Organizational Impact Paper due 1/6/14 MST 9pm
Collaboration – innovation in manufacturing
Case Study 4: The Lotus Elise 1
1The case has been prepared by Dr Bettina von Stamm as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation.
The philosophy behind Lotus and the Elise
A proper sports car should weigh little, handle and ride superbly, and deliver high levels of driver satisfaction.
Lotus founder Colin Chapman
The Lotus Seven, launched in 1957, was Chapman’s first car to be built on a commercial scale – previous models had been built exclusively for racing purposes. By taking his cars to market he wanted to transfer some of the excitement of racing cars to the road. 2 The Lotus Seven offered racing-car qualities at kit-car prices, with performance achieved through light-weight construction rather than a powerful engine. Chapman was quoted to have said, “It is a bit like a four-wheeled motorbike.”
2Interesting to note that 25% of all Lotus Seven built have, at some point or other, been driven in races.
In 1966 Lotus, which had started off on a site in Tottenham, London, moved to its current site in Hethel, Norwich. The site, which had been the home of a USAAF Liberator squadron in the Second World War was chosen not only because it offered ample room for expansion, but also because it allowed the building of a great test track on what was the former runway and the airfield perimeter road. While keeping the driving fun, Lotus moved decidedly upmarket with the development of the £60,000 Esprit in the 1970s, a direction that was substantiated through the introduction of the Elan, a two-seater sports car, in the 1980s. Neither of the cars has ever been built in large quantities.
Group Lotus plc consists of two parts: Lotus Cars Ltd building the Lotus vehicles, which at the time of the Elise development had about 500 staff; and Lotus Engineering, acting as a consultancy to the automotive industry, with about 800 employees. Both parts of the business, each generating about half of the company’s revenue, are located on the same site. While they normally operate quite independently, they operated closely on the development of the Lotus Elise.
Although the company had taken on engineering work for outside companies on a consultancy basis before, a separate Design and Engineering side of Lotus was set up in 1986. In 1998 35 designers and modellers were employed by Lotus. Russel Carr, Chief of Design, explains, “50% of all the work that Lotus Design does is for third parties. The volume of work has increased several-fold over the last five years.” At Lotus’s new design centre in Hethel with its two independent units, officially opened by the Prime Minister of Malaysia in October 2000, they can now run two vehicle programmes independently of each other.
The only other car manufacturer that entertains an automotive engineering consultancy is Porsche.
In its drive to deliver light-weight, fast cars innovation has always played an important part. Says Kenneth Sears, Head of Vehicle Engineering, Lotus Engineering, “One of the things that people identify with the company is gaining some performance advantage through the development of new technology.” Explaining what Lotus means by innovation a company representative explained, “Innovation must combine elements of knowledge, information and creativity. This means that engineers now and in the future need to combine individual and team working skills.” It also means that the company is strongly committed to research and development, and the development of new products.
Previously owned by the Italian company Bugatti International, which had bought Lotus Group in 1994, the Malaysian car manufacturer Proton took a 64% stake in the company for £51 million in October 1996 with its Chairman, Tan Sri Yahaya, buying an additional 16%. When Yahaya died unexpectedly in a helicopter crash his share was bought by Proton in June 1997, bringing the company’s share in Lotus to a total of 80%. The remaining 20% is still held by Romano Artioli (previously of Bugatti). 3
3In the late 1990s Artioli sold Bugatti to the German car manufacturer BMW.
Conception and concept
Don’t follow the crowd and copy what they are doing.
Alastair Florance, Lotus Cars
There were several threads that together led to the conception of the idea for the Lotus Elise, or project M1-11 as it was originally called. The company was looking for a follow-up product to the Lotus Elan, which had proved far too expensive to produce and was rather complex to manufacture. The last straw had been when the Japanese company that had supplied the engines for the Elan closed down. With the discontinuation of the Elan in June 1992 200 jobs were lost.
The Elise started with a clean sheet, the only guideline was that it had to be true to the spirit of the founder. To fund the experimentation and development necessary for an entirely new car it was agreed that money would be diverted from the research budget of Lotus Engineering under the condition that the new car should be a demonstration of Lotus’s engineering and technology skills. In fact, it was the research budget of two years that was ‘liberated’ for the development of the Lotus Elise.
It was agreed that the money available should be invested in the development of those parts that would really make a difference, parts that would contribute to the car’s character and advancements in technology. In addition a member of the development team was tasked with maximising the number of components that were readily available and would not compromise the car’s design and character. For example, the cost involved in developing a door mirror in-house would have been in no proportion to the value created through its uniqueness, so a readily available model, from the Rover Metro, was used instead.
The design brief started from a corridor conversation of a few people – including Kenneth Sears, Head of Technology Strategy, and Roger Becker, Head of Vehicle Engineering – about what a new Lotus car should look and feel like in November 1993. Soon after the design team began its discussion about the philosophy for the new car concept. Unusually, rather than starting with an engineering specification, this project started in the design centre. A few parameters were clear from the beginning: it had to be an open two-seater sports car that would be fun to drive, and it should not cost the earth. Three years were anticipated from conception to production, as was a production run of a couple of thousand cars.
The designers started by putting together theme boards through which they explored customer characteristics and defined the mood and feeling that the car should have. Such boards were covered with pictures of cars, aircraft, fashion items, celebrities, advertisements and motorcycles such as Ducati, a passion for which was shared by Richard Rackham, Head of Engineering, and Head of Lotus Design, Julian Thomson. Richard went into raptures about it, “The bike has some awesome performance. You will never use all of it, but you know it is there. It is a bit of a toy that you just love owning. And if you take the clothes off a Ducati you see lots of nice things, that’s what we wanted to achieve with the Elise.” Richard and Julian kept discussing the concept in all its aspects during work as well as when they met socially.
