Answer a few questions, due tonight, easy I supply other student answers
student answer
(a) Olson explains that distributional coalitions and special-interest organizations slow down policy regulations, which in turn slow down social evolution. In other words, countries with more stable democratic freedom (such as US) will experience a greater growth of special-interest organizations than countries that have suffered foreign occupation and political instability (such as Japan , Germany and Italy after World War II). During the post war era, Japan, Germany, and Italy suffered an unstable legal order that prevented them from accumulating special-interest organizations that could slow down policy making, and therefore create a relatively slow growth performance in government regulations.
(b) The evidence presented by Olson is strongly supported by the current social level rates of development in US. Special-interest group power, overwhelms the economy levels by creating disproportional economic distribution among societies. In order to create a higher real-wage growth, US would have to eliminate special-interest organizations that deviate economic growth in their favor.
student answer
A. According to M. Olson, accumulation increases the complexity of regulation, the governmental role, and complexity of understandings. All these factors are reasons for a slow economical growth. Japan, Germany, and Italy that suffered from upheavals and invasions after World War II, avoided the accumulation of distributional coalitions, which would influence on their growth rates. The instability made it harder for distributional coalitions to protect their interests. According to the eighth application (p.74), distributional coalitions are exclusive and look for limiting of income diversities and values of their membership. Therefore, special interest groups became more inclusive in these three countries; this also helped not to make decisions slowly and to adopt new technologies faster.
B. Due to M. Olson, the US has slow growth in older and heavy industries that are often unionized. Older industries (as railroad, automobile) are very bureaucratic. In such case, I think that special interest groups have influence on government and economical institutes; therefore, they can slow down technological development and economical growth. According to William Lewis, the high growth of national productivity co-exists with respect for human rights. In our case, the explosion of special interest group power can constrain the democracy in the country and decrease of national growth and real-wage growth. I think that the US can build higher real-wage growth again if special interest groups loose will be not so influential.
student answer
(a) According to Olson, the United States has been one of the slowest growing of the developed democracies since World War II. Two theories that were mentioned in the book states why Japan, Germany, and Italy outperformed the United States with respect to productivity growth rates following World War II. The first theory or hypothesis is that "poorer and technologically less advanced areas can grow faster, as they catch up than richer and technologically more advanced areas." (Olson) He tested this theory by using a model to compare the statistical data of 48 states. He found the results to be of low significance, but not enough to be omitted. The second theory suggests that the older manufacturing industries in the US are often in relative decline, while newer American industries are doing much better. Olson goes on to say that the pattern of comparative advantage exhibited by the US economy resembles that of Great Britain more than that of Germany of Japan. "... the United States as well as Britain does relatively badly in older industries and heavy industries that are especially susceptible to oligopolistic collusion and unionization." (Olson)
(b) According to Olson's book, his colleague Peter Murrell came up with the hypothesis that ""special-interest groups in Britain reduced the country's rate of growth in comparison with Germany's." (Olson) He goes on to say that if these groups were the reason for Britain's slow growth, this should put the old British industries at a disadvantage in comparison to West Germany's counterparts. Olson later mentions that "The rate of economic growth is the rate of increase of national income..." (Olson) So in short, the U.S. can build higher real-wage growth again with minimal contribution from special interest groups and a smaller gap between industrialization and growth.