Social Responsibility

UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

DONALD LANGE Arizona State University

NATHAN T. WASHBURN Thunderbird School of Global Management

Notwithstanding the significance to organizations of external reactions to bad behav- ior, the corporate social responsibility literature tends to focus on the meaning of and expectations for responsible behavior, rather than on the meaning of irresponsible behavior. Here we develop a theoretical perspective that explicitly focuses on irre- sponsibility and that particularly helps explain attributions of social irresponsibility in the minds of the firm’s observers. In contrast to approaches in the corporate social responsibility literature that tend to deemphasize the role of the individual perceiver of firm behavior in favor of emphasizing such broader social structures as value systems, institutions, and stakeholder relations, our focus is on how the social reality of external expectations for social responsibility is rooted in the perceptions of the beholder. We draw on attribution theory to describe how attributions of irresponsibil- ity stem from the observer’s subjective assessments of effect undesirability, corporate culpability, and affected party noncomplicity. We describe how those assessments affect each other and how they are influenced by the observer’s perceptions of effect and firm characteristics and by the observer’s social identification with the affected party or the implicated corporation. We conclude by describing the important role of frames on irresponsibility attributions.

Widespread external perceptions that a firm has acted in a socially irresponsible manner can have negative consequences for a firm, since an organization’s success—indeed its sur- vival—depends, in part, on satisfying normative expectations from its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2008). When organizational action seems controversial to observers and constituents, the firm risks losing current and potential members, as well as outside endorse- ment and support, and it risks providing “am- munition for adversaries” (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992: 712). An organization that is seen as a bad actor in society can have a hard time attracting customers, investors, and employees (Fombrun, 1996). Indeed, ample evidence from empirical research shows that counternormative behavior can lead to such consequences for the firm as lawsuits, financial losses through settlements and sales declines, increases in the cost of cap- ital, market share deterioration, network partner

loss, or other costs associated with a negative reputation (e.g., Baucus & Baucus, 1997; David- son, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994; Haunschild, Sulli- van, & Page, 2006; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Strachan, Smith, & Beedles, 1983).

In spite of the demonstrated significance to organizations of reactions to bad behavior, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature tends to focus on the meaning of and expecta- tions for responsible behavior, rather than on the meaning of irresponsible behavior. Irre- sponsibility, distinct from responsibility, is often not discussed explicitly in the CSR litera- ture,1 but the implication is that irresponsibility is simply the opposite side of the responsibility coin—that is, the failure to act responsibly. Here we develop a theoretical perspective that ex- plicitly focuses on irresponsibility and that par- ticularly helps explain attributions of social ir- responsibility in the minds of the firm’s observers.

We are grateful to former associate editor Jean-Philippe Bonardi and the three anonymous reviewers for providing challenging and insightful feedback throughout the review process.

1 A number of counterexamples to this tendency include Mattingly and Berman (2006); Strike, Gao, and Bansal (2006); Doh, Howton, Howton, and Siegel (2010); and Muller and Kräussl (2011).

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One reason that perceptions of social irre- sponsibility are of particular interest is that they have a greater capacity to arouse the firm’s ob- servers. Research on human perception shows that there is significant asymmetry between the cognitive processing that observers do in re- sponse to negative (adverse or threatening) events and the cognitive processing they do in response to positive events (Baumeister, Brat- slavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Fiske & Tay- lor, 2008; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). When con- fronted with negative behavior, people will spend more time thinking about it than positive or neutral behavior, they will search more ex- tensively for causal information, and their re- sulting judgments, allegations, and actions will be more extreme (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Taylor, 1991). As Shaver observes, “People are never blamed for doing good” (1985: 3). Con- sequently, perceptions of social irresponsibility are likely to generate stronger observer reac- tions and ultimately loom much larger for the firm than perceptions of social responsibility (Frooman, 1997; McGuire, Dow, & Argheyd, 2003; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rin- dova, 2010; Rao & Hamilton, 1996).

Moreover—and owing to the heightened cog- nitive activity and intensified causal search as- sociated with negative behavior—attributions of social irresponsibility are of particular inter- est because they lend themselves to a focus on the individual’s perceptions. Thus, they provide a context for considering how social under- standings of firm behavior in terms of appropri- ateness and responsibility ultimately are rooted in the interpretations and knowledge held by individual observers of the firm (cf. Bitektine, 2011). This is important because, as a driver of consequences for the firm, especially in terms of the firm’s relationship with its environment, cor- porate behavior is socially irresponsible only to the extent that observers perceive it as such. Yet in the CSR literature researchers have paid rel- atively little attention to the question of how such perceptions of firm irresponsibility come to be. A commonality among different lines of CSR research, whether from the stakeholder (e.g., Barnett, 2007), economic (e.g., Margolis & Walsh, 2003), reputation (e.g., Bertels & Peloza, 2008), social contract (e.g., Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999), or institutional (e.g., Campbell, 2007) perspec- tive, is that each, in its own way, models envi- ronmental expectations for socially responsible

behavior as a fairly stable social reality. This approach is useful in many ways, but it risks confusing expectations for social responsibility as universal law and ignores the role of the human observer in evaluating the firm’s behav- ior in light of socially constructed expectations (cf. Berger & Luckman, 1967: 187). In contrast to the prevailing approach to environmental ex- pectations found in the CSR literature—an ap- proach that deemphasizes the role of the indi- vidual perceiver of firm behavior in favor of emphasizing such broader social structures as value systems, institutions, and stakeholder re- lations—our focus here is on how the social reality of firm irresponsibility has its roots in the perceptions of the beholder.

ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

In this article we consider how subjective un- derstandings and interpretations of firm behav- ior can add up to perceptions of corporate social irresponsibility. The subjective nature of those understandings and interpretations might un- derlie, for example, the greater degree of public disdain directed at BP in the United States in the wake of its 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill relative to the public disdain directed at Royal Dutch Shell—in spite of Shell’s association with mas- sive amounts of oil spilled over the past fifty years, causing tremendous environmental destruction in the Niger Delta (Nossiter, 2010). Similarly, the subjective nature of observer un- derstandings and interpretations might under- lie the higher level of public scorn directed at Ford Motor Company in the 1970s for its Pinto model relative to that directed at its competitors with their own compact cars. The Ford Pinto became known as a deathtrap and one of the worst cars ever made (Dowie, 1977), even though other compact cars on the market at the time (e.g., Chevrolet Vega, AMC Gremlin, Toyota Co- rolla, Volkswagen Beetle) shared many of the Pinto’s design flaws and had similar track re- cords in terms of occupant deaths per million cars in operation (Schwartz, 1991). Ford execu- tives were characterized as having “deliber- ately and intentionally made a high-level cor- porate decision which they knew would kill or maim a known and finite number of people” (Schwartz, 1991: 1036), while other carmakers es- caped this attribution.

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Certainly, as with most of the countless exam- ples where one firm or firm action is widely seen as more socially irresponsible than another, there are identifiable characteristics of the BP and Pinto situations that lend themselves to subjective perceptions of irresponsibility. With respect to BP, the Gulf spill was relatively con- centrated in time, especially compared to incre- mental spills occurring over many years, and it followed a dramatic oil platform explosion that killed oil workers. From the perspective of United States observers, the BP spill was geo- graphically proximate, and it had an immediate negative economic impact. All of these charac- teristics distinguished BP’s profile in the Gulf oil spill situation from Shell’s profile in the Niger Delta oil spill situation. With respect to Ford, the Pinto was associated, in lawsuits and press re- ports, not just with the debilitating injuries and deaths of its occupants, including children, but also with automobile fires and explosions. Moreover, Ford was associated in the press— accurately or not—with callous and heartless corporate decision making, including a putative internal and secretive cost-benefit analysis in which the financial cost to Ford of the human lives predicted to be lost in Pintos was com- pared to the cost of making the Pinto safer (Gioia, 1992). All of these characteristics distin- guished Ford’s profile in the Pinto situation from its competitors’ profiles.

Our objective is to achieve a better under- standing of these kinds of effects, whereby char- acteristics within given situations predictably skew subjective perceptions and, in particular, an observer’s perception that a firm is socially irresponsible. Understanding these effects is valuable not only for researchers but also for practitioners, since subjective perceptions help constitute the external environment within which the firm must exist and with which the firm must interact. As Wry notes with respect to how external observers react to a firm and its behavior, “Individuals act based on perceptions, not objective reality” (2009: 156). An observer’s belief that a firm has the quality of social irre- sponsibility is, in effect, an attribution—a term that we use from attribution theory to describe an observer’s explanations of the firm’s behav- iors and outcomes in terms of firm and situa- tional characteristics. Indeed, attribution theory provides the theoretical foundation in this article as we develop our descriptive model of

perceptions of corporate social irresponsibility. Attribution theory—which is, in reality, a collec- tion of theories and theoretical perspectives (Kelley & Michela, 1980)—was developed in so- cial psychology and extended to organization studies (Martinko, 2004) and is devoted to the nature, causes, and consequences of attribu- tions (e.g., Hamilton, 1980; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Lord & Smith, 1983; Martinko, 2004). At the level of the observer, the idea of corporate social irresponsibility is a cog- nitive structure, or schema, meaning that it is an element of the observer’s abstract expectations about how the world operates (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). We draw on arguments central to attribu- tion theory, especially about how observers form causal inferences (Heider, 1958; Kelley & Mi- chela, 1980) and moral judgments (Brewin & Antaki, 1987; Hamilton, 1980; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972), to help explain the factors that may lead observers to categorize observations of firm behavior as fitting the so- cial irresponsibility schema.

