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Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1999. 50:191–214 Copyright © 1999 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved

EMOTION

John T. Cacioppo Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1222; e-mail: [email protected]

Wendi L. Gardner Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2710; e-mail: [email protected]

KEY WORDS: affect, evaluation, cognitive appraisal, positivity, negativity

ABSTRACT

We review recent trends and methodological issues in assessing and testing theories of emotion, and we review evidence that form follows function in the affect system. Physical limitations constrain behavioral expressions and incline behavioral predispositions toward a bipolar organization, but these limiting conditions appear to lose their power at the level of underlying mechanisms, where a bivalent approach may provide a more comprehensive account of the affect system.

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Methodological Issues in the Study of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

The Relation Between Emotion and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

The Relativity of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

THE AFFECT SYSTEM UNDERLYING EMOTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 Operating Characteristics of the Affect System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Stages and Channels of Evaluative Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

INTRODUCTION

Recent research on emotions is almost as vast and diverse as emotional life it-

self. A literature search limited to the term “emotion” using PsychInfo re-

0084-6570/99/0201-0191$08.00

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turned 5064 citations over the past five years, and a comparable search using

Medline returned 3542. A Handbook of Emotions appeared (Lewis & Havi-

land 1993) with a second edition already in preparation, journals are now de-

voted almost exclusively to the topic (e.g. Cognition and Emotion, Motivation

and Emotion), and numerous textbooks on the topic have surfaced. The swell

of interest in emotion continues to ascribe a large role to deliberation and civil

discourse. Humans have walked the surface of the earth for about 2,000,000

years, and for all but the last 2000–3000 years humans have been hunter-

gatherers. We nevertheless tend to see our distant past “through a reverse

telescope that compresses it: a short time as hunter-gatherers, a long time as

‘civilized’ people” (Ackerman 1990, p. 129). We begin by reviewing recent

developments in the study of human emotions. We then consider the general

features of an affect system, archaic in some respects, that can be conceived as

underlying emotion.

Methodological Developments in the Study of Emotion

The study of emotion has been aided in recent years by the development of

standardized stimulus materials and procedures for eliciting emotions, and this

continued to be an active area of inquiry in recent years (e.g. see Davidson &

Cacioppo 1992, Gerrards-Hesse et al 1994). New developments were seen in

stimulus sets consisting of pictures (Lang et al 1995), films (Gross & Levenson

1995, Philippot 1993, Westermann et al 1996), sounds (Bradley et al 1994),

words (Bradley et al 1997), and stories, imagery, or social interactions

(Westermann et al 1996, Gerrards-Hesse et al 1994). The measurement of emotions also remained a bustling research area. The

interplay among social, cognitive, and biological processes in emotion is be- coming increasingly tractable, and emotional phenomena are now fruitfully studied drawing upon theories and methodologies that require collaboration among social, cognitive, developmental, clinical, and neuroscientists. For in- stance, methods for stereogeometric functional brain imaging and comple- mentary methods for mapping the temporal dynamics of neural processing have become a reality over the past two decades. Positron emission tomogra- phy (PET) (e.g. Drevets & Raichle 1995, George et al 1995, Lane et al 1997, Paradiso et al 1997) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (e.g. Grodd et al 1995, Maddock & Buonocore 1997, Lang et al 1998) offer consid- erable promise in studies of affective processes (cf Fox & Woldorff 1994, Ku- tas & Federmeier 1998, Sarter et al 1996).

As Kutas & Federmeier note, the temporal resolution of the fMRI is still

limited by the fact that the blood flow response typically lags the actual electri-

cal signal by one to two seconds and does not track activity on a millisecond-

by-millisecond basis. The temporal resolution of PET is similarly limited. In

192 CACIOPPO & GARDNER

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studies in which higher temporal resolution is required, fMRI or PET studies

can be complemented by other measures. Indeed, advances in tracking phasic

aspects of emotion were seen in (a) event-related brain potential paradigms

(Cacioppo et al 1994, Crites et al 1995, Gardner & Cacioppo 1998); (b) startle

probe methods (Davis 1997, Lang 1995); (c) continuous self-report measures

(Stayman & Aaker 1993); (d) retrospective verbal protocols (Cacioppo et al

1997c, Davison et al 1997, Hurlburt 1997); (e) nonverbal pictorial assessment

techniques (Bradley & Lang 1994); (f) facial electromyography (Tassinary &

Cacioppo 1992, Witvliet & Vrana 1995); and (g) observational methods of in-

fants (Emde et al 1993) and interactants (Carroll & Russell 1997, Gottman

1993). Laboratory studies can afford impressive control over relevant variables, an

important feature when dissecting phenomena as complex and multiply deter-

mined as the emotions. The ecological and external validity of laboratory para-

digms and measures can sometimes be uncertain, however. Advances in elec-

tronics and statistics have improved the feasibility and methodological sophis-

tication of both ecological momentary assessments (e.g. Diener & Lucas 1998,

Larsen 1991, Suls et al 1998) and ambulatory monitoring of affective states

(e.g. Guyll & Contrada 1998, Kamarck et al 1998). These assessments intro-

duce their own set of statistical (cf Schwartz & Stone 1998) and methodologi-

cal problems (e.g. Litt et al 1998) but are noteworthy developments as they

should make it possible to identify which laboratory findings generalize to the

real world and to improve laboratory models of human emotions. Two addi-

tional developments that are needed are: (a) programmatic studies of emotion

that test specific conceptual hypotheses based on both the internal validity of

the laboratory and the external and ecological validity of field sampling

methods and ambulatory assessments; and (b) greater use of experimental ma-

nipulations (e.g. an intervention program) in conjunction with field sampling

methods and ambulatory assessments. There has been no shortage of debates over methods and measures, either.

