1 paragraph for each answer and 7 questions, very easy. due in 4 hours

RECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS:

THE CASE OF THOMPSON PRODUCTS, 1934-1964

SANFORD M. JACOBY*

This study of company unionism at Thompson Products (today TRW)

calls into question the usual characterization of company unions as

uniformly ineffectual and short-lived. The company unions examined in

this study were fostered and overseen by Thompson's managers with the

undoubted purpose of keeping national unions out of the company's

work force. But the author also finds that they evolved into

organizations that successfully met their members' needs, partly because

of external pressures, such as government scrutiny and competition

from national unions, and partly because of some internal factors, such

as the workers' unusual degree of loyalty to the firm. The author

suggests that some variant of the company union might be a viable

complement to the progressive nonunion model that is common today.

COMPANY unions were a controversial

personnel and union-avoidance strat-

egy of American employers during the

1920s and 1930s. Yet, the strategy came to

be viewed as a failure because most

company unions either were taken over by

national unions or legally disestablished.

Still, one should be careful not to consign

company unions to the dustbin of 1930s

labor history, since a surprising number of

them not only pulled through that stormy

decade but continued to function during

the calmer years after World War II and

in some cases still do so today. So-called

independent local unions (ILUs) survived

the 1930s at a variety of companies, large

and small. In 1983 they had 479,000

members, about 3 percent of total U.S.

union membership.'

Very little is known about the workings

*The author is Associate Professor, Anderson

Graduate School of Management, University of

California-Los Angeles. He thanks Thomas Kochan,

Maury Pearl, and the staff of the Western Reserve

Historical Society for assistance of various kinds.

' Troy and Sheflin (1985), pp. 3-7.

of these ILUs or how they managed to

surmount legal obstacles and competition

from national unions during the heyday

of unionism in the United States, the years

from 1933 to 1970. This essay examines

the history of ILUs at Thompson Products

Company, which, before its 1958 merger

with Ramo-Wooldridge (creating TRW),

encouraged the formation of ILUs at its

U.S. manufacturing plants. Unlike AT&T

or DuPont, Thompson was a relatively

small company that had neither experi-

ence with company unions nor sophisti-

cated personnel practices before creating

its first company union in 1934. Hence the

longevity of its ILUs-some exist to this

day-is impressive, particularly in light of

the recent claim that the company unions

hastily created in the wake of the 1933

Recovery Act were ineffectual organiza-

tions whose existence was "as ephemeral

and short-lived as their World War I

predecessors."2

Some of the usual limitations of a case

2 Nelson (1982), p. 337.

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (October 1989). ? by Cornell University.

0019-7939/89/4301 $01.00

19

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions20 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

study apply here. But it is worth noting

that Thompson's company unions re-

ceived national attention during the 1940s

because of the firm's repeated clashes with

the government and because of the prom-

inence of its top officers in the manage-

ment community. Frederick C. Crawford,

Thompson's president and architect of its

labor policies, was head of the National

Association of Manufacturers during the

1940s, a time when the NAM was the

nation's leading management organization

concerned with industrial relations issues.

That is, although Thompson was neither a

large firm nor one with a distinguished

history, it nevertheless served as a model

for other companies trying to avoid

unions during the 1940s and 1950s. The

Thompson story is therefore important in

its own right and more generally, because

it sheds light on the history and function-

ing of company unions after passage of

the Wagner Act.

Moreover, a close examination of the

Thompson story provides grist for the

policy mills of American labor and man-

agement. When company unions are com-

pared to the participation programs of

today's progressive nonunion firms, they

appear less odious than in the traditional

view. Some variant of company unionism

might attract workers in these firms

because it would mesh with their values

yet give them more influence and auton-

omy than they now have. National unions

offer many of these same things, too. But

national unions thus far have been incapa-

ble of making inroads in most "new

model" nonunion firms. Given that mod-

el's historical lineage, company unions

might make a better fit and so might stand

a better chance of success than national

unions.

Thompson Products: An Overview

Founded in 1901 in Cleveland, Ohio,

Thompson Products grew up alongside

the motor vehicle industry by manufactur-

ing auto parts for the original equipment

and replacement markets. Aircraft engine

parts became an increasingly important

part of the company's line during the

1930s and military contracts caused rapid

growth during the war. After a postwar

slump, growth resumed, fed by sales of

aircraft parts, which accounted for half of

Thompson's revenue in the 1950s. During

the two decades after the 1958 merger

with Ramo-Wooldridge (a maker of mis-

siles and other high-technology products),

TRW entered various new industries, and

by 1980 it had about 90 domestic plants.

Until the merger, Thompson's opera-

tions were concentrated at three old plants

in Cleveland (referred to as Main) and at a

giant plant outside the city (TAPCO) that

opened in 1942 to produce aircraft parts

for the military. Thompson also owned a

factory in Detroit and smaller plants at

other locations. In 1939 there were about

2,000 production workers at Main and

700 in Detroit, but by 1943, when hun-

dreds of new workers were being hired

each month, employment at Main had

risen to 5,600 workers, and at TAPCO it

reached over 10,000. Employment stabi-

lized in the 1950s, with about 1,400

workers at Main, 7,000 at TAPCO, and

900 in Detroit. Technology at the three

locations was a blend of batch and mass

production: skilled metalworkers were

aided by sizable groups of semiskilled and

nonproduction workers. During the early

1940s, the Cleveland plants paid a bit less

than prevailing rates, but relative pay rose

rapidly during the war.3

Before the 1930s Thompson lacked

most of the accouterments of systematic

personnel management. It had no person-

nel director-workers were hired at the

gate by foremen-and no formal benefit

programs. The company sponsored some

social and athletic activities, but this was a

casual sort of paternalism. Thompson's

production manager, who oversaw employ-

ment during those years, was "a man of

big heart, [who] loved men and machinery

[and] spent his time in the plant. Employ-

ment was never so large but what he knew

3Clark (1952:19-21); R. S. Livingstone to F.

Bullen, Jan. 26, 1944, reel 3, Thompson Products

Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School

(hereinafter TPP).

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 21

them all personally. He loaned them

money, helped them when they were

sick. "4

In 1933, two events shook the firm out

of its complacence: first, Fred Crawford

took over as president, and second, pas-

sage of the Recovery Act sparked the

Cleveland labor movement. That year

Fisher Body and White Motors were in the

throes of organizing drives, and Crawford

was determined to inoculate his firm

against unionism before it had a chance to

take root.

One of Crawford's first steps was to hire

Raymond S. Livingstone to set up and

direct a personnel department. Living-

stone initiated a code of personnel poli-

cies, an employment office, and three new

membership organizations. First was the

Old Guard Association, made up of

workers with over five years' service,

which elected officers to run a social

committee and a loan fund (subsidized by

plant vending machine receipts). Living-

stone had only recently joined the firm,

but he became secretary of the Old Guard

and held that post through the 1950s. The

second was the Social and Recreation Club

(SRC), which had myriad activities like

bowling, motorcycling, baseball, and dance.

The third, the Thompson Products Em-

ployees Association, was a representation

plan begun in 1934, ostensibly by the

employees, although Livingstone con-

ceived the idea and loyal Old Guard

members carried it out.

Besides these formal programs, efforts

to secure worker loyalty rested on Craw-

ford's charismatic personality and Living-

stone's meticulous concern with "prevent-

ing rather than settling labor disputes."

Along with other top managers, Crawford

mingled with employees at events outside

the workplace-Old Guard banquets, com-

pany picnics, and parties-as well as on

the shopfloor, where his regular visits

made workers feel that "little things which

4 F. C. Crawford in "Statement of Labor History of

Thompson Products, Inc.," Aug. 26, 1943, box 18,

TRW Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society,

Cleveland (hereinafter TRWP); Thompson Products,

Employee Handbook 1935, box 27, TRWP.

might be taken advantage of by the

supervisor will come to the attention of the

president. They want him to drift up and

say hello so they can go home and say to

their wives, 'The president was through

the shop tonight and he said hello to me."'

Crawford kept close abreast of workplace

developments, as did Livingstone, whose

personnel department took "precedence

in calling the plays" on all employment

matters and got deeply involved in day-

to-day plant management.5

Close monitoring was facilitated by

propinquity and size. Thompson's plants

were near enough to headquarters and,

until the early 1940s, sufficiently small

that top managers could stay in touch if

they chose to do so. But as Thompson

mushroomed during the war, its managers

had to open up other channels. The firm

created positions for "personnel represen-

tatives," who were to handle any and all

employee problems and "correct irrita-

tions before they became major issues."

They were told to "become intimately

acquainted with as many employees as

possible . . . pass by each employee's

machine at least twice a week . . . [and]

catch the eye of employees and smile as

you pass them." The representatives were

also expected to keep abreast of union

proclivities among workers and report to

top management on "trends of thought

developing in the organization."6

Management relied on a variety of

media to get its point of view across. Each

plant had a public address system; distri-

butions boxes for the company newspa-

per, Friendly Forum; and numerous bulle-

5 Frank Dossett, "Handling Grievances Under

Government Supervision," n.d., 34, reel 1, TPP;

Livingstone (1942), p. 388; U.S. Circuit Court of

Appeals, Sixth District, Transcript of Record, NLRB

v. Thompson Products and Automotive and Aircraft

Workers'Association, Inc., Apr. 1, 1942, 435-43, reel 1,

TPP; J. D. Wright to R. S. Livingstone, Aug. 28,

1933, box 27, TRWP.

6 Livingstone to Lee Clegg, June 27, 1940, and

Livingstone to Crawford, Aug. 20, 1940, box 28,

TRWP; "Duties of the Personnel Supervisor," Febru-

ary 1943, 3, reel 2, TPP; "Organization of Personnel

Administration," National Industrial Conference

Board, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 73 (New

York, 1946), p. 80.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions22 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

tin boards. At dinner meetings for

employees, top officers discussed the

firm's financial position and fielded ques-

tions from the audience. Thompson was

one of the first U.S. companies to use the

new technique of employee attitude sur-

veys, which helped to identify sources of

discontent. Employees received booklets

that summarized survey results and em-

phasized that most Thompson workers

liked their jobs. But useful as these may

have been, the firm preferred to develop a

"favorable opinion among employees"

through "vocal and personal contact [in-

stead of] printed bulletins."7

The communications machinery shifted

into high gear during union organizing

drives. Thompson published special bro-

chures entitled "Let's Have the Truth!" in

which it made point-by-point rebuttals of

union claims. These were reprinted in

flyers hung on plant bulletin boards, in

special editions of the Friendly Forum, and

in letters mailed to each employee's home.