While the firm and situation being observed have specific qualities that exist independent of an observer, in this article we explore the theo- retical mechanisms that influence an observer’s attention to and interpretation of those qualities. Corporate social irresponsibility attributions are rationally derived as the observer considers the evidence about the firm’s behavior and sit- uation, but because those attributions are de- pendent upon the individual’s attention and in- terpretation, they are highly subjective. As Fiske and Taylor write, attribution is “far from logical and thorough” (1991: 553).

The primary theoretical mechanisms affecting observer attention and interpretation, and there- fore underpinning our model of corporate social irresponsibility attributions, involve (1) observer rational judgment and inference, (2) observer bi- ases and perceptual limitations that skew per- ceptions of the firm and situation, and (3) the sensitivity of observer assessments to the ways that others have filtered and framed information about the firm and situation. As we describe in our model development below, observer rational judgment and inference include considerations of evidence about the firm’s intent with respect to a negative social effect, about the affected party’s power and foresight with respect to the effect, and about characteristics of the firm and

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situation that provide clues as to whether the firm was indeed causal.

Playing a large role in our model development are the theoretical mechanisms of observer bi- ases and perceptual limitations. We describe how observer attributions are shaped by ten- dencies toward self and ingroup protection. These observer tendencies produce biases that can result in selective attention, skewed interpretation, and gap filling in response to missing or ambiguous evidence (Fiske & Tay- lor, 2008). We also describe how observer bi- ases and perceptual limitations help explain how attention and interpretation can be influ- enced by specific qualities of the effect— including negativity, seriousness, unexpect- edness, and concentration in time and space— and by specific qualities of the implicated firm—including size and prominence. Addi- tionally, observer attention and interpretation can be influenced by the observer’s possible preexisting categorization of the firm as fitting the schema of social irresponsibility.

Moreover, we describe how the observer’s judgments and inferences are sensitive to the accounts and apologies offered by the firm, as well as to the way that third parties have fil- tered and framed the information about the firm, effect, and affected party (Snow & Benford, 1988; Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Such accounts, apolo- gies, and frames are commonly available to the firm’s observers, predominantly emanating from or transmitted by the media. Because of the fre- quent association of corporations with ill effects, and because corporations are such an omni- present, socially significant, and influential fea- ture of modern life, it is likely that the general observer is quite accustomed and attentive to narratives from the firm or from third parties that attempt to disassociate or associate the firm with bad behavior. Such narratives reso- nate in the context of widespread cultural con- cerns about organizations in general. Those cul- tural concerns derive from the ubiquity of organizations and their reach into all aspects of social life, combined with pervasive suspicions that as firms prioritize profits over social inter- ests, they may act in ways that are exploitive and immoral (Korten, 2001; Scott, 2003).

Attribution theory most often conceptualizes the targets of attributions as individual actors, but the same theoretical explanations can be relevant when a social group is the target of

attributions (Sherman & Percy, 2010; Yzerbyt, Ro- gier, & Fiske, 1998). A social group will be per- ceived analogously to an individual for the pur- poses of attribution when it is perceived as having a high degree of entitativity, meaning that the group is seen as a coherent, unified, and meaningful entity (Campbell, 1958; Lickel et al., 2000; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997; Yzerbyt et al., 1998). “The difference between perceptions of individuals and groups virtually disappears when a group is high in perceived entitativity” (Sherman & Percy, 2010: 149). This would be the case for corporations, which are perceived by outsiders as coherent, unified, and meaningful entities. As Sherman and Percy write, “Despite the fact that corporations consti- tute groups of people rather than individuals, the entitativity of such groups leads them to be viewed much like cohesive individuals” (2010: 168). Accordingly, the model we develop in this article positions the corporation as the target of perceiver attributions, under the assump- tion that perceivers view the corporation as if it were a cohesive individual to be held re- sponsible for its behaviors and outcomes.

THREE PRIMARY FACTORS UNDERLYING CORPORATE SOCIAL

IRRESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS

To model corporate social irresponsibility at- tributions, we start by assuming a knowledge- able and reasonable observer, albeit subject to typical human cognitive limitations, biases, and spontaneous reactions. We suggest that when such an observer makes an attribution of social irresponsibility, he or she not only is judging that the corporation effected some social harm but also is concluding that the corporation has a moral responsibility and should be held in con- tempt for the harm. In this way an attribution of corporate social irresponsibility is relevant to the two lines of thought in attribution theory identified by Hamilton (1980). In the first line of thought, the perceiver is conceptualized as an “intuitive psychologist” (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977: 174) conducting “explanatory inquiry” (Hamil- ton, 1980: 769). Here the perceiver is seen as continually engaging in causal analysis— spontaneously making inferences to explain the behavior and outcomes of others (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967, 1973). A key distinction for the ob-

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server when developing causal inferences is be- tween causes understood as emanating from the actor and causes understood as emanating from the situation the actor is in (Heider, 1958). In the second line of thought, the perceiver is concep- tualized as an “intuitive lawyer” conducting “sanctioning inquiry” (Hamilton, 1980: 767). Here the perceiver is seen as assigning responsibility or blame for harm. The emphasis is not strictly on determining cause and effect but, rather, on concluding who is worthy of sanction (Alicke, 2000; Hamilton, 1980). Indeed, sanctioning in- quiry may transcend careful analysis of cause and effect (Hamilton, 1980). Thus, in this line of thought in the attribution theory literature, attribution entails moral evaluation (Brewin & Antaki, 1987; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Mar- tinko, 1995).

We integrate both of these lines of thought from attribution theory to develop our core model of corporate social irresponsibility attri- butions. Thus, we build on the central idea that the observer’s attributions entail both causal in- ferences and moral judgments. Causal infer- ences imply that the observer arrives at social irresponsibility attributions in part by trying to explain a social harm in terms of distinguishing between causes emanating from within the firm and causes emanating from outside the firm. Especially relevant with respect to the latter are perceptions of the affected party’s complicity in the negative effect. Moral judgments imply that the observer arrives at social irresponsibility attributions in part by trying to vest moral re- sponsibility for a social harm—that is, trying to determine if the firm implicated in the harm should be held in contempt. Here the perceived nature and magnitude of the harm, as well as the firm’s perceived ability to have avoided the harm, are key considerations, as is—again—the perceived complicity in the negative effect of the affected party. Therefore, based on their role in both causal inference and moral judgment, we model three primary factors as underlying cor- porate social irresponsibility attributions: (1) as- sessments of effect undesirability, (2) assess- ments of corporate culpability for the effect, and (3) assessments that the affected party has a low level of complicity in the effect. We illustrate the core model in Figure 1 and describe the three factors next.

Effect Undesirability

Crucial to the perceiver’s categorization of the corporation as socially irresponsible are percep- tions that there has been a negative social effect (i.e., an observed social outcome perceived as undesirable and ostensibly associated with the corporation). Distinguishing beneficial or neu- tral effects from negative effects is a normative calculation that can differ depending on the val- ues and perspectives of different perceivers (Crouch, 2006). However, existing theory sug- gests that part of that calculation is rooted in perceptions that the social effects may be per- sonally threatening, may trigger moral im- pulses, and/or may violate strong norms for cor- porate outcomes (cf. Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Jones & Davis, 1965).

The idea that individuals make judgments of negativity based on what is personally threat- ening—that is, in terms of self-preservation—is consistent with a premise that runs through dif- ferent strains of modern psychological theory— namely, that the human brain is engaged in a constant evaluative process in which environ- mental stimuli are immediately and intuitively sorted in terms of approach-avoid or good-bad

FIGURE 1 The Core Model of Corporate Social

Irresponsibility Attributions

Observer assessments of

effect undesirability based on

threat avoidance, moral impulses, and

norms for moral behavior

Observer assessments of affected party noncomplicity

based on judgments of power

to prevent effect and of foresight

(P1a and P1b)

Observer attributions

of corporate social irresponsibility

P3+

P2+

Observer assessments of

corporate culpability based on

inferences of causality and judgments of

moral responsibility

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(for a review see Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). This kind of sorting is adaptive, since being at- tuned to self-threatening effects promotes self- preservation (Pratto & John, 1991). Extending this idea further, researchers have argued that per- ceptions of undesirability may be rooted in moral reflexive judgment (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008), pertaining to “‘flashes’ of approbation or disapprobation” about an actor’s behavior (Ap- piah, 2009: 128). In other words, organizational actions might be perceived as negative in a moral sense if they fall into categories of stimuli that evoke deep-seated negative moral reac- tions. Such categories of stimuli might include perceptions of suffering, unfairness, violations of ingroup/outgroup boundaries, disrespect, and impurity (Appiah, 2009).

Providing a further context for judgments of effect undesirability are the strong global norms for human behavior that exist across cultures. Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) call these global standards “hypernorms” and describe them as entailing “principles so fundamental to human existence that they serve as a guide in evaluat- ing lower level moral norms” (Donaldson & Dun- fee, 1994: 265). Along with local standards of corporate social obligation, including legal standards and industry norms—which may themselves be shaped by hypernorms—hyper- norms are important standards that observers use to assess the desirability of firm behavior. Of course, norms and moral impulses may be understood and expressed differently among different individuals, even leading to conflicting interpretations of the undesirability of the ef- fects of firm action. For example, in the early 1990s Dayton Hudson Corporation stopped its long tradition of contributing to Planned Parent- hood after the corporation came under harsh external criticism for the undesirable effect of its donations, particularly in terms of financing abortion. Not long thereafter the firm retreated to its old policy and resumed its contributions to Planned Parenthood. Again Dayton Hudson was responding to harsh external criticism for the undesirable effects of its actions—this time from those who argued that, by terminating its dona- tions, the firm was limiting choice and access to legal abortion for women (Jennings, 2006).

