Jahleel Solutions Pro

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories:

What Can We Learn for Designing

Corporate Ethics Programs? Simone de Colle

Patricia H. Werhane

ABSTRACT. In this article we discuss what are the

implications for improving the design of corporate ethics

programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts

offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deonto-

logical ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of

judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle’s virtues of

character, Kant’s categorical imperative, and Mill’s greatest

happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to

answer the question ‘‘What is the right thing to do?’’ We

look at ethical theories from a different perspective: the

question we ask is ‘‘Why should I do the right thing?’’ In

other words, we deal with the problem of moral moti-

vation, and we examine the different rationale the main

ethical theories provide. We then point out the relation

between moral motivation and the concept of rationality

in the different approaches – is acting morally seen as an

expression of rational behavior? Our analysis of moral

motivation provides a useful framework to improve the

understanding of the relationships between formal and

informal elements of corporate ethics programs,

emphasizing the importance of the latter, often over-

looked in compliance-focused programs. We conclude

by suggesting that the concept of moral imagination can

provide a unifying approach to enhance the effectiveness

of corporate ethics programs, by providing an intangible

asset that supports the implementation of their formal

components into management decision making.

KEY WORDS: moral motivation, moral imagination,

corporate ethics programs, Kant, Aristotle, Mill

Introduction

Virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism

are often presented and discussed as different ethical

theories by reason of the different criteria of judgment

they are based upon. Aristotle’s ethics of virtue, Kant’s

categorical imperative and Mill’s greatest happiness principle

are their different moral criteria to find an answer to

the question ‘‘What is the right thing to do?’’ when facing

a moral dilemma. Various authors – such as Donaldson

and Werhane (1979), Velasquez (1982), De George

(1986), Boatright (1993), Beauchamp and Bowie

(1997), and many others – have provided examples of

how different ethical theories can be applied to

analyze and discuss ethical issues in business (the year

refers to the date of the first edition).

Since the aim of this article is to discuss the

implications of the main ethical theories for

improving the design of today’s corporate ethics

programs, we look at ethical theories from a

different perspective. Our focus is less on the situ-

ation and more on the actor who is taking a moral

decision: the question we asks is not ‘‘What is the

right thing to do?’’ but rather ‘‘Why should I do the

right thing?’’ In other words, we deal with the

problem of moral motivation.

The structure of the article is the following: in the

first three sections, we examine the different per-

spectives on moral motivation elaborated within

Aristotelian ethics, of virtue, Kantian deontological

ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism. After summarizing the

main argumentations they offer to judge what

determines the moral worth of an action – that is, their

normative content – we discuss what kind of rationale

they provide to support the motivational aspects of

their theory – that is, their descriptive explanation of

causation of moral behavior. A particular aspect that

we will point out is the relation between moral

motivation and the concept of rationality in the dif-

ferent ethical perspectives: is acting morally seen as an

expression of rational behavior? If so, how is rational

behavior defined in each perspective?

Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 81:751–764 � Springer 2007 DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9545-7

On the basis of this analysis, in the following

section, we discuss the implications for promoting

ethical behavior within organizations in light of the

different moral motivation perspectives. How would

Aristotle, Kant, and Mill design a corporate ethics

program, if they were the Ethics Officers of a

modern corporation? What elements would they

emphasize, to ensure an effective implementation of

the formal elements of a corporate ethics program,

considering their conceptualization of the moral

motivation problem? After presenting this hypo-

thetical conversation among these three great moral

philosophers, we conclude by suggesting that the

concept of moral imagination (Werhane, 1999) offers a

unifying perspective from which any ethical theory

can converge. We argue that – within each of the

three different moral motivation accounts discussed

– moral imagination can be recognized as a valuable

intangible asset that can support an effective imple-

mentation of the formal components of corporate

ethics programs into daily management decision

making. We believe that Aristotle, Kant, and Mill

would all agree, if they were Ethics Officers in to-

day’s corporations.

Aristotelian virtue ethics: morality as

fulfillment of natural capacities

In Nichomachean Ethics (EN) Aristotle begins his

ethical inquiry by stating that happiness (eudaimonia)

is what any rational human being seeks to achieve:

happiness is ‘‘the highest of all the goods achievable in

action’’ (EN: I, 1095a). In order to avoid misleading

conceptions, Aristotle clarifies that the real meaning

of happiness consists in ‘‘a certain sort of activity of the

soul in accord with virtue’’ (EN: I, 1099b). Happiness is,

therefore, an activity that entails the true fulfillment

of the human nature: living in happiness means to

live the good life for a rational human being.

How can human beings reach happiness?

According to Aristotle, the answer relies on the

development of virtue. A virtue is defined as the

actualization of a potential: human beings are not

born good or bad by nature, but have the capacity to

become good if they develop their virtues, or bad if

indulge in vices.

By developing and practicing virtues, we develop

our capacities and natural dispositions to do the right

thing in any situation. And, we can actually do

more: in fact, we develop our willingness to do the

right thing as well. This is a crucial passage for the

purposes of our discussion on moral motivation, and

deserves to be emphasized. According to Aristotle,

developing her virtues not only help the rational

agent to identify the right conduct to pursue: they

also provide a motivation for doing the right thing,

because by doing so she will live the good life: ‘‘The

belief that the happy person lives well and does well also

agrees with our account, since we have virtually said that

the end is a sort of living well and doing well’’ (EN: I,

1098b).

Among the virtues of thought, practical wisdom

(phronesis, also translated as ‘prudence’) plays a very

important role in the real, hard choices of day life

that support the development of virtues: it is the

ability of a person to ‘‘to deliberate finely about things

that are good and beneficial for himself...about what sort of

things promote living well in general’’ (EN: VI, 1140a).

Still, people of good character sometimes make the

morally wrong decisions, even if they know that

what they are doing is wrong. Why can this happen?

Aristotle describes a number of these puzzling

examples of ‘irrational behavior’ and argues that they

are explained by ‘‘incontinence,’’ which can be

described as the prevalence of (wrong) emotions on

(correct) reason: ‘‘The continent person seems to be the

same as one who abides by his rational calculation; and the

incontinent person seems to be the same as one who

abandons it. The incontinent person knows that his actions

are base, but does them because of his feelings, whereas the

continent person knows that his appetites are base, but

because of reason does not follow them’’ (EN, VII,

1145b).