Over the past couple years alone, discussions appeared on topics in a wide

range: (a) import of linguistic analyses of emotion (e.g. Wierzbicka 1995; cf

Forsyth & Eifert 1996); (b) the role and limits of self-reports in studies of emo-

tion (Lazarus 1995, Reisenzein 1995, Schwarz & Strack 1998) and moods (Ba-

gozzi 1993, Green et al 1993, Watson & Clark 1997); (c) the pancultural agree-

ment in emotion judgments (Ekman 1994, Rosenberg & Ekman 1995, Russell

1994); (d) the methodological nuances in research on cerebral asymmetries in

emotion (Davidson 1993, Hagemann et al 1998, Reid et al 1998); and (e) the

nature and existence of basic emotions (Ekman 1992, Izard 1992, Ortony &

Turner 1990, Panksepp 1992). Individual differences in emotional disposition (Davidson 1994, Depue

1996, Gray 1994, Rosenthal 1995, Tangney et al 1995), intensity (e.g. Keltner

EMOTION 193

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& Ekman 1996), and reactivity (e.g. Cacioppo et al 1992, Gilboa & Revelle

1994, Larsen et al 1996) continued to be popular areas of theory and research.

Explanations of the origins of the individual differences in emotion have

turned in part to studies of socioemotional development, work that now ex-

tends across the life span from infancy (e.g. Izard & Ackerman 1997, Nelson &

de Haan 1997, Walker-Andrews 1997) through adolescence (Flannery et al

1994) to old age (Carstensen et al 1997, Schulz & Heckhausen 1997). Related

reports of the genetic determinants of emotion (e.g. McGuire 1993, Plomin et

al 1993) and the universality of emotional expressions (e.g. Averill et al 1994,

Ekman & Keltner 1997, Izard 1994) were counterbalanced by studies of cul-

tural determinants (Mesquita et al 1997, Russell 1994). As this work attests,

emotion is a short label for a very broad category of experiential, behavioral,

sociodevelopmental, and biological phenomena.

The Relation Between Emotion and Cognition

An assumption by rationalists dating back to the ancient Greeks has been that higher forms of human existence—mentation, rationality, foresight, and deci- sion making—can be hijacked by the pirates of emotion. In accordance with the classic assumption that emotion wreaks havoc on human rationality, the emphasis for years in psychology has been on cognition and rationality, and on ways of diminishing the influence of subjectivity and emotion in decision making and behavior. Research with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) sup- ported the notion that symbolic representations (e.g. arabic numerals) evolved in part to lessen the primal grip of appetitive or aversive stimuli (e.g. candies) on decision making and behavior (Boysen et al 1996). However, emotions are much more than primitive reflexes. The notion that emotions are a disruptive force in rational thought and adaptive action was shown to be a gross oversim- plification (e.g. Berntson et al 1993). Although the obstacles of a civilized world still occasionally call forth blind rages, emotions are increasingly recog- nized for the constructive role they play in higher forms of human experience.

Consider the neurological case of Elliot reported by Damasio (1994). Elliot

was a businessman who developed a brain tumor that damaged his prefrontal

cortex. Although Elliot began behaving irrationally, testing of Elliot revealed

that his intelligence, attention, and memory remained unaffected by his illness.

Instead, Elliot had lost the ability to experience emotion; and the lack of emo-

tional guidance rendered decision making a dangerous game of roulette. The notion that emotion contributes not only to an intelligent but also to a

fulfilling life emerged most strikingly in the work on emotional intelligence.

The heightened ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discrimi-

nate among them, and to use the information to guide one’s thinking and action

has proven to be as important a determinant of life success as traditional meas-

ures of intelligence such as IQ (Goleman 1995, Mayer & Salovey 1993).

194 CACIOPPO & GARDNER

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Societal changes have also influenced the direction of research on emo-

tions. With rising health costs threatening to ravage families and finances, at-

tention has turned to the role of emotion in cancer progression (Andersen et al

1998, Spiegel 1997), cardiovascular disease (Brezinka & Kittel 1996, Carney

et al 1995), respiratory disease (Lehrer et al 1993), infectious illness (Cohen &

Rodriguez 1995, Leventhal et al 1997), and immune function (Herbert & Co-

hen 1993, Kiecolt-Glaser et al 1994, Sternberg 1997). A second societal trend,

the dawning of the information age and advances in computer vision, robotics,

and telecommunications, has placed a premium on speech and facial recogni-

tion and production software. For these programs to be realistic, they must

capture the emotion in the message. This need has fueled interest in the acous-

tic (Murray & Arnott 1993, Pittam & Scherer 1993) and rapid facial signals of

emotion (Ekman 1993, Russell & Fernandez-Dols 1997). Although these

represent relatively new areas of research, the economic stakes make these

likely areas of new developments. Research over the past two decades on cognition and emotion provides

