2 paragraph and 3 questions<-------CASE is attached!!!!!! READ THE CASE <------

3 2 2 Chapter 10 Managing IT Projects

Discussion Questions

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DEALING WITH TRAFFIC JAMS IN LONDON

of previous centuries I ^ ^ ^ w * ^ * * * ^ W d r a ™ Cages' congestion nightmare a mafe o ? l t W T ^ " ^ ° ^ W 3 S * i s

mental and economic problems as w e l f i ? T ' *_ * c o n t r i b u t e d *> both environ- businesses roughly £2 S^^t^iZT^ P r a b I e m s « * London aggressive pohcv to address this • - T I T , muuon—every week Clearly, the city needed an

and endorsed by incoming Mavor KJ^ T ! 7 G r 6 a t e r L o n d o n Authority Ad suggests, the city w " a s l ^ T f e e or W a S C 0 " g * As the name secfons of London d u r t ^ e i h o u . ^ t 0 ^ a U t ° m ° b i l e * * e n t e r e d

about 150 000 of tie*bvvZt» L ° n d o n ^ h e r e ™ g % 1 million people entered every day, this area b e l l l ^ ^ l m T d f & 2 ° ° 3 ' ^ w h o ^ vehicles, such as a m b u W s Lses f n d 1 , ° * " ° f h y ( C e r f a i n ^ » o f

charge by mail ( p r e S ^ ' ! , ? ' f ? ' ^ D r i v e i s h a v e *e option ofpayingme p a y t t f e ^ e t ^ current technologies The X T f i J f ^ S f D l f i c a i l % solution makes extensive use of d e s i g n a t e ^ 7 0 0 C a m e r a s - ^ r e than 200 sites in the enterthe area T t w r i m ta r cameras photograph the license plates of every vehicle that images W l _ W ^ T T ^ P t 0 * *** C 8 n t e * * t r m s l a t e s ^ photographic

To create and im pn»j«-< t risks:

• Tight Schedule: multiple statutory

. Technology: The of thousands of li

t ,ack of Pre-existi • Limited Experien

governmental age were experienced

' • Political Fallout: ' be extremely dan

Transport for Lo limit the risks result the most significant specialized in diesi contracted first with

Early in tlie proje project into five "ps included (1) tlie ca converted them int when one vehicle -\ between the earners including tlie ability kiosks and gas static

The retail side w further reduce the ri packages. Another r. process of identifyin rejected proposals to in scenarios such as t increased ridership.

Transport for Lor project was large e Companies through tendered for tlie ca receive bids on a coi before deciding on a Group, England's 1 Capita's bid, Deloitt design studies. In ad established deadline

After awarding th it kept additions to tl: aproject increases in ofthe few changes a< popular SMS text m

[> Chapter 10 Managing IT Projects

ission Questions

hat type of development methodology appears to have been, employed at Southern .mpany for the ECM project? Was this a good approach? Provide a rationale for your sponse. escribe how Traynor could have applied Lewin's three stage model of change in lplementing the ECM? What would have been the advantages of applying Lewin's three- age model? ssess Southern's ECM system on fhe four dimensions of project success? How successful do m think this project is?

:es: Southern Company Web site, www.southemcompany.com (accessed on April 18, 2012); and 'erby, "How Southern Company Revamped I T Change Management," CIO.com (October IS, 2010), /www.do.conVar_cle/print/626323.

\LING WITH TRAFFIC JAMS IN LONDON

.ondon entered the 21st century, it was confronted with a major issue that plagues many cities mghout the world—excessive automobile traffic. Many Londoners—and particularly fhe iness commvrnity—rated traffic congestion as the city's most serious problem. At peak periods, average speed was less than 10 miles per hour, a slower speed than the horse-drawn carriages irevious centuries. Drivers spent about half their time waiting in traffic. Not only was this gestion nightmare a major source of driver frustration, but it contributed to both environ- ital and economic problems as well. By one estimate, traffic-related problems cost London inesses roughly £2 milhon—more than $3 million—every week. Clearly, the city needed an ressive policy to address this issue. The solution, proposed by a government study titled Road jrging Options for London (ROCOL), authorized by the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, L endorsed by mcoming Mayor Ken Livingstone, was congestion charging. As the name gests, the city would assess, a fee, or charge, to every automobile that entered high-traffic tions of London during peak hours. Rather than attempt a broad citywide implementation, the government focused specifically on highly congested section of central London, where roughly 1 mfilion people entered every day,

)ut 150,000 of them by private automobile. Beginning in February 2003, drivers who entered 5 area between 7 AM and 6:30 PM had to pay a fee of £5 ($8) by midnight. (Certain types of ricles, such as ambulances, buses, and taxis, were exempt.) Drivers have the option of paying the urge by mail (prepay), text messaging, telephone, or in person at various pay points. Failure to f the fee results in a fine of £80 (roughly $130). Significandy, this solution makes extensive use of rrent technologies. The city installed almost 700 cameras at more than 200 sites in the signated high-traffic area. These cameras photograph the license plates of every vehicle that ters the area. They then transmit these photos to a data center that translates the photographic Aims into license plate numbers utilizing automatic number plate recognition technology.

