law (legal environment of business)

group1

chapter 15

8-On February 1, 2004, Zhang entered into a contract to buy former realtor Frank Sorichetti’s Las Vegas home for $ 532,500. The contract listed a March closing date and a few household furnishings as part of the sale. On February 3, Sorichetti told Zhang that he was terminating the sale “ to stay in the house a little longer” and that Nevada law allows the rescission of real property purchase agreements within three days of contracting. Sorichetti stated that he would sell the home, however, if Zhang paid more money. Zhang agreed. Another contract was drafted, reciting a new sales price, $ 578,000. This contract added to the included household furnish-ings drapes that were not listed in the February 1 agreement, and it set an April, rather than March, closing date. The primary issue before the court was whether a real property purchase agreement is enforceable when it is executed by the buyer only because the seller would not perform under an ear-lier purchase agreement for a lesser price. Should the court enforce the second contract? Why or why not? [ Zhang v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, 103 P. 3d 20 ( Sup. Ct. Nev. 2004).]

9-This appeal arises out of the trial court’s division of property in a divorce case. Vincent Simmons appeals from the trial court’s order awarding to his wife, Dorothy Simmons, a one- half interest in land that he had inherited from his parents. Vincent contends that the land is nonmarital prop-erty and, consequently, should have remained his separate property. Vincent and Dorothy Simmons were married in 1976. Vincent’s mother executed a trust in order to convey the land in Florida to her children, Vincent and his sister, upon her death. Louise Simmons died on April 1, 1999, but the land remained in trust for several years after her death. After Louise died, Dorothy became concerned that she would not receive an interest in the Florida land if Vincent died before the trust was distrib-uted, so she hired an attorney in Monticello, David Chambers, to prepare a document to protect her interest. In the document, Vincent states, in part, “ It is my intention, through this affidavit, to convey to my said wife marital interest in said real property. If I should die prior to the above- stated Trust being dissolved, then my said wife shall receive my share of said real property as her own property.” In 2003, Dorothy filed for divorce. Vincent argued that there was a total absence of consideration to support a contract in this case. Dorothy argued that her ongo-ing marriage to Vincent constituted adequate con-sideration to support the contract. Who is correct? Why? [ Vincent Simmons v. Dorothy Simmons, 98 Ark. App. 12 ( Ark. Ct. App. 2007).]

chapter 16

7-Roger Bannister was the director of technical and product development for Bemis. Bannister entered into a covenant not to compete with Bemis, which prohibited Bannister from working for a Bemis competitor for 18 months after the termination of his employment. The covenant not to compete included a provision which stated that Bemis was to pay Bannister his monthly salary if he was unable to find work due solely to the covenant not to compete, pro-viding that he provide the relevant paperwork. Bemis terminated Bannister’s employment. Bannister’s counsel sent a letter to Bemis requesting payment of his monthly salary under the covenant not to compete because he was unemployed due solely to the covenant not to compete. In this let-ter, Bannister included a letter he had received from Mondi, which informed him that Mondi would hire him if not for the covenant not to compete. Bannister sent a job contacts log to Bemis that detailed his job search and again requested that Bemis start paying his monthly salary under the covenant not to compete. Bemis responded by allowing Bannister out of the covenant not to com-pete, with the exception that he could not work for Mondi because of a separate agreement Bemis had with Mondi. Bannister responded by letter, stating that the Bemis correspondence was the first notice of his release to pursue employment with any com-petitor other than Mondi and that he considered the release a partial release because of the Mondi exception. Bemis then confirmed in a letter that Bannister could accept “ employment with any com-pany other than [ Mondi]” and reiterated its position that there were no damages due under the covenant not to compete “ based on the fact that Mr. Bannis-ter has been released to seek employment with any company other than [ Mondi].” Bannister accepted a position with Bancroft Bag, Inc., a Bemis competitor. He brought a claim against Bemis for its failure to pay his monthly salary for the nine- month period during which he was out of work under the covenant not to com-pete. The district court found in Bannister’s favor. Bemis appealed. How did the appellate court rule, and why? [ Bannister v. Bemis Co., Inc., 556 F. 3d 882 ( 2009).]