CJ 2241 Survey of Crimanl Law Assignments #2-6 Must understand how to summerize a case no guessing!

Case Summaries for Criminal Procedure, 6e

John Scheb and John M. Scheb II

Chapter 1

Duncan v. Louisiana (1968). Here the Supreme Court made the right of trial by jury applicable to defendants in state criminal cases. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Black expressed his satisfaction with what the Court had done under the mantle of selective incorporation: “I believe as strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. I have been willing to support the selective incorporation doctrine, however, as an alternative, although perhaps less historically supportable than complete incorporation. ... [T]he selective incorporation process has the virtue of having already worked to make most of the Bill of Rights protections applicable to the States.”

Boykin v. Alabama (1969). Boykin pled guilty to five counts of common law robbery; however, at this time Alabama law provided for a jury to determine a defendant’s sentence. At the sentencing phase, the trial judge asked Boykin no questions regarding the voluntariness of his plea agreement nor did Boykin address the court. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony; however, Boykin’s attorney failed to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of Mr. Boykin including the fact that there was no indication the defendant had a prior criminal history. The jury returned a death sentence. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, held “several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment…. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of these important federal rights from a silent record.” The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s sentence because there was no indication in the court record that his plea was made “voluntary and understandingly.”

Chapter 2

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon, a 51 year-old indigent “drifter” who had been in and out of jails all his adult life, was charged with felonious breaking and entering. At trial, he requested that the court appoint an attorney to represent him. The court refused, citing the Florida law that required appointment of counsel for indigent defendants only in capital cases. While serving his sentence in the Florida State Prison, Gideon unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in the Florida Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus. He then obtained review by the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed Gideon’s conviction. Writing for the Court, Hugo Black opined that “[t]he right of one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.” Gideon v. Wainwright overruled the Supreme Court’s 1942 holding in Betts v. Brady. Because Gideon was made retroactive, it allowed numerous persons serving time in state prisons to win their freedom by seeking writ of habeas corpus in the state and federal courts. Without question, Gideon was one of the most important decisions of the Warren Court in the field of criminal justice.

Williams v. Florida (1970). Two years prior to this case, the Supreme Court held “that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a trial by jury in all criminal cases in Duncan v. Louisiana. Here, the defendant was charged with robbery and tried by a jury composed of six members. The question before the Supreme Court was “whether the constitutional guarantee of a trial by ‘jury’ necessarily requires a trial by exactly 12 persons.” The Court held that a jury of twelve is not a requirement under the Sixth Amendment’s right as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment to a trial by jury in criminal cases.

Solorio v. United States (1987). While Petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska he “sexually abused two young daughters of a fellow coastguardsmen.” Authorities learned of these alleged crimes after the Coast Guard transferred the Petitioner to New York. New York authorities investigated the Petitioner for similar sexual abuse allegations while stationed in New York. As a result of the investigations, the Governors Island commander convened a general court-martial to try the Petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and New York. The question presented was whether the “jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a member of the Armed Forces depends on the ‘service-connection’ of the offense charged.” The Court held it did not, overruling its prior holding in O'Callahan v. Parker.

Ex Parte Milligan (1866). Lambdin P. Milligan, a civilian residing in Indiana, was an active collaborator with the Confederacy. In 1864, he was arrested and tried for treason by a military commission established by order of President Lincoln. Milligan was convicted and sentenced to death, but the sentence was not carried out. In 1866, some time after hostilities had ceased, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction. Its landmark decision in Ex parte Milligan was a ringing endorsement of civil liberties. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that the civilian courts were open and operating in Indiana when Milligan was arrested and tried by the military. In ordering Milligan’s release, the Court condemned Lincoln’s directive establishing military jurisdiction over civilians outside of the immediate war area. It strongly affirmed the fundamental right of a civilian to be tried in a regular court of law, with all the procedural safeguards that characterize the criminal process. It must be remembered that this strong assertion of constitutional principles occurred a year after the close of the Civil War and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Viewed in this light, Ex parte Milligan may be more aptly described as an admission of judicial weakness during time of war than as a bold pronouncement of constitutional limits on presidential power.

Ex parte Quirin (1942). In a special term of the Supreme Court in 1942, the Supreme Court handed down this opinion regarding seven consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus. All the Petitioners were born in Germany and lived in the United States, and all but one were citizens of the German Reich. After war was declared between the United States and Germany, the Petitioners received training “at a sabotage school near Berlin, where they were instructed in the use of explosives and in methods of secret writing.” Some of the Petitioners made their way to New York City, others to Florida, “in the hours of darkness” carrying with them “a supply of explosives, fuses and incendiary and timing devices.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation apprehended all Petitioners and learned their objective was to destroy “war industries and war facilities in the United States.” The President, by Executive Order, appointed a Military Commission and directed it to try the Petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War. The executive order also delineated regulations and procedures on the trial and for review of the trial record and of any judgment or sentence of the Commission. Also, the President, by Proclamation, declared “that ‘all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals’.” In addressing the President’s exercise of his war powers as commander in chief, the Court stated that the exercise of those powers, including the detention and trial of the Petitioners, will not be set aside “in a time of war and of grave public danger” unless they are in clear conflict with the Constitution.” The Court stated that “lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.”

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). A Yemeni national detained at Guantanamo Bay brought suit to challenge the legality and constitutionality of the military tribunal before which he was to be tried. Hamdan’s brief to the Supreme Court argued that President Bush had “claimed the unilateral authority to try suspected terrorists wholly outside the traditional civilian and military judicial systems, for crimes defined by the President alone, under procedures lacking basic protections, before judges who are his chosen subordinates.” In Hamdan’s view, the president’s actions “reach far beyond any war power ever conferred upon the Executive, even during declared wars.” Dividing 5-to-3 (Chief Justice Roberts not participating because he had previously voted in the case at the court of appeals level) the Court held that the Bush Administration’s plan to try Guantanamo Bay detainees before military commissions was unauthorized by statute and violated international law. The overarching rationale of the Court’s decision is summed up by Justice Stevens’ assertion that: “Even assuming that Hamdan is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity, the executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment.” The majority indicated that Congress could, through appropriate legislation, provide for the use of military tribunals to try Guantanamo Bay detainees.

In re Gault (1967). Gerald Francis Gault, a juvenile, was arrested in 1964 while his mother and father were at work. The police made no attempt to notify the juvenile’s parents that their son had been taken into custody. During the course of trying to find her son, Mrs. Gault was informed that Gerald had been taken to the juvenile detention home. There, she was informed that a legal hearing would take place in juvenile court the following day. A petition for delinquency was filed with the court the next day; however, the Gaults were never served with a copy of the petition, which further failed to allege facts to support an allegation of delinquency. Mrs. Gault, her eldest son, and two probation officers appeared before the Judge in chambers. The victim that claimed Gerald had made lewd phone calls to her home was not present at the hearing. “No one was sown in. No transcript was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared.” Ultimately, the Judge sentenced Gerald to the State Industrial School until the age of majority for allegedly making lewd phone calls to a neighbor. No appeal was permitted under Arizona state law. Gerald’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting the release of his son; however, the state appellate courts denied the petition. The Supreme Court held that due process requires that several basic rights under the Constitution be afforded to juvenile offenders. First, adequate written notice of the charges must be afforded with adequate preparation time prior to court appearances. Second, the child and his parents must be advised of their right to be represented by counsel, and if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. Third, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is also applicable in juvenile criminal cases. Fourth, juveniles are also afforded the rights of confrontation and sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross-examination.

Chapter 3

Chimel v. California (1969). Police officers obtained a warrant for the Chimel’s arrest for allegedly committing various burglaries. Law enforcement went to Chimel’s home to execute the arrest warrant; however, he was not home. Chimel’s wife allowed the police to wait until he returned. When Chimel arrived, the police arrested him. The police asked for Chimel’s consent to search the premises, but he refused. Although Chimel denied their request, the police “conducted a search of the entire house ‘on the basis of the lawful arrest’.” Items were seized and subsequently used to convict Chimel of burglary over his objection that the items were unconstitutionally seized. The Supreme Court held the “warrantless search of petitioner’s house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest.” The Court futher specified that “an arresting officer may search the arrestee’s person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area ‘within the immediate control’ of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. On this basis, the Court held the serach unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000). In August 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to a operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The overall ‘hit rate’ of the program was approximately nine percent. The checkpoint locations were predetermined weeks in advance based on area crime statistics and traffic flow. The checkpoints were conducted during daylight hours and were identified with lighted signs reading, “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ___ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.” Respondent James Edmonds was stopped at a checkpoint and later filed a motion for injunctive relief claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The US District Court denied the motion for injunctive relief; however, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed holding the checkpoints in violation of the Fourth Amendment because their primary purpose was indistinguishable from general interest crime control. The Court refused to validate suspicionless stops.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2000). In the fall of 1988, staff members at the Charleston public hospital operated by the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) became concerned about an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by pregnant women. MUSC offered to cooperate with City prosecutors when women delivered babies that tested postive for illegal drugs at birth. A joint task force was created, which developed “a policy which set forth procedures for identifying and testing pregnant patients suspected of drug use; required that a chain of custody be followed when obtaining and testing patients’ urine samples; provided for education and treatment referrals for patients testing positive; contained police procedures and criteria for arresting patients who tested positive; and prescribed prosecutions for drug offenses and/or child neglect, depending on the stage of the defendant’s pregnancy.” Women that were subsequently arrested under this policy filed suit claiming that it violated their Fourth Amendment rights on “the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches.” The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “a state hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure.”