Thompson's campaign tactics were nota-

bly daring, deft-and swift. For example,

when the NLRB announced late one

Friday that it was setting aside election

results at a Thompson plant, the news was

printed in special flyers and immediately

posted in the plant. On Monday, when

UAW organizers handed out leaflets hail-

ing the decision, "Thompson people

shrugged it off as 'old stuff.'" Meanwhile,

personnel representatives tried to con-

vince employees that national unions were

unnecessary, which led to charges (upheld

by the NLRB) that they were coercing

UAW supporters. Finally, in each of six

NLRB elections held at Main and TAPCO

between 1942 and 1947, Crawford and

Livingstone delivered illegal captive audi-

ence speeches in the cafeterias. This

repeated flouting of the NLRB's strictures

on campaign conduct made Crawford a

hero for those advocating employer free

speech during the 1940s.8

7 Thompson Products, Personnel Policy Confer-

ence, Jan. 27, 1955, box 128, TRWP; various

"Annual Reports to Employees," boxes 28 and 29,

TRWP.

8"Two-Way Information Flow Pays Off," Factory

Taken singly, none of these activities

was unique. But collectively they consti-

tuted an unusually comprehensive and

dedicated effort to shape and monitor

employee opinion. Few firms had a pro-

gram of this scope during the 1940s and

1950s, and Thompson's moderate size

made this all the more impressive. More-

over, Thompson's approach was based on

a more coherent philosophy than that

guiding most managements during this

period. One of its elements can be termed

authoritarian Mayosim: a belief that workers

wanted more from their jobs than money-

including personal recognition and treat-

ment as intelligent adults-but along with

this went the assumption that workers

were followers, eager to attach their

loyalties to strong institutions and leaders.

As Crawford put it:

The working man today, more than ever

before in this emotional age, wants someone

interested in him, and if he thinks you are not

interested in him he turns instinctively to find

someone outside your plant who is.... The

worker doesn't care about his pay and plant

conditions. It is what he thinks about the

honesty and square-shooting and directness of

the boss who is over the plant, and his ability to

meet him, talk to him, and know him.

But, said Crawford, the worker

has one great weakness-he is far too suscepti-

ble to emotional leadership. He will fall for any

emotional bandwagon that comes along [be-

cause he is] starved for understanding and

friendship and for the truth. He is tremen-

dously confused right now . . . and is eager to

be taught and led.

Crawford sought to exploit that weakness

by spending much of his time speaking to

employees and projecting the force of his

ideas and his personality. One observer

called him "a natural leader of tremen-

dous vitality, self-assurance, and single-

ness of purpose." But there was more to

Management & Maintenance, Vol. 104 (May 1946), p.

109; "Let's Have the Truth!" in Thompson Products,

Inc. and UAW Local 300, 57 NLRB, No. 151 (1944),

976-79; "Transcript of the Proceedings of the

Three-Month NLRB Trial, February 23 to May 25,

1943," 1408, reel IB, TPP; Eighth Region NLRB,

"Report on Objections to Election," June 13, 1946,

box 39, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 23

the Thompson program than Crawford.

At all levels of the organization, managers

tried to convince workers that the com-

pany had their best interests at heart.9

The second element of the Thompson

philosophy was communitarianism: a stress

on the common objectives and values that

unite the employer and the employee and

make the enterprise an industrial commu-

nity. Thompson managers referred to

employees as "members of the Thompson

family" and tried to minimize status

distinctions between managers and work-

ers. According to Livingstone, the firm's

policies were guided by an effort "to

eliminate class lines and have our relation-

ships on a first name basis." To workers,

he was known as "Ray" and Crawford was

known as "Fred." In a 1935 speech to the

Old Guard, Crawford said:

All of us in this room are friends. We are all

workmen, We all come in the morning and

punch a clock and go to work and we all go

home at night. . . . We both want lots of

business; we both want lots of money; we both

want the plant fixed up; we both want success

for Thompson; we both want our pay raised;

we both want our hours shortened. None of us

is wholly satisfied.

Out of this sense of the ties that bound

management and workers together came a

view of national unions as outsiders and

propagators of illegitimate and unneces-

sary conflict. In a debate with a Cleveland

CIO official, Livingstone disparaged what

he called "the outside professional union

organizer":

His interest is not at all concerned with trying

to build a better business so that there will be

more to divide. His interest is in building a

union. Union heads meet in oak-paneled

rooms. In these offices are big maps, and

through the cigar smoke union leaders point to

them and say, "This plant must be organized.

That plant must be struck. That industry must

be closed down." Then, wires crackle all over

the United States and edicts go forth to local

9 Proceedings of the Second Annual Public Relations

Conference Sponsored by the National Association of

Manufacturers, December 7th, 1943, New York, 87-88,

at Hagley Library, Wilmington, Delaware; McMurry

(1955), p. 48.

union officers, and workmen in the plants have

nothing to say at all about the making of such

decisions. 10

Despite their implacable hostility toward

"outside" unions, Thompson managers

were willing, in fact eager, to deal with

"inside" unions, which were easily assimi-

lated into the firm's communitarian cul-

ture. Indeed, the strength of that culture

had a lot to do with Thompson's ability to

successfully propagate company unions.

Not only in the 1930s, but during the

1940s and 1950s as well, ILUs appeared at

Thompson plants around the country,

modeled after the ones at the company's

flagship plants in Cleveland. Although

disestablished by the NLRB and subject to

stiff competition from the UAW, the

Cleveland ILUs proved remarkably resil-

ient, in part because of how they evolved

over time.

The TPEA and the AAWA,

1934-42

Early in 1934 the officers of the Old

Guard Association called a meeting of

Main plant workers interested in forming

an organization for all employees, no

matter the length of service, who could

present their problems to management;

such matters as wages, hours, and working

conditions." A week later 300 workers met

in the cafeteria, formed the Thompson

Products Employees Association (TPEA),

and elected a committee to draft a

constitution.

Like many post-NIRA company unions,

the TPEA gave workers some rights that

had been absent from previous represen-

tation plans: to ratify the constitution (80

percent approved it at a subsequent

meeting); to vote for officers of the

Committee of Employee Representatives

(CER); and to belong to the TPEA

(though no dues were collected or mem-

bership meetings held afterJanuary 1934).

The seven CER officers and an equal

number from management made up the

10 Friendly Forum, 8 April 1935, box 27, TRWP;

"Can There Be Industrial Peace with Unionism?",

pamphlet, Nov. 12, 1946, box 40, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions24 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Joint Council, which met monthly and was

headed by the omnipresent Livingstone as

executive secretary. Under a new griev-

ance procedure, workers took their com-

plaints to delegates appointed by the CER,

and if the grievance could not be resolved

by the worker's delegate and foreman, it

went to a CER member and his paired

management representative. Provision was

made for outside arbitration if the council

could not resolve a grievance, although

that never happened.

The TPEA was a management-con-

trolled organization. Its constitution barred

strikes "or other independent action taken

by employees." Although it negotiated

collective agreements-unlike over 80 per-

cent of the company unions surveyed in

1935-these contained little of substance.

Each was written by management and

presented to the CER for inspection and

signing. No agreement ever mentioned

wages, and wage bargaining was the

TPEA's greatest weakness. When em-

ployee representatives asked for wage

increases, management contended that no

money was available or that the council

was not empowered to raise pay. The

representatives usually did not press fur-

ther. Both pay increases between 1934

and 1937 coincided with outside union

organizing-in 1935, when the Machinists

staged a small strike, and in 1937, when

the UAW first appeared at Main."I

The TPEA had a better record in

grievance handling and problem-solving.

The company provided forms for filing

grievances and the council kept track of

their disposition. Most involved incentive

pay, transfers, or safety. The majority that

reached the council were settled in the

worker's favor, but few concerned disci-

pline and dismissal. The council usually

upheld dismissals without comment, but

1 " "History of the Thompson Products Employees'

Association," Jan. 19, 1934, and "Minutes of the First

Meeting of the TPEA," Feb. 19, 1934, box 27,

TRWP; Shore (1966), pp. 41-155; "Constitution of

the TPEA," Feb. 13, 1934, box 27, TRWP; U.S.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Company

Unions 1935, Bull. 634 (1937), p. 154; Joint Council

Meeting minutes, May 10, 1935, Aug. 9, 1935, Mar.

3, 1937, box 27 and 28, TRWP.

on occasion it saw fit to say more, as when

it upheld two dismissals but told the fore-

man involved to give workers adequate

warning of performance problems.'2

Most of the council's time was spent

discussing plant-wide issues. TPEA repre-

sentatives brought up proposals that ei-

ther were rejected by management or

resulted in joint policy announcements (on

such topics as toilet facilities, drinking

water, and cafeteria prices). The council

also had joint committees that conducted

studies and presented reports to the

council on plant safety, sanitation, and

bonus pay. Management itself raised some

issues, but not for council action, as when

it shared information on expansion plans

or announced new policies in matters both

major (compensation) and minor (nurses

at company sporting events).

Thus, despite its limitations, the TPEA

was more active than many of the com-

pany unions of the 1930s. But it never

seriously challenged management or en-

gaged in concerted action. Bill Hoffman,

TPEA chairman, warned his fellow employ-

ees that "one of the quickest and surest

means of endangering your job and pay

envelope is to permit strike talk," and he

asserted that the TPEA would never cause

the company to lose business to competi-

tors because of its "keen interest . .. in the

welfare of the company."'13

Passage of the Wagner Act did not

affect the TPEA, but the Supreme Court's

Jones & Laughlin Steel decision in April

1937 brought major changes. Propelling

them was a UAW organizing drive that

began at Thompson's Detroit plant in

January and then spread to Cleveland. In

the heat of a sit-down strike of 50 workers

in February, the Detroit plant manager

signed a contract with the UAW, the first

in the union's history. Although the

Detroit local fell apart after six months'4

12 Livingstone, "Employees' Association Secretarial

Report: 1934" in "Transcript of NLRB Trial 1943,"

p. 608; Livingstone to P. B. Lerch, Jan. 10, 1935.

