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pathways_for_society.pdf
ClimateFutures
Edited by
Judy Lawrence
Alana Cornforth
Peter Barrett
Pathways for Society
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December 2011 ISBN: 978-0-475-12384-8 (Print) ISBN: 978-0-475-12385-5 (Online)
© 2011
New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600
Wellington 6140
Photography: Front cover Harley Betts/hedgehoghouse.com Back cover Jim Harding/hedgehoghouse.com Pages 6, 43 Colin Monteath/hedgehoghouse.com Page 15 Peter Barrett Page 16 UNFCCC 2007, Bonn Pages 19, 22 Martin Manning Page 27 NASA Pages 33, 34, 65, 97, 108, 127 ©Andy Reisinger Pages 55, 57, 106, 117, 120 Andy Reisinger/Hedgehoghouse.com Page 51 Dave Hansford/Hedgehoghouse.com Page 74 John Bown/hedgehoghouse.com Page 95 Alex Pyne All other photographs of the forum by Matthew Wood
ClimateFutures
Edited by
Judy Lawrence
Alana Cornforth
Peter Barrett
Pathways for Society
2 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
Acknowledgements
This book has been compiled from the presentations and dialogue at the Climate Futures Forum—
Pathways for Society, held by the New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute at Victoria
University of Wellington at Te Papa on 31 March–1 April 2011 in Wellington, New Zealand.
The Climate Futures Forum was convened by Professor Martin Manning, the inaugural Director of
the New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute, and organised by a committee comprising
Dr Morgan Williams (Chair), Professor Peter Barrett, and Judy Lawrence, supported by Liz Thomas.
The Forum was ably assisted by Glenda Lewis, Professor Jonathan Boston, Professor John McClure,
and Dr Taciano Milfont. Professor Peter Barrett, Dr Nancy Bertler, Professor John McClure, and
Judy Lawrence each chaired a session. Associate Professor Ralph Chapman, Dr Amanda Wolf,
and Judy Lawrence recorded and reported as rapporteurs for the dialogue sessions, which were
facilitated by Dr Morgan Williams, Dr Karen Cronin, and Dr Bob Frame. Dorothee Quade and
Simon Tegg also assisted the smooth running of the sessions as speaker shepherds. Conference and
Events Ltd assisted as the Forum secretariat. Photographs reproduced here from the Forum were
taken by Matthew Wood. Our thanks go to all who assisted.
Thanks also go to the Café and Breakfast session speakers and chairs and finally to all the
participants across the generations and from all walks of society who made the Forum and its
dialogue a success.
The Forum was made possible by the extremely generous support of Dr Lee Seng Tee, Singapore.
We are also most grateful to the British High Commission, the Embassy of the United States
of America, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Royal Society of New
Zealand’s Climate Committee, the Antarctic Research Centre at Victoria University of Wellington,
Environmental Sciences and Research, Geological and Nuclear Science, Landcare Research, and
Wellington City Council.
Sponsors
Dr Lee Seng Tee
3P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yContents Figures and tables 4
Acronyms 5
Foreword 7
An ongoing dialogue 7
Prologue 10
Intergenerational perspectives 10
1 Climate change and society’s challenge 15
Risks and consequences, timescales, and uncertainties 16
Climate futures and choices for society 23
Crafting the long view 30
Group dialogue session 36
Responding to scientific uncertainty: The reinsurance industry’s perspective 40
2 Communication between the science community and society 43
Communicating the science of climate change: Lessons from history 44
Explaining complexity: Challenges for the Fourth Estate 47
Managing messages in the media 53
Group dialogue session 59
3 Human behaviour and the capacity for change 65
Dragons, mules, and honeybees: Why we do less than we should, and how we can overcome 66
Addressing dangerous climate change: Why citizenship matters more than behaviour change 75
How democratic processes can deal with complex long-term issues 80
Group dialogue session 87
4 Towards durable decision making 97
The role of science in robust climate policy: How strategic reframing can change the picture 98
The role of future generations in durable decision making 107
Group dialogue session 113
5 Reflections on ways forward 117
Synthesis 118
Youth perspectives 125
Concluding remarks 127
6 Biographies and Endnotes 129
Biographies 131
Endnotes 141
4 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Figures and tables
Figure 1 IPCC graphs of atmospheric GHG concentrations (IPCC Working Group I Summary for Policymakers) 24
Figure 2 IPCC main conclusions 25
Figure 3 Copenhagen Diagnosis (2009) graph showing actual emissions next to IPCC scenario projected emissions 26
Figure 4 Carbon-budget approach from The Australian Academy of Science (2010), adapted from Meinshausen et al. (2009) 29
Figure 5 Munich Re graph showing the trend in increasing natural catastrophes. 41
Figure 6 Dealing with complex long-term issues 86
Figure 7 GEMs accounted for more emissions than the North in 2008. From (G20 Annex 1) UNFCCC; (GEMs and Rest of World) World Resources Institute, projections from 2005 data, after Frame and Hepburn (2011) 104
Figure 8 Shares of cumulative emissions under a fossil fuel-intensive future consistent with post-1990 patterns (the IPCC A1FI scenario/the present Scenario 1) from Frame and Hepburn (2011). 105
Table 1 Scenario results from Frame and Hepburn (2011) 103
5P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yAcronyms
BAU Business as usual
CFCs Chloroflourocarbons
CO 2
Carbon dioxide
ETS Emissions trading scheme
FoI Freedom of information
GDP Gross domestic product
GEMs G20 emerging markets
GHGs Greenhouse gases
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
R&D Research and development
RoW Rest of world
SDI The Strategic Defense Initiative
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
6 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
7P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yForeword An ongoing dialogue
Climate change raises questions for society that go far beyond climate
science itself and lead to basic questions about how society should plan
for likely climate futures.
We need new ways of addressing the likely consequences of climate
change in the next decade, as well as ways for future generations to both
limit and deal with the consequences.
Our response to climate change requires a clearer social perspective. We
need more collaboration between different sectors of society, and for this
to be integrated with contributions from scientists and policymakers. Only
then will we be able to change the path we are on.
We organised the Climate Futures Forum to launch an ongoing
dialogue—across society and generations—identifying pathways to
different climate futures.
The two-day Forum covered four policy-relevant and interdisciplinary
themes:
• Climate change and society’s challenge
• Communication between the science community and society
• Human behaviour and the capacity to change
• Towards durable decision making
Our response to climate change requires a clearer social perspective.
We organised the Climate Futures Forum to launch an ongoing dialogue— across society and generations— identifying pathways to different climate futures.
8 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s After a mihi from Te Papa and a welcome by the Mayor of Wellington, the Minister for the Environment opened the Forum. Two youth
perspectives set the challenge for the Forum. Each of the four thematic
sessions began with overviews from speakers, followed by group dialogue
sessions between participants and the speakers, and a final summary
session. The Forum concluded with a synthesis of the two-day dialogue.
You can watch videos of all of the presentations at the Forum on our
website1.
During the Forum, participants recorded their comments and these have
been dispersed throughout the text to create continuity with the ongoing
dialogue from the range of perspectives. The wide-ranging perspectives
across the Forum presentations will not be shared by all. Some are
controversial, but we have included them all to foster open dialogue.
To maximise the public dialogue and attract a wide range of participants,
we also organised a number of outreach activities, including:
• Sir Lloyd Geering’s reflections on the legacy of our religious past as
we face future climate change (a seven-minute film)
• a Café Session moderated by Ian Wedde: Expanding our thinking on
climate change—What can I do? What do I need to do?
• a Breakfast Session moderated by Chris Laidlaw: Responding to the
big risks, building resilience into our ‘capitals’: natural, built, social,
economic, and political
• a conversation between three noted climate change writers—UK’s
Fred Pearce (The Climate Files), USA’s Erik Conway (Merchants of
Doubt), and NZ’s Gareth Renowden (Hot Topic), moderated by Sean
Plunket.
Beyond the Forum, several speakers were interviewed for public radio
and television and several newspaper feature articles appeared. Gareth
Renowden also reviewed the Forum on his blog, Hot Topic2.
1 www.victoria.ac.nz/climate-change 2 www.hot-topic.co.nz
The wide-ranging perspectives across the Forum presentations will not be shared by all. Some are controversial but we have included them all to foster open dialogue.
9P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yThis record of the Forum continues the dialogue. It captures the Forum presentations and group dialogue sessions, along with the invited
comments from participants. It is designed to encourage reflection on the
Forum and continues a conversation that we hope will be ongoing.
We at the Climate Change Research Institute will continue facilitating
this effort to increase understanding of the climate change challenge to
society, finding ways in which individuals and wider society can play a role
in ensuring a sustainable future for humankind.
As Ian Wedde, the Chair of the Café Session, said when trying to capture
the essence of the conversation:
“Idea of flows, connectivities, networks, and overlapping embodiments ...
leave you with the image of the mantle of water—he korowai o te wai—
... to get our conversations flowing.”
Professor Martin Manning, Founding Director
New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand
Professor Dave Frame, Director
New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand
December 2011
This record of the Forum continues the dialogue ... It is designed to encourage reflection on the Forum and continues a conversation that we hope will be ongoing.
10 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Prologue
Intergenerational perspectives
Youth perspectives
Jinty MacTavish Dunedin, New Zealand
Generally, it’s my preference to be positive. It’s a much more agreeable
way to be. But I have been asked to speak from the perspective of young
people and, to be frank, to any young person who knows anything
much about climate change, our situation looks pretty grim. It looks grim
because, despite a lot of words—emissions trading, Cancun Accord,
research and development (R&D) in agriculture, ‘fairness’ in forestry
rules—our emissions are still growing and our emissions trajectory is still
frightening, and these ultimately are the only measures of success or
failure that really matter.
It’s looking grim because, with declining oil availability, it seems like we’ll
be facing the climate change challenge in the context of a contracting
economy.
It is hard to be positive. It is hard to know what to do and where to put
your energy and after eight years working to bring about change, I’m left
wondering. And that wondering is what I’d like to offer today.
It begins like this. We talk about climate change as a problem that
we need to fix. Which is true, but it’s only a half-truth. If we question
things further, we find climate change a symptom. It’s a side-effect of
consumption. And that consumption is, to a great extent, due to the
commercialisation of human wellbeing, and an unquestioning faith in our
current economic framework.
When we are communicating the climate change issue, we don’t dig this
deep. We stick to the upper layers, the science, the numbers that we can
crunch, the stories of hardship caused by this symptom we call climate
change.
Let’s consider this for a minute. There is a problem! we say. It is bad and
increasingly worse!
Some of us offer solutions. There are alternatives! Biofuels, electric cars!
R&D is providing promising results in the lab! Change your light bulbs!
Others say—we can adapt, get used to it, find ways to cope. Adapt the
world as we know it? To 4 or 5 degrees? Alternatives? For the rich and
the resource endowed? It’s my belief that, on their own, these options
...our emissions are still growing and our emissions trajectory is still frightening, and these ultimately are the only measures of success or failure that really matter.
11P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yoffer only partial or short-lived solutions. Young people need us to be investing in strategies that will provide long-term stability, for all.The
wondering that I have is: What might happen if we dive a litle deeper? If
we consider the possibilities we open when we address the root cause of
the problem. When we say, what is it that really provides for us and what
is it that makes us happy? What do we really value, and are we valuing
those things enough? And those things that we value, how can we make
them central to our approach and central to our decision making? Is
there another way to be?
Collectively, young people need us to have the courage and the foresight
to empower our communities to question the assumptions on which we
have based decades and decades of human development. The question
I’d like to leave you with is: how powerful might that be?
Simon Tegg Wellington, New Zealand
Constructive discussions about the future and what to do about it are
difficult.
Psychologists tell us that we’re biased to assume that the future will be
much like the past. Our baseline scenario is typically ‘business as usual’
(BAU) even though BAU is the least likely outcome in the long term. For
most Westerners, BAU would be a version of their formative experiences
in the remarkably stable, prosperous, and historically anomalous post-war
era—an era that now appears to be ending (if you haven’t been living
under a rock). Pushing beyond BAU, we run into the myths of progress
and apocalypse that frame discussions in societies with a Judeo-Christian
heritage. John Gray warns that even those of us who purport to be
scientifically minded will often simply update the Book of Revelations
with the discussant’s favourite tropes, be they ‘technology’, ‘changing
consciousness’, or ‘evolution’ filling the roles formerly taken by either
devils and saviours.
This is not particularly useful. Those who set their sights on grand plans
or broad political consensus or some form of BAU, or a revolution
in which their ideology triumphs over other ideologies are in for
disappointment. The challenge is to set our sights lower than ‘saving
the world’, or even reaching consensus. A couple of working prototypes
(and these can be policies, technologies, or designs) that improve things
slightly is pretty reasonable and would be most welcome!
...what is it that really provides for us and what is it that makes us happy? What do we really value, and are we valuing those things enough? And those things that we value, how can we make them central to our approach and central to our decision making?
The challenge is to set our sights lower than ‘saving the world’, or even reaching consensus.
12 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Ninety years of change
Sir Lloyd Geering3 Theologian, Wellington, New Zealand
I suspect I am the oldest person at the Forum. I was born during the First
World War. Because of that, my lifetime has encompassed most of the
20th century. During the 20th century, I witnessed tremendous changes
taking place nationally and internationally. At the beginning of the
20th century, humankind looked into the future with tremendous hope
and expectation because of developing technologies and science. It was
felt that the sky was the limit. Here we were, able to take over the Earth
and make something of it. During the century, I witnessed that original
enthusiasm and confidence slowly wane. Only in the 1970s did we slowly
begin to realise that what we were doing to the Earth was destroying the
very basis of our lives.
At the beginning of the 20th century the churches were full. The
Christian tradition was so full of confidence that it had a slogan: ‘the
Christianisation of the world in our generation’. Missionaries were going
to every non-Christian place in the world. Gradually over the
20th century I saw the whole missionary process decline and wither and
stop altogether. While the churches, full at the beginning of the century,
were beginning to empty and today are closing up at a rather rapid rate.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the word ‘racism’ did not exist for
the simple reason that we were all racists. It was obvious to everyone that
our own race was superior to all other races. Only slowly did we come to
appreciate that people who differed from us in race, colour, religion, and
culture were perhaps just as good as us.
And so a great change took place globally in the human race. Here in
New Zealand we were once proud to be British and part of the British
Empire on which the sun never set. And then the British Empire collapsed.
Then the Great War and the Second World War made us realise that
we sophisticated human beings had yet to learn how to live together.
Indeed, these two world wars shattered our confidence in the human
condition, and we knew how frail and ignorant we were compared with
the confidence we had at the beginning of the century.
3 Sir Lloyd Geering gave this talk at the Café Session.
Only in the 1970s did we slowly begin to realise that what we were doing to the Earth was destroying the very basis of our lives.
...two world wars shattered our confidence in the human condition, and we knew how frail and ignorant we were compared with the confidence we had at the beginning of the century.
13P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yOn the other hand, there were some wonderful things to celebrate during the 20th century. We became aware of racism, which we rejected;
we became aware of human rights, which we promoted nationally and
internationally; we became aware that women were just as important
as men, and the feminist movement had a great success. We are still a
bit stuck with homosexuality, but we are winning the day on the sexual
front.
At the end of the century, in 1999, I was in Oxford and at a loose end.
My late wife was doing a PhD and busy in the library and she said to me,
“You had better write a book.” So I began to do some research on the
future of the world and the next year I published The World to Come.
As you know, that phrase comes out of the Christian tradition and refers
to heaven—but I wasn’t referring to heaven. There is no such place.
I was referring to the 21st century, the world to come. As I began to
study what was happening and projected those trends into the future, I
became more and more depressed. For example, during the 20th century
the human population quadrupled. Quadrupled! Can you imagine that?
Up to 1900, anything humans did by way of interfering with nature had
no substantial effect. Nature was still much more powerful and could
overcome all that we rather powerless humans could do. But quadruple
the human race and it is a different story altogether. Now we were able
to destroy the productivity of the Earth. Not only had we more than four
times the mouths to feed, but we also had to find a way to produce that
food. So we began to tear down the forests and that was the beginning
of the problem with carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and global warming.
That was only the beginning of the various things that I began to study,
so I set out the future of the world to come in 10 scenarios. Not all of
them were independent. Two or three or more of these scenarios could
eventuate at the same time. Nine of these scenarios were absolutely
disastrous. Even I felt that I had to do a bit better than that, so I produced
a tenth scenario, in which we muddle our way through, but it is going
to be exceedingly difficult. That is why a conference such as this is so
important.
Up to 1900, anything humans did by way of interfering with nature had no substantial effect. Nature was still much more powerful and could overcome all that we rather powerless humans could do. But quadruple the human race and it is a different story altogether.
... I set out the future of the world to come in 10 scenarios ... Nine of these scenarios were absolutely disastrous … so I produced a tenth scenario, in which we muddle our way through, but it is going to be exceedingly difficult.
14 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
15
1 Climate change and society’s challenge
16 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Risks and consequences, timescales and uncertainties
Professor Martin Manning New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Key messages • Scientists have learned a lot about climate change.
• But science keeps seeing ‘surprises’ as well—and more risks can
become serious.
• We need to remember the ‘precautionary principle’ that was agreed
in 1992.
• This should lead to a collective approach for risk management.
Science has been steadily discovering how and why our climate is
changing. But we keep finding that things are changing faster than
expected or in ways that make the changes more serious. This has been
happening ever since we first realised that burning fossil fuels would lead
to a change in our climate, over 100 years ago.
As we force our climate into a new state, it becomes more likely that new
and larger surprises will occur. To some extent, governments recognised
this in 1992 when they agreed to a ‘precautionary principle’, which
expected that they would have to act to deal with climate change before
scientists explained everything in detail. It is now increasingly important
to act on that basis.
Much of current policy is based on past experience or focused on the next
election. Climate change introduces a new level of social responsibility
because the issues are global and have major long-term implications for
future generations. Dealing with structural changes of this magnitude
requires a very broad social response.
Early surprises for climate science
Much of the CO 2 from burning fossil fuels remains in the
atmosphere
In the 1890s, Svante Arrhenius was the first person to calculate how
much warming would come from doubling the CO 2 in the atmosphere.
His estimates were surprisingly consistent with the latest science, but
this advance in our understanding was also a prelude to the first major
surprise.
...we keep finding that things are changing faster than was expected or in ways that make the changes more serious.
Climate change introduces a new level of social responsibility because the issues are global and have major long-term implications for future generations.
17P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yArrhenius won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his analysis of how some chemicals dissolved in water. Because CO
2 is water soluble
(and is absorbed by the ocean), he stated that doubling of CO 2 in the
atmosphere would take at least a thousand years1.
Fifty years later, Roger Revelle recognised that the ocean only took up
some of the CO 2 going into the atmosphere. The first surprise was
that much of it stayed in the atmosphere2.Clear evidence for increasing
atmospheric CO 2 came from Athol Rafter’s radiocarbon dating, showing
that carbon in the atmosphere was getting older. Burning fossil fuels3 was
the most likely explanation. In 1957, Rafter explicitly discussed major ice
sheets melting, significant sea-level rise, and the implications for global
warming due to increasing atmospheric CO 2 .4
Complex atmospheric chemistry is an important driver of climate change
In the 1970s, scientists discovered that methane was increasing in the
atmosphere, raising questions about where it came from and how it was
removed5. Then, as another surprise, scientists found that methane was a
major greenhouse gas (GHG)6.
Concentrations of many other GHGs were found to be increasing in
the atmosphere and Sherry Rowland and Mario Molina discovered that
chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) were starting to destroy the ozone layer7. The
Montreal Protocol was set up to control these gases for health reasons.
However, as they are also very powerful GHGs, the Montreal Protocol has
done more to diminish our forcing of the climate system than the Kyoto
Protocol.
The next surprise was the appearance of an Antarctic ozone hole.
Instruments measuring atmospheric composition in the Antarctic region
showed dramatic changes of ozone that scientists initially assumed was
due to malfunctioning equipment. In 1985, a paper recognised it was
real, which led to a large amount of research showing that ozone loss
could happen dramatically8.
The removal process for much of the climate forcing due to GHGs is
atmospheric oxidation9. Scientists still do not have a good understanding
of this critical removal process10 but there is evidence that the removal
rate can fluctuate significantly over very wide regions11. Our limited
understanding of these changes raises serious risk issues for the future.
The Montreal Protocol has done more to diminish our forcing of the climate system than the Kyoto Protocol.
...the removal rate [of GHGs] can fluctuate significantly over very wide regions.
18 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s And the surprises are continuing
The best estimate of global warming is more than we thought
In the 1960s, global climate models enabled more detailed analysis
of how much warming would be caused by doubling the CO 2 in the
atmosphere, referred to as ‘climate sensitivity’. Initial estimates were
between 2°C and 3.5°C, leading to an early consensus that the value was
probably between 1.5°C and 4.5°C12.
For many years, scientists thought that this meant the most likely amount
of warming from a doubling of CO 2 would be about 2.5°C. However, for
the fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment
of climate change science in 2007, Susan Solomon emphasised the need
to refine the range of estimated values, which led to the finding that the
most likely value is actually 3°C13. While that might not sound like much
of a difference, it means that keeping to the 2°C target is actually much
harder than expected just eight years ago. Once again, better scientific
understanding led to the problem becoming more serious.
Because New Zealand is surrounded by ocean, climate models estimate
that our warming will be less than the global average. However, this can
be misleading. The effects caused by climate change will be related to the
amount of variability that systems have adapted to. New Zealand has a
benign climate in which monthly mean temperatures keep within a range
of about 10°C from winter to summer. A mid-range estimate of climate
change this century has a warming of 2°C in New Zealand. While that is
much less than the warming of about 3°C occurring across much of the
Northern Hemisphere, it is larger relative to the winter to summer ranges
that we are currently adapted to.
The importance of warming relative to the range experienced in the
past is that it will challenge our adaptive capacity. This is seen in a recent
study showing that impacts of climate change have already been larger in
tropical regions where the seasonal cycle is much smaller than in the mid-
latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere14.
...keeping to the 2°C target is actually much harder than expected just eight years ago.
Participant comment Certainties don’t exist in climate science. It is down to the best possible management of uncertainties.
The importance of warming relative to the range experienced in the past is that it will challenge our adaptive capacity.
19P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yIce sheets are going and sea-level rise is coming
The last IPCC assessment of climate change science gave estimates for
future sea-level rise based on warming oceans leading to expanding sea
water plus some melting of glaciers and ice sheets. It also identified that
direct observations of increasing ice loss in Greenland and Antarctica
were now inconsistent with the climate models. This led to a numeric
estimate of sea-level rise this century being up to 0.79 metres, but also a
new sense of uncertainties:
“Larger values cannot be excluded, but understanding of these effects
is too limited to assess their likelihood or provide a best estimate or an
upper bound for sea level rise.”15
There is growing evidence that ice-sheet loss in Greenland has been
accelerating for 20 years, and that this has started to occur in Antarctica.
More than a dozen different research groups have produced new
estimates for sea-level rise and the median estimate is twice as large as
estimates made four years earlier.
New Zealand has a large proportion of its population and investments,
as well as key parts of our rail and road transport corridors, on low-lying
land. Some of this land has also been reclaimed for our ports, cities, and
subdivisions close to the coastline.
Expected sea-level rise now goes far beyond anything in the history
of human civilisation and will be more serious because of the trend
towards more extreme storm events. Sporadic events may start to cause
a breakdown in the viability of current uses in some coastal regions.
Scientists estimate that, globally, 100 million people will need to
retreat from coastlines by the end of this century, requiring substantial
societal relocation16. There are also growing tensions between those
with substantial investments in coastal land and those who accept a
responsibility to reduce long-term damages.
Expected sea-level rise now goes far beyond anything in the history of human civilisation and will be more serious because of the trend towards more extreme storm events.
Scientists estimate that, globally, 100 million people will need to retreat from coastlines by the end of this century, requiring substantial societal relocation.
20 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The global dimensions of new risks Climate change adaptation has been largely based on local measures to
deal with the effects, whereas mitigating the amount of future change
has been left to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). However, a local focus does not cover the full range
of impacts. Changes in our climate are already having effects linked
across regions larger than single countries.
A recent detailed study of climate models showed that rapid warming
in the Arctic will lead to extreme cold events moving southwards into
Europe and Russia during a transition period expected to last about 30
years. Such events were described in 2009 and occurred in early 201017.
Another example of interlinked patterns of change is the increase in
heavy precipitation events over much of the Northern Hemisphere, which
is significantly larger than climate models predicted.
In 2010, drought in Russia led to widespread fires across regions. This
was very unusual and so the resources to respond were limited. A large
drop in crop production resulted and the Russian Government banned
grain exports. Over the same period, flooding across Pakistan was at
record levels, there was serious flooding in China, the upper Amazon
River experienced the worst drought on record and its shipping system
was closed down for the first time. Impacts of extreme events are
becoming so widespread that current meteorological data records cannot
track them easily.
Kevin Trenberth has explained such weather events as linked to the Arctic
ice-sheet loss and rapid warming in the Indian Ocean18. However, other
possible interpretations have been proposed, challenging our ability to
understand the changes.
In 2011, more widespread extreme events have occurred. While the
extreme flooding across Queensland in January can be attributed to a
strong La Niña, there was again a widespread pattern of such events
across Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil and increasingly serious
drought conditions in East Africa and parts of China.
Does society have to wait until scientists can explain everything before we
take preventive action for increasing risks?
Changes in our climate are already having effects linked across regions larger than single countries.
Impacts of extreme events are becoming so widespread that current meteorological data records cannot track them easily.
Does society have to wait until scientists can explain everything before we take preventive action for increasing risks?
21P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySociety should take over from science when it comes to risk management In 1996, the IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers in the Second Assessment
noted the potential for more surprises:
“Future unexpected, large and rapid climate system changes (as have
occurred in the past) are, by their nature, difficult to predict. This implies
that future climate changes may also involve ‘surprises’. In particular,
these arise from the nonlinear nature of the climate system. When rapidly
forced, nonlinear systems are especially subject to unexpected behaviour.”
