1100 words essay
Final+Exam+Essay.pdf
Final Exam: Essay Due on Monday, December 16, noon (Oncourse Submission)
Absolutely NO LATE SUBMISSIONS will be accepted. There are two potential essay questions, select only one for your final exam essay submission. Construct your thesis and argument, then use course readings and information from lectures as evidence to support your argument To qualify as a valid submission, your submission must:
• be 1000 - 1200 words (firm requirement) • include a word count at the bottom of your text submission (do not include citations
in this count) • use at least one reading from the final week (Turkle, Jurgenson, or Lanier) • correctly use and properly cite at least five readings from the included list of eligible
course readings • include your citations (in-text and at the end of your essay) one single file and
properly cite them Please chose only one of the two prompts below: 1) Essay Option 1: Some researchers make the following assumptions about the ways in which young people use technology:
Young people are uncritical of new technology Young people have forgone complex in-person interactions/communications in favor of simplified mediated communication Young people believe that newer technology is always better
Critique this perspective (in entirety) using at least FIVE of the class readings*. You must include at least one of the readings from the last week of class (Turkle, Jurgenson, or Lanier). 2) Essay Option 2: Some say that technology inevitably gets “better” over time and always leads to positive social changes. Critique this statement using at least FIVE of the class readings*. You must include at least one of the readings from the last week of class (Turkle, Jurgenson or Lanier). * Only readings from the list below will qualify toward your five course readings. You may also supplement your submission with readings that are not on this list (citing research your found on your own, class readings not lists, course lectures, videos, etc.), however, those will not count toward your total of five readings. Adding additional readings is fine and encouraged as long as it helps improve your argument and submission, but it is not necessary.
Eligible Reading List for Five Reading Requirement (Select from this list to meet your five course readings requirement.) Baym, Nancy
2010 “Technological Determinism” and “Social Construction of Technology.” In Personal Connections in the Digital Age. Pp. 24-28 and pp. 39-44. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Boyle, James
1996 “The Intellectual Land Grab.” In Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society. Pp. 125-128. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bringsjord, Selmer
2007 “Only a Technology Triad Can Tame Terror.” The Record. 7 September. P. 11. http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/tameterror.pdf
Chan, Anita
2004 Coding Free Software, Coding Free States: Free Software Legislation and the Politics of Code in Peru. Anthropological Quarterly 77(3):531-545.
Coleman, B.
2011 What is an Avatar. In Hello Avatar: Rise of the Networked Generation. Pp. 11-50. Cambridge: MIT Press. Gathman, E. Cabell Hankinson
2008 Cell Phones. In The Inner History of Devices. Sherry Turkle, ed. Pp. 41-48. Cambridge: MIT Press. Gershon, Ilana
2012 Introduction. In The Breakup 2.0: Disconnecting over New Media. Pp. 1-15. Cornell University Press. Gladwell, Malcolm
2010 “Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted.” The New Yorker. Published on 4 October 2010. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell
Grayling, A. C.
2011 “The Googlization of Everything.” Salon.com. Last modified on 11 April 2011. http://www.salon.com/books/feature/2011/04/11/the_googlization_of_everything_siva_vaidhyanathan
Heath, Dan and Chip Heath
2007 “The Myth about Creation Myths.” Fast Company. Last modified on 1 March 2007. Accessed 15 August 2013. http://www.fastcompany.com/58773/myth-about-creation-myths
Heeks, Richard
2008 ICT4D 2.0: The Next Phase of Applying ICT for International Development. Computer 41(6): 26-33. Hughes, Thomas
1997 The System Must be First. In Major Problems in the History of American Technology. Merritt Roe Smith and Greg Clancey, eds. Pp. 292–299. Houghton Mifflin.
Jurgenson, Nathan
2012 “The IRL Fetish.” The New Inquiry. Published on 28 June 2012. Accessed on 15 August 2013. http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-irl-fetish/
Lanier, Jaron
2010 Missing Persons. In You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto. Pp. 3-23. New York: Vintage Books.
Latour, Bruno
1987 Machines. In Science in Action. Pp. 103-108. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lessig, Lawrence
2004 Property. In Free Culture. Pp. 116-147. New York: The Penguin Press. http://www.free- culture.cc/freeculture.pdf
Mackenzie, Donald
1998 “The Social Shaping of Technology.” In Major Problems in the History of American Technology. Merritt Roe Smith and Greg Clancey, eds. Pp. 13-15. Houghton Mifflin Company.
Mirsky, Steve
2008 “Whose Phone is it Anyway?: Did Bell Steal the Invention?” Scientific American. Last modified on 8 January 2008. Accessed 15 August 2013. (Audio podcast of text available.) http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=5F1A8F35-C6A1-6742-6DCB11D92DAE6D09
Nye, David
2006 Does Technology Control Us? In Technology Matters: Questions to Live With. Pp. 17-22. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pariser, Eli
2011 “What the Internet Knows About You,” and TED talk. CNN. Published on 22 May 2011. http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/05/22/pariser.filter.bubble/index.html
Raymond, Eric
2005 “The Cathedral and the Bazaar.” First Monday. Published on 5 October 2005. Accessed 15 August 2013. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1472/1387
Sawyer, Steve
2005 Social Informatics: Overview, Principles and Opportunities. Bulletin of the American Society for Information: Science and Technology 31(5):9-12.
Standen, Amy 2012 Silicon Valley Boot Camp Aims to Boost Diversity. NPR Technology News. Published on 23 July 2012. http://www.npr.org/2012/07/23/156555402/silicon-valley-boot-camp-aims-to-boost-diversity Turkle, Sherry
2007 Authenticity in the age of digital companions. Theme issue, “Psychological Benchmarks of Human-Robot Interaction,” Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 8(3):501-517.
Winner, Langdon
1980 Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus 109(1):121-128. 2001 Whatever Happened to the Electronic Cottage. In NetFuture: Technology and Human Responsibility
(Technology Knowledge Revue). Stephen L. Talbott ed. Issue 121. 27 July 2001 http://netfuture.org/2001/Jul2701_121.html
Wu, Timothy 2011 Introduction. In The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
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reading.rar
新建文件夹/Ceccarelli+Manufactured+Scientific+Controversy.pdf
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Leah Ceccarelli is Associate Professor of Communication at University of Washington–Seattle. She would like to thank her writing group, Barbara Schneider and Jen Bacon, for their encourage- ment and support, and Martin J. Medhurst for his editorial guidance.
© 2011 Michigan State University Board of Trustees. All rights reserved. Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 14, No. 2, 2011, pp. 195–228. ISSN 1094-8392.
Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, Rhetoric, and Public Debate
Leah Ceccarelli
Th is article examines three cases that have been identified by scholars as
“manufactured” scientific controversies, in which rhetors seek to promote or delay
public policy by announcing that there is an ongoing scientific debate about a
matter for which there is actually an overwhelming scientific consensus. Th e
comparative study of argumentative dynamics in the cases of AIDS dissent, global
warming skepticism, and intelligent design reveals the deployment of rhetorical
traps that take advantage of balancing norms and appeals to democratic values.
It also reveals the ineff ectual counterarguments marshalled by defenders of
mainstream science. By exploring the inventional possibilities available to those
who would respond to manufactured scientific controversies, this article equips
readers and their students to confute deceptive arguments about science and
engage in a more productive public debate. In so doing, this article initiates an
Isocratean orientation to the rhetoric of science as a field of study.
S oon aft er Th abo Mbeki became president of South Africa in 1999, he
formed a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel that included a number of
people who claimed that an ongoing scientific controversy existed about
whether the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) causes acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Simultaneously, Mbeki prohibited government
hospitals from distributing antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to those who were
infected with HIV.1 Prior to elections in 2003, a popular movement forced
196 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Mbeki to publicly reverse this policy, but his years of support for those who
disputed the overwhelming scientific consensus on AIDS had tragic eff ects on
public health. A study published in 2008 estimates that over 330,000 South
Africans died prematurely as a result of the Mbeki administration’s refusal
to accept freely donated ARV drugs and obstruction of Global Fund grants,
and 35,000 babies acquired HIV who would not have done so had the drugs
been made available.2 What makes this situation more appalling is that before
becoming president, Mbeki vigorously supported the distribution of ARV
drugs; he even supported an unproven drug to fight HIV with the argument
that we cannot wait for scientific research to eliminate all uncertainty because
action needs to be taken quickly for dying AIDS patients.3 Aft er he became
president, though, Mbeki’s argumentative tactics changed; he made the
opposite case that scientific uncertainty justified his new policy to deny drug
distribution. It was not long before his actions “mirrored the machinations
of self-interested obstructionists” everywhere, who have “manufactured
controversy” over scientific claims in the public sphere to further a policy
objective.4 Th e dire consequences to public welfare that can result from the
manufactured scientific controversy justify increased scholarly attention to
this phenomenon.
A scientific controversy is “manufactured” in the public sphere when an
arguer announces that there is an ongoing scientific debate in the technical
sphere about a matter for which there is actually an overwhelming scientific
consensus.5 Th e manufactured scientific controversy can be seen as a special
type of “public scientific controversy” in which “strategically distorted
communication” works to corrode the democratic process.6 Th is article will
explore the argumentative dynamics of three cases that have been identified
by scholars of rhetoric as “manufactured” scientific controversies.
In separate case studies that richly detail the specific civic epistemologies
involved in each, rhetoricians have demonstrated how AIDS dissent, global
warming skepticism, and intelligent design have been used to manufacture
scientific controversy in the public sphere.7 But no one study has yet detailed
the common arguments and counterarguments deployed in all three cases.
Reading these case studies separately, one might conclude that the purpose
of the manufactured scientific controversy is to preclude the resolution of
an issue in government action, or contrarily, that its purpose is actually to
necessitate and legitimize government action.8 Th e comparative study of
arguments produced in all three cases will demonstrate how both ends can
be served by the tactic; those who manufacture a scientific controversy in
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 197
the public sphere use the same rhetorical strategies to initiate an “epistemo-
logical filibuster” that delays policy change (like the regulation of carbon
emissions), or to insert a “fairplay wedge” that enacts policy change (like a
state government’s introduction of new “teach the controversy” directives
for science education).9
Scholars outside the field of rhetorical inquiry who have studied this tactic
have told us a great deal about the use and misuse of scientific uncertainty in
the public sphere. For example, epidemiologist David Michaels details a number
of cases where industries have deployed a strategy he calls “manufacturing
uncertainty” in which “mercenary scientists” are hired to skillfully turn
“what should be a debate over policy into a debate over science.”10 Historian
of science Robert Proctor invented the term “agnogenesis” to refer to the
use of ignorance “as a deliberately engineered and strategic ploy” in cases
like the tobacco industry’s response to cancer studies or the petrochemical
industry’s promotion of global warming skepticism—cases where doubt or
uncertainty becomes “something that is made, maintained, and manipulated
by means of certain arts and sciences.”11 Sociologists William R. Freudenburg,
Robert Gramling, and Debra J. Davidson coined the term “scientific certainty
argumentation methods,” or SCAMs, to refer to “a clever and surprisingly
eff ective political-economic tactic” that exploits the fact that “most scientific
findings are inherently probabilistic and ambiguous”; they point out that
“SCAMs can be remarkably eff ective even in cases where most scientists see
findings as strong or robust—indeed, even in cases where the findings are
backed by clear and emphatic statements of scientific consensus from the
most prestigious scientific organizations in the world.”12
Because these scholars focus on the manufacture of scientific uncertainty in
the public sphere, they do an excellent job of demonstrating how conventional
ignorance claims in scientific articles are taken out of context, data is cherry-
picked, and statistical methods are manipulated with evaluation standards
being strengthened for studies that have inconvenient results. However, with
their focus on uncertainty production, rather than controversy production,
these scholars of public health policy, history of science, and sociology of
science turn their analytic gaze away from some of the most significant
rhetorical dynamics involved in manufacturing an ongoing scientific debate
in the face of overwhelming scientific consensus. Th is article will focus on
those rhetorical dynamics.
By undertaking a multiple-case rhetorical study of argument and
counterargument in the manufacture of scientific controversy, this article
198 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
will reveal how opposition scientists are recruited by political agents and
their voices are amplified through the exploitation of balancing norms in
American journalistic, legal, political, and educational institutions. Appeals
to open-mindedness, freedom of inquiry, and fairness create discursive traps
to constrain the response of mainstream scientists and their allies. Th e topoi
employed by those who manufacture scientific controversy in the public sphere
insinuate that defenders of the scientific mainstream cannot refuse to debate
without seeming dogmatically unscientific and opposed to democratic values.
However, agreement to debate is taken by audiences to indicate that there are
two equally strong sides on the matter within the scientific community. To
further constrain the response of those who speak for mainstream science,
those who manufacture scientific controversy describe academic practices
like peer review and tenure as mechanisms for an orthodoxy to suppress
those who have a dissenting view, thus weakening the very practices of sci-
ence that could be used to contest the quality of the most dubious claims in
such debates. Th e narrative of controversy thus produced identifies skeptics
as heroes in an unfolding scientific revolution, oppressed by mainstream
scientists who are ideologically deaf to their appeals and who try to silence
them so that others are not exposed to their heresy.
Without a clear understanding of these argumentative constraints, those
who respond to manufactured scientific controversy oft en fall into the traps
that have been set for them, replying with arrogant dismissal that serves
only to confirm their opponents’ charges in the eyes of the audience. By
examining the available means of persuasion in these cases, this rhetorical
study exposes this argumentative dynamic and suggests some responses to
the manufactured scientific controversy that are more sensitive to audience
and burden of proof, reclaim democratic values for science, and highlight
how opponents of mainstream science do not always embody the scientific
and democratic values they claim to champion. Such responses would not
try to shut down public debate on these matters, but rather, engage the
debate with a better understanding of the inventional possibilities inherent
in these disputes.
A New Orientation Toward the Rhetoric of Science
Th e analysis of these three cases is grounded on the proposition that each one
involves a deception, a scientific controversy that has been manufactured for
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 199
public consumption, rather than a genuine controversy over scientific facts
and their interpretation that deserves critical airing in a public forum. I will
off er evidence that the identification of each of these scientific controversies
as “manufactured” is correct. Most oft en that evidence comes in the form of
consensus statements by multiple scientific professional organizations com-
bined with “smoking gun” documents in which political agents acknowledge
in private planning reports that they are manufacturing scientific controversy
as a tactic to manipulate a susceptible public.13
On the basis of this proposition about the deceptive nature of the tactic,
the orientation toward mainstream science that I adopt in this essay will be
as a critic of its opponents, and by implication, a defender of the current
scientific orthodoxy. Th is is an approach to the rhetoric of science that rarely
appears in our journals. It is more common for scholars in the rhetoric
of science to orient themselves as critics of the world-defining hegemony
of scientific discourse, interpreting the complicated social and technical
entanglements that coproduce scientific “discoveries,” and thus bringing the
scientific establishment down a notch or two. Th is standard approach derives
from the sophistic impulse that initiated the subfield and still motivates
much of its scholarly energy. Our critical spirit calls rhetoricians of science
to practice the “koractic” art of pollution, “an impious management of
linguistic and social ambiguities” that works “in resistance to the forces of
rationalistic domination and discipline.”14 When Celeste Condit attempts
to create a scientific controversy by critiquing the assumptions of brain sex
researchers, or Carolyn R. Miller characterizes research on the biological
eff ects of nonionizing radiation as part of an ongoing scientific controversy
rather than a closed debate, the rhetorical critic plays the role of Protagoras,
making the (currently) weaker case stronger in a critique that challenges
the scientific orthodoxy.15 I am not opposed to this standard approach; in
fact, I strongly support it in most cases (including the studies by Condit and
Miller), and I oft en adopt this stance in my own research.16
However, I have come to believe that there are also times when the rhetorical
critic should be prepared to develop scholarly insights that can be turned to
the defense of a scientific orthodoxy.17 Others in the interdisciplinary field
of science studies have made a similar point. A recent article in the official
journal of the History of Science Society argues that “in the current political
climate, historians may be surprised to find themselves defending sciences,
when the usual stance of historians is to be critical.”18 Bruno Latour, who
famously argued in 1979 for the social construction of scientific knowledge,
200 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
now wonders, in the wake of “artificially maintained controversies” over
subjects like global warming, if he was “foolishly mistaken” to show “‘the
lack of scientific certainty’ inherent in the construction of facts.” He now
regrets that “entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good
American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up . . . while
dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction
to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives.” Latour fears that
our “critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight
the wrong enemies and, worst of all,” he says “to be considered as friends by
the wrong sort of allies.”19
Regarding global warming skepticism and intelligent design, some of
the rhetoricians of science I most admire have given institutional and intel-
lectual support to those who oppose the scientific consensus.20 Th ey have
thoughtful justifications for bringing the art of rhetoric to the aid of those
countering the scientific consensus in these cases.21 For the sake of fairness,
though, I think other rhetorical critics should be prepared, on occasion, to
develop scholarly insights that can be turned to the defense of the scientific
orthodoxy in such cases.
Th is supportive orientation toward mainstream science might not be
common in our journals, but it finds a rationale in the classical tradition.
Aristotle believed the study of rhetoric was useful because “before some
audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it
easy for what we say to produce conviction.” So Aristotle gave the rhetorician
the task of exploring the available means of persuasion on opposite sides of
a question so that “if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be
able to confute him.”22 One need not adopt the positivist belief that scientists
have “exactest knowledge” to see the merit in exploring ways to counter
deceptive public arguments about the current state of scientific thinking on
a subject. Isocrates, who rejected both Plato’s belief in objective truth and
Gorgias’s relativism, carved out a space for this orientation toward rhetorical
inquiry in the development of a pedagogy that both reflects and manifests
civic virtue by helping to develop the character of his students.23 Drawing
on Isocrates, Bruce Kimball reminds us that today’s student who gets an
education in science but not in the public rhetoric of science is developing
a stunted character that contributes to a troubled state: “searching for truth
without giving commensurate attention to the importance of public expres-
sion inevitably leads the individual to isolation and self-indulgence and the
republic to amoralism and chaos.”24
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 201
Is it any surprise that when students are trained in science but not in
how to engage public discourse about science, those who align with the
scientific mainstream end up adopting a dismissive attitude toward attacks
they perceive as politically motivated? Is it any surprise that they would
prefer to shut down civic debate on scientific matters that they believe have
already been adjudicated by expert communities?25 Sensitivity to rhetorical
concepts like stases and argument fields would help those who align with
mainstream science to recognize that the matters being decided in these
cases—matters such as medicine distribution, carbon emission regulations,
and public school curricula—do not only involve matters of fact; they also
involve matters of value and policy, and therefore must be decided by citizens
in the public sphere. By discovering and sharing the means to respond to
manufactured scientific controversies, scholars of rhetoric can provide each
other and their students with the tools to respond adequately to deceptive
arguments about science in public forums, so rather than dismissing those
arguments or responding with hostility, defenders will enter into more
productive public debates and, ultimately, encourage more informed decision
making in the public sphere.
Th is Isocratean perspective aligns with Barry Brummett’s claim that
articles on rhetorical theory should be perceived as “pedagogical,” directed
to a community of scholars who interpret and pass on what they read in
academic journals to students pursuing a liberal arts education. Th e type
of comparative multiple-case study that I undertake here can be seen as
this type of rhetorical theory, designed to “identify some rhetorical tactic,
strategy, device, etc., and attempt to account for its eff ectiveness,” rather than
to explore “the epistemological, ontological, axiological, or ethical dimensions
of communication” (rhetorical philosophy) or to make “historical, aesthetic,
literary, or similar judgments about particular works” (textual studies).26 Th is
article does not undertake a search for a universal demarcation criterion
that can distinguish manufactured scientific controversy from genuine
scientific controversy, nor will I off er a close reading that interprets and
judges a particular text in one of these cases. Instead, this study examines
the rhetorical strategies employed on both sides of three cases that have been
identified in the scholarly record as manufactured scientific controversies,
and its purpose is to explore the argumentative commonalities of these cases
to enrich the stock of general knowledge on this subject and thus increase
the discursive choices available to readers of this journal and the rhetors
that many of us teach.
202 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Since this comparison of cases focuses on argumentative similarities, it
can be faulted for overlooking the diff erences that a thick description of each
separate case would reveal.27 However, since several very good essays already
have been published that explore the specific historical, cultural, social, and
political valences that both underwrite and trouble the development of the
current scientific consensus in each of these cases, there is much to be gained
from a study that passes over those specificities in order to better recognize
the commonalities of argumentation that appear in all three.28 Th e similarities
revealed by such a study, especially the deployment of discursive traps and
the stumbling responses of those who fall into those traps, tell the story of a
powerful argumentative tactic that is difficult to counter.
AIDS Dissent
Th e appeal to fairness that ennobles the dissident who fights a hidebound
orthodoxy is a common argumentative move in these cases. To publically
manufacture scientific controversy in the face of overwhelming scientific
consensus, a rhetor claims that conflict exists, but is being suppressed by a
scientific community that silences those who counter the dominant scientific
theories. A letter that President Th abo Mbeki wrote to President Bill Clinton,
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and other world leaders in April 2000
demonstrates the power of this appeal. In an ironic turn that identifies Mbeki
more closely with the ideals of science than its Western supporters in the
mainstream scientific community, he claims the successful dissident’s author-
ity in post-apartheid South Africa to fight for freedom against the forces of
dogmatic oppression. “It is suggested, for instance, that there are some scientists
who are ‘dangerous and discredited’ with whom nobody, including ourselves,
should communicate or interact,” he says. Aft er describing the conditions in
apartheid South Africa, in which people were “prohibited from being quoted
in private and in public because the established authority believed that their
views were dangerous and discredited,” he concludes that “we are now being
asked to do precisely the same thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we
opposed did, because, it is said, there exists a scientific view that is supported
by the majority, against which dissent is prohibited.” Mbeki then judges the
scientific community harshly for this attitude: “People who otherwise would
fight very hard to defend the critically important rights of freedom of thought
and speech occupy, with regard to the HIV-AIDS issue, the frontline in the
campaign of intellectual intimidation and terrorism which argues that the
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 203
only freedom we have is to agree with what they decree to be established
scientific truths.” Making an analogy between the scientific orthodoxy and
the church, he rejects “the comfort of the recitation of a catechism” that is not
an appropriate response to African AIDS, and he envisions a frightful future
in which scientists “conduct a holy crusade against the infidels” who dissent
from their decree.29 His words are moving, and coming from a freedom
fighter who suff ered under apartheid, they are difficult to dismiss. When
asked to comment on the letter, the American Assistant Secretary of State
for African Aff airs admitted that it was “quite logical and quite compelling.”30
When a manufactured scientific controversy devolves into a wild conspiracy
theory that has “no clear grounding, no correspondence to the motives we
know in daily life,” it is relatively easy to dismiss.31 Claims that the scientific
establishment has coordinated a massive cover-up to mislead the public about
a nonexistent or innocuous virus are less plausible than the more reasonable
conclusion that a few dissidents are wrong. But when a rhetor invokes a
closed-minded orthodoxy rather than a nefarious cabal, and when he points
to institutional structures that reinforce that orthodoxy, such as peer review
in publication and funding decisions that result in the rejection of research
that fails to fit mainstream assumptions, the complaint that a minority is being
“marginalised by a dominant and well funded consensus” gains plausibility.32
Since a rhetor manufacturing a scientific controversy has no need to establish
the plausibility of an alternative “dissident” paradigm, but seeks only to keep
the debate open, his burden of proof is low; he need only claim that inquiry is
being unfairly stifled, and then wait as outraged defenders of the orthodoxy
unwittingly confirm that claim through their response.
In the case of Mbeki’s support of AIDS dissent, he did not have to wait
very long for this response to appear. Th ree months aft er his letter to world
leaders was leaked to the public, the journal Nature published “Th e Durban
Declaration,” a two-page document introduced by the editors as having
been “stimulated by the current controversy in South Africa about whether
HIV is the cause of AIDS,” a public controversy that they say “has caused
massive consternation among all scientists.” Using the form of a petition to
show the force of expert opinion, the editors indicate that the declaration
was “signed by over 5,000 people,” all of them MDs or PhDs, including the
directors of most major scientific organizations.33 Aft er off ering technical
arguments for the conclusion that HIV causes AIDS, the declaration states:
“Further compelling data are available. HIV causes AIDS. It is unfortunate
that a few vocal people continue to deny the evidence. Th is position will cost
204 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
countless lives. . . . to tackle the disease, everyone must first understand that
HIV is the enemy.”34
Th e authors of the declaration never address Mbeki’s claim about the
silencing of dissent, nor do they assure readers that scientists have debated
these issues to come to the conclusions they draw. Instead, the main activity
of science is characterized as gathering “data,” and the declaration itself is
in the form of a pledge or communal profession of faith, printed at the top
of the page in red ink: “HIV causes AIDS. Curbing the spread of this virus
must remain the first step towards eliminating this devastating disease.”35
Th is response plays right into the hands of those who manufacture scientific
controversy, presenting the face of a dogmatic and closed scientific community
that is alarmed by the prospect of debate and demands assent to its credo.
One AIDS dissenter emphasized this point in his letter to Nature printed two
months later. Regarding the authors of the Durban Declaration, he says, “we
reject as outrageous their attempt to outlaw open discussion of alternative
viewpoints, because this reveals an intolerance which has no place in any
branch of science.”36
Th e defenders of mainstream science thus stumble into a rhetorical trap
in which their struggles to escape only serve to secure them more firmly in
their opponent’s grip. A similar dynamic can be seen in both of the other
cases of manufactured scientific controversy that we will examine.
Global Warming Skepticism
One of the most striking illustrations that global warming skepticism is
employed as a deliberate tactic to achieve a policy objective is the infamous
Frank Luntz memo on the environment; used by Republicans in 2002 to
guide their messaging on the issue of global warming, this talking points
document was written by a self-described “language guy” who takes other
people’s policies and discovers how to communicate them.37 Before Luntz
wrote the memo, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
pronounced the scientific consensus position that it is “unequivocally” the
case that the Earth’s climate is changing, and “most of the observed warming
over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas
concentrations.”38 Th is consensus was the result of much accumulated research,
a point that was demonstrated when historian of science Naomi Oreskes
analyzed 928 abstracts from refereed scientific journals with the keywords
“global climate change” published from 1993 to 2003 and discovered that
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 205
none of the papers disagreed with the consensus.39 However, most Americans
remained unaware that a scientific consensus existed. Several public opinion
polls, the earliest taken in 1997 and the latest in 2007, indicate that a majority
of Americans believe there is “a lot of disagreement among scientists” over
“whether or not global warming is happening.”40
Luntz takes advantage of this misperception when his memo on the
environment urges his clients to recognize that there is still a “window of
opportunity to challenge the science” of climate change. “Voters believe that
there is no consensus about global warming within the scientific community,”
he says, so his clients should “be even more active in recruiting experts who
are sympathetic to your view, and much more active in making them part
of your message. . . . If you wish to challenge the prevailing wisdom about
global warming, it is more eff ective to have professionals making the case
than politicians.”41 Luntz’s memo points out that to create the public ap-
pearance of scientific controversy in the face of “the prevailing wisdom” of
mainstream scientific thought, debaters must be recruited from the ranks of
those scientists who disagree with the scientific consensus, and their message
must be amplified in the public forum.
One reason Luntz found it easy to keep the window of opportunity open
to this manufactured scientific controversy in America is the commitment
to dissoi logoi in our institutions of journalism, law, and politics. We assume
that there are always two sides to a debate, and we structure our institutional
discursive forums around this belief with balancing norms that ensure both
sides are given equal representation and equal time. Studies of news content
have demonstrated that journalism’s balancing norm, in which the appear-
ance of objectivity is achieved by reporting both sides of an issue, leads to
the views of a few maverick scientists oft en getting just as much attention
in American news outlets as the accumulated voice of the multitudes of
mainstream climate scientists.42 Th e result is a news product that conveys
the misperception that there is a lot of disagreement among scientists over
whether global warming is happening. Th is exploitation of the journalistic
norm of balance is a common rhetorical maneuver used by those who
manufacture scientific controversy in public forums.43
A similar commitment to balance in the format of pro/con debate that
organizes our political institutions can likewise create the misperception
of ongoing scientific controversy despite an existing scientific consensus.
Environmental sociologist Aaron McCright points out that in the congressional
hearings that took place over global warming between 1994 and 1997, “five
206 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
contrarians testified approximately as oft en as did thousands of mainstream
climate scientists publishing in the scientific literature.”44 Th e description
Oreskes off ers of a 2006 Senate hearing on global warming in which she
participated illustrates the conditions under which a few challengers might
hold the ground against the rest of the scientific community. Th e hearing
had “the quality of a sports event,” she said, with each side represented by
two or three experts opposed to each other in a contest-like atmosphere.45
Members of the public who encounter such balanced events can hardly be
blamed for assuming that the community of experts is evenly divided on the
scientific question being debated.
Th ose who manufacture scientific controversy for the general public take
advantage of these institutional balancing norms whenever possible. For
example, consider another “smoking gun” memo, this one written in April
1998 by a group of oil company representatives and conservative think tank
researchers who met at the offices of the American Petroleum Institute.46 Th e
document begins with the result of a survey that suggests the public is more
likely to oppose restrictions on carbon emissions if told that some scientists
contest claims about anthropogenic climate change.47 It then proposes an
action plan for a “National Media Relations Program” to “identify, recruit,
and train” a team of five new “independent” scientists who will participate
in media outreach, to “organize, promote and conduct through grassroots
organizations a series of campus/community workshops/debates on climate
science,” and to hit news organizations with a “steady stream” of material to
“undercut the ‘conventional wisdom’ on climate science,” with the goal of
ensuring that “media coverage reflects a balance on climate science.” Th e
document sets a goal of publicly “undercutting the ‘prevailing scientific
wisdom,’” and it proposes “public/government official opinion surveys” and
studies to track “the percent of media articles that raise questions about climate
science” as ways to measure whether this goal has been met.48 Recognizing
the opportunity to exploit the pro/con balancing norms of journalism and
organized public debates, these public relations experts devised a plan to recruit
and train a handful of maverick scientists who could be placed in balanced
opposition to the accumulated force of the rest of the scientific community.
Th e balancing norm is so powerful in America because it evokes a concept
of fairness that resonates with “the mythic basis of the ‘American way,’ freedom
of belief and expression and protection of those rights for minority views.”49
It is perhaps unsurprising that countries with a history of righteous dissent
like South Africa and the United States are places where manufactured
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 207
scientific controversies have taken hold.50 Th e values of fairness and freedom
are exploited by those who manufacture a scientific controversy for public
consumption in order to force scientists to enter a balanced public debate
on a scientific claim that has already been decided in the technical sphere.
For example, consider the following, taken from a 2008 newspaper opinion
editorial that contests the claim that the science of global warming is settled.
So why hasn’t the entire scientific community fallen into step? Can a reputable
scientist be a “denier?” If the evidence of man-caused global warming is as
overwhelming as the left claims it is, why the lack of rational, intelligent public
debate between qualified people of opposing views? Doesn’t this make more
sense than believers simply brushing off deniers? Given the chance, wouldn’t
believers want to publicly articulate their overwhelming scientific evidence
and silence the naysayers or “deniers” once and for all? Th e reason this hasn’t
happened is because the science is not settled. Man-caused global warming
isn’t scientific fact; it’s an article of faith for the left —the stuff of belief. . . .
Both sides claim to love truth, so in an ecumenical spirit, why not hold a
grand examination for discovery and come up with an agreement on beliefs
that both sides can hold in common? On the contested beliefs, why not hold
a debate where reputable scientists contend against reputable scientists like
a 21st-century monkey trial?51
Th e analogy to the Scopes trial in this editorial is telling. Th e author’s misper-
ception that scientists debated each other in that trial hints at a popular belief
that jury trials are the obvious mechanism for laypeople to adjudicate the
testimony of clashing experts. A trial takes the form of a public contest that
pits two sides in a balanced debate. Insofar as this guest columnist invokes
democratic institutions before an American audience, he calls upon values
that are difficult to dismiss. He goads mainstream scientists to enter public
debates with dissidents, and if they refuse because their very participation
in such debates would give the public the false impression that the scientific
community was evenly divided on the subject, he accuses them of being
a closed-minded orthodoxy participating in a conspiracy of silence that
opposes both American and scientific values. His analogy between science
and religion helps to make this case. If a truth claim accepted by the scientific
community can be portrayed as “an article of faith,” the stuff of dogmatic
“belief ” that requires an “ecumenical spirit” to temper it, then the skeptics
who have not “fallen into step” and challenge the claim in public debate are
208 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
being more true to the scientific spirit (and the American Protestant tradition)
than those who speak for mainstream science.52
How do the defenders of mainstream science respond to this? Out of
the 19 critical letters to the editor replying to this essay that were printed
or appeared on the online newspaper site, seven of them argue that the
guest editorial should have never been printed. Th e shortest of these reads:
“Can we please have a moratorium on letters about global warming unless
they are from bona fide scientists with expertise in a relevant area? Th is
isn’t politics, where every opinion has some validity; this is science, where
only the opinions of scientists are meaningful.”53 Given the eff orts of global
warming skeptics to turn a closed technical debate over the existence of global
climate change into an open debate in the public sphere, the impulse behind
this response is understandable, but in the context of the argument being
countered, the call for censorship is an unwise rhetorical move. It seems to
corroborate the essayist’s claim of a dogmatic orthodoxy by indicating that
supporters of the dominant paradigm would prefer to silence dissent. Also,
by suggesting that the opinion of a mere citizen is irrelevant on a matter
that citizens ultimately must decide, and by claiming that only scientists
should be heard in newspaper editorials about an issue that has tremendous
public policy implications, the response seems elitist and antidemocratic.
Th e exploitation of a balancing norm and the implication of a dogmatic
orthodoxy form the arms of a trap that the defenders of science fall into
and then find difficult to escape.
Intelligent Design
Th e “teach the controversy” campaign of the Intelligent Design movement is
yet another example of how the fairness appeal can work with the balancing
norms of various democratic institutions to construct an open debate on a
technical matter that the scientific community has already closed. A “smok-
ing gun” memo that reveals the nature of this campaign against the theory
of evolution is an internal planning document produced by the Discovery
Institute titled “Th e Wedge.”54 In it, advocates of intelligent design theory admit
that their governing goals are to “defeat scientific materialism” and “replace
materialistic explanations with the theistic understanding that nature and
human beings are created by God.” Th ey describe their strategy to achieve
these theistic goals with the help of an analogy. “If we view the predominant
materialistic science as a giant tree, our strategy is intended to function as
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 209
a ‘wedge’ that, while relatively small, can split the trunk when applied at its
weakest points.” To replace “the stifling dominance” of modern science with
a view that is more “consonant with Christian and theistic convictions,” they
stage a scientific revolution. “A lesson we have learned from the history of
science is that it is unnecessary to outnumber the opposing establishment.”
With the careful application of a scientific controversy at the right pressure
point, a small group of scientists “who are not blinded by the prevailing
prejudices” can help to “crack the materialist edifice.”55 By exploiting a
popular conception that science advances only when heroic dissidents push
at the frontiers of normal science to initiate a paradigm change, they can
make intelligent design appear to be on the cutting edge of a contemporary
scientific controversy, rather than the latest incarnation of a religiously
inspired creationist agenda.
They have made little headway with the scientific community. The
American Association for the Advancement of Science and many other
scientific organizations have published several statements confirming the
scientific consensus about evolution and rejecting intelligent design theory
as unscientific.56 Nor has intelligent design theory succeeded in the judicial
domain; U.S. District Court Judge John E. Jones III, aft er listening to a range of
expert testimony in 2005, concluded that intelligent design “is not science”; its
“negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community.
. . . [It] has failed to gain acceptance in the scientific community, it has not
generated peer-reviewed publications, nor has it been the subject of testing
and research.”57 However, an indication that the window of opportunity is
open for the manufacture of this scientific controversy in the public sphere
is signaled by the fact that the American public is only dimly aware of the
scientific consensus on evolution; a 2007 opinion poll indicates that fewer
than half of all Americans believe that “the scientific theory of evolution
is well-supported by evidence and widely accepted within the scientific
community.”58
Th e wedge campaign known as “teach the controversy” is designed to
exploit and sustain this public uncertainty over the scientific consensus on
evolution. It uses a fairness appeal to demand new legislation that requires the
inclusion of antievolution arguments in the public schools. Discovery Institute
senior fellow Stephen C. Meyer and John Angus Campbell demonstrate this
appeal in a 2004 newspaper opinion editorial in which they talk about “the
growing controversy over biological origins” created by “the new theory of
intelligent design”59:
210 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Rather than ignoring the controversy or teaching ideas based in religion,
teachers should teach about the scientific debate over Darwinian evolution.
