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FROM THE EVANS SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
The
Electronic
Hallway
®
Box 353060 · University of Wash
ington · Seattle WA
98195- 3060
www.hallway.org
This
case was prepared in 1987 for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters by Dan H. Fenn, Jr., retired
faculty of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and faculty for the Cascade Center for
Public Service
Executive Programs. This case study is intended as a basis for class discussion and is not intended to
suggest correct or incorrect handling of the situation depicted.
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Copyright 1996 The Electronic Hallway
A CHANGE OF MANAGEMENT
After the announcement of his successor as Executive Director of New Jersey Public Television
(NJPTV) on March 20, 1979, Dr. Lawrence T. Frymire busied himself cleaning up the loose
ends of the position which he had held since
the system had become operational some nine
years before. Looking ahead to April 30, his last day in office, he still wondered what had
happened --
why the Commissioners of the Public Broadcasting Authority had suddenly
requested his resignation some four mon
ths before.
The newspapers thought they had the answer: Governor Brendan T. Byrne was seeking to
establish political control over the state's public broadcasting system. As evidence, they noted
that the leading contenders fo
r the job were
Herbert Wolfe,
Byrne's first information director,
and former Democratic Assemblyman Gordon MacInnes, both politically involved with the
Governor. Frymire thought the pap
ers might be right -- but he was not completely sure.
NJPTV had come into existence in 1969
as the result of a citizens' study made in 1967-68 at
the instigation of then Governor Richard J. Hughes. Governor Hughes had requested a
distinguished group of 18 men and women including the Provost of Princeton, the Poetry Editor
of the Saturday Review, five members of his cabinet and TV personalities like Dallas Townsend
and Dionne Warwick to produce a set "of policies, plans and recommendations for the
development of public radio and television for the state." To head the Commission he selected
Dr. Edward J.
Meade, Jr., then Program Officer in charge of Public Education for the Ford
Foundation.
The Commission issued its report in May, 1968 and the Governor quickly followed through
with its recommendations, filing the nec
essary legislation
to establish a
Public Broadcasting
Authority. Late that year, the Act was passed and signed, and the Governor made the first
appointments of ten public members which were duly confirmed by the Senate. In addition, five
cabinet members (Commissioner of Education, State Treasurer, Chancellor of Higher
A Change Of Management
2
Education, Attorney General and Commissioner of Community Affairs) served ex officio. The
first Chairman was Dr. Meade; the Vice-Chairman was George Connett, Vice President for
personnel administration of the Prudential Insura
nce Company. (Other members, and those
appointed by subsequent Governors, are listed in Attachment 1.)
The Commission plan recommended a capital budget of $16 million, half to be raised in a bond
issue and the other half to come from federal funds, and an annual operating budget of about $6
million. However, the plan was reduced to $7.5 million in capital, financed totally by a bond
issue, and the operating budget to barely $6 million. By the fall of ‘69, a new Governor,
William J. Cahill took office.
While somewhat interested, Cahill was not as enthusiastic about
the project as had been his predecessor. Wanting to see the station for himself, the new
Governor made a visit to the rebuilt bowling alley in a rural area outside Trenton which served
as headquarters for the fledgling operation. To make sure he saw something more than just
empty space, Chairman Meade persuaded RCA to lend some equipment to provide the flavor
of an actual operating station.
The Governor then decided to proceed with the idea,
but more slowly than had been originally
planned because of the financially and politically controversial nature of the undertaking. As
with any major new program in New Jersey, the legislature was especially wary of this one,
uncertain as they were that it could be run
in a non-political, non-partisan fashion.
About this time, Dr. Meade and the Authority began conducting a search for a person to head
up the staff and get the station on the air. After an extensive search, the position was offered to
Dr.
Larry Frymire, a professor of communications at the University of Illinois, who had done a
study for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, worked for the FCC, and worked on the
New Jersey legislation setting up the Authority.
In selecting Frymire, Meade was impressed by his high degree of technical competence and his
intimate knowledge of the administrative steps necessary to put a station on the air. "I didn't
know a tube from a transmitter," Meade said later. In addition, given the potentially
controversial
nature of the effort, the Authority wanted a person of extraordinary integrity and
prudence, someone who did not seek or attract personal visibility but who would rather
concentrate his energies in a steady and
well-
organized way on the launching
and operation of
the station.
Initially Frymire turned Meade down, but by early spring of 1970, with capital funds of $7.5
million and an operating budget of $2.2 million assured, he decided to leave Illinois and take on
the responsibility on June 15, 1970.
By April of 1971, he had Channel 52 in Trenton (the State
capitol) on the air; Channel 23 in Camden followed in October of 1973 and Channels 58 (New
Brunswick) and 50 (Montclair) started operation in June of 1974.