The precautionary principle
In 1992, governments explicitly addressed the question of whether or not
society should wait for scientific explanations of everything before acting.
The Rio Declaration adopted the precautionary principle:
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
Parts of the private sector involved in risk management appear to be
following the precautionary principle. In September 2010, a coalition of
over 100 of the top insurance companies formed a new collaborative
arrangement with the United Nations Environment Programme Finance
Initiative to set up better ways of dealing with increasing risks in
developing countries19. Similarly, the Institutional Investors Group on
Climate Change (IIGCC), representing companies that manage $15 trillion
of investment or pension funds20, is addressing more rapid responses to
climate change. There is growing recognition of the role of the private
sector in providing a large fraction of the capital investment for dealing
with climate change.
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
Participant comment Uncertainty is over- marketed. We know more than enough to act now.
Parts of the private sector involved in risk management appear to be following the precautionary principle.
22 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s In the longer term, there will be issues that the private sector cannot deal with. There is growing need for structural relocation of a large population
because of sea-level rise. The last US Department of Defense Quadrennial
Review also linked climate change with significant geopolitical impacts
around the world and a need for this to be managed by the armed
forces21.
Dealing with such fundamental changes in the small world that we live in
takes us into new dimensions and requires a collective social response.
Dealing with such fundamental changes in the small world that we live in takes us into new dimensions and requires a collective social response.
23P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yClimate futures and choices for society
Professor David Karoly4 University of Melbourne, Australia
Key messages From the Synthesis Report of the Copenhagen Climate conference in
March 200922:
• Recent observations confirm that, given high rates of observed
emissions, the worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories are being
realised.
• Recent observations show that societies are highly vulnerable
to even modest levels of climate change, with poor nations and
communities particularly at risk.
• Rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated
global and regional action is required to avoid ‘dangerous climate
change’, regardless of how it is defined.
• Delay in initiating effective mitigation actions significantly increases
the long-term social and economic costs of both adaptation and
mitigation.
The Garnaut Climate Change Review Update Very recently, Ross Garnaut was commissioned by the Australian
Government to update his 2008 review. His conclusions are23:
• “Observations and research outcomes since 2008 have …
strengthened the position … that the Earth is warming and that
human emissions of greenhouse gases are the primary cause.”
• “Rates of change in most observable responses of the physical
and biological environment to global warming lie at or above
expectations from the mainstream science.”
• “Despite the increased scientific understanding of climate change,
and confidence in the science’s conclusions about climate change,
public confidence in the science seems to have weakened somewhat
in Australia and some other countries since 2008.”
4 Ed: This text is based on a transcription of Professor Karoly’s Forum presentation.
Recent observations confirm that, given high rates of observed emissions, the worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories are being realised.
Rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated global and regional action is required to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’ ...
24 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The Anthropocene The Holocene is the most recent geological time period, spanning
the last 10,000 years. This has been a remarkably stable period in the
Earth’s history, ideal for the development of human societies. However,
in the last 100 years, due to human activity, the rates of change of CO 2
concentrations and temperature have been extremely rapid. We now live
in the Anthropocene24 25, the first period in geological history in which
humankind is having a profound influence on the global climate system.
The choices that we make determine the future climate, not only for
ourselves but also for everyone with whom we share the planet and for
future generations.
These graphs (Figure 1) from the IPCC 2007 assessment26 show the
concentrations of GHGs—CO 2 , methane, and nitrous oxide—in the
atmosphere over the last 10,000 years.
Figure 1 IPCC graphs of atmospheric GHG concentrations (IPCC Working Group I Summary for Policymakers27)
We now live in the Anthropocene, the first period in geological history in which humankind is having a profound influence on the global climate system.
Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years.
The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are primarily due to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.
25P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yClimate change impacts There is plenty of evidence of warming in the oceans, warming in the
atmosphere, cooling in the upper atmosphere, retreat of glaciers, retreat
of sea ice extent28. We can also look at the patterns of change to show
that these increases are not due to natural climate variability. The only
pattern that explains observed increases in change is increases in GHGs in
the atmosphere due to human activity.
Emissions stay in the atmosphere for thousands of years
There are many natural processes that take up and release CO 2 in the
atmosphere and in the Earth system. Even if we switched off emissions
now, it would take many thousands of years for the Earth’s carbon cycle
to remove the CO 2 from the natural systems that humans have added to
the atmosphere over the last 100 years. Twenty-first century increases in
CO 2 will lead to warming and sea-level rise, not just in 2100 but for more
than a millennium. Sea-level rise projections for 2200 or 2300 are
2–5 metres29.
Figure 2 IPCC main conclusions30
There is plenty of evidence of warming in the oceans, warming in the atmosphere, cooling in the upper atmosphere, retreat of glaciers, retreat of sea ice extent.
Conclusions from IPCC AR4 (2007)
• It is very likely that hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events will continue to become more frequent.
• Snow cover is projected to contract. Sea ice is projected to shrink in both the Arctic and Antarctic.
• Storm tracks are projected to move poleward, with changes in wind, precipitation, and temperature patterns.
• Increasing atmospheric CO 2 concentrations will lead to
increasing acidification of the ocean.
• 21st century anthropogenic CO 2 emissions will contribute
to warming and sea level rise for more than a millennium, due to the long timescales required for removal of this gas.
26 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Changes are occurring faster than the models have pre- dicted
As Martin Manning said, the recent science is showing more rapid
changes31. For example, reduction in summertime minimum Arctic sea
ice is occurring faster than any of the climate model simulations used in
the 2007 assessments predicted. This is because the complex processes
coupling between the oceans, the atmosphere, and the ice in the Arctic
are very sensitive and are not sufficiently and reliably represented in
the models. This is an important positive feedback. If the Arctic sea ice
reduction is being underestimated, many other changes might also be
underestimated in the models.
Observed sea-level change over the last 30–40 years, from both tide
gauges and satellite data, is at the upper end of the IPCC projections.
Recent observations are showing rapid increases in sea level.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was established to try to limit GHG emissions.
Yet there has been an increase in CO 2 emissions from burning fossil fuels,
so that the rate is now at the upper range of the IPCC projections.
Figure 3 Copenhagen Diagnosis (2009) graph showing actual emissions next to IPCC scenario projected emissions32
If the Arctic sea ice reduction is being underestimated, many other changes might also be underestimated in the models.
27P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yClimate protection on the basis of equity All countries have signed the UNFCCC, agreeing to stabilise GHGs in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference
with the climate system. At the time that this was written in 1997, no
one really knew what ‘dangerous interference with the climate system’
meant. In 2009, under the Copenhagen Climate Accord, countries agreed
to limit GHG emissions so that global temperatures would be unlikely to
increase more than 2°C above historical levels. Even at this level, there
will be widespread adverse impacts, which are greater in developing
countries. Adverse effects will also be greater in more vulnerable groups,
such as the poor and elderly, not only in developing but also in developed
countries.
BAU approach With BAU emissions, global temperatures increase by up to 6°C by 2100,
with many impacts on ecosystems, agriculture, water resources, health,
coasts, and society. On this path, global sea level will rise by at least
7 metres over the next few hundred years, displacing at least a billion
people33.
The temperature responses and warming relative to pre-industrial times
are shown in Figure 434. The best estimate for warming is 5°C under
BAU, for a global average. This global average is actually the predicted
warming for New Zealand under BAU. For many parts of the world, the
global average is not relevant, because it is the average of the ocean
temperature change and the land temperature change, and the land
warms up faster—about 25 percent faster than the global average. Even
though this is a global average picture showing warming up to 6° or 7°C,
land average warming is up to 25 percent larger than this. And we live on
the land, not in the ocean, so this is very significant. We’re talking about
warming in inland continental areas, which is 10°C or greater under BAU
in 2100, with dramatic consequences.
Carbon-budget approach To achieve the Copenhagen target of limiting emissions to 2°C above
pre-industrial levels, we have to take a carbon-budget approach, which
shows that future temperature rise is directly related to cumulative
emissions of CO 2
35. This approach shows that what matters is not the
rate of change but the total sum of CO 2 emissions. It doesn’t matter if
we emit it now, or tomorrow, or in five years time. If it is emitted, it will
cause warming.
With BAU emissions, global temperatures increase by up to 6°C by 2100, with many impacts on ecosystems, agriculture, water resources, health, coasts, and society.
Participant comment With a small population of a land-proud people, NZ should be an exceptional ‘laboratory’ for implementing socially driven changes in sustainable living and positive changes in policy to combat climate change … Why is this not the case?
28 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The budget approach says that the world needs to emit less than one trillion tonnes of CO
2 from fossil fuels into the atmosphere over the
period 2000–2050 to retain a risk of only 25 percent of exceeding the
Copenhagen target. Higher emissions give a greater risk of exceeding
that target.
This approach would require us to:
• reduce global emissions by more than 75 percent by 2050
• reduce global emissions by 100 percent by 2080.
This is a zero-carbon world in terms of net CO 2 emissions.
For an equal carbon budget per person, this means an individual budget
of about 140 tonnes of CO 2 emissions between 2000 and 2050, or about
three tonnes per person per year. This is much much less than typical per
capita emissions in developed countries.
Under the carbon-budget approach, Australia needs to go to zero
emissions in six years. New Zealand’s fossil fuel emissions are much lower
than Australia’s but they are rapidly growing (46 percent higher than in
1990). New Zealand has 18 years to get to zero emissions.
Achieving the Copenhagen target therefore requires rapid, sustained,
and substantial reductions in GHG emissions, particularly in developed
countries.
The budget approach says that the world needs to emit less than one trillion tonnes of CO
2
from fossil fuels into the atmosphere over the period 2000– 2050 to retain a risk of only 25 percent of exceeding the Copenhagen target.
Under the carbon- budget approach … New Zealand has 18 years to get to zero emissions.
Larson B ice shelf collapse 2002,
NASA. The image represents an area
of approximately 149km x 186km.
29P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yThis alternative path involves a rapid transition to a low-carbon economy, with significant but much reduced impacts from climate change. There
are many opportunities from this transition, but there are also many
difficulties. The technologies needed to power a low-carbon economy
already exist, but at present it appears that the political will does not. If I
was driving a car and being told that I had a 25 percent chance of driving
off a cliff, I’d be changing direction sooner. Waiting is not doing nothing.
Waiting is making a conscious decision that you want climate change to
get worse because you are not reducing your emissions. Every year that
we don’t act is a commitment to further climate change for the next
millennium.
Figure 4 Carbon-budget approach from The Australian Academy of Science (2010)36, adapted from Meinshausen et al. (2009)37
The technologies needed to power a low-carbon economy already exist, but at present it appears that the political will does not.
Fi 4 C b b d t h f Th A
Budget approach
Cumulative emissions allowed for 25% risk of exceeding 2°C
• Equal per capita emissions allowance
• Global budget of 1000Gt CO
2 until 2050
• For world population of 7G, 140 t CO
2 per capita
budget until 2050
• For NZ, emissions of 8t CO
2 per person from
fossil fuels, budget is used in less than 18 years.
30 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Crafting the long view
Sir Paul Reeves Former New Zealand Governor-General
Emissions targets
New Zealand’s targets
In September 2008, the Labour Government passed into law the
New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which aimed to move the
cost of emissions onto those who cause them. The incoming National
Government pushed back the extension of the Scheme to agriculture
to 2015 with Nick Smith saying agriculture will not be included “unless
there are practical technologies farmers can employ to reduce their
emissions”. On the other hand, Labour’s climate change spokesperson
Charles Chauvel said agriculture needs to come into the scheme no later
than 2015 “otherwise the message to the biggest emitting sector is
that they can just continue as they are because there is going to be no
discipline”38.
A recent Minister’s position paper put out for consultation says our
proposed long-term emissions reduction target is a 50 percent reduction
in New Zealand’s GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, or in short
50 by 50. That is a controversial target. We need to remember that
New Zealand’s gas emissions in the electricity, transport, and agricultural
sectors have increased significantly since the 1990 assessment of the
impacts of climate change. I am encouraged by what the Minister has
said about constant review, pace, and detail.
The Kyoto Protocol
Nick Smith thinks the panel set up to review the ETS may recommend
that New Zealand should not take the next step until there is
international acceptance. Probably that won’t happen for a long time. It’s
not clear that the Kyoto Protocol will survive beyond 2012. Japan, Russia,
and Canada are not interested if the United States stands aside. Emerging
nations like China say economic development is their priority and any
restraint on emissions will have to recognise that.
We need to remember that New Zealand’s gas emissions in the electricity, transport, and agricultural sectors have increased significantly since the 1990 assessment of the impacts of climate change.
31P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yIf international politics are unsettled and protective of national interests, then we should not be surprised if our own politics are bound to display
similar dynamics. The politics are complicated and I’m sure that even
within our present government there are interests that remain to be
convinced. The tension between sectional interest and the quest for
national interest is at the heart of the political process. The Minister’s
position paper talks of achieving the balance between the desired
reductions in GHGs and the impact on the economy and our lifestyle. It’s
a political debate that is beginning to heat up.
Climate change impacts for New Zealand
Migration from vulnerable Pacific Islands
Some of our near neighbours are small island states with small land areas,
a high population density, a limited range of natural resources, a fragile
resource base, a narrow range of skills, and low economic resilience.
Fifty percent of the people in the Pacific Islands live close to the coast.
The South Pacific Commission predicts that climate change could halve
the coastal fisheries catches that support these communities. Many of
these islands are no more than 3 or 4 metres above present mean sea
level. A change of temperature and an intensification of rainfall could
mean the spread of malaria, dengue fever, and water-borne diseases.
Coastal land loss and beach erosion, such as we saw recently in Samoa,
will intensify the displacement of communities.
Already Tuvalu and Kiribati are in trouble and their future uncertain.
People from here already travel to Australia, New Zealand, the United
States, and elsewhere in the Pacific and relocation is something they
could manage. Constitutionally, Niue, Samoa, the Cooks, and Tokelau
have guaranteed access to New Zealand in one form or another.
Climate change could significantly accelerate the movement of people
to New Zealand and most of them would be headed towards South
Auckland or Porirua, perhaps to join communities already established
there. There are already more Niueans in New Zealand than in Niue. The
survival of Niuean language and culture is going to be decided in
New Zealand, not in the homeland.
It’s not clear that the Kyoto Protocol will survive beyond 2012.
The tension between sectional interest and the quest for national interest is at the heart of the political process.
Some of our near neighbours are small island states with small land areas, a high population density, a limited range of natural resources, a fragile resource base, a narrow range of skills, and low economic resilience.
32 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Migrants with limited English are disadvantaged at work and their earning power is restricted. Seventy percent of Aucklanders with very
low literacy are Pasifika or Asian. There are people in the workplace and
who are not working to their full potential because they need preventive
medical care and targeted literacy programmes. And if emissions are a
sign of affluence then it must be said that affluence creates poverty and
inequality.
We can expect that immigrant groups will want to retain their own
cultural practices and lifestyles and be treated as full members of society.
Identity is always about the exercise of the power to include and exclude.
Inevitably, this means they will have to work out their relationship to the
predominant cultural identity of their new country. It’s not easy but what
I observe are second and subsequent generations of immigrants who are
skilled in managing multiple identities.
Mäori are particularly vulnerable to climate change
Mäori are a vulnerable group who suffer during economic recession.
Unemployment rates are already high and participation in higher-
paying occupations is relatively low. Changes in regional employment
and increased prices of assorted food stuffs due to climate change
would have a large impact on Mäori. Already many Mäori in Papakura
and Manukau are likely to be NEET (not in education, employment, or
training) and most at risk of poor labour outcomes.
The coastal environment is a very important food source for Mäori and
coastal erosion and flooding would have severe social, cultural, and
economic impacts. The exposure of urupä and sensitive wähi tapu sites
would be a high possibility. Many Mäori communities are in rural areas
that would be prone to new diseases, such as the Ross River virus and
dengue fever. One should anticipate that Mäori will lodge claims before
the Waitangi Tribunal if resources are threatened.
Climate change could significantly accelerate the movement of people to New Zealand ...
...if emissions are a sign of affluence then it must be said that affluence creates poverty and inequality.
We can expect that immigrant groups will want to retain their own cultural practices and lifestyles and be treated as full members of society.
33P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySociety’s challenge
The ‘she’ll-be-right’ mentality
The plural nature of our society means that we don’t speak with a
single voice—we never did—but we do need to be connected. Climate
change throws up attitudes and assumptions we make about ourselves,
how we see ourselves, and how we deal with issues. We are not
introspective people. If anything, we pride ourselves on being adaptable;
more practical than cultured. We claim that we can generate wealth
through the creation and manipulation of new materials whether it be
the ingenious use of flax, the proverbial number eight fencing wire, or
the clever use of our geothermal resources. If we have to, we can make
do with less and still come up with a good result. There is an inherent
incremental pragmatism. Big issues are tackled bit by bit.
This is a view severely criticised by Fran O’Sullivan in the wake of the
Pike River and Christchurch disasters. She asks how much did this
she’ll-be-right attitude play in the decision by the under-capitalised Pike
River mining company to build a mine with few escape routes? “The
consequences of repetitive disasters that might have been anticipated by
more sophisticated standards is national bankruptcy.”39
Here is another variant on the do-it-yourself theme, but slightly out of left
field. Some claim Wellington’s Futuna Chapel in Karori is our finest piece
of architecture. It was designed by the Mäori architect, John Scott and
the team chosen to construct it was six Marist brothers led by Brother
Joseph Kelly. None of them had any building qualifications. Everything
was done by hand and their only tool was a half inch drill. They had
a small concrete mixer and two wheelbarrows but no crane. Large
roofing beams were hauled into place using a block and tackle. A lack of
The coastal environment is a very important food source for Mäori and coastal erosion and flooding would have severe social, cultural, and economic impacts.
One should anticipate that Mäori will lodge claims before the Waitangi Tribunal if resources are threatened.
The plural nature of our society means that we don’t speak with a single voice— we never did—but we do need to be connected.
34 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s experience and tools never slowed things down. Brother Joseph says they simply learnt how to do things or found another way. During the entire
construction the only tradesmen used were an electrician and a plumber.
Science and religion
The Brothers who built the Chapel did not see it as an expression of the
Kiwi do-it-yourself attitude that keeps stores like Mitre 10 and Hammer
Hardware going. They saw it as expressing their faith in God. That seems
strangely out of step in a society where religion no longer dominates the
structures that shape our world and our leaders routinely assure people
of their thoughts, but rarely their prayers. If theology is to speak about
God, and if by definition God is not available for inspection as an object
in a laboratory, that means speaking about the imprint of God on human
lives. That’s how the builders of Futuna Chapel would expect you to
assess their work.
I am influenced here by the philosopher Mary Midgley, especially her
book Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems of Philosophical
Plumbing40. The difficulty, she says, is that religion and science are seen
as competitors, alternative attitudes belonging to separate tribes—one
childish, the other mature. Science seems to mean honest acceptance of
the facts as opposed to religion, which licenses childish wish fulfilment.
But scientists don’t just collect facts. They relate them to each other and
place them within a wider imaginative picture. You can’t isolate science
from the rest of life. All of our thought, including science, arises out of
imagination.
Participant comment People always have and will continue to look to churches for leadership. For the churches not to have a position and not to be out there leading on climate change (as they were in 1981 expressing opposition to apartheid and the tour) is to endorse non-action on climate change and the continued growth of greenhouse gas emissions.
...scientists don’t just collect facts. They relate them to each other and place them within a wider imaginative picture. You can’t isolate science from the rest of life. All of our thought, including science, arises out of imagination.
35P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yAn interesting point of intersection is the Gaia theory advanced by James Lovelock. It has both a scientific and a religious aspect. Lovelock is not
saying the Earth is conscious and capable of forming purposes. Rather,
life is not a loose and chance jumble of competing entities. Life is an
interdependent system that keeps itself going by a constant interchange
of benefits between its parts. That’s why the system is vulnerable and at
risk. That’s why the stakes are so high over climate change.
Society is enriched through diversity and honesty
I am the chancellor of the Auckland University of Technology (AUT),
New Zealand’s youngest university. Our central city campus is crowded
with a lot of building going on but the place really comes alive when the
students are back. We get flooded with chattering, vibrant young people
with different cultural traditions, religious loyalties, and ethnic identities.
AUT’s question is really the nation’s question: How can all these exist
together in a climate of mutual and honest questioning? How can our
differences enrich each other? So at AUT we seek to be a community of
human beings engaged in learning. To be alive is to learn, so learning
is a life-long process. Our invitation to the students is: Where better
could you start than with us as we seek to be a secure space, an open
society, where other voices are welcome and listened to? We don’t
claim perfection but we do ask for honesty. We hope to learn from our
mistakes.
To quote Karl Popper: Totalitarian regimes lay claim to ultimate truth and
impose their views by the imposition of force, but nobody has access to
the ultimate truth. A perfect society is unattainable. We must content
ourselves with an imperfect society that is, however, capable of infinite
improvement. That is an open society.
I would submit, ladies and gentlemen, that we have much to learn about
nation building and the challenge of an open society in the way we
approach the pressing urgency of climate change.
Physical matter is not inert stuff, foreign to life. It is a mighty organised
whole of which we are a part. We belong here and we belong within a
whole that we need to take seriously. Our thinking about climate change
needs to be wide and expansive.
Life is an interdependent system that keeps itself going by a constant interchange of benefits between its parts. That’s why the system is vulnerable and at risk.
How can all these [different cultural traditions, religious loyalties, and ethnic identities] exist together in a climate of mutual and honest questioning? How can our differences enrich each other?
A perfect society is unattainable. We must content ourselves with an imperfect society that is, however, capable of infinite improvement.
36 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Group dialogue session
Rapporteurs (Ralph Chapman, Judy Lawrence, Amanda Wolf)
Building public awareness in the face of rapid change
Encourage collective action
We have science, events, actions, and somehow a sense that these are
not quite enough. We are in a world with people at loggerheads. What
can we do when being at loggerheads won’t do?
Beyond science and individual action there is something more to be
had—a collective response to the collective, societal risk we face. It is
about incremental action and building on a wide range of existing actions
and opportunities. We need to find opportunities for communicating
across the range of interests.
Use the education system
In New Zealand, there is still a lack of awareness of the huge risks of
climate change. Scientists have difficulty communicating uncertainty.
Governments tend to respond too slowly to crises, because of slow
changes in electoral awareness, and an unwillingness to get out ahead
of other countries to their own apparent disadvantage. (However, slow
movers are punished in the long run.)
How do we bridge the gap between what scientists know and what the
public know? In general, we cannot expect the media to inform people
well—they are too sensationalist and commercial. One option is using the
education system—teaching children is a good way to teach parents. We
need to work on people’s understanding of complex systems, in various
ways. Education for Sustainability was a good initiative for building public
awareness and similar programmes could be fostered.
Reward action
There is the challenge of spreading and rewarding green action and
activism. New Zealand has the big advantage of allowing and fostering
a lot of interaction from diverse perspectives. Often the best way to get
involved is around an event. The Australian Youth Climate Commission
(AYCC) seems to have been effective, often focusing on events. They
have >60,000 members (under 25s), which is more than any political
party. Salient and observable action is essential when addressing
problems with long timeframes.
Governments tend to respond too slowly to crises, because of slow change in electoral awareness, and an unwillingness to get out ahead of other countries to their own apparent disadvantage.
Participant comments How do we change politics to emphasise continuity and the long view?
Lack of public understanding, even public interest, is the biggest problem.
Salient and observable action is essential when addressing problems with long timeframes.
37P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yCarbon dioxide versus methane We explored a technical issue about why David Karoly had framed his
comments around CO 2 only and had not included methane. David
explained that CO 2 has a very long lifetime in the atmosphere so the
effect endures over generations; compared with methane, which
degrades to CO 2 over a shorter timeframe, despite its greater short-term
warming effect. David acknowledged that there was a role for early
reductions from methane that would make a difference to reducing
overall emissions.
Low-carbon growth
Debate the growth paradigm
The growth paradigm needs much more debate among society at large—
even though the limitations and problems with growth are well known
among those informed on the issue. We do have the technical ability to
decouple economic growth from carbon emissions, but in practice it is
difficult under present institutional arrangements and market systems.
Do benefit-cost analyses
The Stern Review in the UK and the Garnaut Review in Australia have
great value and show that reductions in carbon can be made at costs that
can be managed. However, New Zealand has yet to undertake such a
comprehensive independent review of carbon reduction policies and the
costs of what is possible here.
New Zealand has yet to undertake such a comprehensive independent review of carbon reduction policies and the costs of what is possible here.
38 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The market is telling a very different story from the democratic political system. Not only is the timeframe different, but so is the manner in which
the market creates a collective, coordinated ‘being’ different from that of
the political system: we can learn from that.
Do regional vulnerability assessments to inform adaptation plans
We need to understand the nature of the climate change risks across the
country and identify critical exposure to those risks. Different adaptation
approaches will be needed in different places, as adaptive capacity
and societal resilience will vary across the country, depending on the
vulnerability of the regions.
The planning and political cycles are conspiring towards the short term
and affecting resilience in the long term. Greater government focus
on adaptive capacity will be necessary to avert high community costs.
Governments and consumers need to take responsibility for emissions
liabilities.
Encourage more community-based adaptation
There is a huge sense of frustration with the top-down UNFCCC process.
Most of the action that is occurring is now bottom up. In Australia,
there are some positive developments such as the Hepburn Wind Project
Co-op. It’s a good example of a community-owned wind project—and
the Co-op is making the planning and action template available free as a
model for other communities.
Creating a healthy society
Maintain social connectedness
It feels like the future is spinning out of control. Connecting through
social media across the world could be a way of gaining control. Social
connectedness is an important driver of security and fostering the
common good. Insecurity can make people less compassionate. However,
our security as a society should not be at the expense of compromised
compassion.
Different adaptation approaches will be needed in different places, as adaptive capacity and societal resilience will differ across the country ...
...planning and political cycles are conspiring towards the short term and affecting resilience in the long term.
39P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yAddress the full social costs
It seems that the ETS response to climate change is dealing with costs at
the margins, while the full social costs, especially to future generations,
are not being addressed.