13 Minutes of the Joint Council Meeting, Mar. 1,

1936, July 2, 1936, and Nov. 11, 1936, and Hoffman

in Friendly Forum, Apr. 2, 1934, box 27, TRWP;

Saposs (1936), pp. 803-11.

4 Detroit News, Feb. 21 and 22, 1937; J. D. Wright

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 25

and the Cleveland drive stalled,'5 it was

clear that the TPEA had to change.

Immediately after the Jones & Laughlin

decision, Bill Hoffman met with Living-

stone to discuss bringing the TPEA into

compliance with the Wagner Act. Under

subpoena at an NLRB hearing in 1940,

Hoffman recalled Livingstone saying to

him, "We will certainly have to do some-

thing, because [previously] we always told

the representatives how to conduct them-

selves in their capacity as representatives."

Events happened quickly: Livingstone re-

signed as council secretary; Hoffman and

other TPEA officers stepped down; and

new officers were selected. At the sugges-

tion of a TPEA delegate, the new officers

hired a local attorney, Milton A. Roe-

misch, to give them legal advice.'6

Roemisch came from a breed of lawyers

who emerged during this period as advis-

ers to, and often de facto leaders of,

independent local unions. He represented

ILUs at a number of Cleveland firms,

including Sherwin Williams Paint, Ohio

Crankshaft, and Ohio Tool. In the early

1940s he tried, without success, to affiliate

these into a federation called the National

League of American Labor. Roemisch

served his clients not only as legal coun-

selor but also as organizer, publicist, and

at times banker, loaning fledgling ILUs

his own money to help them get off the

ground. 17

In 1942 the UAW filed charges against

Memorandum, Feb. 27, 1937, and Livingstone to

Crawford, Nov. 15, 1937, box 142, TRWP.

15 In April the UAW charged that three of its

supporters had been illegally fired by the firm.

Despite an NLRB order, Thompson refused to

reinstate the men and so the NLRB went to the Sixth

Circuit. But in what proved to be the first of several

publicized defeats for the NLRB in its fight with

Thompson, the court not only refused to enforce the

order but criticized the NLRB for failing to provide

more than a "scintilla" of evidence to sustain the

charges against Thompson. A few nights later, board

chairman J. Warren Madden was forced to go on

national radio to defend the NLRB. Cleveland News,

May 11, 1938; New York Times, May 14, 1938; NLRB

v. Thompson Products, 97 F.2d 13 (6CCA, 1938).

16 Thompson Products and UAW Local 300 (CIO), 33

NLRB 1033, 1041 (Aug. 1941).

'' "Transcript of NLRB Trial 1943," pp. 72, 527,

reel IB, TPP.

Roemisch that led to an NLRB trial

examiner's order that he cease and desist

from "instructing and coercing" employ-

ees. The examiner held him to be an

employer because he "worked hand in

glove with the company." Yet, there was

no evidence against him other than the

fact that he represented an ILU judged to

be company-dominated, and a year later

the NLRB dismissed the charges. Al-

though his motives were partly pecuniary,

over time Roemisch became an ardent

believer in the virtues of independent

unionism. In a speech to Thompson

workers he said:

Independent unionism is really a religion. You

people among yourselves have enough brains

to run your own union without paying some

racketeer, or some person interested in extort-

ing money from you, to represent you. Now,

don't get the idea that independents are any

"finky, stinky" shop organization. An indepen-

dent union must be an aggressive, militant

organization that is interested in the workers'

rights and the workers' rights only.'8

Roemisch changed the TPEA's name to

the Automotive and Aircraft Workers'

Association (AAWA), wrote a constitution

for it, and incorporated the new organiza-

tion with his own funds. In June 1937 he

sent Thompson authorization cards signed

by over 60 percent of its Cleveland

employees. Within a month, management

had recognized the AAWA and negotiated

a new agreement. A heftier document

than the old TPEA contract, it contained

some new features: a plan for seniority-

based layoffs (something the UAW had

been promising in its handbills) and

provisions allowing AAWA representa-

tives to caucus at council meetings. There

were also some changes in the AAWA

itself. It began to collect nominal monthly

dues and in August held a mass meeting

18 "In the Matter of Thompson Products and

UAW Local 300 and the AAWA," in U.S. 6 CCA,

Transcript of Record, NLRB v. Thompson Products and

AAWA, Inc., April 1942, pp. 294, 489-500, reel 1,

TPP; 57 NLRB, no. 151 (1944), pp. 941-42,

1016-18; Transcript of the Meeting of Employees of

Thompson Products, Sept. 16, 1942, reel 2, TPP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions26 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

at which Roemisch explained the new

contract and presided over a ratification

vote. 19

Over the next four years, the AAWA's

monthly council meetings addressed the

same types of problems as had the TPEA.

Little was said about discipline and dis-

charge. Discussions instead focused on

matters like rate adjustments, complaints

about foreman, and poor ventilation.

Management continued to make AAWA

representatives privy to the firm's finan-

cial affairs and occasionally sought their

advice on details of personnel policy, such

as whether to rehire workers who had

previously been dismissed. Council meet-

ings were usually cooperative and polite,

with each side taking time to thank the

other for its reason and understanding.

But though it was tamer and more

deferential to management than most

national unions, the AAWA occasionally

displayed an independence that the TPEA

had lacked entirely. It now gathered its

own data, caucused at council meetings,

and regularly sought Roemisch's advice on

legal, tactical, and economic issues. Among

its first actions in 1937 were requests for

the closed shop and a dues checkoff, both

of which management refused. The

AAWA did not raise those matters again,

but on other issues it doggedly persisted,

more willing to challenge management

than had been the TPEA.

One of those issues was vacation pay. In

1938 the AAWA asked to revive the

company's vacation plan and extend it to

workers with less than five years' service.

Lee Clegg, company vice president, said

that neither request could be granted

because of business conditions. The AAWA

insisted that the plan was part of its

contract with Thompson, but Clegg de-

nied this, saying that vacations were given

at management's discretion. When some-

one from the AAWA called this policy

"unfair," Clegg offered to give vacations

but none to workers with under five years'

19 Roemisch, "Special instructions to delegates,"

n.d., box 28, TRWP; Livingstone to Crawford, June

21, 1937, box 28, TRWP; 33 NLRB 1033, pp.

1039-48.

service. In 1939 and again in 1940, the

AAWA asked for a more inclusive plan

and the company said it could not afford

one. But in 1940 the AAWA presented

data showing that many local firms gave

vacations to junior workers. At the next

meeting, management agreed to extend

vacations to workers with over three years'

service.20

On the one hand, this episode shows

that the AAWA had some independence

and was willing to press an issue until a

compromise could be reached. On the

other hand, it demonstrates that the

AAWA's bargaining power partly de-

pended on outside pressure. In this case

the extended plan came less than a month

after the UAW had launched another

drive at Thompson.

The AAWA's record on wage bargain-

ing clearly demonstrated the role of

external forces. In 1939, when the UAW

had only a scant presence at Thompson's

plants, the AAWA asked for an increase of

5 cents. The company refused but said it

was willing to pay a special bonus instead.

When the AAWA representatives asked

for time to caucus and to consult Roe-

misch, management testily told them that

they had three hours to make up their

minds to take the offer or lose it; the

AAWA took it.21

In 1940, the AAWA asked for 7 cents,

saying that "the union wishes to point out

to management that we are in a rising

labor market, and that the law of supply

and demand holds good as to labor as well

as to production." The company said no.

A day later the NLRB announced that it

would hold hearings to determine if the

AAWA was a dominated union. At the

next council meting, management offered

an increase of 5 cents, which the AAWA

promptly accepted. The AAWA boasted

that it won the raise "in a true American

way, without a strike," although the UAW

was nearer the truth when it said in a

handbill that "the 5 cent wage increase you

20 Labor Relations Council (LRC) Minutes-Oct.

4, 1937, Mar. 7, 1938, Apr. 10, 1940-and Executive

Committee Minutes, Sept. 15, 1938, box 28, TRWP.

21 LRC Minutes, Sept. 1, 1939, box 28, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 27

have just received was a bribe granted in a

moment of desperation in an attempt to

keep employees from joining Local 300."22

In March 1941 a trial examiner found

the AAWA to be a dominated organiza-

tion and ordered Thompson to disestab-

lish it, which meant that the AAWA could

never appear on the ballot in an NLRB

election. The NLRB sustained these or-

ders in August, finding that the AAWA

was ''merely an advisory agency supported

by the management for adjusting differ-

ences with the employees within manage-

ment limitations." More serious in the

NLRB's eyes was the fact that the AAWA

had grown out of the TPEA, an organiza-

tion clearly initiated and controlled by

management. This lack of "cleavage,"

combined with the fact that "employees

were never given the opportunity to

freely choose their own representa-

tives," required the AAWA's disestablish-

ment.23

One could argue that the NLRB applied

its fracture rule too mechanically and did

not give sufficient consideration to ways in

which the AAWA was evolving into a

more independent organization. Indeed,

in 1944 the NLRB opted for a less rigid

approach: in cases where the only charge

was no cleavage and the parties had been

bargaining for at least two years, it

permitted previously dominated ILUs to

appear on the ballot so long as employer

domination had ceased. It is possible that

the AAWA would have been permitted to

appear on the ballot had it been tried

under this rule. But before the new rule

emerged, the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals enforced the disestablishment,

stating that "a company-created union

could not emancipate itself from habitual

subservience to its creator without being

completely disestablished."24

22 Roemisch to Crawford, Oct. 7, and LRC

Minutes, Sept. 6, Oct. 22, and Nov. 2 (all 1940), box

28, TRWP; Frank Dossett, Thompson Products: A Case

Study in New Deal Legislation (ms., 1947), p. 274, box

20, TRWP.

23 33NLRB 1050.

24 NLRB v. Thompson Prods., 11 LRRM 521, 526 (6

CCA, 1942).