further evidence for the ubiquity of emotion, with the influence of emotion ex-

tending to all aspects of cognition and behavior. Perhaps of particular note in

recent years are advances in our understanding of the role of emotions in atten-

tion and perception (Niedenthal & Kitayama 1994, Zajonc 1998); memory

(Bradley et al 1995, Cahill 1996, Phelps & Anderson 1997); psychological

defense (Paulhus et al 1997); subjective well-being (e.g. Diener & Suh 1998,

Myers 1993); attitudes and persuasion (Cacioppo et al 1992, Chen & Bargh

1998); reasoning and decision making (Forgas 1995, Schwarz & Clore 1996);

the meaning of expressive displays (Hess et al 1995, Rosenberg & Ekman

1994); emotional contagion (Hatfield et al 1994, Hietanen et al 1998); inter-

personal relationships (Gardner et al 1998, Reis & Patrick 1996); and political

information processing (Ottati et al 1992, Way & Masters 1996). Emotions are also physiological processes and cannot be understood fully

without considering the structural and functional aspects of the physical sub-

strates (cf LeDoux 1995). Physiological investigations not only delineate un-

derlying mechanisms but also contribute to better psychological theories by in-

spiring what is possible (e.g. implicit versus explicit knowledge representa-

tions) and by placing constraints on what is plausible (e.g. forward versus

backward propagation). The biological (e.g. Boiten et al 1994, Cacioppo et al

1997a, Davidson 1994, Levenson 1996), biochemical (e.g. Rubinow &

Schmidt 1996), and neural substrates of emotion (e.g. Damasio 1996, Davis

1997, LeDoux 1995, Neafsey et al 1993), as well as neuropsychological as-

pects of emotional expressions (Borod et al 1997), continued to be important

and active areas of research. For instance, Shizgal (1998), in summarizing re-

search using electrical brain stimulation to probe emotion, stated that in con-

trast to cognitive (i.e. perceptual and timing) channels, “the evaluative [affec-

EMOTION 195

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tive] channel operates without even a pretense of objectivity.” He noted that a

cool stimulus applied to the skin can be pleasant if one is overheated and un-

pleasant if one is hypothermic. The affective value of a stimulus, he concluded,

depends in part on the prevailing physiological and ecological conditions.

Shizgal’s (1998) physiological research implies that the brain is organized in

part as an affect system, and that the operation of the affect system is not con-

trolled in an absolute fashion by the objective features of a stimulus.

The Relativity of Emotion

The notion that there are absolute features that trigger emotional reactions was further undercut by new evidence that relativity governs the province of emotion. Kahneman and colleagues demonstrated that pain, long a bastion of absolutism, was preferred when its duration was extended while its intensity paled (Kahneman et al 1993). Kahneman and colleagues (e.g. Kahneman 1998) offered the intriguing hypothesis that the affective representation of a complex event varied as a function of the peak experience and the experience at the end of the event (i.e. the peak-end rule).

Schwarz & Strack (1998) noted that most objective life circumstances, even

when combined across a dozen domains of life, account for no more than 10%

of the variance in measures of subjective well-being. Indeed, they demon-

strated that the same event can increase or decrease judgments of subjective

well-being depending on its use in construing one’s life or its use as a standard.

Specifically, Schwarz & Strack (1998) suggested that a contrast effect is likely

to occur when an extreme (negative or positive) event is used as a standard

against which to compare a stimulus or one’s current state, whereas an assimi-

lation effect is more likely when the extreme event is included in the transient

representation of the affective event. For example, a moderately negative tar-

get stimulus (e.g. an argument with a spouse) is perceived more positively

when preceded by the experience of a rare, extremely negative event (e.g. a

death in the family) than when not preceded by such an event (Parducci 1995)

as long as the preceding event served as a comparison standard rather than as

part of the target event. Yet other ways were discovered in which the determinants of emotion are

relative. Brendl & Higgins (1995) reviewed evidence that an incentive is

greater when it is compatible with a person’s goal (see also Shah et al 1998).

Counterfactual thinking, or comparing objective outcomes with imagined

outcomes that “might have been,” was shown to leave bronze medalists at the

1992 Summer Olympics apparently happier than silver medalists (Medvec et

al 1995; see also Roese 1997) even though, by objective standards, an Olympic

silver medal is of higher value than a bronze medal. Similarly, stories or con-

fabulations that place an evocative event in a historical context were shown to

be as important a determinant of the emotions elicited by the event as the event

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itself (Harvey et al 1995, Kitayama & Masuda 1995, Traue & Pennebaker

1993). In addition to the perceived valuation of a stimulus or endstate, investi-

gators demonstrated that the rates of movement toward or away from the end-

state are important determinants of emotion in and of themselves (Carver &

Scheier 1990, Carver et al 1996, Hsee et al 1994). Research concerning cognitive appraisals represented an especially active

area of relativity research, complementing the research that emphasized the

features of the emotional eliciting stimulus by focusing upon the relativity of

the internal elicitors of the emotional experience. Indeed, more than 100 arti-

cles, various books (e.g. Lazarus 1991, Omdahl 1995), and special issues of

academic journals (e.g. Cognition and Emotion, Psychological Inquiry) were

devoted to the topic in recent years. The premise in cognitive appraisal theories

is that the appraisal of the significance of a stimulus involves “relational mean-

ing”—the import of an event in conjunction with the conditions present in the

environment and personal goals, beliefs, and adaptational resources (Lazarus

1994). Accordingly, universal antecedents are defined in terms of appraisal

dimensions rather than stimulus features (e.g. Ellsworth 1994, Frijda 1994).