Maintain cultural health
We need to pay attention to the cultural health of groups of people who
may be displaced by climate change. Tensions may arise as displaced
people arrive into pre-existing cultures and conditions.
Seek a common vision
We need to seek a unified vision of the future, with much more
community dialogue about what we can do. For example, carbon zero is
possible for electricity across New Zealand but resources are needed to do
it. More dialogue with young people is needed. Older generations need
to get out of their established positions and work toward the common
good across generations. We can learn from long-lasting civilisations and
from history.
Use creativity and imagination
We need creativity and imagination. People respond better to creativity
and humour than to messages of fear and guilt. Imagination requires
faith—the everyday faith that allows us to look into an uncertain future
and a faith that somehow we’ll get through the bad times and come
out the other side. A sense of the awareness of our interconnectedness
sparks imagination and sensitivity to the failures of imagination.
Participant comment Can we learn from examples internationally where countries have had to change in response to major threats (eg Denmark—oil shock in 1970s, Cuba—collapse of Soviet Union)? In such examples, might we not find some clues about how to manage change and behavioural changes?
We need to seek a unified vision of the future, with much more community dialogue about what we can do.
Participant comment ‘Science’ peddling fear and diabolical consequences is not working. Social and psychological scientists know this and they know why. I hope we will hear from them. Fear is not an appealing emotional response.
C l i m a t e F u t u r e s40
Responding to scientific uncertainty: The reinsurance industry’s perspective
Martin Kreft1 Munich Re New Zealand
1 Martin Kreft gave this talk at the Breakfast Session.
When it comes to climate change, overall risk
awareness has to change. One area that particularly
needs to be addressed is that society needs to
take over from scientists when it comes to risk
management. Most of society is currently reluctant
to consider risk and not inclined to address adverse
outcomes.
Munich Re is seeing a clear rise in weather-related
catastrophes. Different ways of mitigating and
adapting to them are necessary. In the long term it
is possible to foresee a world where these changes
produce areas that are subject to inevitable damage
and unable to be offered affordable insurance
protection. This means society will not have the
protections currently enjoyed or will have to pay
a higher price for them. We need to find ways
of raising risk awareness and preparing for the
changing conditions ahead to build up resilience for
our communities.
How does society cope? There will be more events that demonstrate action
is needed. We can already see that weather-related
catastrophes worldwide have tripled over the last
30 years, partly due to climate change. The recent
earthquakes in Christchurch also show that actions
are necessary because we are going to end up
with authorities saying that land in some parts of
Christchurch has little value. This has significant
implications for local governments, citizens, and
businesses.
Whilst this is as a consequence of earthquakes,
there are also direct implications here for the
consequences of climate change, if large areas of
coastal land become uninhabitable.
There will also be changes in the way the economic
system operates and insurance is one of them. The
rise in weather-related catastrophes means that
people eventually have to pay for them, either
through higher prices for insurance or through
taxes governments may use for repair costs.
How does the reinsurance industry respond? Munich Re has over 30 scientists and researchers
assessing natural catastrophe and climate change
risk. We have the world’s largest database on
natural catastrophes. This gives us clear guidance
for our risk management, regardless of whether
this change is fully attributable to climate change
or not. It helps our experienced underwriters to
determine risk-adequate prices for the insurance
cover we offer.
Fixed timeframes are hard to reconcile for things
that are uncertain. This is why Munich Re puts
great effort into projections using scenarios, which
drive our risk management. We continuously
monitor risks worldwide, including global peak risk
scenarios, more than half of which are weather
related. A Wellington earthquake is also one of
these scenarios. They regulate our behaviour on
what are acceptable risks in these areas.
P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y 41
However, these catastrophes show that risk-
adequate insurance prices are necessary throughout
the cycle (years with a large number of claims and
years with a low number of claims).
For the industry, the large earthquakes in New
Zealand and Japan have mostly been profit eroding.
If there were more big events to come in close
succession then they could become capital eroding
and will likely cause significant reassessment of
reinsurance risk appetite.
Reinsurers generally adapt very quickly, as they have
a large amount of capital at stake. Munich Re has
developed many products, also in cooperation with
governments, to achieve wider insurance coverage
against natural disasters. We see the urgent need
for more protection against natural catastrophes,
especially in the Asia Pacific region.
Figure 5 Munich Re graph showing the trend in increasing natural catastrophes
In some regions, the changes in weather-related
catastrophes are driving the industry to put more
focus on non-peak scenarios, because these are
becoming more frequent. Australia, for example,
has had a number of weather-related events in the
last 12–18 months, which are eroding insurers’
allowances for large claims.
Worldwide, 2011 is already the year with the
highest-ever economic losses recorded for the
reinsurance industry, with US$265bn up to the
end of June. This easily exceeds the total figure
for 2005, previously the costliest year to date with
US$220bn.
How many big hits can the industry cope with? Due to strict risk management, Munich Re has
been able to absorb the exceptional large losses of
the recent natural catastrophes.
5 M i h R h h i th t d i i i t l t t h
42 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
43
2 Communication between the science community and society
44 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Communicating the science of climate change: Lessons from history
Dr Erik Conway Historian of science and technology, United States
An organised effort to cast doubt For the last few decades there has been an organised effort to cast doubt
on the existence of anthropogenic climate change in the United States41.
Today, a Chicago-based political ‘think tank’, the Heartland Institute,
seems to be the most visible face of this effort. But the effort is older
than the Heartland Institute. Its origins are in a different ‘think tank’,
founded by scientists, in Washington, DC. Called the George C. Marshall
Institute, it was founded by three physicists who felt a burning need to
defend President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from
other physicists.
The Strategic Defense Initiative
SDI was a programme to develop a large-scale, space-based anti-ballistic
missile system during the 1980s. It was a locus of conflict within the
American physics community, with individuals cleaving along a line
between supporters of arms control and supporters of weaponeering.
The Union of Concerned Scientists, aided by astronomer Carl Sagan
and nuclear physicist Hans Bethe, led the effort to remove funding from
SDI. In 1984, astrophysicist Robert Jastrow invited solid-state physicist
Frederick Seitz, and nuclear physicist William Nierenberg, to join him
in forming a conservative counterweight to the Union of Concerned
Scientists. They were briefly joined by geophysicist S. Fred Singer,
who soon went off to found his own ‘think tank’, the Science and
Environmental Policy Project.
The Marshall Institute
The Marshall Institute spent its first five years contesting claims that SDI
wouldn’t work, and that it was destabilising international order. It also
worked to paint a dire picture of Soviet strength and American weakness.
One 1987 Jastrow article was titled ‘America Has Five Years Left!’42 The
disintegration of the Soviet Union left the Institute in need of a new
mission. Challenging the reality of anthropogenic global warming became
that new mission.
...there has been an organised effort to cast doubt on the existence of anthropogenic climate change in the United States.
45P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yIn 1989, Nierenberg briefed the George H. W. Bush White House that global warming was probably caused by the Sun, and, that as solar
irradiance declined in the 2000s, would come to an end on its own.
As evidence grew throughout the 1990s that this view was wrong,
the Institute expanded its attacks on mainstream climate science and
climate scientists. In 2007, with its founders retired or deceased, it was
simultaneously acknowledging that uncertainties in climate science were
not a basis for policy inaction and promoting the hoax narrative—that
“the widely propagated ‘fact’ that humans are contributing to global
warming is the ‘greatest deception in the history of science’”43.
A defence of free-market capitalism Why did these physicists take up a retirement career in spreading doubt
about anthropogenic global warming? The evidence, from their own
words, suggests that their principal concern was not the quality of the
science, but with the defence of market capitalism from environmental
‘extremists’44. In one example, Singer wrote that global warming was
being hyped based on a “hidden political agenda” against “business,
the free market, and the capitalistic system”45. In this view, these
‘extremists’, scientists included, were merely socialists in green makeup.
Recall that the Cold War these physicists had invested their lives in, was
fundamentally a conflict between duelling political ideologies: capitalism
versus communism. From these claims, Oreskes and I draw the conclusion
that science had nothing to do with the denial of global warming. The
rejection of science, instead, was the result of political beliefs. These Cold
War physicists were market fundamentalists, and could not accept the
physical evidence of market failure.
Market failure Anthropogenic global warming is, in the words of Nicholas Stern, former
chief economist of the World Bank, “the greatest and widest-ranging
market failure ever seen”46. Fixing it requires some form of market
intervention by government, the very thing these gentlemen feared. It’s
important to understand the resistance to climate science is really about
ethics and values: How best to organise society? What roles should
business and industry play in our economies? What responsibilities do we
have to the future? The denial of global warming is, in the end, the result
of political beliefs, not the failings of science.
The rejection of science, instead, was the result of political beliefs. These Cold War physicists were market fundamentalists, and could not accept the physical evidence of market failure.
Anthropogenic global warming is … “the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen”.
...resistance to climate science is really about ethics and values: How best to organise society? What roles should business and industry play in our economies? What responsibilities do we have to the future? The denial of global warming is, in the end, the result of political beliefs, not the failings of science.
46 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Better science communication
Providing information alone is inadequate
There has been much recent discussion of how to better communicate
climate science to the public. Many scientists practise the ‘deficit model’
of science communication: if we only provide more and better facts
about X, the public will believe X. Empirical evidence suggests this is
wrong. Most people, even some scientists, accept or reject claims on the
basis of their pre-existing beliefs—political, economic, and religious47.
And they evaluate claims based on their perception of the beliefs of the
person making those claims as well48. The Marshall Institute and its allies
have been extremely successful in painting climate scientists as elitists, if
not socialists and communists; among conservatives in the United States,
this view has become nearly universal. Thus the totality of climate science
can be dismissed as a giant political hoax.
Be upfront about values
If communication is not value-free on either end of the conversation,
what should scientists do? We think scientists should be upfront about
their ethics and values. The late Stephen Schneider argued that this
resulted in better science, not just better science communication49. They
also need to address Americans’ fears that anthropogenic climate change
is merely socialism in green makeup. There’s little point in claiming
neutrality when no one believes that anyway.
Tell stories
As others have suggested, scientists should learn to turn their work into a
story50. While charts and graphs are part of the stuff of science, few non-
scientists understand them. The best science journalists weave context
into their writing about new findings and, because science journalism is
rapidly waning, scientists should learn to do the same. Increasingly, they
must learn to tell their own stories.
We think scientists should be upfront about their ethics and values … There’s little point in claiming neutrality when no one believes that anyway.
Participant comment Communication is critical but it needs to be targeted and strategic.
The best science journalists weave context into their writing about new findings and, because science journalism is rapidly waning, scientists should learn to do the same.
47P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yExplaining complexity: Challenges for the Fourth Estate
Fred Pearce Author and environmental journalist, United Kingdom
The media and complexity We in the media like our stories simple. We like good guys and bad guys
and that X marks the spot where the disaster happened. We like sex and
violence. The attention span of the average reader or viewer—and the
average news editor—is very short. There is an old adage in advertising
that you have to sell the product in a six-word slogan. Journalism isn’t
very different. If you can’t write the headline, the story is probably too
complicated.
Conveying complexity or nuance is extremely difficult. Conveying ideas
like uncertainty and error bars is even harder.
You might think things were easier in science journalism, but in some
ways they are less easy. This is because of society’s view of scientists. We
like to see them as the founts of wisdom. They are supposed to know the
truth denied to the rest of us. They are expected to trade in certainties
and ‘facts’. This myth about the omnipotence of science is one in which
many scientists collude, sometimes with disastrous consequences.
What we know Many people, including some journalists, think that either everything the
climate scientists say and predict is true, or it is all lies. That if any part of
the narrative is undermined then the whole edifice falls. The truth is more
nuanced than that. So what do we know, and what don’t we know?
We know GHGs like CO 2 and methane warm the planet. The gases trap
solar heat at certain wavelengths and warm the atmosphere. This is
200-year-old physics. To deny it really is to be a flat-Earther.
We know, too, that CO 2 in particular is accumulating in the atmosphere.
This is certainly thanks to human emissions from burning carbon-
based fuels such as coal and oil. We have direct measurements of that
accumulation for more than 50 years. Physicists calculate that for every
square metre of the Earth’s surface, 1.6 watts more energy enters the
atmosphere than leaves it.
Conveying complexity or nuance is extremely difficult. Conveying ideas like uncertainty and error bars is even harder.
GHGs...trap solar heat at certain wavelengths and warm the atmosphere. This is 200-year-old physics. To deny it really is to be a flat-Earther.
48 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s We know the world is warming. Thousands of thermometers in areas remote from any conceivable local influences tell us that. The oceans are
warming too. The great majority of the world’s glaciers are retreating,
Arctic sea ice is disappearing, sea levels are rising ever faster, trees are
climbing up hillsides, and permafrost is melting.
This doesn’t prove GHGs are doing the warming. There is a lot of natural
variability out there, but not much of it operates globally. If anything,
solar influences would have been cooling the planet in the last half
century—the opposite of what has been happening. Put simply, it would
be very surprising if the cause of the recent warming trend were not
GHGs.
What we don’t know
How fast or how far will things warm?
We don’t know how fast or how far things will warm. The actual
warming caused by CO 2 is quite modest—about one degree for a
doubling of CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere. The rest—twice or
three times as much according to most climate models—comes from
amplifying effects.
For instance, warming causes Arctic ice to melt, which exposes dark
ocean water, which reflects much less solar heat into space than the ice it
replaces—hence more warming. These positive feedbacks are much less
certain than the initial warming.
What happens to clouds?
Clouds have always been recognised as a ticking time bomb in climate
models, because nobody can work out whether warming will change
them in a way that amplifies or moderates warming—still less how much.
How big is natural variability?
If you can say that, for instance, the world is warmer than it has been for
a thousand years or more, thanks to climate change, people take notice.
One of the failures of climate science in the past decade has been to have
an honest debate about the reliability of data showing natural variability,
and what it means. This is an area where the debate has become
politicised.
If anything, solar influences would have been cooling the planet in the last half century—the opposite of what has been happening.
...warming causes Arctic ice to melt, which exposes dark ocean water, which reflects much less solar heat into space than the ice it replaces—hence more warming. These positive feedbacks are much less certain than the initial warming.
49P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yMore knowledge, less certainty? I think I can predict right now the headlines that will follow publication of
the next report from the IPCC, due in 2013. They will be something like:
“Climate scientists back off predicting rate of warming: ‘The more we
know the less we can be sure of,’ says UN panel.”
That is almost bound to be the drift if two-time IPCC lead author Kevin
Trenberth and others are right about what is happening to a new
generation of climate models. I also confidently predict the IPCC will get
an extremely rough ride from the media and elsewhere for admitting its
uncertainty. People will say: What use are you if after more than 20 years
you know less than you did before? Why do I say this? Last year,
New Zealander Trenberth, who is head of climate analysis at the US’s
National Center for Atmospheric Research, wrote a commentary in the
science journal Nature headlined ‘More Knowledge, Less Certainty’. It
warned that the uncertainty in the next IPCC report’s predictions “will
be much greater than in previous reports”. He added that “this could
present a major problem for public understanding of climate change”.
This plays out most obviously in the critical estimate of how much
warming is likely between 1990, the baseline year for most IPCC work,
and 2100. The range of warming predicted in the next IPCC reports will
be wider, especially at the top end. Some preliminary computer runs have
suggested potential warming of 10°C or more.
Trenberth explained: “While our knowledge of certain factors [responsible
for climate change] does increase, so does our understanding of factors
we previously did not account for or even recognize.”51
It is going to be hard to explain why, when you put more and better
information into climate models, they do not home in on a more
precise answer. Also, it sounds dangerously like what Donald Rumsfeld,
in the midst of the chaos of the Iraq War, famously called ‘unknown
unknowns’. I would guess that the IPCC will have even less luck than he
did in explaining what it means by this.
...the IPCC will get an extremely rough ride from the media and elsewhere for admitting its uncertainty.
Some preliminary computer runs have suggested potential warming of 10°C or more.
“While our knowledge of certain factors [responsible for climate change] does increase, so does our understanding of factors we previously did not account for or even recognize.”
50 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Scientific consensus All scientific assessments have to grapple with how to present
uncertainties. The IPCC is caught in a particular dilemma because its
founding purpose was to reach consensus on climate science and report
back to the world. It has always been under pressure to try to find
consensus even where none exists. Critics argue that has sometimes
compromised its assessments of uncertainty.
While we are discussing how the media conveys uncertainty, perhaps
the bigger issue is how scientists cope with it themselves, especially in
their dealings with the outside world. I am far from alone in that view.
When the work of the embattled IPCC was reviewed by a United Nations
(UN) panel last summer52, the conclusion of the panel’s chairman, Harold
Shapiro of Princeton, was that existing IPCC guidelines on presenting
uncertainty “have not been consistently followed”. In particular, he
said, its analysis of the likely impacts of climate change “contains many
statements that were assigned high confidence but for which there is
little evidence”.
The claim that the Himalayan glaciers could all have melted by 2035 was
a crass error resulting from cutting-and-pasting a claim from a report by a
non-governmental organisation. But there were other failures. A headline
claim, in the report’s chapter on Africa, was that “projected reductions in
[crop] yield in some countries could be as much as 50 percent by 2020”.
But the forensic trail on that claim, which I pursued for New Scientist
magazine, was equally dodgy. The cited source was an 11-page paper
by a Moroccan researcher. It covered only three of Africa’s 53 countries
(Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), had not gone through peer review,
contained no original research, and did not cite any. It simply asserted
that “studies on the future of vital agriculture in the region have shown
... deficient yields from rain-based agriculture of up to 50 percent during
the 2000–2020 period”.
Even its author did not claim the changes were necessarily caused by
climate change. In fact, harvests in North Africa already differ by
50 percent or more from one year to the next, depending on rainfall. In
other words, it said nothing at all about how climate change might or
might not change farm yields across Africa. None of this was conveyed by
the IPCC report, even in the footnotes.
All scientific assessments have to grapple with how to present uncertainties.
Participant comment I am worried about the undue emphasis placed on scrutinising the science while neglecting to scrutinise misunderstood criticisms of peer-reviewed science. No review process is fool-proof; however the IPCC review process might well be the most rigorous method currently in operation today … are we necessarily being diverted from priorities of higher order?
51P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y‘Climategate’ This, then, is not just about the communication of science to the public.
It is about the conduct of scientists and how they respond to the
expectations of society about science and its conduct. The media often
amplify that, of course. And that happened in the furore over what came
to be known as ‘Climategate’. The release—hacking or leaking, we don’t
know—of more than a thousand emails sent and received over 14 years
by researchers at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East
Anglia (UEA) in England.
In the resulting row, media commentators mostly took one of two views:
either that the emails revealed nothing of importance and were stolen,
released, and promoted by climate deniers; or that they revealed a
conspiracy by climate scientists to tell lies to the world. Neither was true.
Many of the ‘Climategate’ emails involved the Climatic Research Unit’s
director, Phil Jones. The emails revealed how he and others sought to
battle against their critics—not through the power of reason but by
attempting to marginalise, bad-mouth, and silence their critics. The IPCC
has strict rules about open review of the drafts of the chapters, but some
of the scientists were conducting back-door discussions outside this
process. The emails also reveal how a group of climate scientists tried to
subvert freedom of information (FoI) law when it was used by their critics
to demand their data. (The details of this are set out in my book The
Climate Files53.)
None of this shows climate change science to be a fraud. But it does call
into question the ability and right of science to carry on policing itself. All
is not well in the ivory towers.
None of this shows climate change science to be a fraud.
52 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s What have we learned? There are two main lessons that I see from all this.
The ‘Climategate’ affair itself shows that if scientists are to be believed,
if the science about climate change and many other controversial areas
is to be trusted, then more openness and oversight are needed. And that
means more intelligent scrutiny from journalists.
And it means an end to the idea—as common among science journalists
as scientists themselves—that journalism is just a conduit for scientists
to hand down their tablets of stone to the wider world. That is no more
appropriate in science journalism than it would be in political journalism.
The scientists were caught out in the emails—not in telling outright lies
and conducting conspiracies—but in oversimplifying their message, and
covering up gaps and uncertainties in their research. But in doing this
they were responding to what the public and policymakers expect their
scientists to be—purveyors of certainty rather than uncertainty.
That leads to a final thought. Yes, scientists need to be more frank with
us about what they know and don’t know. But also, we the public—
including of course policymakers and the media—need to be more
realistic in our expectations of science and of scientists.
...if scientists are to be believed … more openness and oversight are needed.
...we the public— including of course policymakers and the media—need to be more realistic in our expectations of science and of scientists.
53P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yManaging messages in the media
Brian Fallow NZ Herald
The state of the media The state of the media is pretty parlous, and that has implications for
people, including climate scientists, who need to communicate to the
public via the media.
Clearly there is a problem. A survey by the Pew Research Centre54 in
the United States late last year found that 59 percent of respondents
accepted there is solid evidence the Earth is warming. That is down from
79 percent four years earlier. Most of the decline occurred between 2008
and 2009.
The proportion who believes the warming is the result of human activities
has fallen from half in 2006 to a third. When asked whether scientists
believe warming is due to human activities, 44 percent said yes and
44 percent said no. Four years earlier the split had been 59 percent yes
and 29 percent no. The 44 percent who said no are badly misinformed.
A paper published under the imprimatur of the US National Academy of
Sciences last year looked at a dataset of nearly 1,400 climate researchers,
ranked them by how often they published in the field, and found that, of
the top 200, only five could be classified as unconvinced by the tenets of
anthropogenic climatic change, as outlined by the IPCC.
It would be unsafe to assume that New Zealanders are a whole lot better
served by the news media here than Americans are by theirs. So it is a fair
assumption that there is also a wide gap here between scientific opinion
and public opinion.
Talking of scientific ‘opinion’ rather than, say, ‘knowledge’ means no
disrespect to climate scientists. I once heard Rodney Hide in the House
invoke a distinction between established scientific fact, which of course
had to be respected, and mere theory and conjecture, which we were
entitled to ignore. Anthropogenic climate change he put in the theory
and conjecture category. Such a distinction sounds fair enough to the
layperson.
When asked whether scientists believe warming is due to human activities, 44 percent said yes and 44 percent said no. Four years earlier the split had been 59 percent yes and 29 percent no.
54 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The only reason it cuts no ice with me is that, as a philosophy student in my distant youth, I was exposed to the ideas of Karl Popper, who was a
visiting professor at Otago for a while when I was there. Popper’s seminal
work in this area is The Logic of Scientific Discovery55; I recommend it
anyone who hasn’t read it.
For Popper, Hide’s distinction is completely wrongheaded. It is not a
shortcoming, but rather the hallmark of respectability, in a scientific
assertion that it might be wrong and might yet be proven to be wrong.
A proposition proof against any future evidence to the contrary is not
science, but an article of faith or some other, lesser thing.
That does not mean, of course, that we are free to shop around and
choose whatever theory we like. We have to go with the one that
explains the most, and is inconsistent with the least, of the available
evidence so far. Those who are not qualified to tell which view is which—
and that is almost all of us—have to accept what those who are qualified
tell us. So why don’t we?
Journalistic norms A large part of the problem is that journalists are habituated to the idea
that there are two sides to every story. Balance requires seeking out and
presenting both sides. In most contexts this is a good rule.
If you were a group of journalists, I would be emphasising the need in
the case of climate change not to allow that habit of even-handedness
to create the false impression that scientists are divided 50:50 on
anthropogenic climate change, that 50 to one is more like it. But as you
are not journalists, all I can do is make some suggestions about how to
try to lean against and pre-empt that tendency.
Communicating with journalists
Don’t ‘bury the lead’
One problem here is scientists’ tendency to present their conclusions
festooned by a lot of qualifications and caveats, acknowledging upfront
deficiencies in the data they have had to work with and assumptions they
have had to make to render the problem tractable. This may be seemly
and appropriate when they are talking to their peers. But when trying
to get through to the public via the mass news media it can create the
impression that their conclusions are more tentative and uncertain and
fragile than they really are.
In 2005, the leaders of the 11 most powerful countries in the world
gathered for a summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, and climate change was
It is not a shortcoming, but rather the hallmark of respectability, in a scientific assertion that it might be wrong and might yet be proven to be wrong. A proposition proof against any future evidence to the contrary is not science, but an article of faith ...
We have to go with the [theory] that explains the most, and is inconsistent with the least, of the available evidence so far. Those who are not qualified to tell which view is which—and that is almost all of us—have to accept what those who are qualified tell us.
...journalists are habituated to the idea that there are two sides to every story.
55P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yon the agenda. The national science academies of all 11 countries wrote them an open letter pleading for action. But it did not begin “Now
look, for heaven’s sake, read our lips ...”, it began “There will always be
uncertainty in understanding a system as complex as the world’s climate
...” Journalists call this burying the lead.
Simplify
This is not to say that the failure of so many of the public to get the
message on climate change can be laid at the door of scientists’ academic
niceties or semantic fastidiousness. Rather, values like scrupulous accuracy
and intellectual honesty are important, but they are not absolute. They
are not binary. They depend on context. And when the context is trying
to communicate with the public via the mass news media, quick and dirty
and simplified is the way to go.
Be aware of journalists’ time constraints
You are as likely as not to be dealing with a journalist who has little or
no relevant background knowledge and who—and I can’t emphasise this
enough—has very little time to get the story and then tell it.
This is a generalisation, obviously, and relates to the New Zealand
context. One of the boons of the internet is that you can access reporting
by specialist writers in great and famous papers overseas. And so far that
has not disappeared behind pay walls. But that may only be a matter of
time. The business models that have traditionally supported newspapers
and free-to-air television news are breaking down. They haven’t
completely failed yet, but they are under real pressure.
...[Scientists] can create the impression that their conclusions are more tentative and uncertain and fragile than they really are.
Participant comments Perhaps the ‘main idea’ for scientists (and journalists) needs to be: first the hard-hitting message, and the caveats about scientific uncertainty be kept to the last comment.
Scientists with the ‘knack’ for words should be encouraged to become science communicators to the public—this should be encouraged at university levels.
