Asian Business Essay! (Looking for a professional business major writer ONLY)
bkbkhomework
abcrisis.pptTHE ASIAN CRISIS:
DIZZY WITH
SUCCESS?
*
The Asian Miracle
Fastest Industrial Revolution The World Had Seen
- Japan - from 1% of World GDP in 1960 to 18% : the second largest economy (more than France & Germany)
- The original tigers had moved to exporting twice as many goods as all of Latin America
- By 1995 East Asia (ex Japan) accounted for 12% of world manufacturing output (3% LA and 2% EE)
- By 1997 Koreans had reached close to UK per capita ’65
- China’s per capita quadrupled in les than 20 years
- 1990s the economic center seemed to shift to the East
ADB
Possible Reasons
- “Asian values”
- Success of Market oriented policies
- Emphasis on importing foreign technology
- Wealth distribution
Culture
Confucian Model
Educational attitudes
Strong top down philosophy
Deference to authority
Minimal welfare state-citizen’s expectation
Family values
Culture and Politics
- Authoritarian power with ruling parties
- Centralization
- Asia’s Mandarin System:
- E.G: Cohort education (Japan)
- British “civil service” culture
- Interlocking/cross-border elite guanxi
Political Background
- Extreme poverty post WW ll
- Land distribution post war
- US direct influence
- Relatively equal income distribution
- External threats and war
Resource Management
- Land Reform
- Japan, South Korea & Taiwan land reform---created middle class
- Control of Minerals and Oil
- Private Companies aligned with governments
Productivity
- Meritocracy-Mandarin System
- Social mobility
- System trusted, with institutions that tend to be paternalistic
- Literacy and education penetrating throughout society
Institutions
- Strong , high quality institutions & bureaucratic structures
- (Dirigisme)
- Mandarin philosophy –Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China & Singapore
- Some countries inherited British institutions-Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia
- BUT…
- Corruption high—cronyism and official corruption Indonesia, Philippines and China
Prevailing Government Policies
- Fixed peg to the US dollar for most Asian exchange rates
- Moderate over-valuation of local currencies beginning by 1996
- Adoption of core Western belief –
“free capital movements underpin growth”
- Use of short-term foreign capital for growth
- “hot money”
- FDI and technology transfer
East Asia – Pre-crisis, ca. 1996
- The East Asia “miracle” - World Bank
- Double digit economic growth
- Trade surpluses in North Asia
- Trade deficits in SE Asia
- Washington Consensus pressure for capital account liberalization; removal of capital controls in markets
- Huge inflows of international portfolio capital - feeding stock market and property booms
EASY MONEY
BELIEF IN THEIR OWN PR
Up close, did business people see it coming? Maybe.
The FEER surveys
Easy Money
- Each country had opened their markets and with interest rates lower in world markets—they borrowed heavily -Expansion of offshore loans
- With money borrowed, banks turned around and lent it domestically for much higher rates becoming ripe for speculators and rate fluctuations
- “Crony capitalism” - no risk management
- Moral hazard – belief that Asian banks were too big to fail or governments would intervene
The result: unregulated private equity pouring in
Signs of Trouble
Prevailing Market Behavior
- Over-reliance on international banks & US dollars to finance growth
- A bubble in property and infrastructure finance
- Lack of transparency and adequate capital & supervision in domestic banks
Economic Liberalization
Domestic Financial Systems Unable To Intermediate Flows
- Effort to promote Thailand as regional center, freeing interest & abolishing ceilings
- Speculative money poured in taking advantage of newly developed financial markets
- Money from outside moved into short term and real estate vehicles, short term financing
- Korea’s deregulation of the Chaebol system—credit allocation was based on cronyism
- Investors worldwide looking to make quick killing
Financial Market Liberalization
- Domestic financial sector deregulation led to massive private external borrowings
- Proliferation of local financial institutions without adequate capital, controls or risk management systems
- Crony capitalism – including government directed lending and overlapping ownership of banks and industrialists
- Breakdown of government directed growth and controls over external borrowing (except – China, Singapore)
What Precipitated The Crisis?
- Growing trade account deficits combined with unexpected bank failure in Thailand and government intervention shake confidence
- Massive speculative shorting of the Thai Baht and Malaysian Ringgit by Hedge funds
- International banks began to pull short term credit lines or call swaps
- Lack of market depth (capital and banks) meant borrowers could not hedge currency mis-matches or refinance domestically as banks pulled credits.
1996-Tigers Begin to Hit Wall
- South Korea export growth plunged 32% to 4%
- Malaysia from 26% to 9%
- Thailand 25% to less than 1%
Schuman, “Miracle” ��������
The Critical Timeline
- Autumn 1996- hedge funds start to target Thai baht and Ringgit
- 1st Qtr 1997 – Major Bangkok banks fail and are taken over
- Thai regulators start “cover-up” of massive swaps to defend baht/ dollar peg which market begins to realize; speculation grows
- May 1997 – shift in $ / Yen balance draws speculative capital back to Japan
- July 2,1997 - BOT caves in and announces it will float the baht . Immediate 25% decline
Contagion
- Speculators move to ringgit , rupiah and peso
- IMF sends team to Thailand – imposes austerity and interest rate increases; currency continues to slide
- August 14th – Indonesia abandons peg (from 2500 to US $1, it goes first to 5,000 and will slide to 15,000 by Dec. 1997) . IMF enters
- November - banks pull most lines to S. Korea; rollover crisis for S-T loans late December forcing US Treasury w/ IMF to devise solution
- International banks agree to “bail-in” Korea with orchestrated rollovers and shared losses; Thailand & Indonesia flounder with longer term restructuring programs under IMF control
Other Asian Reactions
- Malaysia – refuses IMF / austerity.