Emotions can, therefore, fade the moral motiva-

tion of well-intended person, but it is important also

to note that for Aristotle this does not imply that we

have to deny our emotions to be able to act ethically:

rather, what we need to do is to cultivate the right

emotions, as these will in fact reinforce our moral

motivation. As Hartman (2000) points out, coher-

ently with his assumption that the virtuous person

has a disposition not only to do the right thing, but

to enjoy doing the right thing, Aristotle does not

consider emotions being in general a threat for

correct decision making but, on the contrary, thinks

that emotions in the virtuous person are aligned with

reason. 1

752 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

As we will discuss later, this account of moral

motivation raises one fundamental issue, concerning

the problematic relation between the ‘‘free will’’ and

the ‘‘natural disposition’’ elements of Aristotelian

theory. But, before addressing this issue, let’s

examine how the other ethical theories address the

issue of moral motivation.

Kantian ethics: morality springing from

reason

One key element of Kantian ethics is the idea that

the moral worth of any action relies entirely on the

motivation of the agent: human behavior cannot be

said good or bad in light of the consequences it

generates, but only with regards to what moved the

agent to act in that particular way. Kant states this

very clearly in the opening line of the Groundwork of

the Metaphysics of Morals: ‘‘It is impossible to think of

anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that

could considered good without limitation except a good

will’’ (AK 4: 393).

But what are the motives that guide human

action? Kant introduces the key concept of duty to

clarify the rationale underpinning his moral theory,

by analyzing three different types of motivation:

• Actions from duty: These are actions that are really undertaken for the sake of duty itself,

that is, done because the agent think they

are the right thing to do. No consideration

of purpose of the action matters, but only

whether the action respect a universal moral

law;

• Actions by immediate inclination: Everyone has some inclinations, such as to preserve one’s

life, or to preserve honor. These are also

duties that have worth in their own sake.

But acting according to the maxim that these

inclinations might suggests – such as taking

care of one’s own health – lacks for Kant

true moral worth. For example, a charitable

person who donates some goods to poor

people might do it following her inclination

to help the others – that is, because she

enjoys helping the others. 2

This for Kant is

not a moral motivation, even if the action is

in conformity with duty. The person acting

from duty would in fact donate to the other

because she recognizes that helping the others

is her moral obligation; 3

• Actions impelled by some other inclination: This third type of motivation include actions that

can be done in conformity with duty, yet

are not done from duty, but rather as a mean

to some further end. In order to illustrate

this type of motivation, Kant provides the

following example. A shopkeeper who does

not overcharge the inexperienced customer

and treats all customers in the same way

certainly is doing the right thing – that is,

acts in conformity with duty – but we

cannot say for sure that he is acting in this

way because he is moved by the basic princi-

ples of honesty: ‘‘it is his advantage (preserving

his reputation with clients) that requires it’’.

Moreover, we cannot say that he is moved

by a immediate inclination toward his

customers, since he gives no preference to

one with respect to another. Therefore,

concludes Kant, ‘‘his action was done neither

from duty nor from immediate inclination but

merely for purposes of self-interest’’ (AK 4: 397).

This explains why for Kant what makes an action

‘the right thing to do’ has to be found in the agent’s

intention: ‘‘For, in the case of what is to be morally good it

is not enough that it conform with the moral law but it must

also be done for the sake of the law; without this, that

conformity is only very contingent and precarious, since a

ground that is not moral will indeed now and then produce

actions contrary to the law’’. (AK, 4:390). 4

And ulti-

mately, what gives to the agent’s morally good

volition the force to cause her action in accordance

with it – in other words, what morally moves the

agent to act in conformity with the moral law orig-

inates from the agent’s reason itself. It is the reason,

by enabling human beings to develop their moral

thoughts, that at the same time provides an incentive

for us to behave in conformity with them: we make,

using Kant’s words, our moral thoughts become our

own maxim to act in the way they suggest. 5

Kant does not disregard the role of emotions in

providing a support to act in conformity with the

moral law, recognizing the fact that it is both

impossible to know when an action is done purely

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 753

from duty and that is in any case ‘‘unlikely to occur given

the complexity of humans’ moral psychology’’ (Muthu,

2003: 151). Therefore, even if the influence of

emotions, feelings, and passions ultimately represents

for Kant non-moral motivations to act, as they can at

least support human behavior and guide it toward

actions that respect the others as ends in themselves.

Mill’s utilitarianism: morality based on ‘the

social feelings of mankind’

Utilitarianism’s answer to the question ‘‘What is the

right thing to do?’’ is apparently simple and

straightforward, and can be summarized as follows:

‘‘in every situation, one should act in such a way that

will result in the greatest overall happiness.’’ This

expresses the founding principle of utilitarianism

called by Mill (1871) the ‘‘Greatest Happiness Prin-

ciple’’ (GHP): ‘‘Actions are right in proportion as they

tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce

the reverse of happiness’’ (Utilitarianism, 2.2.2). The

consequentialistic approach of utilitarian ethics was

almost naturally adopted by the self-interest, utility-

maximization axioms of the neoclassical homo

economicus, which dominated economic theory for

almost a century and still represents the mainstream

model of human behavior currently applied by

economists, despite a growing literature demon-

strating its theoretical fallacies – see for example, the

key contribution by Simon (1955) and Sen (1977) –

and providing empirical evidence of its inconsistence

with real human behavior (e.g., Kahneman and

Twersky, 1979). However, to reduce Mill’s utilitar-

ianism to the selfish utility-maximization paradigm

would be a simplistic understanding of his moral

theory, failing to recognize a number of key aspects,

as Werhane (1991) and Gustafson (2001) have

pointed out. 6

But, what is Mill’s answer to the question ‘‘Why

should I do the right thing?’’ Mill explicitly address

the issue of moral motivation in the third chapter of

Utilitarianism, entitled ‘‘Of the ultimate sanction of the

principle of utility,’’ which he opens by asking the

fundamental question that concerns ‘‘any supposed

moral standard: What is its sanction? What are the

motives to obey to it? Or more specifically, what is the

source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding

force?’’ (Utilitarianism, 3.1.1). The use of the word

sanction in the title of the chapter is already indicating

the direction toward which Mill is looking for an

answer. According to Mill, there are two types of

moral sanctions, on which any moral theory – not

just utilitarianism – is grounded upon: external and

internal sanctions. External sanctions refers to two

different external powers able to influence one’s

moral behavior: the judgment of other people and

God: ‘‘they are, the hope of favour and the fear of

displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of

the Universe, along with whatever we may have sympathy

or affection for them, or of love and awe for Him, inclining

us to do his will independently of selfish consequences.’’