56 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Technological advances have given people far more options in terms of accessing and sharing information, and there is a widespread
conviction that online content should be free. Relentless pressure on
media organisations’ revenues has led to a hollowing out of newsrooms.
The result is fewer reporters and younger reporters, because people
get disillusioned and there is a greater rate of churn. It means less
chance to specialise and accumulate background knowledge. A positive
development on that front in recent years has been the establishment
of the Science Media Centre, to help plug those gaps. They need to be
supported.
Practise your own sound bites
The hollowing out of newsrooms also means reporters have less time to
spend on any given story. If you know or suspect you might have to deal
with the media, try this as an exercise. Try writing the story you would
like to see appear in print. Give yourself 400 words at the most, or, if
you have a webcam, talk to it for one minute, tops. See how far you
get within those constraints. See what you have to sacrifice to get the
essential points across.
For people used to having a captive audience of students listening to
them for an hour at a time, the art of the sound bite does not come
easily. Because time is limited, try to avoid wasting it on dealing with the
issues sceptics raise. Be conscious of the opportunity cost—any time you
spend responding to them is time you don’t get to spend making the
points you want to make.
Don’t waste time refuting sceptics’ arguments
There are techniques people use to shut down a line of questioning they
can see will take them where they don’t want to go. The best is to reject
the premise of the question: “That would be a problem, if it were true,
but it is not.” Or “That’s old news. It has been looked at and thoroughly
discredited.” Dogmatic and dismissive is better than reasonable and
forthcoming—unless you want to read a piece that is all about what your
opponents are saying. It is the first rule of generalship: don’t let the other
guy choose the ground. That can be half the battle.
A positive development … has been the establishment of the Science Media Centre, to help plug those gaps. They need to be supported.
Participant comment Journalists are under- skilled and under pressure to present news.
If you … have to deal with the media … try writing the story you would like to see appear in print. Give yourself 400 words at the most, or … talk to it for one minute, tops ... See what you have to sacrifice to get the essential points across.
57P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yI must confess it rather goes against the grain for a journalist to be saying these things. But the bottom line is we don’t have all day and our
readers or viewers or listeners certainly don’t. So let’s devote it to what is
important.
Target your message to the medium
There are longer forms, of course, stretching even to the luxurious length
of a book or an hour-long documentary. You can write at whatever
length you like on a website. But how many people will find it and invest
the time in reading or watching it is a hit-and-miss affair. By and large
there is a trade-off, an inverse relationship, at work here: the larger the
audience, the less time you get to address them. Don’t waste it.
Better ways of communicating climate change
Tell stories
Before turning to a couple of areas where I think the message on climate
change might be communicated more effectively, I have to make a caveat
of my own. I write about the economy, not science or the environment.
My occupational interest in climate change over the past 10 years or so
relates entirely to what is to be done about it, rather than the thing itself.
But I’m convinced most people relate more to words than to numbers
and more to images than either words or numbers.
Dogmatic and dismissive is better than reasonable and forthcoming— unless you want to read a piece that is all about what your opponents are saying.
By and large there is a trade-off, an inverse relationship, at work here: the larger the audience, the less time you get to address them.
...most people relate more to words than to numbers and more to images than either words or numbers.
58 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Use past events as reference points
So while scientists may take for granted that there is a big, scary
difference between 2 degrees of warming and 4 degrees, to most of us it
sounds inconsequential. Parts per million of some gas in the atmosphere
even more so. So it is essential to calibrate the scale of what these
numbers mean. And preferably by reference to the past rather than the
future, just because the past has happened already while the future is
always a matter of speculation. Tell us what the world was like the last
time there were 600 parts per million of CO 2 in the atmosphere, or the
oceans were anoxic.
I remember hearing Peter Barrett describe in a lecture the Greenhouse
World of the remote past. To a Southlander with antifreeze in the blood it
didn’t sound at all inviting.
Emphasise the time lags involved
Another crucial part of the story that I don’t think has got through is the
question of time lags—how long a CO 2 molecule emitted right now will
persist in the atmosphere, how long it takes for an ocean to heat up or
cool down, that sort of thing.
This needs to be reiterated endlessly, because otherwise it is easy
for people to be seduced by the Bjørn Lomborg view—that there is
uncertainty about the science so we should wait until it hardens up, and
in 20 years, say, we will be richer and technologically better armed to
deal with it. There are more pressing problems in the meantime.
To sum up The idea is deeply ingrained among journalists that there are two sides
to a story. We usually have very little time to get, and to tell, a story.
So don’t waste it dealing with the issues sceptics raise. Try to stay on
message. Remember that most of us don’t think in numbers. Calibrate
the scale and stress the time lags.
...while scientists may take for granted that there is a big, scary difference between 2 degrees of warming and 4 degrees, to most of us it sounds inconsequential.
Tell us what the world was like the last time there were 600 parts per million of CO
2 in the
atmosphere, or the oceans were anoxic.
Another crucial part of the story that I don’t think has got through is the question of time lags … This needs to be reiterated endlessly.
59P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yGroup dialogue session
Rapporteurs (Ralph Chapman, Judy Lawrence, Amanda Wolf)
Avoiding unitary political activity State-level initiatives can lead thinking and change in the longer term.
In the US, while the Federal Government appears paralysed, California
is taking actions, like setting up an ETS and adopting a 30 percent
renewable energy target for 2020.
The ideal of GDP growth Brian Fallow felt that gross domestic product (GDP) is a useful proxy for
standard of living. Weaning people off this was tricky, especially with the
lower middle class hoping to become better off. Saying we don’t want
growth is currently pointless in New Zealand. We need to broaden the
debate about what is actually valuable to people—providing effective
services, while avoiding ecological debt. It is rather like the social
marketing of drinking messages: “It’s not the growth but the way we are
growing that matters.” We need to ensure that the growth we foster is
the right sort of growth (not fossil fuel-based growth, but green growth).
Getting the ETS in place as part of the ‘plumbing’ is important. It is not
clear how much people need (or want) to know the details. On the
other hand, people need to feel the ETS is not corrupt or fixed by the big
corporates.
State-level initiatives can lead thinking and change in the longer term.
Saying we don’t want growth is currently pointless in New Zealand. We need to broaden the debate about what is actually valuable to people ...
60 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Dichotomies and polarising tendencies In an information-dense dialogue it is possible to pick out a number of
dichotomies and polarising tendencies. One is the accuracy and precision
of science in its presentation and its associated error bars, contrasted with
the very blurred view we have of the future of the Earth and its climate.
Another is the pairing of hype and hope. A third is portraying scientists as
either monks or missionaries.
Polarisation in general is a bad thing because it impedes communication.
Erik Conway noted that there needs to be a better set of protocols about
how to respond when things go ‘wrong’, to avoid the polarisation of
debates about climate change.
The role of journalists and media
Framing ‘the debate’
Fred Pearce felt that editors, media owners, and the nature of the public
discourse shape the debate’s two sides, and reinforce the landscape.
A lot depends on the positions of the political parties. Journalists tend to
frame issues around the political debate surrounding them, reinforcing
the existing political debate until someone ‘kicks it’ in a different
direction.
Journalists report what is ‘newsworthy’
The role of the media is to make money and reporting is based on
newsworthiness. It seems that it is the disasters that become newsworthy
and the public will make its own conclusions about them and the
relationship to climate change.
However, there is a wide variety of science reporting spanning a range
of quality. Some decide to cover climate change in detail, while others
just pick up the simple narratives or use response to media interest. The
interesting media give an opportunity to people with interesting things to
say about the climate debate.
Brian Fallow thought that there had been a shift in the way the public
was responding to climate change, becoming less influenced by media.
Polarisation in general is a bad thing because it impedes communication.
Journalists tend to frame issues around the political debate surrounding them ...
61P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yScience communicators
While the media need educating about science and the nature of the
scientific process to improve their reporting to the public, there is also a
role for specific science communicators, or translators. This role would be
to improve public understanding of scientific method, of uncertainty, of
the range of likely impacts of climate change, and of the consequences
of our actions.
The role of scientists
Monks or missionaries?
There is a lot of debate about the appropriate role of scientists. The
main debate appears to be whether scientists should be ‘monks’ or
‘missionaries’.
Scientists do play different roles. People in-the-know know this, too.
The issue is to know which role they are acting in, and whether the
role is appropriate for the context. A problem is the failure of this
discrimination—a failure to detect when monks act out of character in
the wrong setting. If everyone is in ‘monk-expectation’ mode, but finds
that the interaction occurs with a missionary, then expectations and
behaviours clash (perhaps unwittingly).
Brian Fallow felt that scientists often get into debates over their heads;
they should try to stick to the main messages in their area of expertise.
Others felt that it is important for scientists to share their values; that a
storytelling model is more effective than a fact-disseminating model; and
that more scientists should be involved in outreach, communicate their
values, and try to connect to people’s daily lives.
...there is also a role for specific science communicators, or translators.
Participant comment There are more professions available to interpret the science aside from the current two sides represented: scientists and journalists.
Scientists do play different roles ... The issue is to know which role they are acting in, and whether the role is appropriate for the context.
62 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Improving public trust in science and scientists
Greater transparency
We need transparency between science, policy, and politics. We need
to understand the perceptions and expectations that the public has of
scientists and scientific institutions. The IPCC is a translator of science
rather than a guardian or producer of science—perhaps the National
Academies of Science are the guardians?
Most climate deniers are not climate scientists. The vast majority of
reputable climate scientists support the tenets of anthropogenic climate
change as set out by the IPCC.
For scientists, and those calling for transparency, it is important to
practise what you preach. Being wrong or right is not the main concern
with science; rather, the question needs to be does ‘this’ contribute to
knowledge?
Better communication
When dismissing deniers, it’s important that not all sceptics are lumped
together. Questions should be judged on their merits. Be discerning
about who says what. Being cursory and dismissive makes it look as
though one has something to hide, or is a propagandist. Fred Pearce
called for scientists to be more open and involved in debate by providing
snappy, clear messages; communicating with intent; and making it clear
what was known and not known.
There was a call from scientists for scientists to be able to do 60 percent
science and 40 percent communication, rather than having to respond
to numerous questions about the science with the result they were doing
40 percent science and 60 percent reactive communication.
We need to understand the perceptions and expectations that the public has of scientists and scientific institutions.
Participant comment At the risk of offending very capable and clever scientists, they should stick to what they are good at and let communicators communicate climate change.
...[Scientists are having to do] 40 percent science and 60 percent reactive communication.
63P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yBetter understanding of uncertainty and models
Consider the treatment of uncertainty and the use of models. Volatility,
non-linearity, and surprise in the financial sector compare with the
same in the climate sector. Both matters are complex and difficult to
communicate. They turn on whether hard-to-digest expertise satisfies a
public’s need to know. Yet, we see very different responsiveness in the
political and media spheres to what the models and their information tell
us.
There are difficulties with trust when models are shown as incorrect
and when the experts appear to not know what they’re talking about.
There are voices clamouring for attention occupying ever-distant edges
of the debate spectrum, compelled to yell ever-simpler messages louder
and louder. We can see that yelling to out-compete on the simplicity of
messages has parallels in the economic and atmospheric domains.
Scientific method
Demand for certainty
There are tensions between the scientific process and the certainty of
information demanded by the media and the public.
Science is self-correcting
Erik Conway noted that science is self-correcting by the very nature of the
scientific process of peer review. We shouldn’t criticise the entire scientific
process because a few scientists may have erred. The IPCC process will
continue to evolve and be perceived as more open over time, following
the reviews being carried out and through the self-correcting process that
is part of scientific method.
However, we are still in very early days when it comes to how we
respond when things don’t go right and how we respond to the sorts of
problems that surfaced at East Anglia. On the one hand, we see media
conflagrations, blame games, self-defensiveness, even court actions. But
where, on the other hand, is the equilibrating process that might take
these sorts of things in stride and, importantly, to learn from them and
move on?
There are voices clamouring for attention occupying ever-distant edges of the debate spectrum, compelled to yell ever-simpler messages louder and louder.
Participant comment A set-back has occurred with the Christchurch earthquake—a blurring of natural forces and anthropogenic change— the media doesn’t make a distinction.
...science is self- correcting by the very nature of the scientific process of peer review.
...[Where] is the equilibrating process that might take these sorts of things in stride and, importantly, to learn from them and move on?
64 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Local implications of climate science for people
Feeling good while doing good
We can query the local implications of climate science for people. People
are living their lives, having hopes, sometimes taking part in actions
like Earth Hour or Project 350. They may feel good, but do they also do
good? How do we match ‘feel good’ with ‘do good’?
Public ‘need to know’
What does the public really need to know and how can this be reconciled
with a short attention span? We have people living their lives, without
evident need to understand what is reported on page 735 of the IPCC
report. Yet, in living those lives, they can be supported to build up their
resilience and that of their communities so that they have the lives they
want—and the sort of resilience-building activities and actions that have
climate benefits (achieving outcomes whilst totally sidestepping ‘science’).
How do we match ‘feel good’ with ‘do good’?
65
3 Human behaviour and the capacity for change
66 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Dragons, mules, and honeybees: Why we do less than we should, and how we can overcome
Professor Robert Gifford University of Victoria, Canada
If so many people are concerned about the environment, why aren’t
more of us doing what is necessary to ameliorate the problems?
Of course, many individuals and organisations have taken many steps in
this direction, and others actually are helping the environment without
intending to; these are mentioned later. However, as a whole, humans
continue to degrade the environment and produce massive quantities of
GHGs.
In some cases, the reasons for this are structural, and therefore beyond an
individual’s reasonable control. For example, a low income severely limits
one’s ability to purchase solar panels, living in a rural area usually means
that public transport does not exist as an option to driving, and living
in a region with very cold winters greatly restricts one’s ability to reduce
home-heating-based energy use. However, for many others who are not
held back by structural barriers, many beneficial environmental choices
are possible, but are not adopted, at least to the extent necessary. Thus,
the question remains: What limits more widespread pro-environmental
behaviour on the part of individuals for whom such actions are feasible?
Obstacles to desired behavioural goals, or ‘dragons of inaction’ as I call
them, fall into seven genera, each of which contains subspecies, and all
30 dragons hinder positive action.
What limits more widespread pro- environmental behaviour on the part of individuals for whom such actions are feasible?
Obstacles to desired behavioural goals, or ‘dragons of inaction’ ... fall into seven genera, each of which contains subspecies, and all 30 dragons hinder positive action.
67P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yLimited cognition Humans are famously less rational than once believed. This is as true for
thinking about environmental issues as it is in other behaviour domains.
Ancient brain
The human brain has not evolved much in thousands of years. At the
time it reached its current physical development, before the development
of agriculture, our ancestors were mainly concerned with their immediate
tribe, immediate risks, exploitable resources, and the present. These
here-and-now concerns are incompatible with solving environmental
problems, which often involve distant risks and delayed impacts. Our
ancient brain is capable of dealing with global climate change, but it does
not come naturally.
Ignorance
Some people simply remain unaware of key environmental realities.
Others are paralysed by a lack of knowledge about which actions to
take, how to undertake actions of which they are aware, and the relative
benefits of different actions.
Environmental numbness
Our phenomenal world is composed of more cues than we can monitor,
so we attend to selected elements of it. Thus, people often are unaware
of problematic environmental elements, such as subtle changes in the
climate. Behaviour change is unlikely when this is the case.
Uncertainty
Research demonstrates that perceived or real uncertainty reduces the
frequency of pro-environmental behaviour. In general, people interpret
uncertainty in ways that serve their self-interest. If I believe that global
warming may not be occurring, and I desire a fuel-inefficient vehicle, I will
be tempted to buy it.
Judgemental discounting
The discounting dragon leads people to undervalue geographically distant
risks. We recently found in a multi-national study that people believed
environmental conditions were worse in countries other than their own—
and, of course, people in those countries believed the same thing about
other countries. When problems are presumed to be worse elsewhere,
people are less motivated to improve their own environment.
Humans are famously less rational than once believed. This is as true for thinking about environmental issues as it is in other behaviour domains.
Participant comment If our brains are not designed to think about future impacts of our current behaviours, how has the act of booking Rugby World Cup tickets years in advance become normal for some people? Others buy antiques or art, thinking now about the value they will have in the future (50–100 years). There is a whole international market set up to trade in future shares— anticipated values for stocks not yet in circulation. How do so many brains engage with that? Seems to me we do imagine our futures and act on these imaginings in many ways every day, so we can imagine futures where we take better care of our environments and act on that aspiration right now and here today.
68 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Optimism bias
Optimism generally is healthy, but it can be overdone. For example,
people underestimate their risk from 22 environmental hazards.
Underestimation of risk obviously hinders pro-environmental action.
Lack of perceived behavioural control
Because some problems, like climate change, are global, many people
believe that, as individuals, they can do nothing about it. Similarly, some
believe that nothing can be done even by collective human action.
Ideologies Some belief systems are so broad that they pervade many aspects of a
person’s life. Among these are religious and political views that can be
strong barriers to behaviour change.
Political worldviews
One source of inaction on global warming is unfettered belief in free-
enterprise capitalism.
System justification
“I’m all right Jack—don’t rock the boat.” This is the tendency to defend
the societal status quo.
Suprahuman powers
Some people take little or no climate-positive action because they believe
that a religious deity or Mother Nature (as a secular deity) is in complete
control. Naturally, inaction follows.
Technosalvation
Mechanical innovation has an admirable history of improving our
standard of living. Technology obviously can help with environmental
problems, but some go further and believe that technology alone can
solve the problems. Overconfidence in the efficacy of technology can
serve as a barrier to one’s own pro-environmental behaviour.
Some belief systems are so broad that they pervade many aspects of a person’s life. Among these are religious and political views that can be strong barriers to behaviour change.
69P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySignificant others Humans are social animals; we compare our situation to that of others.
These comparisons take three main forms.
Social comparison
People compare their situation to others. If significant others, family, and
friends are not doing their part, citizens are likely to decide that they
should not exert efforts either.
Social norms
People look to others to derive their norms about what the ‘proper’
course of action is. Norms can be a force for progress in environmental
issues, but they can also be forces for regress.
Perceived inequity
Perceived (in)equity is often heard as a reason for inaction: “Why should
I change if they won’t change?” Well-known persons, organisations, or
other nations are cited as polluters, and these are used to justify one’s
own non-action.
Sunk costs Investments of money, time, and in behaviour patterns are valuable—
unless they are harmful to the environment.
Financial investments
Once invested in something, dispensing with it can be difficult. If one has
purchased a car and is now paying for its insurance and other costs, why
should this cosy portable living room be left at home?
Behavioural momentum
Many habits are extremely resistant to change. Some that contribute to
environmental degradation (such as the use of cars) have a great deal of
behavioural momentum.
Conflicting goals and aspirations
Everyone has multiple goals, and many of these clash with the goal to
improve one’s environmental choices. Being willing to combat climate
change, for example, is not compatible with aspirations such as buying a
larger house, flying to new locations, or driving a bigger car.
Humans are social animals; we compare our situation to that of others.
Everyone has multiple goals, and many of these clash with the goal to improve one’s environmental choices.
70 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Lack of place attachment
Individuals may be more likely to care for a place to which they feel
attachment than for one they do not. Place attachment is complex, but
the lack of it probably acts as an impediment to action in some contexts.
For example, evidence suggests that nature-based place attachment
but not civic-based place attachment is related to pro-environmental
behaviour.
Discredence When people begin with a basic disbelief in others’ views, they are
unlikely to take direction from them. For example, if scientists and
politicians are disbelieved as a matter of course, suggestions from them
to be green are likely to be ignored.
Mistrust
Trust is essential for healthy relationships. When it is absent, as it is
between some citizens and scientists or government officials, resistance
to their behaviour-change suggestions will follow.
Perceived programme inadequacy
Policymakers have implemented many programmes designed to
encourage climate-friendly behaviour. However, citizens choose whether
to accept these offers, and often decide that the programme is not good
enough for their participation.
Denial
Mistrust and reactance easily slide into denial. This may include denial
that climate change is occurring, that it has any anthropogenic cause, or
that one’s own actions play a role in climate change. Mitigation is unlikely
to follow.
Reactance
Some people strongly react against policy that seems to threaten their
freedom. This can go beyond denial to actively choosing climate-harmful
products to spite the policymaker.
When people begin with a basic disbelief in others’ views, they are unlikely to take direction from them.
Participant comments People believe those whom they know and trust.
Have people lost trust in the scientists? Have they lost trust in the news media? How do we regain that trust? Through more varied forms of media— blogs and alternative media sources.
‘Trust’ is relative. Compared to used car salesmen, scientists are well trusted.
If trusted advisers are important in the political process, should we be identifying them or providing them with a view to providing a common voice?
71P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yPerceived risk Changing behaviour holds at least six kinds of potential risk: functional,
physical, financial, social, psychological, and temporal.
Functional risk
Will it work? For example, if one purchases an electric vehicle, it may, as a
new technology, have battery problems. The same could be said for many
new green technologies.
Physical risk
Some adaptations may have, or be perceived as having, danger to self or
family. Is this electric vehicle as crash-safe as the SUV that I sold to buy
it? Bicycles are great for climate change, but may result in a visit to an
emergency room.
Financial risk
Green solutions require capital outlays. How long is the payback? If the
product becomes a fixed part of a residence (like solar panels), will the
owner recoup the installation costs or accrue enough energy savings
before moving?
Social risk
Others notice our choices. This leaves us open to judgement by our
friends and colleagues, which could lead to damage to one’s reputation.
If I ride my bicycle, will my significant others deride me behind my back?
Psychological risk
If one is teased, criticised, or even rebuked by one’s significant others
for making some green choice, one risks damage to one’s self-esteem in
addition to the social loss.
Temporal risk
The time spent planning a green course of action might fail to produce
the desired results. Most people spend considerable time deciding
whether to buy an electric vehicle, become a vegetarian, or plan how
to cycle to work or school. What if it doesn’t work out? The time was
wasted.
Changing behaviour holds at least six kinds of potential risk: functional, physical, financial, social, psychological, and temporal.
72 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Limited behaviour Many people are engaged in at least minimal pro-environmental action.
However, most people could do more than they are. How do they justify
doing less than they should?
Tokenism
Some pro-environmental behaviours are easy to adopt, but have little
impact on the big problems. “I recycle, so I’ve done my part.” This ease
of adoption means that these actions tend to be chosen over higher-cost
but more effective actions.
The rebound effect
After some mitigating effort has been made, the gain is often diminished
or erased by subsequent actions. For example, after buying an electric
vehicle, people may drive further.
Is there any hope?
No
Certain structural barriers stand in the way of behavioural changes that
would help, but many psychological barriers remain for individuals who
do not face structural barriers, including limited cognition, ideologies,
significant others, sunk costs, discredence, perceived risks, and limited
behaviour. Some structural barriers might be removed, but this is not
likely to be sufficient.
Maybe
Psychologists and other social scientists have an important role to play if
these psychological barriers are to be overcome.
Briefly, five strategies are:
1 Better understand the barriers that different groups of people face:
• Which are easiest, cheapest to overcome?
• Which are simply not going to change?
• Conduct a psychological cost-benefit analysis.
2 Educate people about the differential efficacy of pro-environmental
actions.
3 Improve education about climate change and communicate the
problem more effectively.
4 Design, implement, and evaluate more attractive interventions.
Many people are engaged in at least minimal pro-environmental action. However, most people could do more than they are. How do they justify doing less than they should?
Certain structural barriers stand in the way of behavioural changes that would help, [and] many psychological barriers remain for individuals who do not face structural barriers ...
Participant comments We know attitudes don’t lead to actions automatically.
Psychological barriers should be targeted!
How do we use behavioural/motivational studies at the individual level to mobilise community and national action on climate change?
73P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y5 Work with other experts and policymakers; each discipline has valuable skills, and all are necessary if we are to succeed in this
grand challenge.
Yes
Mules
Many people are taking many steps to mitigate climate change. These
people are in the minority, but are carrying heavy loads of responsibility
and action. For that reason, I call them (with affection and admiration)
the mules.
Honey bees
Another group is mitigating climate change and related sustainability
problems, but, perhaps surprisingly they don’t even claim to be doing
so. These are the people who cycle for health reasons, remain childless
because they choose not to have children, use very little in the way of
resources either because they are poor or have chosen simplicity as a
lifestyle. Because they help without intending to, I call these people
honeybees; the insects of that name keep us all in food, but their own
goals are to serve their hive, not to feed us.
Many people are taking many steps to mitigate climate change.
Another group is mitigating climate change and related sustainability problems, but, perhaps surprisingly, they don’t even claim to be doing so.
Participant comment What are the proportions of honey bees and mules in society?
74 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Framing messages
Which sorts of messages work?
• Use empowering messages, not sacrifice messages.
• Use identified messages for mules (but not for honey bees); use
intrinsic messages for honey bees (but not for mules).
• Use messages about local issues.
Remember:
Climate action = Mules + Honey bees – Dragons
Participant comments I think there is a need to shift the focus of climate change away from ‘climate change’ as such. There are a number of other areas where significant changes could be made that would benefit climate change action without having any mention of climate change. There is a great need to reframe this issue.
When discussing specific jobs in green technology, describe the training, the actual work entailed— before speaking of the reasons for these jobs (ie combating climate change).
The co-benefits of action are more important motivators.
75P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yAddressing dangerous climate change: Why citizenship matters more than behaviour change
Dr Bronwyn Hayward University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Addressing climate change effectively will require much more than a
change of behaviour, we will need to rethink the basic principles of our
economies and our democracies, including how we understand our
citizenship.
It is citizenship that I focus on here, firstly on the transformative possibility
of citizen action. Secondly, I consider whether behaviour change is a
legitimate basis for public policy. Finally, I ask whose behaviour needs to
change and why?
A ‘shaky’ introduction I begin by acknowledging that I am currently standing on very shaky
ground. On 22 February 2011, Ruaumoko, the god of earthquakes,
unleashed his energy in a series of aftershocks that devastated my home
city of Christchurch. The New Zealand head of the Reserve Bank,
Dr Alan Bollard, has since described the quake events that hit
Christchurch as “one of the biggest natural disasters in relative terms to
befall an OECD country since World War II”56. One hundred and
eighty-one people were killed and many more injured. Like everyone from
Christchurch, my contribution here is set against the background of the
tragedy unfolding in my provincial city.