The UAW's drive gained momentum

during the sixteen months between the

examiner's report and the appellate deci-

sion. Ed Hall, an experienced organizer,

took over the campaign late in 1941.

Shortly thereafter he filed for elections in

Cleveland and asked the War Labor

Board (WLB) to enforce the NLRB's

orders, which both Thompson and the

AAWA had refused to obey. Company

officials were enraged when the WLB

entered the dispute; they claimed the

agency was "interested solely in a CIO

victory." When Thompson dismissed five

workers for posting pro-UAW stickers in

plant lavatories, a special WLB mediation

panel traveled to Cleveland and issued a

report calling the situation "tense . . . with

danger of interference with all our war

production." Crawford went to Washing-

ton to meet with Dr. Frank P. Graham of

the WLB, who "gave an eloquent sales talk

on the satisfaction of dealing with interna-

tional unions, how reasonable and cooper-

ative they can be" and then denounced

Crawford as a "labor hater." To resolve

the dispute, the WLB scheduled elections

for May.25

Throughout this period, Thompson

workers were subject to a flurry of flyers.

The UAW on one side and Thompson

and the AAWA on the other fought a

heated series of exchanges. Against NLRB

orders, the AAWA played a major role in

the campaign, issuing bulletins attacking

the UAW ("ruled by gangster methods")

and the NLRB ("the leading organizer of

the CIO"); raising its dues to finance these

activities; staging incidents such as one in

which some AAWA members refused to

work alongside a UAW supporter; and

continuing to bargain with Thompson for

wage increases, which were granted shortly

before the election.26

25 Cleveland Press, Jan. 14 and 30, 1942, Feb. 10,

1942; Crawford in "Labor History," p. 49; NWLB,

"Report of the Mediator in the Matter of Thompson

Prods. and the UAW," Case no. 20 (Feb. 26, 1942),

10, reel 1, TPP; Crawford to NWLB, Feb. 25, 1942,

box 30; Dossett, "Handling Grievances" pp. 23-24.

26 "Transcript of NLRB Trial 1943," 443, 534-40,

reel IB, TPP; AAWA flyers, April to August 1941,

box 29, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions28 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Although even its supporters were an-

noyed that it never held membership

meetings and that representatives received

favors from management, the AAWA

nevertheless was quite popular at Main. It

took credit for the seniority plan and pay

increases and maintained a daily presence

in the plant as a result of its grievance

system and other activities. The UAW, on

the other hand-despite a two-year cam-

paign-had little to show for its efforts.

When elections finally were held, it re-

ceived only 33 percent of the vote at Main.

This was a major defeat for the UAW, but

it proved a Pyhrric victory for the AAWA.

At first the AAWA was elated and sold

tickets to a victory party sponsored by the

SRC, but it was forced to disband three

months later when the Sixth Circuit

upheld its disestablishment. That night,

management treated all former AAWA

officers to dinner at a local restaurant

during which they were thanked for their

"cooperation. "27

Formation of the BIW

and the AWA

Independent unionism was far from

dead at Main. In September Roemisch

organized a meeting at an American

Legion hall that was attended by 50

workers interested in starting a new

union. The key speaker was a worker who

had never held a post in the AAWA. In an

interesting twist, he told the audience that

he wanted a new ILU because he did not

wish to be "dominated" by an "outside

organization." Seeking to remedy some of

the AAWA's faults, he argued that any

new union should have three times as

many delegates and that this would "elim-

inate some of the biggest sources of

complaint. We will have spread this from a

few favorite individuals to a representative

body." Roemisch gave a speech that

denounced the UAW for being "hungry

[for] dues because all of the officers are on

27 LRC minutes, Oct. 20, 1941, box 29, and Mar.

11, 1942, box 30, TRWP; Cleveland News, Mar. 27,

1941.

salary." But workers needed some kind of

union, because

it is impossible for management sitting up in

the front office with their Carrier air condition-

ing systems, away from you workers, to know

intimately your problems, your heartaches,

your troubles that happen down in the swelter-

ing heat of the forge department and ... other

departments. They would take advantage of

you, maybe not willfully or maliciously, but

they wouldn't know and understand your

problems.

At the end of the meeting, those present

voted on several names for the new union

and finally chose to call it the Brotherhood

of Independent Workers (BIW).28

Roemisch was careful to shroud the new

union in a coat of lawfulness. He held its

meetings at neutral sites and advised

former AAWA officers not to play an

active role. Although management pri-

vately said that it was "behind [the BIW]

100 percent," it too now was cautious not

to do anything that might create even the

appearance of illegality. When Roemisch

took BIW signature cards to Livingstone

and asked for recognition, he was re-

buffed and told to get the BIW certified in

an election. Several months later, when

BIW leaders approached Lee Clegg for

money to defray expenses, he told them

that "in the old days, I used to be able

to charge something to an expense ac-

count" but "not . . . under present

circumstances."29

Despite these precautions, or perhaps

because of them, the BIW never got off

the ground. It never participated in an

election, nor did it ever obtain a contract

with management. In December 1942 the

UAW filed NLRB charges against the

BIW. The pressure and uncertainty cre-

ated by the ensuing three-month trial

further hindered the BIW, and it soon

disappeared.

Meanwhile, Thompson completed its

giant TAPCO facility in the fall of 1941.

In a brief filed with the WLB, Ed Hall

28 Transcript of the Meeting of Employees, Sept,

16, 1942, reel 2, TPP.

29 57 NLRB no. 151 (1944), p. 998; "Transcript of

1943 NLRB Trial," 9219-24, reel 5B, TPP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 29

charged that the company was handpick-

ing AAWA supporters for transfer to the

new plant and that no UAW members had

been chosen. One of these transferees was

a former secretary of the AAWA who,

with Roemisch's assistance, started an ILU

at TAPCO called the Aircraft Workers

Alliance (AWA). The AWA lost no time

establishing itself. It negotiated a contract

with provisions for seniority rights, a

grievance procedure (delegates now were

called stewards), and a council similar to

the AAWA's. In the 1942 elections, the

UAW lost at TAPCO by the same margin

as at Main.

Despite its losses, the UAW tried for five

more years to organize the Cleveland

plants. It spent large sums on elections

(held in 1944, 1945, and 1947) and on

legal battles. In 1944 it won a favorable

ruling that overturned the 1942 elections

and disestablished the BIW and the AWA,

both of which, said the NLRB, were

extensions of the AAWA "infected from

the outset with the virus of [employer]

control." As before, the lack of a "clear

line of cleavage" and the company's aid to

the ILUs ("in the guise of friendly

cooperation") were said to render them

obstacles to free choice. Although noting

that some BIW and AWA members were

"earnest and sincere" in their efforts to

create a strong union, the NLRB said that

this was not enough to overcome the

firm's early activities, which had created

an indelible image of domination in

workers' eyes.30

During rerun elections at Main and

TAPCO in 1944, Thompson managers

again snubbed the NLRB by giving captive

audience speeches attacking the UAW.

Consequently, the election-which the

UAW lost by wide margins at both

plants-was overturned by the NLRB in

1945. Several months later the UAW

petitioned for a new vote (at Main but not

at TAPCO, where it had less support).

30 57 NLRB no. 151 (1944), pp. 963, 997-98;

"Minutes of the Meeting to Form the AWA," Nov.

12, 1941, reel 1, TPP; Roemisch to Livingstone, Jan.

5, 1942, box 30, TRWP; Livingstone to H. E. Sperry,

June 15, 1942, reel 1, TPP.

Shortly before election day, when it

became clear that management was again

taking an active role, the NLRB went to

the Sixth Circuit seeking an injunction

barring the company's officers from inter-

fering in the election. This request came at

a propitious time for Thompson-"free

speech" was emerging as a public issue-

and three days before the election the

court turned down the NLRB's request

without comment. Newspapers ran head-

lines reading, "NLRB Takes Licking" and

"Thompson Upheld on Free Speech." The

UAW lost by a wider margin than before,

but the NLRB again overturned the

results because it felt that management's

activities had "passed from the realm of

free speech into that of coercion."3'

Some of the tactics the company pur-

sued were more clearly coercive than

captive audience speeches. Dismissals of

UAW activists were a regular occurrence

during each of the UAW's organizing

drives at Thompson. The company's at-

tempt to fire twelve UAW stewards at

Main led to a UAW-authorized walkout in

1943. Inside the plant the pressure on

these activists was continual. Joseph

Coniglio, a UAW steward, received regu-

lar visits from his personnel representa-

tive, who

would ask me how many fellows I signed up

during that day, and he would tell me how

come I didn't go in and play ball with them by

joining the AAWA, and telling me I was a swell

fellow, and I should join up with them and that

[they] could do me a lot of favors, and if I was

on the ball with them, they would see to it that

I would move up in the world.32

A final drive started at Main late in

1947, marred by factionalism within the

UAW and anticommunist rhetoric on the

company's part. Two weeks before the

May election, the AWA negotiated a hefty

wage increase at TAPCO, as if to signal

3' NLRB, Thompson Products and UAW Local No.

300, 2nd Supp. Decision and Order, Mar. 21, 1945,

60 NLRB 3181; NLRB, 8th Region, "Report on

Objections," Case No. 8-R-1989, June 1946, box 39,

TRWP; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 20, 1945.

32 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Apr. 14, 1943; "Tran-

script of NLRB Trial 1943," 1383, reel IB, TPP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions30 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

what it could accomplish at Main. Craw-

ford and other officers gave their usual

captive audience speeches, while the com-

pany churned out anti-UAW material.

Once again the UAW lost, but this time

the NLRB did not sustain any of the

union's charges, and in July it certified the

election.33

The NLRB's sudden turnaround came

on the heels of a major rebuke from the

Sixth Circuit, which in June had over-

turned the NLRB's disestablishment of the

AWA. Not only did the court now hold

the AWA to be lawful, but it sharply

criticized the board's "dictatorial" ap-

proach to election conduct at Thompson.