(Utilitarianism, 3.3.4). As Gustafson (2001) points

out, despite the fact that usually we think at sanctions

only in negative terms, it is clear that in Mill the

concept of sanction must be understood in both

positive and negative sense: they include both the

fear of punishment or reprimand from external

powers (our peers, the Government, God) and the

hope of favor with other people, and sympathy and

affection for others. On the other hand, internal

sanctions refer to the sense of duty, which is present

in human consciousness. Mill defines the internal

sanction of duty as ‘‘a feeling in our own mind; a pain,

more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which

in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more

serious cases, into shrinking from it as impossibility’’

(Utilitarianism, 3.4.2). If external sanctions refers to

external consequences (positive or negative) due to

the influence of other people (or God), internal

sanctions deal with the power of the individual

themselves: the idea of duty is in fact based on the

essence of conscience, the ‘‘compiled collections of inner

feelings, desires, and sentiments which themselves constitute

a motivating power within us, apart from any outside

responsibility’’ (Gustafson, 2001). Internal moral

sanctions seem therefore to be, according to Mill,

the most important ground for morality: ‘‘the ultimate

sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart)

being a subjective feeling in our own minds...’’ (Utilitari-

anism, 3.5.1). Toward the end of chapter three, Mill

states his final answer: the foundation of morality –

or, in other words, the most important support for

moral motivation – is based on a feeling of sympathy

toward others in society: ‘‘This firm foundation is that

of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity

with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful

principle in human nature, and happily one of those which

754 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation,

from the influences of advancing civilization.’’ (Utilitari-

anism, 3.10.1). But, upon what basis are such social

feelings grounded? Mill says that the moral feelings

are not innate, but can be acquired through educa-

tion and habituation to the sense of community, the

value of cooperation and concern for the others. In

this process of moral education and socialization,

literature, poetry, and other forms of art play a

crucial role in developing moral sensitivity, as

discussed by Gustafson (2001).

Moral motivation explanations and rational

behavior

We have seen that for Aristotle, Kant, and Mill

acting according to the moral criterion of their

general ethical theories – namely according to virtue,

the categorical imperative and the greatest happiness

principle – represents at the same time acting in

accordance with the agent’s rationality. But what

concept of rationality these thinkers had in mind? It

appears that their ideas of human rationality differ in

substantial ways.

A distinction between two types of rationality

suggested by the philosopher and economist John

Harsanyi – namely between goal-directed and criterion-

satisfying rationality – seems to be useful for discussing

the concept of rationality in Aristotle, Kant and Mill.

As Harsanyi (1999) points out, our understanding of

rational behavior is often referring to behavior

involving a choice of the best means available for

achieving a given end – that is, we are thinking at a

goal-directed behavior. The means-ends conception of

rationality became the main assumption of economic

theory, where it has been used to predict human

behavior – such as the choices of the producer or the

consumer – assuming that their rational choices will

simply coincide with what they should do in order

to attain their given preferences, or ends. 7

However,

this is not the only conception of rationality, and

even in every day life we use another model of

rational behavior. Harsanyi makes the example of

someone whose aim is to climb the highest moun-

tain in California: for this person, climbing Mount

Whitney would be the rational thing to do. But

climbing Mount Whitney cannot be said to be the

best means to achieve her aim, as climbing that

particular mountain is her aim. In other words,

saying that for this person climbing Mount Whitney

is the rational thing to do, we are not referring to a

goal-oriented idea of rationality, but to another type

of rational behavior. Harsanyi argues that this second

type of rationality can be defined as criterion-satisfying

rationality.

In Aristotelian virtue ethics, we find a similar idea.

According to Aristotle, the problem of moral

motivation is in some way a false problem: there is

an intrinsic coherence between the end, living the

good life (by developing the virtue of character) and

the mean, developing a virtuous character (by acting

virtuously). The motivation for doing the right thing

arises from the fact that the virtuous person will

rationally (and through habit) become aware of this,

and naturally enjoy doing the right thing. As Hart-

man notes, ‘‘...the question whether there is any selfish

reason to be moral is not a straightforward question: for a

person of good character, being moral is selfish in the sense

that it is what one enjoys’’ (Hartman, 1998: 549).

Aristotle believes that rational (and virtuous) agents

will, therefore, act morally and in accordance with

their self-interest. It is precisely the capacity to be

aware and autonomously deliberate what are the

right things to do that qualifies ethical behavior for

Aristotle: an action is not good or bad in se, because

to assess whether someone’s behavior is ethical it

depends on the intentions that moved that person to

act in that way.

One fundamental issue with this view lies in the

duality between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for

virtue ethics. On one side, the good life is the external

end that any rational agent is autonomously trying to

achieve. At the other side, however, the good life is

the fulfillment of the intrinsic function of human

beings. In other words, the good life is at the same time

the expression of an autonomous, subjective choice of

free rational agents, and the necessary, objective end of

human nature. The Kantian principle ‘ought implies

can’ clearly points out how Aristotle’s view generates a

paradox: if the good life is an intrinsic end, how can

one claim that it is the object of autonomous delib-

eration of the free will as well?

According to Kant, morality is first of all a matter

of the free (and good) will: the moral law is the only

constraint to the will that a free, rational agent accept

to impose to herself, therefore, the idea of fulfilling

a pre-ordinated plan constrained by nature is unac-

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 755

ceptable. Kant’s concept of rationality is criterion-

satisfying as in Aristotle, but the role of reason is much

more central in his moral theory. Reason not only

enables the agent to identify the moral law, but also

provides her with the incentives to act in accordance

with it: moral motivation is springing from pure

reason.

On the relation between morality and self-inter-

est, Kant rejects Aristotle’s view of ‘harmony’:

morality ultimately concerns how one treats the

other human beings, and therefore cannot always

coincide with self-interest. 8

In Mill, the concept of rationality is closer to the

first type described by Harsanyi, expressing the goal-

directed rational behavior. Without falling into the

simplistic – and hugely problematic – Bentham’s

‘hedonic calculus’ meant to measure the amount of

happiness generated by any action, Mill thinks that

people use their reason to identify the best way to

achieve their ultimate end, according to the Greatest

Happiness Principle. However, we can also read

Mill’s utilitarianism as expressing a criterion-satisfy-

ing rationality, if we look at the explanation of moral

motivation discussed above, which points out the

key role of moral feelings in choosing which ends the

person is going to try to achieve, and not just which

means are best to achieve a given end. In fact, Mill

does not give to reason the highest place of impor-

tance in his moral theory, nor in his account for

moral motivation. More important is the role of

moral sentiments, which determine the use that any

person will do of her reason: acting unethically is not

a failure of reason, but a lack of appropriate moral

feelings. A person who fails to develop her moral

feelings will for Mill use her reason to adopt the

utilitarian principle in an egoistic, self-interested

way, looking for consequences that maximizes her

own welfare, without any concerns for the welfare

of others. Once moral sentiments are acquired, on

the contrary, Mill’s utilitarianism becomes a much

more socially oriented moral theory, in which the

self-oriented interests tend to converge and find

their own satisfaction in the appreciation of the

welfare of society at large: 9

‘‘The deeply rooted

conception which every individual even now has of himself

as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his

natural wants that there should be harmony between his

feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.’’

(Utilitarianism, 3.11.11).

The table below provides an overview of the key

elements on moral motivation within the ethical

theories by Aristotle, Kant and Mill, their concept of

rationality and the role of emotions for moral

motivation (Table I).

Implications of different moral motivation

accounts for ethics programs design

Corporate ethics programs include a range of

different activities, processes and management tools,

such as promulgating codes of ethics or ethics poli-

cies, nominating an ethics and/or compliance officer,

establishing a confidential hot/help line, promoting

communication activities on the organization’s ethics

policies and standards, providing ethics training

courses to managers and employees, setting up an

internal ethical audit and monitoring system, and

many other approaches.

In practice, all the above-mentioned elements are,

according to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines

(2005), the formal elements that organizations should

consider when designing an ethics and compliance

program. As indicated by Tenbrunsel et al. (2003),

formal elements of corporate ethics programs can be

defined are ‘‘those that are documented and stan-

dardized, visible to anyone inside or outside the

organization.’’ In addition, the Guidelines also

emphasize the importance of informal elements

(namely: organizational culture, values and other

intangibles aspects): the Guidelines states clearly that,

in order for the ethics compliance program to be

effective, corporations should ‘‘promote an organiza-

tional culture that encourages ethical conduct.’’ 10

Both

formal and informal components are therefore

essential elements for an effective implementation of

corporate ethics programs. However, the Guidelines

say very little about how organizations can address

and strengthen the informal part of their ethics

programs.

In this section, we try to throw light on this rather

dark side of ethics programs. We here discuss what

are the implications of the different perspectives

underpinning moral motivation within each major

ethical theory for enhancing the effectiveness of

corporate ethics programs. In other words, we ask

what is, in light of each moral motivation perspec-

tive, the best way to support ethical behavior within

756 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

organizations? If Aristotle, Kant or Mill were the

Ethics Officer of a modern corporation in charge of

the design of the organization’s ethics program, what

would they do to differently to strengthen employ-

ees’ moral motivation within organizations?

Aristotle as ethics officer: building the manager with

‘good character’

For Aristotle ethical behavior is about virtue, not

compliance with rules or principles: therefore, from

the perspective of virtue ethics, an ethics program

merely focused on a compliance-approach would

not able to generate the necessary moral motivation

to support its implementation. Instead, to be

effective a corporate ethics program designed

according to Aristotelian ethics should focus pri-

marily on creating an organizational environment

that supports the development of good character

for managers and employees. This could mean, for

example, engaging in ethics discussions, workshops

and other training activities within the organiza-

tion, rather than focusing on the creation of prin-

ciples and rules of conduct to comply with. As we

have pointed out above, the importance of ethics

training is widely recognized and emphasized

within compliance-oriented ethics programs as

well: ‘‘conducting effective training programs and other-

wise disseminating information appropriate to [such]

individuals respective roles and responsibilities’’ is one of

the key elements indicated by the US Federal

Sentencing Guidelines. However, what is impor-

tant to note is that ethics training courses designed

in the Aristotelian perspective would have some

distinctive characteristics: they would not aim at

teaching different ethical analytical frameworks or

communicating general principles for ethical deci-

sion-making (‘top-down’ approach generated and

controlled by the management), but would rather

aim at providing a dialectical conversation

encouraging individual participants to develop

their own character (‘bottom-up’ approach,

promoting employees participation and individual

TABLE I

Moral motivation across ethical theories

Ethical

theory

Normative

moral

criterion:

What is the right

thing to do?

Moral

motivation

narrative:

Why should I

do the right thing?

Moral

motivation

locus

Concept

of rationality

Role of emotions

for moral motivation

Aristotelian

virtue ethics

Act

according

to virtue

Be virtuous: it

will make you

happy as well

Intrinsic

(natural

pre-disposition)

and extrinsic

(happiness)

Criterion-

satisfying

(moral action =

action by virtue)

Reinforcing:

right emotions

(to be developed)

can reinforce

moral motivation

Kantian ethics Act

according

to the categorical

imperative

Follow your

reason: act

according to

the moral law

within yourself

Intrinsic

(reason)

Criterion-

satisfying

(moral action =

action from duty)

Residual:

emotions can

induce actions in

conformity with

the moral law,

but they are only

non-moral motivation

Mill’s

utilitarianism

Act

according to

the Greatest

Happiness Principle (GHP)

Act according

to the GHP

(for society):

it will also bring

happiness (to you)

Intrinsic

(conscience)

and extrinsic

(external

sanctions)

Goal-directed

(utility maximization)

and criterion-satisfying

(rule-utilitarianism)

Fundamental:

the (acquired)

moral feelings

are the ultimate

binding force

for moral behavior

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 757

responsibility), for example discussing case-studies,

helping them to focus on the virtues and practical

wisdom they need to acquire in order to become a

good manager and a good employee. They would

also probably challenge some common assumptions

of the mainstream business paradigm, such as the

creed that financial performance is the only mea-

sure of corporate success, and suggest the idea that

the values the virtuous person lives by should be

the same at home as well as in the office: in an

Aristotelian perspective, having to abide to inco-

herent principles ‘‘would be no way to flourish, for the

same reason that a deceptive life is no way to flourish’’

(Hartman, 2000: 69). In Table II we summarize the

key elements of an Aristotelian approach to ethics

programs, offering as well a ‘corporate motto’ that

could be used as a communication tool.