Whenever a disaster threatens a community, whether it’s a series of slow,
cumulative, almost imperceptible daily changes like a change in climate or
a sudden cataclysmic event like an earthquake, dangerous environmental
change tests more than our physical infrastructure, it tears at the fabric of
economies, our society, and our democracies.
How we respond to the threats of a disaster will be affected by what has
gone before—our relationships, our experiences, and our cultural and
spiritual depth as a community57.
Addressing climate change effectively will require much more than a change of behaviour, we will need to rethink the basic principles of our economies and our democracies including how we understand our citizenship.
How we respond to the threats of a disaster will be affected by what has gone before—our relationships, our experiences, and our cultural and spiritual depth as a community.
76 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s However, with the grief of disasters comes opportunity for new insights into our past and our future. Amid the turmoil of the earth cracking and
the rubble of the stone buildings of Christchurch (an English delusion
we probably should never have built, but which we loved anyway), there
have been some significant opportunities to rethink basic principles and I
draw here on some of these experiences as I begin to rethink citizenship
and to articulate my concerns about the political limits of individual
behaviour changes as a response to a changing climate.
Rethinking citizenship and behaviour change Psychology has taught us a great deal about how we respond as
individuals to dangerous threats. However, I argue it does not fully explain
our potential to act as citizens.
Robert Gifford has helpfully explained the way our ‘ancient brain’
influences individuals. As a result, individuals are often good at processing
strong visceral reactions to immediate danger but struggle to engage in
reasoning to address long-term threats like a changing climate. Gifford
has described the way that individuals tend to create ‘psychological
dragons’ that inhibit them from acting in ways that might better address
the threats and problems of climate change. His work resonates with the
recent writing of Clive Hamilton (2009)58 and Anthony Giddens (2009)59,
both of whom have also considered how individuals react to dangerous
threats with patterns of denial, distraction, blaming others, or enforced
optimism—all of which tend to be unhelpful ways of dealing with
difficult, long-term climate change.
There is recent thoughtful research in how we process col- lective emotion about changes in our environment
For example, when faced with dangerous environmental changes, a
community often experiences emotions of grief and compassion60. In
the immediate months after the February quake, Christchurch residents
experienced a typical surge of mutuality or goodwill. Now we are
currently entering the period of intense anger, tension, and blame that is
also often associated with natural disasters61. Constant aftershocks tend
to keep creating periods of renewed crisis and grief; however, we can
expect that over time this tension will ease, and be followed by a period
of vision, and then usually (but I hope not inevitably) by the reassertion of
old power relationships and underlying socio-economic inequalities62 63 64.
Psychology has taught us a great deal about how we respond as individuals to dangerous threats. However, I argue it does not fully explain our potential to act as citizens.
Participant comment Psychology doesn’t only consider individual aspects but also social and cultural aspects.
77P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yUnderstanding our individual and collective psychological responses to environmental change does not mean that our psychology will inevitably
determine how we address the threats of climate change as citizens.
When we act as a citizen, we act in a different way from the way we act
as individuals. There are many times in political history where citizens
have taken action against overwhelming odds.
It is possible to imagine other ways of responding to a changing climate,
that might change the trajectory of our future so we are not just
enhancing the resilience of our communities (that is not simply bouncing
back to reinforce our existing patterns of behaviour or underlying
power relationships), but actually transforming our communities in ways
that might be more socially equitable, fairer, and less damaging to the
environment.
What are some of those preconditions of citizenship that might enable us to act differently?
When, as citizens, do we act with courage, or trust despite our fears?
When do we act with hope as determination or with faith in an
‘unrealised possibility’ as Hannah Arendt65 would say?
To begin to answer this question, I turn to our experience of the
Christchurch earthquake and to students: Sam Johnston and six others,
who first organised 1,000 students in September 2010 at the time of
7.3 magnitude quake. Building on what they learned in that experience,
it took only a week after the February aftershocks before that small
group of students were communicating with 24,000 people. It wasn’t
just Facebook and Twitter that enabled this astonishing, youthful
political coordination. There was a raft of pre-existing conditions
that enabled these young citizens, and many communities like them
around Christchurch, to act in new ways66. One of the first common
features of these successful citizenship initiatives is that they built on
existing organisations and networks, improving their communication
and relationships within and between groups and across national
boundaries67.
It is possible to imagine other ways of responding to a changing climate, that might change the trajectory of our future so we are … actually transforming our communities in ways that might be more socially equitable, fairer, and less damaging to the environment.
Participant comments Avoid paternalism when it comes to young people finding their own solutions
Have faith in the younger generation to (eventually) get the planet sorted. You taught us!
One of the first common features of these successful citizenship initiatives is that they built on existing organisations and networks...
78 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Communities and young people are already acting
There are many other examples of communities acting in the face of
seemingly overwhelming odds. Witness the thousands of young citizens
who are currently taking to the streets in protest all over the world at
present, from Tunisia to Madrid. Today’s 1.2 billion teenagers face very
grim futures and could be forgiven for ‘giving up’, yet many are acting
politically anyway. UNICEF’s 2011 State of the World’s Teenagers report
paints a picture of terrifying youth unemployment. In the Middle East
alone, 65 percent of the population will be under the age of 25 in a
decade. UNICEF estimates we will need to create 6.5 million jobs every
year for the next 10 years for the average 13-year-old in that region to be
employed when they are 2368.
Young teenagers protesting internationally are not protesting about
climate change, they’re protesting the grim economic reality of
skyrocketing youth unemployment and lack of voice in decision making.
Yet it is these economic and governance arrangements that have
combined to fuel continued extraction of the resources of the planet
beyond its natural limits69. In short, young people are already acting in
significant ways as citizens, mounting strong protest about the complex
social and economic conditions that are also destabilising our climate. We
do not need to change the behaviours of these young adults, as much as
we need to listen to what they are saying.
When ‘nudge’ comes to shove: Finding a legitimate basis for democratic policy With respect to many colleagues, I am alarmed at current intellectual
streams of thought which seek to unite individualistic psychology and
behavioural economics with a resulting emphasis on identifying behaviour
change policies as the solution to climate change.
Nor do I agree that psychology is necessarily a legitimate basis for
democratic decision, particularly as expressed as the liberal paternalism
of nudge theory70. In a recent address to the Resolve Conference on
Sustainable Lifestyles, Baroness Neuberger (Chair of the British House of
Lords’ behaviour-change inquiry), noted the disquiet raised by many over
the current direction of behaviour-change policy71 72. Her nuanced speech
highlighted the reservations of many about the lack of opportunity to
debate behaviour-change policy.
There are many other examples of communities acting in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds.
Participant comments Nurturing rather than keeping children stuck in these rigid ‘right-wrong’ boundaries in the education system today is important.
Data and information cannot be analysed without educated and curious imaginations—how can we protect and nurture social and education policies that value imaginative work?
... I am alarmed at current intellectual streams of thought which seek to unite individualistic psychology and behavioural economics with a resulting emphasis on identifying behaviour change policies as the solution to climate change.
79P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yTo achieve lasting and significant transformation to our society and our economy, we will need to make significant changes to the conditions
of our social and economic life. This type of lasting and transformative
change will take a shove rather than a nudge. But such far-reaching
policy changes demand inclusive and explicit public debate if they are to
be accepted as a legitimate, democratic policy response.
Whose behaviour needs to change? The behaviours that most urgently need to change are those of the
baby boomers and the corporations, including the international financial
investment and insurance companies they have created. These major
players have far-reaching ability to shape the world that today’s children
inherit. Yet there is very little political incentive to regulate these global
corporate citizens, and a great deal more interest in focusing on small-
scale individual changes. Why is this? Could it be that it does not suit the
baby boom generation to regulate the very industries that have provided
them with their wealth?
Conservative politician and writer David Willets speaks in his book
The Pinch (2010)73 of stealing from our children. His work reminds us
that it’s not baby boomer psychology that we need to worry about, so
much as their sheer political clout at the ballot box, and the clout of the
companies that they have created. It is the baby boom generation who
has benefited from years of low-cost home loans, free state education,
low inflation and ability to travel and export widely, from the shift from
public to private funding of services and from pension plans, insurance
schemes, and investments in forms of economic growth that have
resulted in climbing youth unemployment and resource extraction beyond
our planet’s limits.
However, as an older generation we have the ability and privilege of
reflecting backwards and looking forwards. We can and must rethink
our obligations of citizenship to future generations and then act to
change the ways we exercise our economic and political power. An
effective first step is to develop political commitment devices such as
taxation arrangements, pension schemes, and a commission for future
generations that will help to shift the environmental, social, and political
burdens we are currently placing on our children’s future, back to our
lives now. The behaviours we need to regulate most urgently are our own
and those of the companies we have created.
Participant comment We need to move away from the dominance of psychology and economics of climate change to instead encompass a wider range of theories and conceptions and ideas about climate change from sociology, human geography, and anthropology.
We can and must rethink our obligations of citizenship to future generations and then act to change the ways we exercise our economic and political power.
Participant comment We need to remember climate change is a symptom of something, not an extraneous problem. We need to ensure we are considering it in that context.
80 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s How democratic processes can deal with complex long-term issues
Professor John Thwaites Monash University, Australia
The political challenge of climate change The political process has difficulty dealing with complex long-term issues.
Climate change is an exemplar. We are asking people to bear some costs
now (such as higher electricity prices) for benefits that are perceived to
accrue in the future (cleaner energy generation and a safer climate).
Getting public support for such action is challenging, as illustrated by the
old political saying “what has posterity ever done for me?”
For the political process to deal with complex long-term issues like
climate change, political leaders need to have both a political strategy
and a public-engagement strategy. The political strategy includes strong
leadership, good communication, a media strategy, key stakeholders
on-side, and, importantly, getting the numbers in parliament. The
public-engagement strategy needs to link community engagement
with a behaviour-change strategy that is informed by an understanding
of psychology and behaviour-change theory. This was missing in the
Australian Government’s attempts to pass the Carbon Pollution Reduction
Scheme (the CPRS) in 2009 and 2010.
Complex social planning problems are sometimes referred to as
‘wicked problems’, as it is difficult to find solutions to them. Wicked
problems often have multiple causes and attempted solutions may have
unforeseen consequences. They are difficult to define and there is often
disagreement among stakeholders about both the causes of the problem
and potential solutions. The debate about climate change exhibits these
characteristics.
Governments in Australia have in the past successfully tackled some
complex long-term problems. The Hawke-Keating Government’s
economic reforms and the introduction of national compulsory
superannuation are examples. Both of these were major economic
reforms and faced opposition at the time, but are now generally regarded
as having major benefits for society. In my Ministerial career, I was
confronted by a number of complex issues include drugs, water reform,
climate change, social disadvantage, and planning for more sustainable
cities.
The political process has difficulty dealing with complex long-term issues. Climate change is an exemplar.
Participant comments Politicians get punished for taking strong leadership on any issue not mainstream. Where is the reward for leadership?
Climate change should not be a partisan issue.
81P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yThe nature of modern government
To think about how to solve these complex issues, we need to really
understand modern government.
• Power is very centralised at the top with the Prime Minister or
Premier.
• There is intense time pressure on the Prime Minister and Ministers.
There is no time for contemplating and reflecting on complex
problems in the way they need.
• There is 24-hour media power. Decision making is often done on
the spur of the moment, in response to a bad media story coming
out the next day. An example was the announcement by the Rudd
Government of its decision to defer an ETS in Australia.
• Almost every few days there is a media poll that becomes the
subject of political discussion. This is not conducive to long-term
decision making.
• There is a state of permanent conflict between the political parties
who are continuously campaigning for the next election. While
the philosophies of the parties have converged to a degree, the
partisanship has become exaggerated. This makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to work in a bipartisan way on complex long-term issues
that will impact over many terms of government.
• The media, particularly the print media, plays up conflict and
campaigns on many issues. Much of the media in Australia has
focused far more on the conflict between scientists and climate
sceptics than on reporting solutions.
• Vested interests have considerable power and vast sums of money
to spend on advancing their position. In Australia, businesses
opposed to a carbon price have considerably outspent the Australian
Government in advertising their position.
• The intense time pressure on political leaders, the complexity of
issues, and the permanent level of conflict has led to the increased
importance of a few trusted advisers to political leaders.
There is a state of permanent conflict between the political parties who are continuously campaigning for the next election. While the philosophies of the parties have converged to a degree, the partisanship has become exaggerated.
Participant comments How do you get the population to make responding to climate change a higher priority in their everyday lives and encourage their involvement in the democratic process?
Do we need to do more than be in a position to answer, positively, the question ‘What’s in it for me?’
82 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Key political factors
Politics is increasingly presidential in Australia. It is portrayed as a contest
of leaders more than a contest of parties or policies. So the credibility
and trust that the respective party leaders hold may have a bigger role in
determining public attitudes to key policy issues than the substance of
the issues themselves.
Having said that, the numbers in politics are often very close. Persistence,
resilience, and hard work pay off. For example, the ETS in Australia would
have been legislated in 2009 if one more person had voted for Malcolm
Turnbull in the Liberal Party leadership spill. It looks likely that the carbon
price legislation will pass the Australian House of Representatives this year
by one vote.
Factors affecting the difficulty of achieving change
There are many factors affecting the difficulty for political leaders
in achieving change and providing solutions to complex long-term
problems. These include:
• the size of the change
• complexity
• community support
• vested interests—powerful opponents and supporters
• ‘elite’ opinion
• media attitude
• opposition stance–partisanship (it is easy for the opposition to
exploit the short-term selfishness of some people)
• parliamentary situation—what the numbers are in parliament.
The parliamentary situation should not be underestimated. Whether the
legislature is bicameral or unicameral can be critical. It may well be easier
to legislate for difficult issues in New Zealand, where there is only one
House of Parliament, than in Australia where the two Houses are often
of different political complexions. The recent political sclerosis in the
United States is an even more extreme example of the difficulty in solving
complex issues with divided legislatures.
...the credibility and trust that the respective party leaders hold may have a bigger role in determining public attitudes to key policy issues than the substance of the issues themselves.
Participant comment I believe that NZ has a unique potential for community/deliberative/ participatory/consensual decision making simply because it has such a small population.
It may well be easier to legislate for difficult issues in New Zealand, where there is only one House of Parliament, than in Australia where the two Houses are often of different political complexions.
83P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yPolitical leaders need to have a political strategy if they are to overcome the various challenges thrown up by wicked problems like climate
change. In my experience, there are Ten Commandments that need to be
followed.
The Ten Commandments of political success
1 Be a leader.
2 Have the courage of your convictions.
3 Be trusted.
4 Know what you want to achieve.
5 Communicate, persuade, educate.
6 Engage—develop plans collaboratively.
7 Know what stakeholders want to achieve.
8 Do a deal—this may involve trade-offs.
9 Be persistent.
10 Keep the numbers.
Engagement and behaviour change Complex issues require public engagement and behaviour change as well
as political change. Legislation alone cannot fix these things.
Engagement is necessary to build political and stakeholder support,
to ensure practical implementation, and, in many cases, to come up
with better policy proposals than politicians and bureaucrats acting
alone. Government leaders need to determine what the purpose of the
engagement is. Providing information is rarely enough, but often that is
all government does. Engagement may merely involve consultation to
obtain feedback or it may involve deeper participation and collaboration
with active public involvement in decision making.
In many cases, complex problems will not be solved unless people’s
behaviour changes. This is particularly the case when there are multiple
causes of a problem (such as obesity, drug use, disadvantage), when
the issue depends on community behaviours (such as carbon emissions,
energy, and water use), and when government action is limited by
community attitudes (such as carbon prices, speeding fines).
Politicians should also consider the difference between public attitudes on
issues and actual behaviours. Both are important, but general attitudes
on issues such as climate change are not always a good guide to actual
behaviours.
In many cases, complex problems will not be solved unless people’s behaviour changes. This is particularly the case when there are multiple causes of a problem … when the issue depends on community behaviours (such as carbon emissions …), and when government action is limited by community attitudes.
Participant comment In fisheries management we referred to the 10-80-10 rule in fisheries compliance: 10 percent will always follow the rules, 10 percent will always break the rules, and 80 percent can go either way, based on the reasoning for the rules. In climate change this same split may also be seen. I feel we spend too much time on the 10 percent that will never believe the climate change debate, and not enough time on the 80 percent.
84 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Attitudes about climate change
There has been very little action on climate change compared to the
decisive action following the global financial crisis. In fact, support for
climate action appears to be decreasing. Polls show that while large
majorities of people want climate action, they don’t want to pay much
for it. Public attitudes towards carbon prices are also strongly influenced
by political party support. In Australia, supporters of the Coalition are
much less likely to support a carbon price than Labour supporters.
The problem of human psychology
Climate change doesn’t readily prompt behaviour change because the
human brain evolved to respond to threats that are immediate and can
be appreciated by our senses. By contrast, long-term climate change is
hard to detect from personal experience. Many of the risks seem remote
and in the future. We know from psychology that humans heavily
discount future risks and benefits. For many individuals, particularly those
with individualistic or hierarchic values, climate change policy challenges
their worldview and studies show they are less likely to believe in climate
science. Finally, most of us have a finite pool of worry and the negative
messages about climate change tend to get ignored if repeated too
often.
It’s difficult. So what can we do? In short, we have to do everything.
The first thing is to think about who we are trying to influence. We need
to understand the differences in target groups and target messages and
activities to them. This includes understanding the influence of political
and cultural views.
Then we have to use all the tools available:
• Collaboration and empowerment
• Financial incentives
• Psychology
• Behavioural economics
• Social marketing
• Regulation
Finally, we have to make the actions we seek easy to do. Humans are
creatures of habit and our traditional behaviours will not change unless
we make it as easy as possible.
For many individuals, particularly those with individualistic or hierarchic values, climate change policy challenges their worldview and studies show they are less likely to believe in climate science.
Participant comment We place too much responsibility on the government to make solutions/communications/ behaviour changes. The government will respond to the public making these changes. We need more bottom-up movement—it will become the social norm to see climate change as a problem and take action to prevent it and adapt to it.
We need to understand the differences in target groups and target messages and activities to them. This includes understanding the influence of political and cultural views.
85P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yCommunication and psychology
Political leaders can be assisted by insights from psychology when they
communicate and seek to influence behaviours.
How information is presented can impact on responses. Framing
and language are important. For example, people respond better to
frequencies—1 out of 1,000—than to percentages—0.1 percent.
People cling to misinformation that they already have, so put things in
the positive. Don’t repeat negatives—a myth-versus-fact approach can
backfire as the audience may only remember the myth.
Social norms are powerful. People are very influenced by their perception
of what others do in a specific situation and by what others commonly
approve or disapprove of. Householders are more likely to conserve
water or energy if they are informed that they are using more than their
neighbours.
Attitudes are hard to change but behaviour can be ‘nudged’.
Governments can guide small changes in behaviour by using an
understanding of psychological factors like social norms. In some cases
these behaviour changes may change attitudes as well, as people tend to
adopt attitudes that are consistent with their perceived behaviour.
As Minister for Water in Victoria between 2002 and 2007, I was involved
in a successful behaviour-change campaign that saw a reduction in water
use per head of more than 20 percent. This was an important response to
climate change, which is leading to a reduction in rain water flowing into
Melbourne’s reservoirs. The campaign significantly reduced household
and business water use. Individual behaviours that were encouraged
included shorter showers, purchase of water efficient appliances, and
low-water-use gardens. As well as changing behaviours, the campaign
affected attitudes and built support for water conservation, water saving
rules, and higher water prices.
...make the actions we seek easy to do. Humans are creatures of habit and our traditional behaviours will not change unless we make it as easy as possible.
People cling to misinformation that they already have … a myth-versus- fact approach can backfire as the audience may only remember the myth.
Attitudes are hard to change but behaviour can be ‘nudged’. Governments can guide small changes in behaviour by using an understanding of psychological factors like social norms.
86 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The water conservation campaign involved many of the aspects discussed above including:
• political leadership from the top—the Premier
• participation and engagement with local communities
• a social marketing campaign
• the use of social norms by giving households and businesses
information about water use by their peers
• financial incentives
• water-saving rules and restrictions (that reinforced the social norms).
Conclusion We need a political strategy for combating complex issues like climate
change as well as a community engagement and behaviour-change
strategy. These strategies must be mutually reinforcing. Political leaders
can be assisted in implementing solutions to these complex problems by
insights from psychology and behaviour-change theory.
Figure 6 Dealing with complex long-term issues
We need a political strategy for combating complex issues like climate change as well as a community engagement and behaviour-change strategy. These strategies must be mutually reinforcing.
87P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yGroup dialogue session
Rapporteurs (Ralph Chapman, Judy Lawrence, Amanda Wolf)
Reinforcing and sustaining change
Create a sense of empowerment
It is important to create a sense of empowerment and inclusion to
reinforce and sustain change. One way of doing this could be to ask
people what signs of change they notice locally.
Maintain momentum
Avoiding climate fatigue is a big challenge—the challenge of maintaining
momentum. We can learn from social-marketing campaigns, such as the
anti-smoking campaign. A main lesson from the anti-smoking campaign
is to break action into lots of small steps, which people tend to accept
more readily than larger steps. An example of this is in British Colombia,
Canada, where a 2 percent carbon tax has been absorbed and handled.
The lesson from psychology is that people tend to be prepared to accept
small sacrifices.
Reframing climate change to align with people’s exist- ing concerns
Exploit co-benefits
Robert Gifford’s idea of ‘honey bees’ means increasing collective action
on climate change by building on what people are interested in and
already doing that targets climate change, even though they may not
realise it.
It is important to create a sense of empowerment and inclusion to reinforce and sustain change.
88 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s By avoiding labelling campaigns as ‘climate change campaigns’, we can exploit co-benefits that may appeal more to different groups, such as
the health benefits of cycling, or the financial savings on parking and
petrol. Tying climate change concerns to health, employment, social, and
economic concerns is an effective way of increasing action while side-
stepping the need to increase support for climate change action
Reframing the debate about climate change in a range of different moral
frameworks could also be a way of broadening the support base.
Build collective action
Each individual can’t do everything but we can leverage collective
action through a strategy of influence and leadership, and by building a
constituency. If people are sceptical about climate change, they will need
opportunities created for them, such as insulation rebates, cycle lanes.
Take advantage of moments for change
This ties in to the concept of exploiting moments for change. For
example, the time when someone is doing home renovations could be
the right time for energy efficient retrofits. We need to make it easy for
people to make climate-friendly decisions in situations when they are
already prepared to make changes.
Behaviour change Bronwyn Hayward proposed that the term ‘behaviour change’ could be
interpreted to mean ‘manipulation’, which has negative connotations.
‘Behaviour’ also applies both to individuals and many other levels of
society. Robert Gifford coined the phrase ‘both and’ to explain that both
individuals and society could frame the needed change and that this
could add up to something larger than individual actions, leading to
significant change.
Tying climate change concerns to health, employment, social, and economic concerns is an effective way of increasing action while side-stepping the need to increase support for climate change action.
We need to make it easy for people to make climate- friendly decisions in situations when they are already prepared to make changes.
89P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yConnecting climate change to wider social issues Conversations about climate change have to connect to big social and
economic issues, but in New Zealand, we tend to keep the economic
system ‘off the table’ for discussion. In the last few years, there has been
a convergence of the economic and psychological views arguing that all
that is needed in terms of reform is a focus on individual action/behaviour
change. This tends to keep the bigger systemic and collective action
issues, including systemic drivers of inequality, off the table.
The debate around climate change has become isolated from the social
impacts on vulnerable groups and needs to be integrated more into how
all societal activities are undertaken.
The debate around climate change has become isolated from the social impacts on vulnerable groups and needs to be integrated more into how all societal activities are undertaken.
Participant comment What are the equity issues from economic models and distributional growth models?
90 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The responsibilities falling on young people
Perceptions of young people’s concern
Do young people see the coming ‘tsunami’? One view is that most do not
see it, and those that do struggle to articulate it. Others feel that young
people often do not want to know; while others feel huge pressure, feel
they don’t know where they are going, and feel that everyone should be
helping, given that the older generation are largely responsible for the
problems.
Engaging young people
There is enormous underutilised potential in high schools—a huge
resource we are not using. There are bucket loads of fabulous kids,
stunning networks ‘just doing it’; a lot of positive action. There is some
room for improvement, too: young people tend to undervalue teachers.
We need to create mentoring opportunities so that young people can
learn from older people and then pass on what they know to their peers.
Young people need continued opportunities to broaden their horizons.
Young people are also clever enough to have imaginative ideas. We liked
a story of young Australians dramatising the ‘elephant in the room’.
Creating symbols can enable powerful communication.
We need to create mentoring opportunities so that young people can learn from older people and then pass on what they know to their peers.
91P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yOpportunities for innovation
Build New Zealand’s international reputation
New Zealand has some advantages over Australia. We are a small country
and politicians are accessible, and we have a unicameral political system
that simplifies things. Our emissions don’t make a global difference, but
we have credibility as a broker for doing the altruistic thing because we
are part of the globalisation of trade on which our economy depends. We
can help others understand the benefits of taking action now. Since we
have regular climate events and our economy is sensitive to climate, we
get feedback about things that could become more frequent, which may
help us frame the needed adaptation more clearly.
Improve institutional capacity
It’s not clear that humans are institutionally or socially able to deal with
climate change fast enough.
We have the technology to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and
the knowledge—in principle. But there is a big problem with social and
institutional inertia. Democracy grinds too slowly to avert this huge risk.
It is clear that managing risks is a social matter as much as a technical
matter.
China may change quickly, with top down direction, but it is hard to
change the trajectory of a democracy. Yet, we must retain our society and
protect values of freedom and the role of civil society. We can expect our
way will yield better solutions in the long run than will an autocracy.
We need social entrepreneurship to transform government; perhaps
some ‘bulldozer action’ is necessary.
