A Plus Writer

The Concept of Program Reengineering 

Based on the Case Study: Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Strategy (PDF), write a 4-5 page paper in which you:

PLEASE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS BELOW BEFORE GETTING STARTED.

· APA Style 4 - 5 pages excluding title and reference page

· No Page Number on Title Page

· No Page Number on Reference Page / References APA Style

· Add Abstract!!!

· Running Head on ALL PAGES including title page and reference page.

1. Analyze four (4) policy choices of Mayor Schell that were made as part of the strategy for the homeless.

2. Analyze the Pre-Implementation and Design Strategies of Mayor Schell and interpret four (4) practical outcomes of his choices.

3. Reconstruct four (4) steps taken by Mayor Schell to reengineer the program in order to fit the new objectives.

4. Analyze four (4) reasons for the importance of conducting assessments prior to new program implementation.

5. Research at least four (4) peer-reviewed academic sources.

Your assignment must:

· Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; references must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.

· Include a cover page containing the tile of the assignment, the student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in the required page length.

The specific course learning outcomes associated with this assignment are:

· Analyze and apply concepts of planning, reengineering, implementation, and program evaluation essential to the study of public administration as it relates to political choice.

· Use technology and information resources to research issues in modern public administration.

· Write clearly and concisely about modern public administration using proper writing mechanics.

Bottom of Form

Case Study 1: A Change Management

This case was prepared in 1987 for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters by Dan H. Fenn, Jr., retired faculty of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and faculty for the Cascade Center for Public Service Executive Programs. This case study is intended as a basis for class discussion and is not intended to suggest correct or incorrect handling of the situation depicted.The Electronic Hallway is administered by the University of Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. This material may not be altered or copied without written permission from The Electronic Hallway. For permission, email [email protected], or phone (206) 616-8777.

Electronic Hallway members are granted copy permission for educational purposes per Member’s Agreement (www.hallway.org). Copyright 1996 The Electronic Hallway

A CHANGE OF MANAGEMENT

After the announcement of his successor as Executive Director of New Jersey Public Television (NJPTV) on March 20, 1979, Dr. Lawrence T. Frymire busied himself cleaning up the loose ends of the position which he had held since the system had become operational some nine years before. Looking ahead to April 30, his last day in office, he still wondered what had happened -- why the Commissioners of the Public Broadcasting Authority had suddenly requested his resignation some four months before.The newspapers thought they had the answer: Governor Brendan T. Byrne was seeking to establish political control over the state's public broadcasting system. As evidence, they noted that the leading contenders for the job were Herbert Wolfe, Byrne's first information director, and former Democratic Assemblyman Gordon MacInnes, both politically involved with the Governor. Frymire thought the papers might be right -- but he was not completely sure.

NJPTV had come into existence in 1969 as the result of a citizens' study made in 1967-68 at the instigation of then Governor Richard J. Hughes. Governor Hughes had requested a distinguished group of 18 men and women including the Provost of Princeton, the Poetry Editor of the Saturday Review, five members of his cabinet and TV personalities like Dallas Townsend and Dionne Warwick to produce a set "of policies, plans and recommendations for the development of public radio and television for the state." To head the Commission he selected Dr. Edward J. Meade, Jr., then Program Officer in charge of Public Education for the Ford Foundation. The Commission issued its report in May, 1968 and the Governor quickly followed through with its recommendations, filing the necessary legislation to establish a

Public Broadcasting Authority. Late that year, the Act was passed and signed, and the Governor made the first appointments of ten public members which were duly confirmed by the Senate. In addition, five cabinet members (Commissioner of Education, State Treasurer, Chancellor of Higher

2. A Change Of Management

Education, Attorney General and Commissioner of Community Affairs) served ex officio. The first Chairman was Dr. Meade; the Vice-Chairman was George Connett, Vice President for personnel administration of the Prudential Insurance Company. (Other members, and those appointed by subsequent Governors, are listed in Attachment 1.) The Commission plan recommended a capital budget of $16 million, half to be raised in a bond issue and the other half to come from federal funds, and an annual operating budget of about $6 million. However, the plan was reduced to $7.5 million in capital, financed totally by a bond issue, and the operating budget to barely $6 million. By the fall of ‘69, a new Governor, William J. Cahill took office.While somewhat interested, Cahill was not as enthusiastic about the project as had been his predecessor. Wanting to see the station for himself, the new Governor made a visit to the rebuilt bowling alley in a rural area outside Trenton which served as headquarters for the fledgling operation. To make sure he saw something more than just empty space, Chairman Meade persuaded RCA to lend some equipment to provide the flavor of an actual operating station.

The Governor then decided to proceed with the idea, but more slowly than had been originally planned because of the financially and politically controversial nature of the undertaking. As with any major new program in New Jersey, the legislature was especially wary of this one, uncertain as they were that it could be run in a non-political, non-partisan fashion.About this time, Dr. Meade and the Authority began conducting a search for a person to head up the staff and get the station on the air. After an extensive search, the position was offered to Dr. Larry Frymire, a professor of communications at the University of Illinois, who had done a study for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, worked for the FCC, and worked on the New Jersey legislation setting up the Authority.In selecting Frymire, Meade was impressed by his high degree of technical competence and his intimate knowledge of the administrative steps necessary to put a station on the air. "I didn't know a tube from a transmitter," Meade said later. In addition, given the potentially controversial nature of the effort, the Authority wanted a person of extraordinary integrity and prudence, someone who did not seek or attract personal visibility but who would rather concentrate his energies in a steady and well-organized way on the launching and operation of the station.Initially Frymire turned Meade down, but by early spring of 1970, with capital funds of $7.5 million and an operating budget of $2.2 million assured, he decided to leave Illinois and take on the responsibility on June 15, 1970. By April of 1971, he had Channel 52 in Trenton (the State capitol) on the air; Channel 23 in Camden followed in October of 1973 and Channels 58 (New Brunswick) and 50 (Montclair) started operation in June of 1974.

In those first few months, following the recommendations of the study, the Commissioners made

a number of key policy decisions. First of all, they decided to focus programming on the State

3. A Change of Management

of New Jersey, rather than on regional, national or international events and interests. They recognized full well that northern New Jersey was considered by many to be the flagship of educational broadcasting. Similarly, the southern part of the state had access to the Philadelphia commercial stations and to Channel 12. Thus they were faced from the start with staunch competition. To make matters worse, they were UHF in a state where few sets were equipped to pick up that signal; they were brand new; they had to meet the interests of an area with marked sectional differences, especially between north and south Jersey; and they had no real constituency, or enthusiastic base of support in the state. Given this situation, the decision to aim programs at the state itself rather than the region seemed a necessary one.Secondly, in the face of potential political difficulties, the Commissioners prohibited staff from lobbying the legislature in Trenton. Clearly, they could and should respond to initiatives from elected officials, but the Commission reserved for itself the contacts with the New Jersey elected political leadership. (In May, 1977, this prohibition was lifted for Frymire as the Authority matured and the lack of such contacts began hindering them in the annual competition for budget support among the various state agencies.)

Third, they decided that they should not exercise any direct personnel authority themselves.While they required Larry Frymire to submit a staffing pattern as well as an annual budget for their review, the selection of people to fill the various authorized positions was left solely to his discretion. Though all staff members came from the state's civil service system, only the clerical personnel were to come off registers and have tenure. When politicians and other public figures would suggest people to be appointed to the station, Commissioners would simply accept a resume and pass it along to Frymire and his staff for decision.

Finally, they determined that they would not involve themselves in specific program decisions, although program policy -- balance of different kinds of shows, overall quality, New Jersey emphasis, etc. -- would concern them. At the same time, they encouraged Frymire to seek outside funding sources in order to expand their offerings. As part of his early effort, Frymire worked with a group of people who were supportive of public broadcasting. Early in 1971, the Friends of New Jersey Public Broadcasting was formed and incorporated with its own Board and set of activities in support of NJPTV.The first years were very difficult indeed. Budgets continued to be small (annual promotion allocation, for example, was typically $25,000) and added production equipment was hard to come by. Nevertheless, as the Authority’s 1977 annual report showed, the progress was steady. Though explicitly not a national production center, NJPTV believed it was the most active local-production educational station in the nation with nearly 30% of its prime-time hours filled with its own material. During the first year the station was awarded the Alfred I. DuPont Columbia Award, the first in a long run of national recognition that was to come their way.

In 1974, according to an Eagleton Institute survey, NJPTV was attracting 940,000 viewers. By 1977, the number had grown to over 1.5 million New Jersey viewers, plus over 500,000

4. A Change Of Management

students being served by the NJPTV educational services division. In addition, over 2,000 students enrolled in eleven New Jersey colleges in televised credit courses, as well as business and industry, were served by three courses required for middle management training purposes.News and sports continued to do particularly well. All in all, most observers and the Commission felt NJPTV was doing solid and respectable programming, highlighted by some especially appealing shows. Annually

established objectives (1) for the system were regularly met, with the exception of the implementation of the Commission's desire for a more effective development program and of the establishment of a new headquarters. But, as Frymire pointed out, state-supported systems generally have little success raising money from private sources because they are perceived as being well-supported with taxpayer dollars.From all appearances, there was no reason for Frymire to feel anything but pleased with the work he had done and there was no indication that the Commissioners were anything but satisfied with the enterprise over which they presided. With few exceptions through the years, the Commissioners did not appear to him to be participating in any NJPTV activities other than the Board and Committee meetings, although there were, in fact, a number of informal meetings and telephone conversations between many of them from time to time. It was left to the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Frymire to carry on the business of the Authority.

Their public meetings, held for two or three hours every two months, addressed constraints, reports on the various divisions of NJPTV, and plans to expand service through both technical additions and new locations for crews and cameras. So everything stood until the election, in 1974, of a new Governor, Brendan T. Byrne. It was not long before both Meade and Frymire became aware that the new Governor, or at least some people close to him, looked with considerable disfavor on the nature and direction of NJPTV:• Byrne called Meade shortly after his election on another topic, and did some probing about Frymire. "How good is that fellow Frymire?" the Governor asked. “Very good," was Meade's response, "despite fiscal constraints and freezes on personnel.”

Two close political friends of the new Governor, former CBS-TV New York Commentator, Jerome Wilson, who was to become producer-host of WNET's new weekly program,“Dateline New Jersey," and Richard Leone of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, and subsequently State Treasurer (thus a member of the NJPTV Commission), met with Meade to discuss the situation. Both men were very critical especially of the quality of the public affairs programming.Given inadequate budgets and continuing struggles by staff to keep a respectable operation going, Meade was not especially receptive to their complaints.

5 A Change Of Management

Leone, who was interested in the field, and had done a study of cable TV, showed no confidence in the Eagleton Institute audience studies, stating that he simply did not believe that NJPTV had the audiences it claimed. He felt it was not adequately related to its particular market.

At the first formal meeting between the Commissioners, Frymire and Governor Byrne, the Governor was presented with a tennis bag with the legend: “I Love New Jersey Public Television.” “Huh,” snorted the Governor, “I'm not sure love it!” In spite of the tone of this encounter, no overtly threatening actions ensued, although the Governor did begin to appoint a different type of person to the Authority than had his predecessors (see Attachment 1). Frymire didn’t sense anything more direct than vague hints that the new leadership was dissatisfied with his stewardship. The Commissioners, at least the veteran ones, appeared to Frymire to be as supportive as ever. What he was not aware of, however, was the rumblings of dissatisfaction being expressed in conversations among the Commissioners. Since no formal meetings were set up to discuss the complaints with him or to lodge any formal complaints, Frymire assumed all was well. Furthermore, Frymire felt some satisfaction and relief that the Governor seemed to be very pleased by the results of his first “call-in” report to the people over NJPTV airwaves. The volume of calls was so huge that the telephone company was crippled. Each time the Governor returned every three or four months to repeat the format, the results were the same, proving to the Governor, as he said to Frymire, that NJPTV did indeed have a sizable state-wideaudience.

Then two events occurred which seemed to Frymire to signal that the incipient dissatisfaction might erupt into specific negative actions. The first came as part of the budget cycle in 1975; the second was the sudden enthusiasm on the part of the Administration and Commissioners for a combined news show with WNET which would replace NJPTV's own program.For years, New Jersey had been able to avoid a state income tax, but Governor Byrne felt, in view of the State’s perilous financial picture, that the time had come. When it was not forthcoming, he was faced with a $285 million deficit

in the statebudget and, pointing out New Jersey’s constitutional balanced budget requirement, he said he would have to cut expenses.Following precedent established by many political leaders before him, he slashed the most visible and popular accounts: the extension service, libraries, mental institutions and so on.Public television's request was cut from $3.8 million to $1 million, a figure clearly below the minimum needed to maintain operation. Although the Commissioners ultimately persuaded the Governor and the legislature to restore their allocation to $3 million, the Authority went through a painful and debilitating exercise responding to both the threatened cut and to the Governor's instructions to come up with an alternative method of providing services to the people of the state.

1. A Change Of Management

To many observers, including Frymire, the Governor’s action and attitude appeared to be something more than standard political budgetmanship. They wondered if it was not a deliberate threat on the Governor's part, a warning that unless they became more responsive to his concepts, he would move against them. Some saw his behavior as the first serious attempt to shake up public broadcasting in New Jersey and force it to rethink its mission. At a minimum, it seemed to be a vote of no confidence in the Authority’s staff leadership.The second incident involved the station's news program, far and away the most popular show it had on the air. Called "New Jersey News Report,” it offered a half-hour week-night review of up to 35 "hard" news stories about New Jersey happenings and personalities, including weather stations (commercial and educational) which showed virtually no interest in their New Jersey constituency. There was no attempt at analysis, little feature material, and its budget did not permit it to become as slick as regular commercial shows. Even so, it was extremely popular in southern New Jersey, an established, mostly UHF area (unlike its northern counterpart). The show was clearly the star performer for NJPTV, and represented the best audience builder they had. Much to the surprise of Frymire and the staff, in the fall of 1976, Channel 13 suddenly offered to provide $1 million for a jointly produced nightly half-hour show which would be carried on both WNET and NJPTV. NJ PTV would contribute $1.5 million. The show would be controlled by an independent editorial board to be selected by both stations. When it became very clear that the Governor and his appointees on the Authority favored the idea, some staff members suspected that the initiative for the whole idea had, in fact, come from Trenton.

Certainly it was true that Governor Byrne had asked the General Manager of WNET "When are you guys finally going to do something about New Jersey coverage?"Dr. Meade and the staff both took a stand in opposition to the initial proposal, but as it was refined, the Chairman became increasingly supportive, favoring at least a detailed exploration, and Frymire became increasingly opposed. In a memorandum to the Commissioners in late December, 1976 -- nearly two months after the first discussions of the plan -- Frymire wrote:We have not, due to time factors, given joint study to any other proposals or to any budget less than the $2.5 million proposed by Channel 13. There are other alternatives which would, in my opinion, bring significantly improved coverage of New Jersey through joint use of the $1 million offered by Channel 13 in the news proposal. Staff will ask you to consider some of them today.But first, unless Channel 13 accepts the positions below, I recommend that the Authority reject the Channel 13 joint news proposal. The joint news proposal should be rejected on the basis of the requirement for Channel 13 to provide $1 million contingent upon NJPTV providing $1.5

2. A Change Of Management

million and giving up control of NJPTV's most important program service to an equally weighted editorial board. Under any circumstances, the Executive Producer should be in charge of the daily operation of the news program, but he should be responsible to the NJPTV Director of News and Public Affairs for administrative functions and through him to any editorial board for policy matters. To do otherwise would be to create severe personnel and management problems for NJPTV administration and for the Authority itself.

The joint news proposal should be rejected due to the negative impact it would have on NJPTV audience building efforts for Channel 50 and Channel 58."I did not want to give our top programs to our principal competitor in that part of our market."Frymire said later. "Furthermore, I had a series of other options for joint ventures, other ways to use that $1 million from WNET which I thought would be much better from our standpoint. For example, I thought we could staff up our Newark studio and co-produce selected programs with WNET in both the cultural and public affairs areas; or we could expand both the equipment and manpower in the Newark facility significantly and let WNET use it two days a week.

In that way, I thought we could make the Newark operation really operational, maintain our own control over our popular news show, avoid all the problems of a continuing joint production effort, and sidestep the need to allocate or raise additional dollars. But I could hardly get the Commissioners to listen to me, much less take my ideas seriously. I think my attitude on all this left some Commissioners alienated, feeling that I was being obstructionist."Ultimately, the Commissioners voted to enter into negotiations with WNET along the general lines of their proposal, and a negotiating committee of Commissioners subsequently worked out an agreement. Frymire participated, but had no vote. The staff was given the responsibility of hammering out a specific contract which some Commissioners later felt gave away more control than they needed to. The new program was on the air in May, 1978 (2).The difficulties over the WNET arrangement were followed by a series of events. For example, Senate President Joseph Merlino of Trenton, characterized as the “second most powerful man in the state,” put in a bill which would require the Governor approve the Minutes of the Authority before any of their actions could take effect. Frymire suspected that his antagonism developed out of a pair of incidents: An NJPTV reporter asked Senator Merlino a question as he came out of a session. Apparently it offended him because he turned on him and said "You are an employee of the state, and you have no right to ask me that kind of question.”

Mrs. Merlino, in charge of the annual state teenage art festival, asked the station to cover a portion of the event in which she had particular interest, but was told they could not do so on what was only a single day’s notice.

3. A Change Of Management

It was during this period, 1976-78, that some observers noted a growing difference of opinion between Frymire and members of the Authority over a variety of issues. Some felt that it was the legacy of what they saw as the continuing resistance of the staff to the WNET idea even after it became obvious that the Commissioners wanted to go ahead. Others felt that Frymire was not sensitive enough to the public relations activities of the station, that the press they were getting was neither adequate, nor imaginative enough, and that the PR staff was not sufficiently active or energetic. Following that was a lengthy series of discussions at Authority meetings about the opposition of staff to the broadcasting of certain public service announcements. In 1973, the Secretary of State called to ask that the station air a series of announcements about where and how to register by mail for the upcoming election, but was turned down by Douglas Leonard, Program Manager. The Secretary ultimately complained to Chairman Meade and his announcements were broadcast.

In 1978, a task force, made up of Commissioners, Friends and staff, was established to conduct a one year, long-range review of the Station’s fiscal and physical planning. As a part of that effort, the issue of the Community Services Department came up. Disbanded in 1976 in response to a $390,000 reduction in state funds, Community Services was now being given serious consideration for revival. Authority meeting discussion of the task force findings are exerpted below from the May, 1978 Authority Minutes: Once again the issue relating to the disbanding of the Department of Community Services two years ago was discussed. Dr. Frymire thanked both Mr. Aumente and Commissioner Broadwater for their input. The question is how NJPTV should respond to community groups and organizations. Dr. Frymire reported that NJPTV is performing the essential functions and he recommended that no further specific staff be allocated at this time. He is sensitive to these needs as are the Executive Staff, Programming Department and the new Executive Assistant will also be assigned these duties.

Dr. Meade added that community service is a function distributed throughout NJPTV and, therefore, we are responding without any specific staff allocated to such service. Commissioner Broadwater felt that it is too much to expect the Executive Director to reach out to maintain contact with people in the community, but Dr. Frymire assured her that we have a responsible staff and both Focal Point and Express Yourself are Black shows that are produced through this type of contact and also our Spanish speaking staff are responding to such needs through the Images Latinas programs.

4. A Change Of Management

Dr. Frymire added that news and public affairs programs also deal with community-oriented subjects. Chairman Meade said we do not have the capacity to meet all the community needs but we are doing more local programming than other PBS stations and that there are other services we deliver besides programming.Mr. Aumente (representing the Chancellor of Higher Educationed.) said that he agreed with the Task Force recommendation and he still feels we need a Community Services Department in our budget. He is aware of the fact that we do not have the resources for it but he felt that to drop the search for a solution would be bad and that dialogue should continue on this subject.

More important, however, were the growing problems with Commissioner Stephen Adubato who opposed Frymire from his first day as a member of the Authority. Characterized as a feisty, bright, street-smart, effective community leader in Newark, Adubato wanted NJPTV to broadcast more ethnic programs and, according to some observers, felt that the station’s programming department was unresponsive and did not take his concern seriously. Otherstraced his growing antagonism to the fall of 1977 when his brother, an Assemblyman, was embarrassed on a candidate’s show when one of his opponents suddenly pulled out a plucked chicken, waved it before the camera, and said that this is what the current incumbent was doing to his constituents.

Whatever the source of the antagonism, it was overt. Adubato suggested to Frymire that he resign when they met September 12, 1978 at the first Authority meeting he had attended in nearly a year.Shortly before the regular Authority meeting scheduled for September 12, 1978, Commissioner

Adubato called Chairman Meade and said he was planning to offer a motion of no-confidence in Larry Frymire. Meade suggested to him that the situation be reviewed instead. Consequently, at the September meeting, the Commissioners went into executive session for an hour, emerging to vote favorably on a motion made by Commissioner Adubato calling for "a committee to evaluate the management requirements for the future in relation to the goals which have been established by the Authority.” Dr. Meade then appointed a committee to be headed by vice Chairman George Connet and to be made up of Adubato, Attorney General John Degnan (Governor Byrne’s onetime chief counsel and chief of staff, attending his first meeting of the Authority) and Robert Comstock (Governor Byrne’s former press secretary, also attending his first meeting).

“I saw that action as a real challenge, not at all as a threat,” Larry Frymire said later. “I was assured by George Connett that it was not a ‘get Frymire’ move, but a serious and responsible attempt to look at our situation in light of the future needs of NJPTV.

10. A Change Of Management

"Furthermore, I knew that we had met all of our stated goals and objectives, with the exception of the new headquarters building, that almost all the recommendations coming from a long-range planning task force of the Authority, and the Friends and Staffhad been adopted and put in place, and that the establishment of a Long-Range Planning Committee of the Authority insured continuing self-analysis. Only last June, we had held a day-long intensive review of our programming, and in August we spent another full day reviewing other functions with the Commissioners. No serious criticisms were raised, and we all agreed on a set of positive plans, which have been or are being implemented.

“As the process went along, I saw no reason to be concerned. The group told me their meeting with the Associate Executive Director was ‘frank and positive’, and their meeting with the director of programming was ‘friendly and good.’ My session featured a 45 minute harangue by Adubato, so it didn't really go anywhere and the Chairman adjourned it. But the next time lasted an hour and a half and it was a good discussion.

“I really can't figure out what is Adubato's problem, what he wants. He talks about being dissatisfied with the Newark coverage, both before and after the establishment of a new WNET show. He wants more ethnic programming, but our Black and Hispanic staff have been producing half-hour weekly programs for nine years. He's a volatile man with strong opinions who has provided a unique service for the people of Newark; a real self-made leader. But I don't know really what he wants. When he asked me to resign back in September, all he said was: 'changing needs and changing times -- people ought to recognize that, and move on.'"It was after Frymire’s second meeting with the Connett Committee that he began to feel he had reason to be concerned. Connett, an old friend and supporter, drew him aside and said, "You know, Larry, we’ve been getting a lot of negative vibes from a lot of people about NJPTV and its management.

People just don't know you, and even the Friends aren’t positive." Frymire pointed out that he didn’t always agree with the Friends, and the discussion ended there.In November, 1978, the Board, at its regular meeting, went into executive session to receive an interim report from the Committee. Discussion was limited to a review of a list of interviews that had been held, and those that the Committee planned to conduct. The group reported that they hoped to finish their work by mid-December. A few weeks later, Frymire, who had heard nothing further of or from the Committee, called Meade to ask him what was going on and to suggest that a meeting be held. In early December, Connett and the Committee met with Frymire and then asked Meade to call a special executive session of the Board to hear its report. At the ensuing session, held shortly thereafter, the Commissioners met in executive session for about an hour to hear and discuss the Committee's report, and Frymire talked to them for about an hour, reviewing his accomplishments and the challenges ahead. They then went back into executive session for another hour. The Commissioners, for their part, had two complaints, as Frymire recalled:

11. A Change Of Management

They said I was not a statewide personality, that no one knows me among the state's leadership. Therefore, NJPTV was not well known. They said I had not successfully penetrated the business and foundation community for financial support. I pointed out that no one in the other state-supported systems has either.That’s all they said, but it was clear that the situation was untenable. It was kind of like trying to get rid of a superintendent of schools or a minister. No one wants him around, but no one wants to hurt him either. So I talked to Meade, and told him I would resign.The Associate Executive Director resigned too, and we’ll both be gone by April 30. On March 20, 1979, the Authority made its formal announcement of the appointment, with the approval of the Governor, of Gordon MacInnes as the new Executive Director of NJPTV.

(See Attachments 2 and 3)

(1) Divided into capital plans and operational plans, these formal statements signed by the Chairman and the Executive Director laid out objectives, backed by a description of how New Jersey citizens would benefit from the proposed action.

(2) The new show received mixed reviews at best, especially from the audience for the old show. There was an emphasis on analysis, a number of promotional spots, no weather, and a diminished coverage of sports. On the other hand the talent was excellent, the research and writing more professional, and research component and reporter quality substantially upgraded. At any rate, Frymire and his staff bore the brunt of the critical comments.

12. A Change Of Management

Attachment 1: NJPTV - Board of CommissionersAppointments by Governor Hughes: 1969-70Dr. Edward J. Meade, Jr. Program Officer Public Education, Ford Foundation George ConnettVice President Personnel-Administration Prudential Insurance Company of America John McDonald Special Assistant to the President for Community Relations Rutgers University Carlos Peay Attorney Maurice Veneri AFL-CIO President Industrial Union Council Mrs. Anne Martindell Owner Who’s Who in America Donald Wilson Vice President Time- Life Appointments by Governor William Cahill - 1971-72-73 Henry Becton Owner, Chairman of Board Becton- Dickinson Industries Nathan Friedman Attorney Robert Crager Commercial Broadcaster William Hatchett Manager, Special Employment Programs RCA Calvin Louderback Vice President, New Jersey Manufacturers Association

13. A Change Of Management

Attachment 1 NJPTV - Board of Commissioners (cont.) Mrs. Rosemary Fruehling Assistant Professor Secretarial Science County College of Morris Richard Schoch Senior Vice President, Creative Director Compton Advertising Appointments by Governor Brendan Byrne - 1974-75-76-77-78-79Stephen Adubato Director North Ward Education & Cultural Center, Newark Henry Becton Reappointed Edward Meade Reappointed George Connett Reappointed Robert Crager Reappointed Donald Wilson Reappointed Edith Luray Producer, NBC-TV Campaign Manager, Mrs. English campaign for State Senator (English is present special Assistant to the Governor) Barbara Broadwater Administrative Aide Mayor Errichetti - Camden State Senator Errichetti Robert Comstock Executive Editor -The Bergen Record Former Press Secretary, Governor Byrne Charles Nathanson Private Consultant for City Planning Personal Associate of Mercer County and State Democratic Leaders

14. A Change Of Management

Attachment 1 NJPTV - Board of Commissioners (cont.)Susan Thomases Attorney - Campaign Manager United States Senator Bradley Thomas Erhardt Businessman, Union County National Democratic Committeeman, Campaign Manager, various Union County Democratic politiciansBy state statute, the following Cabinet Officers are members of the Authority, ex-officio with full voting rights: Attorney General Treasurer Commissioner of Department of Community Affairs Chancellor of Higher Education Commissioner of Education

15. A Change Of Management

Attachment 2: Trenton Times, Trenton, N.J.- Thursday, March 15, 1979 MACINNES SLATED FOR STATE TV JOB By Jim Goodman Staff Writer Former state legislator Gordon A. MacInnes Jr. is expected to be the next executive director of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority. MacInnes, 37, a former Democratic assemblyman from Morris County, has been recommended by the authority’s screening committee. The authority board will vote on the recommendation on Tuesday. Gov. Brendan T. Byrne met with MacInnes recently and told him he had no objections to the appointment.MacInnes was a member of the State Assembly in 1974 and 1978, and he was previously a special assistant to Gov. Richard J. Hughes. Before that he was an official in United Progress, Inc., Trenton’s anti-poverty agency. For the last eight years, MacInnes has directed the Fund for New Jersey, a private foundation. The Foundation's principal client was the Center for Analysis of Public Issues in Princeton.MacInnes said today that the foundation gave the center an average of $75,000 a year during his tenure.

MacInnes has no direct experience in television, but has served as a consultant for WNET-TV (Channel 13) in New York and was a director of the Fair Broadcasting Coalition in New Jersey. Sources said that the main reason for MacInnes selection was that the committee felt he would be able to raise private money for the television authority which operates a network of four stations within the state. The station now operates almost entirely on public funds and has had little success in getting donations from its viewers.MacInnes was one of three finalists interviewed more than a week ago by the screening committee. Sources said the other two finalists were from out of state.A former Byrne aide who had sought the job, Herbert Wolfe, was not among the finalists. Wolfe is a former editor of the Trenton Times and was Byrne’s first information director. Edward Meade, Authority chairman, refused to confirm that MacInnes has been recommended by the screening committee. He said he has not seen the committee's final report and pointed out that the committee is made up of a minority of the authority. Other sources said, however, that there was very little chance of the authority overruling the screening committee. MacInnes was elected to the Assembly in the 1973 Democratic landslide led by Byrne.

The Morris County Democrat was identified as part of the Byrne team early in his tenure in the Assembly, but split with the governor several times and was not considered a "team player" by administration officials. MacInnes sought reelection in 1975 but was defeated in his heavily republican district. Administration sources have insisted that the governor would not attempt to influence the selection of the new director, but Byrne did retain his right to veto any appointment. The governor reportedly told MacInnes last week that he would not object to his nomination. The new director will replace Lawrence Frymire, the first director of the authority. Frymire was forced to resign in December after a management study report charged that the Authority lacked strong leadership and had not attracted many viewers. Frymire’s resignation is effective April 30.

16. A Change Of Management

Attachment 3:

The Star Ledger Thursday, March 15, 1979

JERSEY TV MAY PICK EX- LEGISLATOR AS CHIEF by Dan Weissman Former Assemblyman, Gordon A. MacInnes, Jr. will be the next director of the state's Public Broadcasting Authority, a job that pays in the mid-$40,000 range, sources said yesterday.According to the sources, MacInnes, who was among the strongest supporters of Gov. Brendan Byrne’s income tax while he was in the Legislature, will get the appointment confirmed Tuesday when the authority meets. One source said “that information is impeccable.”

The sources said MacInnes was supposed to be named to the job last Tuesday. But the action was delayed because “three members of the authority wanted to talk to him first.”MacInnes would say only: "All I know is I was asked to be one of three finalists to be interviewed last Saturday.” The commission is meeting next Tuesday, when it hopes to reach a decision. MacInnes said he had no knowledge of who would get the job, which becomes vacant April 30 when Larry Frymire will leave. MacInnes served one term in the Assembly, winning election in a predominately republican Morris County district in the Byrne 1974 landslide. MacInnes quickly became one of Byrne’s staunchest legislative allies.Prior to his election victory, the 38-year old MacInnes was a special assistant to former Gov. Richard J. Hughes.A graduate of the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University, MacInnes was considered one of the so-called "Woody Wilson gang” when he worked for Hughes, now Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. Also counted in the association were Byrne’s former treasurer, Richard C. Leone and Treasurer Clifford Goldman.“The Governor's office has nothing to do with it. The authority had a search committee, and it put ads in the papers,” said one source, who added: "But I'm not going to say MacInnes didn't see the Governor."

Case Study 2: Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

This case was written by Eileen Norton, J.D. and former Seattle City Council Member Thomas Weeks, Ph.D.The case is intended solely as a vehicle for classroom discussion, and is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of the situation described.

The Electronic Hallway is administered by the University of Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. This material may not be altered or copied without written permission from The Electronic Hallway. For permission, email [email protected] or phone (206) 616-8777. Electronic Hallway members are granted copy permission for educational purposes per Member’s Agreement (www.hallway.org). Copyright 2006 The Electronic Hallway

MAYOR SCHELL’S ZERO HOMELESS FAMILY PLEDGE

On June 2nd, 1998, Mayor Paul Schell spoke to the press about the needs of homeless families, women and children. He asked for the City Council’s support in providing “immediate emergency assistance to homeless families and single women, a critical step in providing lasting housing solutions for these families and individuals.” He noted that“the problem continues to grow and we absolutely must find better ways to help people find and keep housing.” He closed his remarks with a firm pledge that there will be no homeless families with children or homeless single women on the streets of Seattle by Christmas 1998. His pledge made headlines in both Seattle papers the next day Alan Painter, Director of the Community Services Division of the Department of Housing and Human Services, listened attentively to the new Mayor’s remarks. Painter has dedicated his professional career to serving the needs of homeless people. He was proud and excited to hear Schell’s passion and commitment to addressing homelessness in Seattle.

At the same time, he viewed the pledge with some trepidation. Counting the number of homeless people on the street at any given time is notoriously tricky, influenced by many factors. Further, he wondered how this pledge would dovetail with City priorities and plans for dealing with homelessness. These plans emphasize services to homeless people rather than just providing beds and they stress the need for other jurisdictions to share in funding homeless services. The next six months promised to keep Alan Painter very busy.Homeless People in Seattle Homelessness in King County:

A Background Report, was published in February 1998 by the Seattle-King County Homelessness Advisory Group. The report begins with a profile of King County demographics and housing, and then describes the numbers and characteristics of the homeless population. Subsequent sections describe existing homelessness programs and their funding. Most of the data presented here comes from this report. According to the Seattle-King County consolidated plan, there are at least 5,500 people who are homeless in King County on any given night. Of these, over 1,300 are on the streets, while almost 4,200 have temporary housing in shelters or transitional units. Thousands of people seeking shelter are turned away each year, primarily due to lack

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

2 space. In 1993, Operation Night watch assisted 16,615 people seeking shelter in Seattle. By 1997, the total climbed to 45,529. The majority of homeless people range from 22 to 44 years old. Sixty-three percent (63%) of those receiving shelter are single males, 17% single females, with the remaining 20% spread among families and youth. Fifty-nine percent (59%) of people sheltered in King County in 1997, and 46% of youth sheltered in 1996 were people of color. Of the approximately 1,300 people sleeping on the streets (not in shelters) on any given night in King County, 300 are families, 360 are youth and teen parents and 700 are single adults. Over 700 of these 1,300 homeless people are the “homeless families with children or homeless single women” Schell promised to get off the street in his June 2nd speech; the remainder are single men, or live in the county outside Seattle.

The shelter capacity in Seattle is higher for single males than for other groups. In 1997, 54% of homeless family units turned away from emergency shelter were single females, and 35% were families with children. Two-thirds of homeless families are single women with children. One quarter of all shelter clients is children. Over 2,000 youth living outside a family structure are estimated to be homeless in Seattle during a year.

Over 90% of the shelters in King County are located in Seattle, but the homeless people in Seattle shelters come from a broad geographic area (Figure One). Homeless youth apparently travel farther to reach the streets of Seattle.

Figure One

Previous Residence of King County Homeless Last permanent residence of homeless person being served in King County All homeless people (1997 survey) Homeless youth (1996 survey) Seattle 53 28 King County, outside Seattle 16 35 Outside King County 31 37 The three major factors contributing to homelessness in King County are inadequate income, the high cost of housing, and personal or family problems, such as domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse or mental illness. Surveys of homeless people show rates of drug and alcohol addiction at about 65%. Research indicates that approximately 50% of homeless adults have a mental illness. Prominent reasons for homelessness among youth include emotional conflict in homes, drug or alcohol problems, physical abuse by a parent, and depression.

Seattle’s response to homelessness, 1980-1997

Under the leadership of Mayor Charles Royer (1978-1989), Seattle developed a national reputation for its comprehensive approach to homelessness. Seattle citizens approved two Last permanent residence of homeless person being served in King County All homeless people (1997 survey) Homeless youth (1996 survey) Seattle King County, outside Seattle Outside King County

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

significant property tax increases to support low income housing during the 1980s, raising $50 million in 1981 and another $50 million in 1986. Seattle received the National Alliance to End Homelessness Public Sector Achievement Award in 1990. The awardees noted Seattle’s creative and coordinated approach as well as its financial commitment to fight the problem. Numerous individual housing and homeless projects in Seattle have received awards as well. Mayor Norm Rice (1990-1997) continued this commitment to fight homelessness. Although King County voters rejected a countywide property tax increase to support low income housing in 1992, Seattle voters renewed their commitment to low income housing by passing a third levy in 1995. Reflecting the City’s thoughtful approach and willingness to dedicate local funding to address the problem, Seattle receives one of the largest McKinney awards each year (federal money to support programs for homeless people). In 1998 Seattle received the eighth largest award in the nation.

Each year in King County, many millions of dollars are devoted to addressing homelessness. Major funders include the federal, state, city and county governments as well as United Way, public housing authorities and private foundations. The annual funding to operate and support homeless shelters in King County from all sources exceeds $6 million. In addition, $8 million is allocated each year to operate transitional housing units. Figure Two presents the distribution of the 4,073 units of housing for homeless people in King County by type and location. Ninety-one percent (91%) of all units are in Seattle, although Seattle represents less than one-third of King County’s total population.

Figure Two Housing Capacity for Homeless People in King County

In 1998, the City of Seattle spent approximately $7.8 million on services for homeless people, nearly twice as much as it did in 1989. This includes over $4 million for emergency shelter and transitional housing, $1.3 million for emergency food services and $1.4 million for housing-related social services. In addition, since 1987 the City has helped fund the development of more than 4,000 units of permanent low-income housing. The 1995 housing levy approved by the voters is expected to create 1,360 additional units of affordable housing. Type of Shelter/Housing Total Number in King County % of County total in Seattle Emergency shelter and vouchers 2,236

Transitional housing Permanent housing targeted for homeless people Total number of units for homeless people

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

Over the years, City of Seattle staff have developed a comprehensive approach to the problem of homelessness, going far beyond the provision of shelter beds. In December 1995, the King County Community Homelessness Advisory Committee articulated the preferred strategies for approaching homelessness, including: The community needs to build a more regional, client-focused, coordinated network of homeless services.

The strategies call for maintaining but not increasing the existing shelter capacity at this time, even though the shelters regularly turn away people due to lack of space. This will allow additional resources to flow to other needed services and housing.

It is vital that the community place attention on those housing and services that help people regain long-term stability and address the underlying causes of homelessness, such as transitional housing and related services, employment services, and assistance in making a successful transition into permanent housing.

•[B]emoreproactiveinpreventinghomelessness ... •[E]mphasize approaches that follow clients as they progress throug hout the

continuum of care , including assistance to people once they enter permanent housing. •[D]irect resources toward sub-groups of the homeless who are underserved relative to others, including children in homeless families, single men, and both youth and adults who are leaving institutional settings.

Mayor Paul Schell

Paul Schell is an attorney who first entered the public eye in Seattle in the 1970s as Director of the Department of Community Development under Seattle Mayor Wes Uhlman. When Uhlman did not seek a third term, Schell ran for Mayor in 1977, losing in the general election to television commentator Charles Royer. After his defeat, Schell dropped out of public life and worked as a developer. Many of his successful developments were small, high-end hotels scattered across the Pacific Northwest. In the mid-1980s, Schell was elected to the part-time Port Commission. As a Commissioner, he spearheaded the redevelopment of the Seattle waterfront, adding a new headquarters for the Port, a trade center, office buildings and residential units. Although his primary occupation was real estate development, Schell also served as interim Dean of the University of Washington School of Architecture for two years in the early 1990s.

In 1997 Norm Rice did not seek a third term as Mayor and Schell decided to run, twenty years after his mayoral defeat. Schell attracted support from Republicans and Democrats alike. The press liked the concept of a developer with a heart and a soul. Portrayed as a no-nonsense visionary, Schell swept to victory by wide margins in both the primary and general elections. After the cautious reign of Norm Rice, there was enthusiasm for Schell’s willingness to take risks. In his first months in office, Schell demonstrated a penchant for publicly testing partially developed ideas.

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

A high priority during Schell’s mayoral campaign was his commitment to housing. The economic boom in greater Seattle in the 1990s drove up housing prices at double-digit annual rates. Many middle-class Seattleites were priced out of the market. Schell promised to convene a housing summit immediately after his inauguration to develop strategies to address the unmet demand for affordable housing. While he talked about housing affordability often during the campaign, homelessness was rarely mentioned.

Alan Painter

Alan Painter grew up in Southeast Seattle with a passion for politics, hydroplane racing and baseball games at Sick’s Stadium. After Franklin High School, Alan went on to graduate from Yale University in 1976. While his love of hydros and baseball remain, the demise of the Seattle Pilots and the death of several leading hydro racers during the 1960s soured Painter on careers in both fields. He focused his professional energies instead on supporting liberal Democratic causes, especially the provision of housing and services to homeless people. In the 1980s, he served as District Manager for Seattle Democratic Congressman Mike Lowry, one of the most liberal members of Congress. During his Lowry years, Painter assisted in building coalitions, including the Washington State Coalition for Homeless and the Fair Budget Action Campaign. Lowry was one of the primary authors of the 1987 McKinney Act, which continues to be the most significant federal legislation aimed at homelessness prevention. In 1990 Painter began working on homeless issues for the City of Seattle in the Office of Management and Budget as the City’s Homeless Coordinator. He later shifted to the Department of Housing and Human Services, where he is now the Director of the Community Services Division. He has worked on the design and implementation of services and programs to assist homeless people for over a decade.

Alan Painter is not flashy or a headline grabber. He thinks and plans long-term, and has the patience to build coalitions. Very detail-oriented, Painter keeps score of every baseball game he attends, and then saves the scorecard. He places great emphasis on coordinated, integrated, comprehensive policy development. The consummate bureaucrat, Painter is probably not enough of a risk-taker to have been a particularly effective hydroplane pilot. Steady and effective, Painter consistently delivers on his promises. In The Seattle Times dated December 13, 1990, staff reporter Barbara Serrano wrote an article commending Painter: “Bureaucrat lauded for Tent City solution: Mild-mannered style works for homeless coordinator.” She describes him as follows:

Honest. Straightforward. Sensitive. Politically gutsy. All are among the most common ways people describe Painter. Scott Morrow, as staff member for SHARE – the group that built Tent City- lauds Painter as “a good bureaucrat” who knows how to make government work effectively.

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

It was the homeless coordinator’s mild-mannered style, Morrow said, that helped defuse tensions between determined men and women at Tent City and the buttoned-down types in City Hall.

“He never promised anything he couldn’t deliver,” Morrow said... To no surprise of those who know him, Painter bristles at public attention. During an interview in his house earlier this week, he gave credit to everyone else for addressing homelessness in Seattle: to the city officials he works with, to Mayor Norm Rice and his staff, and mostly to the nonprofit social providers on the front lines of service...“Because Seattle has been so responsive in the past, there’s a tendency to let the city provide all the resources,” Painter said. “The challenge next year is to get others to put as much of an increase and emphasis on housing and homelessness as we have.”...“Seattle’s been extraordinarily successful in leveraging state and federal money for initiatives,” Painter said. “Unfortunately, what we’ve all learned is that it takes a long time to get things done.”

The recognition Seattle has received for high-quality, well-coordinated, strategically- linked programs for homeless people is attributable to a strong network of community non-profit organizations working in close collaboration with a core group of outstanding City staff, Painter chief among them.

June 2, 1998: The Mayor’s Pledge

Alan Painter listened to Mayor Schell’s June 2nd public pledge that there will be no homeless families with children or homeless single women on the streets by Christmas. Walking back to his office following the speech, Painter is thrilled by Schell’s commitment to homelessness. At the same time, Painter recognizes the tension between Schell’s pledge and several of the Advisory Committee’s guiding strategies (as described in the section on Seattle’s response to homelessness). Increasing shelter capacity is quite expensive. The most recent new shelter in Seattle, housing 20-40 women, costs over $300,000 per year to staff, even though it is only open at night. This figure does not include rent or other associated capital costs.

Painter understands the political power of counting and publicly emphasizing the size of the homeless population in Seattle. Even so, the practice makes him uncomfortable. Schell’s pledge raised the stakes and the scrutiny of the homeless street count. He wonders what effect the pledge will have on the supply and demand of shelter space. Even if additional shelter space is developed, Painter fears that some of the target population still might choose the streets. Furthermore, factors beyond the City’s control have a significant impact on the number of homeless people.

Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

According to the best estimates, of the 1,300 homeless people living on the streets without shelter on a given night, over 700 are homeless families with children or single women in Seattle, the categories described in Schell’s pledge. Painter wonders what it will take to bring that number down to zero. He also wonders who will be counting and how they will do so.

..