Kant as ethics officer: developing the company’s values and

principles

Probably the most useful implication of the Kan-

tian ethics for management theory is the idea that

stakeholders are to be considered like ends in

themselves, and not as means to achieve some

other (corporate) end. But, on a more practical

level, it is difficult – and probably not very useful

– the attempt to translate a strict Kantian approach

in corporate ethics programs. In fact, one can

agree with ethicist – such as Norman Bowie –

who have argued that the application of the

categorical imperative should not be taken as an

absolutistic approach, but, on the contrary, as an

overarching principle that ‘‘provides flexibility in

ethics’’ (Bowie 1999: 25). According to Bowie, the

Kantian perspective suggest to consider the

corporation as a ‘moral community’ based on

organizational structure and rules that support

human freedom, encourage workers participation

and treat in a fair way all stakeholders.

The Kantian idea of the moral law can be inter-

preted within the context of a business organization

as the search for corporate values and principles,

stated in the corporate Mission or code of ethics,

which identify a set of principles-based ethics.

Nevertheless, one must also recognize that the

‘ought’ language of universal moral laws or corpo-

rate codes of ethics is not a familiar way of thinking

in managerial decision-making. In front of the

complexity of the many different ‘communities’ that

need to be taken into consideration in today’s

business decision making, a somehow more prag-

matic approach seems to be more useful. 11

In conclusion, a corporate ethics program

designed according to Kantian ethics would focus on

the identification of corporate values and principles

norms best reflecting the moral law that should

guide all the members of that particular organization.

The moral motivation to support the program’s

implementation is for Kant to be found in the

managers themselves – namely in their capacity of

moral reasoning, enabling them to discover the

reasons to make business decisions ‘for duty.’

Mill as ethics officer: balancing internal and external

sanctions

What are the implications of Mill’s explanation of

moral motivation for enhancing ethical decision-

making within organizations? Looking at Mill’s

analysis of the different types of moral sanctions, its

main implication seems to be the need for a balance

between internal and external sanctions. Translated

into the business world, his account of moral

motivation suggests that manager will be motivated

to act morally – that is, they will orient their deci-

sions toward the Greatest Happiness Principle – if

they demonstrate two kinds of capacities:

(a) The capacity to acquire appropriate moral

feelings to appreciate the value of coopera-

tion and society’s welfare (thereby taking

decisions that are satisfying not only their

own interests, or the interests of the share-

holders, but also by trying to achieve the

greatest happiness for all the company

stakeholders, in general); and

(b) The capacity of being aware (and thereby

proactively act in managerial terms) of the

possible external benefits of ethical behavior

(such as corporate awards; reputational

effects; customer and employee loyalty, etc.)

and negative sanctions (such as fines by regula-

tive public authorities; cost of litigation; loss

of customers; high employee turn over, etc.)

of unethical behavior.

758 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

In terms of designing corporate ethics programs,

these two considerations seems to imply that Mill, as

an Ethics Officer, would recommend a balanced

approach between two core elements:

(a) Moral education programs – such as ethics

training courses – specifically designed to

help managers and employees in acquiring

the appropriate moral feelings (the most

powerful factors of moral motivation accord-

ing to Mill); and

(b) Sustainability management/Corporate Social

Responsibility (CSR) processes – such as

sustainability reporting initiatives or CSR

management standards 12

– that help the

management to integrate in their decision-

making processes a careful considerations of

the social, ethical, and environmental

impacts of corporate activity on all the orga-

nization’s stakeholder.

A unifying approach: enabling moral

imagination to support ethics

programs implementation

After having pointed out some specific elements that

differentiate the application of the main ethical

theories to the design of corporate ethics programs,

we want to emphasize a concept that, we believe,

can provide a unifying approach to support a more

effective implementation of ethics programs within

organizations – namely the concept of moral imagi-

nation.

Moral imagination has been defined as ‘‘a neces-

sary ingredient in responsible moral judgment’’ that can

enable in particular circumstances to ‘‘discover and

evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that cir-

cumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or

merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns.

In managerial decision-making, moral imagination entails

perceiving norms, social roles, and relationships entwined

in any situation.’’ (Werhane, 1999: 93). The

importance of moral imagination resides in the

following idea: within organizations – especially

profit-driven corporations – managers who strive to

success and excellence risk in many cases to find

themselves bounded in a cognitive trap, where only

a narrow, partial perspective on reality emerges as

possible. In such cases, managers’ interpretation of

reality can become distorted and their ability to

exercise moral judgment impeded. In the worse

scenarios, as organizational psychologists demon-

strate, the competitive culture may degenerate into

a neurotic tendency of ‘‘search of glory’’ (Horney,

1950), managers tend to confuse reality with a self-

created world of fiction characterized by collective

folie á deux processes, such as psychotic forms of

illusion of grandeur or depressive delusion of per-

secution (Kets De Vries, 1980), and managerial

decision making may be heavily biased by phe-

nomena of over-confidence – unreasonable optimism

on future outcomes, inconsistency in risk-taking

decisions and excessive confidence on personal

skills (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Camerer and

Lovallo, 1999).

In order to ameliorate these risks, and actively

promote a healthy environment where ethical

decision-making does not require the exercise of

exceptional qualities, and does not constitute a

last-resource process to be activated to face

exceptional circumstances, but rather represents a

normal feature – something like a ‘‘Intel-inside’’

component of strategic managerial processes – the

capacity of moral imagination is a key asset. Its

validity as a mechanism supporting the imple-

mentation of ethics programs, we believe, can be

demonstrated across the different moral motivation

accounts of the main ethical theories. In order to

illustrate this, we identify three different stages in

the process of enabling moral imagination, and

show how they emphasize three separate aspects

that are traceable back to Aristotle, Kant and Mill

respectively.

