, not a detailed roadmap for an audit of a specific organization
This section is not specific to DoD or government organizations. Most large corporations perform regular security audits, usually at a 2-3 year interval.
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What is a Security Audit?
As with seemingly everything in this course, there is no standard definition :-)
In general, a security audit is a review of the current status of information security done by an external organization
Corporate: usually a “security audit” department outside the IT organization (usually reporting to the CFO, part of corporate audit) is used to audit corporate or business level information security
A small company may hire an outside firm that specializes in security audit
Federal government departments are audited by GAO, as required by FISMA (lecture 6)
Federal government contractors doing classified work are subject to a security audit of the classified systems
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One Definition of a Security Audit
“A computer security audit is a systematic, measurable technical assessment of how the organization's security policy is employed at a specific site. Computer security auditors work with the full knowledge of the organization, at times with considerable inside information, in order to understand the resources to be audited.” (Security Focus; see webliography
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What a Security Audit is NOT
It is not penetration testing (Pentest): Pentest is a very detailed and complete set of testing for a certain class of vulnerabilities; audit covers a much broader range of security issues and is not as detailed in all of them
…but pentest of certain critical vulnerabilities may be part of an audit
It is not a review of Audit Logs: audit logs are just logs of certain activities in a system, and only looks at security from a forensic (after the fact) perspective
…but a selective review of some audit logs to look for security policy violations might be part of an audit
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Who Is Involved in an Audit
The Audit Team: the ones conducting the audit
The Audited Organization (Audit Target)
Management
Make resources and personnel available to the auditors
Be interviewed by auditors
Receive and act on audit results
Employees and contractors
Be interviewed by auditors (some, not all)
Answer questions about system elements on which an auditor is performing “hands on” evaluation
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Audit Principles (A Useful, But Not Universal View)
The audit team is from outside the organization being audited
The audit team is very familiar with the overall corporate (or government agency) business and practices
The audit team starts with the risk analysis and security policy of the organization being audited
The audit is essentially an external verification that the documented risk management approach and security policies are being implemented and followed properly
Sometimes questions about the risk management approach and security policy are raised at the audit and referred to higher management as part of the audit final report
You have to have a good risk analysis and derived policies in place well before the audit!
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Security Audit Focus
Security audits are part of the on-going process of defining and maintaining effective security controls and policies
Everyone who uses any computer resources throughout the organization is potentially involved
Auditors perform their work through personal interviews, vulnerability scans, examination of OS settings, network configuration, examination of individual’s computers, etc.
Interviews: all higher level managers, key security personnel, and a random set of general users (usually not all)
Examination of individual’s computers: all with access to highly sensitive information, random set of others
Primarily concerned with HOW security policies are actually implemented
Risk Analysis
Policies of the systems being audited
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Audit Software Packages
Software is available for some phases of security audit
Provide automated checklists for specific audit questions; may be add-ons to ISO 17799, OCTAVE, etc.
Provide test suites for specific audit topics, such as vulnerability scans, password cracking, etc.
These are just a starting point for the audit team!
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A Few Issues That Might Be In An Audit (from Security Focus)
Are passwords difficult to crack?
Are there access control lists (ACLs) in place on network devices to control who has access to shared data?
Are there audit logs to record who accesses data?
Are the audit logs reviewed
Are the security settings for operating systems in accordance with accepted industry security practices?
Have all unnecessary applications and computer services been eliminated for each system?
Are these operating systems and commercial applications patched to current levels?
How is backup media stored? Who has access to it? Is it up-to-date?
Are there adequate cryptographic tools in place to govern data encryption, and have these tools been properly configured?
Have custom-built applications been written with security in mind?
How have these custom applications been tested for security flaws?
How are configuration and code changes documented at every level? How are these records reviewed and who conducts the review?
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Other Questions That May Be In An Audit
Do employees and contractors understand the security policies that apply to them?
Interview with particular and randomly selected people
Do they follow these policies?
Interviews, and hands on analysis of individual computers from particular and randomly selected people
Look for policy violations, such as illegal or disallowed software, downloaded copyright protected content, pornography, etc.
Do they understand what to do and who to call if there is a “security event” on their computer, or any system they have access to?
Is there a disaster recovery plan? Have the participants and stakeholders ever rehearsed the disaster recovery plan?
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Audit Stages
Pre-Audit
Auditors
Target
Audit
The Actual Auditing
Post-Audit
Report on findings to audit target management
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Auditors spend significant time preparing for each audit (days to weeks)
They need to understand the scope of the audit
They review:
Results of previous audits (make sure problems have been corrected)
Latest risk analysis and assessment
Currently applicable security policies (corporate, organization, and system specific)
Previous security incidents
Policy for use of proprietary (corporate, civilian, government) or classification (DoD) markings and handling of materials
Understand the systems in the target organization
High level functions
Security controls
Understand the nature of sensitive information used by the target organization
Prepare checklist for each audit step
Pre-Audit: Auditors
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Pre-Audit: Target Organization
Prepare the organization for the audit
Review policies with all employees
Remind employees of the purpose and conduct of the audit
Non-confrontational
Honesty in all answers
Review specific issues with relevant people
Critical areas--make sure all policies are known and followed
Make sure issues raised in prior audit have been addressed, and be prepared to explain how to auditors
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Auditors should minimize impact on operations
Audit should be conducted in a non-confrontational manner
The auditors want to uncover problems so they can be fixed, not to cause trouble
Identifying and solving security problems is in everyone’s interest
Collect data about the physical security of computer assets
Perform interviews of site staff
Go through the prepared checklist
Perform network vulnerability assessments
OS and application security assessments
Access control assessment
etc.