Once a philosophy had been agreed the designers spent about six weeks developing sketches. Through the sketches key aspects were discussed and agreed: it was to be a step-in two-seater with the engine located at the back, set quite low. The question always asked was, is this in the spirit of Lotus, would driving such a car be fun? The team also used a buck made out of fibreboard, mounted on a wooden frame called the ‘seating buck’, through which the relationship of driver to driving controls, such as the steering wheel, pedals and gear stick, could be explored. In addition to mood boards, sketches and the cardboard model the team brought in a whole host of previous Lotus models.
A very clever aspect of the models is that only half a car is built – and then set against a mirror.
With some key aspects and overall lines agreed, a first scale model was developed. This initial 1:3 scale clay model would demonstrate how the car was anticipated to look and what the basic elements would be. Rather than using the clay model for presentations a plaster case was taken from it from which fibreglass models were made. This had the advantage that the original clay model could be used for further development while the presentation model would be much more attractive and representative of a real car than a clay model could be. Once completed the fibreglass model showed some flaws. For example, the proportions of the car did not seem right, it was too short and the overall height had to be reviewed.
Even though the Lotus Board had approved the development of a new car in-house in January 1994, the team faced its first big challenge only a month later. Unbeknown to the Lotus team, Artioli had commissioned other design consultancies to come forward with designs for a new Lotus car. Julian recalls, “Mr Benedini, Bugatti’s representative, got the Lotus Board down to decide which design they liked best.” It was fortunate for the in-house team that their idea was considered to be the most progressive, innovative and different – and more aligned with the key brand values of the company than the other designs. While following a similar philosophy to the Lotus Seven, the design team had made a conscious effort to differentiate the new product from the existing ones.
During a body review meeting held in spring 1994, for which a refined second 1:3 scale model was used, questions were posed as to the feasibility of a step-in design. Finding a satisfying engineering solution, mainly to achieve the necessary stiffness, would require time and was likely to add weight to the car. On the other hand, developing doors and windows would be quite costly too and particularly the designers were very keen to stick to their original idea. As a compromise it was decided to give the team four weeks to come up with a solution. But before the four weeks were up vehicle legislation engineer Ken Evans dropped a bombshell: legislation decreed a maximum step-in height of 750 mm off the ground, a running board, i.e. a step, would be required. Ken pointed out that the line would only have to come down by 30 mm but the designers felt it would compromise the lines of their design. A major rethink was required resulting in additional costs of about £1/2 million.
While the second-generation design changed several times, it showed many aspects found in the final car such as the side air scoops, the top-exit radiator duct, the character of the headlights and the round indicators.
The surface of the 1:3 scale model was scanned to develop a set of drawings from which a full-scale model could be developed. Developing a full-size model is quite an involved process and often scaling problems mean that proportions have to be revisited. Richard compared this to scale toy models where certain aspects of the car look right only because they have been overemphasised. In developing the first full-size model wood and foam were applied to a steel frame which was then sent away to a specialist. At the specialist the foam was milled to 40 mm below the surface and spiked with pegs sticking out 60 mm, making the model look like a giant hedgehog. Upon return to Lotus, the model makers applied clay to the height of the pegs before sending it once again to the specialist who then copy-milled it into the final but still only initial clay buck. At the time Lotus employed 10 model makers, bringing in additional modellers on a contract basis if and when required. A team of four to six worked on a full-size clay model at any point in time, each on a specified area. The role of the model makers was to help designers and engineers to refine the design. Based on the clay model that returned to the factory in May 1994 the design was signed off, both Romano Artioli and Gianpaulo Benedini of Bugatti were part of the decision-making body.
A lot of the actual design was done ‘on the object’, for example height and positioning of the headlights. Clay had the great advantage of being easy to manipulate and change, bits could be taken away and added back on. By doing so any curve or shape could be achieved. Refinement can take quite some time and might leave some people wondering whether anything has actually changed but spending time and effort here could make the difference between the end result being ‘great’ or ‘exceptional’.
While the full-size clay model was developed, the latest 1:3 scale model was tested in the wind tunnel by aerodynamicist Richard Hill. For lightweight cars to achieve high speeds efficient aerodynamics are particularly important. Hill found what he had anticipated when first seeing the low, stubby design: the car had quite a high drag factor. Another aspect contributing to the high drag factor was the radiator duct. By reducing the lift at the front, the radiator duct caused an imbalance at the back, meaning that the car would lift under aerodynamic load. Not something one would want to experience in a rear-drive car. To address the problem Richard Hill used clay, Styrofoam and tape to build up the surfaces until the optimum aerodynamic performance was achieved.
Julian, when presented with the result, was quite taken aback. Not only did he feel that the design had been spoilt, there was also the question of whether this meant that the design had to go back to the board for renewed approval. Richard Hill explained that he had taken the changes to the ultimate limit and that a compromise would have to be found. Project manager Tony Shute commented, “The car was as aerodynamic as a brick! However, the car had style and whatever happened, we did not want to lose that.” Richard Rackham too was a strong supporter of Julian’s design and keen to help find solutions that would maintain the visual identity. Under the mediation of other team members a compromise was finally reached, and a spoiler added.
Julian commented on the design process, “The important thing is to remember that all those decisions governing the size and layout of the package that are given by the body engineering department are relevant to us. We talk about the styling but my group is very much involved with the concept of the car; you find that all companies offering truly innovative products have to have a level of understanding between both groups. You can’t just have engineers produce something and then decorate it with different styles, they have to complement each other.” Richard agreed saying, “Chassis design is more than just a structure, it’s part of the style of the car as well, because it’s so visible in the design.” The team worked to progress engineering and design issues in parallel, as well as considering interior and exterior as each would impact on the other. The efforts were supported by the geographical closeness between the design and the engineering department, and a presence of key concept engineering personnel in the design studio.
Occasionally they would come up against what founder Colin Chapman had described as, ‘the old school engineers’ of whom he had said, “The trouble with experts is they know what can’t be done.”