Case Study 10-2 <l 3 2 3

To create and implement the congestion charge plan, the government had to face a number of project risks:

• Tight Schedule: The project needed to be completed under tight deadlines in order to meet multiple statutory requirements and minimize disruptions to commuters.

• Technology: The cameras had to be strategically placed in order to accurately photograph tens of thousands of license plates every day.

• Lack of Pre-existing Models: There were no pre-existing models in the world to follow.

• Limited Experience and Expertise: Mayor Hvhigstone was newly elected, and the supervising governmental agency—Transport for London—had only recently been created. Thus, neither were experienced in bunding such a system.

• Political Fallout: The political risk of a system failure to the new mayor was so huge that it would be extremely damaging to his career.

Transport for London adopted a series of management strategies to navigate these waters and Emit .the risks resulting from their limited experience, IT ability, and management time. Perhaps the most significant decision was to outsource fhe basic management activities to firms that specialized in these areas. For example, to manage the competitive bidding process they contracted first with PricewaterhouseCoopers and then with Deloitte & Touche.

Early in fhe project, project managers identified fhe critical technical elements and divided the project into five "packages" that could, i f required, be bought and managed' separately. These included (1) the camera component; (2) the image store component that collected images, converted them into license numbers, and condensed the images (duplicates would occur when one vehicle was photographed by several cameras); (3) the telecommunications links between fhe cameras and the image store component; (4) the customer services irrfrastructure, mcluding the ability to pay by phone, Web, 'and mail; and (5) an extensive network of retail outlet kiosks and gas stations where people could pay the toll.

The retail side was seen as a big enough risk that it was bought and managed separately. To further reduce the risks, it was decided to select the best available technologies for each of the five packages. Another risk-aversive move was to utilize only established technologies for the actual process of identifying the vehicles in the designated zone. For example, Transport for London rejected proposals to employ electronic tags because this technology had not been proved effective in scenarios such as this one. Finally, the city added roughly 200 buses to its fleet to accommodate increased ridership.

Transport for London requestedbids on the project early in 2001. The estimated $116.2 million project was large enough to require listing in the European Union's public-sector register. Companies throughout Europe were allowed to bid on the project. Separate bids could be tendered for the camera and communications packages, whereas the remaining three could receive bids on a combined basis or individually. Deloitte & Touche reviewed more than 40 bids before deciding on a single contractor, to manage the entire program. Their choice was The Capita Group, England's largest business process outsourcing firm. Significantly, before accepting Capita's bid, Deloitte required both that firm and fhe other final candidate to submit technical design studies. In addition, Capita's contract included penalties i f the company failed to meet fhe established deadlines.

After awarding the contract to Capita, Deloitte closely monitored every step ofthe process, and it kept additions to the original plan to a minimum. As a result, scope creep—fhe process whereby a project increases in both size and costs as new features are added—was never a serious issue. One ofthe few changes added to the requirements was an option for motorists to pay fees through the

3 2 4 f> Chapter 10 Managing IT Projects

Throughout the implementation ofthe new system, the city continually so„al • r ' ** key stalceho ders. In addition, it regularly updated the pubhc JS^^AX"***

, Consequendy, few drivers were caught unawares when the new n n l w P J " ' l ' s 4ti«>« February 17, 2003. The mayor also wtsely decided to b^Zitl ^ """ ' period, when traffic volumes are ^ ^ . ^ f f ^ 1 ^ ^ dnvers generally had adapted to the new procedures returned I ^

What were the results of these concerted efforts? Unlike so many systems oroi. r , congestion charging plan was completed on time and within budget SfcXtivT °n*"* demanding schedule did not compromise the quality of the work I n s t 3 N h appears to have achieved its basic goals. A follow-up study indicated that traffic m cent' fT*** had dimmished by as much as 20%, and average driving speeds had improv d T l i '• ' ' ' ' ' " * * resulted m a project payback penod of about one and a half years. I t was estilna I ' I I ' ' ' FA

revenues would amount to $2.2 billion over a ten-year period. L r e o v e i v ^ X ! ^ tone substances such as nitrogen dioxide were also reduced. One potenti J n r o H , ! o f

emerge was "rat runs" in which traffic jams would appear in * £ ^ £ ^ U ' ' c l « altezed their routes to avoid the charges. After reviewing the outcomes of L w "

z » *r0T d ftat congesaon w i b—* ^ t e i x

Discussion Questions

1. Assess the risks of this project. Given your assessment ofthe project complexity , ! „ • , size, what management strategies would you recommend? What i f s n y r f £ ' f V were adopted in this project? y' s t '•''•Hugies

2. Describe the development methodology that was apphed to this project Was this l l , , . appropnate approach? Provide a rationale for your response

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