Disengagement from the context

The first stage of activating moral imagination is to

try to disengage from the particular issue and its

context to discover what mental models are at play.

Ethical failures of managerial decision making are

often the result not of weak moral development or a

lack of understanding of what is right or wrong, but

rather of a poor awareness of the moral implications

and social consequences of ‘business decisions.’ 13

Moral imagination begins to act at this level. Starting

with the particular event, behavior or decision that

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 759

are at stake, it enables free reflection and imaginative

thinking on the ethical standards to be applied in

complex business decisions: ‘‘Moral imagination begins

with a particular case, scenario, or event in which we be-

come engaged as thick social selves’’ (Werhane, 1999:

103). 14

This means asking questions, such as: ‘‘What

motivates the decision-makers in this context?,’’

‘‘What conflicts are at stake?,’’ and ‘‘Is anyone in-

volved in the decision-making process over-confi-

dent or deluded into a distorted perspective?’’ From

the Aristotelian perspective, as we have already

pointed out, since moral motivation relies on the

development and practicing of virtues, corporate

ethics programs should be designed to facilitate a

dialectic conversation among corporate members, as

a way to provide a process for training their capacity

of moral judgment and thereby contributing to a

virtuous ‘character’ building – which ultimately

support ethical decision-making within organiza-

tions. We argue that the role of moral imagination in

this process would be essential: to develop and apply

moral principles, managers need first to reach an

appropriate understanding of the complex circum-

stances of reality that they are facing (perception); in

this activity, it is their imagination (phantasia) that

guides their understanding: ‘‘Aristotle sometimes say

that nous (understanding) is at work in correct perception’’

(Hartman, 2000: 60). By exercising their under-

standing and disengagement in the process of

developing a capacity of moral imagination,

managers will be less inclined to underestimate

salient aspects – e.g., the ethical implications – in-

volved in complex decisions.

Delving into possibilities

Moral imagination would at the same time be a core

factor supporting the implementation of a ‘neo-

Kantian’ corporate ethics program, because the

capacity of moral imagination is a necessary

complement of practical moral reasoning. This is

because the second stage of developing a robust

moral imagination involves delving into possibilities.

What are some new alternatives in approaching a

particular issue? What societal, corporate and per-

sonal values are at stake? Do any of these challenges

the status quo? In this stage, it is the combination of

moral imagination with moral reasoning that enables

creative moral managerial decision making. A cor-

porate ethics program embracing the idea of moral

imagination (i.e., aiming at training decision makers

in exercising their capacity for imaginative thinking)

would therefore be consistent with a neo-Kantian

approach, in the sense that it would still aim at

developing moral standards representing the balance

between the initial, context-based moral intuitions

and the imaginative reflection that de-contextualize

the thinking from the thick self. 15

Moral imagination

here can be seen as activating a thought process

similar to the Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium:

by continuously going back and forth between the

(specific) case at hand and the (general) company

mission and values; between the local culture, social

norms and traditions and more abstract personal

values and moral principles, managers will be able to

think through the issues they are facing and reinforce

their motivation to ethical decision making. This

does not mean that managers engaging in this pro-

cess will have to deny their local identities and

parochial interests. On the contrary, they will start

from there, but will put these contextual elements

under moral scrutiny, until, as Rawls (1971) points

out, their ‘considered judgments’, duly pruned and

adjusted, will be in equilibrium with their more

general principles. Instead of the Kantian universal

moral law, however, the kind of moral standards that

we are considering here are rather moral minimums in

the sense that Walzer (1994) and Donaldson (1989)

have pointed out. Moral minimums do represent

widespread agreement across different cultural, social

and historical contexts about what actions are mor-

ally justifiable or (more easily) morally questionable,

but with no claim to be absolute. Their validity

needs to be continuously reaffirmed over time, open

to revision and refinement if new situations or

innovative thinking might enable so – a practical

application example of this dynamic process can be

seen, for example, in the evolution of environmental

standards.

Focus on consequences

Finally, promoting the use of moral imagination

within organizations to support the implementa-

760 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

tion of ethics programs would be also justified

from the social utilitarian of John Stuart Mill.

This is because the third stage of developing

moral imagination takes into account practical

issues and consequences. Here one questions the

viability of alternatives at stake. Can these be

operationalized? And what might be the conse-

quences, negative and positive, for all the stake-

holders involved? This approach to moral

imagination is, in fact, consistent with some

fundamental concepts affirmed by Mill, such as

the idea that the Greatest Happiness Principle is

not simply a ‘value-free’ utility-maximization

exercise, but requires to recognize and appreciate

social norms and rules of behavior, and the idea

that to develop ‘moral sensitivity’ is one crucial

task to enable every person to behave ethically.

Too often in modern corporations managers find

themselves trapped in narrow decision-making

frameworks, biased by short-term pressures that

burden their roles and responsibilities, and fail to

integrate in their thinking an adequate apprecia-

tion of social norms and ethical principles. In a

utilitarian perspective, moral imagination allows

managers to connect with the external word, to

‘feel a concern for the welfare of others’, in

Mill’s words – or to take into consideration the

impacts of corporate action on all the organiza-

tion’s stakeholders, to use a modern management

language.

TABLE II

Moral motivation and corporate ethics programs

Ethical theory Characteristics of corporate ethics programs Role of moral

imagination to

support the

ethics program

Main aim Method Key ethical lead-

ership skills

Corporate

motto

Aristotelian

virtue ethics

Develop the

manager with

‘good character’

Ethics training

based on case

studies and

leadership examples

Practical wisdom

Personal integrity,

Good character

Use the same

rules at home as

well in the office

Moral imagina-

tion enables dis-

engagement from

the context and

discernment

Kantian ethics Develop the

manager’s

capacity of

moral reasoning

to act ‘from

duty’ (accord

ing to the

corporate

Mission)

Discuss case-

studies to

develop/chal

lenge moral

minimums

via a process of

continuous adap-

tation (reflective

equilibrium)

Moral reasoning

Compliance (with

corporate ethics)

Walk the

talk (demon

strating to live

up with the

corporate

Mission and

values)

Moral imagina

tion enables

investigating

new alternatives

and promotes

awareness of

what values are

at stake

Mill’s

utilitarianism

Develop the

manager’s

appropriate

moral feelings

and

Develop man

agerial under

standing of

external

sanctions

Ethics training

designed to

develop moral

feelings;

Ethics/CSR

management

programs & tools

to identify and

measure external

benefits and neg-

ative sanctions for

ethical behavior

Moral feelings

Cost/benefit

analysis (for

all stakeholders)

Act to maximize

overall stake

holder

satisfaction

Moral imagina

tion enables

evaluating the

viability and

consequences of

novel possibil

ities for all

corporate stake

holders involved

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 761

In summary, the use of moral imagination can be

considered as a crucial element to enhance the

effectiveness of corporate ethics programs regardless,

whether your Ethics Officer is more incline toward a

virtue ethics, a social utilitarian or a Kantian

perspective: in designing corporate ethics programs

one should not forget this.