Auditors should be looking for unexpected problems
The Audit
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Short briefing to target management at the end of the audit
Raise any issues that need to be addressed immediately
Otherwise, provide general information
Do not give details until the audit team has a chance to meet and evaluate all survey and test results.
Audit team reviews all results and generates final report
Final report
Overview of organizations security posture
Cite all security deficiencies
Rate severity
Recommend corrective actions
Follow-up audit on a smaller case maybe schedule
Post Audit: Audit Team
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Post Audit: Target Organization
Review audit results
Take corrective actions as needed
Some low severity deficiencies may be left as is after a review by the organization due to either cost/benefit analysis, or a documented willingness to accept the risk
Update the risk analysis and policies as needed
Start getting ready for the next audit!
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Audit Associations/ Groups
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
National State Auditors Association
National Association of State Auditors, Controllers, & Treasures
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security Institute (SANS)
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The End
This is the final slide in the final lecture in this course.
I hope you have found this course interesting, and, more important I hope you have learned useful and important ideas and ways of thinking about security that will be of value in your career.
My best wishes for success to all of you.
Bill Hery
Copyright 2011
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| CNSS Policy Statemement on AES use for classified material | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| Federal X.509 Policy (2006) | 13a. DoD crypto | This is for federal agencies, not DoD classified systems http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/pki/documents/dod_x509_certificate_policy_v9_0_9_february_2005.pdf |
| Army requires PKI for NIPRNET | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| Common Access Card FAQ | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| Information Sharing Environment | 13a. DoD crypto | An environment is under development to allow DoD and the "intelligence community" to align classification levels and share classified data on automated systems |
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| NIST on PKI (4/06) | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| DoD PKI Roadmap | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| DoD X.509 Crypto Policy | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| DoD PKI Program Management Office | 13a. DoD crypto | DoD PKI web site. Many pages are only available in .mil and.gov domains |
| IPv6 and HAIPE | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| Common Access Card Home Page | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| HSPD-12 | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| HSPD-12/PIV FAQ | 13a. DoD crypto | On a Department of Commerce site, but is essentially the same in all departments |
| PIV and CAC | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| Harris DoD WiFi crypto products | 13a. DoD crypto | |
| NSA Suite B Crypto | 13a. DoD crypto | Suite of cryptographic algorithms and protocols recommendations consistent with NSA security policy for both classified and unclassified materials |
| GD Crypto Products | 13a. DoD crypto | A web site showing various Type I crypto products from General Dynamics, including Fastlane, Taclane, and Sectera |
| Copy of Navy Crypto web site | 13a. DoD crypto | Interesting site with a copy of a Navy site on Type I crypto gear. This copy was probably made in the early 2000's. The Navy site is no longer publicly available. This is an interesting resource on legacy crypto, and early versions of some of the recent ones (Taclane, Fastlane). |
| Certificate Authority Work Station | 13a. DoD crypto | GD website on their CAW for the NSA approved PKI. |
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| NSA Global Information Grid (GIG) IA page | 13a. DoD crypto | A quick intro to the GIG, mostly about the IA component |
| TALON PCMCIA encryptor | 13a. DoD crypto | L3 web site for the product |
| L3 Crypto devices | 13a. DoD crypto | This page lists a range of communications devices for DoD, but look at the KG, STE, Talon, Guardian, and OMNIxi series devices for crypto gear |
| KG-530: 40 Gb/sec SONET encryptor | 13a. DoD crypto | A contract to develop this was awarded to GD |
| HSPD-12/PIV FAQ | 13a. DoD crypto | On a VA site, but essentially the same for all govt agencies |
| Federal X.509 Policy (2009) | 13a. DoD crypto | This is for civilian federal agencies, not DoD classified systems |
| Common Access Card FAQ | 13a. DoD crypto | Common Access Card (CAC) FAQ |
| Conducting a Security Audit: An Introductory Overview | 13c. Security Audit | |
| Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) | 13c. Security Audit | Home page for ISACA |
| Security Auditing: A Continuous Process | 13c. Security Audit | A more detailed list of things to included in an audit |
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Cert. Class |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
|
To Protect |
Classified Data on Unprotected Networks |
Mission Critical Data on Unprotected Networks |
Most Remaining Applications |
Most Remaining Applications |
|
Crypto |
NSA certified Type I |
NIST/NSA Type II |
NIST FIPS |
NIST FIPS |
|
Tokens |
All crypto functions in hardware tokens |
Private keys on hardware tokens |
Private keys on software tokens |
Private keys on software tokens |
|
Common Criteria EAL |
5-7 |
3-4 |
1-2 |
1-2 |
|
User ID RA |
In Person |
In Person |
In Person |
Not in person |
|
PIN/passphrase or biometric |
CAW generated |
System generated |
User selected |
User selected |
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