A lot of attention was paid to detail. Having a single windscreen wiper was part of the desired look. But not only would it look racy, it was also cheap, and most efficient aerodynamically. The choice of a single wiper had implications for the size of the windscreen and with it the proportion of the whole vehicle. There were many legal requirements and from the outset there had been some doubts internally as to whether a single wiper would work. Julian remembers, “Our engineers were more interested in developing wiper systems that would fit any car.” Lotus had also approached a French company specialising in complex wiper systems. But the tight schedule for the project meant that Lotus was looking for a solution within four months – rather than the 12 the French company declared necessary – which meant that they decided not to get involved. Determined not to give up, Richard Rackham experimented until he found a solution that worked. He commented, “The fact that I was familiar with the Citroen AX system probably helped to see what would be possible. I just tilted the wiper motor spindle and it worked.” For the manufacture they eventually found a UK-based company but the design was, in the end, done entirely in-house by Richard.
Later in 1997 the French company approached Lotus, being interested in buying the wiper mechanisms Lotus had developed.
Probably the biggest challenge for the team was to achieve all other ambitions within a limited budget – if you have lots of money you can achieve almost anything! To make the car widely affordable the price tag had been set at the £20,000 mark. To meet all challenges the team decided to strip out anything that was not absolutely essential, and have as many parts as possible with more than one function, so for example the front structure of the car, which was crash structure, support for the radiator, aerodynamic wing and attachment for a tow hook.
We wanted to make the frame out of as small a number of components as possible. We wanted to join each piece. directly to the next piece.
Chassis development
While Julian and his team were working on the overall design, Richard Rackham, who had been involved in the development of the M1-11 even at seating buck stage, started to think about the chassis design. The target weight for the new car had been set at 650 kg – to put this into perspective, a Renault Spider Sport weighs about 930 kg and the MGF brings about 1.1 tonnes to the scale.
Some key players in the development team set up in January 1994 and their roles:
· Tony Shute – project manager, product engineering background, philosophy behind the car, its gestation period, has done a lot of the development driving.
· Julian Thomson – head of Lotus Design, designing the shape, styling process.
· Richard Rackham – head of engineering design, responsible for the design of the chassis and suspension, engineering issues, issues during production process.
· Luke Bennett – manufacturing engineering manager.
· Morris Dowton – manufacturing manager, Lotus production.
· Ben Wright – purchasing & procurement manager.
· Dave Minter – executive engineer, responsible for honing the ride and handling.
· John Miles – details of damping set-up.
· Alastair McQueen – chief test driver.
To determine the dimensions of the chassis Richard and his team, together with Julian, started with a full-size plastic sheet onto which the outline of the car was pasted. The tapes that were used for the lines could be moved and reapplied whereby different colours were used for different parts, i.e. chassis, engine and passenger. “Using this”, said Richard, “helps us understand the interaction between car and ‘agent orange’, so called because for the occupant we use orange lines.” From the full-size drawing computer drawings were produced which then allowed working with the chassis and the positioning of individual components.
Before the start on the M1-11 project Lotus had been working with a British car manufacturer on exploring the use of lightweight extrusions for car structures, a liaison that had been set up by Hugh Kemp, Technical Director at Lotus at the time. When Lotus’s collaboration partner was taken over by a German manufacturer the relationship ended rather prematurely. However, Richard had got hooked on the idea and decided to explore possibilities for the M1-11 and Tony commented, “It is nice to have a big brother when exploring new territory but we are quite used to doing such things on our own. Our Board saw the visionary product and felt that our people had not only the necessary expertise and knowledge but also a good dose of enthusiasm to see the project through.” Richard contacted a company they had worked with previously, the Danish company Hydro Aluminium, whose core expertise was in the building industry but who had recently set up a new division, Hydro Automotive Components.
The aluminium is shipped to England for bending, then goes back to Denmark for heat treatment, machining and the assembly of the chassis before being shipped to Lotus.
Welded aluminium had been used for car structures before, but not to the extent Richard planned to use it. Using extruded aluminium would not only mean that the frame would be lightweight but also durable and corrosion resistant. A constraint inherent in the choice was that extrusions tend to be straight. Any bend would not only cost time and money, it would also create a weak point in case of a collision. Finding a solution that would use only straight parts and be aesthetically pleasing turned out to be impossible and in the end two bends had to be integrated into the back part of the chassis. Hydro’s experience and expertise came into its own and a special and complex piece of equipment was developed for the bending. However, the bending had to take place in a part of Hydro located in England, this meant that the chassis parts had to be shipped back and forth a few times. It was agreed that once Hydro’s new plant in Worcester was completed, production would be moved to the UK. While open cars are often compromised structurally, requiring extensive stiffening to make them sufficiently rigid, the Lotus Elise with its aluminium chassis needed no additional measures. Despite its structure weighing as little as 70 kg, it met all safety standards and proved to have great torsional rigidity.
Aluminium versus steel
The most critical aspect of strength in automotive structures is for safety. Modern vehicle structures must retain the integrity of the occupant cell without significant distortion in crash conditions and provide controlled energy absorption. Aluminium alloys have a range of strength to weight ratios which is broadly similar to typical automotive steels whereas the dynamic behaviour may be different. Aluminium, for example, tends to exhibit no effect or a softening. Aluminium generally cannot support such high values of elongation before failure.
Tooling for a particular aluminium extrusion can cost as little as £2000 whereas tools for a pressed steel part can require as much as fractions of millions.
However, welding aluminium tended to reduce its strength, which would have to be counterbalanced by thickening the material. And there were more downsides: (a) welding would only hold the parts together at the seam; (b) as welding changed the properties of the material there was also the concern that corrosion might occur here; and (c) heat-induced distortions could occur. The team did a lot of investigating and much research took place into possible solutions. In the end, to avoid an increase in material, and inspired by the use of glue in the aircraft industry, Richard decided to explore bonding. He found a partner in crime in Peter Bullivant-Clark at Hydro Aluminium Automotive Tønder, Denmark, who had been involved in Hydro’s previous explorations of the use of aluminium extrusions for vehicle spaceframes. He spent two years with the Lotus engineers encouraging them to ‘think extrusion’ and ‘think bonding’.