A good education presents students with competing perspectives held by
credible experts, and off ers them the skills to judge these views themselves. In
such cases, teachers should not teach only one view as true. Instead, teachers
should describe diff ering views to students and explain the arguments for and
against these views as made by their chief proponents. We call this “teaching
the controversy.” . . . [T]eaching scientific controversies engages student interest
and encourages them to do what scientists must do—deliberate about how
best to interpret evidence. As Charles Darwin wrote in the “On the Origin
of Species,” “A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing
the facts and arguments on both sides of each question.”60
Th e reasonableness of this appeal is hard to deny. A number of polls taken from
1998 to 2006 suggest that the fairness appeal is perfectly suited to an American
audience, where a majority are generally in favor of teaching creation along
with evolution in public schools.61 As Rachel Whidden explains, intelligent
design advocates address themselves to an American understanding of what
makes good citizens, namely, people who “are exposed to all sides of an
issue and are encouraged to weigh facts and determine their own beliefs.”62
To oppose the “teach the controversy” argument would mark one as an op-
ponent of free speech and open deliberation, a defender of dogmatic science
that is closed to criticism. Ben Stein, in the 2008 documentary Expelled: No
Intelligence Allowed, makes this point somewhat less subtly than Meyer and
Campbell, arguing that legitimate scientific debate is being suppressed by a
scientific orthodoxy that bans intelligent design theory from the classroom,
and in its zealotry, chastises, fires, or denies tenure to faculty who dare to
question the reigning scientific position on evolution.63
Th e response of scientists to this wedge strategy has been characteristically
clumsy. Another documentary, Flock of Dodos, created by biologist-turned-
filmmaker Randy Olson, points out that for the most part, the supporters of
intelligent design are friendly and skilled at getting their point across to the
public; in contrast, scientists are like a flock of dodos in danger of extinc-
tion because they fail to respond in clear and friendly terms before a public
audience to the intelligent design challenge.64 An example of this clumsiness
can be seen in the same newspaper where Meyer and Campbell make their
case for teaching “the controversy”: a counterpoint opinion editorial writ-
ten by Stanford neurology professor Robert M. Sapolsky appears opposite
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 211
their argument. In his response to the intelligent design challenge, Sapolsky
completely fails to address the fairness issue, and with a tone of intellectual
elitism, stamps intelligent design supporters with what he calls a “Jed-Clampett
profile,” postulating that they live in “the poorest” regions “out in the sticks,”
and are the “unhealthiest” of people “with the shortest life expectancies.” He
then engages in sociological speculation about why the “downtrodden” might
engage in such “bizarre, twitchy forms of ire” as to “dislike evolution” and goes
on to express pity for the “unhappy campers” who believe an acceptance of
evolution will mean they have to give up “one of the more common sources
of solace in that corner of the country, namely fundamentalist religion.”65 He
might as well have said that in their bitterness, they cling to guns or religion.
In tone, the piece confirms the public’s perception of scientists as elitist snobs
locked away in their ivory tower and unwilling to engage the central issues
that are being leveled against them.
Th is sort of response just reinforces the manufactured scientific contro-
versy. Th e fairness wedge is built on public misperception that a scientific
controversy exists, and on a balancing norm that exists in our educational
institutions to ensure that students are not force-fed dogma but encouraged
to think critically. Th e arrogant dismissive response of scientists to the “teach
the controversy” appeal only works to reaffirm the populist argument that
resistance to the hegemony of a closed-minded orthodoxy is necessary.66
Such resistance can take the form of policy changes to protect the minor-
ity view, like the Louisiana Science Education Act, passed by that state’s
legislature and signed into law by Governor Bobby Jindal in 2008. It requires
the Louisiana Board of Education, in certain circumstances, to “create and
foster an environment within public elementary and secondary schools that
promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, and open and objective
discussion of scientific theories being studied including, but not limited to,
evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning.”67 It is
no coincidence that the list of scientific theories considered controversial
enough to require critical discussion includes evolution and global warming.
Both are contemporary scientific controversies that have been successfully
manufactured for American audiences. Th e inclusion of human cloning on
this list, the scientific theories about which are not considered a matter of
controversy either in the public or technical spheres, is the clue that reminds
us that this legislation is part of a larger political strategy, a fairness wedge that
in reality is less about fairness than about turning a public values debate into
a debate over science for the purpose of achieving a particular political end.
212 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Inventional Possibilities for Those Responding to Manufactured Scientific Controversies
Th ose who manufacture scientific controversy for a public that is uncertain
about the state of scientific knowledge do so by exploiting balancing norms
and making appeals to values such as open-mindedness, freedom of inquiry,
and fairness. When frustrated defenders of the scientific mainstream dismiss
these arguments, protesting that there is no scientific controversy to debate,
they are hurting themselves in two ways.
First, when they assume that they can safely ignore claims about science
that remain unpublished in scientific journals, they fail to recognize the
jurisdiction and burden of proof in these cases. Rhetors who manufacture
scientific controversy are making arguments before a public audience to
influence public policy decisions over things like carbon emissions, medicine
distribution, and education standards. When a good portion of the public
believes the skeptics (as with antievolution arguments in America), or when
the empowered decision maker embraces the dissenters (as was the case
with Mbeki and AIDS dissent), then ignoring the arguments of the critics
means conceding the debate. A more promising strategy would be to engage
the debate, but aft er refuting the most damning charges, shift the focus of
discussion away from the conjectural stasis, recognizing that manufactured
scientific controversy is really “a political controversy over values masquerading
as a scientific dispute.”68 Addressing the real issue of which values should
be prioritized in society, or what standards of proof should be applied by
a public body weighing the stakes of action and inaction, or what specific
policies would be best in the given circumstances, forces the debate to turn
on matters that are more appropriately managed in the public forum, rather
than merely replaying a long and complicated technical debate before a
nontechnical audience.69
As Lynda Walsh explains, there tends to be an “upward pull of the stases”
that encourages public audiences to hear scientists making implicit value and
policy claims (answers to epideictic and deliberative “ought” questions) even
when scientists are being careful only to address conjectural, definitional,
or causal stases (answers to forensic “is” questions).70 Given this implicit
conflation of stasis points, an explicit shift between stases might help to
derail the misleading rhetorical implication. Since the ultimate question in
the public sphere regarding science-based matters like AIDS, global warming,
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 213
and science education turns on what we “ought” to do, a deliberate and
unambiguous change in the subject of discussion to matters of value and
policy might allow controversialists to find points of contact that they would
otherwise miss. For example, arguers who disagree about whether global
warming is happening might find a point of contact in support of a policy
to promote the development of alternative energies, regardless of where they
stand on the technical issues surrounding climate science. At the very least,
such a shift between stases would encourage disputants to engage each other
as fellow citizens debating public policy rather than as competitors for the
status of most expert possessor and interpreter of scientific data before an
audience of nonexperts.
Th e second way in which mainstream scientists who follow their impulse
to dismiss the manufactured scientific controversy are hurting themselves is
by unwittingly confirming the very charge leveled against them: that they are
a closed-minded orthodoxy conspiring to silence the opposition. Supporters
of the scientific consensus can take measures to avoid being entrapped in this
unwinnable argumentative sequence. For example, they can acknowledge
that debate is important to science, while pointing out that debate on this
particular subject has already taken place in scientific forums and been
decided against the dissenters. Dissenters can be characterized as a small
group who are given a hearing, but who have not yet off ered a persuasive case.
One of the online letters to the editor in response to the “‘Global Warming’ is
Alarmism” essay off ers a model of this kind of response. Atmospheric scientist
R. A. Brown begins by explaining that he has been a part of the debate for
20 years. He recalls “a heavily attended evening debate . . . circa 1985,” then
claims to “have heard hundreds of debates around the world since then.” He
goes on to note that “there are hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific papers
on the subject. Th ey support anthropomorphic induced global warming
by about 99 to 1. Among global warming scientists,” he says, “man-caused
global warming has been established and proven by the scientific method.”71
Notice how Brown describes the scientific method not as a process of data
collection by a few heroic individuals that leads immediately and inexorably
to the full consensus of all reasonable experts.72 Instead, science is described
as an open debate—a debate that on this matter at least, has been settled
through a lengthy deliberative process among experts, not to the complete
agreement of all involved, but to the assent of a vast majority. Th is allows him
to avoid the charge that debate has been unfairly stifled, and places the force
of intersubjective agreement (99 to 1) behind the conclusion reached. In this
214 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
response, the scientific orthodoxy becomes the defender of democratic values,
rather than the voice of censorship, and global warming skeptics become sore
losers who unfairly dispute the outcome of a deliberative contest.
A similar argument can be made in the case of AIDS dissent. In 2006,
an AIDS scientist objecting to an AIDS dissent article published in Harper’s
Magazine wrote a letter to the editor that countered the romantic notion in
that article that a nascent scientific revolution was being led by heroic rebels.
Th e AIDS scientist points out that the author of the article favors “a few
scientists, and a larger number of laymen, who have chosen not to believe
that HIV causes AIDS. By doing so, she makes a classic error: scientific truth
is not established by one or two people, it is created by consensus within a
research community. It is always possible to find dissidents and denialists
for any argument put forward by humans, be it scientific, political or the
best shade to use for the bathroom wallpaper. But the mere existence of
dissidents and denialists does not mean that they are right.” He points out
that the judgment of a supermajority of experts is generally more reliable
than the claims of a handful of mavericks. Rather than make the futile and
ultimately counterproductive argument that the article should have been
censored, this supporter of the scientific consensus says “fairness” demands
that the magazine “grant equivalent space to bona fide scientists to publish
a detailed rebuttal” of the article in the same public forum.73
Th is fairness appeal also can be turned against those who advocate the
teaching of intelligent design (or global warming skepticism) in public
schools. By definition, a scientific revolution happens despite the status quo
consensus of the scientific community; a scientific community practicing
under one paradigm is transformed over time, through argument and coun-
terargument, into a scientific community practicing under another.74 Th ose
seeking special treatment in the schools for a claim currently rejected by the
scientific community in order to jumpstart what they believe to be a potential
scientific revolution are asking for an unfair advantage in the marketplace
of ideas.75 If their claims are persuasive, intelligent design advocates should
have no trouble finding new recruits for their future research programs by
writing popular books or giving speeches to the majority of Americans who
believe in young earth creationism or directed evolution.76 It is only fair
that intelligent design theorists toil along with every other dissenting view
in science for acceptance, entering the classroom as textbook science not
because they have powerful political connections, but only when they have
won the debate in the technical sphere.
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 215
One might object that the image of science I am encouraging defenders
of the scientific mainstream to adopt is not sensitive to audience insofar as
it does not embrace the crude positivist or objectivist philosophy of science
that most public audiences hold. When characterizing science, the first
impulse of defenders of mainstream science, like the authors of the Durban
Declaration, is to accept this simplistic vision of science as data-gathering
that results in absolute knowledge, where careful observation leads to a
theory that demands the immediate and complete consensus of the scientific
community. But repeating this story of science is counterproductive on two
counts. First, those who tell this story can be charged with “venue relativism”
as they shift between positivism for the masses when countering manufactured
scientific controversies in public settings and more constructivist images of
science when communicating with fellow experts.77 Th is inconsistency, when
revealed, is damning. Second, the positivist image of science adopted for public
audiences is especially vulnerable to the attack of those who manufacture
scientific controversy since any little chink of controversy off ers an opening
to a well-placed wedge. Under the shelter of this narrative, the dissent of one
person who is a bona fide scientist in a relevant area can be seen as evidence
that complete consensus has not been obtained, and thus members of the
public can jump to the conclusion that the correct scientific theory must not
have been discovered yet.
A more promising response retells the Kuhnian story: scientific theories
become accepted through a process of dissent, lengthy debate, and eventual
acceptance by a community of experts. To counter the arguments of those
who deceive the public about the existence of a technical sphere controversy
in furtherance of their own political aims, defenders of the orthodoxy can
dispute the identity of a revolutionary community in the specific case,
pointing out that the mere existence of dissent does not mean that a scientific
revolution is underway. Dissent is normal in science, they can explain, always
existing in small pockets outside the mainstream consensus, and although it
sometimes marks the start of a revolution, it more commonly marks those
who are unwilling to relinquish their grip on an old paradigm, or those
who are unable to persuade their colleagues because of the poor quality
of their theories and evidence. In some rare cases, dissent is the route of
those who find it profitable to take up arms against the consensus position
because political interests pay them to do so. Once a defender draws on
the history of science to establish the extensive debate that preceded the
current scientific consensus, the burden of proof shift s to the dissenter to
216 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
explain why he or she is not acting unfairly as a poor loser or a politically
motivated obstructionist.
Historians of science have done an excellent job of chronicling the record
of disciplinary argumentation preceding the current scientific consensus in
these cases, explaining how scientific knowledge comes to be established
through the developing assent of expert opinion.78 Including such a focus
on the history and philosophy of science in our eff orts at science education,
both in academic settings and in the form of popularizations that reach a
broader public, can assist scientists in defending their work against distortion
by those who exploit common misunderstandings to bolster their attacks on
contemporary science.
Th ose who manufacture scientific controversy will continue to push at
any window of opportunity to challenge the science in public. So defenders
of the scientific mainstream should not hesitate to off er rebuttals that reveal
a manufactured scientific controversy for what it is, pointing to the “smok-
ing gun” memos that expose the political machinations behind organized
campaigns to defeat inconvenient scientific knowledge in the public forum.
As one sociologist reminds us, “Claiming the disenfranchised underdog role
has gained contrarians access to an arsenal of provocative imagery within
American culture. However, this is not a very accurate description of reality.”79
Identifying the unambiguous linkages between conservative think tanks, the
petroleum industry, and global warming skeptics, or between an organized
creationist lobby and intelligent design theory, can go far toward disputing
the dissenters’ self-portrayal as clear-eyed scientists heroically following
the evidence wherever it leads them.80 Th e juxtaposition of industry claims
with proof of their deliberate attempts to manipulate the public can help
reverse the dynamics of uncertainty and highlight the moral dimension of
such cases.81 But defenders of mainstream science should not be surprised
when their opponents use the same credibility-damaging arguments against
them, as with the circulation of the “Climategate” emails that revealed certain
climate scientists as also falling outside the idealized role of the disinterested
observer.82 As Sally Jackson warns, “when political partisans exaggerate
scientific uncertainty to justify inaction, rebuttal choices open to scientists
are all dangerous in diff erent ways, but most dangerous when framed by
accusations of deliberate distortion” because it opens a disagreement space
“that the opponent can exploit to devastating eff ect.”83
Nevertheless, it is a perfectly appropriate rhetorical move for scientists
and their allies battling a scientific controversy that has been manufactured
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 217
in the public sphere to highlight those moments when the dissenter’s charge
of a restrictive orthodoxy morphs into an unbelievable conspiracy theory, or
to point out the places where dissenters’ misrepresentations and fallacious
reasoning call their credibility into question.84 Appeals to authority tend to
dominate over technical argument whenever scientists enter the public policy
context, so arguments that turn on character probably cannot be avoided.85
But recognizing that the empowered audience in these debates is a public
that does not always trust science, care must be taken not to let ethos attacks
on opponents devolve into elitist rants against anyone foolish enough to
doubt the reigning orthodoxy, or to allow the debate to turn on dueling ad
hominem attacks and counterattacks that leave the public with nothing but
a muddy view of the science involved.
Th ese means of persuasion are some of the resources available to those
who would defend the scientific orthodoxy against a manufactured scientific
controversy, whether it be an epistemological filibuster to delay policy change
or a fairplay wedge to initiate policy change. Teased out of the recommenda-
tions of other scholars and an analysis of the few responses by defenders
of the orthodoxy that avoid the argumentative traps that have been set for
them, these appeals show promise for confuting the claims of opponents
and producing a more healthy debate on these matters. In short, students
of rhetoric and science who face what they believe to be a manufactured
scientific controversy can be encouraged to: (1) engage the opponent’s claims
but then explicitly shift the stasis from questions of fact, definition, and
cause to the questions of value and policy that are the driving force behind
the public debate; (2) counter the charge that dissent is being silenced by
characterizing science as a process of open debate among experts, a process
that is ongoing but that has been fairly settled on this issue; and (3) point to
the “smoking gun” memos and other indicators that scientific controversy
is being manufactured to manipulate a public audience in these cases, while
taking care not to adopt a dismissive tone toward everyone who takes a
skeptical view toward mainstream science.
Conclusion
The cases of AIDS dissent, global warming skepticism, and intelligent
design have been separately identified by scholars as manufactured scientific
controversies, but this has been the first rhetorical study of the common
218 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
argumentative tactics used in building all three of them. By off ering a rhetori-
cal perspective to these cases, focusing on the way scientific controversy is
persuasively manufactured in the public sphere through the exploitation of
balancing norms and the topoi of freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry,
this study has revealed the deployment of argumentative traps that constrain
the response of mainstream scientists and their allies. Th ese are techniques
that have not been as thoroughly explored by other science studies scholars,
who have approached this phenomenon from the perspective of uncertainty
production and thus have focused primarily on how scientific data and methods
are manipulated in such cases for political or economic gain. Aft er exposing
the argumentative traps that are deployed in these cases, and the stumbling
responses of those attempting to support the current scientific consensus,
this study revealed some alternative inventional resources. Th e use of these
resources would potentially result in more productive civic debate about
public policy decisions that citizen ultimately must make.
In the past, rhetoricians have been satisfied to critique scientific orthodoxy
from a position that shows sympathy for the heretic; we have revealed the
mechanisms of forum control and ritual scapegoating that are used to exclude
those who contest the authoritarian dogma of an exceedingly powerful
modern scientific institution, and in so doing, we helped call the claims of
that institution into question.86 My study has taken a diff erent position, sug-
gesting the situationally appropriate adoption of more prudent mechanisms
of public persuasion as defenses against the tactics of the politically powerful
and rhetorically savvy forces that manufacture scientific controversies before
public audiences to delay or promote specific public policies. Surely there is
room for scholars of rhetorical inquiry to take both of these positions toward
science in the pages of our journals. Aft er all, our commitment to freedom
of inquiry and a fair balance of positions in the academy demands it.
notes
1. For more on the history of this case, see Marcus Paroske, “Deliberating International
Science Policy Controversies: Uncertainty and AIDS in South Africa,” Quarterly Journal
of Speech 95 (2009): 156–57, 162.
2. Pride Chigwedere, George R. Seage III, Sofia Gruskin, Tun-Hou Lee, and M. Essex,
“Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa,” Journal of
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 219
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 49 (2008): 410–15.
3. Paroske, “Deliberating International Science Policy Controversies,” 155.
4. Paroske, “Deliberating International Science Policy Controversies,” 162, 152.
5. Although the terms “public sphere” and “technical sphere” appear in this definition, I
recognize that the distinction between them is not a simple one. Th e boundaries between
the two are permeable, with social and scientific orders dynamically coproducing each
other; see, for example, Sheila Jasanoff , ed., States of Knowledge: Th e Co-Production of
Science and Social Order (New York: Routledge, 2004). One example of this permeability
is that technical sphere disputes that fail to be adjudicated by formal mechanisms within
that sphere can be taken to the public sphere for resolution. See G. Th omas Goodnight,
“Th e Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into
the Art of Public Deliberation,” Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (1982):
219. It is when this practice for publically adjudicating technical disputes between ex-
perts is exploited by political interests who create a public controversy over scientific
claims in order to achieve a particular policy objective that one might say scientific
controversy is being “manufactured” in the public sphere.
6. Nathan Crick and Joseph Gabriel, “Th e Conduit Between Lifeworld and System: Haber-
mas and the Rhetoric of Public Scientific Controversies,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 40
(2010): 219–20.
7. Paroske, “Deliberating International Science Policy Controversies,” 162, 152; Marlia
Elisabeth Banning, “When Poststructural Th eory and Contemporary Politics Collide—
Th e Vexed Case of Global Warming,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 6
(2009): 286–87, 291, 298; Rachel Avon Whidden, “Th e Manufacturing of Controversy:
Debating Intelligent Design in Public,” in Critical Problems in Argumentation: Selected
Papers from the Th irteenth NCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Charles Ar-
thur Willard (Washington, DC: National Communication Association, 2005), 707–8.
“Civic epistemology” is a term that denotes a public’s “culturally specific, historically
and politically grounded” encounter with science and technology; see Sheila Jasanoff ,
Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 249.
8. Paroske, “Deliberating International Science Policy Controversies,” 151; Whidden, “Th e
Manufacturing of Controversy,” 705.
9. Th e term “epistemological filibuster” was coined in Paroske, “Deliberating International
Science Policy Controversies”; the term “fairplay wedge” is my own.
10. David Michaels, Doubt Is Th eir Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Th reatens
Your Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), x, 60, 264. See also David Mi-
chaels, “Manufactured Uncertainty: Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s
Health and Environment,” in Agnotology: Th e Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, ed.
220 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2008), 90–107; David Michaels, “Knowing Uncertainty for What It Is,” Nieman Reports
59, no. 4 (2005): 75–77.
11. Robert N. Proctor, “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production
of Ignorance (and Its Study),” in Agnotology, 3, 8. See also the more recent popular
nonfiction book cowritten by two historians of science that examines the production
of doubt in these cases and others: Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of
Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to
Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).
12. William R. Freudenburg, Robert Gramling, and Debra J. Davidson, “Scientific Certainty
Argumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt,” Sociological In-
quiry 78 (2008): 2, 5.
13. Th e archetypal “smoking gun” document of a manufactured scientific controversy is
a tobacco industry internal memo that, when faced with evidence that tobacco causes
cancer, candidly admits, “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of compet-
ing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the
means of establishing a controversy.” See Brown and Willliamson, “Smoking and Health
Proposal,” 1969, Brown and Williamson Collection, Bates number 680561778/1786, p.
4, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nvs40f00/pdf (accessed January 2011). Similar docu-
ments will be identified later in this article in the cases of global warming skepticism
and intelligent design advocacy. I have found no such document in the Mbeki case;
instead, I interpret his inconsistent positions about the need for medicine distribution
in the face of scientific uncertainty as evidence that his promotion of AIDS dissent aft er
he became president was a matter of expediency, a political tactic to promote a specific
policy objective.
14. Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “Th e Myth of Rhetoric: Korax and the Art of Pollution,”
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 37 (2007): 268–69.
15. Celeste Condit, “How Bad Science Stays that Way: Brain Sex, Demarcation, and the
Status of Truth in the Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 26 (1996): 83–109;
Carolyn R. Miller, “Novelty and Heresy in the Debate on Nonthermal Eff ects of Elec-
tromagnetic Fields,” in Rhetoric and Incommensurability, ed. Randy Allen Harris (West
Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2005), 464–505.
16. For example, see my critiques of E. O. Wilson in Leah Ceccarelli, Shaping Science
with Rhetoric: Th e Cases of Dobzhansky, Schrödinger, and Wilson (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2001), and Leah Ceccarelli, “Science and Civil Debate: Th e Case of
E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology,” in Rhetoric and Incommensurability, 271–93. See also my
response to G. Th omas Goodnight’s rationale for inquiry into science and technology
controversy, in which I argue that there are times when rhetoricians of science should
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 221
support public rhetors who are capable of “creating a controversy where one did not
previously exist.” Leah M. Ceccarelli, “Let Us (Not) Th eorize the Spaces of Contention,”
Argumentation and Advocacy 42 (2005): 32.
17. Whether to critique mainstream science or align with mainstream science by critiqu-
ing those who oppose it is a judgment that should be made anew in each study. Neither
a scholar nor the field as a whole can aff ord to take a singular stance in all situations.
Starting with the proposition that some cases of public controversy over science involve
deception for political gain is not the same as claiming that all cases of public contro-
versy over science are illegitimate, or that any particular scientific consensus should
be assumed to be permanent. Th e particular case and available evidence at the time
should determine the critical or supportive stance taken by the rhetorician who studies
that case.
18. Zuoyue Wang and Naomi Oreskes, “History of Science and American Science Policy,”
Isis 99 (2008): 365.
19. Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of
Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 227, 231. His groundbreaking earlier work on the
social construction of scientific knowledge is Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Labora-
tory Life: Th e Construction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).
20. In 1998, the Association for the Rhetoric of Science and Technology (ARST) gave cli-
mate contrarian Patrick Michaels equal footing with consensus scientist James Hansen
at the National Communication Association convention. Organizers Gordon R. Mitch-
ell and Timothy M. O’Donnell described the event, printed a transcript of the debate,
and published scholarly commentary on it in a special double issue of Social Episte-
mology that they coedited. See Social Epistemology 14 (2000): 79–233. Th e scholarly
organization’s decision to affirm “conflict and uncertainty” with a sponsored debate
despite “a reasonably firm consensus among scientists” was questioned in Philip C.
Wander and Dennis Jaehne, “Prospects for ‘a Rhetoric of Science,’” Social Epistemology
14 (2000): 220. At another ARST meeting, intelligent design supporters were placed
on the program and their arguments were extended in a special issue of Rhetoric &
Public Aff airs 1 (1998) that later became a book: John Angus Campbell and Stephen
C. Meyer, eds., Darwinism, Design, and Public Education (East Lansing, MI: Michigan
State University Press, 2003). Th is book in the respected Rhetoric and Public Aff airs
Series is now used by intelligent design supporters as evidence that they publish their
research in “appropriate scientific literature.” See Discovery Institute, “Peer-Reviewed
and Peer-Edited Scientific Publications Supporting the Th eory of Intelligent Design,”
the Discovery Institute, Center for Science and Culture, August 26, 2010, http://www.
discovery.org/a/2640 (accessed January 2011).
21. Th at Steve Fuller, one of the founding members of ARST, sees himself as channeling
222 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
the emancipatory voice of Protagoras in making the weaker case stronger, is evident in
his testimony in Kitzmiller v. Dover, where he justifies support of intelligent design “as
an affirmative action strategy with regard to disadvantaged theories.” See “Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District Trial Transcript: Day 15 (October 24, 2005), AM Session,
Part 2,” Th e TalkOrigins Archive: Exploring the Creation/Evolution Controversy, http://
www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day15am2.html (accessed January 2011). As I will dem-
onstrate later in this essay, John Angus Campbell, another rhetorician of science I greatly
admire and a former president of ARST, grounds his support for intelligent design’s
“teach the controversy” approach in a desire to introduce students to the importance
of argument in science. I share the values and goals of Fuller and Campbell (improv-
ing public discourse about science and promoting rhetorical education); I hope these
scholars who have taught me so much over the years can forgive me for disagreeing
with the means they have adopted to achieve these goals, such as collaboration with the
Discovery Institute in support of intelligent design.
22. Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004),
3, 4.
23. Michael Leff , “Isocrates, Tradition, and the Rhetorical Version of Civic Education,” in
Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2004), 236–37.
24. Bruce A. Kimball, Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education
(New York : Teachers College Press, 1986), 238.
25. Consider, for example, the recent independent review by the University of East Anglia
of the conduct of the scientists involved in the “Climategate” emails scandal. Th is com-
prehensive review concluded that, although the rigor and honesty of the scientists was
never in doubt, there was “a consistent pattern of failing to display the proper degree of
openness” by scientists who took an “unhelpful and defensive” posture toward potential
critics in the public sphere. Muir Russell, Geoff rey Boulton, Peter Clarke, and James
Norton, Th e Independent Climate Change E-mails Review, July 2010, 11–12, http://www.
cce-review.org/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf (accessed January 2011).
26. Barry Brummett, “Rhetorical Th eory as Heuristic and Moral: A Pedagogical
Justification,” Communication Education 33 (1984): 103, 97.
27. Sheila Jasanoff notes the opposite limitation for her multiple-case, cross-national study
of biotechnology and politics, which can be faulted for exaggerating diff erences since it
is focused on revealing cultural heterogeneity. See Jasanoff , Designs on Nature, 11.
28. In addition to the studies already mentioned by Paroske, Banning, and Whidden, see
Kiran van Rijn, “Th e Politics of Uncertainty: Th e AIDS Debate, Th abo Mbeki and the
South African Government Response,” Social History of Medicine 19 (2006): 521–38;
Clark A. Miller, “Climate Science and the Making of a Global Political Order,” in States of
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 223
Knowledge, 46–66; and David J. Depew, “Darwinian Controversies: An Historiographi-
cal Recounting,” Science and Education 19 (2010): 323–66.
29. Th abo Mbeki, “Th abo Mbeki’s Letter,” April 3, 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/aids/docs/mbeki.html (accessed January 2011).
30. Susan Rice, quoted in Barton Gellman, “S. African President Escalates AIDS Feud,”
Washington Post, April 19, 2000, A1.
31. James Darsey, “A Conspiracy of Science,” Western Journal of Communication 66 (2002):
488.
32. Van Rijn, “Th e Politics of Uncertainty,” 525.
33. “Th e Durban Declaration,” Nature 406, no. 6791 (July 6, 2000): 15. To avoid the charge
that signatories were influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, the petition explicitly
excludes “scientists working for commercial companies.” An entire paper could be written
on the use of petitions and lists to demonstrate the consensus position, or alternatively,
to establish the existence of significant dissent by those who manufacture scientific con-
troversy. Some notable examples of dissent lists include: “Th e AIDS Industry and Media
Want You to Th ink Th ere Are Only a Handful of Scientists Who Doubt the HIV-AIDS
Th eory. Here’s Th e Reality,” Rethinking AIDS, http://www.rethinkingaids.com/quotes/
rethinkers.htm; “U.S. Senate Minority Report: More Th an 700 International Scientists
Dissent Over Man-Made Global Warming Claims,” U.S. Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.
View&FileStore_id=83947f5d-d84a-4a84-ad5d-6e2d71db52d9; “A Scientific Dissent
from Darwinism,” the Discovery Institute, http://www.dissentfromdarwin.org/. Th ese
lists are oft en deconstructed with arguments that the people named are motivated
by extrascientific factors or are not real experts. For example, see Stuart Jordan and
Th omas O’Brien, “Th e Credibility Project: An Assessment of the ‘U.S. Senate Minority
Report: More than 650 International Scientists Dissent Over Man Made Global Warm-
ing,’” Center for Inquiry Office of Public Policy, July 2009, http://www.centerforinquiry.
net/uploads/attachments/credibility__brochure.pdf; and Whitney Gray, “List of Scien-
tists Rejecting Evolution—Do Th ey Really?” April 14, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ty1Bo6GmPqM. Another critical response to dissent lists relies on irony, like
the tragic catalog of HIV-AIDS dissenters who have died of AIDS, or the humorously
lengthy petition of just those scientists named Steve who believe in evolution. See
“AIDS Denialists Who Have Died,” AIDSTruth.org, http://www.aidstruth.org/denial-
ism/dead_denialists; and “Th e List of Steves,” National Center for Science Education,
http://ncseweb.org/taking-action/list-steves (all accessed January 2011).
34. “Th e Durban Declaration,” 16.
35. “Th e Durban Declaration,” 15.
36. Gordon T. Stewart, “Th e Durban Declaration is not accepted by all,” Nature 407, no.
224 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
6802 (September 21, 2000): 286.
37. Frank Luntz, “Th e Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America,” Th e Luntz
Research Companies—Straight Talk, n.d., http://www.ewg.org/files/LuntzResearch_en-
vironment.pdf (accessed January 2011). Luntz calls himself a “language guy” in his
interview with Hot Politics, November 13, 2006, Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/hotpolitics/interviews/luntz.html (accessed January 2011). Th e existence
of the memo and its use by Republicans was first reported by Jennifer Lee, “A Call for
Soft er, Greener Language: G.O.P. Adviser Off ers Linguistic Tactics for Environmental
Edge,” New York Times, March 2, 2003, N24. Although there is no date on the memo,
it includes a past-tense reference to an event that took place in November 2001, so it
was not produced “back [in] ’97, ’98” as Luntz suggests in the Frontline interview. Lee
indicates that the memo was written before the November 2002 midterm elections, so it
was likely produced sometime between November 2001 and November 2002.
38. J. T. Houghton, Y. Ding, D. J. Griggs, M. Noquer, P. J. van der Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell,
and C. A. Johnson, eds., Climate Change 2001: Th e Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 25, 61. Th is report was released in January 2001 (thus
before the Luntz memo was written), as confirmed in Andrew C. Revkin, “Warming’s
Likely Victims,” New York Times, February 19, 2001, A4.
39. Naomi Oreskes, “Th e Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” Science 306, no. 5702
(December 3, 2004), 1686, erratum post dated January 21, 2005.
40. Matthew C. Nisbet and Teresa Myers, “Th e Polls—Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opin-
ion About Global Warming,” Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (2007): 453.
41. Luntz, “Th e Environment,” 137–38.
42. Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff , “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US
Prestige Press,” Global Environmental Change 14 (2004): 125–36; Maxwell T. Boykoff ,
“Lost in Translation? United States Television News Coverage of Anthropogenic Climate
Change, 1995–2004,” Climatic Change 86 (2008): 1–11; Lisa Antilla, “Climate of Scepti-
cism: US Newspaper Coverage of the Science of Climate Change,” Global Environmental
Change 15 (2005): 338–52.
43. On the balancing norm leading to a misperception of an ongoing scientific debate over
“the extent of human contributions to global warming” and “the cause of AIDS,” see
Sharon Dunwoody, “Scientists, Journalists, and the Meaning of Uncertainty,” in Com-
municating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science, ed. Sharon
M. Friedman, Sharon Dunwoody, and Carol L. Rogers (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates, 1999), 73. On the balancing norm leading to a misrepresentation of
scientific debate over evolution, see Charles Alan Taylor and Celeste Michelle Condit,
“Objectivity and Elites: A Creation Science Trial,” Critical Studies in Media Communica-
tion 5 (1988): 300.
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 225
44. Aaron M. McCright, “Dealing with Climate Change Contrarians,” in Creating a Climate
for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change, ed. Susanne
C. Moser and Lisa Dilling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 203.
45. Wang and Oreskes, “History of Science and American Science Policy,” 370.
46. John H. Cushman Jr., “Industrial Group Plans to Battle Climate Treaty,” New York Times,
April 26, 1998, 1, 24.
47. Global Climate Science Team, “Global Climate Science Communications,” American
Petroleum Institute, April 3, 1998, 2, http://www.edf.org/documents/3860_GlobalClima-
teSciencePlanMemo.pdf (accessed January 2011).
48. Global Climate Science Team, “Global Climate Science Communications,” 3–5, 7.
Although it is tempting to assume a link, I suspect that it is a coincidence that the
ARST-sponsored debate on global warming at NCA seven months later was the sort of
campus/community debate that this public relations team was promoting.
49. Taylor and Condit, “Objectivity and Elites,” 297.
50. Jasanoff ’s comparative study of culturally diff erentiated encounters with science and
technology off ers an explanation of why the United States is more susceptible to persis-
tent regulatory controversies involving science than countries like Germany or England;
in brief, the United States has a “contentious,” as opposed to a “consensus-seeking” or
“communitarian,” civic epistemology. Jasanoff , Designs on Nature, 259–70. I suspect that
political histories that valorize dissent and the protection of minority views, shared by
South Africa and the United States, contribute to the civic epistemology that allows the
argumentative dynamics of manufactured scientific controversy to take hold in those
locations. Th e rise of the Internet with its ease of access to expert materials and leveling
of institutional markers of credibility also undoubtedly plays a role in the contemporary
manufacture of scientific controversy.
51. Jim Pedersen, “‘Global Warming’ Is Alarmism,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, January 28,
2008, B5.
52. Th e language of the editorial echoes a speech given by Senator James Inhofe on the floor
of the Senate, in which he said “man-induced global warming is an article of religious
faith to the radical far left alarmists”; Congressional Record 151, no. 1 (January 4, 2005),
S18. It also echoes an opinion editorial by climate skeptic S. Fred Singer, in which he
claims, “Global warming has become an article of faith for many, with its own theology
and orthodoxy. . . . Its believers are quite fearful of any scientific dissent that threatens
their deeply held beliefs. Th ey therefore lash out at anything that even suggests lack of
a scientific consensus about a cataclysmic climate change. ‘Th e end is near,’ they tell us,
brought on by human folly, like driving cars and other such sinful behavior. Non-believ-
ers of global-warming catastrophes are severely chastised. Academic scientists have had
their research funds cut off for expressing skepticism. Government scientists have been
226 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
ostracized or forced to resign; some have even been fired. Others have been harassed,
demonized and libeled.” S. Fred Singer, “Warming Orthodoxy Ambush,” Washington
Times, October 4, 1999, A15.
53. Ed Burns, “Please, Limit Opinions to Experts in the Field,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
January 29, 2008, B7.
54. “Th e Wedge,” Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, Discovery Institute,
n.d., http://ncseweb.org/webfm_send/747 (accessed January 2011). Although there is
no date on the document, it makes reference to events that place its composition in the
summer of 1998. Th e Discovery Institute acknowledges the authenticity of the docu-
ment and the accuracy of its reproduction in “Th e ‘Wedge Document’: ‘So What?’,”
the Discovery Institute, http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.
php?id=349 (accessed January 2011).
55. “Th e Wedge,” 2, 4.
56. Carrie Sager, ed., Voices for Evolution (Berkeley, CA: National Center for Science Educa-
tion, 2008).
57. Kitzmiller v. Dover, Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ, Document 342, filed December 20, 2005,
64, http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf (accessed January 2011).
58. Th is statistic is from a Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associ-
ates International, March 28–29, 2007, and reported in “Science and Nature,” PollingRe-
port.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/science.htm (accessed January 2011).
59. Stephen C. Meyer and John Angus Campbell, “Controversy Over Life’s Origins: Stu-
dents Should Learn to Assess Competing Th eories,” San Francisco Chronicle, December
10, 2004, B9. Although Campbell was identified as a Discovery Institute senior fellow
in the editorial, he is no longer listed as such on their website. In a more recent publica-
tion that may reflect his break with the Discovery Institute, he says that one “should
not teach as controversial ideas that are not controversial and which, to the contrary,
enjoy consensus among the widest range of professional scientists.” He now argues that
instead of teaching the “controversy” over intelligent design, which he encouraged in his
coauthored 2004 opinion editorial, we should teach the controversy over subjects that
really are matters of contemporary scientific debate, like “questions about the units of se-
lection.” John A. Campbell and Taz Daughtrey, “Teaching the Contexts: Why Evolution
Should Be Taught as an Argument and How It Might Be Done,” Religion and Education
33 (2006): 16, 34.
60. Meyer and Campbell, “Controversy Over Life’s Origins,” B9.
61. Eric Plutzer and Michael Berkman, “Th e Polls—Trends: Evolution, Creationism, and
the Teaching of Human Origins in Schools,” Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (2008): 551.
62. Whidden, “Th e Manufacturing of Controversy,” 707.
63. Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed, DVD, directed by Nathan Frankowski (Premise Media
Manufactured Scientific Controversy 227
Corporation, 2008).
64. Flock of Dodos: Th e Evolution-Intelligent Design Circus, DVD, directed by Randy Olson
(Prairie Starfish Productions, 2006).