Roseman et al (1996) argued that appraisals of unexpectedness, situational

state, motivational state, probability, control potential, problem source, and

agency differentiate 17 emotions, whereas in a cross-cultural study Scherer

(1997) found that fewer appraisal dimensions of the eliciting event provided a

reasonably good account of the major emotion categories (e.g. joy, sadness,

fear, anger, disgust, shame, and guilt) (see also Fitness & Fletcher 1993, Frijda

1993, Parkinson & Manstead 1993, Reisenzein & Hofmann 1993, Smith et al

1993). Importantly, suggestive evidence that the unfolding of cognitive ap-

praisals were themselves influenced by subcortical neural structures long asso-

ciated with emotion emerged from neuropsychological cases such as Scott et

al’s (1997) report of a patient with lesions of the left and right amygdala (see

also Bechara et al 1995, Damasio 1994, Scherer 1993). Cognitive appraisals may be more important for some types of emotional

elicitors than others. In an illustrative line of research summarized by Ohman

et al (1998), two types of emotional conditioning were identified. In one type

of conditioning, the knowledge that the conditioned stimulus (CS) and uncon-

ditioned stimulus (US) are associated in time is explicit (i.e. expectancy-based

learning)—that is, autonomic responses occur on the same trials on which sub-

jects develop the expectancy that the CS is followed by the US. This learning

does not require an aversive US (Hamm & Vaitl 1996), is accessible to con-

sciousness, and modifies responses related to orienting responses (LeDoux

1995, Ohman et al 1998). In a second type of visceral conditioning, the knowl-

edge that the CS and US are associated in time is implicit (Ohman et al 1998).

This learning appears most reliably when an aversive US is combined with a

fear-relevant CS (e.g. snake, angry facial display), results in an enhanced star-

EMOTION 197

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tle response and tachycardia, is relatively resistant to extinction, and, although not dependent on conscious awareness of the CS-US contingency, it modifies the perceived valence of the CS as revealed by ratings (Davey 1992, Schell et al 1991, see Ohman 1993). The hippocampus appears to be especially impor- tant in the explicit learning of emotional expectancies, whereas the amygdala appears especially important in the implicit emotional conditioning. For in- stance, Bechara et al (1995) found that two patients with bilateral lesions of the amygdala learned the conditioning contingencies but did not acquire condi- tioned skin conductance responses in aversive conditioning paradigms. Pa- tients with bilateral hippocampal damage, in contrast, failed to learn the condi- tioning contingencies but acquired conditioned skin conductance responses. Together, these studies suggest that cognitive appraisals may play a more im- portant causal role in human autonomic conditioning based on explicit than implicit knowledge (LeDoux 1995, Ohman et al 1998).

Classical conditioning has traditionally provided a valuable paradigm for studying behavioral preference in nonvertebrates and nonprimates, and more contemporaneously it has been used to examine the mechanisms underlying the learning and memory of affective associations. The evolutionary advan- tage is obvious; recognizing the neutral trappings of a predator as a danger signal allows organisms to avoid becoming a meal. Additional evidence for the special status accorded to motivationally significant stimuli can be found in research on orienting responses. Orienting responses to threat-related stimuli are found whether the stimuli are masked or not, whereas orienting responses to neutral stimuli are found for unmasked but not masked stimuli (Dimberg & Ohman 1996, Ohman 1993). According to Ohman’s theory of the orienting re- sponse, evolution has sculpted perceptual and attentional systems to provide preferential access to those classes of stimuli with adaptive significance for or- ganisms (Ohman et al 1998). Based on comparative data, Hunt & Campbell (1997) have further suggested that orienting responses to neutral stimuli may have evolved from earlier, more motivationally basic responses, answering the questions “Is it dangerous?” or “Is it food?” rather than the “What is it?” re- sponse posited by Pavlov.

THE AFFECT SYSTEM UNDERLYING EMOTION

Evolutionary forces do not value knowledge or truth per se but species sur-

vival. Hunt & Campbell’s provocative proposition underscores the primeval

importance of a system that differentiates between hostile and hospitable

stimuli (1997). The human brain and body have been shaped by natural selec-

tion to perform this affective categorization and to respond accordingly. Af-

fective categorizations and responses are so critical that organisms have rudi-

mentary reflexes for categorizing and approaching or withdrawing from cer-

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tain classes of stimuli and for providing metabolic support for these actions

(Davis 1997, LeDoux 1995). These rudimentary processes are evident in hu-

mans as well, but a remarkable feature of humans is the extent to which the af-

fective categorizations are shaped by learning and cognition (Berntson et al

1993, Kahneman et al 1998). As various authors have noted, an additional

adaptive advantage is conferred to species whose individual members have the

capacity to learn based on the unique environmental contingencies to which

they are exposed, to represent and predict events in their environment, to ma-

nipulate and plan based on representations, and to exert some control over their

attentional and cognitive resources. Zajonc’s influential paper “Preferences Need No Inferences” underscored

the utility of the affect system as an object of study (1980). Evidence that the neural circuitry involved in computing the affective significance of a stimulus (i.e. evaluative processing) diverges at least in part from the circuitry involved in identification and discrimination (i.e. nonevaluative processing) was pro- vided by Shizgal (1998) in a series of studies involving brain stimulation in rats and by Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo et al 1996, Crites & Cacioppo 1996) in a series of studies of ERP topographies in humans. For instance, in- vestigations of the spatial distribution of late positive potentials across the scalp have revealed a relatively symmetrical distribution during nonaffective categorizations, whereas the spatial distribution of the late positive potentials associated with affective categorizations were more right lateralized (Ca- cioppo et al 1996). This asymmetrical activation is consistent with the impor- tance of the right hemisphere in emotion (see Tucker & Frederick 1989). Fur- thermore, the similarities in ERP topographies indicate that affective and non- affective appraisals are not entirely different but rather rely on a number of common information-processing operations.