The material used for the bonding does not cure entirely until the chassis has been into an oven for 4–5 hours. This means that parts could be adjusted and even dissembled during experimentation stage.
Hydro had used chemicals for bonding aluminium before but there were no industry standards, which meant that there would be no ready-made solutions. Several companies were visited and interviewed before they signed up Ciba, based near Cambridge, UK, to help address the problem. Bonding had several advantages: rather than just holding different parts together at the seam it would bind them together through a patch. Bonding would also not be given to distortion. However, a downside was that once a bonded joint started to peel it would have the tendency to separate suddenly – and the idea of the Lotus Elise disintegrating suddenly in the case of an accident was not particularly appealing. In order to overcome the problem special aluminium screws were used right at the edge of the joints. In fact, the screws, which were made of soft aluminium, when driven into the parts were actually slightly melting, so they acted more like rivets and were hence called ‘screw rivets’. These screw rivets did not have to be very strong as their main function was to prevent the onset of peeling. Testing took place to ensure that corrosion would not be likely to happen.
But not only was the chassis made of aluminium. Richard recalls, “Once I got hooked I started looking at every part thinking, could this be an extrusion? For example, I looked at the ugly Metro pedal box we had initially intended to use. Next to it I had sketched an idea pedal – and suddenly thought ‘extrusion’! The resulting pedal did not only look elegant, simple and functional but also turned out to cost a fraction of their steel equivalents.” Other parts that were made of extruded aluminium included the door hinges, suspension uprights and the steering column mounting bracket.
The pedals and brake discs are aluminium, the aerodynamic body is made from lightweight composite material and the oil dips are made of plastic. And, because of its weight, the car does not need power brakes or power assisted steering.
The Elise derived part of its structural stability from two high-sided members on either side of the car, which were connected in front and rear by torsion boxes. Attached to the chassis were front and rear clamshell body sections made from lightweight composite materials.
The switch-over point where the high investment in machinery for steel panels becomes preferential to the high labour cost for glass fibre panels is around 20k–30k units per year.
The body panels were made of very light composite materials. Lotus had been involved in fibre glass reinforced composites since the 1950s. About 20 different types of matting were used in the production of the panels. There are two different ways of producing panels. One was to use a closed mould, the other to use a number of moulds that are joined together. The latter required layering of the glass fibre by hand which was time consuming but had the advantage that several sections could be joined together and would come out as one piece. For example, for the front panel eight sections are joined together, 11 for the back. Matting was laid up in a mould that had been prepared with a gel that formed a smooth, paintable surface. Sufficient curing times for the panels were important, the panels had to remain in the oven for 5–6 hours at 60°C, then stand for 24 hours before being put into the oven for another hour at 80°C. If cured too fast the panels would develop a tendency to buckle and distort.
Once the body parts had cured they were prepared for painting. The first step was cleaning up and smoothing the edges, which was done with a water jet cutter. Next the panels received two coats of primer, after which imperfections were sanded off and another coat of primer applied. After that panels were checked once more for flaws before a colour and clear coat were applied. That done the panels were placed into an oven to dry for 80 minutes at 80°C. Another quality check was made before panels were moved on for assembly. In total there were 16 build stages for the Lotus Elise, each lasting between 7 and 36 minutes.
The brakes were produced by Lanxide. When the company went under in mid-1998 Lotus quickly changed to race car specification cast iron discs.
Another type of composite material was used for the brakes, aluminium and silicon. It was much lighter than the conventionally used cast iron, and, given that it conducts rather than absorbs heat, it had the additional benefit that such brakes would not overheat.
Getting approval
Getting approval for a new model can be a lengthy and frustrating process. There were about 25 major tests a car had to pass to obtain European type approval. More often than not a new type would fail in several of them, which would mean that the programme could be put back by as much as six months. The Elise team had worked hard and systematically to anticipate and avoid any major reasons for a reject. They tested everything they possibly could under a range of circumstances and conditions. The testing facilities at Hethel, such as the track and rigs, were used extensively to ensure any problems would be detected before the car went for approval. One example was noise emission. Instead of measuring noise emission on the finished product, a silencer was incorporated right from the outset, meaning that it was an integral part of the product as well as the production process – rather than having to be put in as an afterthought.
Several internal measures supported quality control efforts. People from engineering and process control met at the end of every day to discuss any issues that had come up during the day. Everyone could find out performance criteria such as production cost, delivery against targets, materials issue and so on from noticeboards that had been distributed around the shop floor. To ensure everyone could see how their work fitted into the whole an instruction booklet was available, providing information on the parts used, sequence of assembly, move-up times, duration of each build stage and so on.
Some of the initiatives had been prompted by the preparations for QS 9000 certification which Lotus obtained in 1997. QS 9000, the car industry’s equivalent of ISO 9000, had been a requirement from some of their major clients such as Ford and General Motors.
The team decided to go for approval in the Netherlands – not that the tests there were much different from those in the UK but the team there had been particularly cooperative and helpful. There was only one aspect that had to be redressed for the Elise, the angle of the front windscreen which was considered to be too shallow. This had escaped the attention of the team as it became only obvious in the prototype – today, where everything would have been done on CAD, it could have been identified earlier.
Lotus has copyright, design registration, trademark and patents for the Elise, and several items on the car are subjects of new patents.
But even that did not prevent the Elise from becoming the first car in the world to obtain the full European vehicle type approval the first time around.
The market and results
Strong design requires strong leadership.
Richard Rackham
1997: Car magazine named the Lotus Elise as the ‘Most Innovative New Car In Production’ in its 2nd Annual Design and Technology Awards. The chassis and brakes on the Elise also picked up the ‘Best Innovation in Production’ award.
When the car was first shown at the international motor show in Frankfurt in 1995 it caused a bit of a stir. Not only because of its exciting design but also because of the extensive use of aluminium in a way thought impossible before. Richard recalls standing next to the car and being approached by someone who turned out to be the project manager for the Renault Spider. The French project manager was completely taken aback by the fact that Lotus had managed to come up with a bonded aluminium chassis – just as he had aimed to do, but he had been told by his engineers that it was entirely impossible. Upon which Richard commented, “The car would probably not have been as daring both in terms of its design and components had decisions been made by consensus.”
While it had originally been planned to produce around 700 cars per year, since the start of production in August 1996 it had become obvious that demand would by far exceed this mark. In May 1997, with a daily production of eight cars expected to go up to 12 by the end of that year, Lotus had an order book of 2000, which translated into a waiting list of 18 months. In handling that kind of demand Lotus’s dedicated, well trained dealership was seen to be essential. Increased demand also meant that Lotus had to invest significantly in increasing production capacity but even in January 2002 they had waiting times of approximately three months. And all that despite, as Tipler writes, “While other cars seem to have a clearer customer profile, it is not quite clear what attracts someone to Elise ownership.” But Lotus were not too worried about customer profiles at that point in time, to quote Julian, “We don’t want to get overly involved in marketing, market research and clinics, that sort of stuff; that’s a lot of hassle. But I think what is important is how you pitch our car in terms of its image, how you separate it, how you use a brand. The luxury for us is that we don’t have to find hundreds of thousands of customers, we only need to find a few thousand. And the product we do can be even stronger for those people. That’s what we’ve done with the Elise: we’ve found a product that isn’t for everyone but definitely is for some people. And those people would never be seen dead in an average sports car. That’s our luxury. We’ve got a fantastic name. We’ve only got to find a maximum of 5000 customers a year, and we know there are nuts who’ll put up with all sorts of things. And we can build our brand and make it stronger. We can do a total enthusiasts’ car, we don’t need to do electric windows or NHV, or worry about a walnut facia. We can get away with blue murder compared with the others, and we can make a fantastic car that enthusiasts are going to love.”
The future
In Autocar magazine of 12 February 1997 Proton, the company’s Malaysian owner, outlined the following agenda for the company:
· Treble Elise production at Hethel.
· Establish Elise assembly in Malaysia.
· Launch third model, possibly slightly larger Elise-based V6 coupe, by 2000.
· Replace Esprit with V8 supercar by 2000.
· Establish post-graduate college for automotive engineers at Hethel by autumn 1997.
· Consider Lotus re-entry to F1 for Malaysian GP of 1999.
· Double earnings from engineering.
Questions
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What can be learned from the use of prototypes at Lotus? |
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2. |
Discuss the role of collaboration with external companies. |
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Given the demand for the new product, what steps should the company consider? |
Managing Innovation, Design and Creativity, Second editionChapter 24: Innovation in the service industry ISBN: 9780470510667 Author: Bettina von Stamm copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons Inc. Innovation in the service industryThe case study of the shared appreciation mortgage is an example of innovation in the service industry. It also provides some interesting insights into innovative organisations’ perspective on what constitutes ‘success or failure’. This chapter takes a closer look at particularities of the service industry, the role of design in developing services, and compares factors that underlie successful service development. Issues around success and failure in new product development and innovation in general are addressed in Chapter 25 . Particularities about the Service IndustryLet us start with a few observations before we start looking at the particularities of the service industry. First, increasingly the boundary between tangible and intangible products becomes blurred. For many products it becomes more and more difficult to say whether it is a service or a product. Think about any form of leasing (a service) versus buying the product, for example, cars. Is a programme providing internet access a product or a service? Is the selling of ‘weed-free fields’ referred to in Chapter 18 a product or service? The second observation is that services tend to be much more profitable than products. Blumberg (1989) reported that service obtain margins of 15–25% before tax whereas product can demand only 7–11%. Not least for this reason more and more companies are either trying to tie in products with services or switch to selling services altogether. Interestingly many of the examples for companies that have switched from products to services have been motivated by sustainability arguments (e.g. the company that offers the service of keeping your floor covered instead of selling carpets – see Chapter 18 ). Another reason is pointed out by Terrill and Middlebrook ( 1996 ) who state that, “When a product is offered in conjunction with a service it is often the service that adds value, not the product.” And, finally, in many developed countries the service industry has overtaken manufacturing by quite a margin. For example, in the UK the service sector today delivers some three-quarters of UK GDP and some 80% of employment, having grown by an average rate of 3.5% this decade. 1 Services industries also spend heavily on innovation (most is not formal R&D). In services, expenditure on innovation is highest in Iceland, Denmark and the United Kingdom (4% or more of total sales). 2 1Speech by Rod Eddington to the Commonwealth Club in London, 1 December 2006 ( http://www.dft.gov.uk/162259/187604/206711/speech ). 2Source: Eurostat; OECD, STI/EAS Division, May 2001. But how is ‘service’ defined? Johne and Storey ( 1998 ) provide a number of definitions that might be useful: · Service product – the predominantly intangible core attributes which customers purchase. · Product development/innovation – the development (or improvement) of tangible or service products. · New product development (NPD) – the development of tangible products which are new to the supplier. Sometimes NPD is expanded to include new service development (see below). · New service development (NSD) – the development of service products which are new to the supplier. · Offer development – the development, by the supplier, of core product (or service) attributes plus the development of the processes by which the product is evaluated, purchased and consumed. Many of the considerations for new product development and innovation are the same, whether the end result is tangible – i.e. a product – or intangible – i.e. a service. The usefulness of a formalised development process, the early involvement of all parties involved throughout the development, and the need for senior management to signal clear support for development and innovation activity, to name but a few. Given the aforementioned I found it quite interesting that an article published in 1997 ( Sundbo, 1997 ) describes the innovation process in the service industry generally as an “unsystematic search-and-learning process”, while it seems that most companies engaged in the development of tangible products have formalised product development processes by now. The description of the process for developing new processes by Terrill and Middlebrooks (in Kuczmarski & Associates, 1995 ) does not look very different from that for the development of tangible products (see Box 24.1 ). Box 24.1. New service development process However, there are also aspects of services and service development that are different and which need to be understood in order to innovate successfully. Most of the differences arise from the fact that services tend to be intangible by nature but the exploration below is broken down under the following headings: · Consequences of the intangibility of services · ‘Manufacture’ and delivery happen simultaneously · Difficult to protect · Easy to innovate Consequences of the intangibility of servicesThe most obvious difference between a tangible product and a service is that the latter is intangible. This means that you cannot look at them or touch them and that they are difficult to assess before a purchasing decision is made. At a basic level service innovations might be easier to understand, for example internet banking means that you conduct all your banking activities on the computer instead of going into the bank or posting letters. However, the real test comes in the experience, when actually using the online service. No description of the product is likely to point out the problems of establishing a connection, problems with setting up transfers to accounts that are held at a different bank or the difficulties one can have in speaking to a real person to discuss a problem. A friend from Germany just reported that his bank would allow ‘either or’, that is he would either have to do all his transactions via the internet, or all the traditional way. As he spends time travelling for longer periods, which means that access to the internet cannot always be guaranteed, subscribing to the internet services is not really an option for him. The fact that by the time that you are able to assess the quality of the service you have already paid for means that reputation and word of mouth are of critical importance. Reputational issues were a major consideration for the Bank of Scotland in the development of their innovative product. Senior management were quite adamant that everything possible should be done to ensure that purchasers of the shared appreciation mortgage would be absolutely clear about the conditions and implications of entering into such a mortgage agreement. This was the reason why a dedicated, well-trained team was set up to answer questions about the new product, and why applicants were initially asked to seek professional advice before submitting their mortgage applications. ‘Manufacture’ and delivery happen simultaneouslyBecause the product is consumed upon delivery there is no manufacturing as such and ergo neither the possibility to ‘manufacture’ in advance and put into an inventory. Unlike with tangible products, where quality controls can be built in at several stages during the manufacturing and delivery process, if there is a lapse in quality for intangible products the customer is probably the first to notice. As a consequence the medium through which the service is delivered – be it an IT system or people – are critical for the quality of a service as well as for its consistency. On the note of IT systems, it seems that many organisations are introducing new and expensive IT systems under the umbrella of improving customer services. However, anyone who has tried to get through a system of options after options in automated telephone answering systems will be aware that most of these systems have little to do with customer service and are implemented for cost reasons only. My own recent experience with the provider of financial services for lease purchases of cars is an example of how ‘improvements’ of IT systems can backfire significantly if not designed and executed carefully (see Box 24.2 ). Box 24.2. Experiencing service quality ... Contact from financial service provider Response by customer Letter of 16 May 02 informing customers about a new computer system, asserting that the customer does not need to take any action; electronically generated signature by ‘A’ No action taken Letter of 19 June 02 informing customer that ‘due to lack of funds in your account your bank has been unable to make your last payment...’ electronically generated signature by ‘B’ Upon return from a holiday 2 July the customer telephoned the financial service provider, after checking that the account in question had been in credit throughout the period in question. A flash of inspiration led the customer to ask what account details were used which resulted in the insight that an account that had been used for the first months of the contract, back in late 1998, had been used; correct account details were given Letter dated 1 July informing the customer that the bank had rejected the request for the second time; electronically generated signature by ‘B’ No action as the customer assumed that phone call and computer generated letter had crossed Letter dated 4 July asking the customer to provide correct bank details signed by ‘C’ Customer received and sent letter 8 July AND spoke to ‘C’ 8 July confirming AGAIN the correct bank details Letter dated 11 July signed by ‘D’ acknowledging customer letter of 8 July No action taken – though customer quite annoyed as it is yet another computer generated letter referring to correspondence as ‘complaint’. Letter dated 11 July electronically signed by ‘B’ informing customer yet again that they were unable to draw from customer’s account, setting an additional charge Received and called 15 July, spoke to ‘E’ again giving current bank details. Customer requested a return call to confirm that problems had been resolved. No such call came Customer called again 18 July and requested to speak to the most senior person; explained the situation again and was yet again promised that problems had been sorted out Letter dated 19 July identical computer generated letter electronically signed by ‘A’ Received 25 July, 12.00; customer asked to be put through to ‘A’ and was told ‘A’ does not take customer calls, spoke to ‘F’ instead; Customer (!) suggested that if they had used the wrong bank details they might also have sent a letter notifying the bank of the changed arrangements to the wrong address; ‘F’ was very helpful and seemed, again, to be able to sort out the problem and promised that the customer would get no more computer generated letters Letter dated 26 July, signed by ‘A’ informing the customer that a new account has been set up No action taken Two identical letters dated 31 July, electronically signed by ‘B’ requesting that the customer should call him Upon receiving the letter 5 August the customer attempted to call ‘B’ (although of course the customer had previously been told that ‘B’ does not talk to customers); after several attempts and time spent in waiting loops the customer gave and wrote letter including a summary of all above correspondence Letter dated 7 August, signed by ‘G’, apologising Customer called 20 August upon returning from travels abroad, spoke to ‘H’ and confirmed that the company should continue with direct debit until all instalments were paid; ‘H’ agreed to call should there be a problem (there was only one left)
Customer called 6 September when she found that her account had been drawn on twice; ‘I’ explained that they were the penultimate and last payment but that due to the problems in drawing from the account in June there was still one payment outstanding; customer decided to send cheque the same day to sever all relations with that company, the cheque was drawn from account 12 September Two identical letters dated 23 September electronically signed by ‘B’ stating ‘we refer to the arrangement for payment of the arrears on your account. The promised payment has not been made and we therefore require immediate payment. If full payment of the arrears or contact, is not received within 10 days, legal proceedings may be taken by this company without further notice’ Customer writes rather angry letter to the financial service (...) provider with copies to the British Consumer Association, the CEO of the car manufacturer associated with the financial service provider, and the MD of the UK branch of the financial service provider Telephone call from the personal assistant of the car manufacturer’s CEO, as well as from the PA of the MD of the UK company of the financial service provider Customer demands letter to acknowledge that all claims had been deleted from her account; letter received 1 November 02, signed by the MD of the UK company Particularly with financial services, frustration caused by IT systems seems common – and the big problem is that it seems the same everywhere. From personal experience I also know that being dissatisfied with bad service is one thing, actually doing something about it is something entirely different. How many people are dissatisfied with their banking arrangements but stay with their existing supplier – out of convenience, rather than conviction? The example of Egg shows that there is a tremendous opportunities for service quality improvements. Difficult to protectUnlike tangible products, which are often built around complex technologies or formula that can be patented, services are very difficult to protect. It is literally impossible to patent services or service components and not only that, it is generally very easy for a competitor to copy and improve existing offerings ( Naslund, 1986 ). Having investigated innovation in the banking industry, Naslund explained that, “In my project several respondents suggested this fact [that service innovations are easy to imitate] as a reason for the low number of innovations in banks. A bank that innovates will not receive much of the profit from the process because competitors quickly imitate the new product.” Many service providers are therefore attempting to develop new offerings in secrecy – as was the case for the shared appreciation mortgage. While the product was under development the bank tried to ensure that only a few people knew about the development, and were also quite selective about which customers and intermediaries to involve. Herein lays a conflict. On the one hand innovative services are difficult to understand unless they are explained in detail and preferably experienced, and a lack of customer involvement can lead to services being designed based on assumptions rather than real needs. On the other hand secrecy is important to prevent competitors from introducing the same or similar product first and hence steeling the thunder. The aim of the Bank of Scotland was to be first to market, to be seen as innovator and to create a level of bind-in of customers that would help them to establish a market leader position. Interestingly though, once the product was on the market the bank would have been quite keen for competitors to take up the product to help create a market, particularly for the bonds that were issues to securitise the mortgages. Unfortunately, while customers were very keen to take up the product, the interest among investors was insufficient to create an effective market for the bonds. Having said services are easy to copy it should be pointed out that it is the ‘what’ that is easy to copy. The ‘how’ is often more difficult to replicate. If a service provider can establish an innovation in the marketplace through delivering a high-quality service, a competitor might be able to offer the same service, but if customers are satisfied with existing services levels they are not very likely to switch to a different provider. Providing superior service levels through training and building expertise can be as effective in fending off competitors as are patents. Easy to innovateThe fact that new service development is often quite inexpensive – there is no R&D expenditure to speak of or any investment requirements for plant and machinery – means that anyone can come up with a new service proposition. While it is frequently pointed out that it is easy to innovate in a service context, the fact that much of the success of establishing a new service in the market depends on reputation and trust means that the ‘coming up with ideas’ is the easy part but implementation can be quite difficult, and often depends on an established and trusted brand underwriting the new offering. For Craig Corn, the ideator of the shared appreciation mortgage, the reputation of the Bank of Scotland as an innovator was an important selection criterion. He was looking for a bank that would have a high level of credibility in bringing an innovation to market, which customers would trust and believe would fulfil their promises. As with the development of tangible products there are certain organisational characteristics that support innovation whereas others hinder the flow and realisation of innovations. In their research into innovation in the banking industry Johne and Harborne ( 1985 ) found that banks are traditionally characterised by tight, bureaucratic structures involving high levels of standardisation, formalisation, centralisation, and limited flexibility and specialisation. They saw this as one of the reasons as to why there is little real innovation in the banking industry. This argument is supported by further insights from their study which indicate that those banks that were innovating successfully were characterised by flexible operating structures. Terrill and Middlebrooks ( 1996 ) propose five possible angles to service innovation: 1. positioning innovation 2. process innovation 3. service offering innovation 4. people innovation 5. communications innovation Using the first, positioning innovation, they suggest developing a unique positioning that differentiates the product or company from existing offerings. Restaurant chains offering a particular service are one example. Think about Starbucks coffee which has changed the fast and cheap caffeine intake into a lifestyle experience for which it charges a substantial premium. With the second angle, process innovation, they refer to the removal or addition of a process step to improve the customer experience. Being able to use credit cards directly at the petrol station pumps is an example. However, this option is less likely to be sustainable than the first. The third, service offering innovation, encompasses three options: first, the creation of a unique set of benefits of features by bundling or repackaging existing offerings; second, the adding of new benefits to an existing service; and third, the creation of a totally new service offering. As an example they quote garages that offer a service that includes life-time oil changes, thereby locking customers into future servicing and creating real switching costs. The fourth, people innovation, is based on the concept of increasing or decreasing the discretion individuals have to improve a customer’s service experience and provide individualised services. Walt Disney’s message to their theme park employees is, “It is up to you to exceed customer expectations.” And finally, with communications innovation Terrill and Middlebrook refer to the branding of a service offering or the use of a unique communication approach to differentiate a service. The example the authors give is that of consulting firm CSC/Index, which branded their approach to cost reduction ‘reengineering’, and created awareness through articles, books and seminars. Part of successful service innovation is the ability to identify the right customer segment. Kennedy ( 2001 ) points out that effective service innovation can generate top-line revenue growth as well as bottom-line profits. He argues that in order to realise this the following are essential: · understanding customer value creation · targeting high-value customer segments · choosing the correct customer interaction model · creative pricing · understanding cash flow He emphasises that his research showed that “selling to the wrong customers, poor retention, failure to deliver value, and delivering service to customers who do not appreciate it destroyed value”. I was impressed when a service provider suggested that the value of changes and innovations should be assessed as to whether it was introduced to serve and please the customer – or the company. However, I found it interesting that de Brentani and Kleinschmidt ( 1999 ) concluded from their research that realising radical innovation can be quite difficult for service companies. They explain that, “For new industrial services, moving into fields that are unrelated to the firm’s known capabilities and resource can be particularly problematic. Especially for highly intangible professional or expert services – where customers use the firm’s reputation and past experience as a proxy when evaluating the new service itself – a low level of synergy with the company’s known capabilities can have a detrimental effect. Conversely, new products involving adaptations, refinements and enhancements of existing products and/or service delivery systems often achieve a higher level of success because they leverage the unique resources and skills of the firm.” And finally, it is noteworthy that Johne and Storey ( 1998 ) found from their review of the literature that, “Leading edge new service development practice seeks to marry organisational aspiration with the aspirations of individuals.” It confirms the importance of the project leader, and his or her enthusiasm to drive the project forward. We will find in the case study on the Technology Partnership, presented in Chapter 29 , that the practice of following individuals’ interest and passion has also proved a great contributor to the success of the company. Design and Service DevelopmentHollins and Hollins ( 1991 ) start their book Total Design with the following: Services are products Products need to be designed Design is a process This process must be organised This organisation is the job of management While there is an increasing awareness among managers of the contribution design can make to the success and impact of tangible products, the realisation that design can play an equal part in the successful design and development of services is less common. However, the involvement of designers can improve the experience of many services significantly. For most services there is a tangible component. Be it forms to fill in when applying for mortgages or insurance policies, be it a computer interface or the physical environment at a hairdresser’s or an advertising agency. Design can help to make the experience as smooth and easy as possible, and all things being equal – as they often are with services – people will be more likely to fill in a form they understand immediately, than one where they have to spend hours finding out what exactly is required, or go to a website that is easy to navigate than waste a lot of time searching around different pages. Increasing competitiveness, as for example in the financial services industry, should also motivate managers to consider all the levers they can pull to differentiate their product. Service Development – What Drives Success?Given the particularities of the service industry there are a number of considerations managers can should keep in mind in order to maximise their chances of success. The first is to involve customers as early as possible and to attempt to get as close to prototyping as possible. A study conducted by Martin and Horne ( 1995 ) suggests that increasing direct customer participation in the development process in general and the use of information about the customer at specific stages increases the potential for success. But even though there seem to be great benefits to be gained from involving customers, Gadrey et al. ( 1994 ) point out that, at least in their research in the early 1990s, the service firms were not very efficient in establishing and using external networks, and involving customers in the innovation process. Often it might even be feasible to engage customers as development partners. This is a way of ensuring that there is a real market for the new service. However, it is worth taking a closer look at what kind of customer is participating in the development. If the service is innovative it is advisable to involve early adopters and those who are known to be open to new ideas and risk taking, rather than a group of customers who are known to be laggards and highly risk averse. Secondly, as it is the ‘how’, not the ‘what’, that makes it difficult to copy services, particular attention needs to be paid to the quality of the service delivery, be it through IT systems or people. This is why internal and external communication as well as advanced training and customer education are essential. In fact, in her research into innovation in the financial service industry de Brentani ( 1989 ) found that ineffective communication between the different parts of the service organisation caused major problems. Insufficient external communication, particularly for radical innovations, can lead to unrealistic or false expectations of the customer, which in turn will have negative implications for the acceptance of the new service. This is again something that the Bank of Scotland took very seriously during the development of its innovative product. And if it is indeed the ‘how’ that makes a difference it is also critical to keep service delivery in mind throughout the design and development process. This is also where design – interface design, the design of forms and brochures etc. – can make a significant difference, something that we address in the following section. The third concerns the development process. De Brentani and Kleinschmidt found that successful service innovations have the following in common: · They address a specific market need, e.g. close contact with and intimate knowledge of customers’ needs and operations. · They follow a formal up-front process as well as a formal and detailed launch process which includes test marketing, frontline training and internal marketing, developing a formal promotion and launch plan. · They explore corporate synergies and build on frontline expertise; corporate synergies refer to fit with managerial skills and preferences, expertise and human resource capabilities, delivery and behind-the-scene competences, marketing and financial resources and frontline expertise, the extent to which the new service uses high-level expert/professional resources in performing judgemental tasks during service delivery. In addition they found that, particularly for radical service innovation, an internal innovation environment (e.g. effective new service development culture and management) is critical. Table 24.1 shows the aspects investigated and their potency in explaining success or failure in incremental and radical service innovation. Table 24.1 Success factors – incremental and radical service innovation compared
Incremental Discontinuous Market/need fit XXXX XX NSD: planned launch XXX + Frontline expertise XX X Corporate synergy XX X NSD: culture & management X XXXX NSD: formal up front process + ns Improved service experience + ns Standardised service + ns Service complexity/cost ns ns Service quality evidence ns X Competition ns ns Market potential ns ns XXXX < 0.0001; XXX < 0.001, XX < 0.01, X < 0.05, + < 0.10; ns – not significant Source: de Brentani, U. & Kleinschmidt, E. ( 1999 ). Achieving new product success in highly innovative versus incremental new industrial services. Paper presented at the 28th European Marketing Association Conference, Humboldt University, Berlin. Reading Suggestions
Zeithaml, V. & Bitner, M. (2000). Services Marketing. New York: McGraw-Hill. Comment: Dedicated to enabling the reader to understand issues in service development including customer expectations and behaviours, the development process, service delivery and pricing Hollins, G. & Hollins, B. (1991). Total Design, Managing the Design Process in the Service Sector. London: Pitman Publishing. Comment: Even though the book is dedicated to the service industry, much of the reading covers ground that is equally relevant to the development of tangible products Some Useful Websites
Comment: This is the website of the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation which is an independent London-based think tank, funded by the world’s top banks. It explores the future of the financial services industry. It has an active agenda of meetings, seminars and research projects which are of wide interest to all who work in, or use, the financial markets. Contact details are: 18 Curzon Street, London W1Y 7AD, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 171 493 0173, Fax: +44 171 493 0190 http://www.serviceinnovation.org/ Comment: The Consortium is a non-profit alliance of support organisations focused on innovation for the support industry.
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