A year later the AWA was recognized at

Main after it submitted cards to a local

accounting firm. Neither the NLRB nor

the UAW said a word. In fact, the UAW

did not reappear at the Cleveland plants

until the 1960s (it lost an election there in

1967), and the AWA continued to repre-

sent workers there until the plants were

sold in 1986.34

Characteristics of the AWA,

1942-1964

Just as the AAWA showed signs of

greater independence than the TPEA, so

too did the AWA become more autono-

mous and active than its predecessors. As

such, it did not correspond to the unfavor-

able picture of company unions painted in

the industrial relations literature. This is

not to say that the AWA came to resemble

an affiliated local in all respects. It took a

highly cooperative approach in its dealings

with the firm, although that stance was

tainted by occasional manipulation of its

leaders by management. Yet the AWA's

features were never fully intended or

foreseen by either party; they evolved

according to an inner logic and situational

incentives beyond either's control.

33 Cleveland Union Leader, Aug. 29, 1947, reel 6,

TPP; Friendly Forum, May 2, 1947, box 41, TRWP;

"Thompson Raises Wages; Beats New Pattern,"

Cleveland Plain Dealer, Apr. 29, 1947.

34 NLRB v. Thompson Prods., 20 LRRM 2291

(6CCA, 1947).

Bargaining power. For most of its life, the

AWA never struck or threatened to strike.

It had no strike funds and boasted to its

members in 1954 that the absence of

strikes "contributes in large measure to

Thompson's success. They can accept

orders with firm delivery dates and their

customers have sufficient confidence to

place large orders. This guarantees steady

work for you."35 But even though it

eschewed strikes, the AWA was not with-

out bargaining power.

Although the probability of a strike

seemed close to zero, there was always a

chance that the AWA would change its

mind. This possibility discouraged egre-

gious management actions. (The AWA did

strike for two weeks during a 1979 wage

dispute.)36

There was also the threat that if the

firm did not do a reasonably good job of

meeting employee needs and AWA de-

mands, the workers would defect to a

national union like the UAW, which

management considered anathema. While

head of the BIW in 1943, Ed Castle grew

"dissatisfied with the way grievances had

been settled" and told company executives

that "if the grievances weren't settled with

some degree of satisfaction and fairness in

the future I would put on a CIO button

and take this whole damn plant CIO."

Ironically, the seven campaigns conducted

by the UAW between 1942 and 1967 gave

the AWA potent leverage in its bargaining

with management. Nearly every one was

accompanied by a negotiated wage in-

crease and other gains for AWA members.

Although nonunion workers had similar

leverage, the payoff to Thompson

workers was larger because of the greater

risk that they might defect to a national

union.37 They had already made a psycho-

logical break by becoming union members;

voting for the UAW would merely have

meant a change of representatives rather

than a whole new system of dues, stew-

35 AWA Publicity Committee, flyer, May 17, 1954.

36 "TRW Hit by Strike at Cleveland Facilities,"

Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1979.

37 Castle in 57 NLRB 1007 (1944).

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 31

ards, grievance handling, and contracts.38

Finally, even when no drive was under

way, AWA members could still signal their

dissatisfaction by rejecting a tentative

agreement, an action they took in 1955.

Throughout the AWA's early years, its

leaders relied heavily on attorney Roe-

misch for guidance. He helped them plot

defensive tactics during UAW drives,

which earned him the enmity of the UAW.

But his assistance went far beyond cam-

paigns. During negotiations he took the

lead-marshaling arguments and facts to

back up the AWA's demands or explain-

ing how to comply with overtime laws.

Roemisch was always polite to manage-

,ment and careful to point out that his

proposals were "realistic" and unlike the

"pie in the sky" demands of national

unions. But he could also be aggressive,

especially if he thought management was

making decisions behind the AWA's (and

his) back. Thus, Roemisch provided some

advice of the sort usually available through

a national union's research staff. Although

other ILUs (such as those at AT&T) relied

on advisers outside of their ranks, a 1945

study judged this arrangement to be "very

exceptional. "39

As time went on, the AWA developed a

cadre of leaders who were familiar with

the arcana of bargaining and grievance

handling. An important source of their

experience was the grievance plan estab-

lished in 1942 by the WLB at Thompson's

Cleveland plants. Under that plan Thomp-

son was forced to recognize the IAM and

the UAW (along with the BIW and AWA)

for grievance-handling purposes. Workers

could select a steward from the union of

their choice and file a grievance under the

WLB's multistep procedure that ended in

arbitration. UAW stewards were more

aggressive-filing more grievances and

pressing a greater number to arbitration-

38 Interview with Oscar Lockard, former AWA

president, Nov. 1987; "Contract Negotiations," July

22, 1955, box 117, TRWP.

39 "Transcript of NLRB Trial 1943," 620, reel IB,

TPP; LRC Minutes, Oct. 11, 1949, box 120. and June

27, 1949, box 70, and Roemisch to Clegg, Mar. 1,

1949, box 118, TRWP; Schacht (1985), p. 73; Millis

and Montgomery (1945), p. 884.

but faced with this competition, the AWA's

stewards were forced to learn contract

administration and to assert themselves,

which they did.

Nevertheless, the AWA's grievance

record differed from that of a typical

UAW local. Not until the 1960s did the

AWA take a grievance to an outside

arbitrator, even though the contract so

allowed. Thompson management had a

strong aversion to arbitration, did not

want to establish any precedent for its use,

and was able to persuade the AWA to

acquiesce on this issue.

Management paid a price for the AWA's

cooperation, however. On more than one

occasion the union threatened to turn to

outside arbitration if management did not

render a decision in favor of the em-

ployee. The company, in turn, had to

either decide the case in the AWA's favor

or concede on some other issue. Over the

years the AWA pressed a number of

grievances to the fifth and penultimate

step in the procedure: a hearing by Lee

Clegg. In theory, Clegg was supposed to

stick to the facts of a case, but he was

vulnerable to pressure from the union.

In other aspects of grievance handling

the AWA had a more conventional record.

Stewards were usually conscientious in

looking out for the job rights of "their

people." Aside from discipline and dis-

charge, the bulk of grievances involved

wage standards, occupational nomencla-

ture, seniority, and demarcation. In other

words, the AWA-like other unions of its

day-fought to preserve a workplace

structure built around rigid job classifica-

tions and seniority rights in promotion

and layoff. Internal labor markets at the

Cleveland plants were much like those at

other unionized firms.40

40 "Public hearing before the NWLB," Nov. 20,

1942, reel 2, TPP; NWLB Directive Order, Case no.

516, Nov. 25, 1942; Lockard interview, November

1987; Minutes of the Cleveland Personnel Commit-

tee, July 2, 1962, box 125; Roemisch to Livingstone,

June 6, 1951, box 117, TRWP; A. Sheahen to

Livingstone, June 21, 1951, box 117; Minutes of the

Main Plant Personnel Meeting, Jan. 17, 1958, box

133; Main Plant grievance files, 1944-1958, boxes

111 and 112, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions32 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

The AWA was never a leader in pay and

benefits, but its contract gains belied the

claim that ILUs were "less effective in

handling wages and hours than in han-

dling other matters." To give automotive

firms an incentive to outsource, Thomp-

son-a parts supplier-kept pay at levels

below those of the Big Three automakers.

But AWA members were still in a high

bracket, earning as much as UAW mem-

bers at firms like International Harvester.

Because it provided good benefits and

matched the auto pattern on raises,

Thompson was rated the best paying local

firm in a 1953 survey of Cleveland factory

workers, even though its wages were lower

than some other firms mentioned in the

survey.4'

Although the AWA felt no prods from

the UAW between 1948 and 1960, it kept

close track of national union pay trends.

In 1949 it asked to reopen the contract as

soon as a "pattern" had been set at Ford

and Chrysler. Two years later, after telling

the company that "dominant" Cleveland

firms were matching the UAW pattern,

the AWA received cost-of-living (COLA)

and improvement-factor clauses in its

contracts.42

Management also monitored pay trends,

because the consequences of falling out of

line could be serious. For example, it con-

ducted studies of UAW pension plans at

Ford, GM, and Ryan Aircraft that led to a

1955 agreement to align the AWA's pen-

sion plan more closely to the UAW's. And

when the GM-UAW COLA formula paid

two cents more than the AWA's, manage-

ment expressed concern that "if this differ-

ential increases much more, the company

might seriously have to consider a change to

4' Millis and Montgomery (1945), p. 883; LRC

Minutes (Cleveland area), June 2, 1961, box 125;

Friendly Forum, Mar. 1, 1946, box 39; "Comparison of

Wages, Main Plant, with U.S. CPI and Wages in

Manufacturing 1948-1960," box 141; Cleveland Pro-

files-Cuyahoga County (May 1953), 1-10, box 128.

Union officials admitted in private that Thompson

was hard to organize because it paid prevailing

wages. E. H. White to S. L. Newman, Apr. 15, 1950,

reel 218, Intl. President's file, IAM Papers, State

Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison).

42 LRC Minutes, June 28, 1949, and Roemisch to

Livingstone, Jan. 11, 1950, box 120.

the GM index." Thus, the UAW's initiatives

served as intermittent, negative reinforce-

ment: they kept management and the AWA

alert to relative pay issues whether a cam-

paign was under way or not.43

No doubt some would consider the AWA's

behavior to have been parasitic. But it was

no different from the kind of wage imita-

tion practiced by small national unions lo-

cated within the wage orbits of large pattern-

setting ones. The only difference was the

consequence for the employer of refusing

to match the pattern: a strike in one case, an

organizing drive in the other.

Cooperation. The relationship between the

AWA and management was akin to a bilat-

eral monopoly: Thompson was the only firm

the AWA bargained with, and the AWA was

the only union that management wanted to

deal with. This arrangement gave the AWA

some of its bargaining power but at the same

time constrained it not to be too aggressive,

lest management lose its preference for an

ILU. Hence Thompson usually met the

AWA's demands, but when it did not, the

union was reluctant to push hard or to raise

the strike threat. Since both sides had an

interest in keeping the UAW out, these dy-

namics produced a highly cooperative rela-

tionship.

During organizing drives, this coopera-

tion became something closer to collusion.