65. Robert M. Sapolsky, “Controversy Over Life’s Origins: Regardless of How It Works,
Evolution Is for Real,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 10, 2004, B9.
66. For a similar analysis of an earlier creationist appeal, see Taylor and Condit, “Objectivity
and Elites.”
67. Louisiana Senate Bill No. 733, SLS 08RS-1629, Regular Session, 2008, http://www.legis.
state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=482728 (accessed January 2011). Similar
legislation has been introduced more recently in other states too; see Leslie Kaufman,
“Darwin Foes Add Warming to Target List,” New York Times, March 4, 2010, A1, A4.
68. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. and Steve Rayner, “Editor’s Introduction,” Environmental Science and
Policy 7 (2004): 356. See also Daniel Sarewitz, “How Science Makes Environmental Con-
troversies Worse,” Environmental Science and Policy 7 (2004): 385–403; and McCright,
“Dealing with Climate Change Contrarians,” 207.
69. Lawrence J. Prelli likewise suggests that scientists who rightly focus on conjectural issues
when debating in scientific or legal forums might do better to consider other issues
when debating about science in the public forum. See A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing
Scientific Discourse (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 261.
70. Lynda Walsh, “Visual Strategies to Integrate Ethos across the ‘Is/Ought’ Divide in the
IPCC’s Climate Change 2007: Summary for Policy Makers,” Poroi 6, no. 2 (2009): 42.
71. R. A. Brown, “More Letters to the Editor: Global Warming,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Opinion, January 31, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/opinion/349560_webltrs1.html (ac-
cessed January 2011).
72. Th omas M. Lessl has argued that it is this simplistic view of science, oft en employed by
scientists in demarcation battles with creationists, that hobbles them when they seek to
instruct the public about global warming. “Scientific Demarcation and Metascience: Th e
National Academy of Sciences on Greenhouse Warming and Evolution,” in Controversy
and Confrontation: Relating Controversy Analysis with Argumentation Th eory, ed. Frans
H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company,
2008), 77–91.
73. Letter by John Moore, cited in “Out of Control, AIDS, and the Corruption of Medical
Science,” February 22, 2006, http://www.aidstruth.org/denialism/harpers-farber (ac-
cessed January 2011).
74. Th omas S. Kuhn, Th e Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), 152.
75. Kieran Healy, “Th e Revolution Will Not Be Synthesized,” in Looking for a Fight: Is Th ere
a Republican War on Science?, ed. John Holbo (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2006),
228 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
76–77; Eugenie C. Scott and Glenn Branch, “Evolution: What’s Wrong with ‘Teaching
the Controversy,’” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 18 (2003): 501.
76. On the beliefs of Americans about evolution, see Plutzer and Berkman, “Th e Polls—
Trends,” 545.
77. John Angus Campbell, “Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy of Public
Education,” Rhetoric & Public Aff airs 1 (1998): 492.
78. For example, see Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt.
79. McCright, “Dealing with Climate Change Contrarians,” 207.
80. Peter J. Jacques, Riley E. Dunlap, and Mark Freeman, “Th e Organisation of Denial: Con-
servative Th ink Tanks and Environmental Scepticism,” Environmental Politics 17 (2008):
349–85; Barbara Forrest, “Still Creationism Aft er All Th ese Years: Understanding and
Counteracting Intelligent Design,” Integrative and Comparative Biology 48 (2008):
189–201.
81. Steve Schwarze, “Juxtaposition in Environmental Health Rhetoric: Exposing Asbestos
Contamination in Libby, Montana,” Rhetoric & Public Aff airs 6 (2003): 319.
82. John M. Broder, “Scientists Taking Steps to Defend Climate Work,” New York Times,
March 3, 2010, A1, A11.
83. Sally Jackson, “Predicaments of Politicization in the Debate over Abstinence-Only Sex
Education,” in Controversy and Confrontation, 219.
84. Nicoli Nattrass, “AIDS Denialism vs. Science,” Skeptical Inquirer 31, no. 5 (2007): 31–37.
85. Jean Goodwin and Lee Honeycutt, “When Science Goes Public: From Technical Ar-
guments to Appeals to Authority,” Studies in Communication Sciences 9, no. 2 (2009):
27–28.
86. Dale L. Sullivan, “Keeping the Rhetoric Orthodox: Forum Control in Science,” Technical
Communication Quarterly 9 (2000): 125–46; Th omas M. Lessl, “Heresy, Orthodoxy, and
the Politics of Science,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1988): 18–34.
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新建文件夹/Deluca+Greenpeace+Analyst+and+Climate+Change.pdf
PRAXIS: INTERVIEW
Greenpeace International Media Analyst Reflects on Communicating Climate Change Kevin Michael DeLuca
This essay is an interview about the communication choices that the senior media analyst
of one of the most significant environmental advocacy organizations in the world,
Greenpeace, faces when organizing and creating publicity about global climate change.
The interviewee is Greenpeace Organizer Soenke Lorenzen (1966), Hannover, Germany),
who studied Geography and Cultural Anthropology at the Universität Trier (Germany),
Albert Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (Germany), and Universität Zürich (Switzerland).
He also worked as documentalist for the award winning Photography Agency Lookat in
Zürich and as Senior Analyst for Cision (a global leader in providing media intelligence).
The interviewer is Kevin Michael DeLuca, a professor of Communication at the
University of Utah. He is author of numerous articles, as well as ‘‘Image Politics: The
New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism’’ (Routledge, 2005).
Keywords: Climate Change; Greenpeace; Media; Advertising; Image Events; Success
Q: Please explain in some detail what your job at Greenpeace International (GI)
entails. How long have you been at GI? What motivated you to work at GI? Was
there any moment in your life that sparked your awareness of environmental
issues or your love of nature (what E. O. Wilson calls ‘‘biophilia’’)?
A: As the International Media Analyst for GI (based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands),
I develop and maintain digital systems to monitor and analyze transnational media
Kevin Michael DeLuca is a professor at the University of Utah. He is author of numerous articles, including
‘‘Meeting in a Redwood: Wilderness on the Public Screen’’ and ‘‘Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking
Experimental Theory and Practice.’’ Email: [email protected]
ISSN 1752-4032 (print)/ISSN 1752-4040 (online) # 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17524030902972734
Environmental Communication
Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2009, pp. 263�269
relevant to international Greenpeace campaigns across all international issue
areas (climate/energy, oceans, forests, toxics, genetically modified organisms, and
sustainable agriculture). One of my key objectives is to develop international media
strategies and advise our international communications managers on effective media
and communication strategies in line with our global campaigns’ program. While I
don’t recall a specific moment in my life that sparked my interest in nature, my
Geography major in university provided me with considerable insights into
environmental issues and fostered my personal environmental awareness. I also
studied cultural anthropology, during which I first got involved in NGO work,
especially focused in Indonesia where I completed anthropological field work during
the mid 1990s. When the opportunity to work at GI came up four years ago, it
gave me the chance to combine my interest in environmental issues with my
professional knowledge gained from several years working in the commercial media
industry.
Q: What do you think are the most pressing environmental issues that the world
faces?
A: The myriad of socio-economic and equitable sustainability issues related to
Climate Change (and transforming our current globally destructive fossil fuel-based
energy regimes into responsible, secure energy systems) is definitely the most pressing
issue of our time. To distill this complex issue into a single focused target, if we don’t
keep global mean temperature rise as far below 28C as possible through this century, we will face global water shortages, food insecurity, health impacts, climate refugees,
biodiversity loss, and economic losses.
Q: How do you frame the issue of global climate change for the media and lay
public? How do you frame it for different audiences in different countries?
A: There are of course various aspects, and levels, to the issue. Greenpeace functions
as a decentralized, but integrated, organization in which our national and regional
offices create national communication strategies that compliment our overall global
program. Of course we have to take into account that in many countries the issue of
climate change is reflected very differently within the respective stages of developed
and developing countries. Regions differ in the messaging needed to build day-to-day
awareness and the resultant relevance necessary to motivate the public and decision
makers to be informed and take action. These media arenas are contested
spaces where different organizations and viewpoints vie to partner in the develop-
ment of knowledge and understanding by respective legislators, industry, consumers,
and voters. Greenpeace provides catalytic leadership as it campaigns in these arenas,
for example, through consumer work (Greener Guide to Electronics, available
at: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/greener-electronics-guide,
264 K. M. DeLuca
Red List Fish Guide available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/seafood/
red-list-of-species), scientific scenarios (Energy [r]evolution, available at: http://
www.energyblueprint.info), and scientific reports (True Cost of Coal, available at:
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports).
Q: What is the role of the media with respect to environmental issues in the
world’s public sphere? How well or poorly do they perform this role?
A: Generally, the commercial media are in a compromised position, since they require
advertising to pay their expenses, and the greatest advertising revenue is generated via
energy suppliers, automobiles, airlines, fast food, electronics, cosmetics, and home
furnishings. To create effective public demand for the level of mitigation of climate
change emissions necessary to stay within that 28C target would require the media to repeatedly and insistently call for revolutionary changes in society. Media would need to
be consistently redirecting their readers, viewers and listeners away from consumption
of the products of their advertisers. Creating public pressure for the allocation of
significant resources for adaptation to climate change will be relatively less threatening
to the status quo that supports, and in many ways in effect, directs these media outlets.
As Boykoff and Roberts (2007) stated, the media has been relatively reformist in its
portrayal of the level of action necessary to combat climate change while scientific
projections indicate that this issue requires revolutionary changes. Greenpeace, and
other NGOs, are of course trying to push media outlets to incorporate the
‘‘revolutionary’’ messages necessary for revolutionary changes in prime spaces such
as editorials, features, and opinion pieces.
Q: Greenpeace got its start by creating dramatic image events for media
dissemination protesting nuclear testing and whaling. How important is that
strategy for GI today?
A: Actions with strong image opportunities are still a key element in our campaign
development and messaging. Our campaign activities can be categorized as: direct
action; direct communication; and protests. These actions reflect the multiple modes
we integrate to confront, challenge, expose, and effect change by creating images
disseminated to the media.
Q: After nearly four decades of image event strategy in a mediascape cluttered
with dramatic images, what makes image events still an important strategy?
A: As it is often said, an image is worth a 1000 words and Greenpeace remains very
successful in conveying complex narratives with engaging, challenging, and iconic
images. Illustrative examples are the images involving our ship-based actions, such as
those involving one of the Greenpeace vessels, The Rainbow Warrior.
Greenpeace International Media 265
Q: Global warming is not as image friendly as whaling? How does GI try to frame
global warming imagistically?
A: Of course the media continue to struggle with communicating an issue with many
levels of complexity, since they don’t want to repeatedly use melting glaciers and smoke
stacks to visualize the issue. At this point, the media often rely on other organizations,
like Greenpeace, to produce more ‘‘exciting’’ visual material. A good example of this
were the public protests against coal mining in Poland during the recent (December
2008) climate talks in Poznan and projections of climate change related messages at
political events leading up to these talks at iconic sites around the world. These
Greenpeace-initiated protests, and their accompanying images, featured prominently
in print and online media.
Q: How does GI get heard in a world that seems to be dominated by terrorism and
war? For example, I think the possibilities of the Seattle WTO protests have been
stunted by 9/11 and the ‘‘war on terrorism.’’
A: Studies (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007; Newell, 2000) have shown that NGOs constitute
an important force for political change by helping to overcome social inertia and
bureaucratic resistance to policy action. Environmental issues, especially climate
change, are still prominently represented in international headlines. Political issues like
energy security provide entry points to communicate related issues such as nuclear
power and renewable energy sources. An example of this is the current crisis
surrounding the gas deliveries from Russia to the Ukraine sparking energy insecurity
messaging throughout European focused and international media. Greenpeace and
other environmental NGOs consistently message, and are frequently cited as saying,
that stronger support for renewable energy would be a critical part of the solution to this
problem.
Q: Please describe a few successful GI campaigns. What factors made them
successful?
A: There are many campaigns/actions that come to mind that were successful from a
media viewpoint, so I will share only a few illustrative examples. In 2006, we launched
a digital campaign with a parody version of the Apple website called ‘‘GreenMyApple,’’
which encouraged Mac lovers to push Apple to review its recycling policies and use of
toxic chemicals. After having received thousands of reactions online, Apple finally
decided last year to start to comply with a more responsible regime of environmental
stewardship. Our anti-whaling campaign over the past years has also been increasingly
successful in isolating Japan internationally on its defense of its inappropriate use of
‘‘scientific’’ whaling on a commercial scale. In 2008, we decided to focus on Japanese
youth to support Japan’s cessation of all whaling activities via a ‘‘whale love’’ bus tour
and online campaign, as well as cartoon adverts in cinemas. For the first time in years,
we were able to generate significant media attention in Japan itself, where the media
266 K. M. DeLuca
were questioning the validity of the whaling industry’s actions. Late last year, two of
our Japanese activists were unjustly arrested and charged for exposing corruption and
scandal in the whaling industry. They had intercepted a box of whale meat being
improperly transferred from the whaling ship Nisshin Maru to the private home of a
crew member. Our Japanese colleagues took this box directly to the Tokyo public
prosecutor as evidence of this improper transfer. The following press conference
received major media coverage in Japan and has discredited the whaling industry. The
public prosecutor actually dropped the charges against the Nisshin Maru whilst our
activists are still under investigation. Another direct Greenpeace action with a high
media impact took place in January 2006 and actually resulted in the return of an
asbestos-laden French aircraft carrier from France bound for shipbreaking in Alang,
India. Greenpeace volunteers intercepted and boarded the Clemenceau off the coast of
Egypt and the resultant ongoing international media attention ultimately forced the
governments in France and India to react.
Q: 2006�2007 represented something of a coming out party for global warming, especially in the USA with Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth, his Academy
Award, the Nobel Peace Prize for Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, and the Step It Up Campaign 2007. That said, the 2008
Presidential campaign remained remarkably free of global warming talk. Instead,
the economy, the wars, lipstick, religion, race, gender, gas prices, offshore oil
drilling, and communism dominated. Did you find this surprising? Although
some of these issues are important, global warming is of world historical
significance. Why is it having such trouble gaining traction?
A: US media pay far more attention to the domestic and foreign policy implications
of issues like climate change than European media (which focus more on the possible
consequences). Additionally, the more prominent role of climate skeptics in the USA
(though diminishing) and a relatively lower (compared to Europe) general public
awareness of the irreversible effects of climate change continues to influence the
public debate, hampering the discussion on actual actions necessary in both scale and
urgency. Now that the presidential election is over, Obama has been generating
headlines on possible renewable energy scenarios to be developed by his new
administration. We will have to wait to see whether his rhetoric will be matched (or
hopefully exceeded) by the actions of his new administration as we proceed on the
road to the climate talks in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.
Q: The recent global economic collapse has changed everything. How will
economic challenges transform approaches to global warming? How will GI
respond? What are the reasons for optimism and pessimism?
A: While it is certainly difficult to predict what effects the developing global financial
crisis will have on the development of renewables, Greenpeace will continue to be on the
forefront of consistently messaging that the development of more stable employment
Greenpeace International Media 267
opportunities are found in the renewable energies field. The reality is that while
governments continue to invest in exploiting the last of the planets fossil fuels, the
viability of many of the world’s ecosystems will depend on our leaving as much of these
fossil fuels in the ground. Unfortunately, misinformed advocates point to the cost-
intensive nuclear industry as an energy savior. The surging and volatile pricing for fossil
fuels such as coal and gas will bolster arguments in favor of greater development of
renewable energy sources. Also, energy conservation is rightfully receiving more
attention in the media, since it is increasingly recognized as an area of individual
empowerment in an issue where the scale and scope of complexities can at times leave
the public feeling disenfranchised.
Q: As educators, we wonder about the role of education. How important is
education? Are there any good education strategies? Is education enough? For
example, in the US people knew sports utility vehicles (SUVs) were bad for the
environment, but they still sold well until gas prices increased.
A: In essence, Greenpeace empowers the public through generating awareness and
knowledge. The media is our mode of distribution for informing the key stakeholders
of legislators, industry, consumers, and voters. The development of knowledge is
increasingly a digital, multimodal experience that Greenpeace will continue to adapt
to, as well as pioneer. While the economics of any lifestyle choice (i.e., SUVs) are
critical, so is the power of peer pressure to conform to what is socially acceptable.
And irresponsible consuming is increasingly socially unacceptable.
Q: Global warming seems to present a rhetorical problem for environmental
activists. Global warming responses clearly require limiting human activities,
including consumerism and reproduction. Yet the worldviews, especially of
the industrialized nations, are premised on unlimited growth, consumerism,
ever-increasing standards of living, and economic progress. Can such worldviews
be reconciled with the finite limits of the planet? Many of the rhetorical strategies
of environmentalists involve claiming that a green revolution can also be great for
the economy*that environmental protection can equal economic progress. Do you think this is true? Is it a tenable strategy for environmentalists? Are there
better strategies? Environmentalists are often accused of being too negative. Can
doomsaying rhetoric work?
A: Communicating only doomsaying rhetoric is definitely not as effective, and
therefore an integral part of our communication strategy on climate change and
energy issues are the solutions. While on the one side, we bear witness to the effects of
climate change on our ecosystems, on the other we also point to viable solutions. The
trend in central European media is that climate change is increasingly portrayed as a
fact, and now the public is more interested in how to be ‘‘green’’ without losing too
much of the deemed ‘‘necessary’’ aspects of their life-style.
268 K. M. DeLuca
Q: It can be said that the world is at a tipping point. Are there markers that will
tell us which way we are tipping? Are there models of success that can give us
hope? In looking back, has the environmental movement been making progress,
treading water, or drowning? What keeps you going?
A: While no-one can accurately foresee the future, my assessment of global media
trends indicates that the environmental movement has certainly been gaining
significant gravitas. For example, German newspaper headlines during the protest
against the recent (2008) transport of nuclear waste to Gorleben indicated a common
theme: This is the renaissance of the environmental movement. Additionally, our
offices in China and India have been attracting tens of thousands of new supporters
in recent years. Personally, I am more energized than ever from the fact that the voices
of environmental NGOs, and the critical equitable sustainability issues that they
champion, have gone from being heard in the back rooms to the board rooms of
major multinationals and the seats of governmental power from Beijing to Brussels.
References
Boykoff, M.T., & Roberts, T. (2007). Media coverage of climate change: Current trends, strengths, and
weaknesses. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report. Retrieved
January 10, 2009, from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/Boykoff,
%20Maxwell%20and%20Roberts,%20J.%20Timmons.pdf
Newell, P. (2000). Climate for change: Non-state actors and the global politics of the greenhouse.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Greenpeace International Media 269
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新建文件夹/Jordan+Plastic+Body.pdf
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The rhetorical limits of the "plastic body" John W. Jordan
Online Publication Date: 01 August 2004 To cite this Article: Jordan, John W. (2004) 'The rhetorical limits of the "plastic body"', Quarterly Journal of Speech, 90:3, 327 - 358 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/0033563042000255543 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0033563042000255543
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Quarterly Journal of Speech Vol. 90, No. 3, August 2004, pp. 327–358
The Rhetorical Limits of the “Plastic Body” John W. Jordan
This essay analyzes the “plastic body” as it is produced in the discourse of plastic surgery. The contemporary industry has constructed a popular image of plastic surgery as a readily available and personally empowering means to resolve body image issues, on the presumption that any body can become a “better” body. The ideology underlying the industry emerges out of analysis of the rhetoric of surgeons and patients. The rhetorical efforts of amputee “wannabes,” who seek elective amputation and who use arguments similar to those of mainstream plastic surgery applicants, reveal the paradoxes and contradictions in decision-making about who has access to these procedures. The essay concludes that the concept of the plastic body is based less on medical technology and skill than on rhetorical power and suggests that this body of discourse has important implications for medical and technological advances that have enlarged the possibilities for body alteration practices.
Keywords: Plastic Surgery; Amputation “Wannabes”; Plastic Body; Body Image
The human body is arguably the most fluctuating signifier in the history of cultural expression, but the technological and commercial developments of the 20th and 21st centuries have given the material body nearly as much fluidity as its artistic representations. Varieties of cosmetic alteration, including piercings, tattoos, the corporeal refashionings of performance artists, and virtual body designing are an increasingly common part of society today and push the boundaries that constitute social understandings of the “natural” body.1 Current body modification techniques prompt new considerations of the human body, but also raise questions about the acceptable limits of human intervention in altering its appearance. These concerns are brought into focus by public messages that define humans as surgically malleable entities—“plastic bodies”—whose corporeal identity is always in a state of potential
John W. Jordan is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Correspondence to: 210 Johnston Hall, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwau- kee, WI 53211, U.S. Email: [email protected]. The author thanks the editor and anonymous reviewers for their help and Melissa Gilbert for access to her excellent documentary Whole.
ISSN 0033–5630 (print)/ISSN 1479-5779 (online) © 2004 National Communication Association DOI: 10.1080/0033563042000255543
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328 J. W. Jordan
transition. This plastic body is a rhetorically contested substance, with a variety of social agents engaged in efforts to shape its public meaning and, by extension, its corporeal form. Their messages frame contemporary debates about the human body, its entelechies, and the means by which individuals seek out and justify their desire for a “better” body.
The most socially sanctioned and physically altering body alteration techniques are those belonging to plastic surgery.2 Although surgery and other medical techniques have for centuries been used to alter the human body, the dramatic and often controversial techniques involved in plastic surgery have brought it to the forefront of the public’s knowledge about body augmentation, leading some to describe the contemporary era as a “plastic surgery culture.”3 Once available only to a select few, plastic surgery is now touted as a democratic technology, “no longer restricted to the very wealthy or famous,” but “mundane and available to everyone.”4 Public accounts of plastic surgery imply that there is an augmentation for every body and for every part of the body, including some of the more idiosyncratic forms, such as having one’s toes shortened to fit designer shoes, “umbilicoplasty” or “designer bellybutton” surgery to create the perfect bellybutton shape, “laser vaginal rejuvenation” or “designer vagina” surgery to reshape a vagina to display a youthful appearance and increase sexual pleasure, and penis enlargements that boost a man’s sexual ego, if not sexual function.5 What may be obscured by the apparent ubiquity of plastic surgery is an understanding that realizing the body’s plastic potential is not a simple matter of personal desire. Because surgeons control the means to actualize body alteration desires, surgical applicants must confront the medical community’s ideological perspective on the healthy body and how this influences surgeons’ choices about which bodies and desires will receive surgical attention and which will be rejected as inappropriate.6 These choices put into perspective the ways in which the plastic body is limited symbolically and materially and the possible avenues for change opened up through rhetorical interaction.
In this essay, I explore three rhetorical phenomena that shape public understand- ing of the possibilities for and limitations on the body’s plasticity in a plastic surgery culture. The first phenomenon is that, over the course of the last century, plastic surgery advocates have engaged in a concerted, commercial effort to redefine the human body as a plastic, malleable substance which surgeons can alter and people should want to alter in order to realize their body image ideals. These messages convey to the public the apparent ease and wonder of plastic surgery and associate body augmentation with individual empowerment, making surgery a desirable solution for individuals with body image issues. The second phenomenon concerns the rhetorical work surgical applicants do to receive augmentation. Although plastic surgery is advertised as an almost universally accessible commodity, access to surgical alteration is predicated on applicants successfully aligning their desire for surgery with the medical community’s definition of a better body. This requires that applicants persuade surgeons of the “wrong”-ness of their bodies and their need for surgical “correction,” a rhetorical strategy that places applicants in embarrassing and contradictory situations. The third phenomenon includes challenges to the medical
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The “Plastic Body” 329
community’s definition of the better body produced through surgery. In particular, I focus on a group of surgical applicants known as amputee “wannabes,” who desire amputation of one of their healthy limbs in order to make their bodies “whole.”7
Wannabes are a compelling example for rhetorical analysis because they articulate their augmentation desires through statements that are nearly identical to main- stream plastic surgery applicants, but they are not granted the same legitimacy by the medical community, thereby bringing into focus the role that the body plays in arguments about its plastic potential.
The plastic body emerges as an influential, contested, and evolving configuration of meanings that circulate through the public sphere and are the impetus behind many body alteration desires. Public discourse about elective surgical alteration comprises rhetorical texts that shape public understanding about bodies as symbolic and material sites of expression.8 A rhetorical analysis of these texts yields important insights into the ways that the borders between technology, medicine, authority, and body image are managed through the production of plastic bodies.9 Statements regarding the “proper” uses of plastic surgery do not limit the body alterations surgeons can perform but the kinds they will perform, which in turn influences the kinds of bodies prospective patients should ask for. By exploring these rhetorical statements, this essay analyzes what counts as an authentic desire for plastic surgery on a plastic body and how authoritative definitions of a whole, healthy, and beautiful body are produced and maintained in public discourse. Ultimately, I conclude that, even in a time of astonishing biotechnology, the constitution of the human body depends on rhetorical invention as much as technological intervention.
A Brief Rhetorical History of Plastic Surgery
The “plastic” in plastic surgery comes from the Greek plastikos, “to shape or mold,” and relates to the techniques for shaping and the object that is to be shaped, meaning that plastic surgery presumes that the body is plastic.10 This presumption forms the basis on which popular and medical discourse, particularly in the 20th century, established the body’s plasticity to the degree that people today “perceive the malleability of the body as commonplace,” a perception “writ so deep in the collective unconscious that it is hard to speak of a ‘natural’ body.”11 In one sense, this perception is not entirely novel as medicine has always regarded the body as a plastic substance that could go from health to illness and back again based on how doctors diagnosed and treated their patients. Indeed, without the belief that medi- cine can transform bodies, medicine would seem to have little to offer.12 Bodies in plastic surgery, however, usually are not so much ill as they are “wrong,” and they are not healed so much as they are corrected or beautified. These distinctions kept plastic surgery at the fringes of medical knowledge until recently, when it emerged as a visible, desirable, and discussable part of everyday life.13 Augmentation now factors into definitions of better, healthier, and even happier bodies. In this section I discuss some of the events that changed attitudes toward plastic surgery and contemporary perspectives on the body’s surgical alterability.
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330 J. W. Jordan
Plastic surgery’s origins have been traced back to ancient India, where techniques were developed to reattach or reconstruct noses lost through misfortune or punish- ment.14 These early procedures were painful and time-consuming but effective, leading to their adoption in other cultures across time. Advances in plastic surgery were slow, largely owing to a lack of technological innovation and to the perception that it was an unnatural and immoral science that meddled with nature and the social order and, therefore, was unworthy of serious medical study or public acceptance. Practitioners attempted to combat this attitude through justifications for plastic surgery that extolled the amazing results of their techniques, but their efforts did little to ease society’s concerns. In his 16th century manual for plastic surgery, De Curtorum Chirurgia per Insitionem, the surgeon Gaspare Tagliacozzi elevated plastic surgeons above nature, writing that, “We bring back, refashion and restore to wholeness the features which nature gave but chance destroyed, not that they may charm the eye but that they may be an advantage to the living soul.”15 Testimonials to the amazing transformations effected through plastic surgery would become an instrumental aspect of 20th century discourse, but in earlier centuries these claims were often viewed as heresies that confirmed plastic surgery’s reputation as an unnatural and dangerous enterprise.16
The history of plastic surgery contains numerous examples of almost comical juxtapositions of the medical skills of plastic surgeons and their ineptitude at gaining legitimacy. Plastic surgery in the 19th century was generally regarded as the province of quack doctors more interested in self-promotion than healing.17 They advertised experimental plastic surgery procedures (some of which ended tragically for their patients), boasted about celebrity clients (many of whom vehemently denied having surgery), and performed facelift operations on public stages in front of paying audiences.18 These stunts raised public awareness about the plastic potential of the body, but the carnivalesque atmosphere of these demonstrations did little to improve plastic surgery’s standing in the eyes of the traditional medical establishment. Medicinal practitioners of this era demonstrated a lack of empathy for quality of life issues beyond survival and did not see the merit in attending to a patient’s personal appearance, dismissing such concerns as mere vanity.19 As has been noted, “Research has shown that surgeons by nature tend to be more critical and less empathetic than most people.”20 Concerns about bodily appearance were not important aspects of surgeons’ decision-making or of their patients’ well-being and as such were not incorporated into the doctor’s “gaze” or perception of the body.21 Even those medical procedures that disfigured patients, such as radical mastectomies, were performed with little to no consideration of the patient’s body image. Doctors were more likely to tell women that they were lucky to be alive, and that should be enough.22
Somewhat ironically, the viciousness of war prompted medical professionals to expand their view of patient well-being to include aesthetic treatment. The First World War introduced new and improved ways of destroying bodies, but advances in medical and transportation technologies also meant that more injured soldiers could be treated and saved instead of being left to die on the battlefield. The
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The “Plastic Body” 331
problem, of course, was that many soldiers were left severely disfigured by their wounds and the emergency surgery that kept them alive. The confluence of numerous damaged bodies, the social disruption of war, and a community of doctors working toward a common goal set the stage for plastic surgery’s legitimiza- tion in the public and medical realms. “Never before had physicians been required to treat so many and such extensive facial and head injuries. Shattered jaws, blown-off noses and lips and gaping skull wounds caused by modern weapons required innovative restorative procedures.”23 The romanticized honor of being wounded in battle provided the necessary credibility to plastic surgery which, in this context, was neither vain, hubristic, nor corrupt medicine but a means to allow soldiers to return home as heroic rather than pitiable figures, thereby preserving the social order through diminishing the personal and social stigma of modern warfare.
The restorative work done on soldiers did much to legitimize plastic surgery as a healing science. “By the end of the war, these [plastic] surgeons had earned the respect of their colleagues and the public. No longer were questions raised about the morality of surgical reconstruction or, for that matter, about the social value of medical practice.”24 Plastic surgery’s legitimation was accompanied by a reinterpreta- tion of its medicinal utility as “techniques primarily evolved for hiding facial blemishes and correcting visible deformities were applied with immense success to the treatment of wounds in general.”25 As the medical gaze of surgeons shifted from blemishes to wounds, public perception of these techniques increased in value as did the status of its practitioners, who became seen as “expert advisers and helpful collaborators in a wide range of surgery.”26 Plastic surgery’s newfound medical and social legitimacy enabled it to rewrite its own troubled history, proudly announcing itself to the public as “one of the world’s oldest healing arts.”27 The plastic surgeon’s perspective on the body became an integral component of the medical gaze, transforming knowledge of the body and of the ways in which bodies could be transformed.
In the 20th century, particularly after the First World War, plastic surgery shifted from reconstructive to aesthetic applications.28 The Second World War provided additional opportunities for plastic surgeons to demonstrate their value, but by this time plastic surgery had expanded into more everyday uses.29 The restored bodies of soldiers were a kind of a fortiori argument in more peaceful times and reversed the earlier proscriptions against vanity surgery: if plastic surgery could work wonders on the horrible disfigurations of a wounded soldier, surely it could repair unsightly features on an otherwise healthy body. Plastic surgery’s acceptance as medicine enabled practitioners to seek out other “ill” bodies in need of their brand of healing, such as those suffering from psychological “wounds” brought about by bodily dissatisfaction. “Whereas plastic surgery was formerly aimed at repairing bodily deficiencies which made a person noticeably different from the rest of the world,” historians write, “it increasingly came to be seen as a normal intervention for essentially normal bodies.”30 An article from a 1939 magazine, Independent Woman, illustrates the way in which normal bodies could be rewritten as needing plastic surgery. “The defect may seem slight,” the author writes, “but its psychological
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consequences may be serious enough to undermine the patient’s mental health or economic security.”31 A more pervasive and permissive sensibility of the body’s plasticity was disseminated, fostering the belief that body alteration was an available, practical, and desirable application. “Throughout its history, aesthetic surgery has striven to join the mainstream of medicine by promising patients uniquely effective therapies for becoming happy, healthy, and whole.”32 Commentators have summed up this attitude by saying, “Not only can we change our identities … we do it all the time. And we ought to be glad, because this kind of plasticity is healthier, more honest, more apt to bring us happiness.”33
Plastic surgery became known as a way of combatting unfair circumstances, of triumphing over the hand dealt by nature or fate and of acquiring the body one ought to have.34 This is a persuasive idea in a culture that is wont to see the body as the canvas for the mind’s desires. The plasticity brought about by surgical augmentation enables a person to see the body as a mere starting point for corporeal identity. Plastic surgeons offer to remold flesh to fit fantasy and base this promise on an image of the body as potential awaiting form. As I demonstrate in the following sections, however, there is a significant disparity between the promise of a plastic body and its fulfillment, and the requirements imposed upon those seeking augmen- tation entail more than wishful thinking.
Plastic Bodies and Plastic Rhetoric
Plastic surgery’s efforts to redefine the natural body as a body-in-transition fit easily within “the cultural landscape of late modernity: consumer capitalism, technological development, liberal individualism, and the belief in the makeability [sic] of the human body,” the cumulative effect of which enabled plastic surgery to “emerge as an acceptable means for altering or improving the appearance of the body.”35 Such acceptance confirms that, “Not only has the body come to stand as a primary symbol of identity, but it is a symbol with an unlimited capacity for alteration and modification,” which is evident in the increasing demand for a variety of surgical enhancements.36 This combination of factors—the body’s presumed plasticity and individuals’ desire to remold their bodies—points to a strong sense of Cartesian dualism permeating the cultural understanding of body modification.37 As I argue below, the impetus to seek plastic surgery for many is the desire to have their bodies reflect an idealized mental image they have of themselves. Surgery is looked on as a means to “restor[e] order and mak[e] the psyche happy through the establishment of a unitary identity,” with alteration of the physical body as the means to this end.38
This “mind over matter” perspective permeates the plastic surgery industry’s public promotions, the justifications for surgery offered by patients, and the judgments made by plastic surgeons.
Plastic surgery’s mind/body dynamic has been addressed in several studies that seek to explain why Westerners are so concerned with using augmentation technolo- gies to improve body image. These analyses explore possible influences on individu- als, such as psychological issues like low-self esteem or cultural influences such as
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mass-mediated body images, which compel them to seek relief through the “scalpel psychiatry” of plastic surgery.39 Of equal importance are the ways that discourse constructs and disciplines the plastic body as a symbolic and material substance, and the way that the material body “binds discourse by setting limits.”40 Put more simply, the way that plastic surgery is discussed shapes the body, and the limitations of the physical body in turn shape the way that plastic surgery is discussed. Despite what their advertisements promise, transforming a physical body to fit a body image is not simply a matter of requesting plastic surgery; instead, such requests generate issues of desire, authority, and resistance. Accordingly, further attention is needed to the ways that the body and bodily desires are constructed rhetorically by physicians and patients as they strive to find ways to translate such desires into an “illness” that a surgeon can cure.41
A rhetorical analysis of plastic surgery discourse identifies several tensions—per- sonal desire and public promise, physical and imagined bodies, psychological need and professional ethics—that are in conflict in the production of a plastic body as a physical object and as an imagined construct. The plastic body is a contested subjectivity whose meaning shapes and is shaped by the ways that the body can be discussed, by whom, and toward what end, as well as the socio-political implications of people seeking to make their bodies conform to an idealized image. This perspective differs from the usual ways in which plastic surgery is discussed publicly, which is in terms of the end product—the visible, post-surgery body. Before a single incision is made, however, the plastic body as an object of discourse has been sculpted rhetorically to reflect the varied interests of patients, surgeons, and, in some instances, communities. Even in situations in which surgery is rejected, a new body is produced because the applicant’s body is redefined as unsuitable for surgery, which alters its rhetorical status. Approval of surgery is made on the assumption that the refurbished body will improve the individual patient and be a public statement affirming the benefits and appropriate uses of plastic surgery. Rhetoric, thus, is a vital component of the development of bodies in plastic surgery culture, and it influences individual decisions about and public knowledge of the human body.
The critical perspective I use to investigate the rhetorical construction of the plastic body stems from and contributes to theories about how “the body is alternately sustained and threatened through modes of address.”42 As critics remind us, “regarding the body as a discursive site is not new,” but engaging the body as a “mobilization of signs, images, and discourses for the articulation of identities, ideologies, consciousness, communities, publics, and cultures” is a more recent enterprise to which rhetorical analysis has made important contributions.43 Rhetoric as an analytical perspective is particularly well-suited to addressing such questions because it takes into account how ideas—and bodies—are produced and altered across time and in a variety of contexts. The human body is rhetorical in that it can be “a pivotal resource for the crucial practice of public argumentation” and the “site and substance of the argument itself.”44 Indeed, because the body is “incongruous” and a “site of incoherence,” it is necessarily rhetorical because it requires interpret- ation in order to be meaningful.45 As the body is interpreted, framed, and under-
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stood, it becomes a text that reflects the attitudes and values of the culture in which it is situated. A body’s meaning depends on rhetorical articulation; “there are no a priori bodies. Bodies are enmeshed in a turbulent stream of multiple and conflictual discourses that shape what they mean in particular contexts.”46 Any “understanding of the body,” critics argue, “whether by the general ‘lay’ person or the expert, must be constituted from language, images, and concepts that are culturally bound.”47
Without interpretation, the body ceases to be meaningful because, “absent context and significant symbols, the body’s declarations remain largely inchoate.”48 The innate incoherence of the body is the wellspring of its rhetorical power.
Although it was not written with plastic surgery in mind, an additional perspective on the material and discursive entwinements of plastic surgery emerges from taking literally Donald C. Bryant’s definition of rhetoric as “adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas.”49 At its core, plastic surgery is literally about adjusting an individual body to a bodily ideal while re-imagining that ideal based on a body’s material possibilities. Statements about plastic surgery can be understood as deliberative, “inherently future-oriented” rhetoric that instruct audiences “about overcoming obstacles through making [bodies] change,” with physical embodiment as the outcome of these deliberations.50 As in many other aspects of everyday life, plastic surgery uses rhetoric to “giv[e] form to the vague and disordered flow of human experience. Rhetoric gives shape to social reality and, in so doing, makes sense of it.”51 Plastic surgery embodies rhetoric metaphorically and literally, reflecting the idea that “one of the ways to connect the physical and the imagined is by invoking terms of identity that mutually constitute who we are with who we want to be.”52
How the human body is made meaningful through public discourse on plastic surgery has important ramifications for the choices people make regarding their health and the possibilities and obstacles they confront in pursuit of better bodies.
Viewed in this way, the physical body can be understood as an “epistemic force that articulates itself not through traditional rational argument but through a kind of corporeal performativity.”53 With respect to surgical alteration, the body’s mean- ing is in even greater need of explication because this epistemic force is spread across multiple, imagined bodies and generates multiple perspectives regarding its proper social function. The body in question is an amalgam of the pre-surgical body of the patient, the body desired, the body the surgeon sees through the disciplinary gaze of medicine, and the body produced by surgery or its refusal. Although plastic surgery seeks to unify the symbolic and corporeal, ultimately it cannot contain the symbolic expressiveness of the body in the public realm, giving rise to multiple and even conflicting interpretations of plastic surgery as an instrument for realizing a desired body image. Granting or refusing requests for surgical alteration does not eliminate the rhetorical plasticity of the body; instead, it adds layers to it.
This is a significant issue in the culture of plastic surgery and signifies the tensions involved in altering bodies: “If bodies are inscribed in particular ways, … then these kinds of inscriptions are capable of reinscription, of transformation, are capable of being lived and represented in quite different terms.”54 The post-surgery body is a living advertisement, which constrains the types of surgeries doctors are willing to
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perform because they do not want just any body to be an example of the effects of medical intervention. Those who challenge these restrictions, such as amputee wannabes, agree with the surgeons that the body is an important site of rhetorical signification, but argue that the limits surgeons place on acceptable body alterations are ill-conceived and too narrow. Wannabes view surgical amputation as a means to diversify social interpretations of the body and to admit and appreciate, rather than stigmatize, differences in bodily form. In essence, they debate two sides of the same coin: The body’s plasticity is either useful only when directed toward conforming to the social norm or when diversifying social body norms. Both sides define the body as plastic, but arrive at that definition through different logics. To observe better these rhetorical issues and their enactment in public discourse, I next examine examples of plastic body discourse in the public sphere.
Plastic Surgeons and Plastic Medicine
Physicians’ public statements about their surgical abilities are an important source of rhetoric about the plasticity of the body.55 As plastic surgery became safer, more popular, and more affordable during the last century, surgeons used self-promotion to attract new clients; some even hired marketing experts to develop ad campaigns for cosmetic services.56 These efforts raised public awareness and transformed “the practices of cosmetic surgery … into commodities,” and many surgeons became “celebrities in their own right.”57 The public persona of the surgeon is a carefully crafted aspect of plastic body discourse that also reveals surgeons’ attitudes toward their patients’ bodies. Pioneering plastic surgeon Adalbert Bettman, for example, writes in his classic essay that, “By the application of plastic surgery the deformities of nature, accident, disease and age are removed and the smooth, plump, rotundity of health and youth replace the wrinkled, hollow, drawn appearance of advancing years and illness.” In Bettman’s estimation, a body could be “changed to suit the esthetic taste of the owner” by “yield[ing] to the touch of the surgeon.”58
When speaking of their abilities, surgeons often resort to hyperbole bordering on hubris. One surgeon, for example, says, “Patients sometimes misunderstand the nature of cosmetic surgery. It’s not a shortcut for diet or exercise. It’s a way to override the genetic code.”59 In proclaiming their ability to relieve patients of their “genetic flaws” or “features that they could change through no other available means,” surgeons redefine the current era as one in which “the wonders of technology have put in the hands of physicians what used to be in the hands of fate.”60 For surgeons, plastic surgery is a way of combatting unfair circumstances, of triumphing over nature, and achieving the idealized body to which a person is entitled. This vantage enables surgeons to craft an image of themselves as “miracle workers” with the power “to make things right, to make faulty organs function most efficiently and to look as well as possible,” and explains why many people believe in their “promise to sculpt our bodies, to restore our youth, to create beauty out of what was ugly and ordinary.”61 “Whatever the problem,” applicants are assured, “deformity, ugliness, old age—you will be made anew. The end will be better than
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the beginning.”62 Plastic surgeons bring about transformations that patients could not effect on their own. Surgeons promote themselves as “purveyors of the mystical quality of beauty itself,” saying that, “What we do … is very powerful magic.”63 In more clinical terms, surgeons report: “The plastic surgeon today can help reconstruct a person’s asymmetries or deformities to conform to their peers, or even surpass the norm.”64 For those hoping to alter their bodies, these messages must sound like the answer to their body image dreams.
Plastic surgeons’ self-promotion creates an understanding of body alteration as a procedure that otherwise healthy individuals might want rather than an operation that only disfigured victims need. The message conveyed is that, “You would be crazy not to be operated on when doing so will change your life—you will be loved, you will be successful. You would be crazy to refuse all that.”65 Surgeons are enamored with their ability to effect changes that extend beyond the flesh. One researcher notes that “repeatedly what surgeons have told me they love about surgery is exactly the way these operations can turn around people’s lives.”66 Although they make a point of not raising applicants’ expectations during consultations, that surgery can reconstruct both bodies and lives comes across in surgeons’ statements regarding the personal empowerment of plastic surgery: “You must be convinced that it is your free and open right to make your individual choice about whether or not to have … any part of your body changed by surgery.”67
Counter-rhetoric is difficult to find. Images of plastic surgery circulating through popular discourse “[do] not apply any brakes to these fantasies of re-arrangement and self-transformation. Rather, we are constantly told that we can ‘choose’ our own bodies,” leading to “a construction of life as plastic possibility and weightless choice, undetermined by history, social location, or even individual biography.”68 Such statements reflect the image of plastic surgery as advertised in the public sphere, but closer inspection reveals obstacles to the realization of these plastic possibilities that are imposed by the same surgeons who speak of entitlement and limitless choice. Surgeons promote and police plastic surgery, offering the ideal to all but surgery only to those who pass intense scrutiny. The gatekeeping of plastic surgeons illustrates the strategic ambiguity in their public marketing and the ideological assumptions informing their decisions.
Plastic Surgeons as Gatekeepers
As publicized, plastic surgery is about open access and personal entitlement: “No patient should have to jump through hoops to benefit from plastic surgery.”69 Even in countries without socialized medicine, such as the United States, the popular perception is that the only obstacle to surgical alteration is price.70 This is a false impression because being able to afford elective surgery is the not the only or even the most significant hoop through which prospective patients must jump. The more substantial yet less discussed requirement for surgery is the ability to demonstrate psychological health. Medical researchers point out that, “The subject is allocated property rights over [his or her] looks[,] and the value of his [sic] property (and
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hence the need for repairs to it) is determined by a calculus based on his own assessments,” but “the exercise of property rights is dependent, however, upon the constitution of a ‘rational’ subject.”71 Accordingly, “the importance of evaluating the psychological motivations and outcomes of patients undergoing aesthetic surgery has been long recognized” by surgeons who scrutinize the ways in which applicants describe their bodies and their surgical desires for signs of mental instability.72 In this context, validation of one’s body alteration desires depends on the rhetorical performance of an appropriate surgical identity.
Gatekeeping is a common component of medical practice. Modern clinical medicine is founded on a physician’s ability to scrutinize patients through the abstract, dehumanizing gaze of medical knowledge to determine what, if any, intervention is needed.73 What distinguishes the gatekeeping of plastic surgeons is that, for elective surgery, the applicants bring their “illness” to the surgeon’s attention.74 “Someone with a problem seeks someone with a skill,” as one surgeon puts it.75 Prospective patients come to surgeons with complaints about their current body and ideas about how it could be improved. Many surgeons even advocate incorporating an applicant’s self-diagnosis into their pre-surgical consultations, advising colleagues to “emphasize that both [the doctor] and the patient share responsibility for the decision to proceed with surgery and for the surgical outcome itself…. Furthermore, a physician–patient relationship that is egalitarian, rather than authoritarian, must be developed. The surgeon thereby allows the patient to express his [sic] desires, fears, and expectations.”76
Despite such advice, egalitarian relationships between plastic surgeons and surgical applicants exist more in theory than discernible practice. When surgeons listen to someone’s complaints and desires, they do so to see how the patient reveals his or her psychological state more than as an earnest collaboration on medical diagnosis. Consultations favor the surgeon’s authority to the degree that they need not ponder the contradiction between the power they exert and the collaborative atmosphere they claim to provide. “Viewing themselves as ‘healers’ of cosmetic defects and emotional desperation,” observers explain, “plastic surgeons need not interrogate their own psychological necessity for intervening in the appearance of healthy bodies.”77 Ultimately, the burden falls on applicants to perform their roles as patients in a way that will win approval from the adjudicating surgeon. Surgeons continue to exert nearly absolute control over their patient’s surgical futures because they have “the power to deny procedures for which the surgeon believes them to be psycholog- ically or physically unfit.… [The] surgeon ultimately decides if she ‘deserves’ the procedure.”78 Applicants must craft rhetoric that simultaneously articulates a wrong body and a healthy mind.
The complexities of this rhetorical situation have led some to conclude that, “of the various forms of body work, plastic surgery is surely the hardest to justify.”79
Justifying a request for plastic surgery is particularly difficult because surgeons’ evaluations are not based on an agreed-upon standard of a beautiful or normal body. Surgeons attempt to develop a “presurgical baseline of a patient’s body image concerns,” but in terms of shaping the body toward an idealized image, surgeons’
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views of beauty are as subjective as any artist’s.80 Surgeons’ statements that “Beauty, attractiveness, good looks and symmetry are synonymous,” are quickly followed by acknowledgments that “beauty may be in the eye of the beholder.”81 In the context of plastic surgery, the eye of the beholder is the surgeon’s gaze, and the declaration of what counts as beauty, “like so much of plastic surgery, comes down to each surgeon’s personal aesthetic.”82 Despite the surgeon’s subjective interpretation of the body, applicants must find ways to articulate their augmentation desires against a subjective standard over which they have little, if any, influence.
Because of the importance placed on fostering identification with the surgeon’s aesthetic sensibilities, critics report that applicants “know, instinctively, that if in our requests for surgery we don’t act the part of the ‘normal patient,’ we might be turned away.”83 In actuality, there is very little that is instinctive about this knowledge. Instead, a century’s worth of discourse on plastic surgery has educated the public about how to perform the role of an applicant in ways that improve their chances of being granted surgery.84 One successful identification strategy that patients employ is a confessional rhetorical style that provides them with the symbolic resources to characterize themselves as dissatisfied enough with their bodies to desire surgery, but mentally stable enough not to appear obsessed or delusional about body alteration.85 Successfully performing this confessional per- sona is all the more important because surgeons are prone to attribute reports of post-operative dissatisfaction to the patient’s unrealistic expectations or an underly- ing psychosis.86 Surgeons may speak of creating egalitarian consultations, but they are most persuaded by applicants who kowtow to their authority. Adopting this confessional persona often causes embarrassment for applicants, whose willingness “to put themselves through such ordeals is an indication of how great their desire for cosmetic surgery [is].”87
Confession in the surgical context is entelechial, and “a failure to confess … is equated with a refusal of health; a preference for disease.”88 Confessional rhetoric is effective because it evokes sympathetic understandings of ill bodies and appeals to the surgeon’s skill in remolding the outer body into conformity with the inner being, thereby absolving patients of their body image crises.89 If a surgeon is convinced by the rhetorical performance that the patient needs rather than just wants surgery, he or she can consent to approve surgery because a patient is being cured, rather than a client being serviced. Confessing through the language of illness is often used to justify commercial enhancement technologies like plastic surgery, and offers applicants strategies for legitimizing their surgical desires as necessary rather than as spurious interventions into otherwise healthy bodies.90
The language of illness also redefines the surgical act from one of elective or spurious action to a restorative or healing function, which helps plastic surgeons justify their own medical authority. In order for this rhetorical schema to achieve the desired result, the applicant’s “illness” has to be expressed in a particular way. Applicants cannot exhibit the wrong kind of illness or express it in the wrong way or they will be rejected by surgeons who “suspect their patients of trying to solve emotional problems by altering their bodies” and warn their colleagues to reject
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applicants who appear too eager or too desperate.91 What may be gleaned from the intricacies of this situation is that the “illness” of a body in the context of plastic surgery is primarily a matter of an applicant’s rhetorical ability to express their “wrong” bodies in the “right” way.
Wrong Bodies and Right Rhetoric
Existent critical and professional studies, along with numerous popular culture examples, suggest that the most effective schema for prospective patients’ con- fessional rhetoric is to claim that their current bodies are wrong, cause them psychological distress, and require the healing powers of plastic surgery to make them right again.92 This argument for scalpel psychiatry expresses the underlying belief that mental anguish can be relieved surgically by altering the body, demon- strating identification between the applicant’s desires and advertisements that prom- ise “a more harmonic relationship between your self-perception and outer image.”93
Constructed in this way, the body is viewed as the scourge and salvation of the applicant’s overall well-being. Surgical applicants articulate their wrong body claims through descriptions of the “ways in which their physical features have kept them from living ordinary lives” because their bodies are misaligned with their imagined perfection.94 Conjoining notions of a wrong and plastic body is sufficient warrant for surgical intervention and delineates the way that the right body is developed through rhetorical interaction between applicants and surgeons.
Wrong body rhetoric follows the Cartesian juxtaposition of an outer body against an inner self, as well as the hierarchy that the body should follow the mind’s will. The goal for those seeking surgery is not to find a way to accept their bodies, but to make their bodies more acceptable. Applicants argue that although they are comfort- able with their inner self and psychologically stable, their outer body gives a false and harmful impression to others and threatens their emotional health. One surgical applicant described her/his problem by saying, “I look like someone who is always pigging out on cake, but I’m not.”95 A woman seeking a rhinoplasty felt her nose made her look “like a character in an old Italian movie,” and one man feared that his facial features resembled “one of those criminal types.”96 It is common for applicants to describe troublesome body parts as “pieces of flesh which had been imposed upon [them]—inanimate and yet acting against [them].”97 Some applicants speak in terms of the strangeness of their own bodies, such as the woman who claimed that her uneven breasts made her look “half man, half woman.”98 Before her breast reduction surgery, another applicant reported feeling that her large breasts “shouldn’t be there.”99 A participant on the television program Extreme Makeover framed her body as alien in declaring of her pre-operative body: “This is not my body. What’s under my clothes is not the person I know.”100
Wrong body rhetoric enables patients to externalize their complaints while demonstrating their mental competence, as though some outside circumstance were responsible for their bodies. The origins of their body’s wrongness include forces such as fate, time, accident, and lifestyle, but the general grievance is of having an
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unduly ravaged and inappropriate body. Applicants complain about aberrant fea- tures that “ruined the rest” of their body, and seek surgical help to acquire the body they would and should have but for the influence of these other forces.101 This reasoning is exemplified in a statement by Patricia Heaton, a successful television actor and mother of four, in her justification for having plastic surgery: “I had four C-sections and my stomach looked like the map of the world. My breasts were hanging down to here from breast-feeding those babies, and my nipples were like platters. I wanted to fit into the gowns that I finally got to wear.”102 Heaton’s statement adroitly makes use of wrong body tropes. She attributes her disfigurement to surgical scarring (the C-sections) and to maternal wear-and-tear (breast-feeding), both of which portray her as a considerate and sympathetic person deserving a better body. Heaton’s surgery seems reasonable because she has done everything right in her life and yet wound up with a body unable to reap the rewards of her success. To be sure, not everyone has the personal and professional successes of a Patricia Heaton to draw on when articulating what is wrong with their body, but her example is a more extreme form of the pattern developed by plastic surgery promotions and articulated by applicants: people deserve bodies that reflect rather than inhibit their inner selves. This concept of a hidden, right body is a prominent feature of wrong body rhetoric because it enables all bodies, regardless of their current condition, to be understood as wrong but with the inherent potential to become right. Through the rhetorical confession of a wrong body, “plastic surgery becomes … not an act of deception but an attempt to align body with self” and the means by which applicants’ surgical desires are realized.103 Plastic surgery is the cure one seeks for a body that “came out wrong.”104
Articulating the body as wrong coheres with “the idea of authenticity [which] drives much of the language that patients and clients use to describe their use of enhancement technologies.”105 Surgeons themselves decree that, “The best motiv- ation [for plastic surgery] is that of achieving an outer appearance that matches the inner spirit, thereby leading to improved self-esteem and surgical satisfaction.”106 In these terms, individuals who recognize and then confess their wrong bodies are promoting health and well-being, not succumbing to narcissism. Desiring to be healthy and beautiful is discussed as a natural impulse for wrong-bodied persons, and the surgeon’s skill is called upon to expose, not impose, health and beauty by “divining the truth of the [patient’s] body—to make visible [its] invisible depths.”107
Addressing the body as a wrong surface obscuring a natural rightness transforms surgery into a revelatory, almost passive transformation: “When [surgeons] put knife to skin, it is as though they are merely tracing the lines already etched in imagin- ation—following the arcs and angles of beauty that are dormant in the subject, until one day awakened and lifted to the surface by the plastic surgeon.”108 Nature may have made the body, but plastic surgery can make it right.
A century’s worth of published patient testimonials, medical journal articles, consumer guides, commercial advertisements, and television documentaries and docudramas about plastic surgery have shaped cultural knowledge of the body’s plasticity. The implied lesson for those seeking surgical body alteration is that a
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person who appropriately confesses to a wrong body should be able to receive surgical assistance to align their physical and idealized body images. Those who are refused are either psychologically imbalanced or rhetorically deficient. In the next section, I argue that this rhetoric is challenged by amputee wannabes, who articulate their surgical desires through the same discursive frames as mainstream plastic surgery applicants but are denied surgery. Wannabes’ rhetorical efforts and their rejection by the medical community reveal the ideological constraints on the body’s plasticity and the cultural disciplining of the material and imagined body.
Limiting Plasticity: Amputation, Authority, and Acceptance
The rhetoric of wrong bodies has “constructed a pragmatic, sensible, affordable image of cosmetic surgery … [I]n it we see reflected the promise of individual transformation.”109 This promise is manifested in surgeons’ declarations that “the sound conclusion must be that there is no valid reason why anyone should be denied the boon of corrective surgery, even though they are not the victims of disease, accidents, wars, and other disasters.”110 Yet the transformations surgeons promise are not available to all who desire them. Like mainstream plastic surgery applicants, wannabes employ wrong body rhetoric in support of their surgical requests but are far less successful in satisfying surgical gatekeepers. Surgeons make a distinction between the inherent plasticity of bodies and their willingness to alter them. The farther an applicant’s desires are from socially sanctioned body images, the more reluctant surgeons are to make those desires real. Because “it is, generally, not acceptable in our culture to be disabled, let alone have an unexplained desire and want for amputation or disability,” wannabes find themselves in the oppressive position of having to prove not only their surgical worthiness but also the validity of their body alteration desires.111 Their strategies for resolving this situation focus attention on the ways in which particular body images, even before their corporeal actualization, restrict individuals’ ability to speak persuasively about their need for surgical intervention.
The primary impediment for wannabes is to convince the medical community and the general public that the elective amputation of a healthy limb will produce a healthier body. This is a particularly difficult task in a culture that is quick to associate difference from the physical norm with tragic deformity.112 “If people with disabilities are considered anything,” critics contend, “they are or have been con- sidered creatures of disorder.”113 Many popular culture texts represent amputees as villains or morally ambiguous characters who must either be subdued or socially readjusted.114 Positive portrayals of amputees usually emphasize their ability to succeed despite their “handicap.”115 Given these generally negative connotations of amputation, when a person voluntarily amputates a healthy limb, the expectation is that dire circumstances forced them to do so, such as the spelunker who amputated his arm after it became pinned under a boulder.116 Under these circumstances, even suggesting that an amputated body would be preferable to a healthy, full-limbed body would seem to contradict every tenet of cultural body logic. The public and
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medical communities resist the wannabes’ desires precisely because they create disorder, calling into question the implied norm of a whole, healthy body as well as the sanctioned uses of surgical intervention.
Further hindering the wannabes’ rhetorical efforts are publicized accounts of the extremes to which some wannabes have gone in their pursuit of amputation when denied elective amputation by surgeons. Reports describe wannabes intentionally injuring themselves so as to compel surgical amputation, such as using a shotgun to blast off a leg, submerging a limb in dry ice, severing an arm with a homemade guillotine, and illegal, often fatal, back-alley surgeries.117 These accounts paint wannabes into a rhetorical corner. They aptly demonstrate the often suicidal desperation wannabes feel at not being able to receive surgical relief from their wrong bodies and make clear that, “for at least some people with the condition, the desire for amputation is not at all trivial … [but] is so intense and all-consuming that it is ruining their lives.”118 At the same time, these stories raise serious doubts about wannabes’ mental stability and make it easier for surgeons to claim that wannabes need psychiatric rather than surgical assistance. Combating this perspec- tive requires wannabes to engage in rhetorical counter-arguments regarding their public status as surgical candidates and their private desires for bodies that will make them feel whole.
Challenging the Wholeness of the Plastic Body
The public attention given to plastic surgery discourse has made available symbolic resources for wannabes to articulate their body modification desires. Like others desiring body alteration, wannabes buy whole-heartedly into the “surgical solution” and look to the medical community to make good on its promise that wrong bodies can be corrected. Wannabes adapt wrong body arguments to emphasize in even stronger terms the incongruities between their mental body image and their corpo- real reality. Similar to mainstream plastic surgery applicants’ descriptions of a right body lurking beneath the surface of their wrong body, wannabes describe their bodies in terms of superfluous corporeality that needs to be cut away. Wannabes “view their body in a distorted way, disoriented from the way they actually present themselves. They do not like what they have as a body and want to be missing a limb.”119 One wannabe considering a below-the-knee amputation expresses this viewpoint by saying, “This part is not my part…. It is not a part of my leg, not a part of my body.”120 Other wannabes declare, “I will never feel truly whole with legs,” and, “when I see myself as a four-limbed person, I don’t feel incomplete. It’s more a matter of feeling that my body doesn’t entirely belong to me.”121 Another wannabe describes her physical body in terms of superfluous parts: “My legs are extraneous. They shouldn’t be there … it doesn’t feel right that they extend beyond where I feel my body should end…. Legs in any form are not something that feel a part of me.”122 Others identify their rhetoric even more closely with medical discourse on plastic bodies. Baz, another below-the-knee amputee, refers to his surgery as “body correction” and strives for clinical rationality in describing his
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decision, saying, “I have effectively cut my leg off. And I have therefore, to your way of thinking, mutilated myself. But to my way of thinking, what I’ve done is I’ve corrected the body that is wrong.”123
Statements like Baz’s illustrate the ways that wannabes attempt to gain acceptance for their desires by broadening the boundaries of the plastic body. Baz conveys an understanding that his actions may be troubling to others by anticipating the argument that his desire for amputation is symptomatic of some other pathology or psychosis. Drawing from plastic body tropes, he defines his body as being in need of correction even though his leg was healthy. Baz’s rhetoric is echoed by other wannabes attempting to counter the public’s sense of incongruity over their actions. Kevin, one of only two wannabes to date to have received a medically sanctioned, elective amputation, acknowledges, “The paradox is that by taking a leg away, I’m actually made more complete; I’m actually more of a person than I was before.” He offers assurances that he feels satisfied with his decision and his new body: “I’m just normal now. Whatever normal happens to be, I’m probably it. Just relaxed, comfortable, at ease.”124 The baseline for normality is not an abstract understanding of what a healthy body should be, but a rational subject’s reporting of a satisfactory unification between the mind and body, which is what surgeons advertise as the benefits of body alteration procedures. By retaining the stated goal of surgical alteration but redefining the means through which it is evaluated, wannabes attempt to persuade the public and the medical community that their desire for surgical correction is earnest, rational, and legitimate.
Wannabes further parallel mainstream plastic surgery arguments by making use of the rhetorical juxtaposition between their physical and ideal selves to redefine their desire for amputation as a rational response to a pressing need rather than a fanciful whim or mental instability. Amputees insist that they “needed to become an amputee. It was not a wish. It was a need,” and that for them living in a wrong body is “worse than death.”125 By articulating their desire for amputation as a pressing need and the corporeal body as the source of their dissatisfaction, surgical ampu- tation becomes the necessary cure for their illness. As one wannabe points out, the problem does not go away without surgery: “Just knowing it’s peculiar and saying it’s weird doesn’t do away with the problem; it’s still there. You’ve got to deal with it somehow.”126 Wannabes argue that the desire for amputation is not “alien and unwanted” because an amputated body image is “part of who they are.”127 Indeed, part of their pressing need argument is that amputation would allow them to live in the bodies they were meant to have and, as one wannabe put it, “to be myself and live honourably.”128 Such distinctions bolster their claims of mental competence by emphasizing that although they feel oppressed by their bodies, they are not slaves to bodily compulsions.
Wannabes also distinguish their need to live in “their natural body form” from a fetish, sexual or otherwise, and make clear that they would be satisfied with a single operation on a specified body part and would not request additional or continual amputation.129 Wannabes are careful to point out that they do not hate their problematic appendages, nor do they “believe they have a defect in the limb or digit,
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for which they desire amputation.” Instead, wannabes define themselves as “persons who need to have one or more healthy limbs or digits amputated to fit the way they see themselves.”130 Specificity is an integral part of wannabes’ arguments for ration- ality in that they “don’t just want to become an amputee; it’s a particular limb, a particular location.”131 Although reluctant to admit it, specificity arguments bring wannabes into alignment with what plastic surgeons “recognize as the perfect surgical candidate. These patients know what they want.”132 Demonstrating a command of their body image desires helps wannabes argue that “a healthy limb amputation is simply an extreme example of persons exercising their right to control their bodies. Surgeons and hospitals are involved only because they are the best places to get safe and tidy amputations.”133 If understood in terms of body autonomy and sanitary alteration, wannabes’ desires are not pathological but responsible choices about reshaping their own bodies.
At the same time, the specificity of wannabes’ rhetoric has potential drawbacks. Although mainstream plastic surgery applicants and wannabes make an effort to distinguish themselves from “scalpel slaves” who continually desire surgical enhance- ments and are reviled by surgeons and the public alike, arguments based on body plasticity work best when the possibility of further modification is present.134
Botched plastic surgeries can be fixed or at least smoothed out, lending credence to the notion that the body’s plasticity can be employed productively. An amputation, however, cannot be reversed, and the finality of the operation creates another obstacle for wannabes because surgeons and the public are reluctant to sanction an irrevocable course of action. Wannabes who have undergone amputation address this concern through “after” statements offered as proof of their happier, regret-free, post-operative lives. George, whose leg was amputated after a self-inflicted shotgun injury, proclaims that his actions, although admittedly drastic, allowed him to “carr[y] out the contents of a lifelong obsession that my leg should be amputated.” After the amputation, he “felt as if transformed…. Because I have realized myself…. I have become whole.” Another amputee describes the feeling of peace resulting from his operation: “The relief, the relief from the fifty years of torment that I’d had, is undescribable [sic].” Others confirm these sentiments, saying, “I felt that a huge weight had been lifted…. That this problem, this weight, had just gone, just melted away.”135 These claims are supported by research on wannabes that reports that, “The few who had managed an amputation seemed … to have made peace with their desires,” and other studies indicating that wannabes respond well to their surgery.136
Because “it is quite feasible for plastic surgeons to mark physical appearances in highly imaginative ways to disconcert, shock, or even disgust others,” the question of whether surgically to alter a healthy body becomes one of rhetorical, rather than technological, efficacy.137 Wannabes’ rhetorical strategies focus on redefining the plastic body to include their notion of a whole body. By aligning their rhetoric with that of mainstream surgery applicants and by offering counter-arguments to the anticipated objections of physicians and the general public, wannabes attempt to gain sympathy and sanction for their body alteration desires. They acknowledge that their requests may appear unusual but argue that they are fundamentally similar to
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the surgeries that millions of other people undergo every year to satisfy similar body modification desires. If surgeons are willing and able to administer scalpel psychiatry in order to achieve cosmetic well-being, then surely it must be acceptable to use the same techniques to grant a tormented person a whole body. Wannabes’ bodies, both as discursive invention and post-amputation substance, are arguments for expanding the concept of the plastic body in which surgeons and society have already invested much of their hopes for personal fulfillment.
Reaction from the Medical Community
Ultimately, wannabes’ quest is to prompt surgeons and society to regard elective amputations as acceptable body alteration desires. During his interview in the documentary Whole, Baz states this goal by looking directly into the camera and saying,
I want you to accept that this condition exists, and that the only way that it can be sorted out is by surgery, by removing the part that that person believes should not be there. And only then can those people be given peace. And, if they’re anything like me, only then can they be given the opportunity to get on with life.138
These pleas have reached a few doctors who have begun to address wannabes sympathetically as legitimate surgical applicants. Dr. Michael First expresses this attitude when he characterizes wannabes as “regular people just like you and I, except they have this one thing going on, and that doesn’t make them crazy.” He goes on to say,
I’m very struck by the amount of suffering. I mean, the people who have it are really, really suffering. As a physician and a psychiatrist it’s my main goal in life to relieve suffering and this is certainly an area where there’s suffering and there’s virtually no answer for these people.139
If one grants that wannabes’ requests stem from an earnest body image complaint, then First’s statements may be understood as tentative acknowledgment of the effectiveness of their rhetorical strategies. He responds to wannabes as ill patients with wrong bodies in need of surgical relief, demonstrating at the very least that such an identification is possible, if not popular.
Doctors like First are a minority, however. Although physicians wish to help wannabes resolve body image issues, particularly without resorting to self-inflicted wounding, most are unconvinced that granting amputations on request is the best method for doing so and admittedly are “baffled by the desire for amputation.”140
Doctors are skeptical of wannabes’ claims and prefer to interpret their desires as symptoms of other psychological conditions, such as childhood neglect or sexual perversion.141 Displacing the origin of the wannabes’ distress from the body and onto the mind also enables surgeons to distance themselves and their medical specialty from these discussions, although this contradicts the Cartesian dualism underlying mainstream justifications for plastic surgery. In medical journals, surgeons advise each other that “amputee wannabes should be encouraged to seek help not from
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surgeons, but from psychiatrists and other mental health professionals.”142 Most surgeons express reluctance even to consider elective amputation until further study and evaluation of the condition has provided clear legal and medical guidelines for treatment.143 Some surgeons have reacted with hostility, chasing wannabes out of their offices upon hearing their amputation requests.144 The amount and type of public attention given to wannabes only adds to surgeons’ reluctance as some have begun to feel the weight of political pressure within their communities. Upon hearing of a surgeon who performed elective amputations on wannabes, a politician called for an official inquiry into the operations and surgical staff, saying, “I find it almost incredible that any reputable surgeon would amputate a perfectly healthy limb.”145 Wannabes’ expressions of their desires have marked them as dangerous and untouchable patients by surgeons and civic leaders alike.
Press reports describing two elective amputation surgeries also illustrate the ways that wannabes are positioned as risky patients who threaten a surgeon’s medical and public standing. The negative characterization of wannabes is evident from the opening summary of events: “A surgeon in Scotland amputated the legs of two psychologically disturbed men who had nothing physically wrong with them but felt a ‘desperate’ need to be amputees.”146 Although factually accurate, the manner in which the wannabes are framed casts doubt on the medical veracity of their illness. Pairing “psychologically disturbed” with “nothing physically wrong” diminishes the possibility of a rational connection between their bodies and their mental anguish. The key term, “desperate,” is set in quotation marks to mark it as a special, non-medical use of the term. This implies that the wannabes’ need is not a typical surgical need and calls into question the surgeon’s reasons for proceeding with the operations. By making it clear that the surgeon consented to amputate only after consulting with psychiatrists regarding the patients’ mental condition, the doctor’s reputation is saved, and he is portrayed as a mindful gatekeeper forced into a troubling decision by these patients.147 The surgeon is then defined nobly as “willing to risk international notoriety to put [each patient] out of his intense emotional pain,” implying that the patients are to be blamed should this surgeon fall into disrepute for having selflessly carried out his humanitarian duty.148 The surgeries are described as successful, but only because it is the surgeon, not the patients, who is satisfied with the outcome, reinforcing the surgeon’s authority over the body’s plasticity and hinting that the patients’ self-evaluations cannot be trusted. “At the end of the day,” the surgeon is quoted as saying, “I have no doubt that what I was doing was the correct thing for those patients.”149 Even though this particular surgeon is sympathetic to the wannabes, these accounts illustrate the rhetorical obstacles that other wannabes face in securing understanding from the medical community and the public, and are warnings to those within the medical com- munity that wannabes bring with them a host of risks in addition to the actual surgery and that a decision to operate will likely face intense public scrutiny.
The difficulty for surgeons, even those who may be sympathetic to the wannabes’ plight, is that elective amputation does not fit readily into traditional body improve- ment schemas, such as the “healthy beauty” achieved through plastic surgery, but
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instead directly contrasts with their understanding of the purpose of surgical correction. Given the strictures of medical ideology, it is difficult for surgeons to believe that amputating healthy limbs could produce a healthier body.150 Surgeons also lack medical precedent for this extreme procedure and are reluctant to set a new precedent with amputees. Even sex reassignment surgery, a once taboo subject that is now discussed in the medical community with relative openness and ease, and is mentioned frequently as a possible analogy for understanding wannabes’ desires, has had little influence on making surgeons more amenable to wannabes’ requests.151
Analogies between sex reassignment applicants and wannabes are dismissed by doctors who argue, “The notion that a [wannabe] is a ‘disabled person trapped in a nondisabled body’ is difficult to justify, there being no ‘naturally-occurring’ state of disability that would correspond to the two naturally-occurring genders.”152
According to this perspective, just as bodies are naturally inclined to be either male or female, bodies are also naturally inclined to be fully-abled, which in this context means having all of one’s limbs. To make the body less than whole is therefore an irrational objective, that jeopardizes the body’s natural disposition. In medical journals and press interviews, physicians inform the public and warn each other that granting elective amputations would place the body in a non-natural state and constitute an improper use of surgical skill.153 By basing their objections on an understanding of a perfect, healthy, natural body as the productive goal of any medical procedure, surgeons avoid speaking out against colleagues who perform mainstream plastic surgeries. They also avoid contradicting previous statements by surgeons about their abilities to triumph over nature because plastic surgery makes otherwise healthy bodies happier and whole, and receive tacit approval from politicians, the medical community, and mainstream body image consumers. For surgeons seeking direction on the issue, the choice between supporting or avoiding wannabes seems a foregone conclusion.
Although clearly not intended to do so, the negative and often unsympathetic reactions to wannabes by the medical community ultimately may reinforce wan- nabes’ belief that their cause would be aided by further rhetorical efforts that address their skeptics. The perception seems to be that, “If wannabes can convince the medical profession that … they suffer from a mental disorder appropriately reme- died by surgery[,] then the courts might consider healthy limb amputations to be legally permissible.”154 This belief has prompted wannabes to speak publicly about their condition and need for surgery, sparking debate and raising awareness of the issue, and emphasizing the importance of understanding the rhetorical underpin- nings of the plastic body in contemporary culture. Wannabes seem to draw inspiration from body rhetoric scholars who observe that, although “the body has thus far remained colonized through the discursive practices of the natural sciences, particularly the discourses of biology and medicine,” there are avenues for rhetorical redefinition and material change. “Although these may represent dominant models for understanding corporeality, they are not incontestable. They may be challenged and superseded by other conceptions.”155 When wannabes argue that amputation is not mutilation but the “correction of a ‘mutilation’—the conversion to what they
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regard as their correct body image,” they are seeking access to the already established and available surgical techniques that “would allow them to become their true selves.”156 This is a promise that surgeons offer to the general public in the form of socially sanctioned cosmetic augmentation. Wannabes are a reminder of the reality that only the chosen few are able to pass through the rhetorical gates of medical discretion based on their narrowly defined concept of a proper plastic body. At the same time, the rhetorical efforts of wannabes are reaching a few sympathetic ears within the medical community and the general public, which may encourage a reconsideration of what counts as a whole body and the role of surgery in helping persons to resolve their body image complaints in an era in which bodies are viewed as plastic.
Conclusion
This analysis sheds light on the role that rhetoric plays in defining and reshaping the human body in a plastic surgery culture. In analyzing plastic surgery discourse, it has not been my intent to argue against imposing any limits on technological, particu- larly surgical, alterations of the human body. Rather, my aim has been to listen empathetically to all aspects of this discursive nexus to discern the possibilities and contradictions involved in the different positions advocated.157 Listening empatheti- cally to the confessional rhetorics of surgical applicants, including wannabes, and to the official and commercial pronouncements of the medical community, makes visible the ways in which bodily plasticity is redefining personal identity and its corporeal performance. This discourse illustrates the ways that bodies are being produced by complex cultural ideologies in addition to technological evolution and conceptions of beauty rampant in popular culture, threatening to turn individuals into surgical automatons. Only when we understand the ways that plastic bodies are rhetorically produced and negotiated can we claim to understand their cultural functions and effects on individual lives and bodies.
“If bodies are objects or things, they are like no others,” critics contend, “for they are the centers of perspective, insight, reflection, desire, agency.”158 I have argued in this essay that the cultural definition of the plastic body is produced rhetorically through a contentious amalgamation of individual desire, cultural knowledge, and institutional disciplining. Although the fulfillment of body image desires is a much heralded and carefully constructed feature of plastic surgery discourse, including those messages coming from the medical community, this plasticity is available only to those who fit within a particular ideological perspective on what constitutes an appropriate body. If “[d]efinitions describe the world, but they do so prescriptively,” then we should expect to find examples of those who, by definition, violate these prescriptions.159 In the case of surgical enhancement, the ways in which the appli- cant’s body is defined give hope to many who feel their bodies are not as they should be, but also leave many others dissatisfied and frustrated when surrounded by messages about a possible cure that they cannot access. Those who challenge this definition of a healthy and whole body risk personal scrutiny, institutional marginal-
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ization, and, in many instances, public condemnation. This risk extends to appli- cants and physicians and illustrates the limitations placed on who can speak about body plasticity and how they can speak about it. What is revealed is that the body may be plastic, but the ideology informing its cultural production is less so.
The surgically modified body embodies cultural notions of physical health and beauty, ownership of the self, and physical appropriateness. For this reason surgeons are wary of granting atypical requests. The bodies on which they operate become medical testimony to the plasticity of bodies and their acceptable alterations. A surgeon’s decision to grant or refuse a request for surgical alteration necessarily becomes a public statement regarding the entelechy of the human form as well as a response to an individual applicant. Consequently, when wannabes challenge the scope of plasticity, they are arguing not only for their individual rights to their own bodies and psychological well-being, but they also are redefining how the body is known and understood in society. Wannabes argue that if the psychological goal of healing the mind through resculpting the body is the aim of plastic surgery, then that promise should hold for any image of the body, even those which fall outside the traditional aesthetic boundaries.
To be sure, not every request for surgical alteration should be granted. At the same time, a rhetorical analysis of the ways that the definition of a wrong body is constructed and maintained by the medical community raises the possibility that some who might benefit from surgery may never receive it. Even for those whose desires fit within the acceptable parameters of correcting a wrong body, the process of acquiring surgical enhancement can be an embarrassing ordeal that contradicts the picture of easy acquisition and personal empowerment portrayed through surgeons’ public statements. This is a troubling circumstance and suggests that current methods of surgical gatekeeping would benefit from rethinking, as would the ways in which plastic surgery is marketed as an uncomplicated solution to individual body image concerns. Furthermore, requiring surgical enhancement desires to be couched in terms of individual psychology is not only demeaning, but ultimately paradoxical. If psychological distress is the primary requirement for being granted surgical relief, then wannabes seemingly would have no trouble demonstrating their need for surgery. These individuals exhibit obvious psychological anguish stemming from a difficulty in resolving their mental and physical body images, but their requests, expressed in language nearly identical to mainstream plastic surgery patients, are rejected because the body they seek to produce does not accord with the current medical thinking about a healthy and whole body. Yet applicants desiring shorter toes or prettier belly-buttons are deemed to have the proper motivation. Psychological distress is not the primary requirement for plastic surgery; it is merely its public excuse.
Although it is important to understand how cultural standards of body image pressure individuals toward normative alterations, it is equally important to recog- nize that these cultural norms are shifting as a result of rhetorical, political, and technological influences. Recent developments in surgical body alteration, such as the Botox phenomenon and numerous designer cosmetic surgeries, suggest that
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plastic surgery’s rhetorical and corporeal visibility in the public sphere will only be enhanced, with the likely result that an increasing number of people will look to surgical alteration as the means to acquire the bodies they desire. Even if there is little horizontal expansion of the meaning of the plastic body and its appropriate surgical enhancement, the vertical extension of current definitions of the healthy body continues to push the boundaries of the “natural” body. Indications of such extension are expressed in the concerns of genetics scholars who point to logics stemming from plastic surgery’s advocacy of a better body as influencing arguments that genetic engineering might produce a better baby, and “scientists have already begun rewriting the genetic body-text through the manipulation of genes.”160 The argument is premised on the notion that if scalpel psychiatry is socially sanctioned for adults with body image issues, then it would be even better to genetically engineer a perfect baby who would never have to deal with these issues.161 Although a host of issues currently prevents this notion from becoming a reality, that it can be mentioned as a possibility demonstrates the extent to which body plasticity has permeated cultural thinking about the human body and is a call for further inquiry into ideologies informing the public’s knowledge of the human body and how this knowledge is articulated. It is likely that we will see more public arguments about the plasticity of the human body at all its life stages and the role medical science will play in its development. As researchers contend, “enhancement technologies, whatever their putative benefits and demonstrated risks, will have significant space in our future.”162
Notes
[1] See Margo Demello, Bodies of Inscription: A Cultural History of the Modern Tattoo Community (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Armando R. Favazza, Bodies Under Siege: Self-Mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Kim Hewitt, Mutilating the Body: Identity in Blood and Ink (Madison, WI: Popular Press, 1997); Victoria Pitts, In the Flesh: The Cultural Politics of Body Modification (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Jennifer González, “The Appended Subject: Race and Identity as Digital Assemblage,” in Race in Cyberspace, eds. Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman (New York: Routledge, 2000), 27–50; and John W. Jordan, “(Ad)Dressing the Body in Online Shopping Sites,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 20 (2003): 248–268.
[2] Surgical augmentation procedures are known by a variety of names: plastic surgery, cosmetic surgery, reconstructive surgery, aesthetic surgery, and others. Each describes non-vital surgical intervention primarily for aesthetic purposes. Throughout this essay, I use the term “plastic surgery” as a general descriptor of these augmentation procedures. I take my cue from the several medical, academic, and popular texts that use the term “plastic surgery” as an umbrella term for the other augmentation techniques. The American Society for Plastic Surgeons, for instance, places cosmetic and reconstructive surgeries under the heading of “plastic surgery,” and emphasized this usage when in 1999 the organization changed its official name from “The American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons” to “The American Society of Plastic Surgeons.” See “History of Plastic Surgery, ASPS and PSEF,” http://www.plasticsurgery.org/History.cfm; Michael Ciaschini and Steven L. Bernard, “History of Plastic Surgery,” http://www.emedicine.com/plastic/topic433.htm;
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and Elizabeth Haiken, Venus Envy: A History of Cosmetic Surgery (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 4.
[3] Virginia L. Blum, Flesh Wounds: The Culture of Cosmetic Surgery (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 52. On the history of medical perspectives on the body’s malleability, see Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception (New York: Vintage, 1973/1994); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1977/1979), 135–194; Tony Hunt, The Medieval Surgery (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1999); and Barbara Maria Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 47–129. Haiken’s Venus Envy is a history of corporeal malleability specific to U.S. plastic surgery.
[4] Carole Spitzack, “The Confession Mirror: Plastic Images for Surgery,” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 13 (1988): 40.
[5] See Kate Kelly and Shelly Branch, “Agony of the Feet: If the Shoe Fits, What’s the Point?” Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2003, A1; Clive Thompson, “The Year in Ideas; Umbili- coplasty,” New York Times, 15 December 2002, 131; Lynda Gorov, “The Latest Fad from La-La Land: A ‘Designer Vagina’,” Boston Globe, 23 August 1999, C1; and Jon Stratton, The Desirable Body: Cultural Fetishism and the Erotics of Consumption (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 128–9.
[6] James Kavanagh defines ideology as “a social process that works on and through every social subject,” and shapes human understanding and meaning making; I use the terms “ideology” and “ideological” in that sense. As John M. Sloop explains, ideology “refers to the process by which knowledge of self and of the world is created, maintained, and assumed.” Different people, institutions, and communities can participate in and generate ideological perspectives on a given subject, and these perspectives often interact in the public sphere. Some rhetorical scholars, such as Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, have written about “ideological rhetoric” that “helps shape and order the cultural meaning” of social institutions, concepts, and artifacts. In Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, “The West Wing’s Prime-Time Presidentiality: Mimesis and Catharsis in a Postmodern Ro- mance,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88 (2002): 209. See James H. Kavanagh, “Ideology,” in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 311; and John M. Sloop, “Ideology,” in Unspun: Key Concepts for Understanding the World Wide Web, ed. Thomas Swiss (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000), 88
[7] Josephine Johnston and Carl Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation: Ethical and Legal Aspects,” Clinical Medicine 2 (2002): 431.
[8] On the importance of textual assemblage to rhetorical criticism, see Raymie E. McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Communication Monographs 56 (1989): 101.
[9] Rhetorical criticism is well-suited to discussing the ways in which symbolic and material borders influence public action. As Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop argue, rhetoric shifts the ideological positions of borders, “changing what they mean publicly, influencing public policy, altering the ways borders affect people…. Rhetoric shapes understandings of how the border functions; taken further, because of its increasingly powerful role, rhetoric at times even determines where, and what, the border is.” See Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop, Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California’s Proposition 187 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 5.
[10] Wallace H. J. Chang, “Plastic Surgery—A Brief Perspective,” in Fundamentals of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, ed. Wallace H. J. Chang (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1980), 3. See also Haiken, Venus Envy, 5.
[11] Thomas C. Shevory, Body/Politics: Studies in Reproduction, Production, and (Re)Construction (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 175; Marilyn Yalom, A History of the Breast (New York: Ballantine, 1997), 159.
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[12] As Thomas J. Darwin points out, “The way a body is articulated in a given paradigm of healing has direct entailments for the treatment of patients.… [A] paradigm of medicine or healing must ground itself in a coherent rhetoric of the body which explains how the body works, what the nature of disease is, and thus how best to care for the body.” Thomas J. Darwin, “Intelligent Cells and the Body as Conversation: The Democratic Rhetoric of Mindbody Medicine,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 35.
[13] Plastic surgery is a ubiquitious discursive phenomenon in contemporary culture, constitut- ing the primary topic of several television shows, books, and the lead stories of many popular press magazines. See Domeena C. Renshaw, “Body Dysmorphia, the Plastic Surgeon and the Psychiatrist,” Psychiatric Times (July 2003): 64.
[14] See Adalbert G. Bettman, “Plastic and Cosmetic Surgery of the Face,” Aesthetic Plastic Surgery 12 (1920/1988): 5; Jennifer Herendeen Brown, “The History of Plastic Surgery: From Ancient India to Modern America,” Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons 71 (1986): 21; and Ciaschini and Bernard, “History of Plastic Surgery.”
[15] Quoted in Deborah A. Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery: The Cutting Edge of Commercial Medicine in America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 35.
[16] Tagliacozzi’s exuberance was viewed by the Roman Catholic Church as heretical effrontery, and after his death his corpse was exhumed and reburied in unconsecrated ground as a sign of his disgrace. Brown, “The History of Plastic Surgery,” 22.
[17] One individual who confounds this narrative, mentioned in the American Society of Plastic Surgeon’s history, is Dr. John Peter Mettauer, who in 1827 performed the first cleft palate surgery in the United States, using surgical instruments he had made. He seems to have been isolated in his accomplishments, as the next moment discussed in the ASPS history is World War I, which is acknowledged as the moment when plastic surgery became legitimized. See “History of Plastic Surgery, ASPS and PSEF.”
[18] See Haiken, Venus Envy, 44–90. [19] Haiken, Venus Envy, 259. Gardner notes that some medical practitioners attempted to
develop means for restoring physical appearance, such as surgical repairs and specialized prosthetics, but their efforts were not widespread. See Kristen E. Gardner, “Hiding the Scars: History of Breast Prostheses after Mastectomy since 1945” in Beauty and Business: Commerce, Gender, and Culture in Modern America, ed. Philip Scranton (New York: Routledge, 2001), 310.
[20] Peter A. Adamson and Warren M. Kraus, “Management of Patient Dissatisfaction with Cosmetic Surgery,” Facial Plastic Surgery 11 (1995): 102.
[21] Foucault argues that the medical gaze is not reductive, ignoring elements of a subject until it finds an essential core; instead, it is a generative capacity that produces the body as a whole subject that admits to no other epistemological possibilities. It is the sole means by which patients’ bodies become visible, and therefore knowable, to medicine. In order for surgeons to see the body differently, their knowledge of the body itself must be changed. See Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, xiv.
[22] See Robert M. Goldwyn, “Forward,” in Fundamentals of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, ed. Wallace H. J. Chang (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1980), viii; and Haiken, Venus Envy, 259.
[23] “History of Plastic Surgery, ASPS and PSEF.” See also Haiken, Venus Envy, 15, 29–43; and Sheila M. Rothman and David J. Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection: The Promise and Perils of Medical Enhancement (New York: Pantheon, 2003), 103-4.
[24] Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery, 40. [25] Charles Illingworth, “Forward,” in Ian A. McGregor, Fundamental Techniques of Plastic
Surgery and Their Surgical Applications (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1965), v. [26] Illingworth, “Forward,” v. As Gilman points out, disreputable knowledge often gains
legitimation by adopting a “more complex and ‘scientific’” rhetorical style. See Sander L. Gilman, Making the Body Beautiful: A Cultural History of Aesthetic Surgery (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 11.
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[27] The first line in the American Society of Plastic Surgeons’ “History of Plastic Surgery” states that “Mankind’s [sic] essential nature entails self-improvement.… Because human beings have always sought self-fulfillment through self-improvement, plastic surgery—improving and restoring form and function—may be one of the world’s oldest healing arts.” This history significantly omits references to outlaw surgeries in ancient India as well as the 19th century quack doctors, offering instead a linear narrative of enlightened scientific progress. See “History of Plastic Surgery, ASPS and PSEF.” An additional example demonstrates plastic surgery’s rhetorical legitimization within medicine. The same hubristic rhetoric that warranted Tagliacozzi’s desecration has been reframed as a progressive statement about individual entitlement and the plastic surgeon’s desire and capacity to do good works. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons displays Tagliacozzi’s (in)famous quotation, cited previously, as the introduction to their informational webpage on reconstructive surgery techniques. See “Reconstructive Surgery,” http://www.plasticsurgery.org/public education/ procedures/ReconstructiveSurgery.cfm.
[28] Kathy Davis, Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery (New York: Routledge, 1995), 16.
[29] Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery, 45. [30] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 18. [31] Lois Mattox Miller, “Surgery’s Cinderella,” Independent Woman (July 1939): 202. [32] Gilman, Making the Body Beautiful, 294. [33] Carl Elliot, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: W.
W. Norton and Co., 2003), 47. [34] Shevory, Body/Politics, 171. [35] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 28–9. [36] Debra L. Gimlin, Body Work: Beauty and Self-Image in American Culture (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), 78. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS) estimates that 6.6 million people underwent cosmetic enhancement procedures (both surgical and non-surgical) in 2002, and paid fees in excess of seven billion dollars. Although the majority of these procedures, 4.9 million, were non-surgical (such as Botox injections and chemical peels), 1.6 million people had surgical cosmetic procedures, an increase from 2001. The top five surgical procedures were nose reshaping, liposuction, breast augmen- tation, eyelid surgery, and facelift. The trend over the past decade shows a significant increase in the number of plastic surgeries performed. From 1992–2002, the number of people who had plastic surgery nearly tripled, the number of breast augmentation surgeries increased sevenfold, and liposuctions quadrupled. The ASPS tracks only those procedures performed by member plastic surgeons, making a comprehensive account of the total number of cosmetic surgical procedures virtually impossible to obtain. See American Society of Plastic Surgeons, “National Clearinghouse of Plastic Surgery Statistics,” http:// www.plasticsurgery.org/public education/statistical trends 92to01.cfm.
[37] Elizabeth Grosz defines Cartesian duality in the context of the body as “the assumption that there are two distinct, mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive substances, mind and body, each of which inhabits its own self-contained sphere.” She also points out that this duality favors the mind as the superior partner that dominates the body. See Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 6.
[38] Gilman, Making the Body Beautiful, 270. [39] See Anne Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge: Cosmetic Surgery and the Technological
Production of the Gendered Body,” Camera Obscura 28 (1993): 207–37; Blum, Flesh Wounds; Susan Bordo, “‘Material Girl’: The Effacements of Postmodern Culture,” Michigan Quarterly Review 29 (1990): 653–77; Gimlin, Body Work; Kathryn Pauly Morgan, “Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s Bodies,” Hypatia 6 (1991): 25–53; Spitzack, “The Confession Mirror” and Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty are Used Against Women (New York: William Morrow, 1991).
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[40] Nathan Stormer, “Embodied Humanism: Performative Argument for Natural Rights in ‘The Solitude of the Self’,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 51.
[41] On the difficulty of communicating bodily trauma as a source for rhetorical articulations of the body, see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 161–80.
[42] Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), 5.
[43] Gerard A. Hauser, “Incongruous Bodies: Arguments for Personal Sufficiency and Public Insufficiency,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 1; Kevin Michael DeLuca, “Unruly Arguments: The Body Rhetoric of Earth First!, Act Up, and Queer Nation,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 10. See also Davis W. Houck and Amos Kiewe, FDR’s Body Politics: The Rhetoric of Disability (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 4; and James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, “Disability, Rhetoric, and the Body” in Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in Language and Culture, ed. James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001), 2–4.
[44] DeLuca, “Unruly Arguments,” 10. [45] Hauser, “Incongruous Bodies,” 2; DeLuca, “Unruly Arguments,” 20. [46] DeLuca, “Unruly Arguments,” 12. See also Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women:
The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 298. [47] Darwin, “Intelligent Cells,” 35. [48] Hauser, “Incongruous Bodies,” 5. [49] Donald C. Bryant, “Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 39
(1953): 413. [50] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 271. [51] Andrew Herman, The “Better Angels” of Capitalism: Rhetoric, Narrative, and Moral Identity
among Men of the American Upper Class (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 6. [52] Vincent Mosco, “Webs of Myth and Power: Connectivity and the New Computer Technop-
olis,” in The World Wide Web and Contemporary Cultural Theory, ed. Andrew Herman and Thomas Swiss (New York: Routledge, 2000), 42.
[53] Christine L. Harold, “Tracking Heroin Chic: The Abject Body Reconfigures the Rational Argument,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 66.
[54] Grosz, Volatile Bodies, xiii. [55] As my concern is the public representations of plastic body rhetoric, my sources for
statements from surgeons, patients, and other members of the discursive community are taken from published or publicly available texts.
[56] See Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery, 131–54. [57] Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge,” 216; Blum, Flesh Wounds, 83. [58] Adalbert G. Bettman, “Plastic and Cosmetic Surgery of the Face,” Aesthetic Plastic Surgery
12 (1920/1988): 5, 7. [59] Quoted in Morgan, “Women and the Knife,” 31. [60] Gimlin, Body Work, 74; Mary Ruth Wright, “The Elective Surgeon’s Reaction to Change and
Conflict” in Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery of the Head and Neck, Vol. 1: Aesthetic Surgery, ed. Paul H. Ward and Walter E. Berman (St. Louis, MO: C. V. Mosby Co., 1984), 525.
[61] James W. Smith and Samm Sinclair Baker, “Doctor, Make Me Beautiful!” (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), 16, 3; Morgan, “Women and the Knife,” 32.
[62] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 272. [63] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 52; quoted in Blum, 4. [64] Renshaw, “Body Dysmorphia,” 64. [65] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 275. [66] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 106. [67] Smith and Baker, “Doctor, Make Me Beautiful!”, 14.
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[68] Bordo, “Material Girl,” 656, 657. [69] Goldwyn, “Forward,” vii. [70] Renshaw, “Body Dysmorphia,” 64. [71] David Silverman. Communication and Medical Practice: Social Relations in the Clinic
(London: Sage, 1987), 162. [72] Michael A. Bolton, Thomas Pruzinsky, Thomas F. Cash, and John A. Persing, “Measuring
Outcomes in Plastic Surgery: Body Image and Quality of Life in Abdominoplasty Patients,” Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, 112 (2003): 619.
[73] Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, 8. [74] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 2. [75] Goldwyn, “Forward,” vii. [76] Adamson and Kraus, “Management of Patient Dissatisfaction with Cosmetic Surgery,” 99. [77] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 13. [78] Gimlin, Body Work, 11. See also Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge,” 209; and Blum, Flesh
Wounds, 275. [79] Gimlin, Body Work, 78. [80] Bolton et al., “Measuring Outcomes in Plastic Surgery,” 619. [81] Renshaw, “Body Dysmorphia,” 64. [82] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 291. [83] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 274. [84] One role science plays in society is that of educator, using rhetorical communication not
only to translate science into everyday language but also to communicate scientific values about how the world ought to be and how people should comport themselves. See Thomas Lessl, “The Priestly Voice,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 75 (1989): 183–97.
[85] See Spitzack, “The Confession Mirror.” [86] See Bolton et al., “Measuring Outcomes in Plastic Surgery.” [87] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 72. [88] Spitzack, “The Confession Mirror,” 39. [89] Elliot, Better than Well, 13. [90] See Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge,” 216; and Haiken, Venus Envy, 6. [91] Gimlin, Body Work, 81. See also S. Anthony Wolf, John W. Devine, Jr., and D. Ralph
Millard, Jr., “Cosmetic Surgery,” in Fundamentals of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, ed. Wallace H. J. Chang (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1980), 262. Foucault also notes that medicine historically has used psychiatric considerations as a means to police “public hygiene.” Michel Foucault, Abnormal (New York: Picador, 2003), 199. These warnings, although medically and legally prudent, contradict surgeons’ self-proclaimed egalitarianism and reassert their own authority over an applicant’s body.
[92] Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery, 64. [93] Quoted in Blum, Flesh Wounds, 72. [94] Gimlin, Body Work, 97. [95] Quoted in Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 71. [96] Quoted in Sanjay Gupta, “Ethnic Makeovers,” Time (6 October 2003): 88; quoted in Davis,
Reshaping the Female Body, 71. [97] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 74. [98] Quoted in Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 77. [99] Quoted in Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 77.
[100] Quoted in Extreme Makeover, ABC Television, September 18, 2003. Chuck Bangert, Lou Gorfain, and Howard Schultz, producers.
[101] Davis, Reshaping the Female Body, 76. [102] Quoted in “Nipped, Tucked, Talking,” People (1 September 2003): 102. See also Patricia
Heaton, Motherhood and Hollywood: How to Get a Job Like Mine (New York: Villard, 2002), 157–158.
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[103] Gimlin, Body Work, 95. [104] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 2. [105] Elliot, Better than Well, 30. [106] Adamson and Kraus, “Management of Patient Dissatisfaction with Plastic Surgery,” 100. [107] Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge,” 209. [108] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 38. For some surgeons, the yearning to resculpt seems almost
compulsory. During an interview, one surgeon suggested that the researcher should have plastic surgery because “the skin you were meant to have is buried underneath the surface and unfortunately people cannot see it.” See Spitzack, “The Confession Mirror,” 47.
[109] Haiken, Venus Envy, 300. [110] Smith and Baker, “Doctor, Make Me Beautiful!”, 17. [111] Gregg M. Furth and Robert Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder: Information, Questions,
Answers, and Recommendations about Self-Demand Amputation (Bloomington, IN: 1st Books, 2002), 66. I draw my use of the notion of “oppression” from Butler’s argument that “discourse becomes oppressive when it requires that the speaking subject, in order to speak, participate in the very terms of that oppression—that is, take for granted the speaking subject’s own impossibility or unintelligibility.” See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 116.
[112] See Renshaw, “Body Dysmorphia,” 64; and Sarah S. Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis Trope,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 24 (1999): 31–54.
[113] Lennard J. Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body (New York: Verso, 1995), 143.
[114] See Paul K. Longmore, “Screening Stereotypes: Images of Disabled People in Television and Motion Pictures,” in Images of the Disabled, Disabling Images, ed. Alan Gartner and Tom Joe (New York: Praeger, 1987), 66–72.
[115] See Bruce Feldman, “Amputee Parry Makes Historic Return,” ABCNews.com, http://abc- news.go.com/sections/sports/DailyNews/ESPNFeature1.html?0919855; and Katherine M. Skiba, “Optimism Sustains Local Soldier Who Lost Legs,” JSOnline.com, http:// www.jsonline.com/news/state/sep03/167076.asp.
[116] See “Lessons Learned,” ABCNews.com, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/GMA/US/ climber 030608.html.
[117] See Whole, produced and directed by Melody Gilbert, Frozen Feet Productions, 2003. James H. Burnett III, “South Side Man Uses Homemade Guillotine to Sever Arm,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7 October 1999, 3; and Jennifer Trueland, “Investigation After Limbs Amputated on Demand,” The Scotsman, 31 January 2000, 1.
[118] Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 432. See also Cherry Norton, “Disturbed Patients Have Healthy Limbs Amputated,” The Independent, 1 February 2000, 13; and Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 6.
[119] Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 29. See also Richard L. Bruno, “Devotees, Pretenders and Wannabes,” Sexuality and Disability 15 (1997): 257.
[120] Quoted in Whole. All quotations from the documentary Whole were obtained from a transcription made by the author from a videotape copy of the original film.
[121] Quoted in Elliot, Better than Well, 213; quoted in Whole. [122] Quoted in “Complete Obsession,” BBCi, http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/1999/obses-
sion script.shtml. [123] Quoted in Whole. [124] Quoted in Whole. [125] Quoted in Whole; Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 44. [126] Quoted in Whole. [127] Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 432.
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[128] Quoted in John Money, “Paraphilia in Females: Fixation on Amputation and Lameness; Two Personal Accounts,” Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 3 (1990): 167.
[129] Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 68. See also Richard L. Bruno, “Devotees, Pretenders and Wannabes: Two Cases of Factitious Disability Disorder,” Sexuality and Disability, 15 (1997): 257.
[130] Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 5. [131] Quoted in Whole. [132] Blum, Flesh Wounds, 280. [133] Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 433. [134] See Balsamo, “On the Cutting Edge,” 220–1; Bordo, “Material Girl,” 656; Davis, Reshaping
the Female Body, 5; and Sullivan, Cosmetic Surgery, 65. [135] Quoted in Whole. [136] Elliot, Better than Well, 216. See also Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 30–35;
and Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 431. [137] Shevory, Body/Politics, 194. [138] Quoted in Whole. [139] Quoted in Whole. [140] Elliot, Better than Well, 209; see also Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 74. [141] The condition is frequently referred to by medical specialists as either “body dysmorphic
disorder,” which is a harmful psychological fixation on a particular body part that the person feels is defective or deformed, or “apotemnophilia,” which describes individuals who desire to have a body part amputated, although usually for reasons of sexual gratification. See Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 5; Elliot, Better than Well, 209–10. Those who have studied the phenomenon argue that neither term is particularly apt as a descriptor for the wannabes’ condition. Similarly, the use of the term “apotemnophile,” although common in the literature, has been criticized because of its connotations of sexual disorder or fixation, such as its closely related term “acrotomophilia,” which is used to describe those who have a sexual attraction to amputees. See Elliot, Better than Well, 210; Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 431; and John Money, Russell Jobaris, and Gregg Furth, “Apotemnophilia: Two Cases of Self-Demand Amputation as a Paraphilia,” Journal of Sex Research 13 (1977): 115–25. Popular press accounts often conflate the two without discussing the possibility of desiring amputation for non-sexual reasons. See Tracey Lawson, “Therapist Praises Doctor’s ‘Bravery’,” The Scotsman, 1 February 2000, 11. Because of these associations, some have offered alternative terms to describe the phenomenon, such as “body integrity identity disorder” and “amputee identity disorder.” In the existent literature, however, the more accepted linguistic path has been a redefinition of apotemnophilia to describe “a syndrome in which individuals believe they belong in a body that is missing a limb or a digit, or, in other words, a body different from their four normal limbs.” See Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, v, 29.
[142] Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 434. [143] See Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 432; Pennie Taylor, “’My Left Foot
Was Not Part of Me’,” The Observer, 6 February 2000, 14. [144] Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 43. [145] Quoted in Norton, “Disturbed Patients have Healthy Limbs Amputated,” 13. [146] Clare Dyer, “Surgeon Amputated Healthy Legs,” British Medical Journal 320 (5 February
2000): 332. [147] See Taylor, “ ‘My Left Foot Was Not Part of Me’,” 14; Trueland, “Investigation After Limbs
Amputated on Demand,” 1. [148] Taylor, “My Left Foot Was Not Part of Me’,” 14. [149] Dyer, “Surgeon Amputated Healthy Legs,” 332. [150] See Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 10.
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[151] See Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 6, 10; Elliot, Better than Well, 221; Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 433–4; Suzanne J. Kessler, “The Medical Construc- tion of Gender: Case Management of Intersexed Infants,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16 (1990): 3–26; and John M. Sloop, “‘A Van with a Bar and a Bed’: Ritualized Gender Norms in the John/Joan Case,” Text and Performance Quarterly 20 (2000): 130–49.
[152] Bruno, 251. [153] Bruno, 257–259; Furth and Smith, 70; Elliot, 230; and Johnston and Elliot, 432–434. [154] Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb Amputation,” 432. [155] Grosz, Volatile Bodies, x. [156] Furth and Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder, 30; Johnston and Elliot, “Healthy Limb
Amputation,” 432. [157] On empathy as a critical rhetorical lens, see Celeste M. Condit, “The Critic as Empath:
Moving Away from Totalizing Theory,” Western Journal of Communication 57 (1993), 178–90.
[158] Grosz, Volatile Bodies, xi. [159] Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning (Carbondale, IL:
Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), 169. [160] Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson, “Disability, Rhetoric, and the Body,” 17. [161] See Glenn McGee, The Perfect Baby: A Pragmatic Approach to Genetics (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997), 118; and Rothman and Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection, 208–12.
[162] Rothman and Rothman, Pursuit of Perfection, 207.
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Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293
O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E
Rhetorical Agency as Haciendo Caras and Differential Consciousness Through Lens of Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Class: An Examination of Dolores Huerta’s Rhetoric
Stacey Sowards
Department of Communication and Sam Donaldson Center for Communication, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA
This study explores the rhetoric of Dolores Huerta, cofounder of the United Farm Workers of America, and expands theoretical understandings of rhetorical agency as a negotiation of the intersectional aspects of gender, ethnicity, race, and class. Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates how rhetorical agency can function through what Gloria Anzaldúa calls haciendo caras [making face, making soul] and what Chela Sandoval calls differential consciousness. Using these rhetorical caras, Huerta embodies collaborative agency through rhetorical styles of emotionality, familia [family], egalitarianism, and optimism, using factors from social and material dispositions relating to ethnicity, gender, and class, that both enable and constrain her sense of rhetorical agency. Ultimately, Huerta’s caras and negotiation of habitus shape rhetorical agency through optimism, resistance, and transformation.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2010.01361.x
Born in 1930 in Dawson, New Mexico, Dolores Huerta has spent much of her life fighting for the rights of farm workers throughout the United States and constructing a persona as an outspoken, confrontational, and assertive union leader (García, 2008). In 1955, she founded the Community Service Organization’s (CSO) branch in Stockton, California, where she met César Chávez (United Farm Workers, n.d.). Chávez and Huerta decided that farm workers needed the right to unionize and greater protection than what the CSO could offer for them (Ferriss & Sandoval, 1997; United Farm Workers, n.d.; Shaw, 2008). In 1962, Dolores Huerta and César Chávez cofounded the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), the organization that eventually became the United Farm Workers (UFW). The NFWA and the UFW activities started with membership drives in 1962 and the boycott beginning in 1965, and strikes that followed in subsequent years. In short, the UFW was able to obtain collective bargaining between farm workers and growers; establish union contracts
Corresponding author: Stacey Sowards; e-mail: [email protected]
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that provided breaks, toilets, drinking water, certain protections against pesticide exposure, farm worker seniority, and job security; and develop programs for a farm worker health plan, pension plan, and credit union (United Farm Workers, n.d.). As the UFW became the strongest and best known advocate for farm workers’ rights, these accomplishments ensured greater protections for farm workers in the United States.
As the president of the NFWA, César Chávez was the primary spokesperson for the organization, but Huerta’s commitment and assertiveness drew attention to her vice-presidential role in the organization as well. Huerta was well known for her stamina, often working 18-hour days, earning between $5 and $35 a week, and living on donated food, clothing, and shelter (Felner, 1998; Rose, 2004). She also had 11 children to support, and because she was twice divorced, many of her children lived with union families or the Chávez family while she traveled throughout California and the East Coast to support boycotts, membership drives, and lobbying efforts (Frank, 1987). Huerta was a charismatic leader of the UFW, as evidenced by numerous reports of her speaking style (Baer, 1975; ‘‘A Life-Time Commitment,’’ 1979; Speer, 1977). She was called Adelita (‘‘the symbolic soldadera [female soldier] of the Mexican Revolution’’) (Ruiz, 1998, p. 134), ‘‘La Pasionaria (the passionate one)’’ (García, 2008, p. xv), General Patton, and the Grand Lady of Steel (Dolores Huerta, n.d.; Miller, 1996; Ross, n.d.). She also was frequently described as a powerful, dynamic, and eloquent speaker (Melendez, 1971; Speer, 1977).
Several communication scholars have studied the Chicana/o and farm workers movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Delgado, 1995; Hammerback & Jensen, 1980, 1994, 1998; Hammerback, Jensen, & Gutiérrez, 1985; Jensen, Burkholder, & Ham- merback, 2003; Jensen & Hammerback, 1980, 1982, 2002; Yinger, 1975; Zompetti, 2002), yet these studies focus on male leadership in both movements and overlook women’s roles in these movements, erasing women like Dolores Huerta in Chicano movement history. For example, John Hammerback and Richard Jensen have written extensively about the rhetorical legacy of César Chávez, yet their work only gives passing reference to Dolores Huerta. In their 1985 book (written with José Angel Gutiérrez), A War of Words: Chicano Protest in the 1960s and 1970s, Huerta is mentioned once. In their 1998 book, The Rhetorical Career of César Chávez, Huerta is mentioned six times, cited for her comments about Chávez’s leadership style. None of these references elaborates on Huerta’s contributions or her leadership within the UFW.
Not only has Huerta been overlooked in rhetorical scholarship, but César Chávez has received credit for ideas that Huerta claims were hers. For instance, Hammerback and Jensen discuss how Chávez converted the name of a neighborhood he had lived in, ‘‘Sal Si Puedes (get out if you can),’’ to ‘‘Si, se puede (Yes, we can),’’1 which has long been used as a rallying cry for the UFW (Jensen & Hammerback, 2002, p. xix). Yet, Huerta has said that she was the person who initiated ‘‘sí, se puede’’ as a rallying cry (Huerta, 2003). Many of her contributions and successes may have been attributed to Chávez, without recognizing her role in those union activities. As Margaret Rose
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observes: ‘‘Such male-centered interpretations have distorted the history of the UFW and the role of women in its development’’ (Rose, 1990a, p. 26).
In addition to being underrepresented in rhetorical scholarship, Dolores Huerta’s rhetorical styles are especially useful exemplars of how women from places of marginality negotiate rhetorical agency through intersectional identities of gender, race, ethnicity, and class. Several scholars have argued that women, especially historically, often employ different rhetorical styles, such as ‘‘feminine’’ styles that include such practices as relying on personal experiences and tone, structuring arguments inductively, inviting audience participation, addressing the audience as peers, basing authority on experience, creating identification with audience, and focusing holistically on relationships (Blankenship & Robson, 1995; Campbell, 1989; Dow & Tonn, 1993; Hayden, 1999). Michael Calvin McGee (1980) discusses the notion of ‘‘feminization’’ of power, which focuses on leadership styles that emphasize gentleness, caring for others, and good will of the people. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1986, 1989, 1995) also has observed that some women enact diverse rhetorical styles. For example, Mari Boor Tonn (1996) examines what she calls ‘‘militant motherhood’’ in the rhetoric of Mother Jones, who used both feminine (mothering) and masculine (militant) rhetorical styles (see also Hayden, 2003; Japp, 1985). However, Raka Shome (1996) problematizes ‘‘the generalized notion of a ‘woman’s/feminist rhetorical or communicative perspective’ that often gets articulated by feminists in the discipline’’ (p. 53). She argues that nonwhite women may negotiate rhetorical situations very differently because of their diverse cultural backgrounds. Similarly, other Latina communication studies scholars interrogate assumptions of women’s similarities and public/private spheres in the choice of texts for study (Flores, 1996; Holling, 2000; Palczewski, 1996). For these reasons, Dolores Huerta’s rhetoric provides a compelling example of how marginalized women might negotiate rhetorical agency in different ways, as I will demonstrate in this analysis of a wide range of primary texts that were obtained through archival research, including public statements, speeches, congressional testimonies, UFW organizational documents, and private letters.
In what follows, I discuss how rhetorical agency serves as a theoretical framework for understanding Huerta’s work. I then explain how Dolores Huerta negotiates rhetorical agency by accounting for social and collective forces that shape agen- tial rhetorical space through three different, but interconnected concepts: Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus, Gloria Anzaldúa’s haciendo caras [making faces/soul], and Chela Sandoval’s differential consciousness. Ultimately, I argue that Huerta’s rhetoric adds to theoretical understandings of agency through Huerta’s use of haciendo caras and differential consciousness, expanding the meaning of agency as it relates to intersec- tional identities of gender, race, and class. I use four examples of caras that include emotionality, familia, collaborative egalitarianism, and courageous optimism. Each of these caras creates a framework for expanding our understanding of rhetorical agency as collaborations and haciendo caras through negotiations of social structures and race, ethnicity, gender, and class.
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Rhetorical agency: Habitus, Haciendo Caras, and differential consciousness
The idea of rhetorical agency, despite recent efforts to theorize and define this term, remains ambiguous and unpredictable, although I will argue that habitus, haciendo caras, and differential consciousness, shaped through social and collective spaces, offer an expanded understanding of rhetorical agency through examining intersec- tional aspects of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and national origin status. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell suggests that the very nature of rhetorical agency is ‘‘promiscuous and pro- tean’’ because it ‘‘can refer to invention, strategies, authorship, institutional power, identity, subjectivity, practices, and subject positions, among others’’ (Campbell, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates the promiscuous and protean nature of agency through her negotiations of social, political, economic, and cultural forces.
Other recent discussions, such as the 2003 Alliance of Rhetoric Studies Conference on the Status and Future of Rhetorical Societies and a 2004 special issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric, have broadened our understanding of rhetorical agency, suggesting that it might be understood as enactment (Brouwer, 2003; Campbell, 1988; Lucaites, 2003), performance (Fishman, 2003), articulation (Biesecker, 2003), personal will (Condit, 2003), resistance (Dube, 2003), invention (Benacka, 2003; Zaeske, 2003), ‘‘ability to make decisions’’ on one’s own (Holling, 2000, p. 145), and creativity (McNay, 1999). For example, Susan Zaeske (2003) observes that agency might be viewed as agentic or subversive invention, in which resistance requires creativity. Cheryl Geisler (2004) clarifies some of these position papers from the Alliance of Rhetorical Studies conference by noting that the ‘‘common understanding of rhetorical agency at the ARS was the capacity of the rhetor to act’’ (2004, p. 12). Emirbayer and Mische further explain that agency is a multifaceted concept that includes:
a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its ‘‘iterational’’ or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a ‘‘projective’’ capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a ‘‘practical-evaluative’’ capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment). (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 962)
To begin to understand agency requires an examination of how rhetors or groups of rhetors reach a moment in which they desire or are invited to speak. Several scholars contend that agency is relational and an ongoing negotiation with oneself, interactions, and power structures within social and material constraints (Bourdieu, 1990, 1991; Campbell, 2005; Enck-Wanzer, 2006; Greene, 2004; Herndl, 2003; Holling, 2000; Lundberg & Gunn, 2004). While this article focuses on a single individual, I contend that Huerta’s rhetorical successes are more than just her own creativities and abilities. She is a product of many social forces, related to family, education, religion, social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the
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Chicano/a movement, the farm worker movement, the women’s rights movement, and collaborative relationships with specific people and organizations.
Specifically, Pierre Bourdieu’s work on habitus illustrates how agency is influenced by the past, or what Emirbayer and Mische call the habitual element of agency. Bourdieu contends that habitus relates to the dispositions that originate in childhood, as individuals are socialized by parents, family members, educational systems, and others who teach them the unspoken and unwritten rules of appropriateness and inappropriateness:
The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions, and attitudes which are ‘‘regular’’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘‘rule’’. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable. (Thompson, 1991, p. 12)
Bourdieu suggests that agency emerges from these dispositions in the act of balancing opposing forces, such as ‘‘possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions’’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). Individuals base their expectations on ‘‘the accessible and inaccessible, of what is and is not ‘for us,’ a division as fundamental and as fundamentally recognized as that between the sacred and the profane’’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 64). Habitus, and these opposing forces, influence our abilities to speak, invent, perform, act, and resist in ways that may not be consciously recognized.
As Michelle Holling (2000) explains, agency exists in relationship to other subjects, so that for Chicanas, socialization (e.g., related to family), social contracts of marriage (e.g., related to Catholicism), and sexuality can limit rhetorical options, voice, and construction of one’s own identity. To negotiate these social and material constraints, Lisa Flores argues that Chicana feminists create a rhetoric of difference through their writing that includes rejecting mainstream rhetoric and shaping their own constitutive rhetoric. This rhetoric of difference allows for the ‘‘creation of discursive space [that] means that the margins are transformed into the center of a new society, and the disempowered find power’’ (Flores, 1996, p. 152). One way such transformation occurs is through collective agency that functions to foster and constitute identity (Enck-Wanzer, 2006). That is, collective agency shapes how the ‘‘subject’’ responds to the possibilities of individual and group identities that allow such rhetors to negotiate rhetorical constraints. Rhetorical agency is not just the process of negotiating one’s individual and social habitus but, rather, the agent embraces enabling mechanisms, such as collective and collaborative efforts for social organizing and elements that facilitate the constitution of identity, from past and present dispositions, while resisting rhetorically constructed social conventions that limit or foreclose rhetorical options.
Based on these theoretical explications of agency, I propose, using Dolores Huerta as an exemplar, that rhetorical agency is a function of individual dispositions, social contexts, and a rhetor’s ability to respond to those situations as they change over time
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and negotiate social standings related to gender, race, ethnicity, class, and national origin status. Gloria Anzaldúa (1990) employs the idea of haciendo caras [making face, making soul] to demonstrate rhetorical limitations and enabling mechanisms, even while recognizing that haciendo caras is fostered through collaborative relation- ships and the tacit approval of such caras. First, she explains: ‘‘ ‘Face’ is the surface of the body that is the most noticeably inscribed by social structures, marked with instructions on how to be mujer, macho, working class, Chicana’’ (1990, p. xv). She further suggests that haciendo caras is a way to manage, negotiate, subvert, and confront dominant structures and ideologies, using ‘‘gestos subversivos, political subversive gestures, the piercing look that questions or challenges’’ (1990, p. xv). The idea of haciendo caras is also a strategic movida [move] in which a rhetor may address internal insecurities or lack of confidence, the kinds of masks, ‘‘las máscaras, we are compelled to wear, [that] drive a wedge between our intersubjective personhood and the persona we present to the world’’ (p. xv). As Mitsuye Yamada writes: ‘‘My mask is control/concealment/endurance/my mask is escape/from my/self’’ (p. 114). These masks are also más/caras, or a type of ‘‘super face,’’ that require extra work to maintain. Finally, haciendo caras is also the ability to transform through the ability to ‘‘ ‘change’ faces . . . like a chameleon’’ (Anzaldúa, 1990, p. xv). For Anzaldúa (1987), the mestiza consciousness allows the transformation of one’s own inner and outer caras and más/caras in the construction of persona and identity.
In order to employ these caras, Chela Sandoval explains that a differential consciousness is required:
enough strength to confidently commit to a well-defined structure of identity for one hour, day, week, month, year; enough flexibility to self-consciously transform that identity according to the requisites of another oppositional ideological tactic if readings of power’s formation require it; enough grace to recognize alliance with others committed to egalitarian social relations and race, gender, sex, class, and social justice. (Sandoval, 2000, p. 60)
Rhetorical tools such as strength, flexibility, and grace establish grounds for the rhetor to employ caras. In essence, haciendo caras, infused with an understanding of differential consciousness, function as rhetorical styles (or practices) related to language and delivery choices and as rhetorical strategies, or conscious efforts to command audiences.
In the rest of this article, I explore habitus in relationship to Huerta’s rhetoric to understand how she negotiated social and material constraints relating to gender, ethnicity, race, and class through collaborations and relationships with others. I then examine how Dolores Huerta’s rhetoric as haciendo caras functions as a major role in facilitating other aspects of rhetorical agency, such as negotiations, experimentations, and collaborations. Ultimately, I conclude that haciendo caras functions through differential consciousness and rhetorical styles relating to flexibility, optimism, resistance, and transformation.
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Negotiating social constraints: Rhetorical agency through habitus
In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Mexican and Mexican-American women faced significant rhetorical constraints related to the intersectional aspects of gendered, classed, and ethnic status in both Mexican and Mexican-American culture as well as within the dominant hierarchical structures (García, 2008). Such social constraints that these women faced relate to Mexican and Mexican-American traditions that called for women’s subservience and obedience to men within the family structure, the Catholic church, the institution of marriage, labor markets, educational systems, legislative and legal systems, and heterosexual relationships (Saldívar-Hull, 2000, citing Sonia López; see also Holling, 2000, 2006; Williams, 1990; Zavella, 1987 for discussions on familia [family]). Many Mexican farm workers were traditionalists and Catholic, expecting Mexican women to be reserved and to care primarily for family (Alarcón, 1989; Hurtado, 1998; Rose, 1990b). Studies of the Chicano and the UFW movement in the 1960s and 1970s also have reported that leadership roles were effectively limited for women (Blackwell, 2003; del Castillo, 1980; Rose, 2004). Highlighting the social expectations for and stereotypes of Mexican-American women, one grower’s representative noted that Dolores Huerta was ‘‘a violent woman, where women, especially Mexican women, are usually peaceful and pleasant’’ (quoted in Baer, 1975, p. 40). In short, Mexican-American women were socially prohibited or discouraged from challenging men’s authority, participating in leadership roles, pursuing higher education, and acting or speaking outside of the home.
However, Huerta’s habitus, shaped by her early family life and her relation- ship with Chávez, is in part what enabled Huerta to become the outspoken and powerful leader of the UFW. Huerta’s mother, her family, and César Chávez were instrumental in shaping who she became and why she became involved in social justice causes (Griswold del Castillo & Garcia, 1995; ‘‘A Life of Sacrifice,’’ 1990; Rose, 2004). According to Huerta, her childhood, relationship with her mother, and the educational opportunities she was afforded as a child and a young adult were in part what enabled and motivated her to become a powerful spokesperson for the UFW and leader on other issues relating to civil rights. Bourdieu explains that ‘‘[e]arly experiences have particular weight because the habitus tends to ensure its own constancy and its defence against change through the selection it makes within new information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its accumulated information, if exposed to it accidentally or by force, and especially by avoiding exposure to such information’’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 60 – 61). That is, as we become older, we may become more resistant to new ideas; what we are exposed to in our early experiences can have a profound influence in how we interact with the world.
Huerta has also reported that her mother played an influential role in how and why she became a strong and outspoken woman: ‘‘We were close — like sisters. She was a very gentle woman . . . She was absolutely influential in my life. She was very strong and she called the shots’’ (‘‘A Life of Sacrifice,’’ 1990, p. 257). Her mother divorced her father when she was 5 years old and raised Dolores and her siblings while working at a
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cannery, and then later, running her own businesses including a hotel, a grocery store, and a restaurant, where her mother often provided rooms and/or food for farm work- ers. Huerta grew up surrounded by working-class Mexicans and Mexican Americans, and her mother’s sense of social justice became infused in Huerta’s life (Rose, 2004). Because Huerta’s mother worked so much, her children were often left in the care of relatives, especially Huerta’s grandfather (Rose, 1988, 2004). According to Huerta, this reversal of traditional gendered caretaker roles in Huerta’s family allowed her to see that independent and assertive women could succeed in U.S.-American society, describing her mother as a ‘‘Mexican-American Horatio Alger type’’ (Huerta, quoted in Coburn, 1976, p. 12). Huerta’s grandfather called her Seven Tongues, because she talked so much and with great ease (Rose, 2004), foreshadowing her assertive persona as an adult. These early experiences, combined with Huerta’s family’s sense of social justice, contributed significantly to Huerta’s later roles in civil rights activism.
In many ways, Chávez was also instrumental in enabling and motivating Huerta’s negotiation of rhetorical agency because he constantly encouraged Huerta to become an effective leader. Because Chávez was very supportive of Huerta’s leadership role within the UFW, he established a set of dispositions or habitus within the UFW in which most organizers came to respect Huerta. In this case, Huerta’s voice was authorized, in part, because of Chávez’s leadership in the UFW. In essence, Chávez encouraged her to be a leader within the UFW. As Huerta herself reports, ‘‘I told Cesar one time, ‘Seems like the workers know more about organizing than I do.’ But Cesar said, ‘Dolores, if they didn’t need you, they would have organized themselves long ago’ ’’ (‘‘Martin Luther King Farm Workers Fund,’’ 1976, p. 12). Chávez, who had great respect for Huerta’s leadership abilities, observed, ‘‘No march is too long, no task too hard for Dolores Huerta if it means taking a step forward for the rights of farmworkers’’ (‘‘A Life of Sacrifice,’’ 1990, p. 266) and ‘‘Dolores is absolutely fearless, physically and emotionally’’ (Coburn, 1976, pp. 12 – 13). As Griswold del Castillo and Garcia (1995) observe, Huerta and Chávez engaged in coleadership of the UFW. Huerta looked to Chávez to confirm her ideas, actions, and self, which, in turn, may have fostered her sense of agency and motivation to continue her work with the UFW. Huerta’s relationships with her mother, family, Chávez, and others created a framework for collaborative and collective agency. Huerta’s relationships with her family and Chávez helped to authorize and create her own rhetorical space. In effect, these collaborative relationships produce their own authority, instilled through the confidence and motivation that is inspired by these relationships.
Haciendo Caras and differential consciousness: Construction of public persona and identity
Huerta used a range of rhetorical styles or caras that are not easily classified as feminine or masculine, despite efforts in the communication discipline to label such practices as feminine/masculine. These styles are illustrated in her public persona, what some have called the Dragon Lady (Huerta, 2003; Miller, 1996), although this
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term is problematic as both a gendered and racialized assessment of her rhetoric. Understanding Huerta as the Dragon Lady implies that she was extremely aggressive, combative, and uncompromising, styles that violated expectations of marginality related to race, gender, and class. These labels of her rhetorical style were negatively connoted by her detractors, primarily because she was a Mexican-American woman, expected to be reserved and apolitical. In what follows, I propose a different rendering of Huerta’s public persona, as Huerta adopts caras of social justice, optimism, and courage, in addition to caras of familia and emotionality.
As Anzaldúa explains, caras of resistance mean ‘‘to put on a face, express feelings by distorting the face — frowning grimacing, looking sad, glum, or disapproving . . . haciendo caras has the added connotation of gestos subversivos, political subversive gestures, the piercing look that questions or challenges, the look that says ‘Don’t walk all over me,’ the one that says, ‘Get out of my face’ ’’ (Anzaldúa, 1990, p. xv). Conversely, these caras might also function as masks that may obscure one’s true feelings, insecurities, or lack of confidence. As Margaret Montoya explains: ‘‘For stigmatized groups, such as persons of color, the poor, women, gays and lesbians, assuming a mask is comparable to being ‘on stage.’ Being ‘on stage’ is frequently experienced as being acutely aware of one’s words, affect, tone of voice, movements, and gestures because they seem out of sync with what one is feeling and thinking’’ (Montoya, 1994/1995, pp. 531 – 532). These faces and masks that Huerta used include a range of rhetorical styles, demonstrated through four examples, manifested through both physical and verbal expressions: caras of emotionality, familia, collaborative egalitarianism, and courageous optimism.
Caras of emotionality Huerta both consciously and unconsciously employed emotion in her public presen- tations and negotiations with growers, often relying on appeals of passion or tears. In these caras, Huerta literally distorted her face to reflect the powerful emotions she felt about farm worker, Chicana/o, and women’s rights. These caras rhetorically func- tioned in three ways. First, they functioned to demonstrate her passion and lifetime commitment to justice, especially for those in marginal positions. For example, a description of Huerta’s negotiating style demonstrates how she employed these faces of emotion:
In the hundreds of negotiating sessions she led between 1966 and 1971, Huerta’s emotional involvement was her strength and her weakness. She shouted and cried easily. She fought with insults, tears, and individuals’ testimony, believing so strongly in winning everything the workers told her they needed she would not compromise . . . She encouraged spontaneous political demonstrations during negotiations as the grievances were shouted out. (Baer, 1975, p. 39)
Rhetorical studies rarely mention the use of this kind of emotionality or passion that was seemingly so effective for Dolores Huerta. These faces of emotion were effective
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for audiences who could see Huerta’s passion and commitment for her causes literally inscribed on her face, an embodied form of resistance.
Yet, there is also rhetorical risk in showing this kind of emotion in public because the use of emotion or tears is not an avowed rhetorical style and, when used, becomes unruly and unexpected. A second rhetorical function of this style, then, is that Huerta disrupts traditional rhetorical styles through her faces of gestos subversivos [subversive gestures]. Huerta used these faces of emotionality (both consciously and unconsciously), which often left her audiences (especially growers and politicians) without response. As one observer noted: ‘‘It is widely known that the growers do not like to face Huerta over a bargaining table. During the 1970s, they labeled her as ‘crazy’ and walked out on her. They say she is ‘unprofessional’ — because she shouts at them and cries easily and condemns them for decades of repression’’ (‘‘A Life-Time Commitment,’’ 1979, p. 6). Huerta explained why she believed this strategy worked for her: ‘‘It’s hard for them — the growers — to negotiate with a woman . . . I think it throws them. A woman can be much more tenacious than a man. Women are not as ego-involved as men are’’ (quoted in Sims, 1974, p. 3-B). In one speech, she also noted that it was tenacity that created an effective bargaining persona: ‘‘They [the growers] didn’t like that. They didn’t. I really stuck to my guns. I was really tenacious. I never swore at them or yelled at them, that’s why they called me that. They couldn’t swear at me because it wasn’t a man that was doing it’’ (Huerta, 2003).
Another way in which these caras of emotionality function rhetorically relates to the use of emotional excess, or melodrama. Huerta herself observed that, ‘‘as a woman I can cry in negotiations and they can’t you know. I can just do ALL kinds of things . . . I can get really melodramatic and talk about the poor farm workers and their families and all that and get reeeeally mushy about it and fellas have more problems doing that’’ (quoted in Sims, 1974, p. 3-B). Huerta’s conscious rhetorical use of what Nájera-Ramírez (2003) calls emotional excess connected with audiences in her passion and disavowal of rhetorical styles that rely solely on reason. As Valenzuela Arce explains, melodrama may be especially suited for addressing and expressing issues related to social justice, especially for campesinos’ concerns:
Melodrama in Mexico is constructed in the interstices of urbanized rurality and its recreation in mass communication, especially cinema and later television. The campesino masses expelled from the countryside with the Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the subsequent exoduses associated with misery and dispossession, formed important cultural adaptations, reterritorializations, and recreations of expressive forms and of campesino ways of life in new urban contexts no less plagued by abuses and injustices. (Valenzuela Arce, 2003, p. 222)
Although Valenzuela Arce (2003) and Nájera-Ramírez (2003) discuss melodrama in mediated form in Mexico, there are parallels of Chicana emotional performance in Huerta’s rhetoric, especially in her emphases on justice, reformulating expression, and conscious choice to use emotionality. Perhaps illustrating the blurred boundaries of
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the physical and metaphorical U.S. – Mexico border, Huerta uses emotional excess as a way to connect with farm workers who were predominantly Mexican and Mexican American and to challenge the boundaries of acceptable behavior for Latina women. Steven Schwarze further explains that melodrama in U.S.-American social movements relies on constituting social and political conflict, polarizing conflict, framing issues as moralistic, and creating monopathy, or a ‘‘unitary emotional identification’’ (Schwarze, 2006, p. 244). Huerta’s rhetorical cara of emotionality embodies each of these elements through her passionate beliefs in justice for farm workers.
Huerta inverted seemingly powerless rhetorical options, such as tears and emo- tional appeals, into effective rhetorical practices that may have invoked emotional reactions for her audiences, such as guilt, anger, sentimentality, and/or passion. In essence, Huerta’s use of caras of emotionality functioned as a kind of differential consciousness, as a ‘‘tactical subjectivity with the capacity to de- and recenter’’ dom- inant rhetorical styles (Sandoval, 2000, p. 59). As Anzaldúa (1990) explains: ‘‘Our strength lies in shifting perspectives, in our capacity to shift, in our ‘seeing through’ the membrane of the past superimposed on the present’’ (p. xxvii) to become a chameleon. Her sometimes conscious and deliberate choice to use these faces rep- resents Huerta’s ability to read audiences, to understand social contexts, and to use unexpected measures in order to craft a space for rhetorical agency. Her use of these caras expands the use of emotion beyond the individual private sphere into the collective public sphere because her audiences, whether growers, politicians, or farm workers, react to and engage with her use of emotion.
Huerta’s rhetoric relies on gender essentialist interpretations of emotion as a gendered tactic. She also employed new and reinvented practices to challenge those social norms and strategies that are enacted through structures of power. Her use of emotion allowed the growers and lobbyists to walk out of meetings and negotiations because they did not see her as rational or reasonable. Perhaps, then, her caras or tactics of emotion both resisted social expectations, but also inscribed normative expectations of how women might speak and behave in political realms. Her reliance on gender essentialism of emotion is both a production of power and a reproduction of gendered and racialized social expectations. Yet as Valdivia observes, for Latina/os to be able to participate in social movements, academic discussions, or other kinds of discourses, ‘‘bringing [the] chair to the table is not done without stress, challenge, and/or resistance. . . . while theories of social change may be palatable, the methods and struggles that these might entail are not’’ (Valdivia, 2008, p. 5). Valdivia suggests that approaches used in resisting dominant ideologies can be disavowed, without recognizing the difficulties in choosing strategies or caras of resistance.
Caras of Familia Another cara that Huerta used was familia [family], which rhetorically functioned to simultaneously disrupt traditional beliefs about and embrace values of the Mexican and Mexican-American familia. According to Flores and Holling (1999), ‘‘the concept of la familia [the family] among Mexican Americans serves as a means through which
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cultural values, attitudes, and assumptions are taught’’ (1999, p. 340). They contend that Mexican-American values of ‘‘harmony/silence; rationality/emotionalism; the concept of personhood; respect for hierarchy, age, and gender; and solidarity and a sense of community’’ contribute to understanding the nature of familia (p. 340, citing Gangotena, 1994; see also Holling, 2006). Huerta both embraced and resisted these values in the construction of her consanguineous familia (her children) and her union familia in several ways. Huerta’s cara of familia was literally embodied in her persona through her pregnancies, nursing and raising her 11 children, involving her children in UFW activities, and talking about her status as mother in interviews, speeches, and letters. The UFW’s rhetorical construction of the union as familia also allowed her to participate fully in union activities (Rose, 1990b; Zavella, 1987). In essence, her face of familia disrupted traditional rhetorical styles and facilitated the UFW’s construction of familia as a broader concept beyond the nuclear family.
However, Huerta was committed to the idea of consanguineous familia, as she explained, ‘‘in our culture, raising kids is the most important thing you can do’’ and ‘‘[w]omen are getting afraid to have kids. I still believe you are supposed to conceive children’’ (Huerta, quoted in Coburn, 1976, pp. 13 – 14). Although she was extremely occupied with union activities throughout the childhoods of all of her children, she was also devoted to their welfare. When she began lobbying in Sacramento, for instance, she reported that ‘‘I had to do it [the lobbying], but at the same time I was too distracted to work. My husband was trying to take the kids away from me in court. I couldn’t lose my children, but I couldn’t quit working for people who counted on me’’ (Baer, 1975, p. 39). Huerta was (and is) also immensely proud of her children, as illustrated in her frequent references to their successes in articles, speeches, and conversations. She often mentioned their accomplishments, noting that her children have pursued careers in teaching, law, medicine, filmmaking, and the UFW (Huerta, 2002, 2003).
Huerta’s belief in having children did not prevent her from also challenging tra- ditional values of the Mexican-American familia. For example, because she was twice divorced, and never married her current partner, Richard Chávez, as she rejected the social norms of the nuclear family and Catholic tradition that discouraged divorce. According to Huerta, several years passed before she was able to reconcile her identity in relationship to familial expectations in order to organize for farm workers’ causes: ‘‘I knew I wasn’t comfortable in a wife’s role, . . . but I wasn’t clearly facing the issue. I hedged, I made excuses, I didn’t come out and tell my husband that I cared more about helping other people than cleaning our house and doing my hair’’ (Baer, 1975, p. 39). After Huerta divorced, she often struggled to provide for her children, evidenced in her letters to Chávez, in which she asked for financial support for baby sitters, food, clothing, gasoline, and other living expenses (Huerta, n.d., ‘‘Just a few short lines,’’ 1962). Fregoso explains that ‘‘Chicana/o family ideology also draws from Anglo-American norms around heterosexuality and consanguinity, especially in its assumptions about very particular roles for women as wives, mothers, economic dependents, nurturers, and cultural transmitters’’ (Fregoso, 2003, p. 77; for further
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discussion, see also Holling, 2006; Williams, 1990; Zavella, 1987). Huerta rejected the wife role and economic dependence within the nuclear family, yet she used the union (and Chávez) as a support mechanism, accepting the union as her familia.
Instead of allowing her struggles in raising her children to impede her leadership role in the UFW, she sometimes used this status as an enabling mechanism, as Huerta noted:
When I had my younger children and I was still negotiating, I would take nursing breaks. So I would take my baby into the negotiations and then I would take a nursing break, and everybody would have to wait while the baby ate. Then I would come back to the table and start negotiating again . . . I think it made employers sensitive to the fact that when we’re talking about benefits and the terms of a contract, we’re talking about families and we’re talking about children. (quoted in Covey, 1994, p. 47)
Vicky Ruiz explains: ‘‘A tough, savvy negotiator, Huerta skillfully manipulated her positionality as a mother at the bargaining table’’ (Ruiz, 1998, p. 134). Huerta may have used her family’s status as a way to control the bargaining process by forcing a break in negotiations on her own terms. Rather than allow the physical aspects of motherhood, such as breastfeeding, to constrain her ability to speak and participate in the UFW and bargaining processes, Huerta embodied resistance to dominant social expectations.
In addition to nursing some of her children during breaks of meetings and negotiations, Huerta also involved her children in other union activities. When possible, she encouraged them to participate in marches and protests, and all of them were raised within the union family structure, sometimes staying with the Chávez family, or other union families. Felner explains: ‘‘Rather than choosing to be with her children and going to work, she brought her children to work (and, as they became adults, put them to work)’’ (Felner, 1998, p. 2). Her children became a part of her rhetorical cara of familia because her audiences saw her as part of a familia that melded her family life with her union life. In fact, some of her children were arrested and sent to jail for their participation in strikes, including one of her children who was 3 months old at the time (Cárdenas, 1977). The rhetorical presence of Huerta’s children at union activities allowed audiences to see her as a family-oriented person and to remind nonfarm-worker audiences that children and families would be affected by policies, decisions, and contracts. This approach was also a UFW rhetorical strategy because the boycotts, pickets, and protests often involved entire families (Rose, 1990b). The familial bond thus expanded to include a much larger union family, in which people worked together to support each other and their causes.
Anzaldúa (1987, 1990) argues la mestiza must constantly look for different faces, moves, and ways of thinking to subvert dominant structures, to access places of rhetorical space and agency. Using differential consciousness, Huerta used familia as a way to ‘‘read the current situation of power and self-consciously choosing and adopting the ideological stand best suited to push against its configurations’’
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(Sandoval, 2000, p. 60), that is, as a way to interrupt dominant ways of thinking, as illustrated through her practices of breast feeding during meeting and negotiation breaks. In another way, Huerta’s 11 children were often visible or referenced within the union and various articles that have been written about Huerta, demonstrating her values of familia and culture, while also resisting traditional familia structure. Rather, Huerta embodies a cara of familia that emphasized both her independence and her children’s independence and values of social justice and her total life commitment to the union. In essence, Huerta used familia within the union to construct her own way of being and her own identity. As with her use of emotion, she invoked gender (and racialized/ethnic) essentialism in resistive ways through her emphasis on the consanguineous family and role of woman as mother.
Caras of collaborative egalitarianism Huerta’s rhetoric of social justice, as evidenced by her and her family’s lifelong activities in the UFW and several other causes, was both collaborative and egalitarian in nature. Like the collaborative relationship Huerta had with Chávez, Huerta also worked to establish a collaborative egalitarianism with her audiences, especially those comprised of farm workers. Huerta embodied and enacted this rhetoric through her emphasis on her own life of sacrifice for the cause, such as accepting a very low salary to work for the UFW and practicing a form of citizenship based on sacrifice. Her mixed use of Spanish and English, audience involvement, and repetitions of resistance and optimism through gritos [shouts, rallying cries] at the end of her speeches also functioned to equalize speaker – audience roles through collaborative egalitarianism.
In addition to enacting a lifestyle that reflected the living conditions many farm workers faced, Huerta also used language that rhetorically functioned to establish a cara of egalitarianism. For example, in a presentation at the Campesino Centers Conference, Huerta spoke about paternalistic approaches to helping farm workers:
Part of the ‘‘agency mentality’’ is paternalism. Get rid of it! You need to sort out your feelings. Watch out for feeling superior to ‘‘those illiterate farm workers’’ or for ****** [illegible] in reverse, feeling sorry for the ‘‘the poor, little [sic] farm workers.’’ I know what I’m talking about. I used to be a schoolteacher and had to sort through my own feelings. Feeling superior or feeling sorry for the farm workers are both wrong attitudes. We have to establish equality — service for service. We’re neither more nor less than farm workers, we are equal. (‘‘Martin Luther King Farm Workers Fund,’’ 1976, p. 6)
Huerta’s approach demonstrates her commitment to egalitarianism, a view that she fostered within the farm worker movement. She believed that farm workers had the ability to help themselves, and demanded great sacrifice from the farm workers, who had to pay dues to the union, participate in boycotts and pickets, and give their time to work for the union, all while working to support their families on very little income. The demand for justice and farm workers’ rights was not a call for charity,
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but rather for egalitarianism and collaboration, to find ways in which farm workers could help themselves.
Furthermore, Huerta’s rhetorical style of audience involvement at the end of her speeches also fostered this sense of egalitarianism because it functioned collaboratively. Almost all of Huerta’s speeches end with audience participation through gritos:
All together, huh. I’ll say Viva La Causa and everybody yells Viva, really loud, okay? Viva La Causa! Viva! Ugh, that was very weak. This is very important. This is like kind of praying together in unison you know, so it’s really important. Let’s try it again. Viva La Causa! Viva! Viva La Justicia! Viva! Now so Cesar can hear us in the hospital — where he’s at the growers can hear us where they’re at. Viva Chavez! Viva! Okay, now we’ll try Abajo. Down with Fear! Abajo! Down with Lettuce and grapes! Abajo! Down with Gallo! Abajo! You know, this really works . . . Can we live in a world of brotherhood and peace without disease and fear and oppression? Si Se Puede, right? Okay, let’s do it together. Si Se Puede. Clapping. Si Se Puede, Si Se Puede. (Huerta, 1974)
Such audience involvement functioned to develop an egalitarian relationship with the audience by strengthening audience commitment to the cause through their participation and use of language such as ‘‘sí, se puede’’ and ‘‘viva justicia.’’ The mixed use of Spanish and English, which was quite common at the conclusion of her speeches, also functioned to galvanize audiences, in that both Spanish- and non-Spanish-speaking audience members could participate. Jensen and Hammerback (2002) explain how César Chávez was able to interchange Spanish and English in such a way that the audience accepted the usage of both languages. By introducing a term or phrase (in either language, depending on the audience’s language preferences, but usually in Spanish), and then translating, audiences felt comfortable in their repetitions because Huerta (and Chávez) established grounds for acceptance of this mixed use of Spanish and English.
Huerta also recognized the rhetorical power in the repetition of sí, se puede [yes, we can/it can be done] and ¡viva! [long live]. Huerta’s rhetoric created space for the voice of farm workers and others who were able to participate through audience involvement and repetition of empowering gritos, such as ¡Viva! [Long live], ¡Abajo! [Down with], ¡Sí, se puede! (Huerta, 1974). Huerta’s audience involvement guides the audience toward a politicized consciousness of social justice issues that influence the everyday lives of farm workers as well as those involved in other social causes. The farm workers and other supporters became a part of social resistance, part of a larger social movement for farm workers’ rights through these repetitions and reformulations of empowering language. Huerta both consciously and unconsciously reconfigured and rearticulated the rhetorical context to create resistance on her own terms rather than adapting to normative requirements.
In particular, the chanting of sí, se puede enabled Huerta to construct a cara oriented toward collaborative egalitarianism. Her rhetorical use of this face fosters a
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sense of rhetorical agency for herself and others in the sense that repetitions of sí, se puede allows the audience to speak, and to speak about what each person can do. Sí, se puede is often translated as ‘‘yes, we can’’ but it can also be translated as ‘‘yes, one can’’ or ‘‘yes, it can be done.’’ The first translation fosters the collaborative element of agency in that the group, ‘‘we,’’ will work together to achieve social justice, while the second translation emphasizes the individual’s sense of ability in that anyone can achieve social justice, and the third translation suggests a collective movement for change. In addition, when a speaker involves the audience in such a way, it may function to further enhance that speaker’s sense of affirmation. That is, Huerta can hear that the audience believes what she says, so that the act of persuasion is completed and confirmed by the audience’s involvement.
Caras of courageous optimism The final example of haciendo caras is Huerta’s cara of courage and optimism, perhaps used to inspire both herself and her audiences (consciously and unconsciously). At times, Huerta reports that she often lacked confidence and self-esteem, constantly worrying about her effectiveness and self-image. For example, in an interview, she observed ‘‘I know I have a terrible temper. It might be that I’m still suffering from guilt about my divorce, and from the feeling that I shouldn’t be the leader people see in me . . . I guess I just haven’t forgiven myself the divorce, and if you haven’t forgiven yourself something, how can you forgive others?’’ (quoted in Baer, 1975, p. 40). In a letter to Chávez, Huerta requests a visit to the farm workers she has been working with, recognizing what she saw as her limitations: ‘‘You know they are quite used to me in Stockton, so I am not anything special to them. I keep telling them I’m here, that they don’t need to talk to you, but somehow, they are not convinced’’ (Huerta, n.d. ‘‘Received’’).
To overcome these feelings of insecurity and doubt, Huerta adopted más/caras (a kind of ‘‘super’’ face) of courageous optimism. This cara rhetorically functioned to enable Huerta to speak out, emphasize immediate action, and develop optimism for future change, shaped through the encouragement of and authorization by others, a collaborative effect of agency. Acquisition of voice and the ability to speak out originated from years of working as an organizer with the Community Service Organization and later with the United Farm Workers. In Huerta’s own account, she reports:
One of the greatest things I have learned in the movement is courage. We really don’t have courage when we have to make tough decisions . . . When Cesar asked me to work for the United Farmworkers Union, I was divorced, had seven children, and had been a school teacher . . . The decision took a lot of sweat. I learned to have courage . . . Working for a cause is the baptism of fire. Being involved is good, because then you lose all types of fear. Then what really happens in [sic] you become strong. (quoted in Cárdenas, 1977)
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Throughout Huerta’s rhetoric, this cara of courage and optimism is prevalent, enabling her to overcome fear, insecurity, and lack of confidence. Huerta also rec- ognized the risks associated with her confrontational, courageous rhetorical style: ‘‘Internally, you know something has to be done, and you do it. You have to make deci- sions, and it’s sometimes difficult, but you do it anyway. You have to know in advance that you will make mistakes and not be afraid’’ (‘‘A Life of Sacrifice,’’ 1990, p. 261).
Huerta also was fearless with Chávez in their interpersonal communication, even though they both respected each other for their own strengths and contributions to the UFW movement. This ability to be confrontational or expressive came from an open discursive and collaborative space, in which Huerta felt confident and comfortable in expressing her opinions and ideas. In one letter, she wrote to Chávez:
To further finish up with my peeves, since I am not the quiet long suffering type, I also resent it when you are not honest with me . . . I do not mind playing the part of the heavy if If [sic] I know why and when I am supposed to take this role — please remember this for any future conspiracies. This is what I mean by your ‘‘honesty’’ of sin cerity [sic] if it sounds nicer thatway [sic]. (Huerta, 1964)
In another memo to Chávez, she wrote: ‘‘For the 10 Billionoth [sic] time, I have not given any orders to anyone outside of my Department. It is important as a sign of courtesy to check with me before you make false accusations’’ (Huerta, 1970).
Having the confidence to take immediate action was also part of Huerta’s fearlessness that fostered her public persona. Huerta directed others to be more assertive and active in whatever cause they might support, a principle in which she strongly believed. During marches or protests, she would shout ‘‘Don’t be a marshmallow!’’ (quoted in Baer, 1975, p. 38) to potential supporters to galvanize them to join in the protests, picket lines, and strikes. In one speech she emphasized immediate action rather than waiting for others to make decisions:
We’can’t [sic] really wait for legislation. You know there’s a lot of things that we can do right away. I think that the one thing that we’ve learned in our union is that you don’t wait. You just get out and you starting doing things. And you do things in such a way that you really help people to lay the foundations that you need. (Huerta, 1974)
Her emphasis on the need for action demonstrated her confidence in the UFW. According to Huerta, action at all levels, ranging from the individual to the entire structure of government and society, was useful.
Finally, Huerta’s rhetoric of courageousness fostered a sense of optimism, best illustrated in sí, se puede, as a rallying cry and challenge to action. Faith was another aspect of this optimistic persona, as Huerta noted: ‘‘We can make the changes as long as we have faith in ourselves’’ (Huerta, 2006). Faith, confidence, and optimism function rhetorically to inspire audiences (and rhetors) that change can and will occur. This commitment to differentialism and optimism reflects the future orientation of rhetorical agency, to imagine new possibilities and alternatives (Emirbayer & Mische,
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1998) in collaborative and collective ways, rather than allowing normative thinking to function as rhetorical constraints.
¡Sí, se puede!: Haciendo Caras and rhetorical agency
In this article, I have suggested that Dolores Huerta’s rhetoric, through haciendo caras, differential consciousness, and negotiation of gendered, racial, and classed constraints, illustrates a reframing and expanded understanding of rhetorical agency. Through the works of Bourdieu, Anzaldúa, and Sandoval, and illustrated through Huerta’s rhetoric, rhetorical agency can be understood as a process in which an agent negotiates past and present individual and societal dispositions (habitus) that constrain, limit, or facilitate one’s ability to create rhetorical space. While I have focused on some of Huerta’s individual rhetorical practices, her relationships with family, Chávez, and others, religion and spirituality (García, 2008), social movements, and other contextual facets also illustrate how agency functions beyond the individual agent. Some rhetorical scholars have suggested that rhetorical agency includes creative, inventive, collaborative, and resistive elements (Benacka, 2003; Campbell, 2005; Enck-Wanzer, 2006; Holling, 2000; Zaeske, 2003); haciendo caras and differential consciousness in Dolores Huerta’s rhetoric more fully explicates and expands these ideas through Huerta’s emphasis on flexibility, hope and optimism, resistance, transformation of self and others, and how she uses these tactics to negotiate intersectional identities related to gender, race, ethnicity, class, and national origin through language choices.
First, rhetorical agency, in Huerta’s rhetoric, is marked by flexibility (Sandoval, 2000), or as Bernadette Calafell explains, ‘‘the power of the shapeshifter and the power of Chicanas as translators. I guess we all get used to wearing different masks at different times’’ (Calafell, 2007, p. 57, citing Sarah Amira de la Garza). Although rhetorical scholars have argued that creativity, invention, craft, and form are facets of rhetorical agency, Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates to a fuller extent as to why flexibility and adaptability enable a rhetor to experiment, adapt, and resist dominant and normative rhetorical structures, especially for Chicanas and Latinas. That is, creativity in invention, style, and form is expanded through the rhetor’s ability to maintain flexibility while speaking or in the process of invention. Huerta’s use of multiple rhetorical caras illustrates her rhetorical flexibility and movidas that enabled her success as a rhetor. It is the constant rhetorical adaptations in haciendo caras, of using available means to negotiate rhetorical barriers related to race, ethnicity, gender, class, and religion, that fostered her sense of rhetorical agency, the ability to read audiences and create a response. Huerta had to adapt through a ‘‘process of taking and using whatever is necessary and available in order to negotiate, confront, or speak to power — and then moving on to new forms, expressions, and ethos when necessary — [as] a method for survival’’ (Sandoval, 2000, p. 28). She used rhetorical caras to adapt to in-group and out-group audiences, negotiating dominant ideologies, power, and material conditions as it suited her needs and contexts.
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Huerta’s caras of optimism and hope are also overarching currents within her rhetoric, an element of rhetorical agency little recognized by rhetorical scholars. Each of her caras — emotionality and passion, familia, collaborative egalitarianism, and courageous optimism — employ optimistic and futuristic orientations. Emirbayer and Mische, and others, have discussed the importance of the past, present, and future in the study of agency. However, a future orientation does not always suggest social change or optimism (e.g., complacent or apocalyptic rhetoric). Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates the specific examples and rhetorical successes in her orientation toward the future. One might have the right material and social conditions to create discursive space, but without a hopeful and optimistic vision for the future, that person may not seize available opportunities or attempt to negotiate rhetorical situations. Huerta and the UFW’s ¡Sí, se puede! is the best example of their hopeful optimism, even though there are many other examples. ‘‘Yes, we/one can’’ or ‘‘it can be done’’ imbues a powerful sense of agency with future orientation, one that is optimistic and hopeful for changing social conditions.
Furthermore, Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates the importance of the resistive nature of agency. Several rhetorical scholars have argued that agency can function resistively or subversively (Holling, 2000; Zaeske, 2003), yet more concrete examples are needed to illustrate the resistive element that Latinas employ to navigate gender, race, and class constraints. In essence, Huerta used caras through fearless, public, and embodied resistance, utilizing simultaneously expected and unexpected rhetorical styles such as motherhood and emotionality. That is, traditional and gendered audience assumptions might expect women to be both motherly and emotional, yet Huerta used motherhood and emotion in unexpected ways to disrupt dominant ways of thinking. As Chela Sandoval explains, ‘‘the citizen-subject can learn to identify, develop, and control the means of ideology, that is, marshal the knowledge necessary to ‘break with ideology’ while at the same time also speaking in, and from within, ideology’’ (Sandoval, 2000, p. 43). Huerta resisted dominant rhetorical styles, but also used such strategies when useful.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, rhetorical agency in Huerta’s case embod- ies transformation for both self and other. Holling (2000) and Enck-Wanzer (2006) illustrate how agency functions constitutively in Chicana feminism and the Young Lords’ social movement, respectively. Holling (2000) and Flores (1996) exam- ine identity construction in Chicana feminist rhetoric, specifically in the process of self-naming and self-labeling, while Enck-Wanzer’s work explores the consciousness- raising aspects of the Young Lords Organization’s 1969 garbage offensive. Huerta’s rhetoric illustrates two important additional functions. First, Huerta used the mask- ing function of haciendo caras to enact courage through más/caras, that is, a face of confidence that had the effect of diminishing her self-doubt and constituted a rhetor- ical attitude of empowerment. Second, Huerta was able to transform beyond herself through the repetition of key phrases that are simultaneously hopeful, optimistic, and resistive that helped the audience to constitute their own sense of transformation and
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empowerment. In the process of speaking out, Huerta also created space for audi- ence transformations through rhetorical collaborations, courage, and egalitarianism. Ultimately, rhetorical agency, through haciendo caras and differential consciousness, is transformative for both Huerta and her audiences.
Notes
1 Spanish grammar conventions require an accent on sí when translated to mean yes (si means if ). Because many writers in the United States did not have access to typewriters or computer programs that allowed the insertion of accents, often accents were/are not included for Spanish language words. In cases where authors did not include accents, I have not included them either, when quoting their materials. Here, Jensen and Hammerback (2002) do not include the accent on sí, nor do they note that sí, se puede can be translated as ‘‘yes, we can,’’ ‘‘yes, one can,’’ or ‘‘it can be done.’’ Se puede in Spanish is generally used to reflect the absence of an actor or the passive voice; in this case it can be translated in several different ways. The ambiguity of these translations is meaningful in the context of discussing rhetorical agency, which I discuss later in this article.
Acknowledgments
I would like to extend my gratitude to the numerous people who have read this article and offered invaluable comments, especially Richard Pineda, Michelle Holling, Sonja Foss, William Waters, Darrel Enck-Wanzer, and Catherine Palczewski, as well as anonymous reviewers and Angharad Valdivia.
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从性别、种族、民族和阶层角度谈修辞手段在Haciendo Caras 的作用和不同意识:对Dolores Huerta修辞学的研究
Stacey Sowards
美国德克萨斯大学传播系
【摘要】
本研究探 了美国 合 民 会副主席Dolores Huerta的修辞,并 大了修辞手段作 性 、民族、 族和 各方面 商的理 理解。Huerta的修辞 了修辞手段如何通 Gloria Anzald´ua所言的haciendo caras [外表与心灵]以及Chela Sandoval所言的有不同意 而起作用。通 使用 些修辞caras (手法),Huerta囊括了多 修辞 格手段来体现情 、家庭、平等主 和 ,并 使用来自社会和 生活中的 族、性 和 的因素来促 和限制 她的修辞手 段的感知。最 ,Huerta的caras(手法)和 商 性通 、反抗和 而成就她 的修辞手法。
La capacité d’agir rhétorique en tant que haciendo caras et conscience différentielle, selon le genre, la race, l’ethnicité et la classe sociale : une étude de la rhétorique de Dolores Huerta Stacey Sowards Cette étude explore la rhétorique de Dolores Huerta, vice-présidente du syndicat United Farm Workers of America. Elle développe la compréhension théorique de la capacité d’agir (agency) rhétorique comme étant une négociation entre des aspects intersectionnels de genre, d’ethnicité, de race et de classe sociale. La rhétorique de Huerta illustre les manières par lesquelles la capacité d’agir peut fonctionner à travers ce que Gloria Anzaldúa appelle haciendo caras (making face, making soul) et ce que Chela Sandoval nomme la conscience différentielle (differential consciousness). Utilisant ces caras rhétoriques, Huerta incarne la capacité d’agir collaborative par le biais de styles rhétoriques d’émotion, de familia (famille), d’égalitarisme et d’optimisme, usant de facteurs provenant de dispositions sociales et matérielles liées à l’ethnicité, au genre et à la classe sociale, qui tout à la fois permettent et restreignent son sentiment de capacité d’agir rhétorique. Finalement, les caras de Huerta et sa négociation de l’habitus donnent forme à sa capacité d’agir par l’optimisme, la résistance et la transformation.
Rhetorische Agentschaft als Haciendo Caras und differentielles Bewusstsein aus dem Blickwinkel von Geschlecht, Rasse, Ethnie und Klasse: Eine Untersuchung der Rhetorik von Dolores Huera
Stacey Sowards
Die Studie untersucht die Rhetorik von Dolores Huerta, Vizepräsidentin der Vereinigung der Farmarbeiter in Amerika, und erweitert das theoretische Verständnis von rhetorischer Agentschaft als die Vermittlung der intersektionalen Aspekte von Geschlecht, Ethnie, Rasse und Klasse. Huertas Rhetorik zeigt, wie rhetorische Agentschaft durch das, was Gloria Anzald´ua hacienda caras (einen Gesichtsausdruck machen, Seele machen) nennt und was Chela Sandoval differentielles Bewusstsein bezeichnet, funktionieren kann. Unter Verwendung dieser rhetorischen caras verkörpert Huerta die kollaborative Agentschaft durch eine rhetorische Art von Emotionalität, Familia (Familie), Egalitarismus und Optimismus und benutzt Faktoren der sozialen und materiellen Art, die sich auf Ethnie, Geschlecht und Klasse beziehen und ihrem Verständnis von rhetorischer Agentschaft sowohl zuträglich sind als es auch beschränken. Letztendlich formen Huertas caras und die Vermittlung von Habitus die rhetorische Agentschaft durch Optimismus, Widerstand und Transformation.
젠더, 종족, 민족, 그리고 계급의 렌즈를 통하여 Haciendo Caras와 차별적 인식으로서
수사학적인 수단: Dolores Huerta의 수사연구
Stacey Sowards
본 연구는미국 농부 협회 부회장인 Dolores Huerta 의 수사에 대한 연구이며, 젠더, 인종,
민족, 그리고 계급 상호교차적인 측면의 협상으로서 수사학적 수단의 이론적 이해를
확대한 것이다. Huerta 의 수사는 어떻게 수사적인 수단이 Gloria Anzald´ua 가 주장한
haciendo caras 를 통하여, 그리고 Chela Sandoval 가 주장한 차별적 인식을 통하여 기능할
수 있가를 보여주고 있다. 이러한 수사학적인 이론을 이용, Huerta 는 감성, 가족, 복음주의,
그리고 긍정주의의 수사학적인 형태를 통하여 집합적인 수단을 구현하였으며, 종족, 젠더,
그리고 계급과 관련된 사회적 그리고 물질적 성향으로부터의 요소들을 이용하여 그녀의
수사학적 감각을 가능하게 하고 제한하였다. 궁극적으로 Huerta 의 caras 와 체형의 협상은
긍정주의, 거부, 그리고 변환을 통하여 수사학적 수단을 형성하였다.
La Agencia Retórica en Haciendo Caras y la Consciencia Diferencial a través de las Lentes del Género, la Raza, la Etnicidad, y la Clase:
Una Revisión de la Retórica de Dolores Huerta Stacey Sowards
Department of Communication, University of Texas-El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA
Resumen
Este estudio explora la retórica de Dolores Huerta, vice-presidenta de los Trabajadores de Granja Unidos de América, y expande los entendimientos teóricos de la agencia retórica como una negociación de los aspectos de intersección del género, de la etnicidad, la raza y la clase. La retórica de Huerta ilustra cómo la agencia retórica puede funcionar a través de lo que Gloria Anzaldúa llama haciendo caras [haciendo el alma] y que Chela Sandoval llama la consciencia diferencial. Usando estas caras retóricas, Huerta representa la agencia colaborativa a través los estilos retóricos de la emocionalidad, la familia, la igualdad, y el optimismo, usando factores de las disposiciones sociales y materiales relacionadas con la etnicidad, el género, y la clase, que a la vez permite y constriñe su sentido de la agencia retórica. En última instancia, las caras de Huerta y la negociación del cuerpo dan forma a la agencia retórica a través del optimismo, la resistencia, y la transformación.
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University of Toronto Medical Journal138
Rhetoric as Mode of Inquiry The term rhetoric commonly brings to mind empty or deceptive speech (“mere rhetoric”); speech that is somehow suspect, and almost expected in the realms of politics and advertising, for exam- ple. (The rhetorical question – the question used for effect, and not really meant to be answered at all – is perhaps the best-known rhetorical device, and one that we usually learn about in high school.) However, while rhetoric includes this everyday meaning, it more properly refers to a discipline developed in ancient Greece and Rome that centred on the webbed relations among knowledge, belief, language, argument, speakers, and audiences. Ancient rhetor- ical theorists (Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero among them) devised a system for producing persuasive spoken and written texts, particu- larly within political, legislative, and ceremonial contexts; that sys- tem was called rhetoric.
Over the centuries, rhetoric has expanded to include the theory of both production and reception of texts, both spoken and written, and it has moved well beyond its original applications in public speaking to include more generally the persuasive element in all human interaction. Contemporary scholars of rhetoric note that all language seeks to persuade – even when it appears on the surface to seek only to inform. The success of any persuasive attempt depends on a variety of factors, such as the particular rhetorical strategies a speaker or writer employs, the receptiveness of the lis- tener or reader to the text, and the context in which the speech takes place. Because it depends on all of these factors, rhetoric is best studied not abstractly, but in the specific situations in which it occurs. Some of these situations occur in medicine- and health- related contexts. An awareness of rhetorical principles in medicine can, in turn, benefit medical practitioners and allied health profes- sionals by providing new perspectives on familiar (and sometimes intractable) problems of human interaction.
Persuasion is a central element in many medical situations. Patients without observable symptoms may need to persuade physicians that they are ill and in need of care; physicians may seek to persuade patients that they are well, despite feeling ill. Furthermore, physi- cians wish to persuade patients to adhere to diets, other regimens, and courses of treatment. Experts persuade the public to consider some conditions as pathological and others not. Pharmaceutical companies try to persuade consumers to request their products and physicians to prescribe them. Moreover, the very terms in which persuasion takes place in health and medicine themselves condition
When the editors of UTMJ introduced the journal’s new “Philosophy and Medicine” section in December 2003, they explained that its purpose was “to provide a forum for students to explore the interface between diverse schools of thought and how they contribute to the practice of modern medicine”.1 This move – providing space in the journal for health researchers from various backgrounds to share their knowledge and expe- rience – reflects a shift in the landscape of health and medicine. As neurologist and professor of Medical Humanities T.J. Murray explained in 1998, “We often use the term ‘med- ical science’ but this refers to the scientific knowledge used by medicine. Medicine is not a science. It is a caring profession that uses science.”2 The shift to a more encompassing idea for health is consistent with changes to the health research agenda in Canada. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (replac- ing the Medical Research Council) recognises that advances in biomedicine are a key factor, but not the only factor, in improv- ing the overall health of Canadians. The social sciences and humanities can suggest ways of tracking some of the psycho- logical and emotional – as well as socio-economic, cultural, eth- ical, and interpersonal – elements of health and health care.
The first article published in the journal’s “Philosophy and Medicine” section, by Raymond Jang, studied the relationship between medical education and moral reasoning.3 It asked, among other things, whether and how an “ethics of care” could figure into new doctors’ daily practices, where their decisions would be based on both intellectual and compassionate grounds. The second contribution, by Susan Lee and Ari Greenwald, explored patients’ roles in medical decision-mak- ing.4 It questioned how to reconcile patients’ autonomy in health care with physicians’ greater knowledge about medical matters. Both of these essays focus on interaction in medicine – between physicians and patients, medical theory and practice, scientific and humanistic views of medicine. Studies of human interaction can further be illuminated and extended through rhetoric, the theory of persuasion. In this essay, we introduce rhetorical theory into the wide-ranging study of health and medicine, and suggest some ways that a rhetorical perspective can offer insight into medical research and practice.
Realms of Rhetoric in Health and Medicine
Philosophy and Medicine
Colleen Derkatch, MA* Judy Z. Segal, PhD**
*PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia **Associate Professor, University of British Columbia
outcomes. The phrase “social anxiety disorder” persuades the very shy person that he or she may be a candidate for drug therapy; the word “breakthrough” persuades the public to imagine medical research as a particularly dramatic sort of enterprise; the phrase “fighting disease” persuades persons that they have failed at some- thing when they cannot stop being ill; the term “survivor” leaves the dead person looking somehow culpable. “Caregiver” creates a class of care-receivers and tips the economy of families; “antibac- terial” enters public discourse as a term of general praise.
Rhetorical criticism identifies the persuasive element in the dis- course of health and medicine, and asks “who is persuading whom of what?” and “what are the means of persuasion?” The goal of rhetorical criticism is a greater understanding of human action, while rhetorical theory as a whole has considerable explanatory power in a world in which we act upon each other by influence.
In the remainder of this essay, we outline some of the ways in which rhetorical principles are pertinent to medicine, paying partic- ular attention to how those applications can be useful to health practitioners. Rhetorical theory informs our discussion, but our primary concerns are practical. Therefore, we have divided our dis- cussion into loosely thematic categories that move from the heart of medicine toward increasingly global concerns. In short, we move from text to context. The following sections suggest some of the approaches one can take in studying the connections between rhetoric and medicine.
Everyday Texts in Medicine Medicine is preeminently a world of texts – of lab notes, medical journal articles, textbooks, case reports, patient charts, regulatory documents, insurance claims, pharmaceutical advertisements, and even prescriptions. These texts not only deliver information, they structure it as well. The form of texts determines significantly the kinds of information they can convey and governs how informa- tion is used. Although the persuasive functions of medical journal articles or case presentations can be trickier to tease out than, say, those of pharmaceutical advertisements, these seemingly neutral texts profoundly shape how both physicians and patients under- stand, interpret, and experience medical situations.
Medical journal articles, for example, present research in conven- tional and even regulated ways. Consider the IMRaD (Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion) structure that is strongly recom- mended in the uniform requirements for manuscripts submitted to biomedical journals. Persuasive strategies are also conventional, and they are expected, even if they are far less visible. For scientific find- ings to be published in medical journals, authors must persuade medical editors of the worth of their work; for findings to be noted and cited, these authors, now with the imprimatur of the journal, must persuade medical readers of that worth. So, not unlike classi- cal speechmakers seeking to persuade classical “judges” of the strength of their claims, medical authors use strategies of argumen- tation, organization, style, and presentation (basically, Aristotle’s four parts of rhetoric5) to persuade the relevant judges of the strength of theirs. Medical journal articles are no less rhetorical than other texts for being scientific – but they are also no less scientific
for being, irrepressibly, rhetorical. (A catalogue of common rhetor- ical strategies at work in medical journal articles is in Segal.6)
Collectively, medical journal articles constitute a genre, a common form or structure that is used to communicate similar kinds of information in similar kinds of ways. Think, for example, of news- paper articles or television guides, where the basic structure and purpose of the communication remain the same, but the content changes daily or weekly. Genres are not simply forms; rather they serve special functions, including social functions, in particular com- munities of discourse. They respond, in recognisable ways, to repeated and, in a sense, typified, rhetorical occasions – from pro- gram listings to medical journal articles. Rhetorical theorists Carol Berkenkotter and Thomas Huckin note that “[g]enres are the media through which scholars and scientists communicate with their peers. Genres are intimately linked to a discipline’s methodology, and they package information in ways that conform to a discipline’s norms, values, and ideology”.7 In other words, Berkenkotter and Huckin explain that genres “are the intellectual scaffolds on which community-based knowledge is constructed”.
Other textual genres also shape how medicine is practiced. Manuals of diagnostic criteria (such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the International Classification of Diseases) provide classifications that shape how researchers and practitioners identify, understand, study, and treat diseases. Carol Berkenkotter and Doris Ravotas note that “nosology [the classification of disease] as prac- tice (and genre) in psychiatry is informed by assumptions that have been appropriated from the biological classification of plants and animals”.8 They argue that by applying Linnaean botanical classifi- cations to psychiatric conditions, manuals such as the DSM reify diagnoses and make distinctions among conditions appear natural and inevitable. These nosologies, in turn, influence psychiatrists’ record-keeping activities, where Berkenkotter and Ravotas find the individual expressions and experiences of clients are absorbed “into a monological account reflecting the therapist’s professional inter- pretive framework”.8 Similarly, sociologist Aaron Cicourel notes that physicians translate patients’ accounts of distress into a set of complaints matching the store of diagnostic criteria.9 Sociologists Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star write that information avail- able to any practitioner “is at best what can be stored using the cur- rently available technology: the encyclopedia comes to mirror the affordances of its technological base.” “In this process,” they say, “people naturalize the historically contingent structuring of infor- mation; they often begin to see it as inevitable”.10 Bowker and Star show that classification itself is never neutral, while researchers like Cicourel and Berkenkotter and Ravotas demonstrate some of the practical effects of the classifications used – and used necessarily – in the practice of medicine.
Everyday medical genres are not only written; they can be oral as well. Case presentations constitute a genre, for example, whose rhetorical study can be illuminating for medical practice. Lorelei Lingard, Catherine Schryer, Kim Garwood, and Marlee Spafford (Lingard and Schryer are rhetorical theorists) studied the teaching of case presentations in medical schools. Their research was guid- ed by the question, “How (and how well) does the learning facili-
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similarly describes the disjunction between the “voice of the life- world” and the “voice of medicine.”15
One means of studying the ways in which medical practitioners and patients approach states of health, illness, and disease is nar- rative analysis. Kathryn Montgomery Hunter notes that medicine is steeped in narrative, or story.16 When a patient visits the doctor, she presents a narrative account of her symptoms; then the doc- tor, whose own work is made up of interconnected narratives (e.g. patient histories, case presentations, patient charts) compares that narrative against a sort of mental index of illness narratives to find a match – a diagnosis. Hunter focuses on doctors’ stories, study- ing how doctors talk to patients, each other, and themselves. She explains how their stories function epistemically: narrative structure is a way of knowing what shapes clinical judgement and guides decision-making.16 Arthur Kleinman looks at the flip side of nar- rative, at patients’ stories, to study how they give order and mean- ing to illness experiences, particularly in the case of chronic, debil- itating, or life-threatening conditions.13 Arthur Frank, a sociologist specializing in illness narratives, offers a taxonomy of such stories: “Restitution narratives,” – with the story-line, “Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy again” – are less useful to the patient’s personal development, according to Frank, than “quest narratives.” “Quest stories meet suffering head on; they accept illness and seek to use it”.17 In Frank’s view, the ill person is morally advanced somehow, and becomes exemplary, when his or her own illness is read through a quest narrative. Narrative analysis illuminates the patterns of meaning that patients and physicians marshal to make sense of illness and disease; these patterns can be framed, rhetorically, as “terministic screens.”
In the view of rhetorician Kenneth Burke, terministic screens describe the ability of terms to shape how we interpret human action in the world. He writes, “We must use terministic screens since we can’t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another”.18 As the studies described above show, the terministic screens of biomedical practitioners are shaped large- ly by an idiom of disease, where patient care is generally predicat- ed on the scientific model: the practitioner’s expert knowledge enables him or her to re-present a patient’s subjective illness expe- rience in “objective” medical terms as a diagnosis. Patients’ ter- ministic screens, on the other hand, are determined more signifi- cantly by the experience of illness, including pain, suffering, fear, limited ability, financial loss, and even dread.
An important case of the negotiation of doctor screens and patient/family screens is in decision-making for the end of life. A research project at a Canadian psychiatric hospital studied the process of consensual decision-making (decision-making by hospi- tal team members in conjunction with family members) on Advance Directives for seriously ill, cognitively impaired patients.19
Rhetorical analysis found that, despite efforts of the multidiscipli- nary hospital team to foreground the input of family members, there were structural elements of the decision-making meetings that privileged a medical “screen.” Meeting structure itself, in other
tated by the case presentation genre socialise the novice into the values and goals of a health profession discipline?”11 The authors found disjunctions between presentation ideals held by students and those held by faculty – disjunctions that, they sug- gest, may influence how new doctors move from educational to professional contexts. A central rhetorical principle, purpose (what is the discourse meant to accomplish?), is key to under- standing their findings. According to Lingard et al., students’ primary purposes in case presentations are to demonstrate their competence, seek guidance, and deflect criticism, while the pur- pose of faculty is effectively and efficiently to communicate knowledge of the patient’s case to care team members. This opposition of purposes, Lingard et al. argue, may negatively affect how students integrate faculty feedback into their work. The authors conclude that, if the dual purposes of case pre- sentation instruction as both the teaching of students and the men- toring of doctors were more openly addressed, students would be better prepared for the transition to the workplace.
While physicians regularly encounter certain everyday texts of med- icine – medical journal articles, diagnostic manuals, and case pre- sentations – other texts circulate in more subtle ways. One such text is the Hippocratic Oath. The Oath is typically recited at med- ical school graduation ceremonies (and is not elsewhere very much in evidence), yet it is understood to be one of the foundational ethical documents in medicine. Rhetorical theorist Lisa Keränen notes that the Oath is perhaps significant less for the moral approach it advocates than for the model of professional practice it implies.12 She points out that the Oath is neither a single coher- ent text, nor a text that, in any form, corresponds neatly to the values of contemporary medicine. Its recitation at graduate cere- monies then must serve social, rather than strictly moral, ends. Keränen links the practice of ritual recitation of the Oath to med- icine’s professionalization movement in the 1850s, and argues that recitation of the Oath in a communal setting binds practitioners to one another, situates them in a tradition, and reiterates a set of val- ues to unite them as a profession. The Oath, that is, performs an essentially rhetorical function.
Rhetoric in the Consulting Room Like medical journal articles and professional oaths, doctor-patient interviews constitute a medical genre. Unlike journal articles and oaths, however, doctor-patient interviews are an interactive genre. They are dynamic and dialogic; they unfold in real time and depend on the exchange between or among speakers with their own attitudes, beliefs, ideals, priorities, knowledge, and motives. While certain other medical genres (such as case presentations) share elements of dialogue, doctor-patient interviews highlight the different persuasive resources available to speakers from different backgrounds. In case presentations, interlocutors belong, essential- ly, to the same universe of discourse: the medical universe. In doc- tor-patient interviews by contrast, the participants belong to dif- ferent discursive universes. Physician-anthropologist Arthur Kleinman has called these the universe of illness (the patient’s expe- rience of bodily distress) and the universe of disease (the physician’s interpretation of pathology of the body)13 – a distinction also drawn by physician Eric Cassell.14 Anthropologist Elliot Mishler
words, functioned persuasively. For example, the medical account of the patient, provided by the physician, routinely was presented before the social account of the patient (the quality of life account), provided by the social worker and family members, and had a spe- cial prominence. Rhetorical analysis also found that the framing of treatment options by hospital team members went some way to influence the choices of family members – so a decision-making hierarchy was maintained, even while the decision-making model was consensual. For example, hospital team members tended to present decisions not to treat as “letting nature take its course” and resuscitation orders, for example, as “aggressive.” In the everyday language of patients and family members, the aggressive choice may seem the negative one (compared to the natural choice), even though, in the everyday language of physicians and other care- providers, “aggressive” is not a negative term, and aggressive treat- ment may indeed be valued positively.
Medical Metaphors and Models In the first two sections of this essay, we explored the ways that individuals perform rhetorically in medical contexts. We’ve looked at the kinds of information they exchange, how they exchange it, and what sorts of filters or screens shape their interpretations and interaction. In this section, we expand our discussion from acts of doing to acts of thinking, noting how conceptual models shape how biomedicine operates on individual, interpersonal, institutional, and legislative levels.
Metaphor is the quintessential rhetorical device. While “metaphor” is itself a common term, it is often seen as no more than a lin- guistic ornament or figure of speech – a decoration to spruce up otherwise “plain” talk. Metaphors are certainly useful as orna- ments, but they also have a more pervasive function in everyday life, functioning just below the threshold of ordinary perception. We often think and speak in metaphor without even realising that we’re doing it. Kenneth Burke playfully defines metaphor as “a device for seeing something in terms of something else. It brings out the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this”.20 Cognitive lin- guists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson define metaphors as map- pings of sets of conceptual correspondences. We don’t just describe something in terms of something else, they argue, but we also understand and experience it in those terms. We have no choice about thinking metaphorically, Lakoff and Johnson claim, because “metaphorical maps are part of our brains”.21
Metaphors are common elements of medical speech and medical thought. For example, rhetoricians Celeste Condit and Deirdre Condit examine two common genetic metaphors – genes as “blue- prints” and genes as “recipes,” and they invite us to think about the conceptual consequences, and indeed the social consequences, of thinking about genes in terms of one or the other – blueprints or recipes.22 They report that some critics of the enthusiasms of genetic researchers for example have found the blueprint metaphor too static, deterministic, and masculine – and arguably, too hos- pitable to rapid technological advance. These critics prefer the recipe metaphor, which they say is more dynamic, open to varia- tion, and amenable to a feminist perspective. Condit and Condit themselves speculate that the two metaphors are in fact more sim-
ilar than they appear, since both blueprints and recipes are essen- tially sets of instructions. Indeed, the recipe metaphor may back- fire, they say, and hasten the acceptance of genetic technologies by linking them with processes usually associated with family, nurtur- ing, and a sense of security.
One of the most widely cited works on the operations of metaphor in a medical context is an essay by anthropologist Emily Martin on representations of reproduction – in particular, the ten- dency in biological accounts of human reproduction to treat eggs as not simply female entities, but gendered feminine (that is, having qualities – like passivity – stereotypically associated with girls and women), and sperm as gendered masculine (having qualities – like adventurousness – stereotypically associated with boys and men). Martin notes that sperm production is typically described as an activity producing felicitous excess, while egg production is described as simply “wasteful.” (“So many eggs are formed only to die in the ovaries,” she quotes a biology textbook as saying.) “How is it,” Martin asks, “that positive images are denied to the bodies of women?”23 Martin finds that textbook accounts of the biology of reproduction also reproduce, at the same time as they are derived from, stereotypical images of the masculine and the feminine. The egg as feminine is irredeemable: if it is not utterly passive in its encounter with sperm (typically, it is “transported” or it “drifts” along), then the abrasive zona is aggressive and sets a trap (as one textbook says, to “capture the sperm with a single bond”).
Metaphor is also one of the primary means through which certain concepts are transported between different discursive universes, such as between the discourses of medicine and health policy. Judy Segal has suggested that key metaphors in biomedicine are bor- rowed into the debate on health policy and constrain it – metaphors such as health care is a business (more of a metaphor than it may seem), medicine is a war, and the body is a machine (or more recently, the body is a computer: with hard- and software, over-pro- grammed, overloaded, etc).24 If health care is a business, then care can be distributed differentially. If medicine is war, then interven- tion is a moral imperative. If the body is a machine, then repair is a sort of requirement of age. Kenneth Burke sets up a rhetorical view of the relation of biomedical terms and health policy debate when he explains that observations are not free, but are con- strained by the terms we use to make them. Many of our obser- vations, he says, “are but implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made.”18 (For a related discussion, see Malone.25)
Rhetoric and the Boundaries of Medicine Rhetoric, then, is a means of studying relations and intersections within medicine – between medical texts and medical practice, between experience and expertise, among people, and even among metaphors. In this essay, we’ve moved from topics relatively inter- nal to medicine (such as how medical texts shape medical practice) toward increasingly global topics (such as how conceptual models influence medical knowledge-making). In this final section, we step toward the edges of medicine to see where biomedicine intersects with other models of health and health care.
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ciplinary framework is a useful question for rhetorical study. (See Derkatch for more on this topic.29)
Conclusion Rhetoric, as a discipline, is a decidedly interdisciplinary enterprise. While some rhetorical critics are specifically trained in rhetorical history, theory, and analysis, scholars from many disciplines play a role in forming and elaborating a rhetorical view of the theory and practice of medicine. In this essay, we’ve cited works by human- ists, social scientists, and medical practitioners, all of whom inves- tigate – and illuminate – in various ways the interactive and per- suasive elements of health and medicine. We offer them as examples, as ways of imagining what rhetoric of health and medicine might look like. Such rhetorical studies all share, ulti- mately, an interest in developing a greater understanding of the various complicated, complex, and sometimes conflicting fac- tors at work in the field of health and medicine, both as it is currently and as it will be.
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pretation of the Sherbrooke Moral Development Study. UTMJ. 2003;81(1):55-57. 4. Lee S, Greenwald A. Patient autonomy: Swinging the pendulum back. UTMJ.
2004;81(3):251-253. 5. Aristotle. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. Ed. and trans. Lane Cooper. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1932. 6. Segal JZ. Strategies of influence in medical authorship. Soc Sci Med. 1993;37(4):521-
530. 7. Berkenkotter C, Huckin TN. Genre Knowledge in Disciplinary Communication:
Cognition/Culture/Power. Northvale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1995. 8. Berkenkotter C, Ravotas D. Genre as tool in the transmission of practice over time
and across professional boundaries. Mind, Culture, and Activity. 1997;4:256-274. 9. Cicourel AV. The reproduction of objective knowledge: common sense reasoning
in medical decision making. In: The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations. Böhme G, Stehr N (eds). Boston: D. Reidel:87-122, 1986.
10. Bowker GC, Star SL. Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
11. Lingard L, Schryer C, Garwood K, and Spafford M. “Talking the talk”: school and workplace genre tension in clerkship case presentations. Med Educ. 2003;37:612-620.
12, Keränen L. The Hippocratic Oath as epideictic rhetoric: reanimating medicine’s past for its future. JMH. 2001;21(1):55-68.
13. Kleinman A. The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
14. Cassell EJ. The Place of the Humanities in Medicine. New York: Hastings Centre, 1984.
15. Mishler EG. The Discourse of Medicine: Dialectics of Medical Interviews. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1984.
16. Hunter, KM. Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
17. Frank A. The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
18. Burke K. Terministic screens. In: Language as Symbolic Action. Berkeley: University of California Press:44-62, 1966.
19. Segal, JZ. What is a rhetoric of death? End-of-life decision-making at a psychiatric hospital. Technostyle. 2000;16:67-86.
20. Burke K. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945. 21. Lakoff G, Johnson M. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980. 22. Condit CM, Condit DM. Blueprints and recipes: gendered metaphors for genetic
medicine. JMH. 2001;22(1):29-39. 23. Martin E. The egg and the sperm: How science has constructed a romance based
on stereotypical male-female roles. Signs. 1991;16:485-501. 24. Segal JZ. Discourse and public policy: Some ways that metaphor constrains health
(care). JMH. 1997;18:217-231. 25. Malone R. Policy as product: Morality and metaphor in health policy discourse.
Hastings Cent Rep. 1999;29(3):16-22. 26. Eisenberg D, et al. Unconventional medicine in the United States: prevalence, costs,
and patterns of use. N Engl J Med. 1993;328(4):246-252. 27. Lay MM. The Rhetoric of Midwifery: Gender, Knowledge, and Power. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000. 28. Spoel P, James S. The textual standardization of midwives’ professional relation-
ships. Technostyle. 2003;19(1):3-29. 29. Derkatch C. Reporting the “New Science” of alternative medicine: shifting health
models in the media. Rhetoric at the Edges of Medical Practice, Canadian Society for the Study of Rhetoric. Winnipeg, MB, 2004.
In the western world, medicine is based on a scientific, biomedical model – most North Americans’ main (and often only) model of health and health care. However, as several landmark studies have demonstrated (especially Eisenberg et al.26), Canadians and Americans consume far more alternative health care (such as chi- ropractic, traditional Chinese medicine, and naturopathic medicine) than had been previously imagined. This revelation has sparked research into the relationships between mainstream and alternative models of health, and rhetoricians are among those at the fore- front of this research.
The incorporation of midwifery into mainstream medicine, for example, has raised questions about how different approaches to health (in this case, approaches to childbirth) come into contact with one another, and how these approaches are constituted in texts, both oral and written, and made persuasive. Rhetoricians Mary Lay and Philippa Spoel have studied the licensing and regulation of midwives in the United States and Canada, respectively. Focussing on public hearings on the licensing of lay (that is, not fully medically trained) midwives in Minnesota, Lay considers tes- timonies from midwives, parents, medical personnel, and lawyers, as they invoke issues of gender, knowledge, and power in their arguments.27 Spoel, with her co-author, midwife Susan James, investigates the self-regulation of Ontario midwives, studying the “key ideological and practical tensions that inform midwifery’s rhetorical negotiation of its new and uneasy status within the dom- inant healthcare system”.28 Both Lay and Spoel and James see in the negotiation of systems a competition of arguments, and demonstrate that rhetoric is an important element of the emer- gence of midwifery as an increasingly conventional practice.
The integration of alternative health philosophies into mainstream medicine poses rhetorical problems not only for alternative health practitioners, but for mainstream practitioners as well. In scientif- ic studies of alternative medicine, medical researchers grapple with questions of method, professional ethos, and models of health and disease. Unlike pharmaceuticals, chiropractic treatments, for exam- ple, cannot easily be tested through conventional scientific methodologies such as randomised controlled trials: because treat- ment involves the unmistakable physical action of moving the spine (often with an audible popping sound), it is difficult to con- trol or blind. Such methodological difficulties raise the important question of what it means to do scientific research when conven- tional scientific methods can’t be applied. This question brings up the related problem of professional ethos – an individual or pro- fession’s character, reputation, and authority – in the scientific study of alternative health. What does it mean for a medical researcher, as a member of a professional community, to study fringe practices such as homeopathy, especially in the case of pos- itive studies, which find some degree of efficacy? And finally, how do medical researchers reconcile their professional worldviews with findings that are incompatible with them? Acupuncture, for instance, has been identified as effective for pain management but its founding philosophy – enabling the flow of Qi, or energy, in the body – is incompatible with a biomedical understanding of health and disease. The question of how health professionals acknowledge the usefulness of such practices within their own dis-
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Queer Criticism and Sexual Normativity R. Anthony Slagle PhD a a University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras Published online: 12 Oct 2008.
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Queer Criticism and Sexual Normativity: The Case of Pee-wee Herman
R. Anthony Slagle, PhD
University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras
SUMMARY. One of the most useful aspects of queer theory is the criti- cal force that the perspective provides scholars. The tenets of queer the- ory provide scholars with a model to interrogate how sexuality and other differences play a fundamental role in rhetorical practice. Focusing on dif- ferences rather than similarities, queer critics seek to dismantle hierar- chies by blurring the definitions of specific identity categories. A framework for queer rhetorical criticism is described and illustrated with a variety of examples from popular culture. The model is further il- lustrated through an examination of the body of work of Pee-wee Herman. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Ser-
vice: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <[email protected]> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2003 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
Correspondence may be addressed: UPR Station, P.O. Box 22097, San Juan, PR 00931-2097 (E-mail: [email protected]).