Conclusion

By analyzing the different moral motivation rationales

underpinning Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian

ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism, we have argued that

this discussion carries two relevant implications:

(a) The explanation of what is the ‘ultimate

binding force’, to use Mill’s words, that

motivates us to do the right thing according to

each ethical theory – that is, their answer to

the problem of moral motivation – brings us

inevitably to consider what concept of

human rationality they are based upon;

(b) The combination of the moral motivation

explanation, the concept of rationality

embedded in any ethical theory, and the

role of moral imagination, have, in turn,

significant implications concerning their

practical application to the design of corpo-

rate ethics programs.

The table below presents a summary of the key as-

pects discussed with regard to the implications for

corporate ethics programs. It is not intended to

provide conclusive arguments, but rather offer a basis

for discussion and suggest further research and

application. In front of the growing – and already

overwhelming – body of corporate social responsi-

bility management standards, stakeholder engage-

ment methods, sustainability reporting

methodologies and other ethics standards that are

currently available or being developed, 16

we believe

that our analysis on moral motivation can provide an

useful framework to improve our understanding of

the factors able to lead to a more effective imple-

mentation of corporate ethics programs, pointing

out the relationship between formal and informal

elements embedded in such programs – an aspect so

far not adequately addressed.

Notes

1 See Ed Hartman (2000: 64).

2 See the comments by Christine M. Korsgaard in

her Introduction of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of

Morals, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 3

Norman Bowie argues that it is possible to defend

a more flexible interpretation of Kant on this issue, by

recognizing that there might be multiple motives to act –

that is, it is possible that an action is done from duty

and for practical prudence at the same time. See Bowie

(1999: 120–125). 4

The citation method used here refers to the

volume and page number of the Academy (AK) edition. 5

The idea that moral motivation can spring from

reason is rejected by many other philosophical

approaches. W.M. Sibley, for example, refers to the

moral philosophy of Hume (1739), who famously stated

that ‘‘Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the pas-

sions’’ to argue that Kant was wrong in trying to derive

moral behavior from reason: ‘‘...what reason then tells me

is not simply: ‘‘Be reasonable!’’ but rather: ‘‘Be reasonable –

if you have to!’’ It issues only hypothetical imperatives. Hume

is thus correct in seeing that morality does not spring from rea-

son alone.’’ See Sibley (1953: 558). 6

As our purpose here is to discuss the issue of moral

motivation within utilitarian theory, we cannot further

elaborate on this. However, as discussed in Gustafson

(2001), at least the following three points must be no-

ted:

(i) Utilitarianism is not just about myopian, short-term

maximization: The GHP does not states that the moral

action is the one which generates the greatest actual and

immediate happiness, but the one which tends (as a

general rule) to promote happiness in society in the

long-term; (ii)

Utilitarianism is not selfish, but social: by differenti-

ating between act and rule utilitarianism, Mill in fact

recognizes the importance of acting in conformity with

rules that ultimately provide for the greatest happiness,

meaning that the theory allows to act in such a way

that is not directly linked with the agent’s immediate

self-interest, if it supports socially desirable rules of con-

duct (in other words, it recognizes the intrinsic impor-

tance attached to following certain rules of behavior,

beyond their instrumental use); (iii)

Utilitarianism distinguishes higher from lower plea-

sures: ‘‘It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to

recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desir-

able and more valuable than others.’’ (Utilitarianism,

2.4.26). Higher pleasures – such as justice, noble

762 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane

feelings and moral sentiments – are ‘intrinsically supe-

rior’ as they are what qualifies human beings; they arise

from the intellect and stimulate our imagination to

think beyond the world of sense. 7

See Harsanyi (1999: 272). 8

As we have discussed in the previous section, for

Kant actions done for self-interest can be in conformity

with duty, but if self-interest is the agent’s primary

motivation, her actions have no genuine moral worth. 9

In fact, Gustafson (2001) uses the term Social Utilitar-

ianism with reference to Mill. 10

US Federal Sentencing Commission Guidelines

Manual, Chapter 8 – Sentencing of Organizations. Part

B – Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct, and

Effective Compliance and Ethics Program; §8B2.1.

Effective Compliance and Ethics Program. 11

See on this aspect the interesting discussion on the

‘Problem of community’ in Dunham et al. (2006). 12

Such as AA1000 for Stakeholder engagement pro-

cesses; SA8000 for monitoring working conditions

along the supply-chain; OHSHA18000 for health and

safety issue, and many others (see, for example, Leipzi-

ger, 2003). 13

A problem that Freeman (2007) has defined as the

Separation Fallacy: ‘‘It is useful to believe that sentences

like, ‘‘x is a business decision’’ have no ethical content or any

implicit ethical point of view. And, it is useful to believe that

sentences like ‘‘x is an ethical decision, the best thing to do all

things considered’’ have no content or implicit view about

value creation and trade (business)’’. This way of thinking,

suggests Freeman, fails to recognize that almost every

business decision has some ethical content. 14

Rorty (2006) has assumed a more radical position

concerning moral imagination, affirming that ‘‘Her

(Werhane, 1999) book argues that moral imagination is a

necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral decision-mak-

ing. I suspect that it may, in fact, be sufficient as well’’.