To defeat the UAW, the AWA and

Thompson collaborated in an adroit ma-

nipulation of personnel practices. AWA

members could leave work early to distrib-

ute literature on company time and

property, and foremen were instructed

not to extend these privileges to UAW

supporters. Ed Castle received a pass

giving him access to all parts of the plant

so that he could "knock off the new

employees before the CIO would talk to

them."44

Management bolstered the AWA's pop-

ularity by allowing it to run a patronage

43 H. E. Stevens toJ. W. Drake et al., May 5, 1955,

and G. H. Malone memo, May 17, 1955, box 117;

Main Plant Personnel Meeting, Apr. 26, 1957, box

133.

44"Statement of Ed Castle," Jan. 20, 1944, and

Livingstone, Personnel Memo, May 1, 1944, reel 3,

TPP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 33

system that dispensed favors to the union's

supporters. Sometimes the patronage was

bald, as when the AWA's president of-

fered one worker a better job if he quit the

UAW. At other times it came more subtly,

as when management chose only AWA

activists to head its wartime joint commit-

tees, including the one that allocated

gas-rationing cards to employees. To help

the AWA gain black members, manage-

ment told it to file a grievance saying that

dust bags needed more frequent cleaning.

Then, when the company hired black

women to empty the bags-something it

was planning to do anyway-the AWA

could take credit for their employment.45

Bargaining brought forth a more be-

nign form of cooperation. Management

regularly gave the AWA financial data on

the firm and allowed it to hire an

accountant to inspect company records

before negotiating a pension plan. For its

part, the AWA repeatedly assured manage-

ment that it was "mindful that the com-

pany faces a serious competitive situation"

and would only make demands that were

"fair." Unlike a national union, the AWA

dealt only with Thompson, and so it was

willing and able to make concessions for

the firm's long-term health, a fact that

management was well aware of. During

the 1958 negotiations a company memo-

randurn noted that "we are certain our

requests will be fairly considered, for

AWA representatives have on many occa-

sions proven their interest in the com-

pany's well-being while at the same time

fairly representing their membership."

When profits were off in 1961, the AWA

allowed the company to depart from the

auto industry pattern. In return, the

company accepted the AWA's demand for

a revamping of the job evaluation plan. In

45 "Transcript of NLRB Trial 1943," 188-93,

490-523, 1116, 1153, reel lB and 9185-6, reel 5B,

TPP. These tactics persisted into the 1960s. After a

1967 election, the UAW charged that TRW gave the

AWA free rein in the plants, while denying UAW

supporters an opportunity to campaign. The NLRB

ordered a rerun election but the UAW lost again.

"UAW 1967" file, box 141; NLRB Case No.

8-RC-6714, TRW Inc. and UAW, AFL-CIO, May 1967,

box 141, TRWP.

so doing, management showed that it too

was interested in the other party's long-

run health.46

Each plant represented by the AWA

had a joint council, the monthly meetings

of which were an important part of the

collaborative relationship. Here manage-

ment regularly presented reports on cor-

porate affairs or informed AWA officials

of decisions on plant matters such as

scheduling and layoffs. But the bulk of the

council's time was devoted to issues raised

by AWA officials. As in the 1930s, most of

these were integrative concerns (sanita-

tion, safety, parking) or plant personnel

matters (transfer, backpay, suggestion

awards). Typically, management promised

to take care of the problem or assigned it

to one of several standing joint committees

(seniority, safety, security). Joint task forces

dealt with special issues like savings plans

and cafeteria prices. Most matters were

resolved in a single council meeting, but

some discussions stretched over months

without reaching a definitive conclusion.

Because the council was part of the

grievance procedure (the fourth step), it

regularly heard grievances that had not

been resolved at lower levels, including

complaints on discipline and discharge.

(For grievances of plant-wide concern, the

AWA could skip lower steps and go

directly to the council.) Given its coopera-

tive approach, the council usually resolved

the grievances that came before it. A few

difficult cases were referred to ad hoc

committees that tried to find mutually

agreeable solutions to the problem. In

other words, the adversarial edge in the

grievance process was softened at the

council level. Contributing to this pattern

was the tendency of AWA officials to

bypass the procedure by bringing griev-

able matters up at council meetings.47

46 LRC Minutes (Main), June 28, 1949, and Oct.

11, 1949, box 120; Livingstone to Cleveland Factory

Supervision, Mar. 21, 1958, box 117; LRC Minutes

(Cleveland area), June 1, 1961, box 125; "AWA

1961-62" file, box 126.

47 Based on LRC minutes from Cleveland area

plants, 1948-1964, boxes 120-21 and 127-28,

TRWP. From 1950 to 1958, the most commonly

discussed LRC topics were plant conditions (23%),

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions34 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

A thin line also separated council meet-

ings and contract negotiations, producing

a system akin to continuous bargaining.

Issues regularly surfaced at the council

that properly were topics for bargaining,

such as a new pension plan or a change in

the seniority system. Although the AWA's

contracts contained the UAW-GM wage

formula that was designed to eliminate

reopenings, the formula tended to under-

estimate real wage trends. Rather than

wait for contract renewal time, council

members negotiated and then added

amendments to the contract. Because

there was little chance of a strike, manage-

ment was willing to reopen the contract

for wage as well as noneconomic issues.

The supplemental agreements negotiated

during intracontractual years allowed the

AWA to appear to be "delivering the

goods" on a more regular basis than

national unions.

Among many similarities to Japanese

enterprise unionism was the AWA's strong

loyalty to the company. AWA leaders

openly expressed concern for Thompson's

economic health and their confidence in

top management. When J. David Wright

became head of Thompson in 1953, the

AWA's president wrote a letter assuring

members that "Dave" was "fair and square

in all dealings with our membership" and

that "we have always found him to be on

the level." The company reciprocated by

doing favors for the AWA, such as pulling

strings in state government so that the

AWA could legally hold a plant bingo

party or keeping production down on the

day of its annual picnic. Council meetings

were polite, amiable, and full of expres-

sions of mutual understanding, with each

side assuring the other that its actions

were "fair and reasonable." Special meet-

ings were held at Christmas; until the early

1950s, these were accompanied by skits

and a party.48

personnel matters (21%), wage rates and standards

(10%), business plans (10%), safety (7%), and

parking (6%).

48 AWA News Bulletin, 2 April 1953, box 117;

Minutes of Main Plant Personnel Meeting, Nov. 10,

1961, box 133; LRC Minutes (Main): May 5, 1949,

Cooptation. By no means, however, was the

AWA identical to a Japanese union in all

respects. For cultural and other reasons, the

AWA was more assertive in disagreeing with

management, more militant in handling

grievances, and more effectual in getting

the company to change its plans and poli-

cies. But there was one similarity to the Jap-

anese case that limited these differences: the

union leaders' susceptibility to manipula-

tion by the company.

Unlike a national union, the AWA could

provide its leaders no opportunity for pro-

motion into union staff positions. Instead,

they returned to their old jobs when their

terms expired, although some were later

promoted into management. Ambitious

AWA officials realized that the rewards to

militance were limited -reelection, eventu-

ally followed by a return to the ranks and

possible retaliation by management. On the

other hand, someone who was cooperative

but not overly obsequious might still get

reelected and then receive a promotion at

the end of his term.

The company also offered direct finan-

cial inducements to cooperation. The

earnings of AWA officers-from presi-

dent to steward-were far in excess of

those received by workers in similar job

classifications. The differential in 1952

averaged 42 percent for the AWA's top

four officers; one steward managed to

raise this to 112 percent. The excess was

entirely the result of overtime pay, part of

which was compensation for normal union

duties such as bargaining and grievance

handling; these took more time than at

other firms because many issues were

handled by joint committees. But AWA

officers were appointed to a slew of plant

organizations-Bond Drive, Old Guard,

and the Welfare Fund-for which they

also received overtime pay.49

The practice of awarding high overtime

compensation to AWA officers was not

entirely secret. A college student who

spent a week at TAPCO in the early 1950s

box 120, and Dec. 7, 1960, box 121; G. H. Malone

memo, Dec. 2, 1949, box 118, TRWP.

49 Eugene Schwartz memo, Dec. 8, 1953, box 117,

TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 35

reported to management that "stewards

seem to be a thorn in our side. Entirely too

many of them abhor work, it seems!"

Three years later an attitude survey found

that workers were annoyed by the stew-

ards' "loafing tactics." Concerned by this

discontent and aware that these practices

might lead to charges of illegal support,

management tried in the late 1950s to

limit the overtime received by stewards,

although it is not known if the effort was

successful.50

Finally, the AWA's isolation permitted a

more subtle form of manipulation. The

AWA had few contacts with, and no

formal ties to, union locals at Thompson

plants outside of Cleveland. The Cleve-

land labor movement was contemptuous

and suspicious of the AWA, which repaid

those feelings in kind. Too small to train

its own officers and cut off from most

labor education programs, the AWA had

to rely on management for some of its

technical needs, which the company will-

ingly provided. It held classes for newly

elected stewards, where they received

basic information on Thompson's person-

nel practices, financial standing, and busi-

ness plans. Company managers sought to

"integrate new AWA officers" by taking

them to American Management Associa-

tion conferences and by holding training

sessions in job evaluation. It is little

wonder that the UAW charged that there

was a "cozy relationship between the AWA

and the company."'5'

Coercion or Choice?

Traditionally it is assumed that com-

pany unions do not function as true labor

unions, protecting and advancing the

welfare of their members, and that work-

ers support them because they are coerced

50 Karl Heilman, Jr., to G. H. Malone, Aug. 19,

1952, box 113, TRWP; Arlen Southern, "Results of

the 1957 Spot Check of Employee Opinion," Febru-

ary 1957, box 137, TRWP; G. H. Malone to R. G.

McCarty, Nov. 5, 1958, box 118, TRWP.

5 Minutes of the Cleveland Personnel Committee:

Apr. 15, 1957, June 6, 1962, and Oct. 1, 1962, box

125, TRWP; UAW flyer, Apr. 27, 1967, box 141,

TRWP.

or naive. In the case of the AWA, then,

the question is whether Thompson work-

ers made a free and informed choice to

back the AWA.