Florida v. J.L. (2000). An anonymous informant called the Miami-Dade Police to report that “a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” Two police officers responded to the call and went to the particular bus stop mentioned by the anonymous informant. The officers saw “three black males ‘just hanging out’.” J.L., a juvenile, was wearing a plaid shirt. The officers did not see a firearm in plain view and “apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct.” The officers approached J.L., “told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun” from his pocket. The other two males were frisked, but nothing was found. While the trial court held the search invalid, the intermediate appellate court reversed holding the search within constitutional limits. The Florida Supreme Court reversed holding that “anonymous tips … are generally less reliable than tips from known informants and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the Court, held “the anonymous call concerning J. L. provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J. L. of engaging in unlawful conduct.” She went on to stated that “the reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search.” Because the officers only had information from an “unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L., there was a lack of reasonable suspicion to justify the search.

Hester v. United States (1924). The defendant was convicted of “concealing distilled spirits; however, the judge admitted testimony of witnesses over the defendant’s objections and he appealed. The two witnesses at issue were revenue officers who, based on information they obtained during an investigation, went speak to the defendant. As the officers approached the house, they saw the defendant hand “a quart bottle” to another individual. The officers attempted to apprehend both individuals, but they fled with jugs in hand. The officer fired a single shot and the defendant halted, throwing his jug away in the process. While the jug the defendant was carrying broke, there was enough left for the officers to determine it had contained whisky. The officer did not have an arrest or search warrant, and as a result, the defendant argued the evidence was inadmissible. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction holding that the evidence was admissible because when evidence is abandoned, as when the defendant dropped the jug, there is no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Illinois v. Gates (1983). The police received an anonymous letter that stated the Respondents, husband and wife, were engaged in selling drugs. The letter claimed specific days and times where the wife would drive their automoble to Florida “to be loaded with drugs, and the husband would fly down” a few days later “to drive the car back.” The letter claimed that car “would be loaded with drugs, and that Respondents presently had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.” The police acted on the tip, determined respondents’ address, learned that the husband made a reservation to fly to Florida, made arrangements for surveillance of the flight with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The surveillance revealed “that the husband took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room registered in the wife’s name, and left the following morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate issued to the husband, heading north on an interstate highway used by travelers to the Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents’ residence and automobile were obtained, which lead to the discovery of marijuana and other contraband in respondents’ car trunk and home. The trial judge orderd all the items seized suppressed because “the letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a determination of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant under Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States since they failed to satisfy the ‘two-pronged test’ of (1) revealing the informant’s ‘basis of knowledge’ and (2) providing sufficient facts to establish either the informant’s ‘veracity’ or the ‘reliability’ of the informant's report. The Supreme Court abandoned the Aguliar-Spinelli test for a “totality of the circumstances” test. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the Aguilar-Spinelli test “should be understood simply as closley intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” The Court went on to state that “the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a pratical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

Katz v. United States (1967). In this landmark 1967 decision, the Supreme Court overturned Olmstead v. United States (1928). The Court reversed a conviction in which government agents, acting without a warrant, attached a “bug,” or listening device, to the outside of a public telephone booth from which Charles Katz, a suspected bookie, often placed calls. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people--not places.” According to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, which has come to be regarded as the most important opinion in Katz, the Fourth Amendment extends to any place or any thing in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Knowles v. Iowa (1998). An Iowa policeman stopped Knowles for speeding and issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The officer conducted a full search of his car, without either Knowles’s consent or probable cause, and found marijuana and other contraband. Knowles was arrested and prior to trial moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that since he had not been arrested, the search could not be sustained under the “search incident to arrest” exception recognized in United States v. Robinson. The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver where they issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, held that the serach violated the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, “the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. While concern for safety during a routine traffic stop may justify the ‘minimal’ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search.” Additionally, Rehnquist asserted that “the need to discover and preserve evidence does not exist in a traffic stop, for once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained.” The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Kyllo v. United States (2001). Here the Court considered whether the use of a “thermal imager” by law enforcement agents constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, police had used the device without first obtaining a warrant to scan a home they suspected to be housing an indoor marijuana growing operation. Having discerned the telltale infrared radiation associated with the use of indoor growing lights, and having obtained corroborating information, the police obtained a warrant to search the premises, where they found more than 100 cannabis plants. The procedure used by police in the Kyllo case has been in wide use around the country as part of the national war on drugs. Police and prosecutors typically take the view that the thermal scan is not a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment, since it only collects data on heat that is being released into the public space. In a close decision (5-4), the Supreme Court disagreed with this perspective. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia opined that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that “[a]ll that the infrared camera did … was passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of petitioners home; all that those measurements showed were relative differences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that some areas of the roof and outside walls were warmer than others.” In Stevens’s view, the police did not significantly intrude on the privacy of the occupants. The Kyllo case is interesting because it shows how changing technology creates new and difficult Fourth Amendment problems. As technology in this area advances, courts will continue to confront such problems.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Cleveland, Ohio police arrived at Dollree Mapp’s home pursuant to information that a bombing suspect was hiding there. They demanded access, but failing to produce a search warrant, were denied. Police returned some four hours later and forced their way into the home. Mapp, who protested the entry was forcibly detained while officers searched the home. Although police failed to locate the bombing suspect, they did find in a trunk in the basement some sexually explicit materials. Mapp was arrested, tried and convicted under the Ohio statute proscribing possession of obscene materials. Dividing 7-2, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed her conviction, holding that the evidence had been improperly admitted against her since it had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. In this landmark decision, the Court overruled its precedent in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) and applied the exclusionary rule to the state courts via the 14th Amendment. Dissenting, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court had “forgotten the sense of judicial restraint which, with due regard for stare decisis, is one element that should enter into deciding whether a past decision of this Court should be overruled.” The majority, however, concluded that its decision “gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”

Nix v. Williams (1984). The Respondent was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. While the Respondent was being transported to Des Moines, the police illegally interrogated him. During the course of the “conversation,” the Respondent made incriminating statements and directed the officers to the missing child’s body. Prior to the beginning of the conversation between the Respondent and the police, a “systematic search of the area was being conducted with the aid of 200 volunteers.” The search was terminated when the Respondent guided police to the child’s body. The Respondent moved to suppress all evidence at trial. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, adopted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this exception, illegally obtained evidence, such as the Respondent’s confession, may be deemed admissible when the prosecution can establish that the information sought would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. The Court held that the “search party ultimately or inevitably would have discovered the victim’s body” because the evidence revealed that the volunteers “were approaching the actual location of the body, that the search would have been resumed had respondent not led the police to the body, and that the body inevitably would have been found.”

Olmstead v. United States (1928). Olmstead, a suspected bootlegger, was charged with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The government’s evidence consisted of transcripts of Olmstead’s telephone conversations obtained through a wiretap placed outside his property. The agents had obtained no warrant authorizing the wiretap. Although there was no search or seizure of his person or physical property, Olmstead maintained that the Fourth Amendment had been violated. The term “effects,” as used in the Fourth Amendment, could have been interpreted to include telephone conversations, but the Court opted for a narrower construction. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taft stated: “The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages passing over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” Justice Brandeis, along with three of his colleagues, dissented. He asserted the need to keep the Constitution relevant to changing technological conditions: “The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?”

Rochin v. California (1952). Rochin was convicted for possession of narcotics after the police had his stomach pumped to retrieve capsules he had swallowed to avoid arrest. Having granted cert, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Rochin’s conviction. Writing for the Court, Felix Frankfurter concluded that the officers’ conduct in the case “shocked the conscience” and was therefore invalid under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. In concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas objected to the broad due process approach and argued that the case should be governed by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which should be enforceable against the state via the 14th Amendment. Arguing for “total incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 14th Amendment, Douglas wrote: “If it is a requirement of due process for a trial in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say that it is not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state courthouse.”

Smith v. Maryland (1979). At the request of law enforcement, and without a warrant, a telephone company installed a pen register at its central office to record the phone numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith’s home. As a partial result of the phone numbers obtained, Smith was indicted for robbery. At trial, Smith moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds for the warrantless installation of the pen register. The trial court denied the motion and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held “the installation and use of the pen register was not a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and hence no warrant was required.” The Court went on to state that the “application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’.” The Court held when Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the phone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the normal course of business, he assumed the risk that the company would reveal the information.”

Terry v. Ohio (1968). A police officer on routine patrol observed two men repeatedly walking up and down a street while stopping to stare into a store window. Each time one of the men walked up the street and stopped to look into the store window and returned, a conference was held between the two men and a third individual. The officer believed the men were “casing a job, a stick up.” The officer approached the men, “identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names;” however, the men were less than forthcoming and mumbled something under their breaths. The officeer “spun [Terry] around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket … a pistol.” The officer then removed the overcoat from Terry, removed the pistol, and ordered the men “to face the wall with their hands raised.” The officer repeated the same procedure with the other two men, finding a pistol during the patdown on one, but nothing on the other. Terry and the second man with a pistol were charged with carrying a conceaned weapon. The trial court denied defense’s motion to supress the evidence “on the ground that the officer had cause to believe the mem were acting suspiciously, their interrogation was warranted, and the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.” The Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and applies to citizens on the street as well as in their home. However, the Court also held that the “exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques.” The officer’s actions to detain and patdown the men were held to be a seizure and serach under the Fourth Amendment, but the serach and seziure were held reasonable. The Court expressly held “where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous.”

Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989). The United States Customs Service implemented a drug-screening program requiring “urinalysis tests of Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the individual to carry firearms or to handle ‘classified’ material.” The Treasury Employees’s Union filed a lawsuit on behalf of Custon Service employees seeking relevant positions alleging that the drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court agreed, and enjoined the program. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the injunction. While the Supreme Court held the production of urine samples by employees for analysis is a serach within the Fourth Amendment, the Court also held that “a warrant is not required by the balance of privacy and governmental interests in the context of this case.” Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, stated that a warrant requirement “would serve only to divert valuable agency resources from the Service’s primary mission, which would be compromised if warrants were necessary in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions.” Kennedy went on to state that “a warrant would provide little or no additional protection of personal privacy, since the Service’s program defines narrowly and specifically the circumstances justifying testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions.” Additionally, the “affected employees know that they must be tested, are aware of the testing procedures that the Service must follow, and are not subject to the discretion of officials in the field.” Lastly the Court noted that “there are no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate, in that implementation of the testing process becomes automatic when an employee pursues a covered position.” As a result, the drug testing of Service employees that apply for “promotion to positions direclty involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the incumbent to carry firearms, is reasonable despite the absence of a requirement of probable cause or of some level of individualized suspicion.”

United States v. Calandra (1974). Calandra’s place of business was searched pursuant to a warrant for the specific purpose of seizing bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia for a gambling investigation. During the course of the search, an agent, knowledgeable of a pending investigation regarding loanskarking activities, discovered and seized a loansharking record. As a result, a grand jury was convened to investigate loanskarking, which subpoenaed Calandra to appear before it for the purposes of questioning him on the seized evidence. Calandra refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds against self-incrimination. Calandra then moved to suppress the loansharking evidence seized during the search of his office on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. The trial court granted the motion and futher ordered that Calandra did not have to answer any questions posed by the grand jury related to the loanskarking evidence. However, the Supreme Court held that “a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.” The Court, speaking through Justice Powell, reinforced the notion that the exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” As a result of this purpose, the Court held that “allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties, and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jury’s role.” As a result, the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings.

United States v. Fregoso (1995). The Nebraska Police Department obtained information that Dixie Buck and Peter Lopez were engaged in elicit drug activities. As a result, officers obtained a warrant to install pen registers on their respective phone lines. The state court also authorized the telephone company to “supply subscriber information and caller identification service for the phones to which the pen registers were attached.” The police were also authorized to “to intercept conversations over Buck’s and Lopez’s home telephones.” As a result of the investigation, police officers obtained search warrants for the homes of Buck, the Fregosos, Soria, and Brown. In conducting the search of the Fregosos’ residence, the police saw David Fregoso “drop a towel and plastic baggie from his hand,” which was later determined to be cocaine. Eleven defendants, including the Fregosos, Soria and Brown were indicted and convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine in furtherance of the conspiracy … based upon the quantity of cocaine David Fregoso dropped on the day the search warrants were executed.” In upholding the use of the pen registers and caller identification service, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the federal statute pertaining to trap and trace devices. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) defines a trap and trace device as “a device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.” The court refused to hold the caller identification service as a wiretap and instead held that the service was a trap and trace device as it “decode[s] the electronic impulses the telephone is receiving and display[s] them as a telephone number at the same time that the telephone is receiving the ringing impulses.” The procedural component of the federal statute requires a magistrate approving the use of trap and trace devices to “enter and ex parte order authorizing the installation” of the device “upon proper application” by law enforcement. The Fregosos failed to present any evidence that the procedures delineated in the statute were not properly followed, and as a result, the Eighth Circuit upheld the use of the caller identification service.

United States v. Leon (1984). Police officers obtained a search warrant acting on a tip from a confidential informant of unproven reliability. A subsequent search of a residence turned up a substantial amount of illegal drugs. At an evidentiary hearing prior to trial, a judge ruled that the warrant had been wrongly issued; that there was insufficient information to constitute probable cause. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the evidence could nevertheless be admitted against the defendants, because to exclude such evidence would have no deterrent effect on police misconduct. The error was made by the magistrate who issued the warrant, not by the police who were deemed to be acting in good faith. Dissenting, Justice Brennan asserted that “it is clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the ‘costs’ of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the ‘benefits’ of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.”

United States v. Ross (1982). District of Columbia Police responded to a tip provided by an informant that Ross was selling narcotics from his car. The informant provided the location of the vehicle and the police immediately drove to where Ross’s vehicle was allegedly located. When Ross entered the vehicle and began to drive, the police stopped the vehicle and made an arrest. The police opened the “trunk, found a closed brown paper bag, and after opening the bag, discovered glassine bags containing white powder,” which later tested positive for heroin. The vehicle was driven to police headquarters where a second warantless search was performed, which “revealed a zippered leather pouch containing cash.” As a result of the two searches, Ross was tried and convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, his objection to the admission of the seized evidence notwithstanding. The Supreme Court held where police officiers have “legitimately stopped an automobile and have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize by warrant.” The Court applied the “automobile exception” articulated in Carroll v. United States to searches “of vehicles that are supported by probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” As a result, the serach was not unreasonable as it was based on “objective facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant,” even though a warrant was not actually obtained.

United States v. Sokolow (1989). When Drug Enforcement Agents stopped Sokolow at the Honolulu International Airport, agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. Prior to apprehending Sokolow, agents discovered during the course of an ininvesigation that he paid cash for two round-trip plane tickes, traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed, travelled to Miami, a city kknown for illicit drugs, stayed in Miami for only 48 hours when a trip from Hawaii takes 20 hours, appeared nervous during the flight, and failed to check any luggage. Sokolow was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Sokolow moved to suppress the evidence; however, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed that there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe Sokolow was transporting illegal drugs when they detained him; thus, the stop was justified under the premise of Terry v. Ohio. The reasonableness of the stop does not turn on whether the police used the least restrictive means, but rather whether the stop was reasonable under the circumstances.

United States v. United States District Court (1972). Three defendants were charged with conspiracy to destroy government property. One of them, Plamondon, was also charged with the bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Defendants filed a pretrial motion to compel disclosure of information the government had obtained through electronic surveillance that had not been judicially approved. The government asserted that the surveillance was lawful as a reasonable exercise of the president’s power to protect national security. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the government’s surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court held that these activities offended the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Whren v. United States (1996). Police were traveling in an unmarked police vehicle through a “high drug area” when they observed a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long time. After some time, “the truck turned without signaling and sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” The officers stopped the truck with the intention of giving the driver a warning; however, when they approached the truck, they saw “plastic bags of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands and arrested him. Whren moved to suppress the drugs on the grounds that the officers did not have “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe” Whren was “engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for stopping the truck was pretextual.” The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court held that the “temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.” As long as the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been violated, the detention of the motorist is reasonable. Furthermore, the Court held that “ulterior motives” will not invalidate police conduct on their own because “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”

Wilson v. Arkansas (1995). In executing a search warrant of Wilson’s home, the police failed to “knock and announce” their presence and authority as they entered the home. As a result of the police violating this common law “knock and announce” principle, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed holding that the “knock and announce” rule is not required under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held however that the “ ‘knock and announce principle’ forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.” The Court stated that in some circumstances, failure to knock and announce while entering a home could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court suggested that when there is a “threat of physical harm to police,” or “reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given,” failure to knock and announce could be reasonable. Additionally, when the police are pursuing a fugitive from justice, it could be reasonable to fail to comply with the common law knock and announce principle. The Court ultimately left it to the lower courts to “determine such relevant countervailing factors.” The police asserted in this case that they “would have been placed in peril” and would have increased the likelihood that narcotics would have been destroyed had they complied with the rule. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to make a determination of the reasonableness of the conduct.