In sum, perceptions that there has been a neg- ative effect feed into the perceiver’s overall cog- nitive schema of corporate social irresponsibil- ity. Assessments of effect undesirability will be

dependent on the values, perspectives, and in- terpretations of the perceiver and likely will be rooted in the individual’s perceptions of threat, moral impulses, and strong norms for corporate outcomes.

Corporate Culpability

When a perceiver associates a corporation with an undesirable social outcome, the corpo- ration becomes the target of the perceiver’s at- tributional activity. In other words, the perceiver considers the corporation’s culpability with re- spect to the negative effect. Again drawing on Hamilton’s (1980) analogy, such a consideration positions the perceiver both as intuitive psy- chologist—judging the firm’s causality—and as intuitive lawyer—judging the firm’s moral re- sponsibility. In essence, judgments of causality and moral responsibility are the product of a rational knowledge-seeking process in which the perceiver considers the available evidence. With respect to causality, the perceiver develops lay theories— commonsense explanations— about why or how effects have occurred (Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbet, 1972; Kelley & Michela, 1980). When the firm is the target of the perceiv- er’s attributional activity, the critical causal question to be resolved is to what extent the source of the negative effect is internal rather than external to the firm (Green & Mitchell, 1979; Heider, 1958; Mitchell & Wood, 1980). Evidence supporting external explanations would include the cognitive availability of plausible alterna- tive causal agents or explanations for the effect (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley, 1972, 1973).

As an example of plausible alternative causal agents, consider how BP’s recent lawsuits citing its business partners’ negligence as leading to the Gulf oil spill disaster (Burdeau & Weber, 2011) may suggest to observers that those busi- ness partners were indeed at least partially causal. As an example of plausible alternative causal explanations, consider how evidence of a victim’s family history of illness might weaken the explanation that the victim’s sickness was caused by a corporation’s product. When alter- native causal agents or explanations are read- ily available, they can discount or completely replace the explanation that the corporation caused a negative effect (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Discounting causality in the face of alter- native causal explanations may help explain

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why automobile manufacturers generally are not strongly causally linked to the tens of thousands of annual automobile-related fatali- ties. The many complex and interactive per- ceived causes of those fatalities include car de- sign, but they also include such factors as road and weather conditions, driver skill and atten- tiveness, and alcohol use. Then again, if infor- mation surfaces highlighting the role of design flaws in a series of automobile accidents, the discounting effect of alternative causal expla- nations may weaken.

Observers exercise their reason not only as they consider alternative causal agents or ex- planations but also as they consider other read- ily perceivable evidence that hints at causality (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Such evidence in- cludes covariation (i.e., the degree to which firm action and negative effect are perceived to occur together; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley, 1967; Kelley & Michela, 1980), temporal order (i.e., whether the firm’s action is perceived to precede the negative effect; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kel- ley & Michela, 1980), and size congruence be- tween cause and effect (i.e., observers will see as more plausible a large firm causing a large effect than a small firm causing a large effect; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shultz & Ravinsky, 1977). Further evidence hint- ing at corporate causality includes the percep- tion that other corporations do not generally do what the focal corporation is perceived to have done (i.e., a low degree of “consensus” between this firm’s behavior and other firms’ behavior in similar situations) and that the focal corporation appears to have a tendency to act in this way over time (i.e., a high degree of “consistency” of this firm’s behavior in similar situations) and across contexts (i.e., a low degree of “distinctive- ness” of this firm’s behavior when the situation changes; Kelley, 1967; Kelley & Michela, 1980: 462). (Below we return to the concepts of con- sistency and distinctiveness when we explore the role of the firm’s perceived disposition for social irresponsibility in social irresponsibility attributions.)

Even when such “cues to causality” (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986: 6) are strong, the case for corpo- rate culpability is not complete. Ultimately, so- cial irresponsibility attributions require that a corporation be perceived not only as causal but also as morally responsible. In other words, the perceiver judges the firm as deserving contempt

or sanction with respect to the negative effect (Hamilton, 1980; Jones & Davis, 1965). The cogni- tive processing rule that Hamilton (1980: 768) applies in this regard concerns whether the per- ceiver judges that the target “could have done otherwise.” Moral responsibility judgments are therefore associated with beliefs that the firm had reasonable foresight of the negative out- comes and was not coerced into the action or driven by strong moral justifications (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Heider, 1958; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Shaver & Drown, 1986).

These beliefs, then, are about the firm’s moral cognizance, deriving from perceptions of both the firm’s awareness of the harm it was causing and its free will in continuing the harmful course of action. If the observer believes that the firm’s moral responsibility is low, even high causality perceptions will not result in strong assessments of culpability. For example, ob- servers may perceive the firm as morally dis- tanced from its own bad behavior, perhaps because it identified and fired employees asso- ciated with that behavior. In that case, even though observers judge the firm as having a causal relationship with the effect, they may deem the firm’s moral responsibility as low, which would not support strong assessments of corporate culpability.

In sum, the perceiver’s categorization of the corporation as socially irresponsible depends on judgments that the corporation was both causal and morally responsible with respect to the undesirable effect. The perceiver assesses causality by considering available alternative explanations and causal agents, as well as other evidence providing cues to causality. The perceiver assesses moral responsibility in terms of whether the firm was both aware of the neg- ative effect and was exercising intent and free will in pursuing the harmful course of action.

Affected Party Noncomplicity

Implied by the existence of a firm’s action leading to an undesirable social effect is a party who is the recipient of that effect. Affected par- ties could range from specific identifiable indi- viduals—such as the drivers and passengers who died in Pinto fires—to more generalized affected groups—such as citizens of the Gulf of Mexico region who suffered economic hardship

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following the 2010 oil spill. Along with a nega- tive effect and a culpable corporation, the third primary factor underlying corporate social irre- sponsibility attributions is an affected party per- ceived as a victim. In other words, those attribu- tions depend, in part, on an affected party who is perceived as being low in complicity (or non- complicit) in the negative outcome.

As attribution researchers who study blame point out, affected parties who are perceived to have more control over a negative effect are, in turn, perceived to be more blameworthy and therefore are less likely to elicit sympathy from observers (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Alternatively, when affected parties are perceived to have less control over a negative effect, observers are less likely to blame them for the situation. For example, in an experimen- tal setting Weiner et al. found that

the physically based stigma of blindness was perceived as uncontrollable, [and] the blind indi- vidual was liked and pitied while eliciting little anger. . . . Conversely, individuals with mental- behavioral stigmas were perceived as being re- sponsible for their condition, were rated rela- tively low on liking, [and] evoked little pity and relatively high anger (1988: 741).

Likewise, parties apparently negatively af- fected by some corporate action will be per- ceived as more or less in control of the outcome and will receive respectively more or less sym- pathy from observers as a result. Perceiver con- cern for a victim will be consistent with the perceiver’s cognitive schema of corporate social irresponsibility. In contrast, the perceiver’s cat- egorization of the firm as socially irresponsible will be diminished when his or her perception is that an affected party was in some way in con- trol of the negative effect. And, as we discuss below, perceptions that the affected party is complicit in the negative effect will have direct implications for reducing how much the firm itself is perceived as culpable for the effect.

Two perceived characteristics of the affected party can influence whether the party is thought to be in control of, and therefore complicit in, the negative effect: (1) the power to act to prevent the effect and (2) knowledge or foresight of the effect (Shaver, 1985). The first characteristic pertains to whether the observer concludes that the affected party could have done some- thing to avoid the negative effect. For example,

as common perceptions have gradually changed from the view of chronic drunkenness as a consequence of the user’s free will and moral failing to the view of alcoholism as a disease (Schneider, 1978), the degree to which the user is perceived as in control of and com- plicit in the negative effect has decreased.

The second characteristic pertains to the per- ception that without foresight of consequences, even a powerful victim cannot take the action necessary to avoid a negative effect. Alterna- tively, when an affected party is perceived as having full information about possible deleteri- ous effects of corporate action, he or she is more likely to be seen as able to avoid those effects. Thus, as public awareness of smoking health hazards has increased, smokers increasingly are perceived as being knowledgeable about the negative effects of the product, and they are therefore less likely to be perceived as innocent victims. Given that perceptions of the affected party’s power and foresight to prevent the effect underlie judgments of the affected party’s com- plicity, it is not surprising that certain types of affected parties will be more readily judged as being low in complicity. In particular, more physically or mentally vulnerable affected parties are more likely to elicit perceptions of victim innocence, which would include the young, the very old, and defenseless-seeming animals. Consider, for example, that children who take up the habit of smoking are much less likely than adults to be seen as complicit in the negative effect, since they are seen as hav- ing a more limited capacity for sophisticated foresight.

In sum, perceptions of affected party noncom- plicity in the negative effect feed into the per- ceiver’s categorization of the corporation as so- cially irresponsible. The perceiver assesses affected party complicity by considering how much power the affected party had to prevent the negative outcome, as well as by considering how much knowledge or foresight the affected party had of the negative effect.