In the last chapter on emotion in the Annual Review of Psychology, LeDoux covered in detail some of the neural substrates of the affect system (1995). Here, therefore, we focus on the structure and operating characteristics of the affect system.

Operating Characteristics of the Affect System

Stimuli and events in the world are diverse, complex, multidimensional—in

short, seemingly incomparable. Yet each perceptual system has evolved to be

tuned to specific features, resulting in the expression of these stimuli on a com-

mon metric (Tooby & Cosmides 1990). Seemingly incomparable stimuli and

events can also be conceived as being expressed on common motivational met-

rics (Cacioppo & Berntson 1994, Lang 1995, Shizgal 1998). As Ohman et al

note, “Evolution has primed organisms to be responsive to stimuli that more or

less directly are related to the overall task of promoting one’s genes to prosper

in subsequent generations. . .. Stimuli of these types are embedded within emo-

EMOTION 199

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tional systems that help regulate behavior within critical functional domain”

(Ohman et al 1998). Information is lost in translating a multidimensional representation of a

stimulus onto a common motivational metric (i.e. a currency function). How- ever, as Shizgal states, “the information lost due to the collapsing of multiple dimensions is essential for identifying the stimulus and distinguishing it from others. . ..The circuitry that computes instantaneous utility must diverge from the perceptual circuitry subserving identification and discrimination” (Shizgal 1998). As noted above, there is now considerable evidence for differences in the circuitry in affective processing versus the processes of identification and discrimination.

From classical learning theory came the principle that motivational strength increases as the distance from a desired or undesired endstate decreases. Cur- rency functions, in essence, represent the activation function for motivational strength. Perceptual activation functions tend to be negatively accelerating, and this appears to describe the activation function for emotion as well (Boy- sen et al 1996, Kemp et al 1995). For example, Boysen et al (1996) demon- strated that, for chimpanzees judging the differential incentive values of candy arrays, the relative effectiveness of a given increment in payoff diminished as the base size of the payoff increased. The activation function for affective re- sponses is thus reminiscent of microeconomic marginal utility functions.

Stages and Channels of Evaluative Processing

One distinction Shizgal (1998) made between the evaluative (affective) and

perceptual channels is that the former is constructed not to return objective

properties of the stimulus but to provide a subjective estimate of the current

significance of these properties. How many evaluative channels are there?

Most have posited one in which subjective, valent information is derived from

the flow of sensation (e.g. Green et al 1993). Studies of the conceptual organi-

zation of emotion, for instance, suggest that people’s knowledge about emo-

tions is hierarchically organized and that a superordinate division is between

positivity and negativity (e.g. Lang et al 1990). One reason underlying this superordinate division in emotional knowledge

may be that physical constraints restrict behavioral manifestations to bivalent actions (approach/withdrawal). Evolution favors the organism that can learn, represent, and access rapidly whether approach or withdrawal is adaptive when confronted by a stimulus. Accordingly, mental guides for one’s actions in future encounters with the target stimuli—attitudes (e.g. Cacioppo & Bernt- son 1994), preferences (e.g. Kahneman 1998), and conceptual organizations of emotion (e.g. Ortony et al 1988)—also tend to be more expected and stable when organized in terms of a bipolar evaluative dimension (ranging from very good and not at all bad to very bad and not at all good).

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Physical limitations may constrain behavioral expressions and incline be-

havioral guides toward bipolar (good/bad; approach/withdraw) dispositions,

but these constraints do not have the same force at the level of underlying

mechanism. That is, the fact that approach and withdrawal tend to be recipro-

cally activated behavioral manifestations does not mean that they were derived

from a single bipolar evaluative channel; it only means that the outputs of all of

the evaluative processors comprising the affect system are combined in order

to compute preference and organize action. Various theorists have posited

that the module in the affect system that computes attitudes, preferences, and

actions derives input from at least two specialized evaluative channels that

process information in parallel—one in which threat-related (i.e. negative) in-

formation is derived from the flow of sensation and a second in which safety

and appetitive (i.e. positive) information is derived (e.g. Cacioppo et al 1998a,

Gilbert 1993, Lang et al 1990, Marcus & Mackuen 1993, Watson & Clark

1992, Zautra et al 1997). According to the model of evaluative space (Cacioppo & Berntson 1994,

Cacioppo et al 1997b), the common metric governing approach/withdrawal is

a single dimension at response stages but is the consequence of two interven-

ing metrics (i.e. evaluative channels)—the activation function for positivity

and the activation function for negativity—at the inaugural affective process-

ing stages. Further, multiple modes of activation are posited to exist for the two

evaluative channels: (a) reciprocal activation occurs when a stimulus has op-

posing effects on the activation of positivity and negativity; (b) uncoupled ac-

tivation occurs when a stimulus affects only positive or only negative evalua-

tive activation; and (c) nonreciprocal activation occurs when a stimulus in-

creases (or decreases) the activation of both positivity and negativity. This

model thus does not reject the reciprocal activation that is assumed in subjec-

tive reports of affect, and demanded in behavioral manifestations of affect, but

rather subsumes it as one of the possible modes of activation and explores the

antecedents for each mode of evaluative activation. Evidence for the existence of multiple modes of evaluative activation has