There is certainly evidence to support a

charge of coercion. Workers were bom-

barded by management bulletins, forced to

listen to Crawford's speeches, and occasion-

ally pressured by shopfloor favoritism. More-

over, the AWA's close cooperation with man-

agement may have undercut its effectiveness

as a proponent for its members without their

ever realizing it. As Chairman Paul Herzog

of the NLRB argued during the Taft-

Hartley hearings, when management bar-

gained with a dominated union, it found

itself on both sides of the table. Workers

might vote for such a union, said Herzog,

but they did so out of a "mistaken contin-

ued belief that the company-dominated or-

ganization affords a genuine agency for col-

lective bargaining." Although the AWA was

exonerated from charges of domination, it

was obviously a different breed of union

from the UAW-namely, a less adversarial

and less independent one.

But it does strain credulity to say that

the majority of Thompson workers were

unaware of that difference or accepted it

only by compulsion. After a decade of

campaigns and six elections, they were

well informed of the AWA's faults and

merits. During the Taft-Hartley hearings,

a congressman cited the Thompson record

and then asked an NLRB official if he

thought Thompson workers were "that

easily influenced and their minds poi-

soned, and that dumb and stupid, that

they cannot go in and exercise a reason-

able intelligence and have their votes

counted and recognized?" Not only the

election results but also data from the

company's attitude surveys show that

Thompson workers had few serious com-

plaints about management and, though

not enthusiastic about the AWA, "general-

ly regarded [it] as the lesser of two evils.

... The CIO is considered more distaste-

ful than the independent union."52

52 Paul Herzog in U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st

sess., Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and

Public Welfare, 1947, pt. 4, 1912; Hugh Sperry in

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions36 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

That Thompson workers might prefer the

AWA to the UAW was hard for NLRB of-

ficials and others to accept (and still is to-

day). Yet, circumstances other than coer-

cion helped shape their preference. First,

Thompson workers had a high degree of

loyalty to management as a result of the com-

pany's financial success, its brand of com-

munitarianism, and the charisma of Fred

Crawford. Their loyalty was something the

UAW consistently failed to recognize, and

so its attacks on Crawford ("the number one

fascist in America") were counterproduc-

tive to say the least.

Second, the AWA did at least a mini-

mally effective job of handling grievances,

and its contracts consistently followed the

UAW pattern. AWA members received

these benefits for only a fraction of the

cost of UAW membership (UAW dues

were about six times higher) and, at least

until 1979, without any losses due to

strikes.

Third, the AWA offered a more imme-

diate and less bureaucratic form of democ-

racy than a national union. All of its

officers, from the president on down,

came from the plant and were well known

by the members. Elections for office were

hotly contested and highly publicized.

Unlike an affiliated local of a national

union, the AWA was entirely the master of

its own fate. It did not have to answer to a

higher authority or conform to policies

that were not of its choosing. Because it

had no staff and only a simple hierarchy,

the AWA was less formal and legalistic

than a national union. Although the UAW

faulted it for failing to hold regular

meetings, the AWA's small size and numer-

ous social activities kept its officers in

touch with the membership.

Another reason for the AWA's success

was its relatively auspicious beginnings.

Management had allowed the AWA's

predecessors to be more active than most

company unions of the 1930s, and the

AWA grew out of that tradition. Those

early policies explain why Thompson's

U.S. House of Reps., 80th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings

Before the Comm. of Educ. and Labor, 1947, Vol. 3,

3472; Southern, "Spot Check," 8.

Cleveland plants remained ILU strong-

holds, whereas those in Toledo and

Detroit were organized by the UAW

during the war. The three plants resem-

bled each other in many respects: their

size, product lines, and work force all were

similar. One difference, however, was that

until the late 1930s the Toledo and Detroit

plants were managed locally. The produc-

tion manager in Toledo was a rugged

individualist who did not adopt the person-

nel policies established by Livingstone at

Main. Not until the Toledo plant had a

strike in 1937 was a company union

established there.

As for Detroit, it too lagged behind its

sister plant in Cleveland. A year after the

TPEA was formed, it started a company

union, but this was an ineffectual organi-

zation because Detroit management never

gave employee relations a high priority.

When Livingstone visited Detroit in 1936,

he was distressed to find that the plant

personnel manager, Tom Colbridge, did

not have his own office (his desk was next

to the gum machine) and that the joint

council had not been "functioning as an

agency for the free exchange and discus-

sion of ideas by the management and

employees." Livingstone noted "a ten-

dency to suppress subjects the employees

would like to discuss most," and when

shown the minutes of the Cleveland joint

council, Colbridge remarked, "You fellows

really discuss things in Cleveland, don't

you!" In short, what was distinctive about

Cleveland was not coercion (each plant

had some of this, and Cleveland less than

the others) but a more progressive ap-

proach to personnel management and

company unionism.53

The UAW's failure to defeat the AWA

in Cleveland was not, however, entirely

preordained. Around the middle of the

war, when the AWA was getting off the

ground and Main plant was without a

union, the UAW seemed to have a

reasonable chance of victory. Because the

53 "Complaint of the UAW to the NLRB 7th

Region," Case C-386, July 1940, box 143; Toledo

Blade, May 22, 1937; Livingstone to J. Cox, Feb. 24,

1936, box 142, and Toledo files, box 146, TRWP.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 37

WLB was concerned about war produc-

tion at Thompson, it was quick to reinstate

dismissed UAW activists. Its grievance

procedure gave UAW stewards a presence

on the shopfloor and a unique opportu-

nity to prove their mettle.

But factional politics were a problem

that increasingly hindered the UAW's

campaign and consumed the energy and

effectiveness of its leaders, many of

whom-Ed Hall, Paul Miley, Bill Grant,

and Wyndham Mortimer-were associ-

ated with the UAW's left wing. When

Elizabeth Hawes, a UAW representative,

visited Cleveland in 1944 and 1945, she

reported that the drive was stalled because

of "Chop Chop"-internal union disputes.

Local UAW staff members told her that

the "Reutherites" had sent an inexperi-

enced organizer to lead the campaign in

the hope that a failure would discredit the

left. Two years later, in what was widely

viewed as an attack on the left, Walter

Reuther's convention speech called for an

investigation of the Thompson drive,

which he castigated as "a glaring example

of . . . mismanagement and waste of

funds." All of these events created a

propaganda opportunity for Thompson

and spokesmen for the AWA, who repeat-

edly criticized the UAW's "Communist

contamination" and called its stewards

"babes in the woods with noble motives

who [are having] clever webs spun upon

them.954

The final blow to the UAW's efforts

came from the conservative drift of labor

law and the NLRB. Under pressure from

the courts and Congress, the NLRB in the

5 Hawes (1946), pp. 181-84; "Report of the

President," Proceedings of the 11th Convention of the

UAW-CIO, Atlantic City, 9 November 1947, 26-28;

Friendly Forum, Dec. 12, 1947, box 42; "By Their

Leaders You Shall Know Them," May 7, 1947, box

40, TRWP. The UAW also was a victim of its success.

It told Thompson's Cleveland workers that they were

paid less than UAW members at major auto firms.

But after the UAW organized the Detroit plant in

1943, AWA members had a more accurate standard

for judging relative pay. Thompson and the AWA

now maintained wage parity with the Detroit plant,

making it harder for the UAW to claim that AWA

members were underpaid. L. Nies memo, Mar. 9,

1959, box 118; "UAW 1967" files, box 141.

early 1940s adopted a more "balanced"

approach to a variety of issues, including

employer free speech and company unions.

One of the board's main critics on these

issues was the Sixth Circuit, which over-

ruled the NLRB in two major decisions

involving Thompson's Cleveland plants

and in other cases as well. Harry Millis,

picked to head the NLRB in 1940, and his

successor, Paul Herzog, were more at-

tuned to politics and public relations than

were their predecessors. It was Millis who

ordered the NLRB not to apply the

fracture rule too rigidly, a policy that

Herzog extended by allowing illegally

supported unions to appear on the ballot.

As a result of these more lenient policies,

ILUs began to win a growing number of

elections and were disestablished less

often: only 51 were disestablished in 1946

and 1947 out of more than 300 cases filed.

Yet, these policies came too late to deter

legislative reform of the act. During the

Taft-Hartley hearings, critics of the board

repeatedly cited Thompson Products as

proof that the law on employer conduct

and company unions had to be changed.

The critics included Leo Wolman, who

testified in the Senate, and Ray Living-

stone, who got a sympathetic reception

from the House. These events were felt

outside of Congress: four months after

Livingstone's appearance, the Sixth Cir-

cuit issued its pivotal decision on the AWA

and a month later the NLRB refused to

order new elections at Main. Thus, the

UAW's myriad political difficulties-both

internal and in Washington-weakened its

position and strengthened the AWA's at a

critical moment in the contest between

them.55

The Strategy's Demise and Legacy

The Taft-Hartley Act ratified Craw-

ford's views on free speech and contained

55 Statement of Leo Wolman, Senate Committee

on Labor (1947), pt. 1, 98-109; statement of

Raymond S. Livingstone, House Committee on

Education and Labor (1947), Vol. 3, 1489-1531;

Millis and Brown (1950), pp. 107-10; Gross (1981),

pp. 227, 248.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions38 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

several provisions making it easier for

employer-supported unions to appear on

the ballot. The result was an upsurge in

ILU formation between 1947 and 1953.

ILU membership increased 50 percent

over those years, faster than the rest of

organized labor. This increase, however,

was a flash in the pan. Few new ILUs

appeared after 1960; those that did were

usually the result of a decertification or of

a local's opting out of a union merger.

Company unionism was a risky and

costly strategy for avoiding national unions.

There was always a danger that an ILU

would become aggressively adversarial or

would affiliate with a national union.

Affiliation was a perennial threat because

ILU members were more likely than

nonunion workers to join a national

union; they were tempting targets for

organizers. But even if an ILU never came

near that brink, bargaining and contract

administration took time and restricted

management's ability to make prompt and

unquestioned decisions. On top of that,

ILU pay levels at Thompson were about

the same as at its affiliated union plants.

Management shouldered these costs when

it judged national unions to be a serious

threat. By the mid-1950s, however, private-

sector unions had begun to lose steam,

and shortly afterward came "a more

realistic assessment of the diminished

threat offered to the business community

by organized labor."56

One result of this development was a

loss of interest in ILUs at firms that had

managed to maintain them past World

War II. At Du Pont this change in attitude

happened rather quickly. Only a couple of

ILUs took hold at Du Pont after the war,

the last in 1949. The firm opened up 25

new plants during the following decade,

mostly in the South and all of them

nonunion.

Thompson was slower to shed its ILU

strategy. Of eight plants built or acquired

during the 1950s, it set up company

unions at seven. Thompson stuck with the

strategy longer than Du Pont for two

reasons. First, its plants continued to be

56 Heilbroner (1964), p. 29; Troy (1961), p. 340.

concentrated in unionism's heartland --the

Midwest and Northeast-where the prob-

ability of organization, although declining,

was higher than in the South. Second,

Thompson's ILUs were less militant than

Du Pont's. Between 1944 and 1959 Du

Pont's ILUs carried out four strikes and

filed sixteen unfair labor practice charges,

while none of Thompson's ILUs did

either.57

Yet, in spite of this record, Thompson

(now TRW) shifted strategies after 1960.

It picked up the pace of diversification,

building or acquiring 39 plants during the

1960s and 27 during the 1970s. No ILUs

were established at any of these plants, the

majority of which (72 percent) were

nonunion. The decision to drop the ILU

strategy was due to a decline in the

perceived benefit of ILUs (a result of the

fading union threat and of TRW's growth

in the South and West) and an increase in

their relative cost. The company's new

nonunion plants paid lower wages and

benefits than its ILU plants. TRW was

nonetheless able to keep the plants unor-

ganized because an alternative strategy

had become available-the new nonunion

model. Indeed, TRW was a pioneer in the

development of that model and served as

an exemplar for other firms.58

At TRW the nonunion model's distinc-

tive features include programs for commu-

nications ("sensing" sessions, attitude test-

ing) and employee involvement (QWL,

quality circles), as well as a "flexible"

approach to work systems (using teams

and pay-for-knowledge). The emergence

of the nonunion model at TRW was based,

in part, on new theories of participation

and job design that appeared in the 1960s.

But rather than being a sharp departure

from the past, the new model has strong

links to the company's earlier practices.

Like the ILU strategy, it is built on

57 Rezler (1963), pp. 178-95; letter to author from

R. D. Lundy, Vice President, TRW Inc., Dec. 19,

1986.

58 Verma and Kochan (1985), pp. 93-95. Regres-

sion analysis of data for 1979-83 shows that TRW's

ILU plants paid roughly the same as its affiliated

plants and more than its nonunion plants. Jacoby

and Verma (1988).

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECKONING WITH COMPANY UNIONS 39

antipathy to national unions rather than to

collective forms of employee influence. Its

stress on corporate culture and the dimi-

nution of status distinctions is similar to

ideas that informed Thompson's commu-

nitarian ethos. Intensive communications

programs are also throwbacks: to the

Mayoist paternalism found at Thompson

in the 1930s and 1940s and to specific

techniques (attitude surveys, media blitzes,

personnel "reps") used in those years.59

This comparison is not meant to deny

important differences between the present

and the past, notably in work systems and

the psychological modeling of employee

behavior. But it is intended to correct the

fallacy that the "new" nonunion model is

entirely new. That fallacy leads to an

explanation of the model's origins that

overemphasizes conjunctural factors-

new technology (continuous flow, flexibil-

ity), new workers (young, educated), new

theories (Y and Z)-at the expense of

more enduring issues and ideas: the

conflict between democracy and bureau-

cracy, the legitimation of industrial author-

ity, employer animus toward unionism,

and corporate paternalism. The point is

that employers face recurrent problems,

and although each generation of employ-

ers fashions its own solutions, in doing so

it relies heavily on values and institutions

inherited from the past. At a less grandi-

ose level, an emphasis on continuity helps

us to understand how individual firms like

TRW and IBM-firms with distinctive

histories of employee relations-became

paragons of the "new" nonunion model.

Conclusions

Company unions represented between

two and three million workers in 1934, but

over the next two decades most of these

workers joined national unions. Why did

Thompson's Cleveland employees choose

to be different? The traditional view holds

59 Interview with Jim Dunlap, Feb. 2, 1988, and

with Dr. Simon Ramo, Dec. 17, 1986; Oates (1973).

An account of the new nonunion model that is partly

based on the TRW experience is Kochan, Katz, and

McKersie (1986), pp. 93-108.

that they were bullied or misled. There

was some of that, to be sure, but there

were other factors as well. These workers

had a high level of enterprise conscious-

ness as a result of the firm's strong culture

and its progressive personnel policies. Not

only did the UAW fail to recognize this

fact, but it also suffered from bad timing:

its own, and that of events. Moreover, the

AWA evolved into an organization that

met its members' needs. Its adequacy in

that respect was a result of external

pressure (from the law and the UAW) and

of internal factors (competition for office,

learning by doing, and managerial toler-

ance of change.)

Yet, differences remained between the

AWA and a typical affiliated union local,

differences that reflected both the sins

and virtues of being an ILU. As compared

to most local unions, the AWA was less

militant and more dependent on the

company, but it also had a more coopera-

tive and trusting relationship with manage-

ment. In both respects, it presaged both

the union and nonunion variants of

today's "new industrial relations."

The new industrial relations, which

blends integrative and adversarial modes

of behavior, is a hybrid that has proven

difficult to graft onto most existing work-

places. Nonunion employers find it hard

to fairly administer employee complaint

systems, and participation programs often

meet with resistance in unionized firms.

On the assumption that both modes are

desirable, industrial relations experts are

trying to invent new institutions that

combine them or are searching overseas

for ideas. Some have looked to Japanese

enterprise unions or to European works

councils and have called for similar forms

of representation in the United States.60

But it is also worth looking back at our

own experience with company unions;

domestic models are likely to be more

viable than imports from abroad. Com-

pany unions might appeal to workers who

identify with their employer, are able to

run a union on their own, and have little

60 Heckscher (1988); McCormick (1987), pp. 76-

79.

This content downloaded from 146.245.216.150 on Thu, 23 Jan 2014 03:09:06 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions40 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

affinity for national unions-that is, to

workers in large nonunion firms like

TRW.

To move in this direction, public policy

should encourage new forms of represen-

tation. But to prevent a recurrence of the

events of the 1920s and 1930s, policy must

be designed so that any new forms become

complements to, rather than substitutes

for, national unions. The goal is to expand

the realm of representation, not merely to

change its composition.

But even if the law were changed, it is

doubtful that many employers would

embrace ILUs except in the unlikely event

of a resurgence of national unionism. As

the Thompson experience shows, ILU

costs for employers are high relative to the

benefits they receive. On the other hand,

unorganized workers might be more en-

thusiastic, because ILUs have the potential

of providing them with representation at

organizational levels higher than the shop-

floor, which is the level at which most

nonunion employee involvement pro-

grams operate. The Thompson story also

suggests, however, that ILUs today would

offer workers less bargaining power and

benefits than they did in the 1940s and

1950s, when the "threat effects" of na-

tional unions were strong.

These qualifications should temper ex-

pectations about company unions but not

close off interest in them. Little is known

about most ILUs, and the AWA is but one

example. As compared to other ILUs, it

fell somewhere in the middle: less aggres-

sive and independent than some, and

more so than others. Even within single

companies like TRW or DuPont, there was

considerable variation among ILUs. Thus,

there is urgent need for more research-

historical, comparative, and contempo-

rary-on this important subject.

REFERENCES

Clark, C. A., Jr. 1952. "Thompson Products."

Barron's, Vol. 32 (March 31), pp. 19-21.

Gross, James A. 1981. The Reshaping of the National

Labor Relations Board. Albany: SUNY Press.

Hawes, Elizabeth. 1946. Hurry Up Please Its Time. New

York: Reynal & Hitchcock.

Heckscher, Charles. 1988. The New Unionism. New

York: Twentieth Century Fund.

Heilbroner, Robert. 1964. "The View from the Top:

Reflections on a Changing Business Ideology." In

Earl F. Cheit, ed., The Business Establishment. New

York: Wiley, pp. 1-36.

Jacoby, S.M., and Anil Verma. 1988. "Enterprise

Unions in the United States." UCLA Institute of

Industrial Relations Working Paper no. 155, July.

Kochan, Thomas, Harry Katz, and Robert McKersie.

1986. The Transformation of American Industrial

Relations. New York: Basic Books.

Livingstone, R. S. "Settling Disputes Without Inter-

rupting Production." Management Record, Vol. 4

(December), pp. 385-91.

McCormick, Janice. 1987. "Challenge in Industrial

Relations." Sloan Management Review, Vol. 28

(Winter), pp. 76-77.

McMurry, Robert N. 1955. "War and Peace in Labor

Relations." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 33 (No-

vember), pp. 48-60.

Millis, Harry A., and Emily Clark Brown. 1950. From

the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press.

Millis, H. A., and Royal Montgomery. 1945. Orga-

nized Labor. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Nelson, Daniel. 1982. "The Company Union Move-

ment, 1900-1937: A Reexamination." Business

History Review, Vol. 56 (Autumn), pp. 335-57.

Oates, David. 1973. "Sensing Aides Candour in

Aerospace Firm." International Machinist, April, pp.

1-4.

Rezler, Julius. 1963. "Labor Organization at DuPont:

A Study in Independent Unionism." Labor History,

Vol. 4 (Spring), pp. 178-95.

Saposs, D. J. 1936. "Organizational and Procedural

Changes in Employee Representation Plans." Jour-

nal of Political Economy, Vol 44 (December), pp.

803-11.

Schacht, John N. 1985. The Making of Telephone

Unionism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University

Press.

Shore, Harvey. 1966. "A Historical Analysis of

Thompson Products' Successful Program to Dis-

courage Employee Acceptance of Outside Unions,

1934-1947." D.B.A. thesis, Harvard Business

School.

Troy, Leo. 1961. "Local Independent Unions and

the American Labor Movement." Industrial and

Labor Relations Review, Vol. 14 (April), pp. 331-49.

Troy, Leo, and Neil Sheflin. 1985. Union Sourcebook.

West Orange, N.J.: IRDIS.

Verma, Anil, and Thomas Kochan. 1985. "The

Growth and Nature of the Nonunion Sector

Within a Firm." In Thomas Kochan, ed., Challenges