The Core Model of Corporate Social Irresponsibility Attributions

A baseline premise of our core model, as shown in Figure 1, is that corporate social irre- sponsibility attributions depend on the com- bined presence of the three factors we described

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above. In other words, those attributions depend on perceptions that there has been a negative effect, that there is a culpable corporation, and that the affected party is not fully complicit in the effect. If an observer sees the effect as neu- tral or beneficial, the firm as not culpable, and/or the affected party as highly complicit in the outcome, the observer’s corporate social ir- responsibility attributions are apt to be low or nonexistent. Consider, for example, Hoffman and Ocasio’s (2001) contrast of two events—Love Canal (buried toxic waste) and Cuyahoga River (fire on a polluted waterway). A perceiver would be likely to see each event as entailing a harm- ful effect as well as a victim group noncomplicit in the outcome. However, in the case of Love Canal, a firm was readily identifiable as re- sponsible—“From the start, the event had a clear villain who was assessed blame—the company which had created the buried toxic waste, the Hooker Chemical Company” (Hoff- man & Ocasio, 2001: 421)—whereas in the case of Cuyahoga River, where industrial waste caused the fire, no specific firm was easily identifiable as responsible. Thus, absent a firm perceived as culpable, corporate social irresponsibility attri- butions will fail to develop.

Importantly, the argument that corporate so- cial irresponsibility attributions depend on as- sessments of corporate culpability requires a clear distinction between those two constructs. That distinction is evident when considering that culpability alone is not sufficient for corpo- rate social irresponsibility attributions; instead, a negative effect and a noncomplicit affected party are also required. If Love Canal had not been perceived as having such an undesirable effect (an effect that, in fact, included health hazards to residents and the long-term evacua- tion of a residential neighborhood), or if the Love Canal residents had been perceived as some- how highly responsible for their own fate, attri- butions of corporate social irresponsibility would have been much less likely, even if the firm was perceived as culpable—that is, as- sessed as causal in the effect and morally re- sponsible for its actions. Thus, casino compa- nies could be perceived as culpable—causal and morally responsible—for the harmful social effects of gambling, but at the same time corpo- rate social irresponsibility attributions could be weak because gamblers are seen as highly com- plicit in their fate.

When perceivers see the effect as at least somewhat negative, the corporation as at least somewhat culpable, and the affected party as at least somewhat noncomplicit, then the perceiv- ers can form attributions of corporate social ir- responsibility. If all three factors are present to some degree, then a higher level of any one of those factors will result in a higher level of cor- porate social irresponsibility attributions.

Proposition 1a: Observer attributions of corporate social irresponsibility de- pend on the combined presence of three components: observer assess- ments that the effect is at least some- what undesirable, observer assess- ments that the corporation is at least somewhat culpable, and observer as- sessments that the affected party is at least somewhat noncomplicit.

Proposition 1b: If all three components are present to some degree, then attri- butions of corporate social irresponsi- bility are positively related to higher levels of any of the three.

Attribution theory suggests that perceivers consider the characteristics of the target and the target’s situation in concert when making attri- butions for the cause of and responsibility for an effect, and therefore that perceivers’ perceptions of the situation’s characteristics can influence their perceptions of the target’s characteristics with respect to the attribution, and vice versa (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Mitchell & Wood, 1980). As applied to our core model of corporate social irresponsibility attributions, the implication from attribution theory, then, is that the three primary factors we have identified may influ- ence each other. In particular, as we explain next, perceptions of effect undesirability can in- fluence perceptions of corporate culpability, and perceptions of corporate culpability and af- fected party noncomplicity can influence each other.

Consider that when an observer is contem- plating the negativity of effects, attribution the- ory suggests that the observer will search more extensively for their causal associations (Alicke, 2000; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Taylor, 1991). Indeed, Mitchell and Wood (1980) demon- strated in lab studies that the seriousness of an effect positively influenced the degree to which

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targets were perceived as responsible for a neg- ative effect. The strong desire to identify causes and responsibility could bias observer percep- tions of a firm already linked in the observer’s mind with the effect. As we argued above, per- ceptions of a greater degree of victim suffering are likely to elicit observer sympathy and con- cern (Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner et al., 1988). Observers may then enter “blame-validation mode,” in which they actively seek explanations for the negative effect and lower their typical standards for establishing corporate causality (Alicke, 2000: 558). In this mode, even if cues to causality are ambiguous, sympathy for the vic- tim and a desire to assign causality and respon- sibility may lead observers to assess the link- age between the effect and the implicated firm “in a biased manner by exaggerating the [firm’s] volitional or causal control, by lowering their evidential standards for blame, or by seeking information to support their blame attributions” (Alicke, 2000: 558).

For example, the horrible suffering associated with victims of Ford Pinto crashes could have increased the plausibility for observers that Ford’s internal cost-benefit analysis, which emerged in the press at the time, was evidence that Ford executives were morally cognizant as they made decisions that posed great potential harm to Pinto drivers and passengers—even though Ford officials adamantly denied that the cost-benefit analysis factored into their decision making. As an effect is perceived as more neg- ative, a firm associated with that effect can eas- ily seem more culpable to observers. Such per- ceived culpability would entail a judgment of moral responsibility consonant with deep- seated cultural suspicions surrounding busi- ness firms—in particular, suspicions that, in their drive for profits, firms can be oblivious to public welfare (Korten, 2001).

Proposition 2: Assessments of effect undesirability are positively related to subsequent assessments of corporate culpability.

When the observer is contemplating the cor- poration’s culpability for a negative effect and perceives that culpability as high, the ob- server has a ready explanation that can help discount perceptions that the affected party had the power and foresight to prevent or avoid the effect. That explanation, because it

makes a strong case that the effect was out of the control of the affected party, can help countermand correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), or the natural tendency of an observer to “view people rather than the envi- ronment as the prepotent controlling forces behind harmful events” (Alicke, 2000: 568). For instance, a cigarette smoker may be thought by observers to be responsible for his or her own negative health outcomes associated with smoking. However, some of that onus may have transferred to the tobacco companies in the mid 1990s when company internal docu- ments were divulged indicating full knowl- edge of the harmful and addictive effects of the product and revealing the conscious mar- keting of tobacco products to children (Hurt & Robertson, 1998; Segal, 1997). It is possible that when observers learned that tobacco compa- nies were perhaps secretly plotting against their own customers, observer perceptions of customers’ complicity in tobacco-related health problems decreased, at least some- what. That decrease in perceived affected party complicity would be consistent with ar- guments and findings in the attribution theory literature suggesting that observers become angry at perpetrators and sympathetic with victims when perpetrators are perceived as being in control of negative outcomes (Weiner, 1993; Weiner et al., 1982).

When the observer is contemplating the af- fected party’s complicity in the negative effect and perceives that complicity as high—that is, perceives the affected party as having foresight and control with respect to the effect—that per- ception may constitute exactly the kind of evi- dence that would effectively discount the expla- nation that the firm is the morally responsible agent. Indeed, correspondence bias would lead observers to favor a plausible explanation that the affected party is responsible for its negative outcomes (Alicke, 2000). Thus, ever since manda- tory health warnings have appeared on ciga- rette packages, as they have in the United States since 1966, observers may have a greater ten- dency to perceive cigarette smokers as being forewarned and therefore at least somewhat complicit in the negative health outcomes they may suffer from smoking. If so, those observers may conclude that tobacco companies are only partially responsible for the negative outcomes, or perhaps that they are not responsible at all.

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Together, these arguments lead us to predict that assessments of high corporate culpability can re- duce assessments of affected party complicity and, in a complementary fashion, that assess- ments of high affected party complicity can reduce assessments of corporate culpability.

Proposition 3: Assessments of corpo- rate culpability are positively re- lated to assessments of affected party noncomplicity.

FURTHER INFLUENCES ON THE CORE MODEL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL

IRRESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS

In the prior section we described the three primary factors underlying corporate social irre- sponsibility attributions—assessments of effect

undesirability, corporate culpability, and af- fected party noncomplicity—and we considered how those factors can be influenced by each other. In this section we delve further into the observer’s subjective construction of corporate social irresponsibility attributions. To do so we continue with attribution theory as our theoreti- cal foundation, and we consider how observer cognitive bias, attention, and social identifica- tion may influence the observer’s attributions. We illustrate the expanded model of corporate social irresponsibility attributions in Figure 2.

Above we argued that assessments of effect undesirability are rooted in perceptions that the effect is threatening, is a trigger of moral im- pulses, or is a violation of strong norms. How- ever, perceptual filtering and interpretive bi- ases can influence whether an observer

FIGURE 2 The Expanded Model of Corporate Social Irresponsibility Attributionsa

Effect characteristics,

including unexpectedness

and concentration in time and space

Observer social identification

with the affected party

Firm characteristics,

including perceived disposition for

irresponsible behavior, size, and prominence

P4+

P5a+ and P5b+

P6a+ P6b−

P8a+ P8b−

P7−

Observer attributions of

corporate social

irresponsibility

Observer assessments of affected party noncomplicity

based on judgments of power to

prevent effect and of foresight

Observer assessments of

effect undesirability based on

threat avoidance, moral impulses, and

norms for moral behavior

Frames positioning firm

as causal and morally

responsible for harming innocent

victims

P9+

Observer assessments of

corporate culpability based on

inferences of causality and judgments of

moral responsibility

Observer social identification

with the implicated firm

a The dotted lines indicate the relationships illustrated and labeled in Figure 1.

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perceives an effect as a threat, a trigger of moral impulses, or a violation of norms. As a result, the observer could be presented with two effects— ostensibly equivalent in terms of some objective standard of harm—and yet the observer’s sub- jective distinctions between the two effects might lead him or her to judge one of the effects as of much greater undesirability than the other. Consider that by objective moral standards, and all else being equal, an outcome of harm to thousands of people should stimulate harsher assessments of undesirability than an outcome of harm to a handful of individuals. Yet, at times, the event of smaller impact may prompt greater alarm because, for one reason or another, it at- tracts attention, foments emotions, and inspires intense reaction (cf. Nordgren & Morris McDon- nell, 2011).

Here we propose two effect characteristics that will prompt observer attention to and con- sideration of the undesirability of the effect: (1) unexpectedness and (2) concentration in time and space. Both characteristics lead the effects to be perceptually figural for observers, mean- ing that they cognitively stand out against the background—that is, they are more salient (McArthur & Ginsberg, 1981; McArthur & Post, 1977). Both characteristics make the effects cog- nitively available to perceivers, and cognitive availability amplifies the perceived importance of the event, which can then bias further percep- tions as the perceiver easily brings the event to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Indeed, attri- bution theorists point out that salience can in- fluence the attributions that observers make (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Smith & Miller, 1979). In particular, salient stimuli are seen by observers as more causal (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). When un- desirable effects are salient to observers, they are likely to prompt observer search for causal- ity and responsibility (Alicke, 2000; Fiske & Tay- lor, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Taylor, 1991).

Unexpectedness leads to salience since ob- servers will have their attention drawn to and focused on strange and novel effects (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; McArthur, 1981). When effects are expected, they are understood as normal and are easily categorized. Because they are com- monplace, they fade into the background. Con- sider how the regularity with which traffic acci- dents occur has desensitized observers. In general, automobile accidents (involving people the observer does not know) remain in the ob-

server’s background. The exception is when some unexpected feature of a particular car ac- cident draws it out of the background—for ex- ample, the unexpectedly low speed at which Ford Pintos in rear end collisions were failing catastrophically, and the unexpected nature of the way in which Ford Pinto accident victims were reportedly dying (namely, by fiery explo- sion; Schwartz, 1991). When effects are unusual or unexpected, they become figural and salient because they do not easily fit into existing cat- egories of understanding. In such cases observ- ers must process and modify their existing un- derstandings to either expand a cognitive category or create a new one (Einhorn & Hog- arth, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977). If an effect can potentially be seen by the observer as threatening, as a trigger of moral impulses, or as a violation of norms, the enhanced cognitive processing and categorization activity induced by unexpectedness is likely to center on and intensify the sense of threat, moral violation, and/or norm infringement. Consequently, unex- pectedness can lead an effect to be perceived by the observer as even more undesirable.

Concentration of the effect in time and space also leads to salience that can influence ob- server subjective assessments of effect undesir- ability. Human perceptual capabilities are opti- mized to perceive imminent dangers rather than subtle insidious effects (Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007). When effects are dispersed over time or geographic space, the complete effect may sim- ply be less visible and salient to the observer. An observation at any point in time or space will be only part of the complete effect and therefore may appear trivial, causing the total impact of the effect to be less perceptible (Gattig, 2002). For example, the temporally and geographically dispersed motor vehicle–related fatalities in the United States may escape widespread notice, even though they number in the tens of thou- sands annually, but the concentrated tragedy of a U.S. airline accident killing hundreds of peo- ple would draw immediate U.S. public alarm. As another example, consider that global deforest- ation as the result of industrial activities is likely to be judged undesirable once it has hap- pened, but because it occurs slowly and is spread out over a large geographic area, observ- ers are less likely to react during the process. Thus, negative effects that accumulate over time or space—in which the threats, moral violations,

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or norm infringements are only incrementally evident—will be less salient and alarming than negative effects that are available for examina- tion immediately and in their entirety.

Proposition 4: When an effect has the potential to be seen by an observer as threatening, as a trigger of moral im- pulses, or as a violation of norms, its unexpectedness and/or concentration in time and space will be positively related to observer assessments of ef- fect undesirability.

Previously, we argued that observers will base their assessments of a corporation’s culpa- bility on inferences of causality and judgments of moral responsibility. As with the other per- ceiver assessments in our model, these assess- ments of corporate culpability are subjective constructions—influenced by human processes of interpretation and perception. An observer could therefore see two corporations as different in their culpability even if, objectively, there was no difference. Here we propose three firm characteristics that can influence subjective as- sessments of corporate culpability: perceived disposition, size, and prominence.

First, with respect to perceived disposition, consider that a firm’s observers are attuned not just to the firm’s most recent actions but also to its prior actions and, therefore, that attributions are an interaction of the observer’s prior beliefs and current observations (Folkes, 1988; Klein & Dawar, 2004). Klein and Dawar (2004) demon- strated the strength of these kinds of prior be- liefs in an experimental setting exploring con- sumer attributions when a company has a crisis involving a well-publicized defective or danger- ous product. The authors argued that a consum- er’s prior perceptions of the company as socially responsible create a halo or spillover effect, leading to a bias about whether the company is or is not responsible for the product-harm crisis. Indeed, Klein and Dawar found that consumers who had existing negative perceptions of a com- pany’s CSR disposition blamed the company more for the product-harm incident than did con- sumers who had positive perceptions of the company’s CSR disposition. Their results showed that a “negative CSR image” led to “un- flattering attributions and blame while a posi- tive image led to attributions similar to those made by control subjects who had no prior im-

pression of the firm” (Klein & Dawar, 2004: 215). When an observer believes that the firm has exhibited a high degree of consistency in its behavior over time in similar situations and a low degree of distinctiveness in its behavior, even when the context changes, the observer is likely to attribute the cause of the behavior as internal to the firm (Kelley, 1967; Kelley & Mi- chela, 1980).

An observer’s perceptions that a firm has a disposition for socially irresponsible behavior represent a kind of existing implicit theory about the firm that can shape the observer’s inferences and judgments about the firm’s cur- rent behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965; Lord & Smith, 1983). The firm’s perceived disposition serves as a cognitive anchor, biasing the observer as he or she makes adjustments from the anchor to reach an interpretation of the meaning of new firm action (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For exam- ple, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Target Corpora- tion have very similar profiles in terms of wages and other employee benefits. However, because of a history of bad relations with organized la- bor, Wal-Mart is seen as a “pariah to U.S. labor unions and urban activists” (Bustillo & Zimmer- man, 2010: 1). The company has to fight labor unions and other groups in order to expand its urban footprint, because these groups fear that Wal-Mart will drive down wages. Target, whose perceived disposition is more favorable, is held to a different standard by activists (Bustillo & Zimmerman, 2010) and has expanded with com- paratively little opposition from labor groups. Both firms’ stores are likely to have similar eco- nomic effects on a community, but Wal-Mart po- tentially is seen as more culpable for negative effects than is Target.

A firm’s perceived favorable disposition also may bias an observer’s interpretation of new firm behaviors such that the expectation of con- tinued reliability tends to be confirmed (Darley & Fazio, 1980). A firm with the perceived dispo- sition of high social responsibility may get the benefit of the doubt among observers, who will discount the possibility of both causality and moral responsibility when the firm is newly as- sociated with a negative effect. This would es- pecially be the case if other cues to causality and moral responsibility were minimal. How- ever, and in accordance with reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), it is possible that very positive prior expectations may lead, paradoxi-

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cally, to especially negative observer reactions to firm behavior violating those expectations (cf. Klein & Dawar, 2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). Taken together, these arguments suggest that although a firm’s perceived disposition for so- cial responsibility could bias observer assess- ments of corporate culpability, the direction of that bias is unclear. In contrast, a firm’s per- ceived unfavorable disposition is not subject to reactance effects, and its predicted effect on as- sessments of corporate culpability is more straightforward.

Proposition 5a: The implicated corpo- ration’s perceived disposition for so- cial irresponsibility is positively re- lated to observer assessments of corporate culpability.

Along with a firm’s perceived disposition for social irresponsibility, its size and prominence are also likely to influence observer assess- ments of corporate culpability. A firm’s size may provide the observer with cues to causality, as well as cues about moral responsibility. In par- ticular, this may be the case when the compar- ison is between very large and small firms. Peo- ple generally regard large firms “as purposive entities that use structured analyses to guide their actions and protect their interests” (Lange, Boivie, & Henderson, 2009: 184; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In other words, people think larger firms have the capacity to conduct sophisticated anal- yses of their options in decision situations, and therefore have the ability to predict and avoid harmful side effects to others. People are also likely to perceive larger firms as having more financial slack and strategic flexibility. Thus, firm size, because of the perceptions that size is associated with abundant options for action and enhanced capacity to scrutinize those options and their possible harmful side effects, may lead to observer impressions that the firm caused the negative effect, that it had foresight of the consequences of its behavior, and that it had no moral justification for its actions.

In addition to its size, a firm’s prominence— that is, how well known it is—helps make the firm salient to observers. As demonstrated in attribution theory research, what is salient in the observer’s perceptual field with respect to the effect is likely to be perceived as causal (Smith & Miller, 1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1975, 1978). The firm’s salience will also make more plausi-

ble outside claims that the firm not only is as- sociated with but also is culpable for a negative effect. (We talk more about outside claims below when we address the role of “frames” in social irresponsibility attributions.) The firm’s salience helps take attention off issue advocates as pos- sible inventors or exaggerators of a problem. Consequently, large, prominent firms are often targeted by issue advocates. Developing a story that portrays them as morally responsible causal agents may be an easy sell. For example, labor advocates found it easy to strongly asso- ciate the well-known firm Nike in the public mind with labor abuses in Asia (Rushford, 1997).

Proposition 5b: The implicated corpo- ration’s size and prominence are pos- itively related to observer assessments of corporate culpability.

Next, we further elaborate the model of corpo- rate social irresponsibility attributions by con- sidering how the degree to which observers so- cially identify with the affected party or with the implicated corporation may affect subjective as- sessments of effect undesirability, corporate cul- pability, and affected party noncomplicity. Our overriding argument is that social identifica- tion, by putting the observer in the shoes of either the affected party or the firm, influences social irresponsibility attributions because the observer has a vested interest in the attribution (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This argument is consis- tent with Jones and Davis’s (1965) idea of “hedo- nic relevance,” whereby the perceiver’s attribu- tional activity is biased when the event under consideration has implications for the perceiv- er’s own welfare. In other words, attributions are influenced because “the perceiver’s motivation, elicited by the action’s consequences for him, is thought to affect the processing of information about the action” (Kelley & Michela, 1980: 461).

Social identity theory and the related self- categorization theory (see review by Haslam & Ellemers, 2005) start from the observation that humans have a natural tendency to organize their worlds into social categories, and these theories then describe how individuals derive their self-concepts in part from the categories with which they see their personal identities overlapping (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People have complex motivations for orienting themselves in relation to society according to social categories, including satis-

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fying the fundamental human needs for affilia- tion and belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995); maintaining or enhancing their own self-esteem (Brewer, 1979); seeking self-definition through assimilation and individuation, aligning with some social categories to help define who they are and distancing from other social categories to help define who they are not (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991); reducing uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 2000); and confirming and verify- ing their own self-view (Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002). Any of these motivations can lead an in- dividual to see him or herself as part of a social category. An individual who identifies strongly with a social group or category is someone who draws critical self-concept–relevant informa- tion, value, and feelings from his or her percep- tions that he or she is a member of the social group or category (Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the context of our model, some observers may socially identify with the group they see as affected by the undesirable effect. Of course, as organizational identification re- searchers have demonstrated, the concept of so- cial group can also easily include the firm such that individuals (both insiders and outsiders) can socially identify with a particular firm (Has- lam & Ellemers, 2005; Pratt, 1998). In the context of our model, some observers may socially iden- tify with the firm that is implicated in the neg- ative effect.

Because of the overlap of personal and social identities that identification implies, the strength of observer identification with the af- fected party will be positively related to the de- gree to which the observer will tend to distin- guish less between his or her own interests and outcomes and those of the affected party. Simi- larly, the strength of observer identification with the implicated firm will be positively related to the degree to which the observer sees his or her own interests and outcomes as aligned with the firm’s (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Haslam & Elle- mers, 2005). As we describe in more detail below, if the observer socially identifies with the af- fected party or the firm, that social identification is likely to influence the observer’s assessments of effect undesirability, corporate culpability, and affected party noncomplicity, thereby con- tributing to the subjective construction of corpo- rate social irresponsibility attributions.

Above we argued that perceptions of effect undesirability are likely to be rooted in threat

avoidance, moral impulses, and strong norms for corporate outcomes. When the negative ef- fect is perceived to be happening to a group with which the observer strongly identifies— meaning that the observer distinguishes little between his or her interests and those of the affected party—by definition, the observer will find the effect to be personally threatening and undesirable. Social identification therefore not only draws the observer’s attention to the effect but also prompts consideration of its personal impact. The personalized nature of the effect may also enhance the observer’s negative moral impulses and perceptions of norm violations. As such, the death of thousands and the lingering health complications of many thousands more following the 1984 Union Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India, may have seemed less severe to U.S. observers than it did to observers in India, who more strongly socially identify with the vic- tims. Had the same accident occurred in the United States, social identification of U.S. ob- servers with the victims would likely have been much deeper and public assessments of the suf- fering much greater, even controlling for the greater attention a U.S.-based accident would have received in the United States.

A contrasting result may occur when the ob- server identifies with the implicated firm. In that case the observer is likely to find confusing and incongruous the implication that the firm would be associated with behavior contrary to his or her values and normative expectations. If so, the more strongly the observer identifies with the firm, the more likely he or she is to discount the seriousness or negativity of the effect. This dis- counting would be consistent with self-serving attributional biases (see review by Fiske & Tay- lor, 2008), in which information inconsistent with ego protection might be overlooked. For exam- ple, consider a fan who identifies strongly with the National Football League (NFL) and, conse- quently, has a strong affinity with the NFL’s goals, processes, and routines. Upon learning of the high incidence of concussions and other head injuries among the league’s players (Sokolove, 2010), this fan may overlook the mag- nitude and severity of these injuries. Discount- ing the negative effect is ego protective for a fan who would not want to view him or herself as actively contributing to the suffering of others.

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Proposition 6a: Observer social identi- fication with the affected party is pos- itively related to assessments of effect undesirability.

Proposition 6b: Observer social identi- fication with the implicated firm is negatively related to assessments of effect undesirability.

In addition to diminishing observer assess- ments of effect undesirability, observer social identification with the implicated corporation is likely to lead the observer to assess the corpo- ration as less culpable. As we argued above, inferences of causality and judgments of moral responsibility (including foresight and inten- tionality) underlie an assessment of corporate culpability. When observer identification with the implicated firm is higher, the observer is more likely to be skeptical of evidence suggest- ing the firm’s causality, more likely to search for and find plausible alternative explanations that challenge the firm’s causality, and less likely to accept third-party claims that position the firm as causal. In addition, an observer who has a higher level of identification with the firm is less likely to see it as morally responsible with re- spect to the negative effect. That observer is more likely to accept accounts from the firm and its advocates that contend the organization’s processes and intents adhere to normative ex- pectations, that proclaim the firm’s innocence, or that justify the firm’s association with the negative effects, as well as accounts and apol- ogies that decouple the firm from negative in- tent (Elsbach, 1994; Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Again, this discounting of causality and moral responsibility is consistent with self-serving at- tributional biases, since self-serving bias ex- tends to groups with which the observer identi- fies (i.e., “group-serving bias”), leading ingroup members to attribute negative ingroup behavior to external causes (Fiske & Taylor, 2008: 80).

Consequently, the football fan who identifies strongly with the NFL may be very amenable to justifications that hard hits are an inherent part of the physical game of professional football. That fan would be less likely than observers who do not socially identify with the NFL to see the NFL as highly culpable with respect to player injuries, even as the problem of head injuries in football receives increasing public attention (e.g., Sokolove, 2010).

Proposition 7: Observer social identifi- cation with the implicated corporation is negatively related to assessments of the corporation’s culpability.

An observer’s identification with the impli- cated firm or, alternatively, with the affected party could also influence the observer’s assess- ments of the affected party’s complicity in the negative effect. Self-serving attributional bias would lead an observer with a higher level of identification with the implicated firm to search for and attend to plausible alternative explana- tions that relieve the firm—and, by extension, the observer him/herself—of culpability (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). This deflection of responsibility would be consistent with the observer’s deep- seated desire to avoid being blameworthy for the situation (Shaver, 1970, 1985).

The search for plausible alternative explana- tions is apt to include consideration that the affected party was not totally innocent with re- spect to the effect. Any suppositions by the ob- server that the affected party had some power to prevent the effect, or had some reasonable fore- sight of the effect, will therefore be amplified by the observer’s identification with the firm. In addition to being consistent with self-serving attributional bias, efforts by observers who identify with the implicated firm to find the af- fected party complicit in the negative effect are consistent with a fundamental human motiva- tion to see victims as responsible for their own negative outcomes. That motivation stems from observers’ need to believe in a just world (Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Conse- quently, the football fan who identifies strongly with the NFL may be especially open to argu- ments that the players are well aware of the possibility of injury, that they choose to play voluntarily, and that they are well compensated for the risk.

In turn, when it is with the affected party that an observer identifies, these same needs and desires will diminish rather than bolster the de- gree to which the observer assesses the affected party as complicit. The need to believe in a just world and the desire to deflect blame are both aimed at ego protection. When the affected party is clearly an outgroup, threats to self can be reduced by perceiving the affected party as complicit in the negative effect. However, when an observer identifies with the affected party

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such that the observer’s self-identity is inter- twined with the identity of the affected party, threats to the affected party may be perceived as personal threats. In this case threats to self can be reduced by deflecting perceptions of blame away from the affected party—and, by extension, away from the self (Fiske & Tay- lor, 2008).

Consistent with the argument that observer social identification with the affected party will influence assessments of affected party com- plicity is Shaver’s observation that “perceivers can be wholly rational judges of another’s re- sponsibility for producing a negative outcome only if they can be confident that they will never be in similar circumstances” (1985: 134). When observers see themselves as similar to the af- fected party, they lose that confidence. It then becomes harder to hold the belief that the neg- ative outcome is justified either as the natural consequence of some behavioral error on the part of the victim or as retribution for some char- acter flaw of the victim (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Shaver, 1985). When one socially identifies with the victim, the belief that the negative effect is justified or deserved could be tantamount to be- lieving oneself to deserve consequences or ret- ribution, and such a belief could be contradic- tory to ego protection.

Proposition 8a: Observer social identi- fication with the affected party is pos- itively related to assessments of the affected party’s noncomplicity in the negative effect.

Proposition 8b: Observer social identi- fication with the implicated corporation is negatively related to assessments of the affected party’s noncomplicity in the negative effect.

CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY FRAMES

Earlier we touched on the idea that an observ- er’s information about and interpretation of ef- fect, corporation, and affected party can be in- fluenced by parties who filter and frame the information. Here we consider that idea in more depth, because the information that parties sup- ply to the observer, as well as the way the infor- mation is presented (e.g., how the specific pieces of information are assembled, empha-

sized, deemphasized, or distorted), can substan- tially affect observer inferences and judgments that underlie corporate social irresponsibility attributions. For example, attribution theorists have considered how putative causal agents (or interested third parties) may attempt to use ac- counts or apologies to influence observers’ attri- butions (Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Accounts may influence attributions by emphasizing how cer- tain personal or situational factors led to the observed outcome. Accounts comprise both ex- cuses—whereby the actor is defended on the grounds that the behavior was out of his or her control—and justifications—whereby the be- havior is defended on the grounds that its value outweighs its negative consequences (Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Whereas accounts may influence both inferences of causality and judgments of moral responsibility, apologies actively ac- knowledge the actor’s causality. Apologies therefore are directed more at attempting to in- fluence judgments of moral responsibility, and they do so in part by attempting to decouple the actor from the intent behind the action. Apolo- gies, including expressions of remorse, can in- dicate that the actor believes in the rule that was violated and is motivated to achieve the required standards going forward (Wood & Mitchell, 1981). The actor’s self-castigation can reduce the degree to which an observer holds the actor in contempt (Wood & Mitchell, 1981).