Representing different viewpoints and approaches What is the role of civil society? How can we ensure that disempowered
groups such as young people and the ‘silent voices’ in all generations are
represented at decision-making institutions?
Participant comments We must be strategic, given the challenge, and focus on points of leverage. That means getting leaders to lead. To do that, we must build a constituency—influence others to influence others.
We need to be forward looking at initiatives and mechanisms to facilitate change.
Our emissions don’t make a global difference but we have credibility as a broker for doing the altruistic thing because we are part of the globalisation of trade on which our economy depends.
Participant comment There needs to be a bit more emphasis on understanding inertia to change.
92 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Discuss ethical implications
All generations have a responsibility to understand that some will be
more disadvantaged than others in society, both within and between
generations. There are generational differences in view and approaches,
but dominant voices in the climate-change discussion tend to crowd out
other voices. There is also a tension between democracy and inherited
or established authority. The established authority is often reluctant to
change, lest it lose privilege.
It is important that we explicitly discuss ethical issues. We need to
consider the ethical implications not only for future generations but also
for people living today. In particular, there are concerns about the global
North outsourcing emissions to the South. Ethical questions such as these
all need public and political debate.
Include existing networks in the conversation
There is spontaneously emerging leadership from all levels and groups in
society. Using these existing networks would enable a more integrated
discussion of climate change and what we can do about it.
Bipartisan change
Include all sectors and levels of government
It is important to have all sectors and levels of government involved in the
discussion because there are opportunities in climate change policies and
actions that have economic value and wider community value through
co-benefits such as health.
Work within the existing market system
For climate change, social norms are more persuasive if they have
bipartisan support. An example is the United Kingdom’s Confederation
of Business Industry—business seeing an opportunity to make money
out of green business. Most businesses have to see an opportunity to
make money before they will change. It is best to work within this system
because it is unlikely that the public can be weaned off the market
system by 2050, despite the need for huge emissions reductions by then.
All generations have a responsibility to understand that some will be more disadvantaged than others in society, both within and between generations.
Participant comment Perhaps we need an Ethics of Responsibility to manage climate change and the uncertainty associated with it.
It is important to have all sectors and levels of government involved in the discussion ...
Participant comments NZ needs a charismatic leader to present climate change as a genuine, urgent matter that needs strong action.
I felt a strong left-wing bias among [Forum] participants … If I’m right, then a key question will be ‘How do we engage the political right?’
93P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySeek independent expert analysis
The ‘tit for tat’ or ‘wedge’ politics of Australia on the carbon tax and the
characterisation of climate change policy as ‘shutting down life as we
know it’ were generating ongoing conflict and stalemate in advancing
policies. The role of the Stern and Garnaut Reviews should not be
underestimated in this context since they provide independent and peer-
reviewed analysis. This is very useful to politicians as it is publicly open
and consulted on, providing a way for differences in power structures to
be addressed within existing systems.
Governments do tend to look to experts (like the IPCC), especially those
who are good communicators, like Peter Cullen in Australia—a great
communicator, with good use of metaphor. The Wentworth group were
hugely influential on water policy.
Storytelling Humans have evolved an ‘old’ brain that functions through storytelling.
Storytelling can be very powerful. We need to make better use of
storytelling and interact with schools so that children can learn about
climate change.
Using storytelling, narratives, images, and film can help improve public
understanding of climate change and encourage other autonomous
actions to develop.
The role of the Stern and Garnaut Reviews should not be underestimated … since they provide independent and peer-reviewed analysis.
Participant comment Where are the stories that show us the impacts and some stories about the opportunities to do things differently?
94 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Citizen-politics interface
Align interests
It is important to find objectives that overlap; to find the space in which
we can match citizen interests with the interests of politicians. We know
that objectors’ voices are heard and we need to make sure others’ are
too.
Use trusted communicators
Trusted advisers and communicators are important. We need to be
alert to the fact that where there is political doubt there is a magnet for
science that matches. It is frustrating that all issues become partisan ones.
We have such a sense of relief and praise for politicians who can carry a
policy over from a previous government and respect the courage entailed.
Represent future generations
We need to consider how the political system can represent the voice of
future generations. We need to award smiley faces where credit is due.
For example, citizen-spearheaded assessments to build in accountability
provide useful merit awards.
Participant comment We need to enhance synergies between science, government, and business.
It is important to find objectives that overlap...
95P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yEncourage critical thinking
Young people are shunted from pillar to post, ticking boxes and achieving
standards. In the employment domain, the jobs available to the under-
30-year-olds are often not jobs in which people can express their critical
thinking faculties. Training for task is a problem.
We are creating a mismatch in what is taught and available in the
education and early-career sectors and what is needed. We are not
providing for young people to use their excellent critical-thinking abilities.
We are not providing for young people to use their excellent critical-thinking abilities.
96 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
97
4 Towards durable decision making
98 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The role of science in robust climate policy: How strategic reframing can change the picture
Professor Dave Frame New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Robust, durable decision making requires political and strategic
sustainability as well as what is customarily included within the meaning
of sustainability.
Demarcations and a caveat Climate policy has several inputs:
• Climate science (which frames but can never specify policy)
• Social science and policy tools (such as estimates of the social costs
of carbon)
• Ethical and normative reasoning (which bound policy options)
Within each of these spheres, reasonable minds may disagree, and
legitimate and defensible reframing within these areas changes the way
the problem looks.
For instance, there is lively, legitimate disagreement among scientists
regarding many significant details of climate change, a point that often
fails to come across in media portrayals of the issue. Much of that
disagreement is expressed within the chapters of the IPCC reports; more
still is expressed in conferences and symposia, as well as in the peer-
reviewed literature. In this sense, climate science is no different from
other healthy research arenas.
The scope for disagreement is even greater in the social sciences where
the relationships between climate change and other areas usually play a
very strong framing role. This framing has the effect of making different
options look more or less obvious or attractive. This is particularly the case
when considering the ethical and policy dimensions of climate change.
Robust, durable decision making requires political and strategic sustainability as well as what is customarily included within the meaning of sustainability.
99P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yPluralism
The public climate change discourse employs a variety of frames or ‘lenses’
People describe the climate change problem using different lenses, which
sometimes complement and sometimes are at odds with each other.
They are a bit like throwing a series of jigsaw puzzles onto the floor: if
you’re asking people to solve five or six jigsaws at once, things get pretty
difficult.
In his interesting reflection, Why We Disagree About Climate Change74,
Mike Hulme (2009) proposes the following lenses:
• Climate change as a technological problem
• Climate change as the ‘mother of all public goods problems’
• Climate change as a problem of international justice
• Climate change as a problem of consumerism
Pushing exclusively on any one of these framings will speak to a limited
constituency. Because global solutions to climate change require broad
coalitions, Hulme argues for approaches more informed by pluralism than
have been customary in both academic and popular writings on climate
change.
As John Thwaites argued, we need greater levels of bipartisanship to
build politically sustainable climate policies. A large part of the challenge
is finding ways to broaden the appeal of suites of policies that don’t
require everybody to agree about everything.
Contributors to this Forum have pointed out that we know that the
deficit model of science—the idea that scientific literacy is the primary
barrier—isn’t the real problem with climate change. We know that what
is actually at work is a complex array of factors that contextualise climate
science for individuals and makes different lenses more or less attractive
to them.
Yet this point can be forgotten when it comes to normative dimensions
of climate change, where the many subtleties of climate change are often
drowned out by heavy reliance on strongly held—but not always widely
shared—framings of the human dimensions of the problem. In the minds
of pluralists, to rely too strongly on particular normative framings is as
much of an error as reliance on the deficit model of science.
Pushing exclusively on any one of these framings will speak to a limited constituency.
A large part of the challenge is finding ways to broaden the appeal of suites of policies that don’t require everybody to agree about everything.
100 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Just as telling people they’re scientifically ignorant isn’t a good way to make them receptive to science, telling people they’re morally deficient
isn’t a good way to get them to change their minds.
Strategy and climate change5 75
The evidence76 77 78 79 80 suggests that climate change is a serious problem
but not an existential threat such as an asteroid strike or total war. It
isn’t an urgent threat like a bomb on a bus or the Cuban missile crisis.
It’s a long, slow, relentless burn. The real problem with climate change
at a global level is that it is difficult to see how any country has sufficient
incentives to reduce emissions81. This means it is the strategic dimensions
of climate change that are the really distinctive parts of the problem.
And those dimensions are more subtle and interesting than is often
supposed6 82.
Three-agent models In climate-change discourse, it is usual to consider ‘two-agent models’83 84—rich and poor, developed and developing. However, these models fail
to recognise rapidly growing and industrialising countries. Considering
three agents allows us to examine important strategic implications for
climate change policy.
Agent 1: The North
The G20 Annex 1 countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, USA.
Agent 2: The GEMs
The G20 emerging market countries (GEMs): Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, South Africa, Korea, Mexico, Turkey. GEM countries
already account for a larger proportion of global emissions (43 percent)
than the North (Figure 7).
The GEMs also accounted for the bulk of global growth in CO 2 emissions
in recent years, and are projected to increase their share of emissions
in the coming decades85. Emissions from these countries are a more
significant driver of 21st century climate change than emissions of the
other two groups.
5 The section builds on similar modelling work to that presented by Hepburn and Ward (2011).
6 The discussion presented here is a summary and extension of previous work undertaken as part of a symposium and book in honour of the Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling (Hahn & Ulph, 2012), also summarised as part of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment’s online Working Paper series (Frame & Hepburn, 2011). Interested readers can read these longer pieces in which many of our arguments are expanded upon.
Just as telling people they’re scientifically ignorant isn’t a good way to make them receptive to science, telling people they’re morally deficient isn’t a good way to get them to change their minds.
Participant comment How do we address the problem of equity within countries as well as between countries?
In climate-change discourse, it is usual to consider ‘two- agent models’—rich and poor, developed and developing. However, these models fail to recognise rapidly growing and industrialising countries. Considering three agents allows us to examine important strategic implications for climate change policy.
101P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yAgent 3: The RoW
The rest of the world (RoW): All other countries.
Three emissions scenarios We also consider three emissions scenarios and apply the MAGICC
climate model86 to determine the impact of emissions on Earth’s levels of
atmospheric CO 2 , global mean temperature, and sea levels. We use the
RICE 2010 model87 88 to evaluate mean economic impacts.
These models are simplifications involving considerable uncertainty.
The physical impacts and resulting socio-economic consequences may
be much more benign, or considerably worse, than suggested by the
modelling here, which is based on best estimates7 89. However, as
damages are a function of cumulative emissions, the relative contribution
of a country or region to climate-change damages depends only on their
relative contribution to cumulative emissions, irrespective of uncertainty
or other distributional considerations.
For instance, if the GEMs are responsible for X percent of cumulative
emissions, then they are responsible for X percent of climate change
damages, regardless of the magnitude and distributional details of those
damages. It follows that as contributions to cumulative emissions change
over time, so too will the fractional contributions of nations and regions.
Specifically, while the North’s (cumulative) contributions to climate change
damage is currently around 45 percent (den Elzen et al., 2005), under
many plausible scenarios this fraction is expected to decline to around 25
percent by the end of the century; the GEM share is expected to grow
considerably to potentially around twice that of the North90.
This change across time has implications for the institutional management
of the problem, since the future of ‘historical responsibility’ is very
different from its past. Institutions structured to deal with the portfolio
of cumulative emissions we see today may find themselves ineffective
at dealing with the portfolio of emissions our children have to deal with
tomorrow.
7 This is compounded by current levels of uncertainty: opinions differ as to whether we can yet reasonably assign zero probability to the possibility that some impacts of climate change may prove catastrophic, perhaps even at large scales (see Weitzman, 2009).
Emissions from [the GEMs] … are a more significant driver of 21st century climate change than emissions of the other two groups.
Institutions structured to deal with the portfolio of cumulative emissions we see today may find themselves ineffective at dealing with the portfolio of emissions our children have to deal with tomorrow.
102 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Sound institutional design would anticipate significant political and economic changes, as well as changes in responsibility for the climate-
change problem.
Only if patterns of economic development are very different from those
seen in the last 20 years, and assumed under standard BAU assumptions,
would the strategic picture presented here be radically changed.
Scenarios are always sketches, drawn from the vast range of possible
climate mitigation futures. One could argue with the details but these
three seem to describe the positions that are on the table.
Scenario 1: No deal
A ‘no-deal’ scenario, where the recent trends in emissions are projected,
based on GDP forecasts broadly consistent with the IPCC Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1FI scenario91. This scenario fits the
present evidence better than the other SRES scenarios.
No one advocates Scenario 1, but it remains a highly likely possibility.
Scenario 2: North leads
A ‘North-leads’ scenario, in which developed countries commit to reduce
emissions by 80 percent of 1990 levels by 2050 (consistent with targets
advanced by the European Union and Japan).
Scenario 2 is broadly what emerges from many of the developing-world
proposals (such as the Brazilian Proposal).
Scenario 3: North and GEM action
A ‘North-and-GEM-action’ scenario, where, in addition to Scenario 2
action by the North, GEMs commit to stabilising emissions, except from
land-use change, at 2005 levels by 2050. This scenario also assumes
that GEMs reduce emissions from deforestation and land-use change by
50 percent of 2005 levels.
Scenario 3 is essentially the position advocated by the USA8.
8 Refer to Frame and Hepburn (2011) for details.
Scenarios are always sketches, drawn from the vast range of possible climate mitigation futures.
No one advocates Scenario 1, but it remains a highly likely possibility.
Scenario 2 is broadly what emerges from many of the developing-world proposals ...
Scenario 3 is essentially the position advocated by the USA.
103P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yScenario results Table 1 and Figures 7 and 8 summarise the key findings.
Action by the North alone does not prevent dangerous climate change
Building policies today in which the North leads and nothing happens for
the foreseeable future in the South leaves us with a problem like what we
think we face today. Merely extending the Kyoto Protocol or establishing
other responses that focus exclusively on OECD-like groups will thus fail
to address the vast majority of the drivers of climate change this century.
Unmitigated climate change is likely to bring significant damages to
countries in all three groups, but perhaps especially in the poorest group.
This highlights an emerging tension between the interests of those who
are gaining most from current fossil fuel-based economic growth—
roughly the GEMs—and those who bear most of the risk from such
growth—predominantly the RoW. Given expected patterns of emissions
growth and development, we expect this ‘South-South’ tension to
become increasingly obvious in coming decades.
Table 1 Scenario results from Frame and Hepburn (2011)92
Variable Scenario 1
No deal
Scenario 2
North leads
Scenario 3
North and GEMs joint
action
Average global temperature increase in 2100 (on 1990 levels), °C
4.6°C 3.9°C 2.7°C
Atmospheric concentrations of CO
2 , parts per million (ppm)
905ppm 730ppm 550ppm
Sea-level rise in 2100, cm above 1990 levels
48cm 41cm 32cm
Economic damages in 2100, % of GDP in GEMs
3.0% 2.3% 1.5%
...[There is] an emerging tension between the interests of those who are gaining most from current fossil fuel-based economic growth— roughly the GEMs— and those who bear most of the risk from such growth— predominantly the RoW.
104 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The choices of GEM countries do considerably more to drive global mean temperatures in 2100
Approximately 72 percent of unabated cumulative emissions this century
come from outside the North. Thus the vast majority of the BAU problem
can only be addressed by regulating non-Annex countries.
Unabated cumulative emissions this century from GEM countries alone
under A1FI amount to more than 800Gt C9—60 percent more than
the available cumulative emissions if we are to contain global mean
temperature increase to less than 2°C with 50 percent confidence93.
It is clear that avoiding dangerous climate change will require regulating
CO 2 emissions outside the Annex countries, and it will do so sooner
rather than later.
Figure 7 GEMs accounted for more emissions than the North in 2008. From (G20 Annex 1) UNFCCC; (GEMs and Rest of World) World Resources Institute, projections from 2005 data, after Frame and Hepburn (2011)
9 Gigatonnes of carbon
It is clear that avoiding dangerous climate change will require regulating CO
2 emissions
outside the Annex countries, and it will do so sooner rather than later.
105P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yGEMs can have a substantial impact on climate outcomes
The demographic and economic growth of the GEMs implies a very
high BAU emissions trajectory, so the GEMs have the scale to make
a substantial material impact on climate outcomes against fossil fuel-
intensive BAU baselines. Given their projected GDP losses in 2100
(Figure 8), GEMs also have a financial incentive to address climate
change.
Figure 8 Shares of cumulative emissions under a fossil fuel- intensive future consistent with post-1990 patterns (the IPCC A1FI scenario/the present Scenario 1) from Frame and Hepburn (2011) (Bubble size proportional to 2008 population)
... GEMs have the scale to make a substantial material impact on climate outcomes … [and] a financial incentive to address climate change.
106 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Conclusions Climate change is complex enough that in some domains there are
incentives to compete and in others there are reasons to cooperate.
We need to determine which parts will resolve themselves with a small
prod (because of competitive pressure) and which require coordination.
Is the question
• Why has so little been achieved?
• Why has anything been achieved?
As far as global threats go, the strategic dimensions of climate change
are its most distinctive aspect. Yet today’s dominant framings and,
consequently, current institutional design, ignore important strategic
dimensions that may either offer new ways out of climate change or
which may prove to be even greater barriers to progress than those we
knowingly face today.
There is no consensus framing of the integrated dimensions of climate
change. There is no consensus (and we shouldn’t expect one) about
what society should look like, what we should do, what the appropriate
discount rate is, or how a government should weigh the interests of its
poor versus the interests of people threatened by climate change. We
haven’t explicitly had these difficult conversations.
Reframings can yield new insights, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable
knowledge. Academics have a role in presenting these reframings.
If we are to be effective communicators and honest brokers of
information to a wide range of stakeholders, we should be familiar with
and open to multiple framings.
Climate change is complex enough that in some domains there are incentives to compete and in others there are reasons to cooperate.
...today’s dominant framings … ignore important strategic dimensions that may either offer new ways out of climate change or which may prove to be even greater barriers to progress than those we knowingly face today.
If we are to be effective communicators and honest brokers of information to a wide range of stakeholders, we should be familiar with and open to multiple framings.
107P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yThe role of future generations in durable decision making
Sacha McMeeking Ngäi Tahu, New Zealand
Pathways for society—mö tätou, ä, mö kä uri ä muri ake nei This Forum is a rich and important opportunity to explore the concept of
‘futures’ and the pathways society can pursue to create the inheritance
we wish to leave to future generations. I am humbled to be able to
participate, and hope that my reflections on the role of vision and shared
leadership contribute to the dialogue and proceedings.
Climate change is not ‘too hard’
We’ve heard today, and it has been extensively expounded in other
contexts, that climate change is too complex for democracy to embrace
and engage with. The characteristics of climate change that ostensibly
baffle the democratic machinery are its high uncertainty, resounding
complexity, long-term horizon, the multiplicity of responsible and
contributory actors, and the contestability of cause and remedies.
However, New Zealand has already made substantial progress on an issue
that shares those same characteristics, and that forms the core of my
reflections: the Ngäi Tahu Claim (Te Kerëme).
The Ngäi Tahu Claim has metaphorical relevance to our approach to
climate change. For Ngäi Tahu, Te Kerëme was a journey that extended
over seven generations, across a political landscape that was at times
treacherous and always complex, to reach a highly pragmatic point of
transition in the Ngäi Tahu Settlement. Sustaining a considered and
purposive path of action over seven generations, that effectively unifies
a heterogeneous population, is a valuable precedent in the context of
climate change, particularly as I do not believe that the conditions and
tools that enabled Ngäi Tahu to address a long-term complex issue have
yet been achieved for climate change.
The Ngäi Tahu Claim has metaphorical relevance to our approach to climate change.
Sustaining a considered and purposive path of action over seven generations, that effectively unifies a heterogeneous population, is a valuable precedent in the context of climate change ...
108 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s A simple, shared vision of the future
The most important tool I believe Ngäi Tahu relied upon was a galvanising
vision: mö tätou, ä, mö kä uri ä muri ake nei (for us and our children after
us). This vision consciously orientates decision makers to the importance
of constructing an intentional inheritance for future generations. I believe
the intentionality of an intergenerational vision provides an unwavering
objective and commitment, while also allowing each generation to
innovate and improvise how that objective is realised. Ultimately, the
vision forms a chain of continuity across generations.
For Ngäi Tahu, the vision, the importance of maintaining
intergenerational continuity, and the conscious building of a platform for
future generations, were the key grounds on which tribal decisions were
made to negotiate and conclude a Settlement with the Crown. Equally,
they are the key grounds on which daily decisions are made on tribal
regeneration, the respective priority placed on language revitalisation and
environmental remediation.
Many of these decisions are complex and contested. For example, the
Ngäi Tahu Settlement ($170 million) amounts to approximately 2 percent
of the asset erosion occurring through the colonial period. The decision
to accept the Settlement as fair redress was therefore one motivated
more by an appreciation of the Settlement as a tool for building the
future envisioned for future generations than a rational assessment of
compensation for loss.
The most important tool I believe Ngäi Tahu relied upon was a galvanising vision: mö tätou, ä, mö kä uri ä muri ake nei (for us and our children after us). This vision consciously orientates decision makers to the importance of constructing an intentional inheritance for future generations.
Participant comments How do we begin intergenerational conversation on visions for the future we want?
What is the climate change vision? I’m sure there is more than one— at national, regional, community, and individual levels. Do we need a single shared vision? If so—how do we go about linking those of different groups?
Every part of tribal regeneration and recreation is important and interdependent … we must rely upon vision and values to provide guidance, prioritise, and reconcile trade- offs.
109P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySimilarly, in the approximately 13 years since the Settlement monies were transferred to the iwi authority, more than $227 million has been invested
in tribal development spanning all dimensions of the development
journey—every dollar, in principle, should directly enhance the lived reality
of current and future generations. However, there is no real way to know
and judge the respective merit of recording an ancient waiata as opposed
to planting native trees next to a river—every part of tribal regeneration
and recreation is important and interdependent. In our decision making
we must rely upon vision and values to provide guidance, prioritise, and
reconcile trade-offs.
At a deeper level, I believe the vision of mö tätou, ä, mö kä uri ä muri
ake nei is a product of, and conduit for, ongoing constitutional renewal
within the tribal context over the last 100 plus years. Crown vagaries
have provoked iwi constitutional contemplation: questioning our role and
the expression of the place of iwi histories and values in our ancestral
landscapes, the expression of our relationships between our members,
and the distribution of authorities and responsibilities across organs
within our tribal community.
The fundamentals that I believe have been reaffirmed during these
active contemplations are shared values and consensus decision making.
Many of the significant decisions the iwi has made over time have been
through the institution of hui, which are dialogue-driven processes that
enable shared understanding to grow and conclusions to be tangibly
felt, supporting consensus decision making and the reaffirmation of
shared values and vision. Hui are a democratic institution that enable
communities to reconcile the horizontal relationships between people and
participants, with a healthy dose of pragmatism and exploratory thinking.
Applied to climate change, I believe the congealing and empowering
nature of a vision could be a useful contributor to domestic and
global conversations, serving to bridge (but not obscure) ideologies,
competition, and complexity. Equally, I believe some constitutional
contemplation could enliven and potentially overcome the apparently
intractable debates regarding trade-offs and accountabilities for climate
change responses.
...hui … are dialogue-driven processes that enable shared understanding to grow and conclusions to be tangibly felt, supporting consensus decision making and the reaffirmation of shared values and vision.
...the congealing and empowering nature of a vision could be a useful contributor to domestic and global conversations, serving to bridge (but not obscure) ideologies, competition, and complexity.
110 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Democratic trends
Territoriality is of lesser importance
As discussed during this Forum, many of the tenets of Western
democracy are progressively being reconsidered, particularly in light of
intractable, trans-border global issues like climate change. The base
premise, that democracy occurs within a territorially bounded sovereign
state and is part of the social contract between state and citizen, is no
longer a clear formula, if it ever truly was.
Territoriality is arguably defined by arbitrary historical factors—who
managed to get there and managed to hold on long enough—rather
than intelligent design about how communities might exist within a
landscape. In the contemporary era, territoriality is even more vexed.
Territoriality is, hypothetically, a reasonably tangible formula for defining
the bounds of responsibility and authority—the domain of power.
However, as the increasingly profound consequences of trans-border
issues gain visibility, the notion of locational authority and responsibility
are displaced by the reality that causation and attribution are somewhat
ethereal—states are no longer in control of what occurs within their
territories and are also no longer able to create solutions in isolation for
shared problems.
The state no longer has the power to arbitrate between rights holders
The social contract is similarly undergoing metamorphosis as the
traditionally vertical relationship between state and citizen. The state
guarantees each citizen a lexicon of inalienable rights, but is being
clouded by the pressing reality that the state may no longer have the
power to make guarantees of this order for two key reasons.
Firstly, the landscape of rights holders has become infinitely more
congested; creating competition between rights holders of theoretically
equal standing that necessitates some form of arbitration. For example,
the limits on the right to freedom of speech have a horizontal relationship
with the right to freedom from discrimination, which if brought into
direct competition requires a political or judicial resolution. In practice, the
process of horizontal reconciliation tends to be political, creating winners
and losers, and, more importantly, reflecting value judgements of the day.
Secondly, business is now arguably in a tripartite relationship with citizen
and state: business creates the conditions for many of our human rights
to be enjoyed, administers our human rights in our employee hours of
the day, and has a broad influence on the policy and legislative functions
of government.
...states are no longer in control of what occurs within their territories and are also no longer able to create solutions in isolation for shared problems.
...the iwi mode of dialogue-driven decision making blends well with global trends in collaborative civil governance to give cause for optimism.
111P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yTo the extent that these arguments are correct, that there is a de facto process of constitutional change occurring as the base principles of
territoriality and the social contract are morphed by contemporary
realities, what does this mean for climate change and is there an iwi
insight of value? The simple answer is that the iwi mode of dialogue-
driven decision making blends well with global trends in collaborative civil
governance to give cause for optimism.