been observed across all levels of analysis (cf Cacioppo & Berntson 1994). For

instance, Hoebel (1998) reviewed evidence that whereas morphine has recipro-

cal effects on neurochemical processes underlying approach and withdrawal be-

havior, food restriction alters neurochemical effects underlying approach behav-

ior in an uncoupled fashion. At the verbal level, Goldstein & Strube (1994)

demonstrated the uncoupled activation of positivity and negativity in affective

reports collected from students at the beginning and end of three consecutive

class periods. The intensity of positive and negative reactions on any particular

day were found to be uncorrelated. Moreover, exam feedback activated positiv-

ity and negativity differently. Students who performed well on an exam showed

an increase in positive affect relative to their beginning-of-class level, whereas

EMOTION 201

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their level of negative affect remained unchanged; and students who performed

poorly showed an increase in negative affect but no change in positive affect. Such distinctions between positive and negative affective processes have

also been observed in (a) uplifts and hassles (Gannon et al 1992, Zautra et al

1990); (b) mood states (Lawton et al 1992, Zautra et al 1997); (c) organization

of self-knowledge (e.g. Showers 1995, Showers & Kling 1996); (d) self-

regulatory focus (e.g. Higgins 1997); (e) self-efficacy (Zautra et al 1997); (f)

personality processes (Robinson-Whelen et al 1997, Rusting & Larsen 1998,

Watson et al 1992); (g) achievement motivations (Elliot & Church 1997, Elliot

& Harackiewicz 1996); (h) attitudes and persuasion (Cacioppo & Berntson

1994); (i) emotional expressivity (Gross & John 1997); (j) social interactions

(Berry & Hansen 1996, Cacioppo et al 1997b); (k) affect toward political lead-

ers (Marcus & Mackuen 1993); and (l) intergroup discrimination (Blanz et al

1997, Brewer 1996). However, Green et al (1993) questioned the notion that positive and nega-

tive affect were separable on methodological grounds (see also Bagozzi 1993,

Marsh 1996). Specifically, they argued that measures of affect typically rely

on similarly worded scales with identical endpoints. This feature, they argued,

can lead to positively correlated measurement error effectively suppressing the

magnitude of the true negative correlation between positive and negative af-

fective states. Thompson et al (1995), in contrast, suggested that methodologi-

cal artifacts (e.g. carryover between unipolar positive and negative rating

scales) could instead inflate the negative correlation between positive and

negative rating scales, and they recommended segregating self-report meas-

ures of positive and negative affect to avoid self-presentational biases. A recent investigation by Nelson (1998) addressed these methodological

concerns and found evidence for the operation of multiple modes of evaluative

activation. Nelson (1998) used a structural modeling approach to examine the

structure of affect toward two different social categories—African Americans

and the poor—while accounting for correlated measurement error among the

observed variables. Nelson’s analyses of the structure of the emotional re-

sponses toward the poor revealed substantial independence between positive

and negative factors. This two-factor model was significantly better than the

bipolar model even when the effects of correlated measurement error were

extracted. This result is precisely what would be expected if positive and nega-

tive affect were separate dimensions at a basic level. Nelson’s analyses of the

structure of students’ emotional responses toward African Americans, how-

ever, revealed a bipolar model to be sufficient when the effects of correlated

measurement error were considered. This latter result illustrates that affect is

not invariably organized in a bipolar or a bivariate structure but rather the

structure of affective response is influenced by the mode of evaluative activa-

tion elicited by the stimulus (Cacioppo & Berntson 1994).

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Methodological issues are important to consider, but assuming that the af-

fect system consists only of a single bipolar evaluative channel can also be

costly in terms of the fertile avenues of research it precludes. Brain imaging

studies, for instance, have tended to contrast positive and negative states, a

procedure that impedes the differentiation of the conditions in which positive

and negative processes are separable. This may be unwise because, although

preliminary at this juncture, some brain imaging studies suggest that different

neural structures may be involved in positive and negative hedonic processes.

George et al, for instance, used PET during the recall of happy, sad, or neutral

memories while viewing congruent happy, sad, or neutral faces (George et al

1995). Comparisons between the sadness-minus-neutral and the happy-minus-

neutral conditions revealed that, rather than reciprocal changes in blood flow

to the same brain regions, a change from sad to happy affective state produced

increased cerebral blood flow to distinguishable brain regions (see also Lane et

al 1997). Research on cortical asymmetry is also consistent with the notion of spe-

cialized evaluative channels for the processing of positive and negative infor-

mation that are subsequently integrated in the production of an affective re-

sponse (e.g. Davidson 1993, Davidson et al 1990). In a study by Sutton &

Davidson, for instance, resting EEG asymmetries were compared with scores

on Carver & White’s Behavioral Approach System/Behavioral Inhibition Sys-

tem measure, a self-report instrument designed to assess individual differences

in the tendency to approach or withdraw and to experience concomitant affec-

tive states (Sutton & Davidson 1997, Carver & White 1994). Consistent with

the notion that positivity and negativity are separable systems differentially as-

sociated with left and right hemispheric activation, respectively, greater rela-

tive left asymmetry at midfrontal electrode sites was positively correlated with

behavioral activation system scores and negatively correlated with behavioral

inhibition system scores. Similarly, studies using computerized tomography

to investigate the relationship between the location of stroke-related lesions

and affective symptoms showed that the severity of post-stroke depression was

positively related to lesion proximity to the left frontal pole but negatively re-

lated to lesion proximity to the right frontal pole (Robinson & Downhill 1995).