Against IMF recommendation imposes capital controls and fixes peg to dollar
- Taiwan –will not defend currency; wards off speculators
- HK – maintains long standing dollar peg
- China – isolated by capital controls
Japan’s Role & Impact
- Vulnerable due to huge $ and Yen lending by both banks and trading companies
- Japan offers immediate G to G assistance for liquidity support. Rebuffed by US and IMF
- Japanese Banks begin to suffer massive NPL’s in already sick economy (early 1998)
Result-Crisis forces a fundamental overhaul of Japanese banking system; bursts long standing asset bubble in property and stock market
Financial system further weakened
- High interest rates force borrowers into default
- Specter of bank bailout
- Credibility of fixed exchange rate further undermined
Domestic economy weakens
- Bankruptcies/bank collapses
- Increasing unemployment
- Rising political unrest
Crisis
- Speculative attack on currency
- Capital outflow
- Spectre of public debt default
Incentives to devalue increase
- Credibility of fixed exchange rate further undermined
International Financial Crises
Typical Government Response and Feedback Mechanisms
Depletion of foreign exchange reserves
- Credibility of fixed exchange rate further undermined
Government raises domestic interest rates
Exchange rate peg
comes under pressure
- Macroeconomic imbalances
- Competitive devaluation
*
Government Response & Feedback
- This slide attempts to illustrate how the efforts of a government to defend a fixed exchange rate can actually fuel a crisis.
- Governments basically have two options to defend the exchange rate: 1) to use foreign exchange reserves; or 2) to raise domestic interest rates (to attract foreign capital, which in turn sustains the exchange rate).
- The first generation theory of international financial crises, developed by Paul Krugman, posits that the credibility of a fixed exchange rate will be undermined if foreign exchange reserves fall below some critical level because the government will no longer have sufficient reserves to defend the peg. Speculators will mount an abrupt attack on the currency, accelerating the loss of foreign exchange reserves, thus forcing the government to abandon its exchange rate peg..
- The second generation theory of international financial crises, developed by Obstfeld, focuses on the domestic economic consequences of raising interest rates to defend a fixed exchange rate undermine the credibility of the exchange rate peg.
- Raising interest rates has two negative effects on the economy.
- First, it can threaten the banking system because banks have to pass on the higher interest rates to borrowers. Debtors may not be able to pay back their loans at these higher interest rates, leading to defaults that on a large enough scale, can threaten the banks’ solvency. This is illustrated by the pathway on the left side of the chart.
- Second, higher interest rates slow down the economy, leading to rising unemployment and potentially to political unrest. This is illustrated on the right side of the slide.
- Investors may judge at any given point that the economic “pain” caused by the high interest rates needed to defend the exchange rate is too great for the government to bear, and that the government will not be willing to raise interest rates any further to defend the peg.
- Instead, they will expect the government to abandon the peg so that it can lower interest rates. This leads them to sell off their holdings of foreign currency.
Political Change Meets Recession
- Withdrawal portfolio/bank capital over the 3-5 yrs
- Negative growth rates
- Unemployment 6% to 20% in different markets
- “Regime change” in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia
- Severe civil unrest in Indonesia (May ‘98)
IMF Reaction and Outcome
Riding to the rescue?
IMF Rx
- Floating rate currency
- Severe Government austerity
- Immediate phase out of subsidies
- Forced increases in interest rates to hold domestic capital
- “Market force restructuring” – against immediate government intervention to shore up banks
The Problem
- South East Asian currency markets reacted in the OPPOSITE way to expected outcomes of IMF in terms of currency values and stability
- Major capital flight- added to currency pressure in Indonesia
- First round of IMF money all lost and 2nd round bailouts of money needed
Why Did IMF Fail?
- IMF prescriptions were largely for sovereign debt crises in Latin America where government itself was over-extended
- Asia- private sector crises with too many lenders to control
- IMF did not understand system or depth of the structural crisis or how to fix it.
Collapse of Asian Banks
- Failure to save banks by government capital injections (except South Korea)
- Massive rise in Non Performing Loans
- Governments took bad assets or entire banks through “AMC” – Asset Management Companies
- Real recoveries on NPL very low – less than 40 cents and sometimes pennies on the dollar
Governmental Responses To Crises
- Bowing to Washington Consensus
- Bringing in outside experts (Jeffrey Sachs, etc.)
- Putting up blocs and barriers
- Government strengthening power
- Government Losing Power -deposing leader or political party in power
Market Changes
- Foreign Banks entered Asian markets (ex China) by 2000 in meaningful way –by building new businesses more than buying old banks
- Bank consolidations were forced among domestic players to meet international standards by regulators
- Capital markets massively impaired and still struggling to come back in SE Asia
- Continuing “rise” of China and India--as export competitors and as destinations for FDI
New Money Players Here To Stay
- Banks are no longer “risk players” in region
- Shifted focus to consumer banking for growth and profits
- Western private equity and hedge funds have provided “risk capital” for industry consolidation and made the big money out of the crisis
- Rising political protectionism in some markets
Still Struggling
- No more “Miracles” : Asian growth overall has not gone back to double digits in most markets despite huge surpluses
- Economies struggling to maintain 5-7% annual growth needed to control unemployment in their populations
China is now the Asian Region’s heart and engine supplanting Japan
India: an emerging player
What’s next?
Crisis response:
Mindset - Samsung
Management - Nissan: Ghosen, divestitures
Sony: need to overcome “stovepipes”
Governance: Korea - reforming chaebols
not easy
Chinese family firms: succession issues, erosion
of the old “bamboo network” (a new one?),
legal issues (insider transactions?)
Chinese SOEs: management reform, corruption,
branding, NPLs