The iwi insight Iwi have lived through redefinition of their territorial authority in the
colonial period and the kin structures of hapü and iwi have a much
different character now than in the pre-contact period. My argument is
that enduring vision, intentionality in creating an intergenerational legacy,
and continuity in core values across the generations, enabled iwi to
maintain momentum, direction, and commitment across a truly long-term
horizon. From iwi insights (and global trends), three particular lessons
appear to emerge.
Institutions can contribute to the emergence of shared moral sensibilities and shared norms
The World Economic Forum, the Clinton Initiative, and the United
Nations Global Compact are international institutions that are generating
dialogue, building shared understanding, and laying the foundations for
shared visions. In my opinion, these institutions operate in a similar way
to hui—they fulfil an informal diplomacy role providing the platform
later relied upon for decisions to be reached. This form of structured
dialogue is important for New Zealand to import through institutions and
enabled by technology—the ‘wiki-everything movement’ has a valuable
contribution to make.
Of equal importance, these forums gather government, business, and
civil society participants to have horizontal conversations across the three
key sectors influencing the social contract and all our lived realities.
This growing trend of collaborative civil governance, across the three
spheres, is critical to our collective future. The 21st century will no
doubt be named many things, perhaps one of them will be the age of
inter-dependency. Neither government, nor business, nor community
organisations can address pressing and intractable problems alone.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships and collaboration are the new black. We
need to look seriously at what we can do domestically to mirror that
institutionalised collaboration and expand the implementation of cross-
sector partnerships.
...enduring vision, intentionality in creating an intergenerational legacy, and continuity in core values across the generations enabled iwi to maintain momentum, direction, and commitment across a truly long-term horizon.
Participant comment We need to develop institutions that can facilitate societal transition and [consider] what sort of institutions they might be (local, national, international).
The 21st century will no doubt be named many things, perhaps one of them will be the age of inter-dependency. Neither government, nor business, nor community organisations can address pressing and intractable problems alone.
112 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s There is no silver bullet
Ngäi Tahu has variously deployed a range of tools from litigation to charm
offensives to achieve our desired outcomes, and our success was in their
combination. In the context of climate change, there is some appetite
for ideologically driven positions on particular interventions—bluntly
described as the market will ‘cure all’ or ‘ruin all’ positions. I am not
convinced that tools are anything other than practical interventions, with
relevance to the extent that they embody a driving vision and values set.
I believe that the challenge is to remain open to all options, with lofty
aspiration, and not be seduced by the short-termism that can accompany
pragmatism.
Mö kä uri
Climate change is perhaps the most devastating injustice that we could
leave for future generations; equally, it could be a galvanising force for
the conscious creation of a fair inheritance that embodies a global vision
and notions of intergenerational equity. Within iwi, there is a reflexive
decision-making process that actively questions whether the decision
of today contributes to the legacy we are actively creating for future
generations—that approach is also growing in prominence in global and
local decision-making models. Intergenerationalism is a companion to the
rise of collaboration—we must act together and think in terms of forever
if we are to create the future in the image of our grandchildren. I am
confident that we can, if we try, and if we hold onto a vision: mö tätou,
ä, mö kä uri a muri ake nei.
...the challenge is to remain open to all options, with lofty aspiration, and not be seduced by the short-termism that can accompany pragmatism.
...we must act together and think in terms of forever if we are to create the future in the image of our grandchildren.
113P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yGroup dialogue session
Rapporteurs (Ralph Chapman, Amanda Wolf)
Matching what’s needed with what’s possible Sequencing and timing are very important. Since actions have to coincide
with opportunities available in a particular community, the actions have
to be matched to local leadership (fostered by and emerging from the
community and then imbued with a sense of the intergenerational
continuum).
Rights-based discourses As Sacha discussed, ‘rights’ discourses can be unhelpful as they can
disempower others by creating competition between conflicting rights
and creating more and more rights holders. Asserting one’s rights over
others could alienate neighbours and create divisions. Moreover, rights
themselves do not guarantee durable outcomes.
...actions have to coincide with opportunities available in a particular community.
114 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Technology and investment
Apply incentives at the producer level
Incentives should be applied at the producer level so we can shift
some attention upstream. Transformations at the producer level can be
significant compared to what can be done at an individual level.
Both positive and negative producer incentives have a role. For example,
the ‘flatlining’ of electricity use in California followed cost-structure
changes. Favourable R&D incentives have positive effects.
Determine a carbon price
An entry price on carbon is important, even if it is low, as it could be
raised over time like alcohol and tobacco taxes have been. However, a
low price signal could prevent an effective response in enough time to
make a difference.
Is technology ready
What does it mean to say that some technology is ‘ready’ to be deployed,
or an industrial site is ‘ready’ for the technology? For example, for carbon
capture and storage, the process of ‘being ready’ is a long one. There
is ready for piloting, ready to be rolled out, the power plants ready to
integrate the technology, the regulatory framework and incentives for
switching ready, the health and safety code ready, a skilled workforce
ready to operate it, and ready in that it is cost effective to the bottom
line.
Transformations at the producer level can be significant compared to what can be done at an individual level.
115P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yLeaving some details to others Sacha McMeeking reflected on the hui process, where a high-level
consensus is reached and the details of putting it into practice are farmed
out to others. David Frame evoked the image of multiple puzzles on the
floor and the fact that not everyone can deal with every piece, or even a
piece, from every puzzle. Instead, a person can gain competence and a
localised holistic understanding of those pieces and puzzles they are able
to attend to, and can leave the detail of the rest to others.
In neither the hui nor puzzle situation do we deny or minimise the details
we do not attend to. We realistically acknowledge what we can do and
are thereby empowered to do it.
Changing values Dave Frame proposed that the discourse be “open to, and respect, neo-
liberalism”. There was a challenge to Dave to be aware of the interests of
power, wealth, and influence, and the systematic move to remove from
the agenda matters such as the public good.
Dave’s view was that he saw a risk that action on climate change could
be scuppered by ‘taking on’ neo-liberalism. Others felt that neo-liberalism
is a key to the wider set of problems we face, including global financial
instability and a growth fixation. However, it is very difficult to persuade
people that their values should change.
...action on climate change could be scuppered by ‘taking on’ neo-liberalism.
116 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Institutional failure Following the Christchurch earthquake, the suspension of law and the
removal of conventional processes were highly risky. Action needed public
participation and consultation. We need extensive public participation
and consultation following inclusive procedures in all contexts where
the government makes such important decisions on behalf of citizens.
Institutions that guarantee these processes are crucial.
Institutions that take the long view are very important, such as the new
Commission for Future Generations, in Hungary.
Credibility is very pertinent in the context of exploring new institutions,
how to foster it and ensure it is embedded. For a new institution to be
better able to make decisions on hard problems, it will need to integrate
those decisions with a range of other competing issues, partly to get
agreement with those affected and partly due to the inherent nature of
the problems we are dealing with being ones that are highly complex,
interconnected, and intergenerational.
Credibility is very pertinent in the context of exploring new institutions, how to foster it and ensure it is embedded.
Participant comment Who presents the long view?
117
5 Reflections on ways forward
118 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Synthesis
Professor Jonathan Boston Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
This Forum has been blessed with contributions from people with a wide
range of backgrounds, experience, expertise, and perspectives: politicians,
social scientists, biological and physical scientists, journalists, managers,
theologians, students, writers, and more. Their emphases and concerns
varied, as one might expect.
A variety of emphases and concerns
Local government initiatives
The Mayor of Wellington extended a welcome to Wellington with a focus
on local government and the policy initiatives to address climate change
being taken by the Wellington City Council.
Emissions targets and the ETS
Hon. Nick Smith, the Minister for the Environment and Climate Change,
opened the Forum by highlighting the importance of interdisciplinary
approaches, the role of the ETS (and prices) in changing market behaviour
(including investment patterns), the nature of the first review of the
ETS, and the various complementary measures that the government has
in place. He also discussed the Green Growth Advisory Group and the
government’s 2050 emission-reduction target.
Uncertainty and risk
Martin Manning focused on risks, uncertainties, and surprises in the
climate system. He emphasised the non-linear nature of the climate
system, the need for risk management, and the application of the
precautionary principle.
Path dependence and emissions budgets
David Karoly, described as ‘the scariest person in Australia’, emphasised
the issue of path dependence (due to the immense length of the carbon
cycle), the relative success of the Montreal Protocol compared to the
Kyoto Protocol, the need to think in terms of cumulative (not annual)
emissions over time (and hence GHG budgets over decades), and the
issue of per capita allocations of emissions responsibility.
This Forum has been blessed with contributions from people with a wide range of backgrounds, experience, expertise, and perspectives ...
Participant comments I think we need to engage practical engineers
We need more input from spiritual speakers/ theologians.
We need to be talking widely to other groups, especially business
We need to consider conservation—our greatest resource.
We need to engage with ecological economists
We need more input from students.
119P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yCollective responsibilities and the Pacific context
Sir Paul Reeves reminded us of the importance of collective
responsibilities, ethical norms, and principles, and the South Pacific
dimension, including New Zealand’s responsibilities to the people of the
South Pacific.
The much-debated role of scientists
The contributions of Fred Pearce and Brian Fallow (both journalists) and
Erik Conway (a science historian), reminded us that:
• fundamentally, the public debate about climate change is not so
much about the merits of the science (although this is critical), it is
more about values and beliefs
• there are huge challenges for scientists communicating scientific
evidence and theories to the public.
They raised a key issue: Should scientists simplify their message to the
public, largely ignoring the finer issues of detail and the many ongoing
uncertainties, and hence go for dogma over doubt; or should they
include all the kinds of caveats, doubts, uncertainties, subtleties and so
forth that they would include in scientific journal articles?
Their contributions also raised other important issues, such as: What
role should scientists play in public debates on important policy issues?
Should they merely stick to facts and data, or should they go beyond the
empirical evidence and comment on wider issues? For instance, to what
extent, if at all, should they be ‘missionaries’? Should they engage in
debates on ethical issues? And is it possible, in any event, to remain value
free? Further, who should be the guardians of science?
Should science be self-policing (via academies and peer review) or should
there be other mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of the scientific
endeavour?
...fundamentally, the public debate about climate change is not so much about the merits of the science (although this is critical), it is more about values and beliefs ...
What role should scientists play in public debates on important policy issues?
120 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Psychology and behaviour change
Robert Gifford highlighted the important issues of social and
environmental psychology relevant to climate change mitigation and
adaptation and outlined seven dragons of non-sustainability. He then
discussed how we might slay these dragons and outlined five approaches,
which included an emphasis on the importance of issue framing
and messaging (using empowering messages, rather than sacrifice
messages, and local messages, rather than global messages), working in
interdisciplinary ways, and making the environment a ‘now’ issue.
The importance of young people and citizenship
Bronwyn Hayward provided information from a major international
survey of the attitudes, perceptions, and aspirations of young people and
highlighted some of the key themes and tensions that emerge from this.
Political difficulties and bipartisanship
John Thwaites highlighted the political difficulties of addressing
climate change and produced his Ten Commandments on how to
make a difference, the second of which is to have the courage of your
convictions.
The global context
Dave Frame emphasised the huge changes that have occurred in recent
decades in the GHG emission paths of different parts of the world
(especially the growth of emissions in Asia) and the implications of this
for climate negotiations and the wider global policy context.
A shared vision of the future
Sacha McMeeking reminded us of the need for vision and persistence.
...have the courage of your convictions.
121P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yThree key themes
Issue framing
Many speakers commented directly or indirectly on the issue and
importance of how the challenge of anthropogenic climate change
is framed. Framing is important in terms of human psychology,
understanding, responses, and also politically. Dave Frame noted that
climate change is a long, slow, and relentless issue but that surprises
can happen. As such, it has some different characteristics from a
natural disaster (such as an earthquake) and requires a very difficult
communication strategy and policy responses. The Forum discussed a
range of ways of framing issues but no conclusion was drawn on the best
ways to frame the issue.
The nature and implications of the human condition
Many speakers touched in various ways on aspects of human psychology
and the human condition. It was emphasised that human beings have
certain deeply rooted behavioural traits that militate against effective
action to address climate change, including:
• a large measure of self-interest
• high private discount rates or myopia
• a tendency to undervalue long-term risks
• a cognitive bias in favour of the status quo, due to loss aversion and
the endowment effect
• what Robert Gifford called ‘discredence’: mistrust, reactance and
denial.
It was emphasised that we need to take these (and related traits)
seriously, identify the barriers to behavioural change, and focus efforts
where they are likely to be most efficacious.
...human beings have certain deeply rooted behavioural traits that militate against effective action to address climate change ...
122 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The importance of ethics
A number of speakers raised ethical or moral issues and noted that
climate change raises some very difficult and complex ethical challenges,
not least:
• the nature of our responsibilities to the biosphere and future
generations
• the problem of trade-offs between assisting the poor now and
focusing on future sustainability
• the issue of global burden sharing (for the costs of mitigation and
adaptation)
• the question of the appropriate discount rate in economic analyses
of mitigation efforts
• the valuing of non-market goods and services
• the role of scientists in debates of issues of this nature.
On the last of these points, I make three observations: the importance of
scientists being in dialogue with philosophers, ethicists, and theologians
on the big ethical issues; the importance of scientists contributing
to public debates on the ethics of climate change (but doing their
homework first); and the importance of recognising the ethical nature of
many of the issues that we have to deal with.
Three issues for the future
National emission-reduction targets
The Minister for Climate Change Issues, Hon Dr Nick Smith, took the
opportunity afforded by his speech to the Forum to announce the
government’s decision to confirm its target of a net reduction in New
Zealand’s GHG emissions of 50 percent by 2050. I observed that the
process for deciding long-term policy positions of this nature had been
deficient. In particular, there is a need for the government to receive
independent, authoritative advice much like the British approach, under
which the Climate Change Committee (a high-level, independent
body reporting to the government and parliament) provides advice to
government on the UK’s five-yearly carbon budgets and longer-term
emission-reduction targets. Additionally, there is a need to focus on
cumulative emissions; it is not sufficient to have a single long-term target
for a specific date.
...climate change raises some very difficult and complex ethical challenges ...
...there is a need for the government to receive independent, authoritative advice ...
123P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t ySecuring a durable policy framework
Recent developments in various countries, not least New Zealand, have
highlighted the difficulties of securing a durable policy framework
for climate change, especially mitigation efforts but also adaptation.
Amongst other things, this requires a relatively broad, multiparty
consensus—but how to achieve this?
There are plainly no easy or simple solutions, and unsurprisingly the
Forum generated few new insights. Nevertheless, there is a case, in
my view, for creating new institutions, both local and national, to help
press the case for policy action, based on expert evidence and high-
quality analysis. The British Climate Change Committee provides a
good example. Another option would be to extend the mandate of the
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. Yet another would be
to establish tripartite and/or multiparty mechanisms and forums, such
as the Land and Water Forum, designed to help build understanding
and consensus amongst key sector groups and the wider society. There
is also plainly a case for strong initiatives at the level of sub-national
government, by local government, business, and by civil society
organisations.
...there is a case … for creating new institutions, both local and national, to help press the case for policy action, based on expert evidence and high- quality analysis.
124 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s The role of China
Will China rescue the world? Dave Frame highlighted that China has
recently agreed to invest some US$750 billion over 10 years in renewable
energy and is also investing heavily in other low-carbon technologies and
related R&D. Clearly, China sees the potential to become a world leader
in clean-tech and green-tech, and secure significant economic (as well as
environmental) advantages from such a strategy. Potentially, this could
make a decisive difference over the next 10 years to the geo-politics
of climate change, as well as the economics of decarbonisation. If so,
there potentially will be much to celebrate. But surely it will be a pity if a
dictatorship is able to achieve what liberal democracies cannot.
...surely it will be a pity if a dictatorship is able to achieve what liberal democracies cannot.
Participant comment We need more information about clean energy initiatives.
125P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yYouth perspectives
Jinty MacTavish Dunedin, New Zealand
There are a few thoughts that I’m taking away from this Forum,
including:
• strong signs of a solid scientific mandate for change
• empowering community and society
• resilience
• scientists taking more of a back seat
• conversations and keeping them going
• urgency and the need for action now
• messages framed in the positive
• the power of relevant, place-based, meaningful education
• the power of story.
I’d like to share with you the story of the North East Valley Project in
Dunedin, which is a community-initiated project that focuses on making
their neighbourhood a better place. The great part about the project
is that it involves a very diverse group of individuals, organisations,
businesses, and groups. A lot of the actions they are engaged in are
making their community more sustainable and more resilient, and yet
very few people have a focus on climate change or an energy-constrained
future. They’re just getting on with it because they feel these things are
what make a community stronger and happier.
In summary, I think the number one message I took away from the Forum
is that we really do need to change the story around climate change.
We need to stop talking about sacrifices and start promoting solutions
as sensible, practical, mainstream things that people are doing simply
because they’re good things to do.
...we really do need to change the story around climate change.
126 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Simon Tegg Wellington, New Zealand
Consensus is not possible or desirable when we disagree about
fundamentals. Physical science can work disagreements out like a small
pig passing through a python. Eventually, the pig is digested. This simply
does not work in social science where ideas about human nature or
human destiny underlie debates. The latter also informs climate policy,
meaning that efforts to put in place effective global climate policy will
most likely fail.
Some accuse the IPCC of stonewalling valid criticism of climate science
consensus while at the same time others, particularly those concerned
with ice sheet dynamics, are wary of the tendency of consensus-
generating processes to tone down conclusions. Climate science has the
advantage of a physical basis; long data series; paleoclimate analogs; and,
importantly, a diverse, critical, and multidisciplinary community.
Economics, especially economic ideas regarding how growth occurs
and the quantity and feasible extraction rates of fossil fuels, has none
of these advantages. Orthodox economic growth theory is notorious
for not including energy or resource quality in its basic assumptions,
while the data on feasible resource extraction are murky at best. These
are critical to understanding the degree of expected climate change
and the feasibility of responses, but are rarely debated or challenged.
Unfortunately, when poor assumptions remain obscured, a ‘policy-
relevant, not policy prescriptive’ consensus across both the physical and
socioeconomic spheres is not possible.
Consensus is not possible or desirable when we disagree about fundamentals.
Participant comment We need to develop transition pathways including incorporation of ecological economics into mainstream economics and displacing the neoclassical approach.
127P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yConcluding remarks
Professor Dave Frame New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
‘Wicked problems’ such as climate change have high stakes, irreducible
uncertainties, are complex and multifaceted, and involve many
stakeholders with different, and sometimes conflicting, values and
perceptions. These features mean that a single approach to climate
change is unlikely to be considered wise by a majority of stakeholders.
This Forum has dealt with four aspects of this ‘wicked problem’, which
can inform a way forward:
1 Communication about the issue and between interests
2 The psychological dimension—the different interests, norms, and
values to be understood
3 Participation and framing—the issues of agency and overlap with
other issues
4 Building new institutions
Although these four aspects are crucial for mitigating and adapting to
climate change, they are often not obvious in the public discourse on
climate change. This discourse tends to be dominated by discussions
of ‘tonnes of this and that per capita against baseline X’. Broadening
the conversation to debate norms, values, participation, ways of
communicating, and the role of institutions helps us deal with ‘wicked
problems’ like climate change.
‘Wicked problems’ such as climate change have high stakes, irreducible uncertainties, are complex and multifaceted, and involve many stakeholders with different ... values and perceptions.
Participant comment Can participants look forward to receiving ongoing feedback, particularly from the students who attended, and who will be using the Forum experience in their future studies and/or theses?
128 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s To avoid significant and damaging climate change, a range of communities—from village planners through to the UNFCCC—are going
to have to become a lot more sophisticated in terms of the structure (and
content) of their conversations. This presents an institutional challenge.
It is not obvious that today’s institutions are well suited for the task,
and many thoughtful commentators are contending that institutional
innovation is likely to become about as important as the technological
and regulatory changes we require.
My hope is that the New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
can be one of these new institutions. As we evolve, we hope to become
more able to manage the ‘wicked problem’ of climate change. We
aim to become a place for communication, dialogue, and respectful
disagreement; where people can bring their intelligence, passion, and
energy, to create genuine engagement aimed at dealing with one of the
great problems of our time.
We finish with the words of a great New Zealander, Sir Paul Reeves:
“I would submit, ladies and gentlemen, that we have much to learn
about nation building and the challenge of an open society in the way we
approach the pressing urgency of climate change.
Physical matter is not inert stuff, foreign to life. It is a mighty organised
whole of which we are a part. We belong here and we belong within a
whole that we need to take seriously. Our thinking about climate change
needs to be wide and expansive.”
...institutional innovation is likely to become about as important as the technological and regulatory changes we require. My hope is that the New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute can be one of these new institutions.
Participant comment Many of these sorts of forums quickly ‘disappear off the radar’ and are never heard about again. I hope this will not be the case with this one.
129
6 Biographies and Endnotes
130 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
131P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yBiographies
Editors
Judy Lawrence
Judy Lawrence is Adjunct Research Associate at the New Zealand Climate
Change Research Institute, Victoria University of Wellington. Her current
research interest relates to decision making under uncertainty, dynamic
change, and long timeframes associated with climate change induced
sea-level rise and increased flood frequency. She is also Director of PS
Consulting Ltd, a strategy and policy consultancy. She is a former Chief
Executive, Ministry of Women’s Affairs; Environmental Strategy Manager,
Dairy Research Institute; Director, New Zealand Climate Change Office,
Ministry for the Environment; Convenor of the National Science Strategy
Committee for Climate Change; and OECD consultant on sustainable
development.
Alana Cornforth
Alana Cornforth is a Research Assistant at the New Zealand Climate
Change Research Institute, Victoria University of Wellington. She has a
BA in English Literature and Art History, and a Masters in Environmental
Studies with a thesis on ‘Concern for climate change and the knowledge-
deficit theory’. Her research interests are the psychology of climate
change and climate change adaptation in the Pacific.
Peter Barrett
Peter Barrett is Professor of Geology and Deputy Director of the New
Zealand Climate Change Research Institute, Victoria University of
Wellington. After graduating from Ohio State University’s Institute of
Polar Studies in the 1960s he returned to New Zealand to establish the
University’s Antarctic Research Centre, serving as its Director until 2007.
Over three decades, Peter led a series of international drilling projects to
core the Antarctic margin for understanding the history of the ice sheet
since its inception around 34 million years ago. As a consequence, his
work has provided a long-term perspective on the future behaviour of
ice sheets in the face of projected future global warming. He has also
represented New Zealand on the international Antarctic Committee on
Environmental Protection (1998–2003), and in 2006 he was awarded the
President’s Medal for Outstanding Scientific Achievement in Antarctic
Science by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. His current
research is directed to providing a soundly based geological perspective
on future climate change.
132 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Speakers
Martin Manning
Professor Martin Manning was the inaugural Director of the New Zealand
Climate Change Research Institute at Victoria University of Wellington,
established to build better interactions between science, policy, and society
on climate change issues. From 2002 to 2007, Martin was Director of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group
I Technical Support Unit that produced the Fourth Assessment Report
on climate change for governments. He has produced over 50 papers in
peer-reviewed science literature and been an author and review editor for
several of the major IPCC reports. Martin has worked in several countries
but spent most of his life in New Zealand where he led research on GHGs,
atmospheric chemistry, and other aspects of climate change science over
the last 30 years. In 2008, Martin became an Officer of the New Zealand
Order of Merit for his services to climate change science.
David Karoly
Professor David Karoly is an ARC Federation Fellow in the School of
Earth Sciences, University of Melbourne and Leader of the Climate
Change theme in the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute. He is an
internationally recognised expert in climate change and climate variability,
including greenhouse climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and
interannual climate variations due to El Niño-Southern Oscillation. He
was heavily involved in preparing the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in 2007,
in several different roles. David was Chair of the Premier of Victoria’s
Climate Change Reference Group during 2008–09. He is a member of
the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists and of the Australian
Government’s High Level Coordination Group on Climate Change
Science. David joined the School of Earth Sciences in May 2007 as a
Federation Fellow funded by the Australian Government. From 2003, he
held the Williams Chair in the School of Meteorology at the University of
Oklahoma. During 2001–02, he was Professor of Meteorology and Head
of the School of Mathematical Sciences at Monash University. From August
1995, he was Director of the Cooperative Research Centre for Southern
Hemisphere Meteorology at Monash University until it closed in June 2000.
133P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y
Sir Paul Reeves
Sir Paul Reeves was Chancellor of the Auckland University of Technology
for the past five years, helping to steer the course of a university that is
just 10 years old. The affairs of his tribe, Te Ätiawa, took up a lot of his
time and he was the deputy chair of a post-settlement entity, the Port
Nicholson Block Settlement Trust. Throughout his life, he concerned
himself with issues of injustice and inequity both in this country and
elsewhere. He had an abiding interest in why people say they are going
to do certain things and why, so often, they don’t do them. Sir Paul was
a pre-eminent New Zealander. He was a man of the church, becoming
Anglican Bishop of Waiapu in 1971 and Primate and Archbishop of New
Zealand in 1980. He was also the first churchman and first person of
Mäori descent appointed Governor-General (1985–90). Following the
completion of his term as Governor-General, Sir Paul took up a number
of national and international positions, including that of Anglican
Observer at the United Nations in New York, a position he held for three
years. Sir Paul passed away on 14 August 2011, after a lifetime of service
to New Zealand.
Erik Conway
Erik Conway is a historian of science and technology residing in Pasadena, CA. He is currently employed by the California Institute of Technology. He studies and documents the history of space exploration, and examines the intersections of space science, Earth science, and technological change. He most recently received the 2009 NASA History award for “pathbreaking contributions to space history ranging from aeronautics to Earth and space sciences”, and the 2009 AIAA History Manuscript Award for his fourth book, Atmospheric Science at NASA: A History. Erik has been, at various junctures in his life, a nuclear field electronics technician in the US Navy, a student of geomechanics, and a naval officer. He served as damage control assistant, and briefly acting chief engineer, of a tank-landing ship and as an operations planner for a Pacific Fleet amphibious squadron. He had small roles in planning the US withdrawal from Somalia in 1994 as well as the non-combatant evacuation operation from Rwanda. He’s a devout fan of Stephen J. Gould’s writing on natural history and considers it Gould’s fault that he’s now a historian of science and technology. Erik began studying the history of climate science in 2002, after receiving a NASA history contract to write Atmospheric Science at NASA: A History. Two years later, at an International Commission for the History of Meteorology meeting in Polling, Germany, he met Naomi Oreskes and began a long conversation about the denial machine. He is currently completing a history of robotic Mars exploration.
134 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
Fred Pearce
Fred Pearce is a freelance author and journalist based in London. He
has reported on environment, science, and development issues from 65
countries over the past 20 years. Trained as a geographer, he has been
environment consultant of New Scientist magazine since 1992. He writes
regularly for the Guardian newspaper, and recently published a 12-part
investigation of the ‘Climategate’ emails affair at the University if East
Anglia. He is a frequent lecturer, having spoken on all six continents in
the past four years, and is a regular contributor to US newspapers and
magazines. Fred’s books have been translated into at least 16 languages.
When the Rivers Run Dry was listed among the all-time Top 50 Sustainability
Books by the University of Cambridge’s Programme for Sustainable
Leadership. Other books include Confessions of an Eco Sinner; Earth: Then
and Now; With Speed and Violence (on climate change); Deep Jungle; and
Peoplequake.
Brian Fallow
Brian Fallow has been a journalist for 30 years and The New Zealand
Herald’s economics editor since 2000. In that capacity he writes about
climate change—what is to be done about it rather than the thing itself.
Robert Gifford
Robert Gifford is an environmental and social psychologist who is Professor
of Psychology and Environmental Studies at the University of Victoria. He
is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association (APA), the Canadian
Psychological Association (CPA), and the Association for Psychological
Science, and was given a Career Award from the Environmental Design
Research Association. Dr Gifford is the author of about 100 refereed
publications and book chapters, and four editions of the textbook
Environmental Psychology: Principles and Practice. He is the editor of the
Journal of Environmental Psychology, has served as coordinator of CPA’s
environmental section, president of APA’s Population and Environment
Division, and is the immediate past president of the Environmental
Psychology division of the International Association of Applied Psychology.
He was a co-author of the APA’s task force report on climate change, and
the article ‘Psychology’s essential role in climate change’.
135P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y
Bronwyn Hayward
Dr Bronwyn Hayward is a senior lecturer in political science at the
University of Canterbury specialising in children’s issues, democracy,
and citizenship in environmental change. She is also a researcher with
the Sustainable Lifestyles Research Group, a UK research consortium
funded by the UK Government (ESRC), Scottish Government, and UK
Department of Food and Environment. Between 2008 and February
2011 Bronwyn was a Visiting Fellow with RESOLVE: Centre for Research
on Values, Lifestyles and Environmental Change, University of Surrey,
UK and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Research (University of East
Anglia). Bronwyn is an adviser to the Children and Climate Change
project (University of Oslo) and lead author for two country reports for
the United Nations Environment Programme’s Global Survey of Youth
Attitudes to Sustainability (2011). Outside academia, Bronwyn works in
television and radio production for children and has been a New Zealand
Broadcasting Standards Commissioner. Her forthcoming book with
Earthscan publishers (2012) examines children’s experiences of democracy
and citizenship in a changing environment.
John Thwaites
John Thwaites is a Professorial Fellow, Monash University, and Chair of ClimateWorks Australia and the Monash Sustainability Institute where he is involved in the Institute’s Behaviour Change Initiative and the Centre for Water Sensitive Cities. He is a consultant at Maddocks Solicitors providing advice to the firm and its clients on climate change, water, and sustainability. He also chairs the Climate Group Ltd in Australia, the Peter Cullen Water and Environment Trust, and the Australian Centre for the Moving Image. He is also a director of the Australian Green Building Council. John chairs a project with the Brotherhood of St Laurence to develop policies to assist low-income Australians cope with the impact of climate change. He is on the Australian Government’s NGO Roundtable on climate change. In 2008–09, John was a special adviser to the Timor- Leste Minister for Infrastructure and helped develop an infrastructure plan for Timor-Leste. John was Deputy Premier of Victoria from 1999 until his retirement in 2007. During this period he was Minister for Health, Minister for Planning, Minister for Environment, Minister for Water, Minister for Victorian Communities, and Victoria’s first Minister for Climate Change. In these portfolios he was responsible for major reforms in social policy, health, environment and water. John was a Member of the Victorian Parliament from 1992 to 2007, and was a barrister prior to entering Parliament. He was a Councillor City of South Melbourne (1985–93) and Mayor in 1991–92. He has degrees in law (Honours) and science from Monash University.
136 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
Dave Frame
Professor Dave Frame has recently taken up the position of Director of
the New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute. He previously held
the position of Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the Smith
School of Enterprise and the Environment at the University of Oxford,
where he remains a Senior Visiting Fellow. Dave is an interdisciplinary
scientist with a background in physics, philosophy, economics, and
policy. His research experience has been published in the world’s leading
scientific journals as well as the specialist climate literature. Dave also
has real-world policy experience in a core government policy agency,
having worked in the New Zealand Treasury’s Policy Coordination and
Development group prior to moving to Britain. Dave looks at new ways
in which advances in climate change research can improve the physical
science inputs into climate change policy.
Sacha McMeeking
Sacha McMeeking has recently founded Catalytic, a boutique consultancy
providing government relations, strategy, and iwi engagement advice
and training. Previously she was the General Manager of Strategy and
Influence at Te Runanga o Ngäi Tahu where she held key responsibilities
for external relations, brand and reputation management, and
engagement with central government. Recently, she has contributed
to iwi capability development in infrastructure investment, inter-iwi
collaboration in commercial and broader respects, iwi engagement with
the ETS, and a range of tribally focused projects. Prior to this role, Sacha
focused on academic pursuits. She graduated from the University of
Canterbury with a Master of Laws (First Class Honours) and then went on
to lecture in the faculty in various fields (constitutional law, Mäori legal
issues, comparative indigenous rights and international law). During this
period, she coordinated iwi advocacy with the United Nations concerning
the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Recently, Sacha was the recipient
of the Fullbright-Harkness New Zealand Fellowship, which saw her travel
to the United States to research corporate social responsibility, with a
particular focus on articulating an indigenous paradigm for traditional
values-based commercial decision making and exploring the evolving
relationship between business, society, and state. Additionally, Sacha has
held numerous external board positions and has assisted government as a
technical expert on topic-specific advisory groups.
137P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y
Jonathan Boston
Jonathan Boston is Professor of Public Policy in the School of Government
at Victoria University of Wellington. He served as Director of the Institute
of Policy Studies during 2008–11. During the course of his academic
career he has undertaken research on a wide range of policy issues,
including incomes policy, public management, tertiary education, social
policy, and climate change. He is the author or editor of 26 books, and
more than 200 articles and book chapters.
Jinty MacTavish
Jinty MacTavish is a 25-year-old, newly elected Dunedin City councillor.
She is a founding member of Sustainable Dunedin City, an organisation
that works to facilitate a positive, secure future for Dunedin City in
the face of the challenges posed by climate change and peak oil. She
coordinated the first Dunedin Secondary Students’ Climate Forum,
a youth event that culminated in a vision for the city’s future, signed
by 3,500 students, being presented to elected members. Her recently
completed Masters in Science Communication from the University of
Otago focused on climate change education in our secondary schools.
Lessons from a Melting Icecap, a film she made to help young people
engage with the issue, is being used in over 500 schools nationwide.
She played a key role in taking the 350.org movement national in 2009,
coordinating the 350.org schools campaign. Having experienced one
UNGCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), her hopes for humanity now
lie with local government!
Simon Tegg
Simon Tegg is a researcher at the New Zealand Climate Change Research
Institute. A pending Masters of Environmental Studies graduate, he is
currently engaged in research on the assessment and communication
of flood risk under climate change uncertainty. Originally trained in
linguistics, he finds himself drawn to multidisciplinary societal problems.
These have included the science-policy interface, decision making under
complexity, and energy-economic feedback loops. Outside the office,
Simon cooks a mean steak.
138 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s
Sir Lloyd Geering
Lloyd Geering was born in 1918, educated chiefly in Otago, and holds
Honours degrees in Mathematics and Old Testament Studies. Ordained as
a Presbyterian minister, he served in Kurow, Dunedin, and Wellington. He
held Chairs of Old Testament Studies at theological colleges in Brisbane
and Dunedin before being appointed as the foundation Professor of
Religious Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. He was married
to Nancy McKenzie (deceased 1949), to Elaine Parker (deceased 2001),
and to Shirley White, and has three children, nine grandchildren (one
deceased), and six great-grandchildren. Since his retirement in 1984 he
has continued to lecture widely throughout New Zealand and overseas.
He was a regular columnist on religious topics: Auckland Star (16 years),
New Zealand Listener (four years). He was awarded an Honorary DD
by the University of Otago in 1976, a CBE in the New Year Honours in
1988, and made PCNZM in 2001 (changed to GNZM in 2009). His chief
publications have been God in the New World, Resurrection: A Symbol of
Hope, Faith’s New Age, Tomorrow’s God, The World to Come, Christianity
Without God, Wrestling with God—The Story of my Life, Coming Back to
Earth—From Gods to God to Gaia, Such is Life!—A Close Encounter with
Ecclesiastes. He was admitted to the Order of New Zealand in the 2006
New Year Honours List.
Martin Kreft
Following graduation from Auckland University School of Engineering,
Martin Kreft worked in the design and construction industries for 10
years in New Zealand and Canada. In 1987 he joined Munich Reinsurance
as Engineering Underwriter and progressed through to Property Manager
and ultimately Regional Manager for New Zealand in 2003. Martin is a
member of the Institution of Professional Engineering New Zealand, the
Australian and New Zealand Institute of Insurance and Finance, and a
Board Member of the Insurance Council of New Zealand.
139P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yRapporteurs
Ralph Chapman
Dr Ralph Chapman directs the Graduate Programme in Environmental
Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. An environmental
economist, he’s worked on energy, transport, urban design, and
climate change. He’s also worked with the New Zealand Ministry for
the Environment, the New Zealand Treasury, the British Treasury in
Whitehall, the OECD, in the Beehive, and as a negotiator for New
Zealand of the Kyoto Protocol. Ralph has a first in engineering, a
Masters in public policy, and a PhD in economics.
Judy Lawrence
See Editors section.
Amanda Wolf
Dr Amanda Wolf is Director, Graduate Research Programmes in the
School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington. She holds
degrees in philosophy and policy (global environmental negotiations).
She currently researches on experimentation and learning from practice
in complex policy contexts, subjectivity and ‘common sense’ in research
and policy analysis, and persuasion in policy. Amanda’s longstanding
interest in the interfaces between public perceptions, attitudes, values,
and experiences on the one hand and policy and regulation on the
other has stoked her fascination with innovative uses of social science—
process and product—with applications to environmental, social, and
food policy topics.
140 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s Facilitators
Morgan Williams (Climate Futures Forum Chair)
Dr Morgan Williams completed 10 years as New Zealand’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE) in March 2007. He had held Adjunct Professor roles at the Universities of Canterbury and Queensland, for eight years. In April 2004, Lincoln University awarded Morgan an honorary doctorate in Natural Resources. Morgan is a trustee of Leadership NZ, WWF NZ, the National Energy Research Institute, and chair of a new wind-power company aimed at community-based wind farm development. Morgan has chaired a review of eight long-term research portfolios for New Zealand’s Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, written a ‘think piece’ on the future evolution of the Waitakere Ranges and associated city and urban farming landscapes in Auckland, chaired a national biosecurity committee and recently has contributed to a global Frontiers of Sustainable Development think tank in Europe and a Food Futures Forum in Iceland.
Bob Frame
Dr Bob Frame helps people imagine what kinds of futures might lie ahead and then find ways to translate this foresight into good decision-making processes. He has worked closely with government agencies. After training in Scotland as an engineer and research physicist, he had diplomatic postings in China and India and was then Director (Asia and Americas) for DATS, British Council in the UK, and now, once again, does research, which he calls transdisciplinary. Bob is Principal Scientist (Sustainability and Society) at Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research, based in Lincoln.
Karen Cronin
Dr Karen Cronin has a background in social research, environmental management, and communication. She has held management positions in local and central government, and an international NGO. Karen has worked as a consultant in the New Zealand science sector and has lectured on ‘science, technology and society’ (STS) and environmental management. Her research interests include: risk management, science policy and governance, deliberative dialogue, sustainability science and transdisciplinary research. Karen leads the STS programme at ESR research institute and currently manages a Foundation for Research, Science and Technology project using upstream engagement methods around future food technologies and an ESR project on innovative models for risk decision making. She was the co-founder and inaugural convenor of the Asia Pacific STS Network in 2008–09. She co-organised a New Zealand conference on Sustainability Science and Climate Change in March 2010 and the Degrees of Possibility workshop in December 2010, on establishing
a New Zealand social science research agenda for climate change.
141P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yEndnotes
Climate change and society’s challenge
Martin Manning
1 Arrhenius, S. (1896). On the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the temperature of the ground. Philosophical Magazine, 41, 237.
2 Revelle, R., & Suess, H. E. (1957). Carbon dioxide exchange between the atmosphere and oceans and the question of an increase in atmospheric CO
2 during the past decades. Tellus, 9, 18–27.
3 Rafter, T. A. (1955). 14C variations in nature and the effect on radiocarbon dating. New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology, 37, 20–38.
4 Polar ice caps may melt with industrialisation. (1957, 23 January). Otago Daily Times, p. 5.
5 Ehhalt, D. H. (1974). The atmospheric cycle of methane. Tellus, 26, 58–70.
6 Wang, W. C., Yung, Y. L., Lacis, A. A., Mo, T., & Hansen, J. E. (1976). Greenhouse effect due to manmade perturbations of trace gases. Science, 194, 685–690.
7 Molina, M. J., & Rowland, F. S. (1974). Stratospheric sink for chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine atom catalysed destruction of ozone. Nature, 249, 810–812.
8 Farman, J. C., Gardiner, B. G., & Shanklin, J. D. (1985). Large losses of total ozone in Antarctica reveal seasonal ClOx/NOx interaction. Nature, 315, 207–210.
9 Manning, M., & Reisinger, A. (2011). Broader perspectives for comparing different greenhouse gases. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 369, 1891–1905.
10 Lelieveld, J., Dentener, F. J., Peters, W., & Krol, M. C. (2004). On the role of hydroxyl radicals in the self-cleansing capacity of the troposphere. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 4, 2337.
11 Manning, M. R., Lowe, D. C., Moss, R. C., Bodeker, G. E., & Allan, W. (2005). Short term variations in the oxidising power of the atmosphere. Nature, 436, 1001–1004.
12 Charney, J. G. et al. (1979). Carbon dioxide and climate: A scientific assessment. National Academy of Sciences. Available at: http://www. atmos.ucla.edu/~brianpm/download/charney_report.pdf
142 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s 13 Solomon, S. et al. (Eds.). (2007). IPCC, 2007: Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
14 Dillon, M. E., Wang, G., & Huey, R. B. (2010). Global metabolic impacts of recent climate warming. Nature, 467, 704–706.
15 Solomon, S. et al. (Eds.). (2007). IPCC, 2007: Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
16 Nicholls, R. J., & Mimura, N. (1998). Regional issues raised by sea- level rise and their policy implications. Climate Research, 11, 5–18.
17 Petoukhov, V., & Semenov, V. A. (2010). A link between reduced Barents-Kara sea ice and cold winter extremes over northern continents. Journal of Geophysical Research, 115, D21111.
18 Trenberth, K. (2010, August). What are the science requirements and capabilities for near-real time attribution. Presented at Earth System Research Laboratory, NOAA, Attribution of climate change workshop, Broomfield, Colorado.
19 ClimateWise, The Geneva Association, The Munich Insurance Initiative, & United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). (2010). Global insurance industry statement on adapting to climate change in developing countries. Available at: http:// www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/insurance_climatechange_ statement.pdf
20 Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change. (2010). Press release: 259 investors representing over $15 trillion call for international action on climate change. Available at: http://www. iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/15154/2010-Global-Investor- Statement-Press-Release.pdf
21 US Department of Defense. (2010). Quadrennial defense review report. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/qdr/ QDRpercent20aspercent20ofpercent2026JAN10percent200700.pdf
David Karoly
22 Richardson, K. et al. (2009). Synthesis report: Climate change: Global risks, challenges and decisions. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen. Available at: climatecongress.ku.dk/pdf/synthesisreport
23 Garnaut, R. (2011). The science of climate change. Update Paper five, Garnaut Climate Change Review—Update 2011. Available at: http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/update-papers/up5- the-science-of-climate-change.pdf
143P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y24 The geology of the planet—welcome to the anthropocene. (2011, 26 May). The Economist, leader. Available at: http://www.economist. com/node/18744401
25 Zalasiewicz, J., Williams, M., Haywood, A., & Ellis, M. (2011). The anthropocene: A new epoch of geological time? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 369, 835–841.
26 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I Summary for Policymakers. (2007). Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf
27 Op.cit.
28 Arndt, D. S., Baringer, M. O., & Johnson, M. R. (Eds.). (2010). State of the climate in 2009. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 91(7), S1–S224.
29 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II Summary for Policymakers. (2007). Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf
30 Op.cit.
31 Allison, I., et al. (2009). The Copenhagen diagnosis: Updating the world on the latest climate science. Sydney: The University of New South Wales Climate Change Research Centre (CCRC).
32 Op.cit.
33 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II Summary for Policymakers. (2007). Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf
34 Allison, I. et al. (2010). The science of climate change: Questions and answers. Canberra: Australian Academy Science. Available at: http:// www.science.org.au/policy/climatechange.html
35 Op.cit.
36 Op.cit.
37 Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., Hare, W., Raper, S., Frieler, K., Knutti, R., Frame, D., & Allen, M. (2009). Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting warming to 2°C. Nature 458, 1158-1162. Available at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v458/n7242/full/ nature08017.html, doi:10.1038/nature08017
Sir Paul Reeves
38 Fallow, B. (2011, 22 January). Drawing a line on climate commitment. New Zealand Herald. Available at: http:// www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_ id=3&objectid=10701192
144 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s 39 O’Sullivan, F. (2011, 19 March).Learn what went wrong before we go forward Weekend Herald. Available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/ news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10713397
40 Midgely, M. (1996). Utopias, dolphins and computers: Problems of philosophical plumbing. London: Routledge.
Communication between the science community and society
Erik Conway
41 This talk is based on Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of doubt: How a small group of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. (2010). New York: Bloomsbury.
42 Jastrow, R. (1987, 13 February). America has five years left. National Review, ( 39), 42–43.
43 http://www.marshall.org//subcategory.php?id=9, accessed 13 February 2007; the quote is from Tim Ball.
44 Singer, S. Fred. (1989). My adventures in the ozone layer. National Review, 41(12), 34-38.
45 Singer, S. Fred. (1991). Global warming: Do we know enough to act? In K. Chilton & M. Warren (Eds.), Environmental protection: Regulating for results (pp. 45–46). Boulder, CO: Westview.
46 Stern, N. (2006). Stern review on the economics of climate change. Accessed 3 October 2009, from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ sternreview_index.htm. Quoted from pg. i.
47 Hulme, M. (2009). Why we disagree about climate change: Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48 Edward Maiback, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Anthony Leiserowitz’s, Global warming’s six Americas (2009, 20 May), discusses the importance of identifying specific audiences in designing messages.
49 Stephen H. Schneider has long argued this as well: Schneider, S. H. (1989). Global warming: Are we entering the greenhouse century? (Chapter 8). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
50 Olson, R. (2009). Don’t be such a scientist! Washington, D.C.: Island Press; Hassol, S. J. (2008, 11 March). Improving how scientists communicate about climate change. EOS, 89(11), 106–107. See also Mooney C., & Kirshenbaum, S. (2009). Unscientific America: How scientific illiteracy threatens our future. New York: Basic Books.
145P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t yFred Pearce
51 Trenberth, K. (2010). More knowledge, less certainty. Nature Reports Climate Change. Available at: http://www.nature.com/ climate/2010/1002/full/climate.2010.06.html
52 InterAcademy Council. (2010, October). Climate change assessments: Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. Available at: http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/report.html
53 Pearce, F. (2010). The climate files: The battle for the truth about global warming. London: Guardian Books, Random House.
Brian Fallow
54 Pew Research Center. (2010, 27 October). Wide partisan divide over global warming. Available at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1780/poll- global-warming-scientists-energy
55 Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books.
Human behaviour and the capacity for change
Bronwyn Hayward
56 Brett, C. (2011, 22 May). Christchurch three months on. Sunday Star Times. Available at: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch- earthquake/5037194/Christchurch-three-months-on
57 O’Brien, K., Hayward, B., & Berkes, F. (2009). Rethinking social contracts: Building resilience in a changing climate. Ecology and Society, 14(2), 12. Available at: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/ vol14/iss2/art12/
58 Hamilton, C. (2009). Requiem for a species: Why we resist the truth about climate change. London: Earthscan.
59 Giddens, A. (2009). The politics of climate change. Cambridge: Polity.
60 Clark, N. (2011). Sociable life on a dynamic planet. London: Sage.
61 Jones, E., & Murphy, A. (2009). The political economy of hazards and disasters. Plymouth: AltaMira Press.
62 Pelling, M., & Dill, K. (2010). Disaster politics: Tipping points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical regimes. Progress in Human Geography, 34(1), 21–23.
63 Klein, N. (2008). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. New York: Picador.
64 Honig, B. (2009). Emergency politics: Paradox, law, democracy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
146 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s 65 Arendt, H. (1998/1958). The human condition (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
66 Brett, C. (2011, 22 May). Christchurch three months on. Sunday Star Times. Available at: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch- earthquake/5037194/Christchurch-three-months-on
67 Hayward, B. (2008). Let’s talk about the weather: Decentering democratic debate about climate change. Hypatia, 23(3), 79–98.
68 UNICEF. (2011). State of the world’s children report: Adolescence: An age of opportunity. Paris: Author. Available at: http://www.unicef. org.uk/Documents/Publication-pdfs/sowc2011.pdf
69 Jackson, T. (2009). Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet. London: Earthscan.
70 Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. London: Penguin.
71 UK House of Lords. (2011, 11 July). Science and Technology Committee—Second report Behaviour change. Available at: http://www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldsctech/179/17902.htm
72 Neuberger, Baroness Julia (Chair of the UK House of Lords Behaviour Change Inquiry). (2011, 15 June). Address to Resolve conference, Living sustainably values policies and practices, London. Available at: http://resolve.sustainablelifestyles.ac.uk/events/conferences/2011
Towards durable decision making
Dave Frame
73 Willets, D. (2010). The pinch: How the baby boomers took their children’s future—and how they can give it back. London: Atlantic Books.
74 Hulme, M. (2009). Why we disagree about climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
75 Hepburn, C., & Ward, J. (2011, forthcoming). Should emerging market economies act on climate change, or wait? Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies.
76 IPCC. (2007). In M. L. Parry, O. F. Canziani, J. P. Palutikof, P. J. van der Linden, & C. E. Hanson, (Eds.), Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
147P a t h w a y s f o r S o c i e t y77 Stern, N. (2007). Stern review: The economics of climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
78 Stern, N. (2008). The economics of climate change, Richard T. Ely Lecture. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 98(2), 1–37.
79 Tol, Richard S. J. (2008). The social cost of carbon: Trends, outliers and catastrophes. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 2, 2008–2025.
80 Meehl, G. A. et al. (2007). In S. Solomon et al. (Eds.), Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 747–846). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
81 Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and statecraft. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
82 Frame, D. J., & Hepburn, C. (2011, forthcoming). Emerging markets and climate change: Mexican standoff or low-carbon race? In R. W. Hahn, W. Robert, & A. M. Ulph (Eds.), Climate change and common sense: Essays in honour of Tom Schelling. doi:10.10.1088/1748- 9326/5/1/014004. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
83 Agarwal, A., & Narain, S. (1991). Global warming in an unequal world: A case of environmental colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment.
84 Shue, H. (1993). Subsistence and luxury emissions. Law & Policy, 15(1), 39–60.
85 International Energy Agency. (2010, 20 July). China overtakes the United States to become world’s largest energy consumer. Available at: http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479
86 Wigley, T. M. L., & Raper, S. C. B. (2001). Interpretation of high projections for global-mean warming. Science, 293, 451–454.
87 Nordhaus, W. (1992). An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science, 258, 1315–1319.
88 Nordhaus, W. D., & Boyer, J. (2000). Warming the world: Economics models of global warming. Cambridge: MIT Press.
89 Weitzman, M. L. (2009). On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 1–19.
148 C l i m a t e F u t u r e s 90 den Elzen, M. et al. (2005). Analysing countries’ contribution to climate change: Scientific and policy-related choices. Environmental Science and Policy, 8(6), 614–636.
91 Nakicenovic, N., & Swart, R. (Eds.). (2000). Special report on emissions scenarios. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
92 Frame, D. J., & Hepburn, C. (2011). Emerging markets and climate change: Mexican standoff or low-carbon race? Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment working papers, 46. London: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
93 Allen, M. et al. (2009). Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne. Nature, 458, 1163–1166.
December 2011 ISBN: 978-0-475-12384-8 (Print) ISBN: 978-0-475-12385-5 (Online)
© 2011
New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute
School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600
Wellington 6140
Photography: Front cover Harley Betts/hedgehoghouse.com Back cover Jim Harding/hedgehoghouse.com Pages 6, 43 Colin Monteath/hedgehoghouse.com Page 15 Peter Barrett Page 16 UNFCCC 2007, Bonn Pages 19, 22 Martin Manning Page 27 NASA Pages 33, 34, 65, 97, 108, 127 ©Andy Reisinger Pages 55, 57, 106, 117, 120 Andy Reisinger/Hedgehoghouse.com Page 51 Dave Hansford/Hedgehoghouse.com Page 74 John Bown/hedgehoghouse.com Page 95 Alex Pyne All other photographs of the forum by Matthew Wood
ClimateFutures
Edited by
Judy Lawrence
Alana Cornforth
Peter Barrett
Pathways for Society
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