Robinson and colleagues further observed that patients with right lateralized

infarctions were more likely than their left-hemisphere–lesioned counterparts

to display inappropriate cheerfulness. The evidence for the separability of positive and negative evaluative pro-

cesses becomes more controversial when one turns to the literature on the

conceptual organization of moods, affect, and emotion. Among the best

known research bearing on the centrality of people’s net positive and negative

feelings is Osgood et al’s classic work on the measurement of meaning (1957).

In multiple studies and cultures, evaluative bipolar word pairs (e.g. pleasant-

EMOTION 203

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unpleasant) were found to comprise a fundamental dimension underlying peo-

ple’s understanding of the world. Conceptually similar results have been found

in crosscultural, multidimensional scaling studies of emotional feelings (e.g.

Bradley & Lang 1994, Larsen & Diener 1992) and in crosscultural ratings of

emotionally evocative pictures (e.g. Lang et al 1995). Thus, the two-

dimensional representation that best represents people’s conceptual organiza-

tion of affect and emotion may tend to be positive/negative X active/inactive

rather than positive/nonpositive X negative/non-negative. Given that psycho-

logical states such as conflict, ambivalence, and inconsistency among beliefs

about an attitude object tend to be unexpected, nonharmonious, and unstable,

people’s conceptual organization of evaluative processes and affective states

(e.g. moods) may tend toward a bipolar structure because of the operation of

motives to maintain a simple and psychologically consistent representation of

the world. In sum, the common metric governing approach/withdrawal can perhaps be

best conceptualized as a single dimension at response stages with the bivalent

affective response the consequence of two intervening evaluative channels,

one for positivity (appetition) and one for negativity (aversion). Consistent

with the notion that input from these evaluative channels is combined with an-

tagonistic effects on action dispositions and behavior, a bivalent organization

of affect is more likely to be observed as one moves down the neuraxis (see

Berntson et al 1993, Cacioppo et al 1998). For instance, relative to neutral

states, negative states tend to potentiate startle eyeblink whereas positive states

tend to inhibit it (see reviews by Filion et al 1998, Lang et al 1990) because of

the modulating effects of the amygdala (Davis 1997, Lang 1995). The value of considering the additional complexities introduced by multi-

ple evaluative channels and modes of evaluative activation derives not only

from the data it explains but also from the questions it generates and the

bridges it builds across data previously thought to be separate. Research in ar-

eas of inquiry as distinct as coping in chronic pain patients (Zautra et al 1995),

classroom performance and academic motivation (Elliot & Church 1997), fre-

quency and quality of social interactions (Berry & Hansen 1996), blood and

organ donation (Cacioppo & Gardner 1993), and racial prejudice (Schofield

1991) all support the wisdom of considering the two motivational systems as

functionally separable. The partial segregation of the positive and negative evaluative channels in

the affect system not only confers an additional flexibility of orchestrating ap-

petitive and aversive motivational forces via modes of evaluative activation,

but also affords evolution the opportunity to sculpt distinctive activation (i.e.

currency) functions for positivity and negativity. Interest in differences in the

effects of positive versus negative information has grown substantially in re-

cent years. Not only have numerous articles and several major reviews on the

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topic appeared (e.g. Cacioppo & Berntson 1994, Levy 1992, Peeters &

Czapinski 1990, Skowronski & Carlston 1989, Taylor 1991) but two issues of

the European Journal of Social Psychology are devoted to the topic. The ex-

tant data suggest at least two differences in these currency functions: (a) a

positivity offset—the output of positivity is higher than the output of nega-

tivity at very low levels of affective input; and (b) a negativity bias—the in-

crease in output per quantum of input is greater for negativity than positivity

(see Cacioppo et al 1998).

POSITIVITY OFFSET The positivity offset is the tendency for there to be a weak positive (approach) motivational output at zero input, an intercept differ- ence in the affective system. As a consequence of the positivity offset, the mo- tivation to approach is stronger than the motivation to avoid at low levels of evaluative activation (e.g. at distances far from a goal). What might be the pos- sible evolutionary significance of the positivity offset? Without a positivity offset, an organism in a neutral environment may be unmotivated to approach novel objects, stimuli, or contexts. Such organisms would learn little about novel or neutral-appearing environments and their potential value or threat. With a positivity offset, however, an organism facing neutral or unfamiliar stimuli would be weakly motivated to engage in exploratory behavior. Such a tendency may have important survival value, at least at the level of a species.

How might this evolutionarily endowed tendency manifest itself in the

present day? One line of evidence may be the prevalence of “unrealistic opti-

mism,” the tendency to expect generally positive outcomes for unknown fu-

ture events (Brinthaupt et al 1991, Hoorens & Buunk 1993, Pulford & Colman

1996, Regan et al 1995). A second line of evidence may be the robust “positiv-

ity bias” found in impressions of neutral, unknown, or ambiguous human and

nonhuman targets (Klar & Giladi 1997, Sears 1983, Peeters 1991). Finally,

research concerning the “mere exposure” effect demonstrates that affectively

neutral stimuli may be evaluated positively even when presented outside of

conscious awareness (Bornstein 1989, Harmon-Jones & Allan 1998). These

lines of research support the existence of a positivity offset in a myriad of do-

mains; when asked to evaluate stimuli or situations that by objective standards

should be affectively neutral (e.g. the unknowable future, the “average” per-

son, an unfamiliar Chinese idiogram), people show a consistent tendency to re-

spond in a mildly positive fashion.

NEGATIVITY BIAS Exploratory behavior can provide useful information about an organism’s environment, but exploration can also place an organism in proximity to hostile stimuli. Because it is more difficult to reverse the conse- quences of an injurious or fatal assault than those of an opportunity unpursued, the process of natural selection may also have resulted in the propensity to re-

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act more strongly to negative than to positive stimuli. Termed the negativity bias, this heightened sensitivity to negative information is a robust psychologi- cal phenomenon (see reviews by Cacioppo & Berntson 1994, Cacioppo et al 1997b, Peeters & Czapinski 1990, Taylor 1991).

Miller’s research on rodent behavior provided some of the earliest evidence for a negativity bias through determining that the slope for the avoidance gra- dient was steeper than the slope for the approach gradient (Miller 1961). Forty years later, evidence supporting a negativity bias has been found in domains as varied as impression formation (e.g. Skowronski & Carlston 1989), person memory (e.g. Ybarra & Stephan 1996), blood and organ donation (e.g. Ca- cioppo & Gardner 1993), hiring decisions (e.g. Rowe 1989), personnel evalua- tions (e.g. Ganzach 1995), and voting behavior (e.g. Klein 1991, 1996). It has been found to characterize the judgments of children as well as adults (e.g. Aloise 1993, Robinson-Whelen et al 1997). Taylor summarized a wide range of evidence showing that negative events in a context evoke stronger and more rapid physiological, cognitive, emotional, and social responses than neutral or positive events (Taylor 1991; see also Westermann et al 1996). As further evidence, Ito et al (1998) have recently uncovered ERP evidence consistent with a negativity bias in the affect system.

In sum, negative emotion has been depicted previously as playing a funda- mental role in calibrating psychological systems; it serves as a call for mental or behavioral adjustment. Positive emotion, in contrast, serves as a cue to stay the course or as a cue to explore the environment. This characterization may help account for evolutionary forces sculpting distinctive activation functions for positive and negative affect; the separable activation functions serve as complementary, adaptive motivational organization. Species with a positivity offset and a negativity bias enjoy the benefits of exploratory behavior and the self-preservative benefits of a predisposition to avoid or withdraw from threat- ening events. The features reviewed in this section represent only the rudimen- tary operations of an affect system, however. Work on the relativity of emotion shows that cognitive factors and physiological states affect the extent to which appetitive or defensive motivations are aroused, and recent work suggests that self-regulatory focus also influences approach and withdrawal gradients (Carver & Scheier 1990, Higgins 1997, Shah et al 1998). The organization of the affect system warrants further study as a reflection of our evolutionary heritage and as a continued force in the shaping of even our most civilized re- sponses.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at

http://www.AnnualReviews.org.

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EMOTION 207

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Annual Review of Psychology Volume 50, 1999

CONTENTS On Knowing a Word, George A. Miller 1 Cognitive Development: Children's Knowledge About the Mind, John H. Flavell 21

Conflict in Marriage: Implications for Working with Couples, Frank D. Fincham, Steven R. H. Beach 47

Psychopathology: Description and Classification, P. E. Nathan, J. W. Langenbucher 79

Deductive Reasoning, P. N. Johnson-Laird 109 Health Psychology: Mapping Biobehaviorial Contributions to Health and Illness, Andrew Baum, Donna M. Posluszny 137

Interventions for Couples, A. Christensen, C. L. Heavey 165 Emotion, John T. Cacioppo, Wendi L. Gardner 191 Quantifying the Information Value of Clinical Assessments with Signal Detection Theory, John T. Cacioppo, Wendi L. Gardner 215

High-Level Scene Perception, John M. Henderson, Andrew Hollingworth 243

Interpersonal Processes: The Interplay of Cognitive, Motivational, and Behavioral Activities in Social Interaction, Mark Snyder, Arthur A. Stukas Jr.

273

Somesthesis, James C. Craig, Gary B. Rollman 305 Peer Relationships and Social Competence During Early and Middle Childhood, Gary W. Ladd 333

Organizational Change and Development, Karl E. Weick, Robert E. Quinn 361

Social, Community, and Preventive Interventions, N. D. Reppucci, J. L. Woolard, C. S. Fried 387

The Suggestibility of Children's Memory, Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci 419

Individual Psychotherapy Outcome and Process Research: Challenges to Greater Turmoil or a Positive Transition?, S. Mark Kopta, Robert J. Lueger, Stephen M. Saunders, Kenneth I. Howard

441

Lifespan Psychology: Theory and Application to Intellectual Functioning, Paul B. Baltes, Ursula M. Staudinger, Ulman Lindenberger 471

Influences on Infant Speech Processing: Toward a New Synthesis, Janet F. Werker, Richard C. Tees 509

Survey Research, Jon A. Krosnick 537 Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions, Roderick M. Kramer 569

Single-Gene Influences of Brain and Behavior, D. Wahlsten 599 The Psychological Underpinnings of Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, J. L. Sullivan, J. E. Transue

625

Neuroethology of Spatial Learning: The Birds and the Bees, E. A. Capaldi, G. E. Robinson, S. E. Fahrbach 651

Current Issues and Emerging Theories in Animal Cognition, S. T. Boysen, G. T. Himes 683

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