Accordingly, an implicated corporation in our model could offer up alternative causal expla- nations or moral justifications for its behavior, claim a lack of moral cognizance, or attempt to distance itself from the moral intent underlying its behavior by expressing remorse, all of which could affect observer inferences of causality and/or judgments of moral responsibility. These attempts at impression management, because they represent the deliberate shaping, packag- ing, and presentation of information in such a way as to influence perceptions of that informa- tion, fall into the broader category of frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974). Frames in our model would include not only the accounts and apologies offered by the firm and its advo- cates but also third-party (e.g., media, politi- cians, social issue stakeholders) story lines or narratives about the issue (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992).

A frame relevant to social irresponsibility at- tributions would include the core elements of

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our model: a culpable organization, an undesir- able effect, and a noncomplicit affected party. Snow and Benford call this “diagnostic fram- ing,” meaning that the frame involves the “iden- tification of a problem and the attribution of causality and blame” (1988: 200). Depending on the information presented in the frame, the ef- fect may appear more or less negative, the firm more or less culpable, and the affected party more or less complicit. For example, an observer might read a press report alleging that a firm, “Privacy Matters 123,” was “draining the bank account” needed to pay medical bills for an eighteen-year old cancer patient (Sandoval, 2009). This press report constitutes a frame in- volving a culpable firm (Privacy Matters 123), a negative effect (draining the bank account), and a noncomplicit affected party (eighteen-year-old cancer patient). This frame will be likely to sup- port corporate social irresponsibility attribu- tions, since it emphasizes each of the three core factors underlying such attributions.

Frames can be especially influential on social irresponsibility attributions when information regarding the firm’s culpability is ambiguous or difficult to perceive. Culpability is determined in part by judgments of causality, but causality often is not obvious. Effective frames can make it seem more so. Consider that some negative effects, given their nature, are difficult to link back to a particular causal agent. In situations where there are few cues to causality, issue advocates may attempt to frame the available information in such a way as to overcome the paucity of such cues (Shultz, 1982). Such a frame would provide a credible cause-and-effect rela- tionship in which well-known parties (i.e., the firm and its leaders) were identified as culpable (Spector & Kitsuse, 2001).

This kind of frame is evident in the way Audi AG was associated with accident fatalities in high-profile media reports. In particular, in 1986 the CBS program 60 Minutes aired an emotional testimonial from a mother who had run over and killed her six-year-old child. Even though she had earlier reported to police that her foot had slipped off the brake onto the gas pedal, the TV program presented the mother as claiming that the accident was caused by unintended accel- eration and that the car was to blame for the death of her son. This causal claim was sup- ported by the TV program’s simulation of an alleged Audi defect underlying unintended ac-

celeration (Heinrich, 2010). In other words, in the absence of evidence of causality, the frame con- stituted this evidence. Subsequent investiga- tions suggested that perhaps there was no Audi product defect resulting in unintended acceler- ation, but the damage to Audi’s sales and repu- tation had been done (Heinrich, 2010). In this case the influence of the media’s frame on cor- porate social irresponsibility attributions was dramatic.

Frames can also support observer perceptions of effect undesirability. Above we described how unexpectedness and concentration in time and space can bring attention to a negative ef- fect and emphasize for observers the threat, moral violation, or norm infringement implied by the effect. Frames provided by parties such as issue advocates, scientists, and media repre- sentatives can also make the effect salient for observers and emphasize the effect’s undesir- able features (Callon, 1998). As a result, frames can bring to the foreground effects that are seemingly commonplace (not unexpected), and they can cognitively aggregate effects that are dispersed (not concentrated in time and space). Consider how the deleterious effects of smoking on human health are not readily observable be- cause they tend to develop only after long expo- sure to the tobacco product. However, starting in the 1950s, a series of studies linking smoking to lung cancer helped to cognitively compile the effects of smoking so that they were more imme- diately evident to the public (e.g., Doll & Hill, 1950). In this case frames based on scientific research brought attention and meaning to to- bacco’s negative health effects.

By emphasizing different aspects of the effect, characteristics of the firm, and even observers’ identification with the affected party or the firm, frames can exert an influence on any given el- ement affecting corporate social irresponsibility attributions in our model. For example, we de- scribed earlier how a firm’s perceived disposi- tion for social irresponsibility can enhance ob- server assessments of corporate culpability. Shortly after BP’s 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, press reports emphasized BP’s prior accidents— including a 2005 refinery explosion that killed fifteen workers. The frame of BP as having a disposition for bad behavior may very well have supported perceptions of BP’s culpability with respect to the Gulf spill. As another example, consider how frames can emphasize affected

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party characteristics in a way that increases observer identification with the affected party. Rather than just providing statistics on the num- ber of individuals harmed, media reports may provide personal details about the victims that cause observers to see similarities between the affected party and themselves, thus fostering social identification and eliciting sympathy (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Nordgren & Morris McDon- nell, 2011). Or, as was the case with the BP oil spill, media accounts sometimes emphasize the non-U.S. nationality of the implicated corpora- tion, thus possibly fostering disidentification of U.S. observers for the company and supporting stronger assessments of corporate culpability.

In sum, frames can directly influence observer assessments of the three primary factors in our model (effect undesirability, corporate culpabil- ity, and affected party noncomplicity). Frames can also influence those factors by affecting the way observers perceive effect and firm charac- teristics, as well as by affecting observer social identification with the affected party or impli- cated corporation. Further, frames can appeal to an observer’s cognitive schema of corporate so- cial irresponsibility by providing a story line that links a culpable corporation with an unde- sirable effect as inflicted on innocent victims. Although these arguments suggest multiple propositions regarding the influence of frames on each aspect of the model, for the sake of parsimony, we offer one general proposition about the ultimate effect of frames.

Proposition 9: Observer awareness of frames that position the corporation as causal and morally responsible with respect to a harmful effect on noncomplicit victims is positively re- lated to corporate social irresponsibil- ity attributions.

DISCUSSION

In this article we used attribution theory to describe how corporate social irresponsibility attributions are rooted in an array of subjective assessments made by the individual observer— assessments that the effect was undesirable, that the corporation was culpable for the unde- sirable effect, and that the affected party had a low level of complicity in the undesirable effect. We described how those assessments can affect

each other and how they are further influenced by the observer’s perceptions of effect and firm characteristics, as well as by the observer’s so- cial identification with the affected party or with the implicated corporation. We concluded by de- scribing how frames play an important role in the corporate social irresponsibility attribu- tion model.

The theory we presented here, although fo- cused on attributions related to the dark side of organizational behavior, contributes to the larger body of research on the concept of CSR— the idea of voluntary firm behavior, not driven by the firm’s explicit transactional interests and legal/regulatory obligations, which has some in- tentional positive social effect (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; McWil- liams & Siegel, 2001). Much CSR research is rooted in the broader research tradition attempt- ing to understand both the firm’s adaptation to its environment and environmental responses to firm action. In that vein, studies seeking to con- firm a link between socially responsible behav- ior and firm performance often investigate mar- ket reactions or accounting performance changes hypothesized to occur because socially responsible actions satisfy expectations in the firm’s environment, thereby giving the firm re- source and institutional advantages (for a re- view see Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Similarly, studies that look at social responsibility as a firm-level outcome variable often consider envi- ronmental antecedents, such as the specific de- mands of external stakeholders, rewards avail- able owing to enhanced corporate reputation, and various mechanisms of institutional diffu- sion (for reviews see Basu & Palazzo, 2008, and Campbell, 2007). A commonality of the majority of CSR studies is that their approach to environ- mental expectations for CSR emphasizes broad social structures, such as value systems, institu- tions, and stakeholder relations. In contrast, the model we presented here suggests that respon- sibility and irresponsibility are social construc- tions with their roots in the knowledge, interpre- tations, and perceptions of the firm’s observers.

Our focus on individual-level knowledge, in- terpretation, and perception is consistent with theories in the organization literature that high- light individual agency within social construc- tivist frameworks. For instance, our approach is compatible with the view not only that institu- tions or social structures constrain and enable

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human behavior but also that they are pro- duced, reproduced, and changed as a result of the knowledgeable behavior of human agents (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Battilana, 2006; Emir- bayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984). Our ap- proach is also compatible with the view that individuals simultaneously react to and shape the environments they perceive as constituting social reality (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1979). Basu and Palazzo (2008) recently employed this view to explore how organization decision makers go about making sense of the organiza- tion’s relationship with its stakeholders and with the world at large, thereby constructing and defining the organization’s CSR character. We join Basu and Palazzo in challenging the idea that environmental pressures on the firm for socially responsible behavior are best under- stood as objective facts. However, our emphasis is on the attributions made by the firm’s observ- ers, rather than on the sensemaking of firm insiders.

An important implication of our model, which should be relevant both to researchers and prac- titioners, is that expectations and evaluations for social responsibility do not exist as an objec- tive reality in the firm’s environment but, rather, are subjective and changeable, being the prod- uct of a confluence of influences affecting indi- vidual perceptions. Consider, for example, that perceptions of effect undesirability are subject to developments in measurement techniques and emerging causal theories. As was the case historically with cigarettes and the developing science linking them with cancer, new methods of measurement emerge that bring effects to ob- servers’ attention and consideration. As nega- tive effects become evident, the search for causal agents intensifies, and associated firms appear increasingly culpable. Yet as the haz- ards of smoking have become widely known and smoking is seen as an active choice, smok- ers’ perceived complicity in their fate may make the associated firms appear less culpable.

Indeed, observer assessments of affected party complicity and corporate culpability with respect to a negative effect are also not static. For example, as we argued earlier, each will be sensitive to the degree to which the observer identifies with the affected party or the firm. Identification entails an abstracted understand- ing of what the affected party or firm is—that is, its identity—along with the observer’s affinity

for that identity (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008). An observer’s abstracted understanding of the affected party or firm develops and changes over time. Affinity with that identify will ebb and flow. Therefore, identification is a state that can strengthen and weaken with experience. Even societal changes that increasingly empha- size the interconnectedness of observers with victims of undesirable effects might cause ob- servers to expand their self-definition to include others. As observer perceptions of ingroup and outgroup boundaries evolve, assessments of af- fected party complicity and corporate culpabil- ity with respect to a negative effect are likely to be influenced accordingly.

Our focus in this article has been on subjec- tive understandings of firm behavior in terms of appropriateness and responsibility as those un- derstandings form at the level of the individual perceiver. An implication for the firm is that those individual-level perceptions, including at- tributions of corporate social irresponsibility, constitute the real-world environment in which the firm exists and with which the firm must interact. This suggests that individual-level knowledge, interpretations, and perceptions ag- gregate across individuals in ways that become visible to organizations and relevant to organi- zational outcomes. A subject for future research is to consider theoretically and explore empiri- cally how individual-level attributions for social responsibility or irresponsibility that correlate across individuals may underlie the structural influences often studied in CSR research, in- cluding institutional and stakeholder pressures on the firm.

Another subject for future research is the em- pirical examination of our model of corporate social irresponsibility attributions. In spite of containing a wide array of predicted influences on social irresponsibility attributions, and there- fore an apparent complexity that would seem to preclude straightforward empirical testing, the model in fact lends itself well to testing. The model entails individual-level perceptions and does not encompass process in terms of se- quence or interactions of influences over time. Combined with these aspects, the important role of frames in the model suggests an avenue for empirical exploration in an experimental set- ting. Because frames can be highly influential on each of the elements in the corporate social irresponsibility attribution model, various parts

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of the model could be manipulated in a lab study using scenarios as frames. The researcher could devise different versions of a scenario in- volving a fictional firm and event to make the effect appear more or less negative, the firm more or less culpable, the affected party more or less complicit, and the affected party or firm as easier or harder for the experimental subject to socially identify with. The researcher could then measure perceptions among experimental sub- jects to check the manipulations of those factors.

For example, one version of the scenario could include descriptive information about the af- fected party that emphasizes lack of foresight or power, whereas a different version could omit this information. In this way the researcher would be able to assess the impact of percep- tions of affected party power and foresight on observer assessments of affected party noncom- plicity. The researcher could then test the de- gree to which factors such as the subject’s as- sessment of affected party noncomplicity contribute to a measure of the subject’s attribu- tions of corporate social irresponsibility for the focal firm. Because real-world attributions of corporate social irresponsibility are often influ- enced by the reading or hearing of a story about a firm and a negative event, having experimen- tal subjects read, listen to, or watch a scenario about a company would be a very natural way for observers to form corporate social irrespon- sibility attributions. We therefore expect that a scenario-based lab study would provide rich in- formation regarding the formation of these attri- butions in a manner that would allow for high external validity.

A possible limitation of the model presented in this article is that it simplifies some of the real-world nuances in terms of individual differ- ences among observers, among events, among corporations, and among frames. The explora- tion of those nuances represents an opportunity for future theoretical development and empiri- cal research. Consider, for instance, the individ- ual observer differences that we modeled with respect to perceptions of threat, moral impulses, and interpretations of norms and the degree to which the observer socially identifies with the implicated firm or affected party. These differ- ences help explain how perceptions of corporate social irresponsibility might vary across observ- ers. Future research can explore other sources of variance in observer perceptions that affect the

way the observer assesses effect undesirability, corporate culpability, and affected party non- complicity. Chief among those sources of vari- ance likely will be the individual’s shared inter- ests with other observers—shared interests that may not necessarily relate to the individual’s social identification with the firm or affected party. One way of understanding such shared interests is in terms of whether and how the individual is a stakeholder of the focal organi- zation (Freeman, 1984). Different types of stake- holders, by virtue of their different types of rela- tionships with the firm, will have different sets of interests, making stakeholder analysis a po- tentially useful avenue for extending the theo- retical model presented here. We would expect that an analysis of stakeholder interests, be- cause those interests may naturally diverge and can even compete among different stakeholder groups, would add a layer of complexity that would complement and deepen the understand- ing of individual-level corporate social irrespon- sibility attributions we have introduced.

Future research could also extend the model provided here by considering nuances among events. We modeled events as primarily differ- ing in terms of the subjective perceptions of dif- ferent observers. This approach helps explain how two events apparently representing similar levels of social harm can differentially contrib- ute to corporate social irresponsibility attribu- tions. However, there may be important differ- ences among events that facilitate or impede those attributions. For instance, it would be valuable to explore how events may differ in terms of the dimensions of the firm’s legitimacy (e.g., “pragmatic,” “moral,” or “cognitive” legiti- macy, as per Suchman, 1995: 571) that the events potentially undermine. Events that differ in the way they harm the firm’s legitimacy might also differ in the way they contribute to observer perceptions of corporate culpability. We would expect that, relative to other types of legitimacy damage, moral legitimacy damage would be most consistent with observer assessments of corporate culpability for undesirable social outcomes.

Another potential avenue of exploration is how events differ in terms of ambiguity, which Frisch and Baron describe as “the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction” (1988: 152). We would expect that, across observers, events higher in ambiguity

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would have higher variance in corporate social irresponsibility attributions, since the subjective influences on attributions modeled here would be more operative.

In this article we modeled differences among corporations primarily in terms of size, promi- nence, and perceived disposition, but there are other differences among corporations that future research could explore as potentially influenc- ing corporate social irresponsibility attribu- tions. For example, it would be valuable to con- sider how stigma—meaning that the firm is widely perceived as possessing a “fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and dis- credits the organization” (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009: 157)—would contribute to attributions of irresponsibility. Attributions of corporate social irresponsibility, as we have presented them in this article, are individuating in that they are unique assessments about a particular firm, but we expect that they would be sensitive to the inherently deindividuating na- ture of stigmatization.

Another potential avenue of exploration is how firms differ in terms of their perceived as- sociation with other firms, including network and industry memberships. For instance, illegit- imacy, negative reputation, and stigma spill- over from associated firms (e.g., Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002; Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008) could easily influence an observer’s assessments of the focal firm’s culpability for an undesirable effect.

Finally, our treatment of frames as a fairly homogenous construct is another area in which the model presented in this article could be elaborated in future research. There is quite a bit of existing research on how certain charac- teristics of accounts and apologies can make those accounts and apologies more or less effec- tive (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Elsbach, 1994; Higgins & Snyder, 1989; Wood & Mitchell, 1981). For exam- ple, Elsbach (1994) described how organizational audiences are more forbearing when the firm acknowledges rather than denies a controversy and when the firm’s accounts of the controversy signal attention to firm legitimacy rather than to firm efficiency. Similarly, researchers have paid attention to the qualities of third-party frames that make them more or less effective in draw- ing attention to and influencing perceptions. For example, scholars have argued that frames are

especially effective when they are simple yet dramatic, are marketed in such a way as to maximum novelty and minimize oversaturation, appeal to widely accepted cultural concerns, are consistent with powerful economic and political interests, and fully specify parties to blame as well as potential remedies for the problem (Hil- gartner & Bosk, 1988; Spector & Kitsuse, 2001). The model presented here would be enhanced by further exploration into how these kinds of nuances in the accounts and apologies offered by the firm and in the frames offered by third parties will influence not only the observer’s attention to the effect, corporation, and affected party but also how the observer will interpret and explain those elements potentially underlying corporate social irresponsibility attributions.

CONCLUSION

Even though much consideration has been given in various streams of the organizational literature to the causes and consequences of bad behavior by firms, little attention has been given to how observers subjectively understand firm behavior as bad or irresponsible. The the- ory offered here provides insight into how cor- porate social irresponsibility attributions arise at the level of the individual observer of the firm. Since those subjectively constructed under- standings help constitute the real-world envi- ronment in which the firm exists and with which the firm must interact, it is important to consider how those understandings come to be. With our focus on attributions of irresponsible rather than responsible behavior, we join a nascent stream of research laying the foundation for further study of how perceptions that the firm has acted in a socially harmful way may be particularly relevant to the firm’s ability to draw support and resources from its environment. Attributions of irresponsibility may generate stronger external reactions than perceptions of responsibility and, ultimately, have a much greater impact on the firm’s relationship with its environment.

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Donald Lange ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of management in the W. P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include reputation, legiti- macy, and prestige in organizational and industry settings; controversial organiza- tional action; and organizational corruption.

Nathan T. Washburn ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of management at Thunderbird School of Global Management. He received his Ph.D. from Arizona State University. His research interests include the role of values in executive decision making and leadership, corporate social responsibility, and global strategy topics.

326 AprilAcademy of Management Review

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