Rorty thinks that moral reasoning skills are not useful at

all in the process of moral deliberation: ‘‘I think of moral

imagination not as a supplement to moral theory and moral

reasoning skills, but as pretty much all you need. [...] When

it comes to ‘moral reasoning skills’, I am less certain than

Werhane that there are such things’’. Rorty concludes that

moral motivation is fundamentally time and context-

depending: ‘‘There is no connection between skill at justify-

ing one’s beliefs – rhetorical effectiveness – and having the

right beliefs. Being able to have the right beliefs and to do the

right thing is largely a matter of luck – of being born in a cer-

tain place and a certain time.’’ While the first part of the

argumentation seems valid – there is not a causal rela-

tionship between the agent’s ability to exercise imagina-

tive moral thinking and her actual moral behavior –

Rorty’s conclusion appears dangerous: it risks to throw

the baby out with the bath water. As noted in Werhane

(2006: 405), Rorty’s idea that moral imagination is

‘‘pretty much all you need’’ threatens to reduce moral

judgments to intuition and story-telling. Refusing the

direct causal link between moral imagination and moral

behavior does not imply that moral reasoning skills have

no role to play at all. On the contrary, we believe that

moral reasoning skills can enable the agent to ‘see’ what

is the right thing to do, that is, they help the agent in

identifying possible alternatives for moral actions – which

we do not see how one could reasonably argue as not

being a key phase in the process of choosing to do the

right thing. 15

In ‘‘Thick and Thin’’ Walzer (1994) explains the dis-

tinction between a thin set of universal principles,

which we can think of as a ‘‘core morality’’ shared

across different cultures, which become thick through a

process (or, more precisely, the many different pro-

cesses) of elaboration which reflect cultural, political,

social and historical differences.

References

Aristotle: 1999, Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by

T. Irving. Indianapolis. Hacket Publishing.

Beauchamp, T. L. and N. R. Bowie: 1997, Ethical Theory

and Business (Prentice Hall).

Boatright, J. R.: 1993, Ethics and the Conduct of Business

(Prentice Hall).

Bowie, N. E.: 1999, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective

(Blackwell, Oxford).

Camerer, C. and D Lovallo: 1999, ‘Overconfidence and

Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach’, The

American Academy Review 89(1), 306–318.

De George, R. T.: 1986, Business Ethics (Prentice Hall).

Donaldson, T. W.: 1989, Ethics in International Business

(Oxford University Press, New York).

Donaldson, T. W. and P. H. Werhane (eds): 1979, Ethical

Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach (Prentice

Hall).

Dunham, L., R. E. Freeman and J. Liedtka: 2006,

‘Enhancing Stakeholder Practice: A Particularized

Exploration of Community’, Business Ethics Quarterly

16(1), 23–42.

Freeman, R. E.: 2007, ‘Managing for Stakeholders’, in

T. Beauchamp, N. Bowie and D. Arnold, (eds.),

Ethical Theory and Business 8th Edition (Prentice Hall)

(Forthcoming).

Gustafson, A.: 2001, J. S. Mill on Moral Sentiments, With

Application to Advertising Ethics. PhD Dissertation,

Marquette University.

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 763

Harsanyi, J. C.: 1999, ‘Advances in Understanding

Rational Behavior’, in P. K. Moser (ed.), Rationality in

Action. Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge University

Press), pp. 271–293.

Hartman, E. M.: 1998, ‘The Role of Character in

Business Ethics’, Business Ethics Quarterly 8(3),

547–559.

Hartman, E. M.: 2000, ‘An Aristotelian Approach to

Moral Imagination’, Professional Ethics 8(3&4), 57–77.

Horney, K.: 1950, Neurosis and Human Growth (Northon

& Company, New York).

Hume, D.: 1739, A Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford

University Press (2000).

Kahneman, D. and D. Lovallo: 1993, ‘Timid Choices and

Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk

Taking’, Management Science, Vol. 39(1), 17–31.

Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky: 1979, ‘Prospect Theory:

An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’, Econometrica:

Journal of the Econometric Society 47(2), 263–292.

Kant, I.: 1785, in M. Gregor (ed.), Groundwork of the

Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press)

(1998).

Kets De Vries, M. F. R.: 1980, Organizational Paradoxes.

Clinical Approaches to Management (Tavistock).

Leipziger, D.: 2003, The Corporate Responsibility Code

Book (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield).

Mill, J. S.: 1871, ‘Utilitarianism’, in R. Crisp (ed.), Oxford

Philosophical Texts (Oxford University Press) (1998).

Muthu, S.: 2003, Enlightment Against Empire (Princeton

University Press).

Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University

Press).

Rorty, R.: 2006, ‘‘Is Philosophy Relevant to Business

Ethics?’ Invited Address to the Society for Business

Ethics Annual Meeting, August 2005’, Business Ethics

Quarterly 16(3), 369–380.

Sen, A. K.: 1977, ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the

Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’,

Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(4), 317–344.

Sibley, W. M.: 1953, ‘The Rational Versus the Rea-

sonable’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 62(4) (Oct.

19533), 554–560.

Simon, H. A.: 1955, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational

Choice’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69(1),

99–118.

Tenbrunsel, A. E., K. Smith-Crowe and E. E. Umphress:

2003, ‘Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the

Ethical Infrastructure in Organizations’, Social Justice

Research, Vol. 16(3), September 2003.

US Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 2005, http://

www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm.

Velasquez, M. G.: 1982, Business Ethics. Concepts and

Cases (Prentice Hall).

Walzer, M.: 1994, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at

Home and Abroad (Notre Dame Press).

Werhane, P. H.: 1991, Adam Smith and its Legacy for

Modern Capitalism (Oxford University Press, New

York).

Werhane, P.H.: 1999, Moral Imagination and Management

Decision Making. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics

(Oxford University Press).

Werhane, P. H.: 2006, ‘A Place for Philosophers in

Applied Ethics and the Role of Moral Reasoning

in Moral Imagination: A Response to Richard Rorty’,

Business Ethics Quarterly 16(3), 401–408.

Simone de Colle

The Darden School of Business,

University of Virginia,

P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, VA, 22906-6500,

U.S.A.

E-mail: [email protected]

Patricia H. Werhane

Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics,

Darden School of Business, University of Virginia,

Charlottesville, U.S.A.

and

Director of the Institute for Business and Professional

Ethics,

Depaul University,

Chicago, IL, U.S.A.

764 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane