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ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT THEORY

Schools of management thought have evolved over the past century to provide conceptual maps of how to deal with internal and external challenges. These conceptual maps include theories of how things work, what causes what, and how to act. The theories are not mutually exclusive and can serve as multi-dimensional or multilayered models to guide managerial action. Executives benefit from being familiar with, and adept at using, many of these conceptual maps. This is no easy task; it is akin to being ambidextrous, both left-brain and right-brain, and more a fox than a hedgehog (Berlin, 1953).

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Early Writings on Bureaucracy and Organization

Western management theory received its early impetus in the writings of Max Weber (1964), a German sociologist writing about the Prussian civil service in the late nineteenth century. Weber described the prominent features of this “bureaucracy” (literally, government by bureaus or offices) in terms of offices and officeholders, a vertical hierarchical ordering of these offices into organizational pyramids, a horizontal division of labor that separated offices and their functions, the use of explicit procedures to govern activities, the presence of records and files, and the selection of officeholders based on achievement rather than ascription. For Weber, bureaucracy was that form of administrative organization that operated under legal authority and was capable of the highest level of efficiency.

Research suggests that the bureaucratic model of organization is technically efficient and even superior to other forms under certain environmental, technological, and task conditions (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1967). There is also considerable research on how to apply this model to the six common pathologies of the bureaucratic division of labor (Bacharach, Bamberger, and Conley, 1990):

· Role overlap (duplication): two roles perform the same task

· Role gap (accountability): neither role performs the needed task

· Role underuse (boredom): role not assigned enough tasks

· Role overload (burnout): role assigned too many tasks

· Role ambiguity (anxiety): role not clear what the tasks are

· Role conflict (stress): role’s tasks are at cross-purposes

Bureaucracies are endemic to all organizations, including those in the health care industry. The degree of bureaucracy tends to be associated with both the firm’s size and age. Thus, bureaucracy is less pronounced in small work groups and entrepreneurial startups (e.g., biotechnology firms) and more pronounced in hospitals and large consolidated firms (e.g., pharmaceuticals). Hospitals are peculiar bureaucracies in that they feature a “dual hierarchy”—a centralized system governing the nonmedical activities and a decentralized, collegial one governing the medical staff (Begun, Luke, and Pointer, 1990; Pool, 1991). Physician group practices, the majority of which are quite small, are peculiar in that they feature consensual governance rather than a bureaucracy. As many researchers have noted, physicians dislike and distrust authority (Burns and Wholey, 2000).

There is nothing inherently evil in bureaucracy, even though in modern parlance it has taken on a negative connotation of poor service, lack of responsiveness, and inscrutable, byzantine operation. At its essence, management and bureaucracy are all about “control.” The word “manage” derives from the French word manege, used in dressage, meaning to put a horse through its paces (Braverman, 1974). The challenge for the modern manager is to utilize the clarifying elements of bureaucracy (e.g., to resolve the six pathologies above) while at the same time avoiding the classic bureaucratic pitfalls of too many hierarchical levels that separate executives at the top from frontline workers down below, or too many horizontal divisions or units that effectively create boundaries inside and outside the firm, which impede interaction and the flow of information, or too many rules and regulations, which stifle creative problem-solving. Chapters 3, 4, and 8 in this book consider these issues.

IN PRACTICE: Efforts to Deal with Bureaucratic Dysfunctions

Considerable research has highlighted the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucracy including its inward focus (rather than focus on the client or the environment), its tendency to rigidity and inertia, and its stultifying effects on individual creativity and thus organizational change. Nothing has changed here; as late as the 1980s and 1990s, major firms such as General Electric (GE) used change programs like “Work-Out” to attack their bureaucracies (Ulrich, Kerr, and Ashkenas, 2002). After downsizing its workforce, GE found that the remaining managers and employees had more work and responsibilities to handle. To reduce the load, they gathered employee suggestions for how to get non-value-adding work out of GE’s processes (hence, the title of the program). The company discovered that Work-Out was more than just trimming excess work, however. It was also an “exercise” work-out for employees to study and diagram their work processes, as well as a mechanism for conflict resolution as different departments worked out their differences in how processes overlapping their areas might be simplified.

Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management

The scientific management school (Taylor, 1911) extended the Weberian model by explicitly emphasizing the “control” element of bureaucracy. Scientific management was an attempt to apply the methods of science to increasingly complex problems of controlling work in rapidly growing firms (Braverman, 1974). For example, Frederick Taylor employed time-motion studies to analyze a steelworker’s task into its simplest components and then systematically improve the worker’s performance of each component to maximize productivity and ensure conformity to the one best way of production. Such thinking became embedded in assembly-line technologies like auto making by industrialists like Henry Ford.

Scientific management had an enormous impact on management practice and theory for decades to come. Of particular importance to us are three assumptions. First, Taylor assumed that workers were guided by intuition and variable training, and thus were unable to perform their tasks in the best way. Instead, armed with scientific techniques (e.g., time-motion studies), management must control every aspect of the labor process and dictate precisely how it should be done. Workers were left with no discretion in their jobs, while managers were vested with all decision making regarding task design. This separation of decision making at the top from execution/implementation down below in the firm came to pervade all management and strategy thinking (Mintzberg, 1994). A second related assumption was that management needed to closely supervise workers to ensure adherence to standardized tasks and prevent any “soldiering” (deliberate restriction of output); rather than being intrinsically motivated, workers responded primarily to monetary incentives and external control. Third, due to the large variability in how to do one’s job (e.g., which methods, which tools), scientific management focused on reducing the variations and finding the one best way to perform the work in order to maximize productivity.

This school presaged several recent movements in management thinking. The emphasis on decomposing tasks into their constituent elements and worker training anticipated the early work on job design; later efforts to amend this approach included the job redesign approach (Hackman, 1975, 1983), human factors engineering (Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman 1959), and the quality of work life movement. These topics are taken up in Chapters 3 and 5. The emphasis on reducing variations in work anticipated the later work of W. Edwards Deming and total quality management movement in the United States of the 1980s—a topic taken up in Chapter 9. And the emphasis on specialized tasks and productivity anticipated the focused factories of the 1980s and 1990s (Herzlinger, 1997).

Classical School of Administration The writings of Gulick (1937), Gulick and Urwick (1937), and Fayol (1949) took many of the concepts developed by Weber and Taylor and formulated them into general principles of management—essentially continuing Taylor’s view of “one best way” to manage. These principles included unity of command (i.e., one boss), unity of direction (one objective, one plan, one boss), subordination of individual interest to general interest, centralization, authority, span of control (optimal number of people to supervise), and departmentalization (Fayol, 1949). Such principles directed managerial practice for much of the twentieth century.

Departmentalization has been one of the most enduring principles articulated by this school. These writers identified two principal models for the firm’s division of labor: process departmentalization and purpose departmentalization. These have since been relabeled functional and divisional organization: organizing by functional area versus organizing by product line, customer, or geographic area. Alfred Chandler (1962) depicted the large-scale shift in the organization of American enterprise from the former to the latter. Twenty years later, Goldsmith (1981) described a similar transformation taking place among U.S. hospitals. Efforts to commingle the two forms of management gave rise to matrix structures utilized both in industry and in health care (Burns, 1989; Galbraith, 1973). Alternative forms of departmentalization comprise the core of thinking on organization design and coordination, the topic of Chapter 3.

Human Relations School The human relations school developed a model of worker motivation that sharply differed from the Taylorist approach, and thus suggested a different way of management. Work conducted by Elton Mayo (1945) and Roethlisberger and Dickson (1947) at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company ironically began as a Taylorism project to assess the impact of lighting changes on worker productivity. In contrast to Taylor’s focus on individual workers and their jobs, their research anticipated Kurt Lewin’s (1951) insight about the primacy of the group in structuring individual behavior. 1617The findings implied that to improve productivity, management must attend to a new set of considerations beyond monetary incentives and top-down control of work. Managers must instead understand the informal organization of workers (groups, group sentiments, team work), the need of workers to be listened to and participate in the design of their work (participation, self-governance), and the importance of morale and satisfaction as motivators of worker effort. Group structure and process are considered in Chapter 5; communication skills are discussed in Chapter 6.

Mayo’s work suggested that workers are less rational than Taylor believed, guided less by financial incentives and more by human sentiments. Workers were also motivated to be accepted by their peer groups and achieve social solidarity. Finally, workers had an array of goals and needs that did not necessarily coincide with, or were subordinated to, the firm’s interests. This insight led to an entirely new managerial approach called “organization development,” which recognized the interdependence of the organization and groups of employees, and sought ways to simultaneously achieve both the firm’s goals and those of its workers. By extension, this school paved the way for later recognition of the employee as the firm’s key asset.

Subsequent research and writing expanded the human relations school’s approach. Douglas McGregor (1960) contrasted this school and its emphasis on managing human resources (Theory Y) with scientific management and its emphasis on control and coercion (Theory X). For McGregor, human relations management sought ways to integrate the firm and the worker, as well as ways to harness the worker’s creativity and imagination. Taking account of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs, McGregor argued that satisfying the worker’s higher-order needs of belongingness, esteem and self-actualization was critical. Herzberg refined Maslow’s approach and suggested that such intrinsic motivation was inherently satisfying, while extrinsic factors were merely dissatisfying if not met. These approaches led to the entire field of job-redesign (Hackman, 1981) and self-managing work teams. The topics of motivating people and developing teams are considered in Chapters 4 and 5.

Contingency Theory of Leadership

By the mid-twentieth century, two schools of management thought had been established. One argued for greater structure, control, top-down decision making, and reliance on extrinsic rewards (Theory X); the other argued for more participative management, self-governance, bottom-up decision making, and reliance on intrinsic rewards (Theory Y). For decades these schools were often (but erroneously) viewed as polar opposites. Subsequent research conducted during the 1960s and 1970s (summarized in Bass, 1981) suggested the choice of leadership style is not either-or. Instead, the effectiveness of specific management approaches depends on key situational factors (see Chapter 2).

Decision-Making School The decision-making school of management—also labeled the “Neo-Weberian” model (Perrow, 1986)—developed during the 1950s and 1960s, spearheaded by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947). This school focused as much on how decisions were made and goals were set as on the structure of the firm—but all within a context with which Weber and scientific managers were comfortable: control of the work process and the worker.

In contrast to both scientific management and human relations, the decision-making school focused neither on top executives or lower-level workers, but rather on the large cadre of middle managers that had developed inside the large firms of the mid-twentieth century. Such managers and their decisions needed to be controlled. Because of limits on managers’ cognition—known as bounded rationality—decision making needed to be guided by “satisficing” behavior (limited search among alternative options, and selection of first acceptable solution) and the use of “programs” and “routines” (e.g., solutions or problem-solving paths used before) (cf. Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958). Such approaches served as points of stability and biases against innovation by narrowing the strategic choices available to managers. Decision making was also organized and controlled through means-ends hierarchies, in which the goal (ends) of one layer of management (e.g., increase profits) became translated into sub-goals (means) pursued by the subordinate layer of management (e.g., raise revenues, decrease costs). They also presaged the “garbage can model” of decision making, in which solutions have a life of their own distinct from the problems they are called on to solve, and may behave as answers looking for questions to solve (March, 1994).

The decision-making school had entirely different views of worker motivation as well. Rather than viewing workers as 1718extrinsically or intrinsically motivated, or having goals that were shared or divergent from the firm, researchers described “inducements-contributions contracts” through which the firm and the worker engaged in exchange (Barnard, 1938). This had implications for the goals pursued by the firm. There was no necessary harmony or consistency in the goals pursued. Instead, firms could have multiple coalitions, each in pursuit of their own sub-goals. Conflict could thus exist internally, and conflict resolution was never complete. Agreement on firm goals was thus accomplished through bargaining and negotiation. This school of thought thus presaged more political theories of the firm, which viewed organizations not as unified hierarchies but as competing coalitions pursuing self-interests (see Chapter 7).

Finally, the decision-making school introduced several new themes in organization theory and analysis. Rather than overt supervision and control espoused in Taylorism and scientific management, this school emphasized more unobtrusive controls over managerial decisions and behaviors. These controls included: standard operating procedures (SOPs), decision-making routines, socialization and training, organizational vocabularies and communication, and uncertainty absorption strategies (e.g., techniques to filter, process, edit, classify, and restrict the flow of information inside the firm).