Economic Rise of China and India

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2._reform_liberalization_and_economic_growth.pptx

ECON 2213 2. Reform, Liberalization, and Economic Growth

China’s economy 1949-1978: “Big Push” industrialization

Before 1949, China had a traditional household-based economy.

After the PRC was established, China’s leaders resolved to develop an industrial economy by using a high degree of socialist planning.

China’s presidents

1949-1959 Mao Zedong

1959-1968 Liu Shaoqi

1968-1975 Song Qingling and Song Biwu

1975-1976 Zhu De

1976-1978 Song Qingling

1978-1981 Ye Jianying

1981 Song Qingling

1981-1983 Ye Jianying

1983-1988 Li Xiannian

1988-1993 Yang Shangkun

1993-2003 Jiang Zemin

2003-2013 Hu Jintao

2013-: Xi Jinping

China’s premiers

1949-1976 Zhou Enlai

1976-1980 Hua Guofeng

1980-1987 Zhao Ziyang

1987-1998 Li Peng

1998-2003 Zhu Rongji

2003-2013 Wen Jiabao

2013-: Li Keqiang

The president is the head of state; the premier is the head of government.

China’s economy 1949-1978: “Big Push” industrialization

Priority was given to investment over consumption.

By 1954, investment was 26% of GDP.

Even today, the world average is 19%.

This was almost entirely government investment in the construction of new factories, especially heavy industry.

China’s economy 1949-1978: “Big Push” industrialization

Between 1952 and 1978:

industrial output grew by 11.5% per year on average

the share of industry in GDP rose from 18% to 44%

the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 51% to 28%

The Big Push did jump-start the economy—but other strategies might have worked too.

China’s economy 1949-1978: “Big Push” industrialization

China focused on the industries at the top and middle of the value chain: natural resource extraction and materials (top), refining and machinery (middle).

Hong Kong and Taiwan focused on the industries toward the bottom of the value chain: final products for consumers and firms, such as textiles, toys, and food products. They later moved up the value chain and had even faster growth than China.

China’s economy 1949-1978: Command economy

Key feature: no role for prices in resource allocation.

The government owned all large factories; in rural areas, agricultural collectives owned the land and organized the farm economy.

Factory product prices were kept high and farm prices were kept low (with procurement quotas), so relative prices were set to push resources into industrialization.

To keep workers in agriculture, there were restrictions on mobility through the hukou system, the household registration system providing residency permits and access to schooling and health care.

China’s economy 1949-1978: Command economy

No need for a modern tax system: state-owned industrial enterprises were very profitable, adding to government revenues.

Material balance planning was used to run the economy.

Nomenklatura system (Communist party controls on employment decisions) used to manage employees.

Compared to the Soviet Union, the economy was less controlled, with more decisions made at the local government level—but political ideology was more controlled.

China’s economy 1949-1978: Policy instability

China’s economy 1949-1978: Policy instability

1949-52: Recovery

1953-57: First five-year plan

1958-60: Great Leap Forward

Communes established in countryside; all monetary incentives rejected

Leaders reduced the resources available for agriculture, but increased the required procurement of grain

The result was the largest famine of the 20th century, with 25-45 million excess deaths

China’s economy 1949-1978: Policy instability

1961-63: Readjustment

1964-66: Third Front

1966-69: Cultural Revolution

Groups of students (“Red Guards”) encouraged by Mao to overthrow the Communist Party leadership

1969-71: New Leap Forward

1971-76: Retrenchment

1976-78: Leap Outward

China’s economy 1949-1978: Legacy

Consequences:

Dissatisfaction with standard socialist system

Periods of experimentation showed possibilities

Mao as a scapegoat

Neglect of consumption and services

1952-78: investment grew 10.4% per year on average, while per-capita consumption grew 2.3%

Services declined from 29% of GDP to 24% of GDP

No competition in consumer markets, little quality improvement, few new products

Luxury goods like wristwatches and electric fans were inaccessible to average households

China’s economy 1949-1978: Legacy

Other shortcomings:

Underemployment and slow job creation due to emphasis on capital-intensive industry

Overambitious industrialization strategy, inefficiency of industrial products

But: high human capital

Life expectancy rose

2/3 of the population was literate by 1982, where literacy is defined as recognizing 1500-2000 characters

India’s economy 1947-1981: slow growth

India’s economy 1947-1981: Nehru’s objective

Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister from 1947 to 1964. His goal was for India to be independent.

Nehru wrote: “The objective…was the attainment…of national self-sufficiency. International trade was certainly not excluded but we were anxious not to be drawn into the whirlpool of economic imperialism…To base our national economy on export markets might lead to conflicts with other nations and to sudden upsets when those markets were closed to us.”

Nehru referred to economic independence as the key objective of his advocacy of heavy industry.

India’s prime ministers

1947-1964 Jawaharlal Nehru

1964 Gulzari Lal Nanda

1964-1966 Lal Bahadur Shastri

1966 Gulzari Lal Nanda

1966-1977 Indira Gandhi

1977-1979 Morarji Desai

1979-1980 Choudhary Charan Singh

1980-1984 Indira Gandhi

1984-1989 Rajiv Gandhi

1989-1990 Vishwanath Pratap Singh

1990-1991 Chandra Shekhar

1991-1996 P.V. Narasimha Rao

1996 Atal Bihari Vajpayee

1996-1997 H. D. Deve Gowda

1997-1998 Inder Kumar Gujral

1998-2004 Atal Bihari Vajpayee

2004-present Manmohan Singh

India’s economy 1947-1981: Industrial policy

India’s industrial policy had three key elements: a dominant role of the public sector, regulation of the private sector through licensing, and price controls.

A large role for the public sector was necessary because India wanted to keep out foreign investors, and the private sector had too few resources to take a larger role.

Because of the need for licences and permits, India’s economic policies were known as the “Licence Raj.”

India’s economy 1947-1981: Industrial policy

At first, only industries with larger factories (more than 50 workers) were subject to licensing, but all industries came to be included. Licensing meant that firms could not expand capacity, change the goods produced, move location, or increase production without permission.

As the economy grew more complex into the 1960s, the licensing system grew more chaotic and corrupt.

Price controls were instituted to control inflation and grew in importance in the 1960s. Price controls were imposed on goods from iron and steel, nonferrous metals, coal, and fertilizers, to cotton textiles, paper, sugar, cars, bicycles, tires and tubes, soap, and matches.

India’s economy 1947-1981: Agricultural policy

Agriculture had a low priority at first, with little role for price incentives. Nehru stated that he did not want to “encourage acquisitiveness beyond a certain measure.”

The zamindars (revenue-collecting landlords) were eliminated in the first round of reforms, but there was slow progress on land redistribution, and slow growth in agricultural output.

India’s economy 1947-1981: Growth 1951-1965

Growth in GDP was 4.1% on average between 1951 and 1965, due to rising investment rates (from 9.7% of GDP in 1954-55 to 14.1% in 1964-65) and to expansionary fiscal policy (that would prove unsustainable).

From 1965 to 1981, growth was much slower. Between 1965 and 1975, GDP grew by only 2.6% on average; since population grew by 2.3%, this meant a virtual standstill in the standard of living.

A per-capita growth rate of 0-1% has been called the “Hindu” rate of growth.

India’s economy 1947-1981: Growth 1951-1965

India’s economy 1947-1981: Political context

Nehru was prime minister from independence until his death in 1964. In 1966, his daughter Indira Gandhi became prime minister and (except for 1977-80) ruled until her assassination in 1984.

With stagnation caused by the droughts of 1971-73 and inflation caused by the 1973 oil price shock, the heavily-controlled economy could not adjust. Mrs Gandhi was found guilty of fraud in the 1971 election but declared a state of emergency rather than step down.

She called an election in 1977 and lost power, but three years of a failed coalition led to her re-election in 1980.

After her assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv became prime minister until 1989.

India’s economy 1947-1981: 1960s

Trade deficits, droughts, and war with Pakistan led to a crisis in 1965, and India was forced to devalue its currency and liberalize its trading regime. Both were politically unpopular and the liberalization was short-lived.

The government then imposed further controls on industry, tighter restrictions on foreign investment, and tighter licensing restrictions, and introduced a policy reserving certain products for small-scale industry (including clothing, shoes, leather products, and other goods that a labour-abundant country would have a comparative advantage in producing and exporting).

India’s economy 1947-1981: 1960s

Labour-market regulations were introduced that made it almost impossible for larger firms (more than 100 employees) to fire workers.

Detrimental to productivity

Drove entrepreneurs towards capital-intensive industries and capital-intensive technology

In 1969, larger banks were nationalized. This caused more branches to be opened in rural areas, but could this have been done at a lower cost?

The Green Revolution (the use of high-yielding dwarf varieties of seed from Mexico) was the most positive development of the 1960s. This was controversial, but India was self-sufficient in food by the late 1970s.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HucSCNQ01X4

India’s economy 1947-1981: Growth 1965-1981

Whether due to poor economic policy or adverse external shocks, India did experience slower growth in the 1965-81 period compared to the 1951-65 period.

But growth should have been much faster.

During 1965-75, the world economy grew rapidly, including the GDPs of developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

By keeping itself closed off from the world economy, India missed out on this growth.

India’s economy 1947-1981: Growth 1965-1981

Reform in China after 1978

By now, China has spent a longer period building a market economy than it spent under a command economy. However, the transition is not yet complete.

The first phase of reform (“reform without losers”) was gradual and began to develop a market economy alongside the command economy.

The second phase was more thorough.

Reform in China after 1978

The reform process in China was very different from transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

There was no “big bang” in China, whereas in Eastern Europe, the goal was to move as quickly as possible to a market system, despite the short-run costs.

In China, the focus was always on economic development. Areas of unregulated activity (special economic zones [SEZs] or township and village enterprises [TVEs]) were allowed to operate since they would help lead to growth.

Gradually the balance between the planned economy and the market economy began to shift.

Reform in China after 1978

The reforms started in the countryside in 1978, with farmers in Anhui province taking over land to use privately. The government called this the “household responsibility system,” in which farmers were responsible for sending a certain amount of grain to the government but could retain their extra output.

The result was increasing production. Lin (1992) shows that agricultural output grew at an annual average rate of 7.1% during 1979-1984, compared to 2.7% during 1970-1978.

The reforms in the industrial sector followed a similar path, with enterprises given residual control over production.

Reform in China after 1978

Characteristics of the early phase of reform:

Dual-track system: coexistence of a traditional plan and a market channel.

A commitment to growing out of the plan over time, i.e., keeping the traditional plan constant and allowing the market channel to grow. This meant that both farms and enterprises faced market prices at the margin.

Government monopoly over industry was relaxed and new entrants were allowed.

Gradual loosening of price controls.

Reform in China after 1978

Continued characteristics of the early phase of reform:

Managerial reforms, not privatization; new emphasis on profitability and autonomy even in state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Rise of SEZs, TVEs, and other areas of detachment from planned economy.

Experiments to attract FDI started in Guangdong province in 1979.

TVEs produced 26% of GDP by 1996.

Saving done by households rather than government.

Reform in China after 1978

Industrial output grew at an annual rate of 9.3% between 1978 and 1993.

Most groups benefited from reform; workers in SOEs were protected.

In 1989, anger over rising inflation (over 25%), corruption, and possibly unfulfilled expectations of more rapid political and economic change led to weeks of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. After a political struggle behind the scenes, conservative leaders ordered the military to clear the square. Hundreds were killed and reform slowed for a couple of years.

Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “Southern Tour” got reform back on track. “Development is the only hard truth. It doesn’t matter if policies are labeled socialist or capitalist, so long as they foster development.”

Reform in China after 1978

The second phase of reform started in 1993 and is ongoing.

Characteristics include:

Market reunification: no longer a dual track.

Fiscal reforms and the introduction of a tax system to boost government revenue.

Macroeconomic austerity to reduce inflation.

Restructuring of the banking system.

Foreign trade reforms, including WTO membership.

Reform in China after 1978

Outcomes of the second phase:

Downsizing of SOEs: the number of workers who are employed in state-owned firms has dropped by 40% since the mid-1990s.

Privatization (“restructuring”).

Reform with losers, e.g. SOE workers.

Continuing reforms:

Financial system: dominated by state-owned banks with weak budget constraints.

Corporate governance.

Regulatory agencies.

An increase in inequality and poverty, with pensions and health insurance lagging behind.

Kotwal, Ashok, Bharat Ramaswami, and Wilima Wadhwa, “Economic Liberalization and Indian Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?,” Journal of Economic Literature 49:4 (2011), 1152-1199.

Problems with data

Measuring output

Production measured at current prices vs. constant prices.

Comparing countries using exchange rates vs. purchasing power parity.

Data quality

It is unusual for economists to even acknowledge that data are not always trustworthy.

The Penn World Table used to give grades for data quality.

Maddison, Angus and Harry X. Wu, “Measuring China’s Economic Performance,” World Economics 9:2 (2008), 13-44.

China GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 186.43966067109992 193.63815602551051 208.1708634913125 227.54964013833305 258.72023073512929 289.67596824884265 310.51434704025263 341.02129351122699 373.4945008173674 382.89215532989766 391.65295288702902 421.88917481776178 475.92886966147222 536.35726471441535 599.80228054973838 657.99260019026849 716.24511661325948 774.88463403743253 827.34859801700986 882.55232179207894 949.17806208299191 1020.5199935033831 1105.9525569567111 1208.993960974934 1323.219928685796 1464.1076270031251 1640.8615182850172 1864.1027022203878 2032.6149802993341 2208.4039475036752 2426.3324663395492 2634.7116580038692 India GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 230.00853550107806 238.23056652032702 240.90967865289818 252.65169429879768 256.45343997227485 263.96052053051028 270.51327739447589 275.15138774904108 295.19699680955586 306.17172884337066 316.42857787568084 313.27451323097063 323.85750144891563 332.60568485181665 347.95103504034216 367.27716252565409 387.74152141543215 396.18443877339939 413.28705191508669 440.56930932129654 450.41510612385292 464.97426070759929 475.45705812449984 505.24893628575546 536.60487996218365 577.65673483909552 621.89943990989764 673.00462621505767 689.27320443546432 735.6318487873616 794.80121108556204 837.74641803311818 United States GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 22630.520148183088 22978.984705646271 22310.239368523406 23105.520726635696 24554.402883613555 25338.555640389201 25965.883424048501 26549.876021724365 27388.618022092083 28098.400723355753 28298.446951236972 27849.880842461829 28401.465175897421 28834.559347582919 29655.069410443954 30050.986733064768 30827.988196486305 31831.461594185323 32847.351969028146 34053.355408429612 35081.923084361377 35116.215078994443 35427.909964491482 36021.314082149212 36931.39382546665 37718.005366579324 38349.398788591454 38710.885441536884 38208.761183378185 36539.228231680005 37329.615913867594 37691.027330766578

China GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 523.9502538933956 544.18014197095351 585.02132210964976 639.48138123978163 727.07990399191988 814.0746264205344 872.6365966536116 958.37008432165305 1049.6293429554642 1076.0395147511001 1100.6599312861044 1185.6326034115484 1337.500031896272 1507.3215860462565 1685.6207313865207 1849.1526357037051 2012.8593312634948 2177.6536134027569 2325.0927749438551 2480.2314669136617 2667.4693830072824 2867.9611825868928 3108.0518003825318 3397.6284366118884 3718.6369847281785 4114.5728335605054 4611.3032281580854 5238.6765809166618 5712.2456196384073 6206.2642939206544 6818.7074959928459 7404.3142815106366 India GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 879.40451701131644 910.84026873932362 921.08346821811983 965.97737433045654 980.51280150711352 1009.215043091741 1034.2685654425352 1052.0017125508098 1128.6432124658288 1170.603520167024 1209.8191055785294 1197.7599935570452 1238.2225251846851 1271.6699447919298 1330 .3406816909451 1404.2313473999084 1482.4738769921551 1514.7541558312621 1580.143534606844 1684.4533174808537 1722.0973038784928 1777.762135085389 1817.8416016115059 1931.7465580870762 2051.6314938531732 2208.5873499991367 2377.7429624171737 2573.1362837195993 2635.3368500647239 2812.5824516540983 3038.8079887210697 3203.0028038890805 United States GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 25509.516998569699 25902.312325137493 25148.490917881056 26044.94593484807 27678.151171419486 28562.061834871638 29269.196653521172 29927.483294743139 30872.927905635621 31673.007345463709 31898.502942437131 31392.871401409597 32014.626881963628 32502.818185665539 33427.711438626371 33873.996349679655 34749.845950540846 35880.978665502815 37026.108013659403 38385.536123853184 39544.955546896126 39583.610081315674 39934.957992361953 40603.853463048974 41629.711221960184 42516.393469999275 43228.111147106982 43635.585206814234 43069.58 1985720804 41187.655325080705 42078.594105197226 42485.983357520781

Bosworth, Barry and Susan M. Collins, “Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and India,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:1 (2008), 45-66.

Eichengreen, Barry, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin, “When Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China,” Asian Economic Papers 11:1 (2012), 42-87.