In those first few months, following
the recommendations of the study, the Commissioners made
a number of key policy decisions. First of all, they decided to focus programming on the State
A Change Of Management
3
of New Jersey, rather than on regional, national or international events and interests. They
recognized full well that northern New Jersey was considered by many to be the flagship of
educational broadcasting. Similarly, the southern part of the state had access to the Philadelphia
commercial stations and to Channel 12. Thus they
were faced from the sta
rt with staunch
competition. To make matters worse, they were UHF in a state where few sets were equipped
to pick up that signal; they were brand new; they had to meet the interests of an area with
marked sectional differences, especially between north and south Jersey; and they had no real
constituency, or enthusiastic base of support in the state. Given this situation, the decision to
aim programs at the state itself rather than the region seemed a necessary one.
Secondly, in the face of potential pol
itical difficulties, the Commissioners prohibited staff from
lobbying the legislature in Trenton. Clearly, they could and should respond to initiatives from
elected officials, but the Commission reserved for itself the contacts with the New Jersey
elected
political leadership. (In May, 1977, this prohibition was lifted for Frymire as the
Authority matured and the lack of such contacts began hindering them in the annual competition
for budget support among the various state agencies.)
Third, they decided that they should not
exercise any direct personnel authority themselves.
While they required Larry Frymire to submit a staffing pattern as well as an annual budget for
their review, the selection of people to fill the
various authorized positions was left
solely to his
discretion. Though all staff members came from the state's civil service system, only the clerical
personnel were to come off registers and have tenure. When politicians and other public figures
would suggest people to be appo
inted to the
station, Commissioners would simply accept a
resume and pass it along to Frymire and his staff for decision.
Finally, they determined that they would not involve themselves in specific program decisions,
although program policy -- balance of different kinds of
shows, overall quality, New Jersey
emphasis, etc. --
would concern them. At the same time, they encouraged Frymire to seek
outside funding sources in order to expand their offerings. As part of his early effort, Frymire
worked with a group of people who were
supportive of public broadcasting. Early in 1971, the
Friends of New Jersey Public Broadcasting was formed and incorporated with its own Board
and set of activities in support of NJPTV.
The first years were very difficult indeed. Budgets continued to be small (annual promotion
allocation, for example, was typically $25,000) and added production equipment was hard to
come by. Nevertheless, as the Authority’s 1977 annual report showed, the progress was
steady. Though explicitly not a national
production center, NJPTV believed it was the most
active local-
production educational station in the nation with nearly 30% of its prime-
time hours
filled with its own material. During the first year the station was awarded the Alfred I. DuPont
Columbia Award,
the first in a long run of national recognition that was to come their way.
In 1974, according to an Eagleton Institute survey, NJPTV was attracting 940,000 viewers. By
1977, the number had grown to over 1.5 million New Jersey viewers, plus over 50
0,000
A Change Of Management
4
students being served by the NJPTV educational services division. In addition, over 2,000
students enrolled in eleven New Jersey colleges in televised credit courses, as well as business
and industry, were served by three courses
required for middle
management training purposes.
News and sports continued to do particularly well. All in all, most observers and the
Commission felt NJPTV was doing solid and respectable programming, highlighted by some
especially appealing shows. Annually
established
objectives (1) for the system were regularly
met, with the exception of the implementation of the Commission's desire for a more effective
development program and of the establishment of a new headquarters. But, as Frymire pointed
out, state-supported sys
tems generally have little success raising money from private sources
because they are perceived as being well-supported with taxpayer dollars.
From all appearances, there was no reason for Frymire to feel anything but pleased with the
work he had done and
there was no indication that the Commissioners were anything but
satisfied with the enterprise over which they presided. With few exceptions through the years,
the Commissioners did not appear to him to be participating in any NJPTV activities other than
the Board and Committee meetings, although there were, in fact, a number of informal meetings
and telephone conversations between many of them from time to time. It was left to the
Chairman, Vice Chairman and Frymire to carry on the
business of the Auth
ority. Their public
meetings, held for two or three hours every two months, addressed constraints, reports on the
various divisions of NJPTV, and plans to expand service through both technical additions and
new locations for crews and cameras.
So everyth
ing stood until the election, in 1974, of a new Governor, Brendan T. Byrne. It was
not long before both Meade and Frymire became aware that the new Governor, or at least
some people close to him, looked with considerable disfavor on the nature and direction of
NJPTV:
•
Byrne called Meade shortly after his election on another topic, and did some
probing about Frymire. "How good is that fellow Frymire?" the Governor
asked. “Very good," was Meade's response, "despite fiscal constraints and
freezes on
pers
onnel.”
•
Two close political friends of the new Governor, former CBS-TV
New York
Commentator, Jerome Wilson, who was to become producer-host of WNET's
new weekly program,“Dateline New Jersey," and Richard Leone of Princeton’s
Woodrow Wilson School, and
subsequently State Treasurer (thus a member of
the NJPTV Commission), met with Meade to discuss the situation. Both men
were very critical especially of the quality of the public affairs programming.
Given inadequate budgets and continuing struggles by s
taff to keep a
respectable operation going, Meade was not especially receptive to their
complaints.
A Change Of Management
5
•
Leone, who was interested in the field, and had done a study of cable TV,
showed no confidence in the Eagleton Institute audience studies, stating that he
simply did not believe that NJPTV had the audiences it claimed. He felt it was
not adequately
related to its particular market.
•
At the first formal meeting between the Commissioners, Frymire and Governor
Byrne, the Governor was presented with a tennis bag with the legend: “I Love
New Jersey Public Television.” “Huh,” snorted
the Governor, “I'm
not sure
I
love it!”
In spite of the tone of this encounter, no overtly threatening actions ensued, although the
Governor did begin to appoint a different type of person to the Authority than had his
predecessors (see Attachment 1). Frymire didn’t sense anyt
hing more direct than vague hints
that the new leadership was dissatisfied with his stewardship. The Commissioners, at least the
veteran ones, appeared to Frymire to be as supportive as ever. What he was not aware of,
however, was the rumblings of dissatisfaction being expressed in conversations among the
Commissioners. Since no formal meetings were set up to discuss the complaints with him or to
lodge any formal complaints, Frymire assumed all was well.
Furthermore, Frymire felt some satisfaction and r
elief that the Governor seemed to be very
pleased by the results of his first “call-
in” report to the people over NJPTV airwaves. The
volume of calls was so huge that the telephone company was crippled. Each time the Governor
returned every three or four months to repeat the format, the results were the same, proving to
the Governor, as he said to Frymire, that NJPTV
did indeed have a sizable state-wide
audience.
Then two events occurred which seemed to Frymire to signal that the incipient dissatisfaction
might erupt into specific negative actions. The first came as part of the budget cycle in 1975;
the second was the sudden enthusiasm on the part of the Administration and Commissioners for
a combined news show with WNET
which would replace NJPTV's
own p
rogram.
For years, New Jersey had been able to avoid a state income tax, but Governor Byrne felt, in
view of the State’s perilous financial picture, that the time had come. When it was not
forthcoming, he was faced with a $285 million deficit
in the state
budget and, pointing out New
Jersey’s constitutional balanced budget requirement, he said he would have to cut expenses.
Following precedent established by many political leaders before him, he slashed the most
visible and popular accounts: the extension service, libraries, mental institutions and so on.
Public television's request was cut from $3.8 million to $1 million, a figure clearly below the
minimum needed to maintain operation. Although the Commissioners ultimately persuaded the
Governor and the
legislature to restore their allocation to $3 million, the Authority went through
a painful and debilitating exercise responding to both the threatened cut and to the Governor's
instructions to come up with an alternative
method of providi
ng services to
the people of the
state.
A Change Of Management
6
To many observers, including Frymire, the Governor’s action and attitude appeared to be
something more than standard political budgetmanship. They wondered if it was not a
deliberate threat on the Governor's part, a warning that unless they became more responsive to
his concepts, he would move against them. Some saw his behavior as the first serious attempt
to shake up public broadcasting in New Jersey and force it to rethink its mission. At a
minimum, it seemed to be a vote of no confidence in the Authority’s staff leadership.
The second incident involved the station's news program, far and away the most popular show it
had on the air. Called "New Jersey News Report,” it offered a half-hour week-
night review of
up to 35 "hard"
news stories about New Jersey happenings and personalities, including weather
stations (commercial and educational) which showed virtually no interest in their New Jersey
constituency. There was no attempt at analysis, little feature material, and its budget did not
permit it to become as slick as regular commercial shows. Even so, it was extremely popular in
southern New Jersey, an established, mostly UHF area (unlike its northern counterpart). The
show was clearly the star performer for NJPTV, and represented the best audience builder they
had.
Much to the surprise of Frymire and the staff, in the fall of 1976, Channel 13 suddenly offered
to provide $1 million for a jointly produced nightly
half-
hour show which would be carried on
both WNET and NJPTV. NJ
PTV would contribute $1.5 million. The show would be
controlled by an independent editorial board to be selected by both stations. When it became
very clear that the Governor and his appointees on the Authority favored the idea, some staff
members suspected that
the initiative for the whole idea had, in fact, come from Trenton.
Certainly it was true that Governor Byrne had asked the General Manager of WNET "When
are you guys finally going to do something about New Jersey coverage?"
Dr. Meade and the
staff both took a stand in opposition to the initial proposal, but as it was
refined, the Chairman became increasingly supportive, favoring at least a detailed exploration,
and Frymire became increasingly opposed. In a memorandum to the Commissioners in late
December, 1976 -- nearly two months a
fter the first discussions
of the plan -- Frymire wrote:
We have not, due to time factors, given joint study to any other proposals or to
any budget less than the $2.5 million proposed by Channel 13. There are other
alternatives which would, in my opinion, bring significantly improved coverage
of New Jersey through joint use of the $1 million offered by Channel 13 in the
news proposal. Staff will ask you to consider some of them today.
But first, unless Channel 13
accepts the positions below, I recommend that the
Authority reject the Channel 13 joint news proposal.
The joint news proposal should be rejected on the basis of the requirement for
Channel 13 to provide $1 million contingent upon NJPTV providing $1.5