The author wishes to thank Mary Garrett, Dale Brashers, Joseph Pilotta, R. Jeffrey Ringer, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments in preparing this manuscript. A substantially different version of this essay was part of the author’s doc- toral dissertation. In addition, a substantially different version of this essay was pre- sented at the Rhetoric Society of America convention in 1998.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Queer Criticism and Sexual Normativity: The Case of Pee-wee Herman.” Slagle, R. Anthony. Co-published simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality (Harrington Park Press, an imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 45, No. 2/3/4, 2003, pp. 129-146; and: Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s) (ed: Gust A. Yep, Karen E. Lovaas, and John P. Elia) Harrington Park Press, an imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc., 2003, pp. 129-146. Single or multiple copies of this article are available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-HAWORTH, 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST). E-mail address: [email protected]].
http://www.haworthpress.com/store/product.asp?sku=J082 2003 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
10.1300/J082v45n02_06 129
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KEYWORDS. Pee-wee Herman, popular culture, queer criticism, queer theory, rhetorical criticism
In recent years, a relatively new branch of social criticism and activism has emerged. Scholars from a diverse range of disciplines, concerned with the ab- sence of sexuality in mainstream theory, have begun to address the issues sur- rounding sexual identities. Collectively, these theories are referred to as queer theory. Queer theorists seek to illuminate the ways in which sexuality is a fun- damental influence in the ways that human beings behave and communicate. The tenets of this theory provide a foundation for criticism that is unique in terms of its focus.
To understand the fundamental ideas of both queer theory and activism, it is important to recognize the conditions that have led to the emergence of this radical new approach. Queer theory is a reaction to: (1) an oppressive, heterosexist mainstream, and (2) an approach to theory that focuses on social assimilation as its goal and has emphasized an essential notion of identity in order to foster collective activity.
The goals of queer theory are consistent with those of postmodernity. In particular, queer theory raises challenges to totalizing theory, entrenched val- ues, and essential identity categories. In line with postmodern theories, queer theorists view identity as fractured and individual. Queer theorists bring issues of sexuality–issues generally considered private and personal–to the fore through critical inquiry. Morton (1996) explains that queer theory “is seen as making an advance by opening up new space for the subject of desire, a space in which sexuality becomes primary” (p. 1).
In terms of the emergence of queer theory and activism, one must under- stand the distinction between the gay and lesbian liberation movements and the more recent queer movements. In general, people in the liberation move- ments have sought to allow gay men and lesbians participation within the dom- inant system. Whereas liberation theory has explicitly reified sexual identity and gender categories, queer theory is a progressive move toward inclusivity and the celebration of differences. In other words, the recent emergence of queer theory and activism is a reaction to the more conservative approach to framing identity of the liberationists. More broadly, in fact, queer theory is a reaction to other late 20th-century identity political movements that have gen- erally relied on essential identity constructions in order to form cohesive groups for political action.1
Perhaps the most useful aspect of queer theory is the critical force that the perspective provides scholars. In a narrow sense, queer theory provides schol- ars with a model to interrogate how sexuality plays a role in rhetorical practice. Queer criticism, however, has broad implications for how differences of any kind play themselves out in communication. In other words, because queer theory raises fundamental challenges about the essential nature of identities, a
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queer perspective could be useful in understanding the fluid nature of any identity. Queer theory can be viewed as an identity politics based on the differ- ences of the movement’s participants rather than on their similarities. While the implications of queer theory are potentially broad–at least in terms of how identity is understood as a rhetorical construction–my focus in this essay is on issues of sexuality and gender. I describe a framework for queer criticism and illustrate the concepts with examples from popular culture, and I conclude with the analysis of a body of work from the mass media. My primary goals in this essay are: (1) to provide a model for such a critical approach, and (2) to demonstrate how such a model might be useful in examining a particular rhe- torical phenomenon.
QUEER APPROACHES TO CRITICISM
Queer theory and criticism is broad in its scope. While it certainly involves the critique of language and discursive rhetoric, it also potentially includes any symbolic activity that focuses attention on sexual difference and identity con- structions (a kiss-in, for example). At the same time, any “queer” approach necessarily acknowledges that the world is diverse, and that any framework consistent with such a conviction must recognize that difference is both desir- able and unavoidable. With this in mind, the framework that I set up here is my own. It is, indeed, a framework for queer criticism, and yet it is by no means in- tended to be the “last word” on queer analysis. I am presenting one approach to queer criticism. I believe, nevertheless, that this framework accounts for the key issues that must be addressed in any queer model. Any queer framework must pose critical questions that help us to understand the role of difference in the construction of messages. I respect and encourage other approaches to queer analysis because I believe that no one framework can possibly account for all sexual differences. Queer critics, then, must hold firm to the belief that any one framework inherently privileges one world view over others. My ulti- mate goal, then, is to advance the conversation about how difference is theo- rized in critical studies.
Dominant vs. Oppositional Readings
In this essay, I am working from the postmodern assumption that texts are read differently by different people. To put this another way, texts are open to both dominant and oppositional readings. People read (or see, or hear, etc.) texts differently because experience and identity are essential to how they un- derstand the world. Furthermore, I assume that some texts lend themselves more easily to an oppositional reading, while for others a dominant reading may be more typical. An example of a text that has been read in multiple ways
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is the film version of The Wizard of Oz. The dominant reading of the film is that it is a charming children’s story about a young girl who wants nothing more than to return to her family. Others have read the film as a commentary on economic conditions during the early twentieth century (Littlefield, 1983). One theorist has argued that the Yellow Brick Road can serve as an analogy for the Information Superhighway (Gandy, 1994). Still others have given it a queer reading–the film is about a place where difference is celebrated (Doty, 1993).
Queer criticism, then, is aimed at uncovering and emphasizing sexuality in general, and sexual difference in particular, even though the dominant or tradi- tional reading of a particular text might differ from a queer reading. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that queerness is pervasive in texts, even those that are not intentionally queer. At the very least, a queer reading of main- stream texts is possible. Doty (1993), for example, argues: “I’ve got news for straight culture: your readings of texts are usually alternative ones for me, and they often seem like desperate attempts to deny the queerness of what is so clearly a part of mass culture” (p. xii).
Queer critics are interested in pointing to the ways that discourse in- tended for a mainstream audience frequently includes queer suggestions and undertones. In other words, queer critics are interested in pointing out to the mainstream that they are not as “normal” as they would like to believe.
Sometimes the explicit messages in mainstream discourse are heteronormative, yet a queer reading is possible. Implicit messages are sometimes queer, or, at the least, ambiguous. The 1948 western movie Red River is an example of a text in- tended for a mainstream audience with implicit queer messages. Red River is the story of a cattle drive across the Chisholm Trail in Texas. The film stars John Wayne, Montgomery Clift,2 and John Ireland. As Murray (1996) points out, “[s]exual repression runs rampant in this film, between both male and fe- male characters” (p. 178). In particular, the film involves sexual tension be- tween both Clift and Wayne as well as Clift and Ireland. In one scene with Clift and Ireland, the two compare guns. The scene can be read in different ways. On the one hand, the comparison of weapons is innocent. On the other hand, it is difficult to miss the sexual implications of the scene. In a line not unlike “I’ll show you mine if you show me yours,” Cherry (Ireland) says to Matt (Clift): “That’s a good looking gun you were about to use back there. Can I see it?” There is a brief pause and then he adds, “Maybe you’d like to see mine.” Matt hands the gun to Cherry who fondles it and says, “Nice. . . . Awful nice.” The two then take turns shooting the other’s gun, flirtatiously complimenting each other on how well they each handle the weapon of the other. The sexual under- tones in the film Red River are an example of a how mainstream text can chal- lenge the assumption that heterosexuality is the only sexuality that people experience in their lives.3
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Queer Criticism: Assumptions and Practice
With the notion of dominant and oppositional readings in mind, I turn my focus to a specific approach to queer criticism grounded in the premises of queer theory. In this section, I briefly discuss the premises of queer theory and provide some examples from the mass media to help illustrate these assump- tions. Finally, I conclude with a complete analysis of an extended example from popular culture.
Challenge of essentialism. One of the fundamental assumptions of queer theory is that essential notions of identity are problematic. Indeed, queer critics focus on the uniqueness of individual identities and celebrate the novelty of differences among all people (Seidman, 1993). Put another way, queer theory rejects any perspective that approaches the construction of identity from a uni- versal perspective. Rather than arguing that queers communicate in a particu- lar way, queer theory explodes the notion that individual identities and differences are constructed, communicated, and performed by individuals, and that individual communication varies widely from person to person. Thus, queer critics adamantly reject the idea that identity categories are a sufficient way to label the identities of groups of individuals. This is significant because queer critics reject any perspective that approaches discourse from a universal perspective. Furthermore, audiences are also composed of unique individuals; they are not the monolithic entities that mainstream theorists often assume.
Queer criticism examines artifacts for essential identity categories. Because queer theorists challenge the notion of a static, essential, or natural identity, a queer critique must focus on how identities are represented in the artifact. Queer criticism acknowledges that all human beings are, by their nature, unique. That is to say that no two people experience their identities in the same way. The critic engaged in queer criticism celebrates the diversity of humanity by emphasizing diversity and difference of those who are oppressed by the mainstream.
Jim Beam, the whiskey manufacturer, recently ran an advertising campaign designed to challenge traditional gender identity characteristics. In one of their advertisements, a seductive woman is shown smoking a cigar. To the side of the black-and-white picture, a caption reads: “Get in touch with your mascu- line side.” Under the caption is a small color photograph of a bottle of Jim Beam whiskey. This advertisement pushes the boundaries of what is generally considered feminine. The ad implies that smoking a cigar is traditionally a male characteristic. Likewise, drinking whiskey is, supposedly, a male charac- teristic as well. The artifact challenges the notion that supposedly masculine gender characteristics are appropriate only for biological males.
Privacy. Queer theorists insist that sexuality is a critical element of individ- ual human identity. This is consistent with the contention raised by feminist critics who argue that “gender is a critical dimension of humanness that func- tions as a lens that affects all human perceptions” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp,
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1991, p. 322). Like gender, sexual difference functions in much the same way: individuals understand the world based upon their individual identity charac- teristics.
Queer critics resist the notion that sexuality is only a matter of sexual be- havior, and they contend that to reduce sexuality to this is to deny that sexual- ity comes into play in many aspects of human life. To be sure, queer theorists and critics do not deny the relevance of sexual activity. However, these critics and theorists also contend that the imposed silence on queer sex is both hypo- critical and puritanical. Nevertheless, queer critics argue that sexuality cannot be reduced to sexual activity.
Thus, queer criticism raises a fundamental challenge to the idea that sexual- ity is a “private” matter that is not appropriate for public display (Warner, 1993). A great deal of mainstream discourse has argued, at least implicitly, that sexuality is best left to the bedroom. Queer theorists contend that sexuality is always a fundamental part of everything that we do in our lives. Put another way, our sexuality is always present, and always influential in the decisions that we make about our lives in general, and our communication in particular. Queer criticism focuses attention on sexuality whenever it is explicit or im- plicit in discourse. Furthermore, queer criticism insists that individual sexualities are a fundamental aspect of who we are as human beings; sexuality, then, cannot or should not be viewed as a peripheral issue of identity. In other words, sexuality is always–and, indeed, it must be–invariably public.
Queer criticism, then, both draws attention to and challenges the notion that sexuality is a private matter that is best left in the bedroom. For queer critics, when people suggest that it is inappropriate to discuss issues of sexuality, they are really saying that nonnormative sexualities are inappropriate. The dog- matic insistence upon silence when it comes to queer sexualities does not, in practice, apply to those with normative sexualities. Queer critics draw atten- tion to the fact that heterosexuality is frequently displayed publicly. Such dis- plays include the fact that heterosexuals are able to walk down the street holding hands, or sit in the park kissing. It is not unusual to see heterosexuals have photographs of their husbands or wives and children on their desks in the workplace. Marriage is another example of the celebration of normative sexu- ality–engagements and marriages are typically announced in the newspaper.
When queers try to celebrate their relationships in similar ways, they are, at best, accused of making something public that people don’t want to hear about or, at worst, they are accused of trying to destroy the most fundamental institu- tion upon which society is built (the nuclear family). Queer critics draw atten- tion to the hypocrisy of such a double standard, and they emphasize that if people were secure in their own sexual roles they would have no reason to feel threatened by sexualities that differ from their own.
The challenge to privacy has led to numerous controversies over so-called “outing.” Activists who advocate outing reveal the sexual orientation of peo- ple who are in the closet. Michelangelo Signorile (1993) advocates outing in
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cases where people in positions of power could do potential harm to queer rights by remaining closeted. More recently, Andrew Sullivan, an openly gay conservative writer, was “outed” in another sense. Sullivan, who is HIV posi- tive, and has written at length criticizing promiscuity and sexual behavior, par- ticularly in the age of AIDS, was outed for placing personal ads on America Online, using the screen name RawMuscleGlutes, seeking sexual encounters (Goldstein, 2001). Specifically, Sullivan was seeking men interested in barebacking, a term for men who have sex without condoms. Sullivan did indi- cate that he preferred men who are “poz,” but he also indicated an interest in “bi scenes,” orgies, groups, and “gang bangs.” Goldstein points out that “[t]his hardly fit the gay ideal Sullivan had created in his book Virtually Normal. In fact, RawMuscleGlutes is just the sort of ‘pathological’ creature who raises Sullivan’s wrath” (Goldstein, 2001). Sullivan responded by admitting that he had placed the ad, but added that his private life is his own business and that for journalists to reveal the details of his sex life is nothing short of “sexual McCarthyism I find repugnant and evil” (Sullivan, 2001). Sullivan remains unwilling to concede the hypocrisy that exists between his moralistic rhetoric about gay men and his own irresponsible behavior. I agree that Sullivan’s sex life is not really the issue. Instead, the real scandal is that Sullivan has the power to be the self-proclaimed moral center of the queer community.
Heteronormativity. Queer criticism challenges the heteronormative as- sumptions in the mainstream (Seidman, 1993; Warner, 1993). In other words, queer rhetoric insists that there is nothing necessarily “normal” about being heterosexual. In this world view, those who are not heterosexual are labeled as deviant. When heterosexuality is seen as “normal” or “natural,” other sexualities are seen as “abnormal,” “unnatural,” or they are ignored entirely (Butler, 1990; Fuss, 1991; Morrison, 1992; Smyth, 1992). In popular culture, this notion abounds. We are bombarded every day with messages that tell us not only that heterosexuality is the only acceptable way to live our lives, but also that a partic- ular kind of heterosexuality is normative; that is, we are told regularly by a vari- ety of sources that, at least in the United States, the nuclear family is the foundation of everything that we believe as a nation. Queer criticism rejects the idea that normative heterosexuality is the only acceptable sexual posture. Queer theory is critical of dominant models that view heterosexuality as the only “nor- mal” form of sexual expression because these models leave no room for dis- courses that come from other perspectives.
The force of queer criticism is that it illuminates normative heterosexual privilege in discourse. Put another way, queer criticism challenges the notion that traditional heterosexual relationships are the only normal sexual expres- sion, to the exclusion of other sexual possibilities.4 Queer rhetorical criticism celebrates the range of queer sexual expression, which can, indeed, include normative heterosexual expression to the extent that heterosexual construc- tions of the world do not dismiss or diminish queer sexualities. For this reason, some have argued that there are “straight queers” (Powers, 1993). Straight
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queers are individuals who immerse themselves in queer cultures and ideolo- gies, yet their objects of sexual desire are members of the opposite sex. In other words, they are queer except in terms of sexual activity.5 Straight queers pro- vide a unique challenge to dominant ideologies; that is, they challenge the dominant notion that sexual object choices define queerness (as is the case with “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “homosexual,” and “straight”).
The debates in Congress during 1996 over the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) were filled with language that reinforced this notion (Smith, 1997). For example, these debates emphasized that “marriage is a legal bond between one man and one woman.” Even for heterosexuals, non-monogamous relation- ships are condemned; non-procreative relationships are not given the same emphasis in our society as relationships that produce children, to say nothing of relationships between members of the same sex, or combinations of more than two individuals regardless of the biological sex of the participants.
Queer critics draw attention to texts that emphasize sexual fluidity and am- biguity (Morrison, 1992; Sedgwick, 1990). Queer criticism should, whenever possible, demonstrate the possibility for multiple sexualities. In a recent adver- tising campaign, for example, Catalyst, a fragrance by Halston, ran an ad that was open to multiple readings. The advertisement includes a picture of Wil- liam Baldwin, a well-known actor. Baldwin’s hair is disheveled, and he is wearing an unbuttoned white dress shirt (revealing his muscular chest) tucked into his trousers, and a dark sport coat. He is looking directly at the photogra- pher, with a smirk on his face. Floating in front of the black-and-white picture of Baldwin is a shelf of some sort supporting three different shaped containers that apparently hold the cologne. There are two captions in the advertisement. The first, “Boys like to experiment,” is set on Baldwin’s bare chest. The sec- ond caption, “CATALYST,” is set on Baldwin’s crotch. This advertisement is rich in sexual messages, and is notable for the ambiguity that is present in the presentation. One reading of the advertisement might take a scientific ap- proach–the containers look remarkably like beakers and test tubes. On the other hand, the beakers are also remarkably phallic in nature. In addition, the containers are different shapes and sizes. Hence, the advertisement suggests that “boys like to experiment” sexually. This includes, as suggested by the presence of the phallic containers, experiments with the same sex.
Even the placement of the captions in the advertisement is sexually signifi- cant. In order to read the captions, the reader is drawn to both Baldwin’s crotch and his bare chest. Furthermore, one of the phallic containers (a test tube-like container) is placed so that it extends directly from the top of Baldwin’s trou- sers to the middle of his chest as if Baldwin has a rather long erection. It is im- portant to note that the advertisement is apparently directed at men; in small type at the bottom of the page is the text, “The new fragrance chemistry for men. By HALSTON.”
Assimilation. Queer critics adamantly argue that queers are not interested in assimilating seamlessly into an unchanged mainstream (Seidman, 1993;
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Tierney, 1993). For example, queer critics reject the rhetoric of gay liberation that strives to make sexual identity something that should ultimately not be a factor in determining who is allowed to participate in society, and who is not. Queer critics argue that individual sexual differences are significant, that queers are unique, and that these differences still do not justify oppression.
Finally, it is important to remember that queer criticism has an explicitly ac- tivist agenda; that is, queer criticism seeks to dismantle the existing social or- der that silences queer voices in our society. Queer critics attempt to construct a world in which sexual difference is not only acknowledged, but celebrated. Queer theorists argue that it is not sufficient to point out that oppression and domination merely exist; instead, a major goal of queer criticism is to point to the potential for progressive change in the social structure.
THE PRACTICE OF QUEER CRITICISM: PEE-WEE’S QUEER ADVENTURE
The film and television work of Pee-wee Herman (the stage/screen name of actor Paul Reubens6) provides interesting fodder for queer analysis. Perhaps the most interesting thing to note about this discourse is that both the television show Pee-wee’s Playhouse as well as two full-length feature films, Big Top Pee-wee and Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, were geared to children. Indeed, Pee-wee’s Playhouse was a part of CBS’s regular Saturday morning line-up for several seasons. Nevertheless, they are all rich in potential alternative read- ings. In this section, I examine both the television series and the film Pee-wee’s Big Adventure.
Pee-wee’s Playhouse, the Saturday morning television series, was based on The Pee-wee Herman Show, a “sexually risque work of performance art” (Penley, 1993, p. 132) that had been successfully produced in Los Angeles. In the television series, the sexual references were dealt with much more subtly than in the stage production, for obvious reasons. Penley (1993) explains that the stage production was “fully scatological (the secret word was ‘latrine’), and entirely sadistic and voyeuristic. There were jokes about wienies, doggy doo, underwear, open flies, vaginal smells, anal intercourse, masturbation, and sexually transmitted diseases, among others” (p. 132). Nevertheless, while the later work was toned down somewhat, subtle sexual references remained.
Characters
In terms of challenging assimilation, Pee-wee Herman is much like Peter Pan: he is a boy who refuses to grow up. Indeed, in both the television series and the movies, Pee-wee lives alone in his “playhouse,” and he associates with other characters who are physically adults, and yet have never outgrown child- hood. Pee-wee Herman rides a bicycle (indeed, the plot of Pee-wee’s Big Ad-
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venture revolves around Pee-wee’s search for his stolen bicycle), plays with toys (and his food), and revels in practical jokes (stink bombs, fake vomit, etc.). Pee-wee Herman, then, challenges the normative expectation that he should act like an adult.
The character of Pee-wee Herman is a camp version of the classic portrayal of homosexuals as sissies. The stereotype has been pervasive throughout the history of film and television. Even when, for any number of reasons, explicit references to homosexuality have not been permitted, film makers have used “the sissy” to represent non-normative sexualities (Russo, 1987).7 While one might argue that Pee-wee Herman reinforces such a stereotype, the camp na- ture of his portrayal of the sissy might also be read as poking fun at the stereo- type. The character of Pee-wee Herman is portrayed as an extreme version of the sissy: he dresses well (except for the white socks he wears with his trade- mark grey suit), he skips, he giggles, indeed nearly everything that he does is carried to an effeminate extreme. While the characterization is carried to an ex- treme, Pee-wee still remains popular with most other characters in both the television program and in the films. In Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, Pee-wee is embraced by a motorcycle gang, an escaped convict, movie executives, and a hyper-feminine waitress. In other words, Pee-wee is popular despite his sissyness–a break from the traditional representation of the sissy as something to be avoided.
In this body of work, we find a myriad of characters who cross borders be- tween normative ideas about sexuality, gender, and age. Cross dressing, for example, is a regular activity in Pee-wee’s world. In Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, Pee-wee dresses as a woman twice. The first time he dresses as the wife of Mickey, an escaped convict who picked Pee-wee up while he was hitchhiking to Texas. Pee-wee’s plan was to divert attention from the police in a roadblock who were searching for the escaped convict. Not surprisingly, Pee-wee and Mickey are successful. Interestingly, though, Pee-wee in drag is a turn-on to both the officer at the roadblock and to Mickey. The officer asks Pee-wee to step out of the car so that he can look at “her” pretty dress, to which Pee-wee responds, “Why don’t you take a picture, it’ll last longer.” After being cleared through the roadblock, Pee-wee remains in the dress (apparently content in the reversal of roles), and Mickey looks over at him with a lascivious grin, clearly titillated by seeing Pee-wee in a dress. The second instance of cross-dressing occurs later in the film when Pee-wee dresses as a nun8 in order to get onto a movie set. It is worth noting that nuns, for any number of reasons, are fre- quently the object of queer camp.9
Pee-wee Herman’s films and television programs are packed with camp representations of particular identities, both male and female. In Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, for example, several of the major male characters are presented as hyper-masculine. Specifically, the waitress’s boyfriend is portrayed as a ste- reotypical redneck complete with a hunting cap and red flannel shirt. Mickey,
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the escaped convict, is also characterized as an exaggerated version of mascu- linity.
The female characters in the film are also camp representations of feminin- ity. Simone, the waitress who befriends Pee-wee, is characterized as a super-feminine woman who wants nothing more than to go to Paris, which she describes as the “city of dreams.” Large Marge, the ghost of a truck driver who picks Pee-wee up while he is hitchhiking, is another camp characterization, but of a different sort than Simone. Marge is portrayed as a hyper-masculinized woman who drives a semi–an exaggeration of the stereotype that driving a truck is supposedly a man’s job.
Pee-wee’s Playhouse is also loaded with campy characters. Miss Yvonne, much like Simone, is represented as a super-feminine coquette–in this case, Yvonne even has big, blonde hair. Cowboy Curtis is portrayed as a caricature of a rough and tough cowboy. Tito, the lifeguard, is portrayed as a body-build- ing hunk with a perfect tan. It is worth noting that Tito rarely wears any cloth- ing except for a skimpy bathing suit. Balfour (1993) explains that “the one time Tito is compelled to dress up, he wears a purple tuxedo jacket without shirt, tie or pants. It is Tito, rather than any of the women, who ranks as the most eligible and desirable libidinal attachment in the topsy-turvy world of the playhouse” (p. 145).
Pee-wee’s television series and films are brimming with characters who are icons of queer desire. Bruce (cited in Penley, 1993) explains that it is beyond the fact that Pee-wee is surrounded by attractive men,
it’s rather that each represents a specific gay male icon, prominent fan- tasy figures in homosexual pornography (although in the context of the Playhouse made human and friendly), including the sailor (Captain Carl), the black cowboy (Cowboy Curtis), and the muscular, scant- ily-clad lifeguard (Tito), not to mention the escaped con (Mickey) in Pee-wee’s Big Adventure. (p. 133)
Finally, Jambi the genie is portrayed as a flamboyant character who grants Pee-wee one wish in each episode. Jambi is presented as having only a head, and he resides in a box with doors that Pee-wee can open and close. In the stage production, Jambi receives a pair of hands that he ordered through the mail. When they arrive, Pee-wee delivers them to Jambi, who asks Pee-wee to close the door to his box because, he explains, “there is something that I have been wanting to do for a long time.”
Sexual Innuendo
In terms of challenging assimilationist assumptions of sexuality, the dis- course of Pee-wee Herman is subtler for the simple reason that children are the target audience. Nevertheless, sexual innuendo runs rampant in both the films
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and television series. Early in Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, Pee-wee is asked by his “girlfriend” Dotty about going to the drive-in with her. Pee-wee is visibly disgusted by the idea that he would go on a date with Dotty, and he replies to her by saying in the most “butch” voice that he can muster:
Dotty, there’s a lot of things about me you don’t know anything about, Dotty. Things you wouldn’t understand. Things you couldn’t under- stand. Things you shouldn’t understand. . . . You don’t wanna get mixed up with a guy like me. I’m a loner, Dotty. A rebel. So long, Dotty.
Pee-wee then turns on his heels, walks out of the store, and giggles the trade- mark “Pee-wee-esque” giggle. This line can be understood on multiple levels. For children, it is not likely to have any meaning other than that Pee-wee is not interested in dating Dotty; young children, afterall, are seldom interested in members of the opposite sex (generally, they are perceived as having “coo- ties”). For a more sophisticated audience, the line potentially has much more significance; there are things about Pee-wee that are kept secret, and he rebels against mainstream norms of what it means to be a man. The line is almost pro- phetic in terms of what is still to come in the film. While there are certain as- pects of Pee-wee’s identity that should be kept quiet (by normative standards), the audience occasionally gets a glimpse of them in the film.
As I pointed out above, there is an obvious need for subtlety in both the films and television series, given that the target audience is children. Neverthe- less, both the television series and films are loaded with references to sexual difference. At the end of Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, after Pee-wee has recov- ered his bicycle, most of the characters from the film are gathered at a drive-in watching Pee-wee’s Big Adventure, apparently the Hollywood version of what had happened to Pee-wee. We see Pee-wee apparently having just left the snack bar. As he is walking back to where he is watching the film, he walks past all of the friends that he has made during his adventure. When he reaches a grey bus, Mickey, the escaped convict, leans out of one of the windows to greet Pee-wee. Pee-wee tells Mickey that he has a “footlong” for him and winks. At this point, a guard checks the hot dog and finds a file hidden inside the bun. While it is unlikely that children would understand the sexual reference, most adults would not miss it. This reference is particularly interesting given the sexual tension between Pee-wee and Mickey while Pee-wee was in drag.
In the television series, sexual references are common as well. In one epi- sode, at a playhouse party, Tito and Miss Yvonne are dancing, and Pee-wee asks if he can cut in. Miss Yvonne nods her approval, and Pee-wee steps in and begins dancing with Tito. Only a few moments pass, and Pee-wee backs away from Tito giggling and begins dancing with Miss Yvonne. Although this is a brief moment, it is notable because it shakes the sexual order.
In another, lengthier example, Cowboy Curtis asks Pee-wee to coach him before his date with Miss Yvonne. Balfour (1993) explains that “Curtis com-
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plains of having never been out on a fancy date with a woman–one wonders if he’s been on any kind of date with a woman–and the Cowntess (a cow who oc- casionally wears a muumuu) ropes Pee-wee into pretending to be Miss Yvonne for Curtis’s benefit” (p. 145). At first, Pee-wee objects because he “doesn’t want to be a girl.” Nevertheless, the Cowntess encourages him that he can have some fun with it. Pee-wee agrees, and dives into the role. He takes on a falsetto voice, talks about wearing lipstick (which, of course, he already does), hairspray and a dress, and flirts with Cowboy Curtis. After several min- utes of this (sexual) play, Curtis attempts to kiss Pee-wee goodnight. Order is finally restored when Pee-wee protests to the kiss. This scenario is made even more significant by the fact that the moral for the show is “Be Yourself.” Balfour explains that this moral can be interpreted in more than one way:
One imagines the reading the network and sponsors could offer with a sigh of relief: “Be Yourself” that is to say, boys will be boys, girls will be girls. For in the end the traditional shakedown of masculine boys and feminine girls is duly restored. But again the narrative resolution hardly obviates all that has gone before it. A principal effect of Pee-wee’s his- trionics, whatever the outcome of the episode, is to unsettle culturally codified notions of masculine and feminine, indeed to twist them around. (pp. 145-146)
In another example from the television series, Pee-wee has decided to re- model the playhouse and has invited all of his friends to help. Miss Yvonne shows up, as usual, wearing a formal dress (complete with frills). Pee-wee is concerned that Miss Yvonne’s dress will get dirty. Miss Yvonne tells Pee-wee not to worry about it because her motto, and the theme for this particular epi- sode, is to “Be Prepared.” With that said, she pulls a clear plastic overcoat out of her purse to cover her dress. In addition, she puts on a clear plastic cap to cover her hair. The safe sex allusion is likely to be obvious to most adults watching the program, but it is not likely to be clear to the child viewers of the show.
(Hetero)Normativity and Pee-wee
The early stage production, the television series, and the films of Pee-wee Herman are rich in examples of how queer discourse challenges normative dictates about sexual and gender identities. In particular, Herman’s characters challenge essentialist notions of what it means to be men and women, as well as essentialist notions of sexual identities (although these references are much more subtle). While on one level it could be argued that Herman’s characters reinforce essentialist stereotypes, it is important to consider the camp nature of their presentation. All of the characters in Pee-wee’s world are carried to ex- tremes through the use of camp as a rhetorical strategy. So, rather than rein-
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forcing the stereotypes, Herman/Reubens is making fun of them; he makes them seem silly and ridiculous.
Second, Herman/Reubens challenges the notion that individuals who are different should assimilate into the mainstream in terms of how they will be- have, and with whom they will interact. Indeed, one message of Pee-wee’s work is that people should not be afraid to be themselves, regardless of societal norms in terms of identity and behavior. For Herman, differences must be cele- brated. As Penley (1993) explains:
Although multiplying and celebrating “differences” can risk leveling or vitiating crucial political categories of difference, I would argue that here, in the context of Saturday morning television, the Playhouse’s dizzying presentation of difference, accompanied by a constant plea for tolerance, show a sharp understanding of how one might go about reordering (atti- tudes toward) difference, even under the gaze of the masters of the televi- sion universe. (pp. 137-138)
Finally, the notion that sexuality is something that should be kept quiet is dealt with in interesting ways in the work of Herman/Reubens. On the one hand, given that the television series and films are geared to children, refer- ences to sexuality are generally quite subtle, or, at the least, well above the heads of children viewers. On the other hand, as I have already pointed out, the frequently explicit message of Pee-wee is that individuals should not be afraid to be individuals, and the diverse sexual references reinforce this message. In other words, the message to a sophisticated audience is that sexual differences exist, should be celebrated, and should not be kept silent.
CONCLUSION
Queer theory provides a framework for understanding how differences are constructed and communicated. In other words, unlike the liberation rhetorics, queer criticism does not seek to demonstrate how human beings are similar, but it focuses, instead, on difference as a site of power and knowledge. Put an- other way, queer theory rejects the notion of “grand theory.” It is not possible to make sweeping claims about the ways that queers (or anyone else for that matter) communicate with one another. Instead, queer criticism examines texts for the ways that they either challenge or maintain a status quo in which differ- ences are denigrated.
Queer criticism, like queer theory and activism, has an activist agenda. Queer critics do not stop after describing rhetorical practice. This criticism is particularly useful in the sense that it helps us to understand how power rela- tionships have been constructed, why these relationships are problematic, and how differences can be a progressive site for social change.
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Queer critics challenge the binaries that have been used to construct a social order that silences sexual differences. Queer criticism is useful in helping peo- ple to understand that the world would be a better place if we celebrated differ- ences, rather than forced people to fit into molds of what most consider “normal.” Queer criticism, then, highlights heteronormativity in mainstream and liberation discourse.
Furthermore, queer rhetorical critics seek to dismantle hierarchy by blur- ring the definitions of specific identity categories. In other words, queer critics de-emphasize the specificity of all identity categories (gay, lesbian, straight, etc.). Ambiguity is frequently introduced to demonstrate that few people actu- ally fit into the rigid limits of such categories. Queer criticism is guided by the assumption that when definitions of “normal” begin to shift, particular differ- ences will not be privileged over others. Obviously, this is an ideal that queer theorists and queer critics are working toward.
To summarize, queer critics are not interested only in demonstrating that oppression exists. Queer criticism, instead, is interested in demonstrating: (1) that queer perspectives are not valued, (2) that queer experience is fre- quently silenced, (3) that heteronormativity is rampant in both theory and dis- course, and (4) that difference–particularly sexual difference–is an important, and largely unexplored, site for social change. Queer criticism, while taking aim at identity categories and the effects of such categories, does not abandon identity as a site of knowledge and political activity, but attempts to render identity permanently open and contestable as to its meaning and political role. Put another way, queer critics shift the terms of identity. Rather than focusing on identity and group identification from the perspective of essentialized simi- larities, queer critics point to the differences that exist among members of groups. Rather than dismissing any particular sexual identity, queer critics are interested in creating a changed social structure in which all sexual identities are celebrated, and no identity is perceived as better or more appealing than any other.
NOTES
1. The distinction between the liberation movements and the queer movements have been written about elsewhere. It is important to note that the early liberation move- ments did not focus on assimilation as a primary goal, but a distinct shift occurred at some point in the 1970s. For more explanation of the liberation movements, see Altman, 1982; Chesebro, 1994; Chesebro, Cragan, and McCullough, 1981; Darsey, 1981; Darsey, 1991; Gamson, 1996; Kennedy and Davis, 1993; Moraga, 1983; Morin and Garfinkle, 1981; Nogle, 1981; Phelan, 1993; Reid-Pharr, 1993; Sears, 1987; Seidman, 1993; Seidman, 1994; and Slagle, 1995.
2. Throughout his life, Montgomery Clift had a relatively fluid sexuality. As Murray (1996) explains:
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Clift’s sexuality was rather well known in Hollywood (on the set of The Misfits, Clark Gable referred to him as that “faggot”), though he did his best to keep his private life just that. He wasn’t always successful: In 1949, he was arrested for trying to pick up a hustler on 42nd Street; the charges were subsequently dropped. Though a bisexual who took delight in his sexual conquests of both men and women, Clift was not totally comfortable with his gayness (which was his preference), and he was often tormented by it. This anxiety, coupled with drug and alcohol abuse caused the actor to burn-out before his time. John Huston, who directed The Mis- fits, said, “The combination of drugs, drinking, and being homosexual was a soup that was too much for him.” Clift died of a heart attack at the age of 46.
3. The flirtatious relationship between Clift’s and Ireland’s characters is not the only example of a queer subtext in the film. In fact, the relationship between Clift’s and John Wayne’s characters, while far from explicit, also challenges heteronormativity. The sexual tension between the two characters comes to a climax at the end of the film when “Hawks’ only use for Joanne Dru is to have her tell John Wayne and Montgom- ery Clift what we can already see. ‘Stop fighting! . . . You two know you love each other’” (Russo, 1987, p. 78).
4. I should note that this does not reduce to a binary relationship between heterosex- ual and homosexual, or straight and gay. Instead, queer rhetoric focuses on the relation- ship between heterosexuality as “normal” and queer as deviant. It would be accurate to contend that queer theory forces a binary between normal and queer. This binary, how- ever, is non-essentializing; that is, queer allows for a range of identity characteristics without fixing them.
5. Ann Powers (1993) explains that straight queers, like herself, “pass” as queer: “Queer straights don’t just hang around; what they do is pass. They carefully maneuver their rhetoric toward ambiguity of desire and display, leaving aside questions of the private” (p. 24).
6. Reubens generally took on the character of Pee-wee Herman outside the context of the television program and films. Rather than listing Paul Reubens in the credits of pro- ductions, Pee-wee Herman was listed as the star. In fact, Penley (1993) points out when reporters have been granted an interview with the star, they “are warned that they will be interviewing Pee-wee, not Paul Reubens” (p. 130).
7. Russo (1987) is also critical of the sexist nature of the sissy stereotype. He con- tends that:
Homosexuality in the movies, whether overtly sexual or not, has always been seen in terms of what is or what is not masculine. . . . [I]t is supposed to be an insult to call a man effeminate, for it means he is like a woman and therefore not as valuable as a “real” man. The popular notion of gayness is rooted in sexism. (pp. 4-5)
8. This is not the only instance in Pee-wee’s work that he poses as a nun. In one epi- sode of Pee-wee’s Playhouse, he takes out a pair of giant underpants and demonstrates how useful they can be. In the skit, “he places a pair of truly humongous Fruit of the Looms over his head to show how this simple everyday garment can be turned into a nun’s habit or Rapunzel’s flowing hair” (Penley, 1993, p. 126).
9. One activist group, trying to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS issues, dresses as nuns and refers to themselves as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence. Recently the musical Nunsense, which is campy anyway, was performed Off-Broadway by a group of male actors (renamed Nunsense, A-Men!). Another well known camp portrayal of nuns is the nuns in Whoopi Goldberg’s Sister Act movies, although these are not intended as “queer” (they are certainly open to a queer reading, like any artifact).
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