Chapter 4

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991). Fulminante’s 11-year-old daughter was murdered in Arizona. After the murder, he left Arizona for New York, where he was convicted of an unrelated crime and sentenced to prison. While in prison, Fulminate became friends with a fellow inmate named Anthony Sarivola, who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the course of conversation, Sarivola told Fulminante that the reason for the harsh treatment by other inmates was a rumor circulating that he had murdered a child. Sarivola told him that he would provide protection in exchange for the truth. Fulminante disclosed that he had killed his daughter in Arizona and gave details about the crime. After being released from prison in New York, Fulminante was indicted for first-degree murder in Arizona. The confession to Sarivola was the key piece of evidence, and Fulminate sought to have it suppressed. The trial court rejected the notion that the confession was coerced and barred by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed holding that “the confession was coerced” and ordered a new trial without the use of the confession. The Supreme Court affirmed holding the confession was coerced because Fulminante’s primary motivation to confess was to prevent physical violence. Thus, the confession could not be used against him under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Chimel v. California (1969). Police officers obtained a warrant for the Chimel’s arrest for allegedly committing various burglaries. Law enforcement went to Chimel’s home to execute the arrest warrant; however, he was not home. Chimel’s wife allowed the police to wait until he returned. When Chimel arrived, the police arrested him. The police asked for Chimel’s consent to search the premises, but he refused. Although Chimel denied their request, the police “conducted a search of the entire house ‘on the basis of the lawful arrest’.” Items were seized and subsequently used to convict Chimel of burglary over his objection that the items were unconstitutionally seized. The Supreme Court held the “warrantless search of petitioner’s house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest.” The Court futher specified that “an arresting officer may search the arrestee’s person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area ‘within the immediate control’ of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. On this basis, the Court held the serach unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000). In August 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to a operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The overall ‘hit rate’ of the program was approximately nine percent. The checkpoint locations were predetermined weeks in advance based on area crime statistics and traffic flow. The checkpoints were conducted during daylight hours and were identified with lighted signs reading, “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ___ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.” Respondent James Edmonds was stopped at a checkpoint and later filed a motion for injunctive relief claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The US District Court denied the motion for injunctive relief; however, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court Court affirmed holding the checkpoints in violation of the Fourth Amendment because their primary purpose was indistinguishable from general interest crime control. The Court refused to validate suspicionless stops.

Koon v. United States (1996). In the wake of the Rodney King beating, the police officers involved were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force, but were convicted in federal court for violating King’s “constitutional rights under color of law.” Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, each defendant was eligible for a sentence ranging from 70 to 87 months; however, the judge sentenced them “two downward departures from that range” based on King’s misconduct. Additionally the judge based the departure on four factors, including “the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison, they would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement, they had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions, and that they posed a low risk of recidivism.” The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each

to 30 months. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected each departure cited by the District Court. The Supreme Court held that the federal Sentencing Guidelines do not remove judicial discretion in a sentencing determination, but rather “allows a departure from the range if the court finds ‘there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration’ by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.” The Court held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering “the susceptibility to abuse in prison and the burdens of successive prosecutions.” However, the Court also found that the District Court did abuse its discretion in relying on “collateral employment consequences” and “the low likelihood of recidivism” as support for its departure.

Miller v. Clark County (2003). A Clark County Sheriff’s Deputy was on routine patrol when he became suspicious of the driver of a silver Pontiac Fiero. The deputy conducted a “computerized check” and discovered that the vehicle displayed a license plate belonging to a different vehicle, and as a result, attempted to stop the vehicle. Miller, the driver of the vehicle, refused and gave chase. At one point in the chase, the passenger exited the vehicle and the Deputy pursued. The driver entered a driveway and was pursued by another officer traveling with his police dog “Kimon.” Once the officer and the police dog reached the vehicle, Miller was no longer in the vehicle and traveling on foot. After unsuccessfully searching for Miller, the Deputy yelled out, “This is the Sheriff’s Office. You have five seconds to make yourself known, or a police dog will be sent to find you.” Miller gave no response. The Deputy let “Kimon” off his leash and “gave a command that directed the dog to search for [Miller] and detain him by biting his arm or leg.” Approximately one minute later, Miller was heard screaming in the nearby woods. It took sixty seconds for the Deputy to find Miller and saw “Kimon biting his upper arm. The Deputy gave the command for “Kimon” to release Miller, who complied immediately. Miller was then transported to the hospital for treatment. Miller alleged the “deputy’s use of the police dog constituted excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the of the police dog to “bite and hold” Miller’s arm for up to one minute did not constitute the use of deadly force nor did it “constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”

Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993). Police officers observed Dickerson leaving a building known for selling and trafficking cocaine. When the officers approached Dickerson, he seemed to make “evasive actions.” Therefore, the police decided to investigate further and told Dickerson to submit to a “patdown” Terry search. The search resulting in finding no weapons, but the officer “felt a small lump felt a small lump” in Dickerson’s pocket, “believed it to be a lump of crack cocaine upon examining it with his fingers.” The officer “then reached into the pocket and retrieved a small bag of cocaine.” Dickerson moved to suppress the evidence at his trial for possession of a controlled substance, but the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court stating that the “police may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense of touch during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry, so long as the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry.” The Court refused to accept a “plain feel exception” to Terry. According to the Supreme Court, Terry “permits a brief stop of a person whose suspicious conduct leads an officer to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot, and a patdown search of the person for weapons when the officer is justified in believing that the person may be armed and

presently dangerous.” This is a “protective search” that is “not meant to discover evidence of crime, [and] must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others.” The Supreme Court explicitly held that if “the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”

Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Police arrested Ernesto Miranda, a 23 year-old indigent with a ninth grade education, and charged him with raping an 18 year-old girl. At the police station, the victim picked Miranda out of a “lineup.” Two officers then took Miranda to a room where they interrogated him. After first denying his guilt, Miranda eventually confessed to the crime. Following his conviction, Miranda appealed on the ground that his confession had been coerced. The Supreme Court granted review, consolidating Miranda’s appeal with three other cases involving the admissibility of confessions. The Court reversed Miranda’s conviction, holding that his confession had been improperly admitted into evidence. Per Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that, henceforth, police must advise suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to have counsel present during interrogation. Failure to provide these warnings will result in the suppression of a confession, even if it is deemed reliable. These new requirements were based on the Court’s conclusion that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation ... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” In a bitter dissent, Justice White complained that “[i]n some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets ... to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”

New York v. Quarles (1984). Two New York City police officers were approached by a woman who claimed she had just been raped and that her assailant had gone into a nearby grocery store. The police were informed that the assailant was carrying a gun. The officers proceeded to the store and immediately spotted Benjamin Quarles, who matched the description given by the victim. Upon seeing the police, Quarles turned and ran. One of the police officers drew his service revolver and ordered Quarles to “freeze.” Quarles complied with the officer’s request. The officer frisked Quarles and discovered an empty shoulder holster. Before reading Quarles the Miranda warnings, the officer asked where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty boxes and said, “The gun is over there.” He was then placed under arrest and “Mirandized.” Later Quarles moved to have his statement suppressed from evidence since it was made prior to the Miranda warnings. He also moved for suppression of the gun under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The Supreme Court allowed both pieces of evidence to be used against Quarles, notwithstanding the delay in the Miranda warnings. Obviously, the Court felt that the officers were justified in locating a discarded weapon prior to Mirandizing Quarles. In so holding, the Court created the public safety exception.

Nix v. Williams (1984). The Respondent was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. While the Respondent was being transported to Des Moines, the police illegally interrogated him. During the course of the “conversation,” the Respondent made incriminating statements and directed the officers to the missing child’s body. Prior to the beginning of the conversation between the Respondent and the police officers, a “systematic search of the area was being conducted with the aid of 200 volunteers.” The search was terminated when the Respondent guided police to the child’s body. The Respondent moved to suppress all evidence at trial. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, adopted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this exception, illegally obtained evidence, such as the Respondent’s confession, may be deemed admissible when the prosecution can establish that the information sought would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. The Court held that the “search party ultimately or inevitably would have discovered the victim’s body” because the evidence revealed that the volunteers “were approaching the actual location of the body, that the search would have been resumed had respondent not led the police to the body, and that the body inevitably would have been found.”

Reid v. Georgia (1980). Two men were observed by federal narcotic agents at the Atlanta Airport “occasionally” looking to each other while in line to board a commercial flight early in the morning hours. Both men were charring a “shoulder bag,” but neither had any other luggage. As the two men left the terminal, the agents asked both for identification. The two consented to a search of their person and should bags; however, Reid attempted to flee. Before Reid was apprehended, his abandoned bag was serached and cocaine was found therein. Reid successfully moved to supress the evidence at trial; however, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, “holding that the stop … was permissible, since he appeared to the agent to fit the so-called ‘drug courier profile’.” The Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, held “the agent could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected [Reid] of criminal activity on the basis of the observed circumstances.” The Supreme Court stated “the fact that the agent believed [Reid] and his companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were traveling together is too slender a reed to support the seizure.” The conviction for possession of a controlled substance was vacated and the case remanded to the lower court.

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980). A taxicab driver who was robbed “by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun,” identified Innis as the guilty party. A police officer on patrol saw Innis, “arrested him, and advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.” Other officers arrived at the arrest sence, who also advised Innis “of his Miranda rights.” Innis told the officers “he understood his rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer.” Innis was transported to the police station with three officers that “were instructed not to question [him] or intimidate him in any way.” However, during the commute, “two of the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves concerning the missing shotgun. One of the officers stated that there were ‘a lot of hanicapped children running around in the area’ because a school for such children was located nearby, and ‘God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves’.” Innis immediately interrupted the conversation, “stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.” Once the officers returned to the arrest sence, Innis was advised of his Miranda rights for a third time. Innis stated he “understood those rights, but that he ‘wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the school’.” Innis then led the police to the shotgun. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, held Innis “was not ‘interrogated’ in violation of his rights under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.” The Court stated “there was no express questioning of [Innis]; the conversation between the two officers was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between them to which no response from respondent was invited.” The Court went on to state that Innis was “was not subjected to the ‘functional equivalent’ of questioning, since it cannot be said that the officers should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Although Justice Stewart conceded Innis was subjected to “subtle compulsion,” Stewart also noted that “it must be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, which was not established here.”

