Philosophy Essay 2 Pages

PHILOSOPHY FOR

THE 21sT CENTURY

A Comprehensive Reader

Edited by

Steven M. Cahn City University of New York Graduate Center

Associate Editors

Delia Graff Cornell University

Robin Jeshion Yale University

L. A. Paul University of Arizona Jesse J. Prinz University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Stuart Rachels University of Alabama

Gabriela Sakamoto Mount Saint Marys College

David Sosa University of Texas at Austin

Cynthia A. Stark University of Utah

New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2003

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ISBN 0-19-514792-8 (pbk.: a1k. paper) I. Philosophy-Introductions. I. 'ritle: Philosophy for the twenty-first century. II.

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AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

theoretical changes in which old theories are discarded and entirely new theories are adopted in their place. Hence, science does nm give us a cumulative increase of knowledge of the world; rather, it gives us a succession of wholly different conceptions of the world.

Richard Boyd defends the realist conception of science that scientific theories are (at least approximately) true against the problems raised by Kuhn, Goodman and others. He argues that the scientific method gives us a successful guide to facts about the empirical world and that scientific realism gives us an adequate explanation for the success of tbe scientific method. Those who challenge realism by raising concemsabout projectibility and the like have noade- quate explanation for the success of science; hence, we should prefer the realist conception of science to the opposing "antirealist" or "instrumentalist" conception of science.

The selections included in this section represent only a sampling of the philosophical analyses of science advanced by past and current philosophers of science. lJebate on almost every topic addressed continues to flourish in cOlltemporary philosophical circles. Although there is no definitive agreement among the contributors as to what constitutes science's con- tribution to our knowledge of the world, a careful reading of the text should help the thought- ful reader to develop a broader, deeper, and more sophisticated philosophical conception of science and scientific knowledge.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

DAVID HUME

David Hume (171 1 -1 776) was a Scottish philosopher and leading exponent of British empiricism. H is books include the Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

When it is asked, What is the nature of aU our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and etIect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concern- ing that relation? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carryon our sifting humoUT, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philoso- phers, that give themselves airs of superior

David Burne, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive disposi- tions, who push them from every comer to which they retreat, ami who arc sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to dis- cover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myselt~ in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed.

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I say then, Lhat, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and etTecl, our COII- clusions from that experience arc not founded 011 reasoning, or any process of the understand- ing. 'Ibis answer we must endeavour both to explain and 10 defcm.l.

It must certainly be allowed, thaI natufe has kept us al a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded liS only the knowlcdg,e of u few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from liS those powers amJ principles 011 which the influence of these oi:!iecis entirely depends. OUf senses inform us of the colonr, weight, and consistence of bread; bUl neither sense nor rcason can ever infonn us of lhose qualities which fiL it for the nourishment and support of a human body. SighL or feeling COI1- veys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, anti which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of Ulis we cannot form Ule most distant (.'on- ception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers l and principles, we always pre- sume, when we see like sensible qualities, that Uley have like secret powers., and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experi- enced, will follow from Ulem. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have fonnerly cat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating Ule experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that Ulere is no known connexion between the sen- sible qualities and the St'eret powers; and con- sequently, that the mind is not led to fonn such a conclusion concerning their constant and reg- ular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, amI that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to

DAVIDIIUME

future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. '111e bread, which I fonl1erly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at ,mother time, and that like sensible Qualities must always be .lllended with like secret powers? The conse- quence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a con- sequencc tlrawn by the mind; that there is a cer- tuin step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are I~'ll' from being the same, [ have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and [foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, simi- 1m; will be attended with similar ~fJects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reason- ing. The conncxion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a mediwn, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if intleed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert Umt it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning mailer of fact.

This negative argument must certainly, in 30 process of time, become altog.ether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intennediate step, which supports the under- standing in Ulis conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his own penetralion, as lo conclude, because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it docs not really exisl. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task;

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 243

and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonslrative reasoning, or lhal concL'fning relati()lls of ideas, and moral rea- soning, or that conceming matter of fact and existence. That there are no dcmonstrative argu- ments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction lhat the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like lhose which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effecls. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is lhere any more inlelli- gible proposition than to amnn, that all the lrees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intel- ligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no conlradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abslracl rea- soning jj priori.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these argu- menls musl be probable only, or such as regard mailer of fact and real existence, according 10 the division above mentioned. But that lhere is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said thaI all argumenls concerning exislence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; lhal our knowledge of thaI relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition thaI the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this lasl supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evi- dently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the VCty point in question.

31 In reality, all argumenlS from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover

among natural o~jects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such o~jects. And lhough none but a fool or madman will ever prelend to dispute lhe aUlhority of experi- ence, or to r~ject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighly authorily 10 experience, and makes us draw advanlage from lhat similarily which nalure has placed among different objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our exper- imental conclusions. Now it seems evidcnt thaI, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfecl at tirsl, and upon one inslance, as after ever so long a course of expe- rience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like a<; eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same la'lte and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of unifonn experimenls in any kind, lhal we attain a finn reliance and secmity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of rcasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different fmm that which it infers from a hundred ins lances lhal are nowise differenl from that single one? This question I propose a<; much for lhe sake of infonnation, a<; with an intention of raising dif- ficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to inslruction, if anyone will vouchsafe 10 beslow it on me.

Should it be said thaI, fmm a number of uni~ 32 fonn experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems lhe same diflicuHy, couched in different tenns. The question still recurs, on whal process of argu- menl lhis inference is founded? Where is the medium, the intcrposing ideas, which join propositions SO very wide of each other? It is confessed Ulat the colour, consistence, and olher sensible qualilies of bread appear not, of

244

themselves, to have any COIll1cxion wilh the secret powers of nourishment and support for otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appe.1rance of these sensible qualities, withollt the aid of experience; COI1- trary to the sentiment of all philosophers, rmd contrary to plain matter of fact. !-Iere, then, is our nalural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. I-low is this remedied by experience? It only shows liS a number of 1I11ifonn effects, resulting from cef- tain objects, and tcaches liS that those particu- lar objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new o~iecl, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar pow- ers and forces, and look for a like etIect. From a body of like colour lInd consistencc with bread we cxpect like nomishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, 1 have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualilies conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor arc these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is expclimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be con- joined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, Umt any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments arc founded on the supposition of that resem- blance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without

DAVIDIIUME

some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you preteno to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens some- times, lUld with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? My prac- tice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mis- take the purport of my question. As an agent, I mn quite satisfied in the point; but as a philoso- pher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the pub- lic, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtain in!!, a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignonmce, if we do not aug.ment our knowledge.

I must confess that a man is gUilty of unpar- 33 donable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the leamed, for several ages, should have employed them~ selves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude posi- tively that the su~iect must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we exam- ine all the sources of our knowledge, and con- clude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present sul:!iect, there arc some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

It is certain that the most ignorant and stu- pid peasants-nay infants, nay even brute beasts-improve by expelience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the

THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his htmd near any candle; but will expect a sim- ilar effect from a cause which is similar ill its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your en- quiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the ctlpacity of a mere infant. If you hesitatc, there- fore. a moment, or if. after reflection. you pro- duce any inllicate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confes..;;

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that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similtlr effects from causes which are. to appeamnce, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present sec- tion. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wroug, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which. it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cmdle.

NOTE

1. The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popu- lar sense. The more accurate ex.plication of it would give additional evidence to this argument.

The Traditional Problem of Induction

BRIAN SKYRMS

Brian Skryms is professor of logic and philosophy of science at the University of Cali- fornia at Irvine. He has made important contributions to theories of inductive logic, game theory, and decision theory. His books include Choice and Chance, Causal Necessity, and The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.

INTRODUCTION

[I]nductive logic is used to shape our expectations of that which is as yet unknown on the basis of those facts that tire already known; for instance, to shape our expectations of the future on the basis of our knowledge of the past and present. Our problem is the rational justification of the use of a system of sci- entific inductive logic. rather than some other system of inductive logic, for this task.

The Scottish philosopher David Hume first raised this problem, which we shall call the traditional prob- lemo/induction, in full force.! Hume gave the problem tl cutting edge, for he advanced arguments designed to show that no such rational justification of inductive logic is possible, no mailer what the details of a system of scientific inductive logic turn out to be. The history of philosophical discussion of inductive logic since Hume has been in large measure occupied with attempts to circwnvent the difficulties he raised ..

Reprinted from Choice and Chance (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986), by permission of the publishers.