Rochin v. California (1952). Rochin was convicted for possession of narcotics after the police had his stomach pumped to retrieve capsules he had swallowed to avoid arrest. Having granted cert, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Rochin’s conviction. Writing for the Court, Felix Frankfurter concluded that the officers’ conduct in the case “shocked the conscience” and was therefore invalid under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. In concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas objected to the broad due process approach and argued that the case should be governed by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which should be enforceable against the state via the 14th Amendment. Arguing for “total incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 14th Amendment, Douglas wrote: “If it is a requirement of due process for a trial in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say that it is not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state courthouse.”

Tennessee v. Garner (1985). At the time this case reached the Supreme Court, a Tennessee Statute provided that “if, after a police officer has given notice of an intent to arrest a criminal suspect, and the suspect flees or forcibly resists, ‘the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest’.” A Memphis police officer, acting under this statute, shot and killed the repondent’s son. Garner’s son was “told to halt” by the officer, but instead he “fled over a fence at night in the backyard of a house he was suspected of burglarizing.” The officer “used deadly force despite being ‘reasonably sure’ the suspect was unarmed, 17 or 18 years old, and of slight build” As a result, the father filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his son’s constitutional rights. The District Court held that the statute and the officer’s actions were constitutional; however, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice White, held the Tennessee statute unconstitutional “insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against … an apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect.” Under these circumstances, “force may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

United States v. Arvizu (2002). Arvizu “was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona” believed to be a path traveled by drug smugglers. The agent searched his vehicle and found “more than 100 pounds of marijuana.” Arvizu was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute. Agent Stoddard believed, based on his training as a board agent, that Arvizu was transporting marijuana into the United States. Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court, held under “the totality of the circumstances and giving due weight to … inferences drawn by Stoddard, … [there was] reasonable suspicion to believe that [Arvizu] was engaged in illegal activity.” Rehnquist went on to say that “because the ‘balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security,’ tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’.” Rehnquist gave lower courts direction in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion by instructing courts to look at the “totality of the circumstances” to decide whether the officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity.

United States v. Wade (1967). Wade was indicted for conspiracy and bank robbery. Several weeks afterwards, police placed Wade in a “lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used.” This was done without notice to Wade’s appointed counsel. As a reuslt of the lineup, two bank employees identified Wade as the robber. At Wade’s trial, the employees identified Wade as the robber when asked whether the guilty person was in the courtroom. However, Wade’s attorney arged that the lineup “violated [Wade’s] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications.” The trial court denied the motions, and Wade was convicted. The Supreme Court held “neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated [Wade’s] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the Court held the post-indictment lineup without the presence of his attroney, violated Wade’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because such a right “guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial.” The post-indictment lineup was held to be a “critical prosecutive stage,” and therefore Wade was entitled to have counsel present.

Whren v. United States (1996). Police were traveling in an unmarked police vehicle through a “high drug area” when they observed a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long time. After some time, “the truck turned without signaling and sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” The officers stopped the truck with the intention of giving the driver a warning; however, when they approached the truck, they saw “plastic bags of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands and arrested him. Whren moved to suppress the drugs on the grounds that the officers did not have “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe” Whren was “engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for stopping the truck was pretextual.” The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court held that the “temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.” As long as the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been violated, the detention of the motorist is reasonable. Furthermore, the Court held that “ulterior motives” will not invalidate police conduct on their own because “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”

Chapter 5

Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978). Here the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is not violated when.a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to have the accused reindicted on more serious charges on which he is plainly subject to prosecution if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged.” Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the “the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s criminal justice system; properly administered, they can benefit all concerned.” Stewart went on to say “though to punish a person because he has done what the law allows violates due process, there is no such element of punishment in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor’s offer. Bruton v. United States (1968). Burton and his co-defendant, Evans, were tried jointly and convicted for armed postal robbery. While Evans did not testify, a postal inspector testified that Evans confessed that he and Burton committed the robbery. As a result of the testimony, “the trial judge instructed the jury that, although Evans’s confession was evidence against him it was inadmissible hearsay against [Burton] and had to be disregarded in determining [Burton’s] guilt or innocence.” The Court of Appeals affirmed Burton’s conviction in view of the trial judge’s jury instructions. The Supreme Court held that due to “the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating statements in determining [Burton’s] guilt, the admission of Evans’s confession in the joint trial violated his right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Burton’s conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

Cook v. State (1977). Cook and three codefendants were jointly tried and convicted for conspiracy to commit sexual battery and sexual battery. Each defendant argued on appeal that they were denied their Sixth Amendment right to confront their accusers when incriminating statements of three of the codefendants were introduced” when none of the defendant’s testified at trial. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burton, Florida promulgated Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152, which gives the State of Florida three options “when the trial court determines that a defendant’s statement is not admissible against a codefendant.” The State can choose to 1) severe the trials of the defendants, 2) try the defendants jointly without admitting the incriminating statement into evidence, or 3) try the defendants jointly, admit the incriminating statements into evidence, but remove the references to the defendant in which the statements are inadmissible. The State proceeded under option two; however, the Court examined whether a defendant could nonetheless be prejudiced even though the references to him are deleted from the incriminating statements of a codefendant. The Court, speaking through Judge Scheb, adopted the following standard: “if the jury was ‘highly likely’ to determine from a co-defendant’s statement that the defendant was the nameless individual incriminated by the statement, a Bruton violation has occurred, even if the inference drawn from the codefendant’s statement is incriminating only when considered in light of other evidence offered at trial.” However, because of the overwhelming evidence against Cook, even if there was a Burton violation, the Court held it was harmless error.

Duncan v. Louisiana (1968). Here the Supreme Court made the right of trial by jury applicable to defendants in state criminal cases. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Black expressed his satisfaction with what the Court had done under the mantle of selective incorporation: “I believe as strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. I have been willing to support the selective incorporation doctrine, however, as an alternative, although perhaps less historically supportable than complete incorporation. ... [T]he selective incorporation process has the virtue of having already worked to make most of the Bill of Rights protections applicable to the States.”

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon, a 51 year-old indigent “drifter” who had been in and out of jails all his adult life, was charged with felonious breaking and entering. At trial, he requested that the court appoint an attorney to represent him. The court refused, citing the Florida law that required appointment of counsel for indigent defendants only in capital cases. While serving his sentence in the Florida State Prison, Gideon unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in the Florida Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus. He then obtained review by the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed Gideon’s conviction. Writing for the Court, Hugo Black opined that “[t]he right of one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.” Gideon v. Wainwright overruled the Supreme Court’s 1942 holding in Betts v. Brady. Because Gideon was made retroactive, it allowed numerous persons serving time in state prisons to win their freedom by seeking writ of habeas corpus in the state and federal courts. Without question, Gideon was one of the most important decisions of the Warren Court in the field of criminal justice.

Hurtado v. California (1884). In this case the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the grand jury procedure required in federal criminal cases by the Fifth Amendment was an essential feature of “due process of law” and thus required in state criminal cases by the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, the Hurtado decision remains “good” law; states are not required by the federal constitution to use grand juries to bring criminal charges, although many still do.

Powell v. Alabama (1932). Ozie Powell and six other black defendants were charged with raping two white girls. The defendants, who were poor, young and uneducated, were tried without assistance of counsel. An all-white jury found them guilty and sentenced them to death. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had been denied due process of law. The Court stopped well short of saying that all indigent defendants must be provided counsel in all felony cases. Rather it limited its holding to the facts, saying that “in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him a as a necessary requisite of due process...”

Scott v. Illinois (1979). Scott was arrested for and convicted of shoplifting; however, Scott was unable to afford counsel to represent him. The statute on point set the maximum penalty for shoplifting at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail. Scott requested the appointment of counsel; however, the trial court denied his request. The Supreme Court held the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require “that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” However, the Court also held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “do not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant, such as Scott, who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not imposed.” Therefore, the Court explained that Argersinger v. Hamlin “limits the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings to a case that actually leads to imprisonment.”

Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966). The defendant was convicted of murdering his wife by “bludgeoning” her to death. The issue in this case was the pretrial publicity. There was “virulent and incriminating publicity” about the defendant. The murder case was “notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges and countercharges besides those for which defendant was tried.” The defendant was examined “for more than five hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted before an audience of several hundred spectators in a gymnasium.” Moreover, the “newspapers published the names and addresses of prospective jurors causing them to receive letters and telephone calls about the case.” Also, the trial took place during a highly contested election, “at which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judgeships.” The media took over the courtroom, and they “hounded” the defendant and witnesses. Members of the media inside the courtroom often caused consfusion and disruptions. As a result, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition on the grounds that he was denied a fair trial in the judge’s failure to take “effective measures against massive publicity … or to take adequate steps to control the conduct of the trial.” The Supreme Court held that the “massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity” prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that while “freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the fair and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose of adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only in open court. The Court gave orders to release the defendant unless tried again “within a reasonable time.”

Stack v. Boyle (1951). Twelve individuals were arrested and convicted of conspiring to violate the Smith Act. Their bail was initially set at different amounts ranging from $2,500 to $100,000; but later was fixed “pending trial in the uniform amount of $50,000.” Each defendant moved for a reduction in bail under the theory that the $50,000 was “excessive under the Eighth Amendment.” The Government’s only argument against lowering the bail was that four other individuals previously convicted under the Smith Act “had forfeited bail.” While the Government presented no evidence relating specifically to the twelve individuals in the present prosecution, the US District Court denied the motion to reduce bond. The Supreme Court held that the bail was not “fixed by proper methods.” The Court stated that bail “set before trial at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose of assuring the presence of the defendant is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” The Court went on to establish the standards for setting bail by stating that the amount of bail “must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”

United States v. Calandra (1974). Calandra’s place of business was searched pursuant to a warrant for the specific purpose of seizing bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia for a gambling investigation. During the course of the search, an agent, knowledgeable of a pending investigation regarding loanskarking activities, discovered and seized a loansharking record. As a result, a grand jury was convened to investigate loansharking, which subpoenaed Calandra to appear before it for the purposes of questioning him on the seized evidence. Calandra refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds against self-incrimination. Calandra then moved to suppress the loansharking evidence seized during the search of his office on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. The trial court granted the motion and futher ordered that Calandra did not have to answer any questions posed by the grand jury related to the loanskarking evidence. However, the Supreme Court held that “a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.” The Court, speaking through Justice Powell, reinforced the notion that the exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” As a result of this purpose, the Court held that “allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties, and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jury’s role.” As a result, the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings.

United States v. Salerno (1987). Here the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act), which requies “courts to detain prior to trial arrestees charged with certain serious felonies when the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure … the safety of any other person and the community’.” At the hearing required under the Act, the accused is affoard the “right to counsel, to testify, to present witnesses, to proffer evidence, and [the right] to cross-examine witnesses.” In making its determination whether to grant bail, the Act specifies certain factors to be considered by a court, including “the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government’s evidence, the defendant’s background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by his release.” The Supreme Court ruled that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is not unconstitutional “given the Act’s legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose and the procedural protections it offers” to the accused. The Court’s examination of the legistlative history revealed the Act was not intended as pretrial punishment, but rather “as a potential solution to the pressing societal problem of crimes committed by persons on release” and to prevent “danger to the community.” As a result, there is no constitutional right to bail under the Eighth Amendment.

Weeks v. United States (1914). The Court held that evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the 4th Amendment may not be used in a federal prosecution. Justice Day’s opinion for the Court suggested that exclusion of tainted evidence was implicit in the requirements of the Fourth Amendment: “If letters and private documents can thus be [illegally] seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment ... is of no value ... and might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”

Chapter 6

Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Batson, an African-American man, was on trial for burglary and receiving stolen goods. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks from the venire, which led to an all-white jury being impaneled. The judge denied the defendant’s motion to discharge the jury. Batson was convicted on both counts and the state supreme court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that Batson had been denied a fair trial due to the purposeful exclusion of blacks from the jury. Under Batson, the trial judge has the responsibility to scrutinize peremptory challenges. If the judge determines that they are racially motivated, they must be disallowed or the jury discharged.

In re Death of Eric Miller (2003). Eric Miller died as a result of arsenic poisoning in 2000. The police investigation revealed on the night of November 15, Eric Miller and his wife, Ann Rene, went bowling with several of Ann Rene’s co-workers. While bowling, Eric Miller consumed a portion of a beer given to him by Derril Willard, upon which Miller commented that the beer “had a bad or ‘funny’ taste.” The following day Eric Miller was admitted to the hospital for arsenic poisoning, but was discharged several days later. On December 1, 2000 Miller became extremely ill, and the next day Miller died from arsenic poisoning. After Miller’s death, Ann Rene claimed that she was unaware of anyone that would want her husband dead. The police interviewed everyone at the bowling alley in November, with the exception of Willard, whom the police could not locate. After Miller’s body was cremated, Ann Rene refused further interviews with the police. After Miller died, Willard sought legal advice from attorney Richard Gammon, and Willard subsequently committed suicide. The State filed a “Petition in the Nature of a Special Proceeding” requesting that the trial court to “determine whether the attorney-client privilege should be waived or whether compelled disclosure of communications between [Gammon] and Willard was warranted for the ‘proper administration of justice’.” The judge ordered Gammon to “provide the trial court with a sealed affidavit containing information relevant to the murder investigation … that was obtained from his attorney-client relationship with Willard.” The judge would then examine the affidavit in camera to determine whether the information should be disclosed to the State. The North Carolina Supreme Court held “when a client is deceased, upon a non-frivolous assertion that the privilege does not apply, with a proper, good-faith showing by the party seeking disclosure of communications, the trial court may conduct an in camera review of the substance of the communications.” The court went on to state that when communications “between the attorney and the deceased client relate solely to a third party, such communications are not within the purview of the attorney-client privilege.” The court gave the trial court instructions in that should it find “that some or all of the communications are outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the trial court may compel the attorney to provide the substance of the communications to the State for its use in the criminal investigation.” However, the court refused to determine whether “any information provided by any attorney [in these circumstances] would be admissible in any future criminal prosecution.”

Jackson v. State (1987). John William Jackson was charged and convicted of first-degree murder and armed burglary. At the end of the State’s proof, and again at the end of the defense’s proof, Jackson moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court denied the motions and sentenced Jackson to life imprisonment with a minimum mandatory term of twenty-five years. Jackson appealed. The Florida Court of Appeals, speaking through Acting Chief Judge Scheb, reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion and vacated his convictions and sentence. The court held that when the state’s evidence is primarily circumstantial, the appellate court’s role “is to determine whether the jury might have reasonably concluded that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.” The court went to say that “the weight of the evidence is a matter for the trier of fact, and a jury verdict should not be reversed when there is substantial, competent evidence to support it.” However, when a “criminal conviction … is based solely on circumstantial evidence, it is [the court’s] duty to reverse the conviction when that evidence, although strongly suggesting guilt, fails to eliminate any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The evidence against Jackson did not include “substantial, competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict,” and as a result, the court vacated the convictions and sentence.

Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd (2003). Joseph Rico was convicted by a Philadelphia County jury of murder and criminal conspiracy, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Rico filed several post-trial motions, including a motion that “alleged … the prosecutor exercised seven of twenty peremptory challenges against Italian American prospective jurors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Superior Court found that “all but two of the stuck jurors” were dismissed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky, reversed Rico’s convictions and granted a new trial. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding “that the Superior Court erred in rejecting the trial court’s factual finding of no purposeful discrimination.” Rico then sought habeas corpus relief in the federal District Court, arguing Batson violations and prosecutorial misconduct. The federal Magistrate Judge held in the Report and Recommendation that Rico’s petition should be dismissed, and the District Court adopted the position of the Magistrate Judge. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held affirmed. The court stated that the trial court’s denial of Rico’s Batson claim based on the mere fact that jurors bore Italian American surnames, without any other evidence to support the allegation of discrimination was not “objectively unreasonable.” Additionally, the court held where prosecutors have “mixed motives” for challenging a potential juror, an action “partially motivated by an improper purpose is nonetheless valid if the alleged offender would have taken the same action in the absence of the improper motive.” While one of the excused jurors was Italian American, he also displayed fear of the mob when questioned during voir dire. The trial court held that while the juror’s Italian American decent was a motivation in striking the juror, it was nonetheless de minimus. As a result, the Third Circuit held it was not “objectively unreasonable” for the District Court to deny Rico’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966). The defendant was convicted of murdering his wife by “bludgeoning” her to death. The issue in this case was the pretrial publicity. There was “virulent and incriminating publicity” about the defendant. The murder case was “notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges and countercharges besides those for which defendant was tried.” The defendant was examined “for more than five hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted before an audience of several hundred spectators in a gymnasium.” Moreover, the “newspapers published the names and addresses of prospective jurors causing them to receive letters and telephone calls about the case.” Also, the trial took place during a highly contested election, “at which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judgeships.” The media took over the courtroom, and they “hounded” the defendant and witnesses. Members of the media inside the courtroom often caused consfusion and disruptions. As a result, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition on the grounds that he was denied a fair trial in the judge’s failure to take “effective measures against massive publicity … or to take adequate steps to control the conduct of the trial.” The Supreme Court held that the “massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity” prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that while “freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the fair and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose of adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only in open court. The Court gave orders to release the defendant unless tried again “within a reasonable time.”

United States v. Richardson (2000). Phyllis Richardson was convicted in federal court of embezzlement, money laundering, and mail fraud. During the trial, the judge “instructed the jury that if they did not understand a part of a witness’s testimony they could submit written questions to the court after the lawyers ended the examination of that witness.” The court also “explained to the jurors that some of their submitted questions might not be asked because the question might be improper under the rules of evidence and instructed them not to speculate on what the answer to such questions might be or why the court did not ask a particular question.” At the time of the judge’s instruction, Richardson did not object. However, Richardson did object mid-trial to this practice arguing “that the questions demonstrated the jurors were becoming adversarial and engaging in premature deliberation.” The judge overruled the objection, but again “instructed the jury … that they were allowed to ask questions only for the purpose of clarifying a witness’s testimony; that jurors should not become advocates for either side; and that they must decide the case after they retired to the jury room based only on the evidence presented to them in court.” On appeal, Richardson argued that allowing “jurors to ask any questions at all deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial,” and in the alternative argued that “at least ten of the questions – all asked after her objection – were prejudicial.” The Eleventh Circuit “rejected[ed] outright … that permitting juror questioning of witnesses is per se error.” The court noted “every circuit to consider the practice has permitted it, holding that the decision to allow juror questioning rests within the discretion of the trial judge.” As to Richardson’s alternative argument, the court noted that there was no evidence in the record to indicate “that the jurors actually talked to each other about the questions they planned to ask,” nor any evidence that “the questions posed …reflect[ed] any opinion the jurors may have held regarding either the credibility of any single witness, or the guilt or innocence of Richardson.” The questions asked by jurors were “factual in nature and for the purposes of clarification.” As a result, the court held that there was no evidence of “prejudice resulting from the juror questioning” and affirmed the convictions.

Williams v. Florida (1970). Two years prior to this case, the Supreme Court held “that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a trial by jury in all criminal cases in Duncan v. Louisiana. Here, the defendant was charged with robbery and tried by a jury composed of six members. The question before the Supreme Court was “whether the constitutional guarantee of a trial by ‘jury’ necessarily requires a trial by exactly 12 persons.” The Court held that a jury of twelve is not a requirement under the Sixth Amendment’s right as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment to a trial by jury in criminal cases.

Chapter 7

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). Apprendi “fired several shots into the home of an African-American family and made a statement—which he later retracted—that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race.” Apprendi was charged with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose; however, there was no mention of the state hate crime statute that would allow for an enhanced sentence. After Apprendi pled guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence, due to race being an underlying motivation of the offense. The trial court found the “shooting was racially motivated” and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison on the firearms charge. Apprendi appealed the sentence on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” The state appellate courts affirmed the sentence on a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution “requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, stated that the “Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, taken together, entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” As a result, Apprendi’s sentence was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Atkins v. Virginia (2002). Atkins was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Virginia jury. On appeal, Atkins argued that he could not be sentenced to death on the basis that he was mentally retarded; however, following state precedent, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that “executions of mental retarded criminals are ‘cruel cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” After an examination of state legislation and the relevant medical standards addressing mental retardation, the Court held that such executions are now prohibited under the evolving standards of decency. In justifying the Court’s holding, Justice Stevens wrote “mentally retarded persons who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”

Austin v. United States (1993). Austin pled guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute in a South Dakota state court. Once Austin was sentenced in state court, the United States Government filed an in rem action in federal court seeking the forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop due “to being used, intended to be used, or to facilitate the commission” of the drug offense in which he pled guilty in state court. The District Court granted the Government’s request that Austin forfeit the properties. On appeal, Austin argued that forfeiture of his properties was in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause; however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the forfeiture holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply in civil in rem proceedings. The Supreme Court held forfeiture of property in these circumstances “is a monetary punishment and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.” However, the Court declined “to establish a test for determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally ‘excessive,’ since prudence dictates that the lower courts be allowed to consider that question in the first instance.” Therefore, the case was remanded to the District Court to make a determination of whether the forfeiture was in fact excessive.

Coker v. Georgia (1977). While serving a prison sentence for various violent felonies, Corker escaped, committed an armed robbery, other various offenses, and raped an adult woman. At trial, Corker was convicted of all crimes in which he was indicted while on escape, and the jury sentenced Corker to death for the rape. However, the Supreme Court vacated the death sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds. Justice White, in announcing the Court’s decision, concluded “that the sentence of death for the crime of rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.” For Justice White, the “Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are ‘barbaric,’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime committed, and a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Justice Powell concluded in his concurring opinion that “death is disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman where, as here, the crime was not committed with excessive brutality and the victim did not sustain serious or lasting injury.”

Ford v. Wainwright (1986). Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Florida state court where at no time was there any “suggestion that he was incompetent.” After proceedings concluded, Ford began to “manifest changes in behavior, indicating a mental disorder,” which led to psychiatritic examinations at his counsel’s request. One doctor concluded that Ford was “not competnet to suffer execution.” As a result, Ford’s counsel sought to have him declared incompetent under statutory procedures. The court ordered evaluations “reached conflicting diagnoses,” but all agreed that Ford was competent to be executed. As a result, the Governor signed Ford’s death warrant. Ford’s counsel filed for “a habeas corpus proceeding in Federal District Court, seeking an evidentiary hearing on Ford’s competency, but the court denied the petition without a hearing,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded “that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane.” Justice Marshall, writing for a pluarality, concluded “the reasons at common law for not condoning the execution of the insane – that such an execution has questionable retributive value, presents no example to others, and thus has no deterrence value, and simply offends humanity – have no less logical, moral, and practical force at present.” For Justice Marshall, “whether the aim is to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.” The Court ruled that Ford was entitled to a de novo evidentiary hearing in the District Court on the question of his competence to be executed.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973). Gerald Scarpelli was placed on probation for committing an armed robbery. While he was on probation, Scarpelli was arrested for allegedly committing a burglary. Scarpelli orginially admitted being involved in the burglary, but later claimed that his admision was false and made under duress. While Scarpelli was not represented by counsel, the court revoked his probation without a hearing. While Scarpelli was serving his sentence, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but was paroled prior to the hearing. The District Court concluded, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that “revocation of probation without hearing and counsel was a denial of due process.” The Supreme Court held that “due process mandates preliminary and final revocation hearings.” The Court went on to state that courts should “decide in each individual case whether due process requires that an indigent probationer or parolee be represented by counsel. Though the State is not constitutionally obliged to provide counsel in all cases, it should do so where the indigent probationer or parolee may have difficulty in presenting his version of disputed facts without the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the presentation of complicated documentary evidence.” The Court held “presumptively, counsel should be provided where, after being informed of his right, the probationer or parolee requests counsel, based on a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged violation or, if the violation is a matter of public record or uncontested, there are substantial reasons in justification or mitigation that makes revocation inappropriate.”

Furman v. Georgia (1972). Five justices voted to strike down Georgia’s death penalty. There was, however, only a brief per curiam opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. For the majority’s rationale, one had to look at five separate concurring opinions. Only two of the five justices--Brennan and Marshall--held that the death penalty itself was cruel and unusual punishment, given the “evolving standards of decency.” Of the five justices who voted to invalidate the death penalty, Justice Stewart’s opinion seems to have been the most influential. For Stewart the problem with the death penalty was not the punishment itself but the manner in which it was being administered. Trial juries were being left with virtually unfettered discretion in deciding when to impose capital punishment. The result, according to Stewart, was that the death penalty was “wantonly and ... freakishly imposed.”

Gregg v. Georgia (1976). In the wake of the Furman decision, some thirty-five state legislatures rewrote their death penalty laws. Georgia’s revamped death penalty statute was before the Supreme Court in the Gregg case of 1976. The revised Georgia Law requires a bifurcated trial for capital crimes: In the first stage guilt is determined in the usual manner; the second stage deals with the appropriate sentence. For the jury to impose the death penalty, it has to find at least one of several statutorily prescribed aggravating factors. Automatic appeal to the state supreme court is also provided. The appellate review must consider not only the procedural regularity of the trial, but whether the evidence supports the finding of the aggravating factor and whether the death sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The Court had little difficulty upholding the new Georgia statute, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. Justice Stewart’s opinion announcing the judgment stated: “The new Georgia sentencing procedures ... focus the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.... In this way the jury’s discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence, it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.” Thus, after a hiatus of four years, the death penalty was reinstated.

Roper v. Simmons (2005). In Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) the Supreme Court held that juveniles aged 16 and older at the time of their crimes could be sentenced to death. According to Justice O’Connor’s controlling opinion, “it is sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16- or 17-year-old capital murderers.” But in Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Court held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy found “evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles….”.” In a caustic dissent, Justice Scalia chided the majority’s reasoning.

Hutto v. Finney (1978). Several prisoners in the Arkansas prison system filed suit alleging prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Upon a finding of such conditions, the District Court “entered a series of detailed remedial orders,” including an order “placing a maximum limit of 30 days on confinement in punitive isolation.” Prison officials challenged the order on appeal. The Supreme Court held that “the District Court did not err in including the 30-day limitation on sentences to isolation as part of its comprehensive remedy to correct the constitutional violations.”

Jones v. United States (1999). Jones was sentenced to death pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 for kidnapping that resulted in the victim’s death. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant requested that the court inform the jury as to the consequences of jury deadlock; however the court denied his request. The jury unanimously recommended that Jones be sentenced to death, but had the jury been unable to reach a unanimous decision, sentencing would have fallen to the trial court under the statute. The Supreme Court held that the “Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.” The Court held instructing the jury as to the consequences of possible deadlock “has no bearing on the jury’s role in the sentencing process.”

Koon v. United States (1996). In the wake of the Rodney King beating, the police officers involved were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force, but were convicted in federal court for violating King’s “constitutional rights under color of law.” Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, each defendant was eligible for a sentence ranging from 70 to 87 months; however, the judge sentenced them “two downward departures from that range” based on King’s misconduct. Additionally the judge based the departure on four factors, including “the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison, they would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement, they had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions, and that they posed a low risk of recidivism.” The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each

to 30 months. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected each departure cited by the District Court. The Supreme Court held that the federal Sentencing Guidelines do not remove judicial discretion in a sentencing determination, but rather “allows a departure from the range if the court finds ‘there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration’ by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.” The Court held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering “the susceptibility to abuse in prison and the burdens of successive prosecutions.” However, the Court also found that the District Court did abuse its discretion in relying on “collateral employment consequences” and “the low likelihood of recidivism” as support for its departure.

McCleskey v. Kemp (1987). Here the Supreme Court reviewed the death sentence of an African-American man convicted of murdering a Caucasian police officer in Georgia. McCleskey filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court alleging that the sentencing process “was administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” In support of his position, McCleskey produced a statistical study that purported to show a “disparity in the imposition of the death sentence based on the murder victim’s race and, to a lesser extent, the defendant’s race.” The Baldus Study, as it has been called, indicated that “black defendants who killed white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.” However, the District Court rejected McCleskey’s constitutional allegations and denied his petition for relief. While the Court of Appeals “assumed the validity of the Baldus study,” it also “found the statistics insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment context or to show irrationality, arbitrariness, and capriciousness under Eighth Amendment analysis.” The Supreme Court affirmed stating that “the Baldus Study does not establish that the administration of the Georgia capital punishment system violates the Equal Protection Clause.” The Court held in order to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, a petitioner “must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey failed to provide evidence specifically tied to his case, and as a result, did not establish a discriminatory purpose in his case. Furthermore, the Court held that Baldus Study “does not demonstrate that the Georgia capital sentencing system violates the Eighth Amendment” because McCleskey did not demonstrate that his sentence “is disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases.” The Court noted that “at most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race, but this discrepancy does not constitute a major systemic defect … Despite such imperfections, constitutional guarantees are met when the mode for determining guilt or punishment has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible.”

Mempa v. Rhay (1967). Mempa pled guilty to “joyriding” on the advice of his court appointed attorney and was placed on probation for two years. However, Mempa was subsequently arrested for burglary and the State of Washington moved for the trial court to revoke his probation. A revocation of probation hearing was held where Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor did the court ask whether he wanted counsel. At the hearing, Mempa admitted involvment in the burglary, and his probation officer testifed, without being crossexamined, that “according to his information, [Mempa] had been involved in the burglary and had previously denied participation.” Without further questioning Mempa, the trial court revoked his probation, sentenced him to confinment for a maximum term of 10 years, but recommended that Mempa serve no more than one year. After serving six years in custody, Mempa filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus “claiming that he had been denied the right to counsel at the proceeding at which his probation was revoked and sentence imposed.” The Supreme Court held the “Sixth Amendment, as applied through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that counsel be afforded to a felony defendant in a post-trial proceeding for revocation of his probation and imposition of deferred sentencing.” The Court stated that “the services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage are necessary to ensure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are seasonably asserted, and to afford the defendant the substantial assistance which may be necessary in various other situations at that stage.”

Payne v. Tennessee (1991). Payne was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. During the penalty phase of Payne’s trial, the State presented the testimony of the mother of the one of the victims. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor commented at some length on this “victim impact evidence.” Payne was sentenced to death for each of the murders and to 30 years in prison for the assault. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Payne’s convictions and sentence. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, splitting 6-3, affirmed the judgment thereby receding from its holdings in prior cases. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the “State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”

Solem v. Helm (1983). Solem was convicted in South Dakota for “uttering a ‘no account’ check for $100.” The usual penalty for this offense is five years’ imprisonment and a $5000 fine; however, Solem was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under the state recidivist statute due to six prior felony convictions including third-degree burglary, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving while intoxicated. The state supreme court affirmed the sentence. Solem sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts arguing his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding the life sentence to be “significantly disproportionate” and thus invalid under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, stated “a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria,” which include “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, that is, whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”

Chapter 8

Chapman v. California (1967). A California constitutional provision allowed state prosecutors to comment on a defendant’s decision not to testify at trial. In similar fashion, when Chapman refused to testify, the prosecutor “commented extensively” on the fact to the jury. The judge presiding over the trial also commented on Champan’s failure to testify, charging the jury that they were free to draw their own conclusions. Interestingly, after Chapman’s trial, but prior to his appeal, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the California constitutional provision in question. However, the state supreme court upheld Chapman’s conviction on the basis of harmless error. The Supreme Court reversed Chapman’s conviction. The Court, speaking through Justice Black, held in order for an error to be harmless, the state “must be able to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt” that the error was in fact harmless. In this particular case, the Court held the state was unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the state’s ”repetitive comments to the jury, and the trial court’s instruction … did not contribute to the convictions.” As a result, the conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.

Douglas v. California (1963). Douglas and his codefendant, Bennie Meyes, were tried jointly and convicted on 13 various felonies. Both indigent, Douglas requested appointed counsel for his only appeal by right to the state appellate court. The trial court, in accordance with the relevant state rule of criminal procedure, reviewed the record ex parte and concluded the appointment of counsel would neither serve the Douglas’s interests nor be “helpful to the appellate court.” As a result, Douglas’s appeal was heard without the assistance of counsel and his conviction affirmed. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, held that “where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right [are] decided without [the] benefit of counsel in a state criminal case, there has been a discrimination between the rich and the poor which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” As a result, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the lower court.

Felker v. Turpin (1996). Felker was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Georgia state court. Felker appealed his conviction on a direct appeal, but was denied relief. Felker also sought and was denied relief in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding. While Felker was awaiting execution, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was signed into law. The Act require requires “dismissal of a claim presented in a state prisoner’s second or successive federal habeas application if the claim was also presented in a prior application.” The Act also compels “dismissal of a claim that was not presented in a prior federal application, unless certain conditions apply. The Act also functions as a “gatekeeping mechanism, whereby the prospective applicant files in the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the district court, and a three-judge panel determines whether the application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies” the Act’s requirements. Lastly, the Act declares that a panel’s grant or denial of authorization to file “shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . writ of certiorari.” As a result of these provisions, Felker filed a motion for leave to file a second federal habeas petition,” which was denied based on the premise that “the grounds raised had not been presented in his first petition.” After the appellate court’s denial, Felker filed a petition before the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the Act “does not violate the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which provides that ‘[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended’.” The Court believed “the new restrictions on successive habeas petitions constituted a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called … ‘abuse of the writ’.” Because Felker did not comply with the Act’s requirements nor did he show “exceptional circumstances” in “justifying the issuance of the writ” of habeas corpus, the Court denied Felker’s petition.

Herrera v. Collins (1993). Herrera was convicted of the capital murder of Police Officer Carrisalez and sentenced to death in January 1982. Herrera unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct appeal and in two collateral proceedings in the state courts, and in a federal habeas petition. Years later, Herrera argued “in a second federal habeas proceeding that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he was ‘actually innocent’ … and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee forbade his execution.” However, “the Court of Appeals held that the claim was not cognizable on federal habeas absent an accompanying federal constitutional violation.” Herrera appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that a “claim of actual innocence does not entitle him to federal habeas relief.” The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held where “a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the constitutional presumption of innocence disappears.” It is not he job of federal habeas courts do not sit to correct errors of fact,” instead it is their job “to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution.” Rehnquist went on to state that “to allow a federal court to grant him typical habeas relief … would in effect require a new trial 10 years after the first trial, not because of any constitutional violation at the first trial, but simply because of a belief that in light of his new found evidence a jury might find him not guilty at a second trial.” As a result, the Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of Herrera’s second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Wiggins v. Smith (2003). Wiggins was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in a Maryland state court. At the sentencing phase, Wiggins’s public defender stated in his opening statement that the jury would hear evidence regarding Wiggins’s “difficult life,” but no evidence was actually submitted to the jury for their consideration. The only mitigating evidence presented at sentencing was that Wiggins had no prior criminal history. At a subsequent postconviction relief hearing, Wiggins’s new counsel argued “that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background.” Expert testimony by a forensic social revealed “the severe physical and sexual abuse [Wiggins] had suffered at the hands of his mother and while under the care of a series of foster parents.” Trial counsel testified at the hearing that while funds were available for such expert testimony, “he did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history before sentencing.” The trial court denied Wiggins’s petition for postconviction relief, and the state court of appeals affirmed. However, the US District Court “granted Wiggins relief on his federal habeas petition, holding that the Maryland court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the US District Court holding that “The performance of Wiggins’ attorney at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” In writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated in order to grant a federal writ of habeas corpus, the state court’s decision must involve an “unreasonable application of clearly established precedent.” Wiggins’s trial counsel failed to conduct “a reasonable investigation,” which “fell short of the professional standards.” Also, Justice O’Connor noted that “in light of the facts counsel discovered in the DSS records concerning Wiggins’s alcoholic mother and his problems in foster care, counsel’s decision to cease investigating when he did was unreasonable. Any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing such leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of aggravating factors from Wiggins’s background.” As a result of the inadequate representation at sentencing, the Court held “counsel’s failures prejudiced Wiggins’s defense.” Given, Wiggins’s sufficiently satisfied the two-prong test in Strickland, the Court reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings.